

# Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process

*An Analysis of Public Opinion Surveys in the  
West Bank and the Gaza Strip*



Written by  
Dr. Isabelle Daneels  
With a forward  
by Dr. Salim  
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**Written by Dr. Isabelle Daneels**

*With a Foreword by Dr. Salim Tamari*

*A joint project of :*







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## PREFACE

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The idea for this joint study originated in May 1999 when Oxfam GB was seeking to strengthen its advocacy initiatives in promotion of the social and civil rights of Palestinian refugees. The positive reactions from and recognized impact of Oxfam GB's policy document on the social implications of UNRWA's budget deficit propelled Oxfam to investigate further useful research. The analysis of existing opinion polls towards refugees over time was one idea that Oxfam GB took-up with JMCC, the leading pollster in Palestine. Following numerous internal and external discussions and debates over the usefulness and impact of the study, its potential value was confirmed as an unparalleled attempt worth venturing into.

This study, that is also translated into Arabic, comes at a crucial time of final peace negotiations and heightened attention on the future of Palestinian refugees – a population who have suffered from prolonged dispossession, social and political exclusion and poverty. We hope that the revealing results presented will enhance the various political deliberations by providing sound analysis on disparities in perceptions among refugees and non-refugees; camp-refugees and non-camp refugees; males and females; and the old and the young. More importantly, it unveils the effects of dynamic political epochs and events on the attitudes and opinions of populations.

Through our wide distribution of the study, we also aspire that this analysis will serve as a basis for investigating further research opportunities and as Dr. Tamari suggests in the Forward, is followed by similar endeavors regionally. We also hope it will be picked up and debated by the academicians, journalists, researchers and most importantly be the source of internal debate by refugees themselves.

Many individuals from within and outside our institutions, contributed to the successful conclusion of this study. We would particularly like to thank the following:

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Ghassan El Khatib  
JMCC  
September, 2000

Joyce Ajlouny  
Oxfam GB



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## FORWARD

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Events subsequent to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994 led to significant re-thinking among Palestinians, refugees and non-refugees alike, about the future status of the refugee question. It became clear, now that the deferred permanent status talks had begun, that the future of refugees, together with Jerusalem and settlements, were placed on top of the agenda of bilateral negotiations. Refugee groups, both inside and outside Palestine, began to mobilize and agitate lest their long-awaited grievances were overlooked or traded off in the negotiations. What became increasingly obvious in these debates was that the opinion of refugees was not clearly solicited in the course of these processes, whether in the multi-lateral negotiations, or in the bilateral talks following the Camp David meetings in the summer of 2000.

This report is significant because it represents the first systematic attempt to examine, over a period of four years, positions and shifts in public attitudes among both refugees and non-refugees in Palestine, as well as corresponding positions among Israeli Jews and Arabs, concerning such critical issues as repatriation, restitution and compensation. This study builds on and supplements the significant work done in the survey of living standards among refugees and non-refugees (FAFO, 1993), the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics Population and Housing Census (PCBS 1999) and the continued work of the CPRS and JMCC, among others, in polling samples of public opinion in the West Bank and Gaza over the last five years. However none of these surveys have examined the meaning of these studies over a significant period of time, particularly the crucial years separating the first Oslo accord, and the permanent status negotiations in Camp David in 2000.

What are the critical findings of these periodized surveys:

The first conclusion is that the early negotiations, beginning with the terms of the Oslo Agreement, gave rise to high expectations among refugees, particularly those living in camps, which were soon followed by frustration and a sense of let down when moves on the ground did not correspond to the promises inherent in these accords. This frustration was translated in higher militancy, lower support for the peace process, and a decreased faith in the ability of the PNA and its leadership to deliver. Nevertheless, and contrary to expectations, support among camp and non-camp refugees is still substantial in continued peace negotiations, and in the Palestinian leadership—though to a significantly reduced rate.

Secondly, the findings show a high degree of volatility among camp refugees in a manner not observed outside the camps. During the intifada camp refugees



(particularly in Gaza, Bethlehem, and Nablus) initiated and led the civil insurrection against Israeli military rule. In this survey we notice a higher initial support of the peace negotiations and less opposition to the terms of settlement among camp refugees, to be reversed in 1999 in favor of increased opposition to the peace process. Why do we have this more extreme reversal of attitudes among camp refugees? It is partly the result of the lack of concrete expectations for a reasonably just solution from the current deliberations on refugees, in response to which camp refugees have increasingly adhered to a principled position towards issues of resettlement and compensation, insisting on categorical implementation of the right of return, which is reinforced by refugees' physical proximity and access to their former homes and properties. This should indicate to policymakers that any future packaged solution must include a component of repatriation of refugees to Israel if it is to succeed. Furthermore, it is worth noting as well that these reversals reflect a tendency towards sudden shift in attitudes depending on anticipated results of political events that are not based on long term assessment of options.

Thirdly, having said that, we must note that the differences between refugees and non-refugees (as well as between camp and non-camp refugees) are not that crucial, particularly when we take into account degrees of error in statistical extrapolation. While differences between camp and non-camp refugees are marked, we note that the even more crucial determinants of difference are regional (Gaza vs. West Bank), generational (old vs. young), gender-based (males vs. female), and only finally, refugees vs. non-refugees. The study notes in this regard that women tend to be more supportive of the peace process than men, older people more than young people. As for the regional factor, the study notes that initial support for the peace process was higher in Gaza than in the West Bank, only to be reversed three years later. The survey authors correctly attribute this to the higher frustration with the results among camp refugees in Gaza whose weight is much higher among the population as a whole compared to the West Bank.

Furthermore, it is significant to note that regional differences and the generation gap are more significant in terms of variance than the gap between refugees and non-refugees. I would also venture to say, on the bases of previous studies, that the attitudes of camps residents vs. refugees outside the camps tends to be, to some extent, a variance among members of different class categories, where the refugee status is enhanced and complicated by additional attributes of poverty and displacement.

FOURTHLY, the trends described here show substantial political atomization among all sectors of the population. Although Yaser Arafat and Fateh continue to garner substantial support from refugees and non-refugees in both regions, this support is dropping. What is more interesting is that the drop in support for the PNA and the peace process is not being translated into higher militancy (with the marginal exception of refugee camps in Gaza where an 8% increase of support for Hamas was recorded), or into support for oppositional figures like Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, or Haidar Abul Shafie. Parties in opposition have either kept their low level of support, or have experienced a historical decline. It seems that people are losing faith in politics and political parties. In electoral terms this may mean that independent candidates and political figures with no party affiliation have a better chance in attracting support than old partisans. On the negative side, it means that it has become more difficult to mobilize support either for or against political issues.



Another value of this survey is that it has established comparative indices of measurement for changing attitudes in Israel, both among Arabs and Jews. What is interesting in this regards is that Israeli Jewish attitudes about the refugee issue, though deeply divided, reflect a significantly more conciliatory approach towards such controversial issues as repatriation, restitution, and the right of return, than any Israeli government, whether Labour or Likud. In other words, these surveys show that the Israeli public is more likely to accept a settlement that breaks the historical taboos against refugee return (for example, in a plebiscite) than is being presumed either by the public media, or the utterances of Israeli leaders, both right and left. Having said that, one must realistically note that a majority of Israeli Jews continue to reject an agreement based on General Assembly Resolution 194, or assigning blame on their own state for the fate of the refugees themselves. Nevertheless it seems that fully one third of the Israeli Jewish public (31%) accept the thesis of revisionist historians who assert that the cause of the flight of refugees in the 1948 war lies in the acts of expulsion by Israeli military forces. Such attitudes would have been unthinkable only ten years ago.

Although there are noticeable differences in attitudes by region, there is nevertheless significant convergence among Gazans, West Bankers, and Palestinians in Israel on the crucial questions concerning the right of return, the practicality of its application, and in assigning Israeli responsibility for the flight of refugees in the 1948 war. The study underscores the increasing articulation of the voice of Palestinians in Israel ('Israeli Arabs') in participating in final status deliberations. Many of these voices demand to be heard as *Israeli citizens* who should be heard on equal par with their Jewish compatriots. This is especially significant for the policy maker since any potential repatriation of refugees to the Galilee (particularly refugees from Lebanon) will most likely involve Arab villages in the northern part of Israel in matters of absorption and relocation. The survey shows considerable divergence of attitudes between the three Arab communities and those of Israeli Jews, with a majority among the latter being opposed to repatriation, restitution of property, as well as in assigning blame or responsibility on the part of the Israeli state and its armed forces during the war. Nevertheless, as noted above, this rejection shows considerable amelioration--and one important value of this study points to shifting trends in Israel in favor of reconciliation and the breaching of what used to be taboo subject. One should look here for trends, and possibilities, not for absolute figures.

Finally a word should be mentioned as to where this study can be fruitfully expanded and replicated. The study deals with attitudes in Palestine and Israel alone. The bulk of the Palestinian refugees still live in Arab and foreign host countries, and their opinions are crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the peace process on the global fate of Palestinian refugees. The methodology and contents of this study could be usefully replicated, with proper methodological adjustments, to refugee groupings in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Here it is quite likely that we would witness significant divergences from the results cited here. That, however, should be the more reason for extending the scope of this survey in the near future.





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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The findings of this joint Oxfam - GB/JMCC report on the attitudes of refugees may be summarized as follows:

PART ONE of this report details how the peace process has enjoyed widespread support among Palestinians from 1996 to 1999, according to survey data. Still, analysis of support for key Palestinian political players and official institutions underscores that the peace process enjoys much less support than it did when it commenced.

While the majority of the Palestinian public continues to **support the peace process** with Israel, that support has declined by 13% from 1996 to 1999, the years within the scope of this report. Those opposing the peace process have increased by 21% over the same period.

- Among refugees versus non-refugees, these trends are repeated. A small shift is noted from April 1997 to March 1999, where refugees, previously more supportive of the peace process than non-refugees, become slowly less supportive of the peace process than non-refugees.
- A break with these trends appears, however, in examination of the attitudes of Palestinians living in refugee camps, versus those living in villages and cities. Those living in the camps are clearly less supportive of the peace process than those living in other areas.
- Further, while *refugees* living in refugee camps were in 1997 less in opposition of the peace process than refugees living *outside* refugee camps, their opposition to the peace process increased by 19.1% over three years. By March of 1999, they were less supportive of and more in opposition to the peace process than refugees living outside the camps.
- While attitudes in the West Bank and Gaza towards the peace process are now quite similar, that is largely because Gaza Strip residents have changed their opinions significantly. The roots of this change seem to be found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps. It is a major hypothesis of this report that the 13% drop in support for and 26% increase in opposition to the peace process seen in the Gaza Strip is due largely to this change in opinion among refugee camp residents.
- Palestinian women are more supportive of the peace process than are Palestinian men. On average over three years, 73.4% of female respondents

said that they support the peace process, as compared with only 65.4% of male respondents. Recently, however, this gap appears to be closing. Similar trends are repeated among male and female refugees.

- JMCC opinion polls show that support for the peace process gradually increases with age, while opposition to the peace process decreases with age. Over the years, all age groups remain fairly consistent in showing a gradual increase of 22% in opposition to the peace process.

The **political faction** which the majority of Palestinians place the most trust in is Fateh, the political faction of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat. Hamas is the second most trusted faction, with other factions garnering incremental amounts of trust. However, a high and increasing number of respondents over the years say that they trust no political faction. In January 1996, 17.1% of interviewees said that they did not trust any faction, but by October 1999, this number had doubled. The increase appears to come at the expense of trust in Hamas and Fateh.

- Among refugee camp residents in 1996, trust in Fateh was significantly higher than among villagers or city residents. Over time, however, trust in Fateh among camp residents decreased by 13%, while trust in Fateh among other groups changed only slightly.
- Further, while trust in Fateh in the West Bank has stayed nearly the same, the Gaza Strip has seen an 11.5% drop in trust in Fateh over the years. When these results are broken down according to refugee camp residency, it appears that this decline is directly related to the opinions of Gaza Strip refugee camp residents, who show a 16% plunge in trust in Fateh since 1996. While city residents show a wavering decline in trust in Fateh, villagers in the Gaza Strip actually increased their trust in Fateh over the same period.
- Trust in Hamas is almost always higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. It is notable that trust in Hamas has stayed fairly stable in both areas over the years. The important exception is in Gaza Strip refugee camps, where a steady 8% increase is seen in trust in Hamas. This rise has not been reflected in the Gaza Strip as a whole.

By far, the **Palestinian personality** who garners the most trust among survey respondents is Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin comes in a distant second. Notable, while in April 1997, 18% of respondents said that they did not trust anyone, this number had increased to 29.9% by October 1999. The increase in those trusting no one comes at the expense of trust in Arafat and Yassin.

- Both Arafat and Yassin enjoy slightly higher trust among refugees than among non-refugees. Trust in Yassin among refugees seems to be increasing, however incrementally. Refugees are consistently less likely than non-refugees to say they trust no one, although both groups show a 30% rise in trusting no Palestinian personality.
- A breakdown of the opinions of Gaza Strip residents by place of residency shows that, in the Gaza Strip, the gradual decline in trust in Arafat appears to



be attributed to an erosion of trust among refugee camp residents. Gaza Strip refugee camp residents lost trust in Arafat by 17% over the years, dropping only 5% in villages and 11% in cities.

While the Palestinian public evaluates **Palestinian Authority performance** largely positively, that evaluation has worsened over time, with 32% of respondents in October 1999 evaluating Palestinian Authority performance negatively. In 1997 and 1998, Gaza Strip residents evaluated the Palestinian Authority more positively than did West Bankers, but in 1999, West Bankers became more pleased with the Palestinian Authority's performance, with 68% saying it was good, compared with 58% of Gaza Strip respondents saying it was good. In a breakdown of the Gaza Strip by city camp and village, the largest drop over time (33%) in those evaluating the Palestinian Authority's performance as good, and parallel increase (30%) in those evaluating the Palestinian Authority's performance as bad is seen among Gaza Strip city residents.

In concluding Part One's findings, while dissatisfaction with the peace process is widespread, it is slightly more evident among Palestinian refugees and markedly so among residents of refugee camps. One explanation for this could be the marginalization of the refugee issue in continuing Palestinian-Israeli talks and the inability of the Palestinian leadership to rally behind a clear agenda on the refugee issue. Frustration with the peace process is now higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, a trend that appears to be informed by the attitudes and opinions of refugees and refugee camp residents.

PART TWO of this report explores Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip attitudes on the rights of refugees and solutions to the refugee problem, glancing for comparative purposes at the opinions of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel. This overview demonstrates that the opinions of Palestinians in Israel on the refugee problem are strikingly similar to those of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Further, while the Palestinian public in general attaches high importance and difficulty to the refugee issue and generally agrees how it might be resolved, refugees tend to be more adamant in their views towards a resolution of the refugee problem.

The views of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, combined with those of Palestinians in Israel, are often antithetical to those of Israeli Jews when discussing the refugee issue. When asked **the most "difficult" issue on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations** table, however, all parties overwhelmingly agreed that it is the issue of Jerusalem and its status. Both Palestinians in the territories and inside Israel say that the refugee issue is the second most difficult issue to be settled, while Israeli Jews consider the issue of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza next in difficulty.

- In examining the views of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by refugee status, while both refugees and non-refugees agree on the most "difficult" issues, it is clear that refugees attach higher difficulty to the issue of refugees. This trend is even more pronounced among refugee camp residents in comparison with residents of cities and villages.



- When asked the most "important" issue, both refugees and non-refugees see the issue of Jerusalem as slightly more "difficult" than "important." Among refugee camp residents, however, a solution to the refugee problem is more "important" than all other issues.
- Further, both refugees (versus non-refugees) and residents of refugee camps (versus those living outside camps) attach less difficulty and importance to the issue of borders.

One half of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip say that Israel was either solely or **mostly responsible for the creation of the 1948 refugee problem**. Another 42% of Palestinians give Israel joint responsibility with Arab parties.

In fact, 59% of Palestinian respondents in the territories said that the **"immediate cause" of the 1948 refugee problem** was the expulsion of the refugees by Jewish forces. Another 21% said that refugees left in part due to being expelled by Jewish forces, as well as other causes.

- By comparison, 30% of Israeli Jewish respondents said that the refugees left voluntarily, although a significant 31% said that the immediate cause of the 1948 refugee problem was the refugees' expulsion by Jewish forces.
- Among West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians, refugees are slightly more of the opinion than non-refugees that the immediate cause of the refugee problem was their expulsion by Jewish forces. Refugee camp residents, however, are much more of this opinion (with 67.2% of respondents choosing this answer) than Palestinians who live in cities (54.3%) and villages (60.6%).
- Respondents in the Gaza Strip were much more likely than those in the West Bank to say that the cause of the refugee problem was the refugees' expulsion by Jewish forces. It appears that the roots of this opinion are found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, where 70% of refugee camp residents say that the cause of the refugee problem was mainly their expulsion by Jewish forces and only 6% say that the refugee problem was caused by a combination of expulsion by Jewish forces and being told to leave by Arab leaders. By comparison, approximately 60% of villagers and city residents said that mainly, the refugees were expelled by Jewish forces and 13 and 12% respectively said that the refugees were expelled by Jewish forces and told to leave by Arab leaders.

Eighty-two percent of Palestinian respondents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip said that the **most just solution to the refugee problem** is one based on United Nations Resolution 194, which calls for the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not return. Only 11% of Palestinians say that the most just solution would be that which appears to be on the negotiations table now, i.e., return for a limited number of refugees and suitable compensation for those who do not return, to be negotiated between Israel and Palestinians.

- By comparison, only 4.5% of Israeli Jewish respondents said that the most just solution to the refugee issue is one based on United Nations Resolution



194. Fifty-seven percent said that only those refugees approved by Israel should be allowed to return and compensation given to those who do not.

- Palestinian refugees are even more adamant than non-refugees that a solution based on UN Resolution 194 is the "most just" and "most feasible" solution to the refugee problem. Male refugees answered more often than female refugees that the most just solution is one based in international law.
- Interestingly, five percent more refugees living outside refugee camps said that the "most just" solution to the refugee problem is one based on international law than did refugees living in the camps. Still, the 83% of refugees living in camps said that the "most just" solution was one based on UN Resolution 194.

When asked the **"most feasible" solution to the refugee problem**, fully one fourth (the most of all surveyed subgroups) of refugees living in camps said that the most feasible solution was one based on a limited return and compensation to be negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians. Still, 58% of refugees in camps said that the "most feasible" solution is one based on UN Resolution 194. In comparison, 69% of refugees outside camps said that the "most feasible" solution is one based on international law.

- Here it appears that the opinions of refugees in refugee camps influence the trends visible in the Gaza Strip as a whole. West Bank residents are nearly 10% percent more likely than Gaza Strip residents to say that the "most feasible" solution to the refugee problem is one based in international law.

On the issue **right of return**, over 55% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip agree without qualification with the principle that "according to international law, people who have left their homes voluntarily or by force as a result of war conditions are entitled to return home once hostilities end."

- As to whether that principle applies to Palestinian refugees, Palestinians in the territories agreed or strongly agreed at a combined rate of 81%. Only 40% of the Israeli Jewish public said that they agreed at all that the principle of return applies to Palestinian refugees.
- Both Palestinians in Israel (by 82%) and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (by 80%) agree that any Palestinian refugees who want to return should be allowed to. In contrast, only 12% of Israeli Jews gave this answer, with a full 43% saying that no refugees at all should be allowed to return.
- When looking at breakdowns of Palestinian opinion in the territories, several trends become visible. Refugees are even more unequivocal than the general public over the principle of the right of return, with 59% agreeing without qualifications. Villagers are much more likely than city dwellers or camps residents to agree with qualifications to the statement that international law supports the right of return.
- Refugees are more adamant (7% more) than non-refugees that the principle of the right of return applies to them. Ten percent of refugee camp residents,

the most of all groups, actually disagree that the right of return applies to them. It is unclear if this is based on camp residents' understanding of the right of return or on how they have seen it applied.

- Nearly 10% more refugees than non-refugees agreed that anyone who wants to return should be able to, although the vast majority of both groups gave this answer. Villagers (15%) said more than any other group that a few thousand refugees should be allowed to return.

When Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were asked who should bear the **financial burden of compensating the refugees**, only 21% of respondents said that Israel alone should bear the financial burden. Most said that the responsibility of compensation should fall on both Israel and international institutions like the United Nations.

- In a breakdown according to refugee and non-refugee status, refugees said more often that Israel and the United Nations should be the source of compensation. Camp refugees preferred over refugees not living in camps that the source of compensation be Israel, international bodies and Arab governments combined or Israel and the United Nations.

IN CONCLUSION, this report demonstrates that it is important not to regard the refugees as one homogeneous group. While refugee attitudes tend to be more adamant than those of the general population, refugee opinion varies significantly according to residency in refugee camps and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Finally, the general Palestinian public and its leadership must take note of these views as negotiations continue over a final settlement with Israel.



The longitudinal section of this report uses 1999 as a starting date because it was the year of the first Palestinian general elections. The following surveys were used in the report: April 1998, April 1997, May 1997, July 1997, August 1997, November 1997, May 1998, August 1998, March 1999, August 1999, October 1999, and November 1999.

## INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH APPROACH

The selection of respondents is preceded by a selection of geographic concentrations. The survey is divided into a historical sample of approximately 7,500, joined as three villages or camps. This selection is based on population statistics collected by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Ministry of the Interior.

This report aims to identify the attitudes of Palestinian refugees with respect to the political situation and the extent that these attitudes conform with those of the remainder of the Palestinian public living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including Jerusalem.

The study is divided into two main parts. The first part explores the attitudes of the Palestinian public, including refugees in general and residents of refugee camps specifically, on their level of support for the peace process, various political or religious factions and leaders and Palestinian institutions such as the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council.

The second part of this report, based solely on a survey conducted in November 1999, addresses issues pertaining to the refugee problem. It deals with the attitudes of the Palestinian public, with a special focus on refugee opinion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, on issues such as the origin of the refugee problem, the right of return and compensation for the refugees.

While the first section of this report looks at popular opinion over a period of four years, the second section deals with attitudes on the refugee issue at the time of the November 1999 poll. Thus, the first section is an overview of changing public attitudes on the issues over a period of time, while the second does not reflect such shifts as it is not longitudinal or comparable with other similar surveys.

This report is based on data collected by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC). Only a number of the JMCC's many surveys were used in this report. Due to the large number of surveys and the large volume of data, the researcher opted to select a sample of these polls in this report.

Surveys and questions from those surveys were selected for use in this report in three ways - by the use of similar wording in survey questions; according to the consistency of the question values (answers) and according to the time period of the surveys. It is important to note that the researcher examined other surveys in order to be certain that their responses do not deviate from the trends reported in this study. The researcher is confident that the addition of other surveys would not call into question the conclusions of this report.

The comparative section of this report uses 1996 as a starting date because it was the year of the first Palestinian general elections. The following surveys were used in this report: April 1996, April 1997, May 1997, July 1997, August 1997, November 1997, May 1998, August 1998, March 1999, August 1999, October 1999, and November 1999.

The surveys of the JMCC are based on a random sample of approximately 1,200 people over the age of 18, who are interviewed face-to-face throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The respondents are selected randomly according to Kish Tables that take into consideration both the gender and age of household members.

The selection of households is preceded by a selection of population concentrations, defined as cities, villages, or camps. This selection is based on population estimates published by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Health Development Information Project (HDIP). The population concentrations are then subdivided into sampling points proportionate to the associated population concentration. Thus, if a particular village has a population of 10,000, it is assigned 10 sampling points.

Using the computer database Excel, an average of 60 sampling points for each poll were randomly selected from the combined West Bank and Gaza Strip sampling points. Each of the selected sampling points was assigned 20 questionnaires and one interviewer.

The November 1999 survey discussed in the second half of this report used a similar methodology. However, this survey was unique as part of a project that put the same questions to both the Israeli Jewish public and Palestinians living in Israel. The Steinmetz Center at Tel Aviv University conducted the survey among Israelis. The survey of Palestinians in Israel was directed by Professor Elia Zureik of Queen's University in Ontario, Canada and was supervised by Dr. As'ad Ghanem of Haifa University in Israel. The second section of this report concentrates largely on the opinions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, using the opinions of Israelis and Palestinians in Israel in a comparative manner.

Because of controversy surrounding the definition of a refugee, it is important to state that this report uses the term "refugee" for those Palestinians who identify themselves as such. The respondents were asked "Are you a refugee or not?" and then classified as "refugee" or "non-refugee" by their response. The classification of "camp resident," "villager" or "city resident," however, was made on the basis of the number of sampling points given to where the interviews took place. Once self-identified refugee status and place of residence were cross-tabulated, it was possible to distinguish further categories within the refugee sample according to age and gender.



It is also worth noting that millions of Palestinian refugees do not reside in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Accordingly, the attitudes in this report reflect, and *only reflect*, the attitudes and views of those refugees residing in those two areas and not elsewhere. In addition, as the refugees interviewed are part of a larger Palestinian population sample, their numbers are relatively small for drawing statistical inferences, particularly when the refugee subgroup is further subdivided into various categories, such as gender and age.

This report does not claim to analyse Palestinian attitudes nor does it claim to explain the reasons behind such attitudes. It merely attempts to objectively describe what these attitudes are on various political issues - not why such attitudes prevail. Although analysis of the reasons for these attitudes is extremely important, it was not in the scope of this report. The goal of this report is to provide those interested in the refugee situation with better insight, enabling in-depth examination of the dynamics of Palestinian refugee opinion.





Figure 1

Figure 1: Evolution of the Peace Process

## PART ONE: PALESTINIAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES OVER TIME

### Background

The Oslo process, commencing with the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), was both a dramatic transformation in Palestinian political realities and the beginning of a progression of shifts in Palestinian public opinion. In 1994, the Palestinian Authority, an interim government derived from the PLO, was established in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1996, Palestinian elections were held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the seats of the Palestinian Legislative Council, an interim legislative body. Until today, the PLO's negotiations with Israel continue in efforts to bring the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to a close in a final peace accord.

The following pages explore Palestinians' evolving attitudes towards the peace process and the Palestinian political establishment from 1996 until 1999. In particular, the views of the Palestinian refugees are compared to those of the wider public in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to delineate how the local refugee population is an effective adherent of or opponent to the peace process, the actors involved and the institutions it brought about.


### 1. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PEACE PROCESS

#### 1.1. In general

The majority of the Palestinian public supports the current peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. However, as indicated in Figure 1 below, there has been a small but extremely significant and consistent drop in support for the peace process from 1996 to 1999 - a decline in support of 13%. The significance of this drop is reinforced by the consistent and relatively greater increase in those opposing the peace process over the same time period. Those opposing the peace process increased by 21%, reflecting a switch to the side of the opposition from those either previously supporting the peace process or declining to answer the question.



Figure 1:



## 1.2. According to categories of refugee status and other indicators

### 1.2.1. According to refugee status

Palestinian attitudes towards the peace process among refugees mirror the above trends. Table 1 presents refugee and non-refugee attitudes on the peace process. Over the two years examined, there is very little difference in opinion between the two groups. A small shift is noted from April 1997 to March 1999, where refugees, previously more supportive of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process than non-refugees, become slowly less supportive of the peace process than non-refugees.

**Table 1: Evaluation of the peace process according to refugee status**

	Refugees		Non-refugees	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Apr. '97	74.4	21.7	71.4	24.5
July '97	69.2	25.8	68.3	27.3
Nov. '97	72.7	23.2	75.6	20.9
Aug. '98	52.5	40.1	58.3	34.2
Mar. '99	65.7	32.5	62.6	35.9

### 1.2.2. According to refugee camp residency

The similarity in opinion seen above disappears, however, when the responses are broken down according to place of residency. The greatest shift in attitudes of support or opposition to the peace process is observed among refugee camp residents, versus those who reside in villages or cities. Table 2 below shows clearly that while the highest show of support for the peace process was found in refugee

camps in 1997, that support dropped by 16.6% over the next two years. In villages and cities, support for the peace process dropped by 7% and 7.8% respectively over the same period.

**Table 2: Evaluation of the peace process according to place of residency**

	Village		Refugee camp		City	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Apr. '97	72.5	25.5	77.2	17.4	71.0	24.6
July '97	70.7	25.7	72.9	21.5	65.3	29.7
Nov. '97	74.8	21.5	70.7	25.1	75.6	21.1
Aug. '98	57.2	34.6	54.3	35.8	54.6	39.9
Mar. '99	65.5	33.6	60.6	37.4	63.2	34.8

Even more notably, opposition to the peace process rose by 20% in camps from 1997 to 1999, while opposition in cities increased by 10.2% and in villages by 8.1%.

### 1.2.3. Refugees in camps and refugees outside camps

A comparison of the findings in Tables 1 and 2 indicates that refugees outside the camps are more supportive of the peace process than camp refugees. This explains why it initially appears that there is no significant difference between the opinions of refugees on the peace process, and those of the wider population. In the West Bank, 26.1% of refugees live in refugee camps, while in the Gaza Strip 54.9% of refugees live in the refugee camps, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

**Table 3: Evaluation of the peace process amongst camp refugees and non-camp refugees**

	Refugees in camps		Refugees outside camps	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Apr. '97	76.9	17.5	71.7	26.2
July '97	73.4	21.7	65.2	29.7
Nov. '97	70.4	25.2	74.5	21.7
Aug. '98	54.1	36.2	51.4	42.6
Mar. '99	61.3	36.6	68.1	30.4

The emerging difference in opinion between camp and non-camp refugees has been quite marked, as shown in Table 3. Whereas in April 1997, camp refugees were clearly more supportive of the peace process than refugees living outside the camps, by March 1999, support for the peace process among camp refugees declined by 15.6%, as compared to a drop of only 3.6% among refugees living outside the camps. Similarly, opposition to the peace process among camp refugees increased by 19.1%, compared to an increase of only 4.2% among non-camp refugees. In fact, in March 1999, refugees not living in camps were even more supportive of the peace process than non-refugees (see Table 3).



## 1.2.4. According to residence in the West Bank vs. Gaza Strip

There are sharp differences over time in Palestinian attitudes towards the peace process in the West Bank versus the Gaza Strip. Whereas in 1996, support for the peace process was greater in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, this had changed by the end of 1997. Indeed, from then on, support for the peace process has been greater in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.

**Table 4: Evaluation of the peace process in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip**

	West Bank		Gaza Strip	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Apr. '96	74.0	14.7	80.8	10.6
Apr. '97	67.9	27.4	80.9	16.9
July '97	65.7	28.4	73.1	23.9
Nov. '97	75.3	21.1	73.7	22.3
Aug. '98	57.7	36.5	54.9	38.1
Mar. '99	65.2	32.2	63.5	36.1

While attitudes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are now quite similar, it is clear from Table 4 that this similarity is in fact the result of a major shift in attitudes in the Gaza Strip. Over the years, support for the peace process decreased by nearly 20%, while opposition to the peace process increased by 26%. Comparatively, in the West Bank, support fell by less than 9%, though opposition increased by 17%.

This study hypothesises that the drop in support for the peace process in the Gaza Strip reflects the higher number and relatively greater percentage of camp refugees in Gaza Strip over the West Bank. As previously stated, overall support for the peace process dropped most among residents of the refugee camps; thus the larger percentage of those living in Gaza Strip refugee camps, versus Gaza Strip cities or villages may have influenced the evaluation of the peace process among Gaza Strip residents as a whole. To confirm this, it is necessary to break down the population of the Gaza Strip by city, village or camp residency.

**Table 5: Level of support and opposition to the peace process among Gazans according to area**

	Village		Refugee camp		City	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Apr. '97	78.7	19.6	80.5	16.1	82.0	16.9
	N*=61		N=210		N=189	
July '97	75.7	24.3	76.2	19.6	70.0	27.7
	N=37		N=189		N=213	
Nov. '97	-	-	68.9	16.6	79.3	18.5
	N=11**		N=203		N=217	
Aug. '98	53.8	40.1	50.9	37.8	59.0	37.8
	N=80		N=167		N=188	
Mar. '99	63.3	36.7	56.7	42.6	67.6	31.9
	N=79		N=141		N=216	

\* N = number of respondents

\*\* The number of villagers interviewed in November 1997 was too small to be statistically significant.

These results clearly indicate that, while in April 1997 there was no noteworthy difference in opinion on the peace process between villagers, camp dwellers and city residents, by November 1997, this had changed. Further, by March 1999, there was less support for the peace process among camp residents than among Gazans living in cities or villages.

In the same period, opposition to the peace process among camp residents was higher than opposition in the remainder of the Gaza Strip population. These findings support the idea that Gazan opinions on the peace process are greatly influenced by the large number of refugees living in the Gaza Strip camps.

#### 1.2.5. According to gender and refugee status

Palestinian women are much more supportive of the peace process than men, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. On average over three years, 73.4% of female respondents said that they support the peace process, as compared with only 65.4% of male respondents. In addition, far fewer women than men stated that they outright oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Whereas on average over the years, 20.8% of female interviewees said that they were opposed to the peace process, 29.6% of male interviewees gave this response. Recently, however, this gap appears to be closing.

Figure 2:







Figure 3:

*Level of support and opposition to the peace process**According to the surveyed women*

While the number of men opposing the peace process increased dramatically and primarily in 1996 and 1997, women's withdrawal of support for the peace process happened more gradually over time and appears to be continuing.

Among refugees, these trends according to gender persist (Figures 4 and 5). While both female and male refugees have become less supportive of the peace process over the years, women refugees remained more supportive of the peace process than refugee men until very recently. On average over the years, 74% of women refugees supported the peace process, as compared with 67.4% of male refugees. Slightly more than 20% of women refugees opposed the peace process on average, compared with 29.2% of men who said they were opposed to the peace process.

Figure 4:





Figure 5:





## 1.2.6. According to age and refugee status

In JMCC opinion polls conducted over a three year period, support for the peace process gradually but clearly increases with age, while opposition gradually decreases with age. All age groups remained fairly consistent in their support or opposition to the peace process, within a gradual decline among all groups. Illustratively, while those aged 18-30, 31-45 and 46-60, expressed varying levels of opposition to the peace process, all three groups increased their opposition to the peace process by approximately 22% over three years.

Table 6: Evaluation of the peace process according to age

	18-30 years		31-45 years		46-60 years		Above 60 years	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
Apr. '96	75.8	15.0	75.9	11.7	81.8	10.7	84.6	5.8
Apr. '97	69.3	27.1	72.5	21.9	81.1	16.6	85.7	9.6
Aug. '97	66.2	28.2	66.7	26.8	76.2	17.4	84.5	6.6
July '98	62.9	32.9	66.3	27.4	72.1	25.1	77.8	11.2
Mar. '99	61.2	37.3	65.5	33.2	65.4	32.7	72.9	22.9

Notably, while Palestinians aged 18-30 are consistently less supportive of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process than their older counterparts, the largest drop in support for the peace process occurred not in this subset, but among Palestinians aged 46-60. Palestinian respondents above 60 years of age remain the group most supportive of the peace process and have increased opposition to the peace process at a lesser rate than other age groups (a 17% increase, as compared to a 22% boost in other age groups). However, those aged 31-45 have been the most steady supporters of the peace process, dropping in support by only 10% over the years.

The age factor may also have played a role in the level of support for the peace process among refugees. It is difficult, however, to determine its impact categorically as some subgroups of refugees according to age are too small to be considered statistically valid. The results in Table 7 can only be considered informative and cannot be used to draw conclusions.



Table 7: Evaluation of the peace process among refugees according to age

	Refugees							
	18-30 Years		31-45 Years		46-60 Years		Above 60*	
	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose	Support	Oppose
April '96	76.4	15.3	75.5	13.8	90.6	3.8	95.0	5.0
	N=275		N=159		N=53		N=20	
April '97	70.5	25.7	73.3	21.7	83.7	13.4	96.3	3.8
	N=308		N=157		N=75		N=26	
August '97	65.6	27.5	65.2	26.8	66.0	22.0	84.2	5.3
	N=276		N=138		N=50		N=19	
July '98	64.5	33.0	65.6	28.0	69.8	27.0	79.2	16.6
	N=251		N=157		N=63		N=24	
March '99	64.6	34.3	65.9	32.3	62.5	34.4	85.7	9.5
	N=254		N=167		N=64		N=21	

\* The age group of above 60 is not statistically significant, because the number of interviewees in this age group is too small.

## 2. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL FACTIONS AND PERSONALITIES

### 2.1. Public attitudes towards political factions

#### 2.1.1. In general


In every JMCC poll, when respondents were asked which political or religious faction they trust, most answered that they trusted Fateh.<sup>1</sup> Fateh is the strongest faction represented in the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the faction of PLO Chairman and Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat.

The Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, a group that opposes the Oslo negotiations process, was the second most trusted faction. Interviewees' trust in other political or religious factions such as leftist, Communist or more marginal Islamist groups was negligible. Therefore, in Figure 6, the number of respondents that indicated that they trusted a third faction were added together under "Others."

<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that the survey question asked on trust in political or religious factions is open-ended, i.e., the respondents are not presented with a predetermined list of factions to choose from.



Figure 6:



What is perhaps most interesting in these results is that a high and increasing number of respondents state that they do not trust any political or religious faction. Whereas in January 1996, 17.1% of the interviewees said that they did not trust any faction, this number had doubled by October 1999. A closer look at Figure 6 demonstrates that whenever popular trust in Fateh and Hamas decreases, the number of respondents stating that they do not trust any political or religious faction increases. Support for Hamas and Fateh also appears to be more and more interrelated - when trust in Fateh has gone up, trust in Hamas has also gone up and vice versa.

#### 2.1.2. According to categories of refugee status and other indicators

##### 2.1.2.1. According to refugee status

There are no significant trends over the years concerning the level of trust in Fateh between refugees and non-refugees. Both groups show a slight drop in trust in Fateh between January 1996 and October 1999.

Table 8: Trust in Fateh according to refugee status

	Refugees	Non-refugees
Jan. '96	38.4	39.3
Apr. '96	32.5	34.3
Apr. '97	39.1	38.0
Jul. '97	35.3	34.5
May '98	32.4	33.1
Aug. '98	38.9	31.0
Mar. '99	40.2	35.9
Oct. '99	32.1	35.4

As illustrated in Table 9 below, trust in Hamas has been slightly higher among refugees than non-refugees. Particularly since July 1997, refugees' trust in Hamas has consistently been at least two percent higher than that among non-refugees.

**Table 9: Trust in Hamas according to refugee status**

	Refugees	Non-refugees
Jan. '96	13.6	11.4
Apr. '96	7.4	8.0
Apr. '97	10.9	10.2
Jul. '97	12.1	10.7
May '98	16.2	11.3
Aug. '98	14.9	11.7
Mar. '99	16.6	13.4
Oct. '99	12.3	10.1

#### 2.1.2.2. According to refugee camp residency

In the beginning of 1996, trust in Fateh was significantly higher among refugee camp residents than among villagers or respondents in cities. Over time, however, this has changed dramatically. While trust in Fateh in other locales either stayed nearly the same or dropped somewhat, trust in Fateh among refugee camp residents steadily decreased, registering a 14% drop in the level in trust over the three year survey period.

**Table 10: Trust in Fateh according to refugee camp residency**

	Village	Refugee Camp	City
Jan. '96	38.1	44.6	36.5
Apr. '96	33.1	35.9	31.9
Apr. '97	42.4	40.1	35.2
Jul. '97	34.7	33.0	35.9
May '98	37.0	37.9	27.1
Aug. '98	31.8	43.4	33.1
Mar. '99	40.2	37.9	35.5
Oct. '99	40.8	30.7	27.9

As indicated in Table 11 below, trust in Hamas, particularly since July 1997, has been higher in refugee camps than in villages and cities. In March 1999, nearly one-fourth of refugee camp residents said they trusted Hamas more than any other group.



**Table 11: Trust in Hamas according to refugee camp residency**

	Village	Refugee Camp	City
Jan. '96	11.6	11.9	13.1
Apr. '96	7.0	11.1	7.2
Apr. '97	14.0	9.9	8.8
Jul. '97	11.1	12.6	10.8
May '98	11.3	16.9	13.4
Aug. '98	13.2	18.4	11.5
Mar. '99	16.1	21.2	11.3
Oct. '99	11.1	13.5	10.1

**2.1.2.3. According to West Bank vs. Gaza Strip residency**

While trust in Fateh in the West Bank has stayed at nearly the same level from 1996 to 1999, trust in Fateh in the Gaza Strip has declined by 12%. The drop in trust in Fateh over the years in the Gaza Strip appears to be directly related to the drop in trust in Fateh among refugee camp residents. Referring to the breakdown by refugee camp residency above (Table 10), it appears that the opinions of the Gaza Strip as a whole most resemble the opinions of refugee camp residents, which lost trust in Fateh by 14% over the same period (villagers gained trust in Fateh, while city residents lost trust in Fateh to a lesser degree).

**Table 12: Trust in Fateh in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip**

	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Jan. '96	37.3	43.0
Apr. '96	28.9	41.3
Apr. '97	37.8	42.8
Jul. '97	36.0	34.9
May '98	32.1	36.7
Aug. '98	32.9	41.6
Mar. '99	38.9	42.2
Oct. '99	37.6	31.5

A further breakdown of Gaza Strip responses according to residence, supports the idea that the overall decline in trust in Fateh in the Gaza Strip was largely influenced by a significant loss of trust in Fateh among Gaza Strip refugee camps residents. While opinions have wavered over the years, refugee camps residents responses show a 16% plunge in trust in Fateh since 1996.

**Table 13: Trust in Fateh in the Gaza Strip according to camp, city and village**

	<b>Village*</b>	<b>Refugee Camp</b>	<b>City</b>
Jan. '96	41.7	48.2	39.2
	N=60	N=164	N=199
Apr. '96	50.8	36.6	43.5
	N=61	N=194	N=177
Apr. '97	45.9	41.9	42.9
	N=61	N=210	N=189
Jul. '97	64.9	31.7	32.4
	N=37	N=189	N=213
May '98	47.1	38.0	32.8
	N=51	N=187	N=195
Aug. '98	32.5	43.1	44.1
	N=80	N=167	N=188
Mar. '99	50.6	34.8	44.4
	N=79	N=141	N=216
Oct. '99	50.5	22.7	29.1
	N=91	N=141	N=206

\* It should be noted that in many surveys the number of villagers interviewed is too small for the results in this category to be statistically significant.

It is noteworthy that, while trust in Fateh has gradually dropped in cities and refugee camps, it has increased in villages. In fact, in 1999, villagers had more trust in Fateh than camp dwellers and city residents.

Trust in Hamas is often - although not always - higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Notably, trust in Hamas in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank has remained more or less stable over the years, even as trust in Fateh has declined over time.

**Table 14: Trust in Hamas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip**

	<b>West Bank</b>	<b>Gaza Strip</b>
Jan. '96	11.1	15.6
Apr. '96	7.3	9.3
Apr. '97	11.0	11.7
Jul. '97	12.3	11.6
May '98	12.7	16.9
Aug. '98	14.4	14.3
Mar. '99	12.7	18.3
Oct. '99	10.3	13.9

When the answers of Gaza Strip residents are examined by place of residence - villages, refugee camps or cities - the results show that support for Hamas has fluctuated rather erratically over the years in villages and cities. The exception is found in Gaza Strip refugee camps, which registered a steady 8% increase support for Hamas over the years.



It is difficult to argue here that refugee camp support for Hamas in Gaza Strip has direct influence upon the opinions of Gazans as a whole. While refugee camp residents supported Hamas more over the years, this rise is not reflected in support for Hamas in the entire Gaza Strip.

**Table 15: Trust in Hamas in the Gaza Strip according to camp, city, village**

	Village*	Refugee Camp	City
Jan. '96	13.3	11.6	19.6
	N=60	N=164	N=199
Apr. '96	8.2	11.9	7.3
	N=61	N=194	N=177
Apr. '97	23.0	10.5	9.5
	N=61	N=210	N=189
Jul. '97	2.7	12.7	12.2
	N=37	N=189	N=213
May '98	17.6	17.6	15.9
	N=51	N=187	N=195
Aug. '98	15.0	19.8	9.9
	N=80	N=167	N=188
Mar. '99	19.0	24.8	13.9
	N=79	N=141	N=216
Oct. '99	13.2	16.3	12.6
	N=91	N=141	N=206

\* It should be noted that in many surveys the number of villagers interviewed is too small for the results in this category to be statistically significant.

Looking at the polls conducted by the JMCC, there are no obvious trends in opinion concerning trust in political factions according to the gender or age of the respondent.

## **2.2. Public attitudes towards Palestinian personalities**

### **2.2.1. In general**

By far, out of all Palestinian political and religious personalities, Palestinians trust Yasser Arafat, the leader of Fateh and the Palestinian Authority president, more than any other leader (Figure 7). Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the leader of Hamas, comes in a distant second.<sup>2</sup> As was the case with the question on political factions, trust in other political and religious personalities is too minimal or diverse to record for our purposes.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Again, the question on Palestinian personalities is presented to interviewees without a preset list of responses to choose from. Because personalities other than Arafat and Yassin appeared at much lower rates, these answers are not presented here. Respondents were also given the option of choosing "no one" and these responses are included here.


<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, the only Palestinian personality other than Arafat and Yassin that does enjoy steady support from respondents is Haidar Abdul Shafi, a secularist and outspoken critic of the Palestinian Authority. On occasions, Abdel Shafi was even more trusted in the Gaza Strip, where he lives, than Yassin, also from Gaza Strip.

As seen in the previous section on trust in religious or political factions, the number of respondents that said they do not trust any Palestinian personalities has increased over time. Whereas in April 1997, 18% of the interviewees answered that they do not trust anyone, this number increased to 29.9% by October 1999.

Figure 7:

### Trust in Palestinian personalities

According to the general public



#### 2.2.2. According to categories of refugee status and other indicators

##### 2.2.2.1. According to refugee status and age

Both Arafat and Yassin enjoy slightly higher trust among refugees than they do among non-refugees. Trust in Arafat has declined steadily among both groups by nearly equal increments since 1996 (12% and 13% among non-refugees and refugees respectively).

Trust in Yassin, however, rose steadily among both refugees and non-refugees through March 1999, only to plunge again in both groups in August of 1999. Still, over the years, refugee trust in Yassin has increased by a slight 2.4%, while non-refugee trust in Yassin has actually declined.



**Table 16: Trust in Palestinian political and religious personalities according to refugee status**

	Refugees				Non-refugees			
	Arafat	Yassin	Others	No one	Arafat	Yassin	Others	No one
Jan. '96	42.6	3.8	43.8	9.8	39.5	2.6	45	12.9
May '97	40.5	6.0	28.6	24.9	39.3	5.2	29.3	26.2
May '98	40.1	8.9	25.9	25.1	37.7	7.9	29.7	24.7
Mar. '99	42.0	11.4	23.5	23.1	36.6	8.2	25.7	29.5
Aug. '99	29.4	6.2	25.4	39.0	27.1	1.9	29	42.0

Perhaps most significantly, over the years both refugees and non-refugees said more and more that they did not trust any Palestinian personality. This increase is almost identical between the two groups, nearing a 30% rise over time.

#### 2.2.2.2. According to refugee camp residency

As shown in Table 17, Palestinians living in refugee camps consistently have more trust in either Arafat or Yassin than residents of cities or villages. Also consistently, refugee camp residents have been less likely than other groups to say they trust no one, although refugee camp resident opinion also reflected the general 30% increase in Palestinians that said they do not trust any personality.

**Table 17: Trust in Palestinian political or religious personalities according to village, camp and city**

	Village			Refugee Camp			City		
	Arafat	Yassin	No one	Arafat	Yassin	No one	Arafat	Yassin	No one
Jan. '96	39.4	3.1	14.0	48.0	3.3	8.6	38.8	3.1	10.6
May '97	41.0	5.1	26.2	48.7	6.6	20.3	34.8	5.3	27.5
May '98	40.6	7.7	26.1	47.3	10.3	20.6	33.2	8.0	25.8
Mar. '99	38.6	10.0	27.5	39.4	13.1	25.8	38.8	7.9	26.2
Aug. '99	26.1	2.3	43.6	34.0	6.1	38.6	27.5	3.8	40.3

Notably, the increase in support for Yassin noted above among refugees is clearly the result of an increase of support for Yassin in refugee camps. Trust in Yassin shows the greatest, albeit slight rise, among residents of refugee camps, although all groups show a steady rise over time until August 1999, when trust in Yassin drops significantly in all locales.

#### 2.2.2.3. According to West Bank vs. Gaza Strip residency

A breakdown by West Bank versus the Gaza Strip shows clearly that residents of the Gaza Strip consistently express more trust for Arafat or Yassin than do residents of the West Bank. Respondents in the West Bank were significantly more likely to say that they trust no Palestinian personality.

Otherwise, both West Bank and Gaza Strip responses reflect the gradual erosion of support for Arafat by approximately 12% and an initial climb and then 1999 drop in support for Yassin. The Hamas leader's support dropped slightly over time in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Again, both West Bank and Gaza Strip respondents said increasingly that they did not trust any one Palestinian personality, with this response given slightly more frequently in the Gaza Strip over time.

**Table 18: Trust in Palestinian political or religious personalities according to residence**

	West Bank			Gaza Strip		
	Arafat	Yassin	No one	Arafat	Yassin	No one
Jan. '96	39.8	2.8	13.4	45.2	4.3	7.6
May '97	38.3	5.1	25.9	46.9	7.1	23.0
May '98	35.6	7.7	30.5	46.4	9.7	15.7
Mar. '99	37.1	7.0	29.0	44.1	14.4	20.5
Aug. '99	26.9	2.6	42.1	32.5	5.5	38.9

A further breakdown of the Gaza Strip by city, village and refugee camp shows that locally, the drop in trust in Arafat can be attributed largely to a drop in his trust among refugee camp residents. While Arafat consistently enjoys more trust among refugee camp residents than among other locales in the Gaza Strip, trust in him over the years eroded by 17%, while trust in Arafat dropped only 5% in villages and 11% in cities.

**Table 19: Trust in Palestinian personalities in the Gaza Strip according to camp, village, city**

	Village			Refugee Camp			City		
	Arafat	Yassin	No one	Arafat	Yassin	No one	Arafat	Yassin	No one
Jan. '96	35.0	8.3	5.0	53.0	1.8	6.1	41.7	5.0	9.5
	N=60			N=164			N=199		
May '97	49.2	5.1	25.4	53.0	8.6	18.4	40.3	6.3	26.7
	N=59			N=185			N=191		
May '98	52.9	9.8	13.7	49.2	10.7	18.7	42.1	8.7	13.3
	N=51			N=187			N=195		
Mar. '99	46.8	19.0	24.1	39.0	16.3	24.8	46.8	11.6	15.7
	N=79			N=141			N=216		
Aug. '99	30.3	1.8	52.3	36.6	7.7	34.5	30.6	5.9	34.4
	N=109			N=142			N=186		

Trust in Yassin grew the most in Gaza Strip refugee camps (by 6%), slightly in cities and actually dropped by 7% in villages (at times however, the numbers of villagers interviewed was statistically insignificant).

While generally, this breakdown repeats the general increase in those who say that they trust no Palestinian personality, it appears that, among Gaza Strip villagers, this trend is more dramatic. In August 1999, over half of Gaza Strip village respondents said that they trusted no Palestinian personality.

#### 2.2.2.4. According to gender and refugee status


Even as trust in Arafat has declined among both men and women respondents, over the years, Figure 8 shows that Arafat has enjoyed more trust among women than among men.



**Figure 8:**

JMCC, 2000

Men and women refugees trusting most in Arafat mirror the responses given by men and women in the general public. Over the years, female refugees maintained a higher trust in Arafat than male refugees, although those differences in opinion are less pronounced than those between men and women in the general public sample (compare Figures 8 and 9). Trust in Arafat has also dropped over time among both male and female refugees.

**Figure 9:**

JMCC, 2000

#### 2.2.2.5. According to age

Trust in political and religious figures according to age follows two clear trends. First, trust in Yassin is higher among younger respondents and decreases with older respondents. Conversely, older respondents trust Yasser Arafat more than do younger respondents. These trends are detailed in Figure 10, which illustrates the results of a JMCC opinion poll conducted in March of 1999.

Figure 10:




Table 20 details the level of trust in Arafat and Yassin among refugees according to their age. Although the number of respondents in the age groups "46-60 years" and "60 years and above" is too small to be statistically valid, it appears that the level of trust among refugees in Arafat and Yassin is generally higher than seen in the answers of the general public broken down by age above.

**Table 20: Level of trust in Arafat and Yassin among refugees according to age in March 1999**

March 1999	Refugees			
	18-30 Years	31-45 Years	46-60 Years	Above 60
	N=254	N=167	N=64	N=21
Arafat	41.3	40.7	48.4	42.9
Yassin	13.4	9.6	9.4	9.5

Table 21 illustrates the level of trust in Arafat and Yassin among non-refugees according to their age. Although again the number of interviewees in the age group "60 years and above" is too small to be statistically valid, two main conclusions may be drawn here.

The level of trust in both Arafat and Yassin is significantly lower among non-refugees than compared to the level of trust in those two figures among the general public (see Figure 7). The level of trust in Arafat among non-refugees increases with age, while the level of trust in Yassin decreases with age.



**Table 21: Level of trust in Arafat and Yassin among non-refugees according to age in March 1999**


March 1999	Non-refugees			
	18-30 Years	31-45 Years	46-60 Years	Above 60
	N=337	N=223	N=98	N=26
Arafat	33.2	37.7	42.9	46.2
Yassin	10.1	7.2	6.1	3.8

### 3. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

#### 3.1. Public attitudes towards the Palestinian Authority

##### 3.1.1. In general

The majority of the Palestinian public positively evaluates the performance of the Palestinian Authority. Over time, however, the public has become less pleased with the Palestinian Authority's performance. As shown in Figure 11, in April 1997, 79.6% of the respondents said that the performance of the Palestinian Authority was good, while 16% thought it was bad. By October 1999, only 63% of the respondents continued to evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority positively, while 32% evaluated its performance negatively.

**Figure 11:**

### 3.1.2. According to categories of refugee status and other indicators

#### 3.1.2.1. According to West Bank vs. Gaza Strip residency

While respondents in the Gaza Strip evaluated the performance of the Palestinian Authority more positively in 1997 and 1998 than respondents in the West Bank, that picture changes in 1999. In that year, West Bank residents began to evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority more positively than residents of the Gaza Strip.

The change in Gaza Strip residents' attitudes towards the Palestinian Authority reflects the greater shifts in refugee camp residents' attitudes seen on previous issues. However, this may also be brought about by Gazans' more intimate exposure to, and subsequent disappointment with, the day-to-day activities of the Palestinian Authority, as evidenced by the fall in Gaza City residents' attitudes. The Gaza Strip is largely one contiguous area and home to many government institutions, therefore its Palestinian Authority presence is more pronounced than that of the West Bank.

Figure 12:







Figure 13:



Survey data shows, however, that consistently refugee camp dwellers in the Gaza Strip have evaluated the Palestinian Authority's performance more negatively than the remainder of the Gaza Strip population. As portrayed in Table 22, only in October of 1999 were residents of Gaza Strip cities slightly more negative in their evaluation of the Palestinian Authority than respondents in refugee camps.

**Table 22: Evaluation of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip according to city, camp, village**

	Village			Refugee camp			City		
	Good	Bad	NA	Good	Bad	NA	Good	Bad	NA
Apr. '97	86.9	9.8	3.3	78.6	18.1	3.3	86.8	11.1	2.1
	N=61			N=210			N=189		
Nov. '97	63.7	18.2	18.2	71.9	25.7	2.5	73.2	24.4	2.3
	N=11			N=203			N=217		
May '98	74.5	21.6	3.9	60.5	36.9	2.7	70.7	26.2	3.1
	N=51			N=187			N=195		
Mar. '99	62.0	35.4	2.5	52.5	42.6	5.0	66.6	32.9	0.5
	N=79			N=141			N=216		
Oct. '99	69.2	30.8	0	55.3	39.8	5.0	53.9	40.8	5.3
	N=91			N=141			N=206		


Over time, however, refugee camp residents increased their assessment of Palestinian Authority performance as "bad" by approximately 21%, a gradual rise mirrored in the assessment of villagers. Notably, the largest increase in negative

assessment of the Palestinian Authority (29.7%) occurred among city residents over time.

### 3.1.2.1 According to gender

As shown in Figures 14 and 15, over the years female respondents evaluated the performance of the Palestinian Authority more positively than their male counterparts. Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that women, who spend more time in their homes, rely more often upon sources of news, i.e., official television, radio and newspapers that are often less critical of the Palestinian Authority. Men, however, have greater access to alternative newspapers, leaflets and political meetings, which may give them a different perspective.<sup>4</sup> Still, both men and women have gradually increased their negative evaluation of the Palestinian Authority's performance.


Figure 14:



<sup>4</sup>For further discussion of this thesis, see Daneels, I., *Palestine's Interim Agreement with Democracy*, Jerusalem, JMCC, 1998, pp.65-66.



Figure 15:



Also among refugee respondents, women evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority more positively than their male counterparts (Figures 16 and 17). Again with time, both male and female refugees have become less positive about the performance of the Palestinian Authority.

There are no noteworthy differences in the responses of females in the general sample and females of the refugee sample. It is worth noting, however, that a sudden positive surge in the male refugee evaluation of the Palestinian Authority (in March 1999) appears at the same time that female refugees evaluate the Palestinian Authority less positively. A similar drop in the male general public's positive evaluation of the Authority can be observed at the same time.

Figure 16:





Figure 17:






There are no clear differences in evaluation of the Palestinian Authority's performance when examining the subgroups of age, area or refugee status.

### 3.2. Public attitudes towards the Palestinian Legislative Council

#### 3.2.1. In general

As a whole, the Palestinian public has a rather dim view of the Palestinian Legislative Council. The Legislative Council was established in 1996 as a parliament representing Palestinians residing under Palestinian Authority rule. Its members were elected by voting districts throughout the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. As shown in Figure 18, only a small majority of those surveyed positively evaluated the performance of the Legislative Council.

Figure 18:



#### 3.2.2. According to refugee and refugee camp status

There are few visible trends in a breakdown of poll results on the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Despite the lack of visible correlations, it is worth noting that the respondents that identified themselves as refugees and those who reside in refugee camps did not differ greatly in opinion with the general public over the Legislative Council's performance. In 1999 surveys, camp dwellers did evaluate the performance of the Council significantly more poorly than both the general public and those who identified themselves as refugees.

**Table 23: Comparison of the evaluation of the performance of the Legislative Council according to the general public, respondents who identified themselves as refugees, and respondents who live in refugee camps**

	General public		Refugees		Refugee camps	
	Good	Bad	Good	Bad	Good	Bad
Apr. '97	53.8	31.9	51.5	33.1	43.2	42.5
	N=1200		N=570		N=294	
Nov. '97	54.8	28.8	55.5	30.3	56.7	29.3
	N=1180		N=576		N=263	
May '98	52.2	39.7	51.6	39.9	51.0	39.9
	N=1208		N=506		N=243	
Mar. '99	49.6	44.0	50.9	43.9	42.9	51.0
	N=1199		N=507		N=198	
Aug. '99	55.4	36.9	49.5	41.4	43.7	47.7
	N=1200		N=469		N=197	

### 3.2.2.1. According to gender and refugee status

Women evaluate the performance of the Legislative Council far more positively than men do.

**Figure 19:**

### Evaluation of the performance of the Legislative Council

According to the surveyed men







Figure 20:



JMC'C, 2000

As indicated in Figures 19 and 20, not only are men more critical of the performance of the Legislative Council than women, but, on some occasions, the majority of male respondents evaluate the Legislative Council negatively. This does not occur in the female subgroup. Women also often did not answer the question when asked to evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council.

Likewise, when male and female refugees evaluate the performance of the Legislative Council, female refugees evaluate the performance of the Legislative Council more positively than their male counterparts.

Comparing the results in Figure 19 and Figure 21, it is clear that male refugees hold more negative opinions of the Legislative Council than men surveyed in the general public. This difference of opinion is not found between refugee women and women in the general public.

Figure 21:





Figure 22:







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## PART TWO: PALESTINIAN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE REFUGEE ISSUE

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### Background

At the time of this writing, Palestinians and Israelis are deep into negotiations over a final status agreement. The issues under negotiations are the status of Jerusalem, the fate of the Palestinian refugees, the future of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian statehood and the borders of that state, as well as arrangements on the economy, resources and the environment.

In that light, this report attempts to illuminate Palestinian public opinion over the "difficulty" and "importance" of final status issues. As with Part One, special emphasis is given to the opinions of the public at large on the refugee problem, focusing on its origin and its solution, as well as the opinions of refugees on the same.

To those ends, this report compares the opinions of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israeli Jews and Arab-Israelis. In light of the ongoing final status talks, the opinions of the Palestinian and Israeli people are of the utmost significance and worth exploring.

### 1. Popular attitudes on the most "difficult" and "important" issues under Israeli-Palestinian negotiation

#### 1.1. Comparison between opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel

##### 1.1.1. On the most "difficult" issue

Asked what were the three most "difficult" issues in the current Israeli-Palestinian negotiations,<sup>1</sup> Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel overwhelmingly agreed that the status of Jerusalem is the most difficult issue on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations table.

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<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that, in order to get an accurate count of respondents' view of the most and progressively less difficult issues in the talks, respondents were asked a variation of this question three times, first giving the most difficult issue, the next difficult issue and the third most difficult issue. Their responses were then averaged together to create a final count.

For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Palestinians in Israel, the refugee issue is the second most difficult issue in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The size of the refugee population may be one reason that Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line give prominence to this issue in the negotiations. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), as of December 31, 1998, had 3,573,382 Palestinian refugees registered under its definitions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Refugee scholars, however, note that many Palestinian refugees are not counted by UNRWA. They put the actual number of refugees as high as 5.1 million. According to the United States Population Office, the number of Palestinians worldwide exceeds seven million.


Table 24:

Field	In camps	Not in camps	Total
Jordan	272,257	1,215,192	1,487,449
Lebanon	200,707	166,903	367,610
Syria	107,961	262,074	370,035
West Bank	150,904	411,833	562,737
Gaza Strip	427,840	357,711	785,551
Total of all	1,159,669	2,413,713	3,573,382

*Source: Map of UNRWA's area of operations, issued by the Public Information Office, Gaza, April 1999.*

Israeli Jews consider the issue of Jewish settlements the second most difficult issue up for discussion. They, too, are interested in the fate of Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Figure 23:




All groups surveyed answered differently in choosing the third most difficult issue in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, solving the problem of Jewish settlements is the third most difficult issue. Israeli respondents said that the issue of borders is the third most difficult issue, while Palestinians in Israel considered agreement over the establishment of a Palestinian state the third most difficult issue in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

### 1.1.2. On the most "important" issue

Responses to the question of the three most "important" issues for Palestinians and Israelis to agree to were similar to those given to the previous question. The groups interviewed identified the same issues as above, only in a different order. Borders moved up in prominence for Israeli Jews, while Palestinian statehood moved up in prominence for Palestinians inside Israel.

Figure 24:



## 1.2. West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian public attitudes according to categories of refugee status and other indicators

### 1.2.1. On the most "difficult" issue

#### 1.2.1.1. According to refugee status

While generally refugees and non-refugees in the territories agree on the most "difficult" issues for Palestinian and Israeli agreement (Jerusalem remaining the most difficult issue to tackle), it is clear that refugees attach slightly higher difficulty to the issue of refugees.



In addition, refugees see the issues of statehood and borders as less difficult than do non-refugees. Because refugees left homes inside what is now Israel, perhaps there is some ambivalence among refugees about the meaning of Palestinian statehood and borders that do not encompass their homes, i.e., acceptance of the borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Figure 25:






Figure 26:



#### 1.2.1.2. According to refugee camp residency

This point is reinforced when one examines Palestinian views on the most difficult issue in the negotiations by respondents' place of residence (Figure 26). First, refugee camp residents were more inclined than other subgroups to say that the fate of the refugees is the most difficult issue up for negotiation. In addition, only 4.5% of refugee camp residents said "borders" were the most difficult issue in the negotiations - markedly less than residents in other locales.

Figure 27:



In a comparison between the opinions of refugees living in the camps and refugees outside the camps, camp refugees are slightly more pronounced in their opinion that Jerusalem and refugees are the most difficult negotiations issues. Refugees residing in camps think that settlements are less difficult to solve than do refugees not living in camps. And again, the issue of borders is less difficult, say camp residents in comparison with refugees residing outside the camps.

#### 1.2.1.3 According to West Bank vs. Gaza Strip residency

For both West Bankers and Gazans, the future status of Jerusalem is the most difficult issue to be resolved in a peace settlement, followed by the issues of refugees and Jewish settlements. While there are no significant differences in opinion over these three issues between the respondents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it is worth noting that there are considerable differences in opinions between those two subgroups concerning the issues of borders and water.

As shown in Table 25 below, West Bank respondents see the issue of the borders of a future Palestinian state as more difficult to resolve than do Gaza Strip respondents. The water issue, on the other hand, is seen as more difficult by respondents in the Gaza Strip than by respondents in the West Bank.

**Table 25: The most difficult issue in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to find an agreeable solution to**

	Area	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
	N=762	N=438
Palestinian state	12.0	13.1
Jerusalem	28.1	29.8
Borders	9.8	4.7
Refugees	19.9	19.2
Water	6.4	8.2
Jewish settlements	18.9	17.9
No answer	4.9	7.1

### 1.2.2. On the most "important" issue

#### 1.2.2.1. According to refugee status

A similar picture emerges when comparing answers of non-refugees and refugees on the most "important" issue to be resolved in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations (Figure 28 below). Again, refugees see statehood and borders as less important than the other issues on the negotiations table.

In a cross reference with the above results, both refugees and non-refugees see the issue of Jerusalem as slightly less "important" than it is "difficult" (when comparing with Figure 25). The issue of *refugees*, however, is seen by both groups as just as "important" as it is "difficult."

#### 1.2.2.2. According to refugee camp residency

Refugee camp residents, as compared with residents of other locales, see a solution for the refugee issue as markedly more important than other issues. In fact this is the only issue where more refugee camp residents answered "most important" than did respondents in villages and cities. All other issues are seen as less or equally important by refugee camp residents compared with villagers and city residents.



Figure 28:






Figure 29:



An examination of the opinions of refugees inside and outside the refugee camps shows that these trends are slightly more prominent in refugees living inside the camps (Figure 30). Camp refugees say that the issue of refugees is more important, and the issue of borders less important than do refugees outside the camps.

Figure 30:

***The most important issue in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations****Comparison between refugees residing in camps and outside camps*

JMCC, 2000

**1.2.2.3 According to West Bank vs. Gaza Strip residency**

Residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip agree on the high importance of the issues of the status of Jerusalem, refugees and Jewish settlements. Again, however, as illustrated in Table 26 below, it is clear that West Bank respondents attach higher importance to the future borders of a Palestinian state than do Gazan respondents. Also, the issue of water is of higher importance to respondents in the Gaza Strip than it is to those in the West Bank.

**Table 26: The most important issue in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to find an agreeable solution to**

	Area	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
	N=762	N=438
Palestinian state	13.4	12.4
Jerusalem	26.8	26.1
Borders	11.3	6.6
Refugees	19.6	19.1
Water	7.2	9.9
Jewish settlements	18.3	17.8
No answer	3.4	8.1


## 2. PUBLIC ATTITUDES CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

### 2.1. West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian public attitudes

#### 2.1.1. On the "responsible party"

One half of the Palestinian public in the West Bank and Gaza Strip say that Israel was either solely or mostly responsible for creating the 1948 refugee problem. Another 42% of respondents give Israel joint responsibility with the Arab parties (Figure 31).

Figure 31:



It can be argued that the type of blame directed by Palestinians at Arab governments differs from that directed at Israel. The type of blame directed at the Arab parties, because it appears less prominently, might be understood as Palestinians blaming the Arab parties for being unable to solve the refugee problem through pressure or international intervention.

More than 90% of Palestinian respondents hold Israel at least partially responsible for the creation of the 1948 refugee problem.

#### 2.1.2. On the "immediate cause"


When asked what was the immediate cause of the 1948 refugee problem, a majority of West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian respondents, 59%, replied that it was the Jewish forces who expelled the refugees (Figure 32, below). A significant portion of the interviewees, 15.4%, responded that the 1948 refugee problem was caused by a combination of being expelled by Jewish forces and being told by Arab leaders to



leave. Only 4% of Palestinians in the territories responded that they thought the refugees left voluntarily.

**Figure 32:**

*Cause of the 1948 refugee problem, according to Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*



While the Israeli Jewish response to the same question was very different, a significant 31% of Israeli respondents said that the 1948 refugee problem was caused as a result of Jewish forces expulsion of the refugees, while 29.9% thought that the refugees left voluntarily. About 17% of the Israeli Jews surveyed responded that the refugees left mainly because they were told to do so by Arab leaders.

## 2.2. According to categories of refugee status and other indicators

### 2.2.1. On the "immediate cause" of the refugee problem

#### 2.2.1.1. According to refugee status

Refugees are more of the opinion that the 1948 refugee problem was caused by Jewish forces expelling the refugees than are non-refugees. Similarly, non-refugees say that the refugee problem was caused by a combination of the Arab leaders telling the refugees to leave and the Jewish forces expelling them.<sup>2</sup>


<sup>2</sup>The figures and tables in this section only show the survey results that were statistically significant when broken down according to specific indicators.

Figure 33:

According to refugee status

Mainly, Jewish forces expelled the refugees

Mainly the refugees were told to leave by Arab leaders + Jewish force expelled the refugees




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Figure 34:

According to residence

Mainly, Jewish forces expelled the refugees

Mainly, the refugees were told to leave by Arab leaders + Jewish forces expelled the refugees



JMCC, 2000

2.2.1.2. According to refugee camp residency

As shown in Figure 34 above, the opinion that Jewish forces expelled the refugees is markedly higher among refugee camp residents than city dwellers and villagers, in that order. Interestingly, villagers are much more (12% more) of the opinion that Arab leaders had a role in causing the refugees to leave and both camp residents and city dwellers.

Further examination of opinion on the cause of the refugee problem, combining refugee status and place of residence, demonstrates that refugees in camps are most likely to say that refugees left because Jewish forces expelled them. On the other hand, those most likely to respond that the refugees left because Jewish forces expelled them *and* because Arab leaders told them to are refugees that live outside refugee camps.

**Table 27: Popular opinion about the cause of the 1948 refugee problem**

	Total	General public		Refugees	
		Non-Refugees	Refugees	In camps	Outside camps
	N=1200	N=644	N=552	N=183	N=369
Mainly, Jewish forces expelled the refugees	59.0	58.0	60.2	65.6	54.2
Mainly, the refugees were told to leave by Arab leaders + Jewish forces expelled the refugees	15.4	17.4	13.8	10.9	20.6

2.2.1.3. According to West Bank vs. Gaza Strip residency

In the West Bank, interviewees were markedly more of the opinion that the 1948 refugee problem was caused by a combination of the refugees having been told to leave by Arab leaders and their expelling by the Jewish forces. The high number of refugees living in the Gaza Strip in general, and in refugee camps in particular, may have influenced these results.




**Figure 35:**

*According to West Bank/Gaza Strip residency*

*Mainly, Jewish forces expelled the refugees*

*Mainly, the refugees were told to leave by Arab leaders + Jewish forces expelled the refugees*



JMCC, 2000

*Note: In Figure 35 and following tables and graphs, only the responses with a statistically significant numbers of respondents are shown.*

Indeed, a breakdown of responses in the Gaza Strip according to refugee camp residency supports this thesis. Gaza Strip refugee camp residents, as shown below, are much more likely to say that the cause of the refugee problem was their expulsion by Jewish forces and much less likely to implicate Arab leaders.

**Table 28: Popular opinion about the cause of the 1948 refugee problem in the Gaza Strip according to residency in cities, villages, or refugee camps**

	Gaza Strip		
	Village	Refugee camp	City
	N=91	N=141	N=206
Mainly, Jewish forces expelled the refugees	60.4	70.2	60.2
Mainly, the refugees were told to leave by Arab leaders + Jewish forces expelled the refugees	13.2	6.4	12.1

### 3. PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON A SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

#### *Background*

In the political arena, Palestinians have always taken the position that the resolution to the Palestinian refugee problem must come about via international law, i.e., via United Nations resolutions that promise the return of the Palestinians to their original lands, in addition to compensation for material damage and loss. Israel, on the other hand, has rejected this position, refuting both its own responsibilities for the refugee problem and the applicability of international law in this case.

To bridge this gap, many plans have been proposed that offer some sort of symbolic return to either Israel or the future Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, along with compensation for the land forsaken by those who do not return to 1948 areas. This kind of compensation differs from the above because it does not come hand in hand with the option to return. Moreover, some of these proposed political solutions include stipulations that Israel will be given the right to decide which refugees may return, based on security considerations, age or memories of the 1948 areas. These are important distinctions to be aware of in the following discussion of Palestinian public opinion on the most just and feasible solutions to the refugee problem.

### 3.1. The "most just" and "most feasible" solution to the refugee problem

#### 3.1.1. Comparison between opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel

The vast majority of Palestinian respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip said that the "most just" solution to the refugee problem is one based on United Nations Resolution 194, which calls for the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not return.

A much smaller group says that the most "just solution" is one negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians, whereby a limited number of refugees would return to Israel and a suitable compensation provided to those who do not wish to return.

A tiny 2.9% of the surveyed Palestinians responded that only those refugees approved by Israel should be allowed to return, with compensation given to those who do not. Palestinians in Israel responded very similarly to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip when asked what was the "most just" solution to the refugee issue.

Table 3: Popular opinion about the cause of the 1948 refugee problem in the Gaza Strip according to residency in cities, villages or refugee camps


	Gaza Strip	
	Village	Refugee camp
	N=27	N=47
Majority Jewish forces expelled the refugees	74%	70%
Majority the refugees were expelled by Arab	17%	14%
Majority Jewish forces expelled the refugees	10%	10%
Majority the refugees were expelled by Arab	10%	10%
Majority Jewish forces expelled the refugees	10%	10%
Majority the refugees were expelled by Arab	10%	10%

#### 3. PUBLIC ATTITUDE ON A SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

##### Background

In the political arena, Palestinians have always taken the position that the responsibility for the 1948 refugee problem lies with the Jewish forces that expelled them from their homes. This position is based on the fact that the Jewish forces were the ones who expelled the refugees from their homes. In the public opinion survey, the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip agreed with this position. The majority of respondents in both areas said that the Jewish forces were responsible for the 1948 refugee problem. This is in line with the position taken by the majority of Palestinians in Israel, who also agreed that the Jewish forces were responsible for the 1948 refugee problem.

Figure 36:




Again, the Israeli public responded in sharp contrast to the surveyed Palestinians. Of the Israeli Jewish respondents, only 4.5% said that the solution to the refugee issue should be based on United Nations Resolution 194. The majority of the respondents (56.8%) said that only those refugees approved by Israel should be allowed to return and compensation should be given to those who do not.

When asked about the "most feasible" solution to the refugee issue, returns were very similar to the above. Again, a solution based on United Nations Resolution 194 was by far the most favored among Palestinian respondents, followed distantly by those who opted for a negotiated solution between Israel and the Palestinians. And again, the opinions of Palestinians in Israel resembled those of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while Israeli public opinion was nearly diametrically opposed to that of Palestinians.



Figure 37:



### 3.1.2. The "most just" solution, according to refugee status and other indicators

#### 3.1.2.1. According to refugee status

While the Palestinian public is nearly unanimous on the "most just" and "most feasible" solution to the refugee problem, refugees are even more adamant than are non-refugees. Not surprisingly, almost 90% of refugees said that the most just solution to the refugee problem is one based on United Nations Resolution 194, while more non-refugees than refugees stated that a just solution to the refugee problem would allow for the return of a limited number of Palestinian refugees to Israel and a suitable compensation for those not returning.


Figure 38:

### Palestinian opinion on the most just solution to the refugee issue

According to refugee status

The solution should be based on UN Resolution 194 which calls for the right of return to all the Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not return

The return of a limited number of Palestinian refugees to Israel and a suitable compensation for those who do not return, to be decided by negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians



JMCC, 2000

#### 3.1.2.2. According to refugee status and gender

Among refugees, the gender of the respondents proved to be a significant variable. Male refugees answered more often that the most just solution to the refugee issue would be based on international law. Female refugees, however, showed more flexibility in accepting a negotiated solution of limited return and compensation.

**Table 29: Popular opinion about the most just solution to the refugee issue according to gender among refugees**

	Refugees	
	Male N=273	Female N=279
The solution should be based on UN Resolution 194 which calls for the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not return	88.3	83.9
The return of a limited number of Palestinian refugees to Israel and a suitable compensation for those who do not return, to be decided by negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians	7.0	9.3

#### 3.1.2.3. According to refugee camp residency

Perhaps surprisingly, more refugees residing outside camps than those living in camps said that the most just solution to the refugee issue is that based on United Nations Resolution 194. Conversely, more refugees living in camps, albeit a small 11%, said that the most just settlement would entail a political solution with limited return. No refugees at all said that there is no refugee problem to solve.

**Table 30: Popular opinion about the most just solution to the refugee issue amongst refugees according to camp residency**

	Refugees	
	In camps	Outside camps
	N=183	N=369
The solution should be based on UN Resolution 194 which calls for the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not return.	82.5	87.8
The return of a limited number of Palestinian refugees to Israel and a suitable compensation for those who do not return, to be decided in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.	10.9	6.8
Only those who are approved by Israel should be allowed to return and compensation given to those who do not return.	1.1	3.8
There is no refugee problem	0.0	0.0
No answer	5.5	1.6

### 3.1.3 The "most feasible" solution, according to refugee status and other indicators

#### 3.1.3.1. According to refugee status

Between refugees and non-refugees, there is not a great difference of opinion over the "most feasible" solution to the refugee issue. Refugees are slightly more likely to say that a solution based on international law is the most feasible solution, while non-refugees are slightly more likely to say either a negotiated solution or a return approved by Israel is the most feasible.

**Table 31: Most feasible solution to the refugee issue under the present circumstances among refugees according to refugee camp residency**

	Total	General public	Refugees		
			Refugees	In camps	Outside camps
	N=1200	N=644	N=552	N=183	N=369
The solution should be based on UN Resolution 194 which calls for the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not return	63.6	62.6	65.2	57.9	68.8
The return of a limited number of Palestinian refugees to Israel and suitable compensation for those who do not return, to be decided in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians	18.8	19.3	18.5	25.1	15.2
Only those who are approved by Israel should be allowed to return and compensation given to those who do not return	6.4	6.8	6.0	3.3	7.3
There is no refugee problem	0.4	0.2	0.7	1.6	0.3
No answer	10.8	11.2	9.6	12.0	8.4



### 3.1.3.2. According to refugee camp residency

A clear diversion of views, however, is found between refugees living in camps and refugees living outside camps. While refugees in camps are the least likely of all groups represented in Table 31 to say that a solution based on United Nations Resolution 194 is most feasible, refugees outside of camps are the most likely. The opposite is true of a solution based on a negotiated settlement and limited return.


As shown in Figure 39, refugee camp residents are significantly less likely to say that the "most feasible" solution to the Palestinian refugee issue is one based on United Nations Resolution 194. A sort of "real politic" seems in effect in the camps, as fully one fourth of refugee camp residents said that a negotiated limited return and compensation was the most feasible solution. City residents were the most likely to believe that a solution based on Resolution 194 was most feasible, and least likely to say the same of a negotiated limited return and compensation.

Figure 39:

#### *Most feasible solution under the present circumstances According to residence*


*The solution should be based on UN Resolution 194 which calls for the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not return*

*The return of a limited number of Palestinian refugees to Israel and suitable compensation for those who do not return, to be decided in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians*



JMCC, 2000

Figure 40:



### 3.1.3.3. According to West Bank vs. Gaza Strip residency

The returns on refugee camp residency, in combination with a breakdown according to West Bank and Gaza Strip residency, demonstrate that the opinion of refugee camp residents influences the opinion of the Gaza Strip as a whole (Figure 40). West Bank residents are nearly 10% more likely to say than Gaza Strip residents that the most feasible solution to the refugee camp problem is one based on international law. Gaza Strip residents, on the other hand, are 6% more likely than West Bank residents to opt for a negotiated limited return and suitable compensation as the most feasible option.

A breakdown by refugee camp residency in the Gaza Strip, as in Table 32, further demonstrates this point.

**Table 32: Most feasible solution to the refugee issue under the present circumstances in the Gaza Strip according to whether respondents reside in villages, refugee camps, or cities**

	Gaza Strip		
	Village N=91	Refugee camp N=141	City N=206
The solution should be based on UN Resolution 194 which calls for the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and compensation to those who do not return	68.1	51.8	57.8
The return of a limited number of Palestinian refugees to Israel and suitable compensation for those who do not return, to be decided in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians	26.4	27.0	21.4


### 3.2. Public attitudes concerning the right of return

#### 3.2.1. Comparison between opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel

According to international law, people who have left their homes voluntarily or by force as a result of war conditions are entitled to return home once hostilities end.

Of Palestinian respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, over half of respondents agreed with this principle without qualification. Nearly one-third agreed with this statement with qualifications.

**Figure 41:**





On the question of whether the principle of the right of return applies to Palestinian refugees, as shown in Figure 42 below, Palestinians in the territories agreed or strongly agreed at a combined rate of 81%. Interestingly, more than 10% of respondents said that they didn't know or did not answer the question.


Palestinians in Israel were even more unequivocal in their replies. Approximately 92% said that the principle of the right of return applies to the case of the Palestinian refugees, while only 1.6% of the surveyed Palestinians in Israel said it did not.

The Israeli Jewish public was more divided over the issue. About 40% of the respondents said that they agreed that the principle of return applies to Palestinian refugees, while over half said they disagreed with that premise.

**Figure 42:**

*The principle of the right of return applies to the case of the Palestinian refugees*

*Comparison between WBGS, Israeli Jewish and Arab Israeli respondents*




The gap between Israeli and Palestinian opinion becomes more distinct when respondents are asked how many refugees should be allowed to return. An overwhelming majority of Palestinian respondents, those in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in Israel, said that anyone wishing to return should be allowed to. It is important to note here the uniformity between the opinions of Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

By contrast, the largest portion of Israeli respondents (42.7%) said that no refugees should return. Just over 20% said that, in their opinion, only a few hundred refugees should be allowed to return.

Figure 43:

**Number of refugees who should be allowed to return**


Comparison between WBGS, Israeli Jewish and Israeli Arab respondents



Where should these refugees be settled? Over half of Palestinian respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (53.8%) replied that the refugees ought to be resettled in their original homes inside Israel. Nearly 30% said that the Palestinian refugees should be resettled inside the Palestinian state (although it should be noted that JMCC fieldworkers found that many respondents defined the Palestinian state as the 1948 borders of Palestine).

Figure 44:


**Comparison between opinions in the WBGS and among Israeli Jews**



Israeli Jewish opinions are once again in almost direct opposition to those of Palestinians in the territories. Only five percent of Israeli respondents said that the refugees should be resettled in their original homes in Israel, while the vast majority said that the refugees should be resettled in their present locations in the Middle East or elsewhere.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip seem unsure how many Palestinian refugees would make use of the right of return if it was made available to them. With 5.1 million UN-registered and unregistered refugees, nearly one-third of respondents estimated that up to one million refugees would return. The next most popular answer was that between one to two million refugees would return.

**Figure 45:**



### 3.2.2. Rights granted by international law between according to indicators among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

#### 3.2.2.1. According to refugee status

Refugees are very aware that their cause is supported by international law that legitimizes their intent to return home after the end of war conditions. Indeed, as shown in Figure 46, nearly 60 % of refugees agree unequivocally with the statement that international law guarantees the right of return. Non-refugees, more often than refugees, put some qualifications on the statement that those who have left their homes due to war are entitled to return.

It is worth noting that among refugees, no significant differences in opinions were found according to the gender or age of the respondents.



Figure 46:

*According to International Law, people who have left their homes voluntarily or by force because of war conditions, are entitled to return once hostilities end.*

*According to refugee status*





Figure 47:

*According to International Law, people who have left their homes voluntarily or by force because of war conditions, are entitled to return once hostilities end.*

*According to residence*



3.2.2.2. According to refugee camp residency

Refugee camp residents are also most likely to say unequivocally that international law supports the right to return with the cessation of hostilities (Figure 47). Interestingly, villagers are more likely by far than any other group to put qualifications on the statement that international law supports the right to return. Nearly 10% of city residents, the most of the three groups, did not know the answer to this question.

There were no significant trends on this question according to age or gender.

3.2.3. *The right of return and Palestinian refugees according to indicators among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*3.2.3.1 According to refugee status

Some interesting trends appear when respondent data over the applicability of the right of return and the case of the Palestinian refugees is analyzed according to refugee status (Figure 48). Many more refugee than non-refugee respondents "strongly agree" that the right of return applies to Palestinian refugees. However, the same number of refugees as non-refugees (albeit in both cases only about 7%) disagree that the right of return applies to the case of Palestinians. It is unclear whether these refugee respondents are indicating the futility of their desire to return to 1948 Palestine, or whether they truly believe that, in their case, the right of return according to international law does not apply.

**Figure 48:**





Figure 49:



#### 3.2.3.2. According to refugee camp residency

Eighty-one percent of refugee camp residents "strongly agree" or "agree" that the principle of the right of return applies to Palestinian refugees, as compared with 83% of villagers and 80% of city residents (Figure 49).

Notably, the tendency to be less affirmative than other groups that the right of return applies to Palestinian refugees is repeated among refugee camp residents, albeit only slightly. Ten percent of refugee camp residents - the most of all three groups - actually "disagree" that the right of return applies to them. Again, it is unclear if this is based on an understanding of the right of return or how refugee camp residents have seen the right of return applied on their behalf.

#### 3.2.4. How many refugees should be allowed to return according to indicators among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

##### 3.2.4.1. According to refugee status

The vast majority of respondents, when asked how many refugees should be allowed to return, said that anyone who wishes to return should be allowed to (Figure 50). Not surprisingly, nearly 10% more refugees agreed with this statement than did non-refugees. Non-refugees also responded more frequently that those returning should be limited to a few hundred or a few thousand.



Figure 50:





Figure 51:



### 3.2.4.2. According to refugee camp residency

Refugee camp residents were also more likely than resident of villages or cities to say that any refugees that want to return should be allowed to, although the vast majority of all surveyed gave this answer (Figure 51). They also responded less often than others that the numbers of those returning should be limited. Villagers responded more often than others that the numbers of those returning should be limited to a few thousand.

In a comparison of responses of refugees living in camps and those living outside camps, the gap seen above narrows. Both refugee camp and non-refugee camp refugee respondents answered nearly equally that the numbers of those returning should not be limited. Refugees living outside of the camps were more likely than any other group to say that the numbers of refugees allowed to return should be limited to a few thousand. Non-refugees answered more often than any other group that the refugees allowed to return should be limited to a few hundred.

**Table 33: The number of refugees who should be allowed to return. Opinions of refugees according to residency in camps**

	Total	General public		Refugees	
		Non-Refugees	Refugees	In camps	Outside camps
	N=1200	N=644	N=552	N=183	N=369
None should be allowed to return	1.3	1.4	1.1	2.2	0.5
Few hundred should be allowed to return	3.1	4.5	1.4	1.1	1.6
Few thousand should be allowed to return	10.8	12.9	8.5	4.4	10.6
Anyone wishing to return should be allowed to return	79.6	75.8	84.6	85.2	84.3
No answer	5.2	5.4	4.3	7.1	3.0

### 3.2.5. How many refugees would make use of the right of return according to indicators among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

#### 3.2.5.1. According to refugee status

Respondents seem unclear as to how many refugees would actually make use of the right of return if it were granted to them. Non-refugees (nearly 17%) were more likely not to answer this question, although 12% of refugees also did not respond. Both refugees and non-refugees equally answered that over 4 million refugees would return, although as the estimates diminish in size, non-refugees gave lower estimates. Refugees responded most often that 1-2 million refugees would return if given the option.

Figure 52:

Popular assessment of how many Palestinian refugees will actually use the right of return if granted and will leave their places of residence and move to Israel

According to refugee status





Figure 53:

Popular assessment of how many Palestinian refugees will actually use the right of return if granted to them and leave their places of residence and move to Israel

According to residence





### 3.2.5.2. According to refugee camp residency

The majority of refugee camp residents (52%) say that between 1-3 million Palestinian refugees would return if given the opportunity (Figure 53). Interestingly, refugee camp residents were the least likely of residents of all locales to say that over 4 million refugees would return. Villagers, more than any other group, opted for a response of "up to one million," while a full 19% of city residents - far more than any other group - declined to answer.


## 3.3. Popular attitudes concerning compensation of the refugees

### 3.3.1. Comparison between opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel

Any settlement on the refugee issue between Palestinians and Israel will likely include a component of compensation - whether compensation in addition to the right of return or compensation in lieu of the right of return. In that case, it would be important to determine the source of this money.

When the Palestinian public in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was asked who should compensate the refugees, only 21% of the respondents said that Israel alone should bear the financial burden. Most respondents replied that the responsibility of compensation should fall on both Israel and international institutions like the United Nations. Another significant portion of respondents said that Israel, international institutions and Arab governments should compensate the refugees.

Figure 54:



### 3.3.2. Who should compensate the refugees according to indicators among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

#### 3.3.2.1. According to refugee status

Interestingly, non-refugees responded much more often than refugees that Israel alone must bear the brunt of compensating the Palestinian refugees (Figure 55). Refugees, on the other hand, responded more often that Israel and the United Nations should be the source of compensation. Refugees were also significantly more likely than non-refugees to say that Israel, international bodies and the Arab states combined should be the source of their compensation.

Figure 55:





Figure 56:



### 3.3.2.2. According to refugee camp residency

Moreover, refugees living in camps answered much less frequently than refugees in cities and villages that Israel alone should be the source of their compensation (Figure 56). Camp refugees preferred either that the source of compensation be Israel, international bodies and Arab governments or Israel and the United Nations over refugees not living in camps.

**Table 34: Who should compensate the refugees? Opinion according to refugee camp residency.**

	Refugees	
	In camps	Outside camps
	N=183	N=369
No one	2.7	0.8
Israel	9.8	19.2
International bodies such as the UN	12.0	13.3
Arab governments	5.5	3.3
Israel + Arab governments	5.5	7.6
Israel + international bodies + Arab governments	18.6	12.5
Israel + international bodies such as the UN	32.2	31.4
International bodies such as the UN + Arab governments	4.9	7.3
Others	5.5	1.6
No answer	3.3	3.0





