This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 33, which was carried out by the JMCC on 21 and 22 October 1999.
The first part of this issue will discuss some of the results of the more general questions in the survey, including regarding Palestinians’ optimism towards the future, the performance of the Palestinian Authority, the level of trust in political figures and factions, and Palestinian popular attitudes towards the peace process.
The second part of this issue will focus on issues pertaining to the media.
First, however, a short outline of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit is provided.
This section intends to both highlight the main results of the general questions of poll no. 33, and to provide background information and analysis where deemed important.
1.1. Optimism about the future
When the interviewees were asked about their level of optimism or pessimism about the future, 70.7% of the respondents replied positively, whilst 27.9% saw the future negatively. There were no major differences in the level of optimism about the future between the surveyed people in the West Bank and those in the Gaza Strip.
Figure 1
The results in figure 1, above, however, do indicate that
the level of optimism or pessimism amongst Palestinians about the future
over the last ten months was not much influenced by political events such
as the change in the Israeli government and the election of Labor prime
minister Ehud Barak. Also, given the slow and hazardous road to peace,
it is interesting to see how such a large number of Palestinians managed
to
remain optimistic about their future. It might be suggested
that this optimism, even under difficult circumstances, is part of Arab
culture and even religion, whereby people tend to think that in the end
the situation has to improve.
A breakdown of the surveyed people according to their trust or distrust of political factions reveals an engaging explanation for the high level of optimism. As becomes clear from figure 2, Fateh supporters are far more optimistic about the future than supporters of other political factions and respondents who stated that they do not trust any faction. A possible explanation for the higher optimism amongst Fateh supporters might be that they stand much more to gain from the main political faction, as it is heavily entangled in all layers of Palestinian society and as Yasser Arafat heads it. Indeed, 83.9% of the surveyed Fateh supporters said they were optimistic about the future compared to only 64.2% of supporters of other factions, and 63.7% of those respondents who said that they do not trust any faction. Similarly, whereas only 16.1% of the Fateh supporters stated that they were pessimistic about the future, 35.9% of the respondents who said that they support other factions than Fateh said that they were pessimistic, and 36.3% of those who distrust all factions said so. It is therefore, possible to deduct that the positive picture described in figure 1, above, is heavily influenced by the Fateh contingent within Palestinian society.
Figure 2
1.2. Popular evaluation about internal factors
1.2.1. The performance of the Palestinian Authority
In general, one can say that public perceptions of the performance of the Palestinian Authority have remained stable since the beginning of 1999. As shown in figure 3 below, 63% of the respondents evaluated the performance of the Palestinian Authority positively, whilst 32% responded negatively. When the same question was asked in public opinion polls conducted respectively in August and February 1999, it is clear that opinions on the performance of the Palestinian Authority did not fluctuate much.
Figure 3
Again, a breakdown of the surveyed people according to their trust or distrust of political factions explains why, given a less than optimal domestic situation, such a high percentage of Palestinians nonetheless seem to evaluate the Palestinian Authority positively. The answer lies again with the Fateh supporters within Palestinian society. As shown in figure 4, 85% of the Fateh supporters said that, in their opinion, the performance of the Palestinian Authority is good. Amongst supporters of other factions, only 47.4% evaluated the performance of the Palestinian Authority positively. In fact, more of those who support other factions than Fateh (52.6%) said that the performance of the Palestinian Authority is bad. Therefore, whereas at first glance it might seem that Palestinians are contented with the performance of their Authority, a further look indicates that merely a section of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are. Again, it might be suggested that the Fateh supporters evaluating the Palestinian Authority more positively can be in part explained by the personal benefits and job opportunities this segment of society enjoys as a result of their political affiliation.
Figure 4
A closer look at Palestinian opinion on the performance of the Palestinian Authority since the beginning of 1999, also denotes an increasing gap between popular opinion on this issue in the Gaza Strip and that in the West Bank. Indeed, as shown in figure 5, below, 66.3% of the West Bankers evaluated the performance of the Palestinian Authority positively, compared to only 57.6% of the Gazans. Similarly, whereas 28.2% of the West Bank respondents classified the performance of the Palestinian Authority as bad, 38.3% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip did so.
Figure 5
One explanation for the more negative evaluation by the respondents in the Gaza Strip could be the higher dependence on the Palestinian Authority by Gaza residents than their compatriots in the West Bank. The West Bank is a more open area with better access to Israel, a better economy, a larger private sector, and a well-established NGO community. Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip remains under siege and its economy continues to decline. The average daily wage for a household head in the Gaza Strip is approximately 20% lower than that of a household head in the West Bank. Moreover, the long-awaited safe passage linking the Gaza Strip to the West Bank has proved another major disappointment. Disappointment, especially for the Gaza residents, as there are heavy restrictions regarding those permitted to use the safe passage, and free movement of goods and persons between Gaza and the West Bank continues to be difficult. In short, Westbankers are provided with alternatives to the Palestinian Authority, whereas Gazans remain highly dependent on the Palestinian Authority, and are, therefore, likely to be more critical of its performance.
Another explanation for the more negative evaluation of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip could be the larger support for Hamas in that area. In the JMCC poll Number 33, 13.9% of Gazan respondents said that they trusted Hamas most compared to 9.4% of the Westbankers. Hamas is in opposition to the Palestinian Authority and its supporters, therefore, are more critical of the performance of the Palestinian Authority.
1.2.2. Trust in Palestinian figures
When asked which Palestinian figure they trust most, as usual, most respondents answered Arafat. As shown in figure 6, below, Palestinian figures residing in the Gaza Strip (such as Ahmed Yaseen and Haidar Abdel-Shafi) are more popular amongst Gazans, and Palestinian figures residing in the West Bank (such as Hanan Ashrawi and Sa'eb Erekat) or Jerusalem (such as Faisal al-Husseini) are more trusted by Palestinians living in the West Bank.
Figure 6
Two aspects included in figure 6, above, are worth a further discussion: One is the popularity of Yasser Arafat; the second aspect concerns the number of respondents answering that they do not trust anybody. As shown in figure 7, below, both aspects are fluctuating considerably over time. Whenever Arafat’s popularity increases, the number of respondents replying that they do not trust anyone decreases. The opposite is also the apparent. Whenever Arafat’s popularity decreases, the number of respondents saying that they do not trust anyone increases. The correlation between these two variables and its fluctuation can be easily explained when placed in the context of the political events since the beginning of 1999.
Figure 7
As is to be expected, Yasser Arafat, being the head of Fateh, is most trusted by Fateh supporters. What is surprising, however, is the extent to which he is basically forced to rely on this segment of Palestinian society. As shown in figure 8, 68.9% of the Fateh supporters said that they trust Arafat most. Only 16.8% of those who support other factions than Fateh said that Arafat was their most trusted political leader, and a mere 12.7% of those who do not trust any faction made Arafat their choice. Moreover, amongst non-Fateh supporters, trust in Sheikh Ahmed Yassin is higher than trust in Arafat. Also, as shown in figure 8, Dr. Haidar Abdul-Shafi remains a popular figure amongst those sections of Palestinian society. In short, although from the general data it appeared that Arafat is by far the most trusted political figure in Palestine, in actuality, his support base is more precarious than would be imagined at first sight.
Figure 8
1.2.3. Trust in political factions
When interviewees were asked which political factions they trust most, similar trends appeared as in the question about trust in political figures. As becomes clear from figure 9, below, whenever support for the most trusted factions (i.e. Fateh and Hamas) declines, the number of people responding that they do not trust anybody increases.
Figure 9
1.3. Popular evaluation of issues related to the peace process
1.3.1. Personal opinions about the peace process
Since the last opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in August 1999, the feelings of the interviewees about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process have remained stable. As shown in figure 10, below, 58% of the respondents stated their support to the peace process, 21.8% neither support nor oppose the peace process, whilst 18.1% oppose it. It is noteworthy that the Gazan respondents are clearly far more opposed to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process than the West Bank respondents are. Again, a possible explanation for the more negative attitude amongst Gazans towards the peace process could be that the Gaza Strip continues to suffer economically under the siege by the Israelis. Also, as 70-80% of the Gaza residents are refugees and as the refugee problem is an issue to be dealt with in the final status talks between Israel and the PLO, the majority of Gazans have not seen many tangible results of the peace process. The Palestinian Authority, for example, refuses to improve the living conditions in the refugee camps until an appropriate agreement on the refugee issue is reached in the final status talks.
Figure 10
Again a breakdown of the surveyed Palestinians according to their trust or distrust in political factions shows, that the relatively high number of respondents stating that they support the peace process is merely a result of the high support for the peace process amongst Fateh supporters. As becomes clear from the results illustrated in figure 11, 81.6% of the Fateh supporters also support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, whilst only 4.7% of them oppose it. Of those respondents who distrust all political factions, only 51.1% said that they support the peace process, compared to 21% who oppose it. Even more negative were those interviewees who support factions other than Fateh. Only, 41.4% of these respondents seem to support the peace process, whilst 34.6% of this segment of society opposes the peace process.
Figure 11
1.3.2. The respondents' evaluation of people's feelings or opinions towards the peace process
When the respondents were asked how they evaluated people’s attitude towards the peace process, it became clear that they thought other people support the peace process less than they do themselves. As shown in figure 12, only 33.8% of the respondents thought that other people supported the peace process, whilst 42.9% said that other people are hesitant in their attitudes towards the peace process. These findings might support the argument made in section 1.3.1. and might be an indication that support for the peace process is not as solid as would be expected from the overall survey results on respondents’ personal opinions about this issue.
Figure 12
1.3.3. Sense of personal security since the beginning of the peace process
When asked if their feeling of self-security is better than before the peace process, the small majority of the respondents (53.5%) seemed to think so. About 28.2% said that their sense of self-security did not change since the beginning of the peace process, whilst 16.3% of the respondents replied that it became worse than before the peace process.
Figure 13
As shown in figure 13 above, respondents in the Gaza Strip were more positive in their evaluation than those in the West Bank. Whereas 62.1% of the surveyed Gazans stated that their feeling of self-security improved compared to before the peace process, only 48.6% of the surveyed Westbankers agreed with this statement.
The evident positive feeling amongst Gazans with regard to their personal security could be explained by the low Israeli presence within the Gaza Strip as the Gaza territory is predominantly under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. As a result, Israeli attacks or harassment, whether by settlers or by soldiers, are relatively negligible in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, provocation by settlers and Israeli soldiers is more evident, because their presence in the West Bank continues to be very prevalent. This reality might have a negative effect on the sense of personal security of the West Bank residents.
CONCLUSION
The main conclusion to be extracted from Part One is the crucial importance of the Fateh supporters in Palestinian society. Without them, the performance of the Palestinian Authority would be evaluated negatively and Arafat’s popularity would pludge under that of political figures such as Ahmed Yassin and Haidar Abdul-Shafi. Also, without the massive support of Fatah supporters, the majority of the Palestinians are not very much in favor of the peace process. In short, the Palestinian leadership is heavily dependent upon this segment of society for approval of both its internal affairs and its strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
2.1. The Palestinian Media environment
The media landscape in the Palestinian territories is unique in the Arab world. This is due to a number of reasons.
Most importantly, ever since the establishment of the autonomous Palestinian Authority (PA), private ownership of newspapers and TV- and radio stations became possible in Palestine. Palestinians have eagerly made use of the right to establish private media. Presently, there are 5 private newspapers, 26 private TV channels, and 9 private radio stations catering to the needs of Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. In addition, a nationwide public broadcasting system has been established.
Secondly, censorship is not an officially condoned behavior. However problematic this provision might be in practice, it provides the local media with a legal framework unknown to other Arab countries.
Thirdly, the Palestinian audience is divided into two major factions, one in the Gaza Strip, the other in the West Bank and Jerusalem. While foreign media (including the non-Palestinian Arab media) feature prominently in Palestine in general, the two areas are affected differently by this phenomenon, as the results of this poll clearly present.
2.2. Media usage habits
For Palestinians, electronic media are the prime sources of information.
As indicated in figure 14, over two third of those interviewed (68.8%) retrieve their information from either radio or TV, while only 14% rely on newspapers as their primary source.
Among the electronic media, local radio stations feature most prominently, garnering 36.9%. Arabic satellite broadcast news ranks second, with 31.9%. The informal sector, i.e. workplace discussions, rumors and chats with friends, serves as a prime source of information for 17.1%.
Figure 14
As to the preferences of information resources, residents of Gaza and of the West Bank reveal different habits. The informal sector is about twice as important for Gazans as a source for news as it is for people from the West Bank (23.5 vs. 13.3%). The latter rely on local radio much more than their fellow Palestinians in Gaza (43.1 vs. 26.5%).
The above findings indicate that the media has not yet established an information monopoly as strong in Gaza as it was capable of doing in the West Bank. This could be due to the fact that in the relatively poorer Gaza Strip media access is not as affordable on average than it is in the West Bank. Also, the much higher population density in Gaza might further the development and enhance the importance of the informal sector as a source of information.
2.2.1. Television
TV watching habits are a prime example for the importance of the foreign media in Palestine.
Al-Jazeerah, an Arabic TV channel based in Qatar, was named the most independent TV station by roughly one third of the Palestinians surveyed in both Gaza and the West Bank (37.1% combined, see figure 15). This corresponds strongly with the trust Palestinians put in non-Palestinian TV stations, as presented in figure 17. Al-Jazeerah is also by far the most trusted channel in Palestine (35.7%).
Figure 15
When it comes to viewing habits, however, Gazans
and West bank residents reveal different habits: While Al-Jazeerah ranks
high among both groups, Gazans rely on Palestine TV almost twice as much
as West Bank residents do (30.8% vs.16.2%). This makes Palestinian TV Gaza’s
first program of choice, and third in the West Bank. As a result, Palestine
TV is the most widely-watched TV station in all of Palestine (see figure
16). In the West Bank, the top slot is taken by Al-Jazeerah. Jordanian
TV, which is the West Bank’s second most watched TV channel is not among
the Gaza top three programs. In turn, Egyptian television, which Gazans
name as their third most-watched program, does not
feature prominently with West Bank resident. This is,
of course, partly due to respective areas’ proximity to the proximity of
the respective areas to the home countries of these TV channels.
Figure 16
Palestine TV is trusted most by a total of 18.1% of the interviewed respndents, which makes it the second most trusted channel in the region. Israel TV is considered about as trustworthy as Jordanian TV (7.2% vs. 7.7%), despite it being watched considerably less often.
Figure 17
The perceived independence of the foreign media could be attributed to the fact that they are less inhibited to criticize the PNA and its performance. For foreign stations, the PNA is an easy target and no retributions need to be feared from it. Vis-à-vis their respective home governments, these stations might not show the same critical stand.
Figure 18 indicates the duration of daily TV usage in
Palestine. The relative majority of TV consumers (39.7%) in Palestine spend
at least 1-2 hours watching TV. One out of four Palestinians (25.9%) uses
the TV more than four hours a day. Long-time watching habits (i.e. spending
more than four hours watching TV) can be observed in Gaza (32.7%) more
often than in the West Bank (22.1%). Accordingly, short-time watching habits
(i.e. using the TV for 1-2 hours daily) are more frequent in the West Bank
(43.7%) than in Gaza (32 %).
Only a small minority of the respondents (4.3%) stated
that they watch no television at all.
Figure 18
2.2.2. Radio
Radio is a predominantly local medium, and only few stations distribute their programs nation-wide. Surprisingly, Israeli radio stations are the most listened-to programs among surveyed Palestinians (see figure 19). 24% of them named them as their programs of choice, followed by Palestine radio (21.6%) and BBC World Service (9.8 %).
Figure 19
Furthermore, while Gazans and West Bank residents show a similar appreciation for Israeli radio, they differ significantly with respect to consumption of Palestinian radio. Only 11.5% of Gaza residents, but 26.7% of West Bank residents rank Palestine radio as their number one station. This makes Palestine radio the first choice in the West Bank, but only fourth in Gaza. Gazans also give Palestine radio weak ratings when it comes to trust and independence. In both categories Israel radio takes second best rating, as opposed to rank four in both for Palestine radio. For Gazans, only the BBC is considered more trustworthy and independent than the Israeli radio.
Figure 20
Among West Bank residents, a different picture emerges. In line with their listening habits, trustworthiness and independence of Palestinian radio are considered much higher than in the Gaza strip. Furthermore, the BBC is much less frequented in the West Bank than in Gaza (6.9% vs. 15.7%).
Figure 21
Generally, Palestinians are very much inclined to listen to radio programs produced outside their own territories. In both Gaza and the West Bank, foreign stations take three of the top four positions, with Israel radio taking No. 1 in Gaza.
Part of the Israeli radio’s appeal to Palestinian listeners has to do with its closeness to the Israeli government which is the region’s prime news maker. Israel radio can provide vital news faster than the Palestinian media can. Also, Israel radio can provide a different perspective on current affairs, an ability that is seemingly appreciated by many Palestinian listeners.
The poll also inquired about the listeners’ preferred times of radio usage. More than at any other time during the day, the radio is used in the early hours between 6 and 9 a.m. One third of the Palestinians (32.5 %) claim to use the radio at this time of the day. The radio is then used again in the evening by one out of five Palestinians (19.4%). In between, radio usage is significantly lower, ranging from 11.9% at lunchtime to 9.5% in the afternoon. West Bank residents are more likely to use the radio in the morning than Gazans (37.9% vs. 22.8%). In Gaza, radio usage is highest in the evening (28%), and almost as popular during lunchtime (21.4%) as it is in the morning.
Figure 22
2.2.3. Daily Newspapers
Different from TV and radio, the newspaper media segment is primarily a Palestinian domain. The two most widely-read newspapers, Al-Quds (57.3%) and Al-Ayyam (24.4 %) are produced within the Palestinian territories or East-Jerusalem. Kul al-‘Arab, which takes the third place (14.1 %), is the newspaper of Arabs with Israeli citizenship. Foreign papers, such as Cairo-based Al-Ahram, do not play a major role in the reading habits of Palestinians.
Figure 23
Since newspaper consumption involves the purchase of an actual copy, and there is usually only one copy bought a day, the decision to rely on a local product seems to be the most natural one. This could account for the almost exclusive use of Palestinian papers.
Figure 24
Figure 25 presents Al-Quds as by far the most trusted newspaper. It is also deemed the most independent one and, consequently, it is the one most read (as indicated by figure 23). Al-Ayyam takes second place in all three categories. Despite not being listed among the papers most trusted, Kul al-‘Arab is the third-most read paper in Palestine.
Figure 25
2.2.4. Openness to social topics
As indicated in figure 26, below, two thirds (66.4%) of the surveyed Palestinians think that the media should devote more space to coverage of non-political and social issues. About one fifth (20.7 %) is contented with the current amount of articles and programs on these topics. The lack of coverage on these issues has been subject to complaint for some time now among media. For the first time, these results show that the problem is perceived similarly by the public. Developing a critical attitude towards the contents presented in the media is crucial for the critical usage of the media in general. Palestinians seem to be concerned with the lack of coverage of events and topics on segments of society. Such as women and children.
Figure 26
2.3. Independence of media and its political significance
A free media is generally considered to be a cornerstone of a democratic society. Palestinians overwhelmingly share this point of view. When asked how important a free media is for promoting democracy in Palestine, about three quarters (74.7%) of the respondents said that it is “very important” (as shown in figure 27).
Figure 27
Palestinians are very well capable of distinguishing the desirable from reality, since, at the same time, only twenty percent of them consider the media to be entirely free (see below, figure 29).
Answers to the question “Should the media play a role in affecting the government?” were very much in line with the above findings. Palestinians favor an independent media as a strong actor vis-à-vis the government. As figure 28 illustrates, over 80 percent of the Palestinians surveyed want the media to affect government. Hence, it can be said that the concept of the media as the “fourth estate” monitoring the government, an inherently Western idea, is widely accepted by Palestinians. As a consequence, Palestinians are very concerned about the freedom of the press in their country.
Figure 28
When asked whether they deemed the Palestinian press independent or not, only one fifth (20.5%) believed in the independence of the local media, as illustrated in figure 29. While 27% claimed that the press was neither independent nor dependent but somewhere “in between,” a relative majority clearly viewed the press as being not independent at all (39.2%). This belief is more firmly held in Gaza (42.9%) than in the West Bank (37.1%). The Palestinian press has not managed to present itself as an independent player among the media present in the area.
Figure 29
Among those who expressed skepticism about the media’s independence, a combined 56.5% believed that some kind of direct censorship was the reason for this lack of freedom. As figure 30 reveals, all three forms of direct censorship – exercised by either the PNA, Israel, or both combined – scored roughly the same percentage (ranging at 14.2%, 15.7%, and 16.6% respectively).
Figure 30
Self-censorship, as exercised by either the journalists themselves (1.3%) or their superiors (3.1%), obviously, is not a major concern of the Palestinian people. Also lack of professionalism and lack of proper funding were not seen as major obstacles to a greater freedom of the press. A large relative majority (40.6%), however, believed that a combination of several of the named factors are responsible for the media’s lack of independence.
2.4. Conclusion
In general, Palestinians have developed a mature attitude towards the press, embracing modern ideas such as freedom of the press, and the controlling of government by the media. One reason for this is that Palestinian society is historically more open than that of other Arab nations. A revolutionary heritage and principles such as pluralism and transparency are stronger than anywhere else in the Arab world. The diverse civil society with its variety of NGOs, parties and associations is proof of this.
The above findings make a good point of departure for the subsequent development of an open and democratic society in a future Palestinian state. However, the critical views of the Palestinian people also hint at the major obstacles that need to be overcome in order to reach the goals envisioned. Despite censorship not being legally framed, a real freedom of the press remains yet to be established. A major problem is the traditional structure of Palestine society, which impedes the free exchange of diverse viewpoints. While the institutions for a free exchange of opinions exist, the market is yet a limited one. Touching social topics, for example, remains difficult. Journalists exercise self-censorship in order to prevent societal restrictions from coming into effect.
Palestinians show a strong ability to distinguish between what is desirable and the current situation. This, more than anything else, will enable them to gradually develop a media environment that can live up to their expectations.
A random sample of 1200 people over the age of 18 was interviewed face-to-face throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip on 21, 22 October 1999. The interviews were conducted in randomly selected homes, and the subjects inside each home were also selected randomly according to Kish tables. The interviews were conducted in 58 sampling points chosen randomly according to population.
In the West Bank, 762 people were surveyed from the following areas: Jenin: Jenin, Tubas, Jenin refugee camp, Kufr Ra’ii, ‘Arrabeh, Silat al-Harthieh. Nablus: Nablus, Salfit, Huwara, Beit-Dajan, Deir Sharaf, Kufr al-Deik, Burin, Askar refugee camp, Zuwwata. Tulkarem: Tulkarem, Tulkarem refugee camp, ‘Anabta. Qalqilia: Qalqilia, ‘Illar, al-Jayyous. Hebron: Hebron, Sa’eer, Beit-Ula, Bani N’eim, Dura, Assamou’, Tarqoumia, al-Fawwar refugee camp. Bethlehem: Bethlehem, Nahalin, al-Duhha, Husan, al-‘Azzeh refugee camp. Jericho: Jericho and ‘Ein al-Sultan refugee camp Ramallah & Jerusalem: Ramallah, al-Bireh, Jalazon refugee camp, Sinjil, Ni’ilin, Silwad, Shuqba, Old City, al-Dahieh, al-Ram, al-‘Izarieh, Abu deis, Beit-Hanina, Shu’fat, Beir Nabala, Qalandia refugee camp, Kufr Aqab, ‘Anata.
In the Gaza Strip, 438 people were surveyed from the following areas: Gaza North: Jabalia refugee camp, Jabalia, Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun. Gaza: Sheikh Radwan, a-Darji, a-Tufah, Sabra, al-Meghraqa, a-Zeitoon, a-Nasser, a-Shujaeih, a-Rimal north and south and Shati refugee camp. Deir al- Balah: Nusseirat refugee camp, Deir al-Balah refugee camp, Deir al- Balah. Khan Younis: Khan Younis, Khan Younis refugee camp, Khuza’ah, al-Qararah and Bani Suheila. Rafah: Rafah, Rafah refugee camp and Tal al-Sultan refugee camp.
The margin of error is +/ - 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.
Sample distribution
¨ 57.2% of the respondents were from West Bank, 6.3%
from Jerusalem, 36.5% from the Gaza Strip.
¨ 41.9% said they live in villages, 16.0% in refugee
camps, 42.1% in towns/cities.
¨ 47.2% were male, 52.5% were female.
¨ 66.3% were married, 26.7%, single, 3.7% widowed,
1.4% divorced, 1.9% no answer.
¨ The average age of the respondents was 34 years.