January 9 1998 - VOL 4 No. 30
by: Joharah Baker
In the wake of the new developments in Israeli internal affairs, the peace process seems to have taken yet another blow. The resignation of Israeli foreign minister David Levy on January 5 from the Israeli coalition government was both an indication of turbulence inside Israel and a further impediment to progress in the peace process. Palestinians have expressed concern that Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu will use his foreign minister's resignation as an excuse to again delay the implementation of redeployment, already a matter of tension and sensitivity between the two sides to the peace process.
Levy provided two official reasons for his resignation, but primarily the foreign minister was unhappy with the current draft budget set forth by the Israeli government and had apparently been calling for certain amendments dealing with social issues. When he received a letter rejecting the his proposed allocations, he decided to call it quits.
Levy's resignation undoubtedly caused panic inside Israel's right-wing government, which feared that his action could topple the current coalition and push Israel to early elections, possibly paving the way for their arch-enemies, the Israeli left, to return. This may be a viable possibility, given the fact that the second reason cited by Levy for his resignation was his disagreement with the coalition over the redeployment from additional West Bank lands. Israeli prime minister Netanyahu has insisted, however, that the current government will hang on and Israel will not be ruled by left-wing parties which would, according to Netanyahu, return Israel to the borders of 1967.
Palestinians are also wary of the future. Not only do they fear further procrastination by Israel in implementing additional redeployment, but Palestinian officials have expressed concern that Netanyahu might even use the current crisis to bribe more extremist Israeli groups into supporting the government by increasing settlement activities, house demolitions and the ongoing judaization of Jerusalem. According to Palestinian Authority presidential advisor Nabil Abu Rdeineh, the Palestinians' main interest is to see an Israeli government committed to the peace process.
_We are not concerned with who will take the foreign ministry or who will represent the Israeli government._
Meanwhile, Palestinians have remained adamant in their rejection of Israeli redeployment maps. A 12-page document presented to the Israeli cabinet last Sunday regarding redeployment of Israeli troops in the West Bank would impose even further restrictions on the Palestinian Authority before Israel agrees to move out. These conditions include the disarming of Palestinian _extremists_, halting all activities which _incite_ against Israel and terminating all funding to armed resistance groups. Israel has also called on the Palestine National Council's legal committee to hold another meeting in order to cancel articles of the Palestinian National Charter which they say the Palestinians have committed themselves to abolish.
Palestinians have not yet officially received a copy of this latest document, but have made it clear that they are not prepared to discuss the plans already set forth by Israel's national infrastructure minister Ariel Sharon and defense minister Yitzhak Mordechai. Palestinian officials have warned against any Arab or international party receiving or dealing with such maps, actions which would be considered a _stab in the back_ since the plans bypass completely the _land for peace_ formula of the Middle East peace process and UN resolutions 242 and 338. PA planning and international cooperation minister Nabil Sha'ath stressed that West Bank lands are not negotiable and that final status negotiations will focus on arrangements made after Israel's withdrawal from the entire West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in addition to addressing the issue of settlers and the return of refugees. Sha'ath also warned the Arab world, particularly Jordan and Egypt, of the Israeli attempts to set up buffer zones around Palestine, claiming that such zones will be used to build settlements. _This is the most dangerous of all proposals,_ noted Sha'ath.
The United States has insisted that Israeli foreign minister Levy's resignation will not harm the peace process. US Middle East peace coordinator Dennis Ross began a 5-day visit to the region on January 6 to prepare both leaders for their meetings with US president Bill Clinton later this month and to discuss important issues such as redeployment, Israeli unilateral measures and the progress of the joint negotiations sub-committees, particularly those dealing with the air and sea ports, the safe passage route, and industrial zones. Palestinians are also planning to discuss with Ross Israeli expansion of settlements and their noticeable increase throughout 1997. Ross will also try to resolve the dispute over the joint security memo between the Palestinians and Israel which Netanyahu insists he will only deal with after several amendments are made.
Palestinians are greeting Ross with a marked degree of negativity, given the fact that it was Ross who drafted the still-unimplemented Hebron agreement on redeployment and urged Palestinians to give their consent. Ross' constant pressure on Palestinians to make further concessions in order to force Israel to comply with agreements has been deemed fruitless and Palestinians are fed up.
The Americans are also falling short in terms of coming up with feasible solutions. Because of Ross' half-hearted endeavors to convince Israel in to implementing signed agreements, Palestinians are growing impatient with their biased mediator. The outcome of this month's meetings between president Clinton and both Palestinian president Yasser Arafat and prime minister Netanyahu could tip the already tottering scale either way.
by: Muna Hamzeh-Muhaisen
Bethlehem _ The end of 1997 will undoubtedly stick out in many Palestinian minds for a few years to come. The reason has nothing to do with some terrible event, as is common in Palestinian life, but rather because the year end brought three major occasions, Christmas and New Year, together with the start of Ramadan. Ramadan, the holy month of fasting for Muslims, was exceptional because in 1997 it occurred twice in one year: the first time on January 9, two days after the Eastern Orthodox Christmas celebrations, and the second time on December 30, one day before New Year's Eve.
Many Palestinians heatedly debated whether the Palestinian Authority would prohibit the consumption of alcohol at New Year's parties, following press reports that Jordan was planning to prohibit the consumption of alcohol on New Year's Eve. Some Palestinians wanted to see a ban on alcohol, while others argued that Palestinian society has always been more open and tolerant than other Arab societies and should continue to be so.
As it turned out, the PA did not ban alcohol consumption, and New Year's parties in Palestinian areas went on as usual, to the relief of hotel and restaurant owners who had counted on making a sizable profit on New Year's Eve. In Bethlehem, several hotels and restaurants held special New Year's parties, offering their customers dinner and live music at ticket prices ranging from NIS250-NIS300 (NIS3.5=US$1). This is quite a jump from 1996, when tickets sold for NIS80-NIS150. These prices, of course, are beyond the reach of most Palestinians, particularly since tickets were sold to couples only, which in a relatively conservative society means married or engaged couples only.
_Attending such a party with my wife would have cost me NIS500 in tickets, when my entimonthly salary is NIS1500,_ comments one area resident who, for the first time in years, spent New Year's Eve at home. Organizers of these parties certainly were not counting on the middle and lower-income classes to buy out their tickets, but on the well-to-do Christians and Muslims who can afford such exorbitant prices. Meanwhile, less fortunate Palestinians planned to watch the New Year celebrations on television after hearing that some local TV stations planned to relay live coverage of the New Year's parties around town, a sort of a _bar-hopping_ broadcast going from one party to another. This plan was abandoned, however, for fear of offending Muslim viewers who might not have wished to see bottles of champagne cracked open on the second night of Ramadan.
Ironically, New Year's Eve celebrations in Bethlehem did not turn out as planned, with many hotels and restaurants reporting a modest attendance of only 30 to 40 people. While the high ticket prices, along with the start of Ramadan, were part of the reason, there was more to it than that.
With the intent of hurting Bethlehem's economy, the Israeli authorities, issued 6,000 Bethlehem residents entry permits to Israel over the holidays. A source at the joint Israeli-Palestinian District Coordinator's Office (DCO), where these permits were issued, told Palestine Report that these permits were issued exclusively to Christians, and did not include the number of permits obtained directly from the Israeli authorities in Etzion (headquarters of the Israeli military in the southern West Bank). _These permits were restricted to Bethlehem Christians and were not issued to Christians in other PA areas,_ adds the source. _Furthermore, they were issued for a period close to one month, from December 12 until January 19, and for a daily hour period between 5 a.m. until 10 p.m._
As a result, Bethlehem Christians who obtained these permits were not only able to spend the Christmas holidays and New Year's Eve in Jerusalem and Nazareth but also did most of their Christmas shopping at the 'Malha Kenion' shopping center in West Jerusalem. Christian-owned clothing stores in Bethlehem, who usually report good sales over the holidays, complained of the lack of sales this Christmas. _My usual customers simply did not show up this year, opting to buy from the 'Kenion',_ says the owner of a fashionable menswear boutique.
_Right before Christmas, the Hebrew press reported that the number of security guards at the 'Kenion' had been beefed up,_ comments one Bethlehem journalist. _Even an idiot can figure out that hitting Bethlehem's economy over the holidays was a planned Israeli policy._
Palestinians agree that issuing these permits was part of a targeted (and underhand) Israeli policy aimed at hitting the Bethlehem economy hard. Furthermore, area Muslims say that while they are with the principle of issuing permits to all Palestinians, the way in which Israel gave permits to Christians, while excluding Muslims, raises doubts about Israel's intentions and leads Palestinians to believe that the Israel wants to create a sense of discrimination between Muslims and Christians.
_Bethlehem is the holiest site to Christians during Christmas, and yet the Israelis were issuing the Christians permits, allowing them to leave Bethlehem during the holiday,_ comments one Bethlehem resident sarcastically. _Meanwhile, Jerusalem is the holiest site to Muslims during Ramadan, and yet Israel is keeping Muslims out of the holy city._
Indeed, Israel has not issued any permits to Muslims who wish to pray at al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem during Ramadan. _Israel has also refused to ease up its measures when it comes to issuing permits to Palestinians requiring medical treatment in Jerusalem, and college students who normally have to sneak past Israeli roadblocks to get to their colleges in Jerusalem,_ remarks the source at the DCO office in Bethlehem.
As part of its policy targeting Bethlehem, the Israeli military went to great lengths over the Christmas holidays to prevent Christians and Muslims from various PA areas from getting into Bethlehem to participate in the celebrations there. In a show of might, Israeli army roadblocks were erected at Bethlehem's northern and southern entrances to turn back Palestinian cars. With the start of Ramadan, similar roadblocks are occasionally erected on the road between Ramallah and Bethlehem, particularly in the late afternoon when Muslims are rushing home to break their fast with families and friends.
Earlier this week, Israeli military, police and undercover units, erected random checkpoints at several locations on the Wadi Nar (Valley of Fire) Road which connects the northern and southern West Bank regions by a lengthy detour around Jerusalem. According to several Bethlehem residents who work in Ramallah, Israeli undercover units were dressed in civilian clothes and driving in civilian vehicles, making it hard to identify them.
_They would suddenly place a siren on the roof of the car, come to a stop, take out portable stop signs from the trunk, place them on the road and start stopping Palestinian cars,_ says one Palestinian. _They were checking the identity cards of all passengers and comparing them to a long lists of names that they had with them._ Another Palestinian says that he left his office shortly before 3 p.m. one day this week and did not get home until 7 p.m., nearly two hours after sundown when the daily fast is broken. _The Israelis know it is Ramadan and yet they were stopping the cars quite late into the afternoon,_ he says. _One passenger in our taxi had some dates and everyone in the taxi broke their fast by eating a couple of dates and smoking cigarettes. Nearly everyone in the taxi used my mobile phone to call their families and explain why they were late._
Meanwhile, many middle and low-income families are complaining of the high cost of food and Ramadan sweets. Chicken has jumped from NIS5.3 per kilo to NIS7.5 in Bethlehem, and the price of one kilo of 'Qataief_, a special Ramadan crepe is selling for NIS5 compared to NIS3 last Ramadan. The price of the nut stuffing for this crepe is also expensive, NIS 9 per one quarter kilo. _To feed our family of 12 'Qataief' on any given day would cost us NIS 28,_ remarks one housewife. _This is why we have bought it only once since the start of Ramadan._ She laughs bitterly and adds, _If we bought it every day, it would cost NIS 840 for the month, and my husband's monthly salary is NIS1200._
by: Azmi Bishara
There is no doubt that the Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu only set forth the second proposal for redeployment, of such minuscule percentages, after being cornered by his Arab counterparts and being criticized by the international community. The performance of the Arabs, on the other hand, has noticeably improved throughout the period of Netanyahu's rule. The United States also has been forced to direct some criticism towards Netanyahu after it became apparent that the continuation of his current policies threatens the American _new order_ which has prevailed in the region since after the Gulf War.
The present US administration was never opposed to the Likud party. On the contrary, its political beliefs were closer to the Likud's philosophy concerning the way in which Palestinians should be dealt with. However, it quickly became clear to the Americans that the Likud's consideration of US strategic plans in the region was not equal to the Americans' sympathy for Likud's policy.
The US administration has made it clear to prime minister Netanyahu that it will be impossible to back his plans to move straight into negotiations over final status issues if he is not willing to implement some of his commitments under the Hebron Protocol, which he signed, including the second phase of Israeli redeployment in the West Bank.
In proposing the second phase of redeployment, Netanyahu was paying lip service only, words vacant of any significant content and conditioned by vague demands such as fighting terrorism. The right-winsupport for his initiative gave Netanyahu the time he needed in Israeli political circles to handle the approaching crisis which discussion of the Israeli budget at the end of the year would bring. Netanyahu was also able to transform the discussion inside Israel from a debate within the Israeli right over the positions of power inside the Likud party to a wider political discussion between the right-wing and the Zionist left and the Labor party over the scope of the scheduled redeployment.
This is the discussion which softens the accusations from Israel's left-wing over the senseless positions of the right, while at the same time allowing the right to gain a stronger hold over the land. For the Israeli right claims that the left will return most of the land to the Palestinians before final status negotiations even begin, whereas the right will ensure that the land stays with Israel as a negotiating card to be used in the final status talks with the Palestinians. Thus, Israel's internal political considerations have been combined with external policy considerations in formulating the proposed redeployment plan.
The important thing to remember is that the internal conflict within the Israeli right-wing _which has nothing to do with the Palestinians or the Arabs but with the power struggle between the different camps and their positions within the Likud party _ has been postponed until other imminent occasions. And the Arabs who are involved in this conflict for no apparent reason have now moved toward the concession regarding the scope of redeployment.
The United States has returned to playing the role of mediator, confident that it will arrive at an intermediate solution between the various percentages. There is the minister of infrastructure Ariel Sharon, who proposes giving the Palestinians less land in return for territorial contiguity between the land they will have.
Then there is the proposal of defense minister Yitzhak Mordechai, who suggests redeployment in a number of geographically unconnected areas. The Israeli media, which is continually searching for details and excitement almost as if the issue was pornography, provides sufficient motivations for politicians to delve deeper and deeper into details until every Israeli politician has devised his own special proposal and can be hosted on some television show or have a few words written about him in the newspapers.
Amid this Israeli excitement over each detail revealed, an Israeli national consensus has been achieved over something completely unrelated to any of these details. What I am referring to is the Israeli national consensus, which has arisen before our eyes and without our concern, on the issue of the final settlement. It was apparent in the past that a sort of consensus between the two largest parties in Israel could be reached regarding issues related to a permanent solution, e.g., the Beilin-Eitan agreement which was formulated in the wake of the last elections, won by the right-wing.
That agreement detailed the foundations for an Israeli national unity government under the umbrella of certain _no's_ in any final settlement...
The Israeli right has surrendered to the existence of a Palestinian entity under this platform, while the left has surrendered to the existence of settlements. However, in the tense discussion currently surrounding redeployment, Israeli political circles and their many factions have moved another step in outlining a final settlement. This has occurred through the following developments:
First: The joining of the religious right in this consensus through the presentation for the first time of a plan of its own. This suggestion was presented by the Mifdal party, which is in the governing coalition, which recognizes the existence of a Palestinian entity demographically separated from the settlements in return for the annexation to Israel of all settlements and most of the land. Any new Israeli withdrawals will be to the benefit of the PA in the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the final settlement. This means that the settlements have been strategically transferred from the framework of occupation to the framework of apartheid in the Palestinian entity in which they are included.
Second: Convincing settlement leaders of the necessity of an Israeli national consensus concerning a final settlement and of the dangerous effects on the unity of Israeli society resulting from the isolation of one political/social camp through placing it at the top of the final status priorities. Some Labor party leaders share this same conviction.
Third: The return of Ariel Sharon's plan to the top of the priorities list, through improving relations with the Labor party and with the Zionist left in general; despite the right-wing vision of a Palestinian state in Jordan it was forced to accept Palestinian claims of a Palestinian entity west of the river, due to the realities of Oslo. Sharon now writes in the Israeli press since stepping down from active politics and the political decision-making process after the Lebanon war, especially in the second half of the eighties _ speaking to the Labor party and adopting the Alon program. Sharon said at that time with a pragmatic tone distinct from that of the _security_ man and not far from the Labor party mentality, that according to Alon's plan, the densely populated residential areas will be relocated from the West Bank to Jordan. This means that Israel will annex the remaining areas under their sovereignty.
These areas include the majority of settlements. In addition to this, there already is an Israeli consensus on the security and strategic need to have Israeli troops all along the Jordan Valley. This is to ensure that Israeli-Arab borders will be alongside Jordan and not along the Green Line.
What is new then? The new element is that Sharon now agrees that these densely populated residential areas cannot be located in Jordan but in a Palestinian entity which was created after Oslo and which requires negotiating over the need to expand these areas.
It is possible to give this Palestinian entity a choice _ Sharon has no objections to it being called a state _ between large geographically disconnected areas or small but geographically contiguous areas. And, another new element is Sharon's ability to claim, after the improvement in his personal relationships with Jordan, that the presence of the Israeli army along the Jordan Valley to separate Jordan from the Palestinian state is not only an Israeli security need but is also in Jordan's security and strategic interests.
Sharon is currently working to see that his plan is adopted by the larger Israeli political parties. He also wants his plan adopted by the United States so that the US will transfer its pressure from Israel in the redeployment phase to the Palestinians in the final status phase of negotiations.
The Israeli debate surrounding redeployment must not pull the wool over the eyes of Arabs and Palestinians, hiding from them the Israeli consensus on final status, which is similar to an Israeli-Palestinian apartheid, with the following elements:
The absence of a national Palestinian consensus in the face of the national Israeli consensus on the final settlement _ such a consensus could be achieved through democratic institutions expressing the will of the Palestinian people _ this is the weak point of the Palestinians _ and Israel believes it can use this to impose its final settlement on the Palespeople.
The present Palestinian resistance to this possibility rests on one person who rejects agreement to such a settlement and who holds on to permanent rights. Then there is a popular Palestinian position which rejects the apartheid reality, but this position has not been institutionalized through the support of the power and influence of the Legislative Council and the various political parties, in particular Fateh.
This is the historical mission and linked to it is the ability of the Palestinian people to prevent the establishment of a new apartheid system at the end of the 20th century.