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Second U.S. “Joint Goals” Proposal
Presented 26 March 2002

JMCC has obtained the second U.S. “Joint Goals” proposal presented by United States envoy Anthony Zinni to the Palestinians and Israelis on Tuesday, 26 March 2002. The proposal, now known as the Zinni paper, came after several bilateral Palestinian-American meetings and trilateral Palestinian-American-Israeli meetings. Zinni presented the first US proposal on 25 March 2002. It is apparent that the Zinni paper (second proposal) has several points of deviation from the Tenet Plan in a manner that positively reflects Israeli interests. Following is the text:

1. Phase 1 – Immediate – 48 hours

GOI (Government Of Israel) and PA (Palestinian Authority) leaders make public declarations of cease-fire to their respective populations.

GOI commits to cease “proactive” operations in areas under the control of the PA, including attacks on PA Ra’is Facilities; and headquarters of Palestinian Security, Intelligence, and Police Organizations; or prisons in the West Bank and Gaza Strip unless responding in self-defense to an imminent terrorist attack.

PA issues clear orders to field commanders to take action to prevent terrorism or violent attacks, arrest persons involved in ongoing terrorist activities, ceases PA security forces involvement in inciting aiding, abetting attacks against all Israeli targets. PA and GOI issue clear orders to their field commanders and take other measures necessary to prevent individuals and groups from using areas under their respective control to carry out acts of violence.

GOI, acting on information made known to the Trilateral Security Committee, takes action against Israeli citizens inciting, carrying out, or planning to carry out violence against Palestinians, with progress reports to the Security Committee.

GOI and PA resume security cooperation through reinvigoration of DCOs based on the standards existing before September 28, 20000. GOI and PA share information on terrorists’ threats directly and through the Trilateral Security Committee followed by immediate actions and reporting of results to the Security Committee. IDF adopts measures to reduce lethality of rules of engagement.

GOI and PA allow secure movement of security personnel within Gaza and WB, in accordance with existing agreements.

PA makes public commitment to prevent smuggling, production, acquisition of illegal weapons, prepares plan for collecting weapons, preventing smuggling, and closing factories and arresting those involved.

IDF carries out demonstrable redeployment (locations to be notified to the Trilateral Security Committee).

GOI takes demonstrable action to lift closures (locations to be notified to the Trilateral Security Committee).

PA assumes security responsibility where it has jurisdiction at locations where GOI eases security restrictions. GOI takes measures to facilitate the transfer of these responsibilities.

2. 48 Hours – End of Phase 1 – Trilateral Security Committee Meeting to Assess Progress (Phase 2: 48 Hours – 1 Week).

PA acts decisively to prevent attacks, enforce cease-fire, including arrest of activists in breach of cease-fire, action against those who incite, aid and abet such activities.

GOI and PA act to prevent incitement to violence among their respective populations.

GOI and PA allow secure movement of security personnel within and between Gaza and WB, in accordance with existing agreements.

GOI completes withdrawal from Area A, continues removal of internal closures and redeployment according to agreed schedule, including removal of permanent roadblocks in Gaza, supervised entry of vehicles at Mawasi area, removal of IDF positions from Palestinian houses, continues removal of other checkpoints and earth barriers, further redeployment of armored vehicles.

PA continues to assume security responsibility at locations where GOI eases security restrictions. GOI continues to take measures to facilitate the transfer of these responsibilities.

Trilateral committee identifies “flashpoints,” each side designates senior security personnel responsible for them, develops JSOP for each.

PA presents comprehensive plan for collection of illegal weapons as defined in existing agreements including the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement, Annex I, articles IV and XI. PA begins actions in concert with GOI to prevent smuggling of illegal weapons. PA takes demonstrable action against weapons and mortar factories, based on PA information and information developed in conjunction with the GOI. Each side informs the security committee of the status and success of these efforts.

GOI takes specified actions to ease economic restrictions and movement of Palestinian civilians, as detailed in Israeli proposal, p. 6.

GOI identifies Palestinian prisoners, including PA security personnel, arrested in security sweeps, and not involved in terrorist activities. Begins releasing prisoners in this category.

Trilateral Security Committee using information provided by the parties, identifies activists involved in planning or carrying out terrorist activities. PA takes demonstrable actions to arrest individuals on this list.

GOI re-institutes military police investigations into Palestinian deaths resulting from IDF actions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in incidents not involving terrorism.

3. 1 Week – End of Phase 2 – Trilateral Security Meeting to Assess Progress - Phase 3 – 1 week – 4 weeks (plus or minus) (Further Trilateral Security Meetings will be held to assess interim progress during the course of phase 3)

Pursuant to agreed schedule, GOI completes redeployment and lifting of all internal closures to 28 September 2000 positions including reopening of internal roads, the Allenby bridge, Gaza Airport, Port of Gaza, and border crossings.

GOI further eases specified civilian restrictions, as detailed in Israeli proposal, p.7.

PA arrests terrorist activists from names made known to the trilateral security committee and provides the committee the names of those arrested, as soon as they are apprehended, as well as summary of actions taken.

PA takes credible and sustained judicial action (“due process”) against arrested individuals for the purpose of further investigation and prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts of violence and terror.

PA continues to undertake preemptive operations against terrorism, continues implementation of illegal weapons collection plan, and transfer of collected weapons to a third party, continues actions to prevent smuggling. Measures include taking demonstrable action against weapons factories, laboratories, safe-houses, and arms depots at locations identified by the trilateral security committee, arrests and prosecutes individuals connected with these locations and other actions against the support structure of terrorism, including the financing of terrorist activities and mechanisms for inciting terror.

4. 4 Weeks (plus or minus) – End of Phase 3 – Trilateral Security Committee Meets to Assess Progress and decide on Transition to Next Steps.

PALESTINIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUSTAINABLE PEACE PROCESS

Following are the three core requirements that underline the Palestinian proposal and the Palestinian responses to the Israeli and the American proposals. The main issues of reservations are on Zinni Paper’s divergence from the Tenet Plan:

First: Absolute necessity to link the implementation of the Tenet Workplan with the implementation of the rest of the Mitchell Report recommendations. Whereas the Tenet Workplan concentrates on the security elements, the rest of the Mitchell Report recommendations concentrate on the root cause of the Intifada, which is the occupation, manifested by continued settlement activities. According to the Mitchell Report, “security cooperation can not be sustained without [meaningful] negotiations and with on going actions seen as prejudicing the outcome of negotiations.” The PA agrees that absent a political process, the security cooperation achieved by the implementation of the Tenet Workplan will not be sustainable.

Second: As stated in the Tenet Workplan itself, the goal of implementing the Tenet Workplan is to return “the security cooperation and the situation on the ground” to the condition existing prior to 28 September 2000. Palestinians need to see a return to these conditions as a starting point in a renewed peace process. These include demographic, geographic, administrative, and economic conditions, and not just security.

Third: The Palestinian Authority aims to reach a timetable for the implementation of the Tenet Workplan. This means specifying and agreeing to the timing of each Palestinian and Israeli commitment. The PA and the US administration, based on President Bush’s speech announcing General Zinni’s return, do not want to reopen the Tenet Workplan for negotiation. The Palestinian reference remains the Tenet Workplan with all its commitments and without any additional commitments.

Below is a summary of how the Palestinian proposal, the Israeli proposal, and the two American proposals handled the above three requirements:

Implementation of the Mitchell Report Recommendations
The Palestinian proposal included Tenet language confirming that the implementation of the Tenet Workplan is an entry to the implementation of the rest of the Mitchell Report recommendations. It clearly stated that the implementation of the Tenet Workplan would be immediately followed by the implementation of the remainder of the Mitchell recommendations. The PA reconfirmed this requirement when responding to the Israeli and American proposals.

However, the Israeli and the American proposals never mentioned this requirement creating doubt among Palestinians that Israel has any intention of addressing the root cause of the Intifada.

The American first and second proposals did not mention that the implementation of the rest of the Mitchell recommendations would immediately follow the conclusion of the implementation period of the Tenet Workplan. This is in contradiction to verbal statements made by the American team in the bilateral Palestinian American meeting on March 26, 2002 that the Tenet Workplan and the Mitchell Report had to be implemented seamlessly and without gaps. Furthermore, the US proposal did not even state a firm fixed time period for the implementation of the Tenet Workplan. While the Palestinian proposal suggested two weeks and the Israeli proposal suggested four weeks, the American proposal suggested four weeks “minus or plus” which implies that implementation can drag on endlessly without moving to the rest of the Mitchell Report recommendations.

Achieving the Goal of the Tenet Workplan
The Tenet Workplan makes clear at the outset that its goal is to “reestablish security cooperation and the situation on the ground as they existed prior to 28 September 2000.” The PA believes that accomplishing this requires a reversal of all demographic, geographic, administrative, and economic changes made by Israel. This position was clearly stated in the Palestinian proposal and emphasized in its verbal and written responses to the Israeli and American proposals.

The Israeli and American Proposals did not include this commitment. Nothing in the Israeli and American proposals implies that this is the goal of the implementation of the Tenet Workplan.

Sticking to the Tenet Workplan
The Palestinian proposal focused on implementing the Tenet Workplan. The PA does not believe that reopening the Tenet Workplan for negotiation by introducing new commitments or eliminating others is the right approach to achieving a quick cease-fire.

Not only did the Israeli and American proposals exclude some of the Israeli obligation in the Tenet Workplan but also added Palestinian obligations that were not in the Tenet Workplan.

Examples of these deviations are listed below.

1. The Tenet Workplan forbids “all types of attacks” against prisons, police stations, the Presidential compounds, and security offices. The Israeli and American proposals limited the Israeli commitment to cease proactive attacks on these locations.

2. The Israeli and the American proposals allow Israel to attack Palestinian Authority infrastructure in violation of the Tenet Workplan if Israel argues that it is acting in “self-defense to an imminent terrorist attack.” It is impossible to imagine a scenario where such attacks would be legitimate.

3. The Tenet Workplan forbids “proactive attacks” on Palestinian innocent civilian targets. The Israeli and American proposals drop that commitment.

4. A central part of the Tenet Workplan is its requirement for the parties to work out a schedule within one week for the complete redeployment of Israeli forces and the lifting of the closure and siege. The Palestinian proposal included these schedules. The Israeli and American proposals never responded to the Palestinian schedules nor specified when the schedules are to be developed.

5. The Tenet Workplan recognized the need for the PA and Israel to cooperate on a number of issues such as the collection of illegal weapons, whereas the Israeli and American proposals convert some of these efforts to unilateral Palestinian obligations.

6. The Tenet Workplan also requires “legitimate threat information to be acted upon immediately by the party in whose security jurisdiction the terrorists are located.” The Israeli and American proposals make this obligation a Palestinian unilateral obligation and drop the word “legitimate.”

7. The Tenet Workplan does not require the PA to apprehend individuals based on lists. The American and the Israeli proposals both require the PA to apprehend individuals based on lists “made known” to the PA. In its proposal, the PA committed to apprehend terrorists and provide the security committee the names of those arrested as soon as they are apprehended, as well as readout of actions taken, in accordance with Tenet.

8. According to the Tenet Workplan, “untoward events” should not stop security cooperation. There is no conditionality to the implementation of either side’s commitments. This was ignored by the Israeli proposal when most of the implementation of Israeli commitments was made conditional to “security conditions." This was also ignored by the American proposals, which introduced “assessment” but not monitoring and verification.


Other Related Documents:

  • Palestinian Comments on the Second US “Joint Goals”

  • The Tenet Ceasefire - June 14, 2001

  • Mitchell Report "Report of Sharm El Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee - April 30, 2001

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