Double Standard Takes its Toll
by Ghassan Khatib
Once again, the United States finds itself in a dilemma as its traditional double standard policies in the Middle East have overlapped with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Gulf conflict. The conclusion is the same: the approach to peace cannot be compartmentalized. Middle East-related issues or policies are irrevocably interlinked, and attempting to isolate the Palestinian-Israeli issue from its Middle East or Arab context is short-sighted and unsustainable.
In her last visit to the region, Madeleine Albright found herself in a situation whereby her desire to achieve one thing only gaining support and allies for a possible US strike on Iraq depends on the improvement of US credibility by ensuring some progress in the peace process. This in turn requires using all means necessary to effect a change in the Israeli position and attitude so that progress could be made, but this contradicts the very nature of US-Israeli relations, which forces a closer look at the domestic political constraints on US foreign policy.
The Palestinian public, which was clearly sympathetic to Iraq in the war of 1991, remains supportive, and critical if not hostile to the idea of an American attack against Iraq, for the same reasons that influenced sentiments seven years ago. The American drive to bring Iraq into compliance with UN Security Council resolutions once again reminded Palestinians of the unfairness, bias and double standards exemplified by US foreign policy. The United States has never once shown the same zeal in bringing Israel into compliance not only with Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, on which the peace process is based, but even with the agreements which Israel itself signed with the Palestinians, and the American president signed as witness and guarantor.
The new American ideas presented by President Clinton to Arafat and Netanyahu during their last visit to Washington, and followed up in Madeleine Albright's recent trip here, are only the latest example of the flaws in the US approach to the Middle East peace process. These new ideas not only bypass the Oslo accords by suggesting that the third phase of redeployment be dropped, they represent an adaptation of US policy to conform with the Israeli position and so contradict explicit US commitments accompanying the Hebron Protocol in a letter signed January 15, 1997 by then secretary of state Warren Christopher: In this regard I have conveyed our belief, that the first phase of further redeployment should take place as soon as possible, and that all three phases of further redeployment should be completed within 12 months from the implementation of first phase of further redeployment, but not later than mid-1998.
The Palestinian leadership, which was punished severely for supporting Iraq in 1991, is trying hard to avoid the same mistake this time around. This was clear when Arafat stated, first to Madeleine Albright and later publicly, that he expects Saddam Hussein to implement the Security Council resolutions. Arafat will find it difficult to maintain such a position, however no matter how neutral he tries to sound if an attack does occur, because popular sentiment will be strongly against him.
The difficulties confronting US policy in the Gulf and the Arab world in general are simply a result of US policy on the peace process. Continuing that policy will only lead to further deterioration in the US position, policies and credibility in the region and this will inevitably lead to a deterioration in the peace process, since it is heavily dependent on the US role.