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Good
Governance Monitoring Report – Issue no. 1
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3.2. Cabinet Performance
The performance of the Cabinet
during the period covered by the report has been difficult to assess primarily
because the operations of the new Cabinet are somewhat more secretive than
those of its predecessors. Unlike
previous Cabinets, the Cabinet of the 10th government does not
publish its decisions on regular basis. The lack of information
on cabinet performance in general, and its decisions in particular, creates a
fertile environment for the exchange of accusations between the HAMAS
government and the opposition (especially FATAH) about the Cabinet’s
willingness and ability to deliver public services and public sector reform.
The assessment of the Cabinet performance presented in the following
sections is largely based on the decisions that were made available to the
GGI, which we believe represent the majority of the Cabinet decisions taken
in 18 out of the 26 sessions held during the period under review. 3.2.1 Conduct of Cabinet Meetings and
Decision-Making
Regularity The cabinet took a decision in
its first meeting held on April 5th 2006 to hold a weekly session
on Tuesdays at half past one in the afternoon; this is consistent with the
Amended Basic Law of 2003 and the Cabinet Executive Regulations of 2003. The sessions went on as planned despite the
movement restrictions between the Type of decisions Although it was neither
possible to obtain copies of all Cabinet decisions taken during the period
under review, nor to ascertain whether the obtained decisions constitute all
the decisions taken in the meetings for which decisions were available. However, it is fair and reasonable to say
that most of the decisions were of administrative nature dealing with
appointments, revision of ministerial structures, and allocating financial
resources to ministries. Most of these decisions (60%) were prepared and
submitted by the Cabinet’s Economic and Administrative Affairs Committees,
which have each held 15 meetings since they were established on April 11th
2006. The Cabinet’s inability to
focus on strategic policy decisions to address the ongoing political and
socio-economic is an area of great concern.
Only 6% of the reviewed Cabinet decisions can be classified as policy
decisions, focusing mostly on austerity measures, public sector employment
and some modest reorganization of the Executive branch. However, it is
important to note that previous studies have indicated that the Cabinets of
previous government were preoccupied with administrative matters rather than
strategic policy formulation and decision-making[2]. Implementation of decisions (e.g., public
sector appointments) Historically Cabinets in the
PNA have always taken a keen interest in public sector appointments. In mid-June 2006, despite the lack of an
annual budget, the new Cabinet decided that new appointments for 2006 should be
limited to a total of 4,284 new posts (4,064 posts per the table below plus
220 new posts split equally between the 22 ministries for bodyguards,
Ministers’ assistants and deputy assistants) and that these appointments
should be made in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Despite this relatively clear policy,
a review of subsequent Cabinet decisions and interviews with several senior
civil servants reveal that implementation of the decision has been weak and
has not been compliant with the spirit of austerity in which the original
decision was apparently made. For
example: ·
The
Cabinet referred the appointment of 76 new senior-level civil servants (i.e.,
Vice Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Senior Advisers) to the President for
approval. However, the majority of these started working prior to
confirmation of their appointment by Presidential Decree as stipulated by the
Civil Service Law; the President issued decrees approving the appointment of
38 (50%) of these. ·
The
Cabinet exceeded the limits on new appointments set out in its mid-June
decision when, in subsequent decisions, it approved financial allocations for
3,500 new members of the Executive Force of the Ministry of Interior[3], 600 new
posts for the Ministry of Religious Affairs and 105 new posts for the
Ministry of National Economy. Despite of the absence of any official reports
regarding new appointments, and conflicting figures obtained from the
Ministry of Finance and the General Personnel Council, our review of Cabinet
decisions indicates a total of approximately 10,600 (i.e., a 7.5% increase).
·
The
Cabinet made various decisions related the revision of organizational
structures within Ministries, including the creation of new senior positions
in all Ministries (i.e., “Vice Ministers”) as well as the establishment of
new departments or organizational units. Several of these new
departments or units were staffed by external candidates instead of utilizing
existing human resource capacities. The technical justification behind
these various decisions to revise ministerial structures are unclear, marking
a departure from sound new practices established under the previous
government to standardize Ministry structures and impose strict procedures to
minimize the creation of new departments or units. ·
Certain
appointment decisions seemed to be based on a desire to provide employment
for certain individuals rather than qualified candidates. A number of
decisions stipulated appointing people at Ministries subject only to the
condition that there were “vacant positions”; others gave approval for an appointment
subject to "ensuring that the administrative committee receives the
curriculum vitae" or “subject to ensuring that the person has a certain
university degree”. It is worth noting here that,
before the elections, HAMAS declared its intent to address overstaffing and
nepotism in the PNA and went as far as advocating for retrenchment. Yet, in
recent months, it has seemingly recruited new HAMAS-loyal employees into both
the civil and security services – this appears to be an attempt to by-pass or
counteract FATEH loyalists holding influential positions in the
PNA. Therefore, HAMAS appears to
be engaging in a battle with FATEH for control of the PNA, primarily through
organizational changes and new appointments to senior posts and, for the
time-being at least, HAMAS’ election manifesto undertakings to reform the PNA
seem to be “on hold”. 3.2.2. Transparency of Cabinet
Functions
The transparency of the
Cabinet gradually diminished over the period covered by this report.
Whilst the new Cabinet never went as far as the previous
government in making the full text of all its written decisions public,
during the first 100 days of the new government, press releases were issued
after each Cabinet meeting summarizing Cabinet discussions and key
decisions. These press releases
stopped almost completely in July 2006 and coincided with the removal of the
archive of the previous Cabinets’ decisions and reports from the Prime
Minister’s Office website. In early July, the Prime Minister’s Office
website – which was the only comprehensive source of official information on
Cabinet activities and decisions – was taken down. Press conferences, official
statements by individual Ministers and Friday prayers’ speeches made by
Cabinet members – including the Prime Minister – have become the only source
of public information on the activities and decisions of the
Cabinet. These sources often provide conflicting information, a
recent example being a statement made by the Prime Minister on Friday, October
6th 2006 announcing a 37% decrease in the government fuel subsidy
which contradicted the Minister of Finance’s announcement on the previous
day, published in al Ayyam newspaper, of a 50% reduction. According to interviews
conducted in several ministries, public employees’ access to Cabinet
decisions has also been restricted. According to senior civil servants,
the minutes of Cabinet meetings are no longer made available to them as was
customary during previous governments. The Cabinet decisions
reviewed also reveal that Ministers have prepared nine-month plans for their
Ministries and submitted them to the Prime Minister’s Office. However,
anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that the majority of these plans have
not been shared or discussed with relevant civil society stakeholders (e.g.,
private sector, NGOs, unions, universities, etc). This undermines the participation of public
employees and civil society in policy formulation and high-level
decision-making, reducing their level of buy-in and understanding of Cabinet
decisions. 3.2.3 Leadership of Governance Reform
The Cabinet has not carried
out any tangible steps in reforming public administration and civil service,
or even continued the work of the previous government in this area. One of
the most prominent indicators of this shortcoming is the inactivation or
failure to regenerate any of the ministerial or technical committees or units
dealing with the reform agenda. It is
worth noting that lack of progress in reform may be attributed to changing
government priorities and focus on crisis management due to the political,
economic and social crisis faced by the tenth Palestinian government. Published by Good
Governance Initiative - 2006 |
[1] We obtained the texts of 289 decisions covering
18 out of 26 cabinet sessions during the period from April 5th 2006
to September 30th 2006.
[2] Unfortunately, it was not possible for the GGI to review the Cabinet decisions of prior government to determine the exact percentage of policy decisions as all previous Cabinet decisions have been removed from the Prime Minister’s Office website and the PMO refused to provide the GGI with hard copies of these decisions.
[3] In a speech made on Friday, October 6th