Volume 2, Number 5 - July, 2001
This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 41, which was carried out by the JMCC between 14th and 17th June, 2001 .
The first part of this issue will discuss some of the results about personal opinions regarding the current Palestinian Intifada. The second part will focus on personal opinions about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the peace process. Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and sample distribution.
The current opinion poll was conducted about 8.5 months after the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada, which started on September 28th, 2000. The Intifada started 2 months following a deadlock in the Camp David negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis on final status issues, including refugees, Jerusalem, and settlements. So far, about 540 Palestinians have been killed, thousands injured and disabled, mostly during civilian demonstrations against Israeli occupation or as a result of shelling of residential areas. Additionally, three million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been living under siege since the beginning of the Intifada. On May 18th, Israelis used F-16 warplanes, for the first time since the 1967 war, to strike Palestinian areas killing 12 Palestinians. On June 1st, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 21 Israelis in Tel-Aviv. These escalations led to the intensification of international efforts to restore pre-Intifada conditions.
The Mitchell Committee, a fact-finding committee led by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, was established after an October 2000 summit at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, and released its report on May 21st, 2001. The commission called for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, and recommended confidence-building measures to bring the two sides back to negotiations, including resumption of talks between Israeli and Palestinian security officials, a freeze on construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and a call for Israel to lift economic restraints on Palestinian areas. An American plan to stabilize the ceasefire and create measures to restore confidence between Palestinians and Israelis, and eventually lead to a resumption of formal peace negotiations, was brokered by CIA Director George Tenet on June 13th.
This section aims to highlight Palestinians’ personal
opinions regarding the current Palestinian Intifada and identify correlates
of
these opinions.
1.1 Support for the continuation of the current Palestinian Intifada
When respondents were asked whether they supported or
opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada, 79% stated that they
supported it, 15% stated that they opposed it, 5% were not sure, and 1%
did not give an answer. These figures are similar to those obtained
in JMCC Poll # 40 conducted in April 2001. However, they represent
a 10-point increase in favor of continuation of the Intifada as compared
to 6 months earlier when 70% of Palestinians supported the continuation
of the Intifada (JMCC Poll #39, December 2000). As figure 1 illustrates,
Palestinians living in Gaza Strip are more supportive of the continuation
of the Palestinian Intifada compared to Palestinians living in the West
Bank and East Jerusalem (90%, 74% and 68% respectively).
Figure 1: Support for Continuation of Current Palestinian Intifada by Region
Also, Palestinians who live in refugee camps are more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada when compared to Palestinians living in cities and villages (88%, 81% and 71% respectively). In general, refugees are more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada than non-refugees (85% versus 76% respectively).
Additionally, respondents who trust a specific party are
more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada than those who do not
trust any party at all (82% versus 73% respectively). Among the former
group, Fateh supporters have the lowest level of support for the continuation
of the Intifada (79%), followed by supporters of Islamic parties, including
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions (85%), and supporters
of other parties, including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, PLO, Democratic Coalition,
and Seculars (90%) (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Supprot for continuation of current Palestinian Intifada by Political Party
1.2 Preferred characteristics of the Palestinian Intifada
Respondents were asked whether they prefer the continuation of a popular resistance Intifada alone (unarmed public resistance of the occupation), a military resistance Intifada alone, or a popular and military resistance Intifada together.
Fifty-four percent of respondents support the continuation of a popular and military resistance Intifada together as opposed to 20% who support the continuation of a popular resistance Intifada alone, 15% who support the continuation of a military resistance Intifada alone, 9% who were not sure, and 2% who did not provide an answer (see figure 3).
Figure 3: Preferred Characteristics of Palestinian Intifada
Support for military operations
Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption
of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response in
the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found
it harmful to Palestinian national interests. Military operations
do not involve a Palestinian killing himself in the attack.
Examples of such operations include car bombs, mortar attacks, and shooting.
Seventy-one percent supported military operations, 20% opposed them, 8%
were not sure, and 2% did not answer. The level of support for military
operations did not change much since December 2000 (JMCC Poll # 39).
However, current levels represent a doubling of levels of support found
a few years ago (34%, JMCC’s Poll # 20, May 1997).
When asked whether they would support the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the occupied territories or inside israel and the occupied territories, 32% of respondents answered that they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 4% supported them inside the occupied territories, 41% supported them inside Israel and the occupied territories, 17% did not support them at all and 7% did not give an answer.
Support for suicide operations
Respondents were also asked whether they supported suicide
bombing operations as a suitable response in the current political conditions,
or whether they opposed them and found them harmful to Palestinian national
interests. Sixty-nine percent supported suicide operations, 23% opposed
them, 6% were not sure, and 2% did not answer. The level of support
for suicude bombing operations decreased slightly since JMCC’s poll # 39
conducted in April 2001 (76%). It is worthwhile mentioning
that the level of support for suicide bombing operations had increased
dramatically during the current Intifada as compared to a few years earlier
(JMCC poll # 20, May 1997) when only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide
operations (see figure 4).
Figure 4: Support for Suicide Operations against Israeli targets
The final goal of the Intifada
Respondents were asked whether the final goal of the
Intiafada should be the improvement of the Palestinian negotiation situation,
ending the occupation based on UN resolution 242 and formation of
a Palestinian state, or freedom of all Palestine. Forty-six percent of
Palestinians believed that the final goal for the Intifada should be to
end the occupation based on UN resolution 242 and form a Palestinian state,
41% believed that the goal should be to liberate Palestine (the area that
was under British mandate before 1948), 9% believed that the goal should
be to improve the Palestinian negotiation situation, 1% had other
goals in mind, 2% were not sure, and 1% did not give an answer (see figure
5).
Figure 5: The Final Goal of the Intifada
Respondents’ views about the final goal for the Intifada were highly correlated to their area of residence and the political party they trust most (see table 1).
Table 1: The final goal for the Intifada*
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Palestinian state (242) |
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| Area of residence | |||
| West Bank |
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| E Jerusalem |
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| Gaza Strip |
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| Type of locality | |||
| Village |
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| Refugee Camp |
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| City |
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| Political party support | |||
| Fateh |
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| Islamic |
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| Others |
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| None |
|
|
|
The best method to achieve Palestinian national
goals and end occupation
Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada
alone, or both of them would be the best method to achieve Palestinian
national goals and end occupation.
Twenty-nine percent believed that the Intifada alone is the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals, 12% believed that negotiations alone are the best method, 56% believed that Intifada and negotiations together are the best method, 3% were not sure and 1% did not give an answer (see figure 6).
Figure 6: Best Method to achieve Palestinian National Goals
Respondents’ views regarding the best method to achieve
Palestinian national goals were highly correlated to their area of residence
and the political party they trust most (see table 2).
Table 2: The best method to achieve Palestinian national
goals*
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| Area of residence | |||
| WB/EJ |
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| Gaza Strip |
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| Type of locality | |||
| Village |
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| Refugee Camp |
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| City |
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| Political party support | |||
| Fateh |
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| Islamic |
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| Others |
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| None |
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1.4 Satisfaction with Arab solidarity with the Intifada
When asked whether they were satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada, 15% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied, while 85% were dissatisfied. This represents a considerable decrease in the percentage of Palestinians satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada since April 2001 (41%, JMCC Poll # 40).
2.1 Future optimism and potential solutions
Optimism about the future
Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic
or pessimistic about the future. Fifty-one percent stated that they
were optimistic, and the rest were pessimistic. Respondents living
in East Jerusalem are more optimistic than those living in Gaza Strip and
the West Bank (64%, 50%, and 49% respectively). Additionally, respondents
living in villages are more optimistic than those living in cities and
refugee camps (56%, 52%, and 36% respectively). Moreover, 60% of
respondents who indicated that they trusted Fateh most were optimistic,
as opposed to 46% of respondents who indicated that they did not trust
any faction, 44% of respondents who indicated that they trusted Islamic
factions most, and 39% of respondents who indicated that they
trusted other factions.
Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the
onset of the Intifada. In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning
of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future,
as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning
of the Intifada).
Preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
Respondents were asked what they thought the preferred
solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was. Forty-seven percent
of Palestinians supported the two state solution, 22% supported a bi-national
state in historic Palestine where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal
rights, 12% thought that there was no solution to the conflict, 12% supported
a Palestinian state, 1% supported an Islamic state, 4% were not sure, and
1% did not give an answer (see figure 7). These figures are not significantly
different from those reported 2 months ago (JMCC Poll # 40, April 2001).
Figure 7: Preferred solution of the Palestinian - Israeli conflict
Supporting two states was correlated with the area the
respondent lives in, being a refugee, and the political party s/he trusts
most. Fifty percent of West Bank residents supported two states as
compared to 46% of Gaza Strip residents, and 34% of East Jerusalem residents.
Additionally, 41% of refugees supported the 2-state solution a two states
as opposed to 51% of respondents who were not refugees. Moreover,
respondents who trusted Fateh most had the highest level of support for
two states (64%), followed by respondents who trusted other parties (49%),
those who do not trust any party (40%), and respondents who trusted Islamic
parties most (31%).
2.2 Peace process, Oslo agreements, and negotiations with Israelis
Evaluation of the status of the peace process
Respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the
peace process during the current difficult conditions. Twenty-seven
percent of respondents thought that the peace process was dead and that
there was no way to resume negotiations, 50% thought that the peace process
was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, 18%
thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible
to resume negotiations, 3% were not sure, 1% gave other answers, and 1%
did not give an answer (see figure 8).
Figure 8: Status of the Peace Process
Support for the Peace process
Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed
the current peace process between Palestinians and Israelis.
Forty-seven percent of Palestinians supported the peace process, 48% opposed
it, and 5% did not give an answer. There has been a 10-point drop
in the level of support for the peace process since the eruption of the
Palestinian Intifada in September 2000 (see figure 9).
Figure 9: Support for the Peace Process
Supporting the peace process is associated with the gender
of the respondent, the area where the respondent lives, and the political
party s/he trusts most. Fifty-two percent of females supported the
peace process as opposed to 43% of males. Additionally, 50% of West
Bank and East Jerusalem residents supported the peace process as compared
to 43% of Gaza Strip residents. Village residents were more supportive
of the peace process (56%) than those who lived in cities (45%), and refugee
camps (39%). Moreover, Fateh supporters had the highest level of
support for the peace process (70%), followed by those who do not support
any political party (43%), supporters of other parties (31%), and supporters
of Islamic parties (22%).
Support for Oslo agreements
Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed
the Oslo agreements. Thirty-eight percent of respondents supported
Oslo agreements, 54% opposed them, and 8% did not give an answer.
There has been a dramatic decline in support for the Oslo agreements following
the eruption of the current Palestinian Intifada in September 2000 (see
figure 10).
Figure 10: Support for Oslo agreements
The level of support for the Oslo agreements is associated the area where the respondent lives, being a refugee, and the political party s/he trusts most. Forty-two percent of West Bank residents supported the Oslo agreements as compared to 36% of Gaza Strip residents, and 24% of East Jerusalem residents. Also, 45% of village residents supported the Oslo agreements as compared to 38% of city residents, and 27% of refugee camp residents. Additionally, 32% of refugees supported the Oslo agreements as opposed to 43% of respondents who were not refugees. As figure 11 shows, Fateh supporters had the highest level of support for the Oslo agreements (57%), followed by those who do not support any political party (36%), supporters of other parties (21%), and supporters of Islamic parties (17%).
Figure 11: Support for Oslo Agreement by Political Faction
Mitchell Report
Respondents were asked whether they have had a look at
the context of the report recently published by the Mitchell committee.
Fifty-two percent of respondents answered that they have seen the report.
Among the subgroup that has seen the report, 44% supported the Palestinian
Authority’s acceptance of the report.
Respondents were also asked if they agreed to the cessation of the Palestinian Intifada in return for cessation of Israeli settlements on the occupied territories. Sixty-seven percent of respondents disagreed with the proposal, 25% agreed, 5% were not sure, 2% did not give an answer, and 1% gave other responses.
Palestinians who reside in cities and refugee camps disagreed with the proposal much more than Palestinians who reside in villages (75%, 74% and 49% respectively). Also, Palestinians who trust Islamic or other parties disagreed with the propposal much more than Palestinians who trust Fateh or do not trust any party (79%, 75%, 65% and 62% respectively).
President Arafat‘s decision of a cease-fire
Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed
President Arafat’s decision of a cease-fire. Fifty-two percent of
respondents supported it, 44% opposed it, and 3% did not answer.
Non-refugees were more supportive of the decision than refugees (58% and
44% respectively). West Bank residents were more supportive of the
decision than East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip (58%, 50% and 44% respectively).
Village residents were also more supportive of the decision than city and
refugee camp residents (58%, 54% and 37% respectively). Additionally,
Fateh supporters were more supportive of the decision than those who did
not support any factions, supporters of Islamic factions, and supporters
of other factions (74%, 55%. 26% and 25% respectively).
2.3 Evaluation of Palestinian bodies, factions, and figures
Performance of the Palestinian Authority
When asked about their views regarding the general performance
of the Palestinian Authority, 63% of respondents stated that the Palestinian
Authority’s performance is good. Based on previous JMCC polls, there
is a gradual decline in the percentage of respondents who say that the
performance of the Palestinian authority is good. However, there
has been no change in the evaluation of Palestinian Authority’s performance
since the beginning of the current Intifada.
Respondents’ favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority is correlated with place of residence (67% in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and 55% in Gaza Strip), type of community (60% in cities, 52% in refugee camps, and 72% in villages), age category (70% for respondents 50 years or older, 61% for respondents younger than 50 years), gender (68% in females and 58% in males), and refugee status (56% for refugees and 67% for non-refugees).
Evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian authority is also highly correlated with the faction that the respondent trusts most. Ninety percent of respondents who trust Fateh most indicated that the Palestinian Authority’s performance is good, as opposed to only 36% of respondents who trust Islamic factions most, 39% of respondents who trust other factions most, and 53% of respondents do not trust any faction (see figure 12).
Figure 12: Evaluation of the Performance of the Palestinian Authority by Political Party
Gaza Strip residents were more supportive of the formation
of a national unity government than West Bank/East Jerusalem residents
(75% versus 66% respectively). Also residents of cities and refugee
camps were more supportive of the formation of a national unity government
than residents of villages (73%, 72% and 60% respectively). Supporters
of Islamic parties had the highest level of support for the formation of
a national unity government (75%), followed by Fateh supporters (70%),
those who do not support any political party (64%), and
supporters of other parties (61%).
Trust in Palestinian political or religious factions
When respondents were asked which Palestinian political
or religious faction they trusted most, 35% indicated that they trusted
Fateh most, 26% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most
(including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions), 5% indicated
that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP,
PLO), 25% indicated that they did not trust any faction, and 9% did not
give an answer (see figure 13).
Figure 13: Turst in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions
A comparison with figures obtained a year ago (JMCC Poll # 37, June 2000), shows that support for Fateh and other factions remained unchanged, while support for Islamic factions increased and support for no factions decreased (35%, 4%, 12%, and 37% respectively)
There is more trust for Fateh among residents of Gaza
Strip and the West Bank than among residents of East Jerusalem (38%, 34%,
and 25% respectively). On the other hand, there is more trust for
Islamic parties among residents of Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem than among
residents of the West Bank (33%, 31% and 21% respectively).
Trust in Palestinian figures
When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure
they trusted most, 28% indicated that they trusted Palestinian President
Yasser Arafat, 10% indicated that they trusted Ahmad Yaseen, founder and
spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 28% indicated
that they trusted other figures, 27% indicated that they did not trust
any Palestinian figure, and 8% did not give an answer (see figure 14).
Figure 14: Turst in Palestinian Figures
These figures are not significantly different from those
obtained a year ago (JMCC Poll # 37, June 2000).
Satisfaction with the way President Arafat is handling
his work
Respondents were asked about their satisfaction with
the way President Arafat is handling his work as the head of the Palestinian
Authority. Fifty-six percent of Palestinians are generally satisfied
with the way President Arafat is handling his work. The level of
satisfaction varies widely by the political faction the respondent trusts
more; 86% of Fateh supporters are satisfied with the performance of President
Arafat, as opposed to 26% of Palestinians who support other factions, 48%
of Palestinians who do not support any faction, and 32% of Palestinians
who support Islamic parties (see figure 15).
Figure 15: Satisfaction with President Arafat's Handling his work as head of PA
President Arafat‘s control of the internal Palestinian
situation
Respondents were asked whether they believed that president
Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation. Seventy-two
percent believed that President Arafat was in control of the situation.
Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.
A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,201 Palestinian individuals 18 years or older, from 60 sampling points, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in their homes.
In the West Bank, 761 people were surveyed from the following areas: Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp (RC), Ya’bad, Zababdeh, Kufr Rai’, Fahmeh, Silat al-Harthia, T’nik. Nablus: Nablus, Madama, Kifl Haris, Marda, Beit Fureek, Balata RC, Sabastia, Zawata. Tulkarem & Qalqilya: Tulkarem, Tulkarem RC, Bala’, Beit Leed, Qalqilia, Jayyous . Hebron: Hebron, Yatta, Halhoul, Dhahiria, Fawar RC, Sureef, Tarqoumia. Bethlehem: Bethlehem, BeitSahou, Duha, al-Khader, Artas, Deiheishe RC Jericho: Jericho, Aqbat Jaber RC . Ramallah & al-Bireh: al-Bireh, Ramallah, Beit Reema, Jalazon RC, Kufr Malik, Nilin . Jerusalem: a-Dahia, A-ram, Shufat, Beit Hanaia, Old City, Wadi al-Joz, Ras al-Amoud, Beir Nabal, Qalandia RC, Beit Hanaian a-tahta, al-‘Isawia, Silwan.
In the Gaza Strip, 440 people were surveyed from the following areas: Gaza North: Jabalia refugee camp, Jabalia, Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun. Gaza: Sheikh Radwan, a-Nasser, a-Daraj, a-Tufah, Sabra, a-Zeitoun, a-Shajai’a, Shati RC, a-Rimal Deir al- Balah: al-Nusseirat RC, al-Maghazi RC, Deir al- Balah and al-Bureij RC . Khan Younis: ‘Abassan al-Kabira, Khan Younis RC, Khan Younis, Bani Suheila and Abassan al-Saghira . Rafah: Rafah, Rafah RC and Tal al-Sultan RC .
The margin of error is +/- 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95%.
Sample distribution