

The Reality of Jerusalem's Palestinians Today



Written by: Kate B. Rouhana

Jerusalem Media & Communication Center

Jerusalem Media and Communications Center

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Table of Contents

Introduction	v
1:	
Which Jerusalem?.....	1
At Least Seven Different Jerusalems	1
Palestinians' Concept of Jerusalem	6
In This Study	7
2:	
Setting the Context: Demographic and Planning Realities	9
The Demographic Imperative.....	9
Results of Policy: Demographic Changes Over Time.....	11
Planning and Housing in Jerusalem	18
Municipal Services and Taxation.....	27
Summary	32
3:	
Palestinian Access to Jerusalem: Closure and Its Impact	33
Evolution and Nature of the Closure Policy	34
Impact of Closure on Palestinian Institutions.....	39
Impact of Closure on Palestinian Economy.....	45
Impact of Closure on Palestinian Social and Cultural Life.....	52
Overall Impact: A Shifting Geography of the Mind	55
4:	
Permitted Existence: Residency and Social Issues	57
Permanent Residency Status and Associated Benefits	57
Role of IDs in Daily Life	59
Evolution and Nature of the "Center of Life" Policy.....	61
Impact of "Center of Life" Policy on Palestinian Quality of Life and Feelings About the City.....	63
National Insurance Institute Inquiry Policy.....	65
Summary	66
5:	
Political Predicament: Caught in the Crossfire	67
Integration with/Apartedness from Israeli Society	71
Evaluation of Existing Situation and Political Strategies	81
Outlook for the Future	96
Summary	101
Conclusion.....	103
Appendix	107
Notes	109

Tables, Graphs, and Maps

List of Tables

Table 1: Meaning of Jerusalem.....	6
Table 2: How Survey Respondents Defined Themselves.....	8
Table 3: Overall Breakdown of Arabs and Jews in Israeli Municipal Jerusalem.....	15
Table 4: Land Expropriated in East Jerusalem, 1967-1991	19
Table 5: Allowed Housing Units vs. Actual Population in Selected Arab Neighborhoods.....	23
Table 6: Number of Days of Closure: West Bank/Jerusalem.....	36
Table 7: Impact of Closure on Freedom of Movement.....	38
Table 8: Private Palestinian Hospitals in East Jerusalem.....	40
Table 9: Problems Created for Hospitals, Doctors, and Patients by Closure	41
Table 10: Crisis Indicators for Private Palestinian Hospitals in East Jerusalem, 1997.....	42
Table 11: Cost Cutting Measures Taken by East Jerusalem Hospitals, 1996-97.....	43
Table 12: Impact of Closure on Commerce	45
Table 13: Impact of Closure on Work Conditions	46
Table 14: Hotels in East vs. West Jerusalem.....	47
Table 15: Impact of Closure on the Family, 1996.....	52
Table 16: Impact of Closure on Family Relations, 1999.....	52
Table 17: Impact of Closure on Cultural Life.....	54
Table 18: Impact of Closure on the Geography of the Palestinian Mind	55
Table 19: Benefits and Obligations of Permanent Residency	58
Table 20: Importance of ID Cards.....	60
Table 21: Jerusalemites' Understanding of Hebrew	72
Table 22: Jerusalemites' Use and Knowledge of Hebrew (Oral Conversation)	72
Table 23: Jerusalemites' Knowledge of Hebrew (Reading)	72
Table 24: Jerusalemites' Knowledge of Hebrew (Writing)	73
Table 25: Knowledge of Hebrew Among Jerusalem Segment	73
Table 26: When Palestinians in Jerusalem Use Hebrew.....	74
Table 27: Attitudes on Israeli Passports, 1995.....	75
Table 28: Attitudes on Israeli Passports, 1995.....	75
Table 29: Citizenship Preference, 1996.....	75
Table 30: YOUR Citizenship Preference Today (1999) and in Peace	76
Table 31: Rating of Israeli Health Care and Social Services, 1996	78
Table 32: Future PNA Health Care and Social Services, 1996	78
Table 33: Expectations for Future PNA Health Care and Social Services, 1996.....	79
Table 34: Evaluation of Current Health Care, 1999	79
Table 35: Willingness to Switch From Israeli to Palestinian Health Care, 1999	80
Table 36: Main Problems Jerusalemites Face, 1995 vs. 1999	81
Table 37: Municipal Services Provided by Israel.....	82
Table 38: Satisfaction with Municipal Services in Your Area	82
Table 39: PNA Interest in Jerusalem, 1996.....	83
Table 40: PNA Caring About Jerusalem Issues, 1999.....	83
Table 41: Municipal Services Provided by the Palestinian Authority	84
Table 42: Political Representation Preference	85
Table 43: Sources of Support in a Crisis.....	86
Table 44: Participation in Municipal Elections, 1995.....	90
Table 45: Working with the Jerusalem Municipality.....	91

Table 46: Working with the Jerusalem Municipality by Current Passport Preference	92
Table 47: Importance of Jerusalem to the Palestinians	96
Table 48: Importance of Peace vs. Jerusalem	97
Table 49: Preferred Solution for Jerusalem, 1995	97
Table 50: Preferred Solution for Jerusalem, (Jerusalemis Only) 1999	98
Table 51: Preferred Solution for Jerusalem (West Bank & Gaza) 1999	99
Table 52: Compromise Solution for Jerusalem (West Bank & Gaza) 2000	100

List of Graphs

Graph 1: Israelis and Palestinians, 1972-1996: % of East Jerusalem Population	12
Graph 2: Demographic Balance in Israeli Municipal Jerusalem, 1967-1998	13
Graph 3: Number of Government-ordered Demolitions of Arab Homes in East Jerusalem	25
Graph 4: ID Cards Revoked Under "Center of Life" Policy, 1995-1999	63
Graph 5: YOUR Citizenship Preference, Today (1999) and in Peace	77

List of Maps

Old City	1
East Jerusalem Before June 6, 1967	2
Israeli Municipal Jerusalem	3
Greater & Metropolitan Jerusalem	4
Palestinian <i>Mubafazha</i> of Jerusalem	5
Population Distribution in Jerusalem	16
Settlement Development in Jerusalem & Environs 1967-Present	20
Checkpoints for Closure	34

Introduction

The aim of this study is to provide an in-depth picture of the daily lives and dilemmas of Palestinians in Jerusalem today. The study focuses on a number of questions:

- How do Palestinians define Jerusalem?
- What is their demographic weight in the city, and what role has demography played in Israeli policy?
- What impact has Israeli policy on city planning and housing had on Palestinians' quality of life in Jerusalem? What is the reality of Palestinians' housing situation today?
- What has the closure of the city done to Palestinian institutions, economy, social life, and collective well-being?
- What is the Palestinians' current residency status in the city, and what effect has the "center of life" policy had?
- What effect have the political changes of the past decade had on the lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem? How integrated into or apart from Israeli society are they? What political predicaments do they face today? How do they evaluate their existing situation and political strategies? What are their views on the future of their city?

We have tried to focus on some of the lesser-known but enormously important aspects of Palestinian life in Jerusalem, such as the impact of the city's closure and Palestinian political attitudes, and to bring the Palestinian perspective to life through interviews and survey research. The purpose of this report is not to give detailed reports on each aspect of Palestinian reality, since there are many excellent existing studies that do just that. Rather, this report strives to put it all together and paint a more broadbrush picture of life through the eyes and voices of Palestinian Jerusalemites, so we can understand what they experience each day.

Today, Jerusalem's Palestinians are caught in dilemmas on every level. Whether or not a solution is found for the final status of Jerusalem, and whatever that solution may be, the urgent and chronic problems of this sector of the population will have to be addressed as soon as possible. This report is a step toward identifying some of those problems and shedding light on how Palestinians themselves view the problems and potential solutions.

The report was commissioned by the JMCC and funded by the Ford Foundation. Research methods include random field surveys¹, first-person interviews with prominent Palestinian Jerusalemites, and a literature survey. The field studies and interviews were carried out in the summer of 1999.

This report was researched, written, and produced before the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Uprising on September 28, 2000. While it does not reflect the impact of these events, we nonetheless feel it captures the overall situation in Jerusalem before the uprising, most of which holds equally true now.

*Ghassan al Khatib
Director, JMCC
September 2000*

I:

Which Jerusalem ?

Before beginning any discussion of Palestinian life in Jerusalem, it is worthwhile to explore the question of which Jerusalem is meant, and whether in fact Palestinians and Israelis define "Jerusalem" in the same way. Perhaps more than any other city in the world, Jerusalem has been the focus of a continuous struggle for political ascendancy, and the process of defining the city, naturally, falls right into that struggle. For both communities, the question of "Which Jerusalem" has grave political significance, because shifting a border a kilometer or two can include or exclude whole swaths of population and dramatically shift the demographic balance.

At Least Seven Different Jerusalems

When a Palestinian or Israeli speaks of "Jerusalem," he or she might be referring to *at least* seven different physical entities.

The Old City. This term refers to the walled Old City (see map). The current walls (circumference 19.3 km., diameter 3.2 km.) were built by the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman in 1542. The Old City has four quarters, in addition to the enclosed 135-dunum holy area of the Haram al-Sharif compound, which houses the Dome of the Rock, the al-Aqsa Mosque, and the Wailing Wall. In order of size from largest to smallest, they are: the Muslim Quarter, the Christian Quarter, the Jewish Quarter, and the Armenian Quarter. The walled city was synonymous with the city up until the late nineteenth century, when building beyond the walls began. The Old City was under sole Arab control until June 6, 1967, when Israel conquered it in the 1967 war. Today, the walled Old City (871 dunums, or less than one sq. km., in area) represents only a tiny fraction of the area that Israel defines as municipal Jerusalem (123 sq. km.).²




Source: A. Cheshin, B. Hutman, and A. Melamed. *Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 263-4.

Which Jerusalem?

East Jerusalem before June 6, 1967. This term refers to the Eastern area of the pre-war city, which was under Jordanian control from 1948 until Israel occupied it in June of 1967. During that period, the Eastern half of the city was wholly Arab. It comprises the Old City and a number of outer Arab neighborhoods (Silwan, Ras al-Amud, A-Siwana, 'Ard al-Samar, and the southern portions of Shu'fat³) that were considered to be part of the East Side municipal boundaries before the war. The total area is six sq. km.⁴

The date June 6, 1967 (which marks the beginning of the war) is an important frame of reference, because after the war, Israel made massive changes to the city borders (see below).



Source: Special Technical Unit, Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation


Larger copy of the same map can be found at the end of the book.

East and West Jerusalem before June 6, 1967. This term refers to both the Eastern (Arab) and Western (Jewish Israeli) areas of the city in their pre-war boundaries. Most Arabs who had lived in the Western side were driven out or fled to the East or elsewhere in 1948, so the ethnic separation was almost total. The two sides of the city were divided by a wall and an international border during that period. Since West Jerusalem was 38 sq. km in area, the total size of the Eastern and Western halves together was 44 sq. km.

Which Jerusalem?

Israeli Municipal Jerusalem. The municipal boundaries of Jerusalem have undergone some profound changes since the 1967 war.

On June 27-28, 1967, the Israeli government passed orders that designated an additional 70 sq. km. (including the 6 km. of East Jerusalem and the Old City) to the north and south as falling under Israeli jurisdiction, and then extended Jerusalem municipal boundaries over that same area.⁵ The areas in question, to the north and south of the city, included the eastern half of the city (6 km) as well as 28 Arab villages (or portions thereof) from the outlying areas. The boundaries were drawn with political, demographic, and security considerations so as to include the maximum amount of land with the fewest Arabs.⁶ The Israeli government assumed that these borders would in the end be the state's borders (with Jordan), so military considerations were also paramount.⁷ As a result, the new municipal boundary cut through some Arab villages in peculiar ways. Anata was split in half. Abu Dis, al-Izariyyeh, Hizma, Dahiyet al-Barid, and A-Ram, among others, were left outside the municipal boundaries. Other villages had lands included in the municipality but people left outside: Bayt Ikhsa, El-Bireh, Bethlehem, and Bayt Sahur were among these. The Arab villages/neighborhoods left in the Israeli municipal boundaries were A-Tur, Abu Tur, Bab Al-Zahra, Bayt Hanina, Bayt Safafa, al-Isawiyyeh, Jabal Mukaber, Arab es-Sawahra, Kufr Aqab, the Old City, Ras al-Amud, Shaykh Jarrah, Shu'fat, Shu'fat Refugee Camp, Silwan, Sur Baher, Umm Tuba, and Wadi Joz.



Israel expanded the city boundaries yet again in May of 1988, when another 15 sq. km to the west – the Israeli – side was added to the city. The resultant total city area was 123 sq. km, making Jerusalem by far the largest city in Israel. (Tel Aviv, the next largest, is 51 sq. km.)

Palestinians, however, do not consider these expansions to have been legal, and many still consider Arab villages that technically lie within the current municipal boundaries but outside the pre-1967 municipal boundaries to be part of the West Bank, not the city of Jerusalem *per se*. Nonetheless, over the

Larger copy of the same map can be found at the end of the book. Source: Special Technical Unit, Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation

Which Jerusalem?

years, the spatial conceptions of what does and does not belong to the city have evolved and become blurred, so villages that originally were satellites of Jerusalem, such as Bayt Hanina, have gradually come to be perceived as outlying neighborhoods of the city.


For the purposes of this study, it is important to understand that the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem correspond neither with the Palestinians' concept of the city (which was the smaller pre-1967 version) nor with their concept of the larger Jerusalem district (since they exclude key population centers that for Arabs would clearly fall into this sphere).

Nonetheless, these boundaries play a powerful role in the lives of Jerusalem Palestinians since they determine residency and all the rights that derive from it (see Chapter 4).

Israeli Greater Jerusalem. The concept of Greater Jerusalem dates from 1983, when the Israeli government under the Likud announced that an expanded area to be defined as Greater Jerusalem would now be considered to extend from Ramallah in the north to the Etzion bloc of settlements in the south, to Maale Adumim in the east, and to Bet Shemesh in the west (see map, below). Greater Jerusalem became the basis for Israeli planning and settlement efforts, all with the underlying intent of securing permanent Israeli sovereignty and control over the city. Because of the importance of this goal, Greater Jerusalem has been a focal point of settlement construction and population. In January 1993, Israel began construction of major highways designed to link the Jewish settlements in the outskirts of the city with Maale Adumim, a large settlement 4.5 km. to the east of Jerusalem.

Metropolitan Jerusalem.

This is an even more ambitious Israeli planning construct launched in 1995, when an inter-ministerial committee drew up the Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan. The plan envisioned three concentric circles, each of which would define a different Jerusalem: Municipal Jerusalem, Greater Jerusalem, and an even larger Metropolitan Jerusalem (440 sq. m.). This plan would entail an ambitious demographic expansion of the outer ring of settlements around Jerusalem as well as a major expansion of the area and population of the Jewish settlement of Maale Adumim.⁸



Source: Cheshin et. al, p. 265.

Which Jerusalem?

Palestinians' Concept of Jerusalem

In our survey, we found that for Palestinians, the answer to the question, "Which Jerusalem?" is not at all unanimous. There is a wide distribution of answers to this question.

Table 1.: Concept of Jerusalem

Q: When you say "Jerusalem," which of these do you mean?

Definition	West Bank Respondents* n. = 681	Gaza Respondents n. = 410	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 70	Total n. = 1161
The Old City	12.0%	12.0%	25.7%	12.8%
East Jerusalem before June 6, 1967	21.7%	12.4%	11.4%	17.8%
Jerusalem - East & West, before the expansion on June 28, 1967	30.0%	22.0%	28.6%	27.0%
The Israeli Municipality within its 1999 borders	0.6%	0.5%	0.0%	0.5%
Israeli Greater Jerusalem**	2.3%	1.7%	5.7%	2.3%
Palestinian Jerusalem governorate	27.6%	47.1%	24.3%	34.3%
I don't know	5.7%	4.4%	4.3%	5.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

* For the purposes of this report, in order to see if living within the municipality made any difference on attitudes, we separated the answers of East Jerusalem respondents from those of respondents in the rest of the West Bank. The West Bank categories, therefore, exclude the East Jerusalem respondents.

**Note: We did not include Metropolitan Jerusalem in the survey, so those who gave this answer could conceivably have meant either one. From a Palestinian perspective, though, both are largely the same.

First, there is a clear cognitive disconnect between the Israeli and Palestinian concepts of Jerusalem: Only one-half of one percent of all Palestinian respondents means the Israeli municipal definition of the city when referring to "Jerusalem." Among Arab Jerusalemites, it is striking that *not one* respondent means Israeli municipal Jerusalem when s/he says "Jerusalem." This is indicative of the depth of alienation these residents feel from the Israeli concept of the city.

The most popular definition, the Palestinian *mubafazha*, or district, is the furthest from the Israeli municipal one. Indeed, the two are mutually exclusive, since the boundaries of the governorate do not include Israeli municipal Jerusalem at all. It is not clear whether those who gave this answer were aware of this fact.

Second, the answers reveal a striking lack of consensus among Palestinians, wherever they live, on this question. No one definition captured any more than one-third of all the answers. And fully five percent of those interviewed (and six percent of those interviewed in Jerusalem) said that they did even not know what they meant when they said "Jerusalem." Moreover, Jerusalemites differed from West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in their answers in these respects: They were about twice as likely to mean the Old City, but generally less likely to mean the Palestinian *Mubafazha*.

In This Study

The lack of consensus on a definition of Jerusalem has implications for the researcher, as well. Statistics given by each party have a totally different basis. Israeli statistics on Jerusalem are based on people living within (or who claim to be living within) the municipal boundaries. Palestinian statistics use a broader definition of Jerusalem, in the sense of Jerusalem as Arab urban sprawl, and include the following additional neighborhoods/villages in the Jerusalem area: Abu Dis, al-Izariyyeh, Anata, Hizma, A-Ram, Dahiyet al-Barid, Bir Nibala, A-Sawahra a-Sharqiya, A-Shaykh Sa'id, A-Siwana, Qalandya, Qalandya Refugee Camp, Rafat, Mikhmas, Bayt Duqqu, Jaba', al-Judeira, Bayt Anan, al-Jib, Bayt Ijzam al-Qubeiba, Khirbet Um al-Lahem, Biddu, an-Nabi Samueil, Bayt Hanina al-Tahta Qatanna, Rafat, Bayt Surik, Bayt Ikse, Az-Zaim, and the Beduin communities at Jaba' and al-Khan al-Ahmar..¹¹ In this report, when we draw on statistics from either side, we have noted that there are inconsistencies. As a general caveat, however, no statistics should be taken as absolute truth but rather as indication, because basic definitions of Jerusalem are still so far apart. Where possible, we have also tried to validate survey findings with interviews and to draw a picture in the words of the residents themselves.

For the field surveys in this study, which was done in the summer of 1999, before discussions on Israeli withdrawal from parts of Jerusalem, we went along with the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics definition of Jerusalem.¹² We did this for a number of reasons.

For the researcher, it is virtually impossible to get a "pure" sampling of those whom Israel defines as Jerusalemites (Israel only grants permanent residency status and ID cards to Palestinians who live within the *municipal* boundaries of the city on a permanent basis), since large numbers of Jerusalem ID card holders have moved out of the city borders but retained their ID cards (and would never reveal that since to do so could cost them their residency). And a good number of non-ID card holders live surreptitiously within the city limits as well. But nor would be good science to limit the sample strictly to ID card holders, since Palestinians do not consider only ID card holders to be *bona fide* Jerusalemites. Therefore, it did not seem relevant or necessary to isolate for this factor in the surveys we did. We did, however, ask this as a background question.

Which Jerusalem?

The sample results validate our approach. Within the random sample of Jerusalem-area residents, the vast majority (79%) answered “yes” in response to the question, “Are you a Jerusalemite?” (Of these, more than two-thirds of those *outside* the municipal boundaries still considered themselves Jerusalemites, even if they did not hold an ID.) And 71% of the sample, both those living inside and outside the boundaries, said they hold an Israeli blue ID card (for Jerusalem). However, among those living within the boundaries, the number holding ID cards very high – 93%.

Table 2.: How Survey Respondents Defined Themselves

Question	Yes	No	Total n. = 480
Are you a Jerusalemite?	79.0%	21.0%	100%
Do you carry an Israeli (blue) ID card?	71.1%	29.9%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll, October, 1999

2:

Setting the Context: Israeli Demographic and Planning Policies

I do not like the growth of the non-Jewish population in Jerusalem.

-- Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert, May, 1997

This is a zero-sum game in which any gain by one side is automatically perceived as a loss by the other. Therefore, the existing planning policy is virtually "immune" to any attempts at improvement, however well-intentioned.

-- *East Jerusalem: The Current Planning Situation – A Survey of Municipal Plans and Planning Policy*. Jerusalem: Ir Shalem, November 1998, p. 54.

In east Jerusalem, however, the stakes were different....Allowing "too many" homes in Arab neighborhoods would mean "too many" Arab residents in the city. The idea was to move as many Jews as possible into east Jerusalem, and move as many Arabs as possible out of the city entirely. Israeli housing policy in east Jerusalem was all about this numbers game. Israel believed that the more Jews it moved into east Jerusalem, the stronger its hold on that part of the city. Israel saw each new Jewish neighborhood in east Jerusalem as another insurance policy against the re-division of the city.

-- Amir Cheshin, Bill Hutman, and Avi Melamed. *Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem*. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 32.

The importance of demography and planning in Jerusalem and their resultant effects on housing for Palestinians are well known and have been thoroughly documented elsewhere.¹³ In this chapter, we offer a brief background sketch to set the context for the findings presented in later chapters.

The Demographic Imperative

In Jerusalem, demography drives Israeli policy. The overriding imperative is prevention of the physical redivision of the city in order to retain sole Jewish sovereignty in perpetuity. To set the context, a brief background on the demographic imperative is in order. This demographic imperative, which is not purely a local one but issues from the highest ranks of the Israeli government, was quietly determined in the early 1970's by Golda Meir, and has been blessed and passed down by every succeeding Israeli government. Today, it is unquestioned dogma.

The policy of maintaining the same demographic ratio at any cost is fully backed across the Israeli political spectrum and at all levels of the public as well. A 1995 poll of the Israeli public¹⁴ (by the Guttman Institute and the University of Maryland) found that:

- 58% of Jews in Jerusalem were "disturbed" by the fact that 28% of the city's population was composed of Palestinians.
- More than half supported restricting housing construction for Palestinians.

Setting the Context

- A full 65% favored redefining city limits yet again to exclude Arab settlements.

As seen in the quote at the opening of the chapter, even the city's mayor has no compunction about stating this policy clearly and publicly. The quote cited is just one of a myriad of public expressions of this nature. It is common and perfectly accepted public discourse.

The political imperative is that the demographic balance must remain as it was at the end of 1972: **26.5% Arab vs. 73.5% Jewish**, at a minimum.¹⁵ A change in favor of the Jewish proportion is cheered as a success; a change in favor of the Arab proportion is treated as a calamity, and an immediate call to arms is issued to reverse it. Thus, for over two decades, Israeli municipal planning in Jerusalem has been driven by the overriding need to freeze a demographic ratio at the same random number, regardless of natural trends or residents' needs.

The political aims of freezing the demographic ratio were and remain to:

- Ensure a Jewish majority in both the Eastern *and* Western halves of the city
- Prevent territorial contiguity between Arab East Jerusalem and the West Bank
- Minimize, at any cost, the number of Arabs in the city

Politically, this has translated into massive and consistent efforts to move as many Jews as possible into Arab East Jerusalem, even at the expense of Jewish West Jerusalem, and as many Arabs as possible out of the city entirely, beyond Israeli municipal boundaries and outside Israel itself.

Toward the former goal, of attracting Jewish settlement, the government and the city have employed many measures for Jews only, including:

- Massive construction of settlements
- Housing with low or interest-free mortgages
- Tax breaks (exemption from municipal tax for five years)
- Targeted marketing campaigns among new Jewish immigrants to attract them to Jerusalem

Toward the latter goal, of “repelling” Arab settlement, the government and the city have used, among other measures, the following:

- Policies that stripped residency rights from Palestinians without cause (see Chapter 4)
- A planning and housing policy that ensured a severe housing shortage among Arabs, because it derived first and foremost from the mandate to preserve the 26.5%:73.5% ratio regardless of residents' needs (see below)
- Bureaucratic regulations that make it extremely difficult for Arabs to obtain building permits (without which they cannot build new homes or renovate existing ones)
- An aggressive policy of demolishing illegally constructed homes

Has all of this effort “paid off?”

Results of Policy: Demographic Changes Over Time

To understand the nuances of demography in Jerusalem, it is instructive to look again at different Jerusalems -- Arab East Jerusalem, Israeli municipal Jerusalem and Israeli "Greater" Jerusalem -- because the demographic trends look different from each different perspective.

It is important to reiterate that the numbers here are not wholly reliable. The Israeli figures are based on the number of Jerusalem ID holders. To hold an ID, one is supposed to live within the municipal boundaries. However, there are tens of thousands of ID holders who have quietly moved outside the boundaries without reporting it, since doing so would have lost them their residency (see Chapter 4). In addition, there are perhaps up to 30,000 Palestinians living in the city without IDs. Moreover, as we have seen, the municipal boundaries deliberately go right up to areas of dense Arab population without including them. So a more accurate picture of the situation would have to look farther than the municipal boundary. Palestinian figures do that, but the district area upon which they are based does not include the municipal area, so this is not a valid comparison either. Also, Israeli figures do not break down their numbers between East and West, or for Arabs only. Rather, they supply figures for the city as a whole and then for each of its many neighborhoods, for Jews vs. "Arabs and Others," meaning other non-Jews. In Jerusalem in particular, this number of "others" can be significant, since the city is holy to so many denominations.


Unfortunately, an accurate picture of the city's demography is likely not possible until such a time as the political climate makes it less costly for Palestinians to openly declare their true status or for Israelis to admit that the percentages may have changed. With those caveats, it is still useful to look at trends that emerge from the Israeli statistics, flawed though they may be.

Setting the Context

East Jerusalem, 1967-2000: Arabs From Absolute Majority to Half

Within East Jerusalem (current boundaries), Israeli policy has been the most successful. Arabs have gone from having an absolute majority (virtually no Jews) to being roughly equal (about 200,000 to 180,000). Jewish growth rates in Jerusalem since 1967 have been highest in East Jerusalem. Today, Jews in East Jerusalem make up 80% of the total increase in the city's entire Jewish population since 1967.¹⁶ In 1993, at the height of the wave of Soviet immigration to Israel, the city announced that a Jewish majority had been attained in East Jerusalem (168,000 Jews to 154,000 Palestinians).¹⁷ However, that majority proved elusive, as in subsequent years the balance again reversed.


Graph 1: Israelis and Palestinians, 1972-1996: % of East Jerusalem Population (Approximate)



Adapted from Foundation for Middle East Peace Website, www.fmep.org/charts/chart9903_1.gif

Israeli Municipal (East and West) Jerusalem, 1967-2000: Arabs Consistently at Around 30%

Graph 2: Demographic Balance in Israeli Municipal Jerusalem, 1967-1998



Within the municipal boundaries as a whole, Israeli policy has been less successful. Despite massive Israeli efforts, percents have held steady, in part because the increases in East Jerusalem were often achieved by moving Jews from West Jerusalem. The only period in which there was a slight reversal of this trend was from 1990-1992, when the Soviet immigration to Israel was at its peak. At that time, an internal municipal paper was written that stated, "For the first time since 1967, a possibility exists not only to preserve the demographic balance in the city, but to alter it."¹⁸

Setting the Context

However, once the immigration boom had tapered off, and demographic growth had to rely on natural increase, the Palestinian percentage crept up again (see box). As a result, the Arab percentage returned to 28% and then crept up even beyond it. The latest figures for 1998 (released in 1999) showed that Arabs had reached the highest percentage since 1967: 31.6%. This caused a political uproar in Israel. Recent projections show that if current rates of migration and natural growth continue, by 2020, the balance will be 62% Jewish to 38% Palestinian.¹⁹

Arab Population Growth in Municipal Jerusalem

Higher birth and growth rates. Arab population in municipal Jerusalem grows faster than the Jewish population. Since 1967, the Arab population has grown by 164% vs. 113% for the Jewish population. The annual growth rate was around 5%, whereas the Jewish rate was around 3%. The only year in which the Jewish growth outstripped Arab growth was in 1992-1993, with the Soviet immigration.

Population Growth in Jerusalem Over Time

Year	Total	Jews	Arabs & Others
1967-1977 Growth %	41.2%	37.7%	51.2%
1977-1987 Growth %	28.4%	27.1%	31.6%
1987-1996 Growth %	24.8%	21.7%	32.5%
1967-1996 Growth %	126.1%	113.1%	163.7%

Source: Adapted from M. Choshen, *Jerusalem on the Map: Basic Facts and Trends*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1998, p. 27.

Younger population overall. As is clear from the table below, the Arab population in Jerusalem is significantly younger than the Jewish population. Since Arab women in Jerusalem tend to marry young and bear children right away, this is another indicator that Arab growth will persist.

Age Structure of Israeli Municipal Jerusalem Population

Age Group	Arabs & Others	Jews
0-4	16%	12%
5-14	24%	21%
15-24	20%	18%
25-44	26%	23%
45-64	10%	16%
65-74	3%	6%
75+	1%	4%
Total	100%	100%

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1998*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1999, p. 49.

Favorable immigration/emigration balance. Paradoxically, the "Center of Life" policy (see Chapter 4) seems to have backfired in that some number of Arab ID-card holders who had moved out of the municipal boundaries panicked and moved back in, even in very crowded quarters, so they would not lose their residency. By contrast, Jewish Jerusalemites, particularly secular ones, have been emigrating from the city in increasing numbers. As of 1990, more Jews left the city than moved in each year. In recent years, even the ultra-Orthodox have been leaving, although in smaller numbers.


Table 3.: Overall Breakdown of Arabs and Jews in Israeli Municipal Jerusalem

Year	Total	Arabs (Thousands)	% Arabs	Jews (Thousands)	% Jews
1967	266.3	68.6	25.8%	197.7	74.2%
1970	291.7	76.2	26.1%	215.5	73.9%
1972	313.8	83.5	26.6%	230.5	73.4%
1974	346.0	93.2	26.9%	252.8	73.1%
1976	366.3	100.3	27.4%	266.0	72.6%
1977	376.0	103.7	27.6%	272.3	72.4%
1978	386.6	107.2	27.7%	279.4	72.3%
1979	398.2	110.8	27.8%	287.4	72.2%
1980	407.1	114.8	28.2%	292.3	71.8%
1981	415.0	117.4	28.3%	297.6	71.7%
1982	424.4	120.2	28.3%	304.2	71.7%
1983	428.7	122.4	28.6%	306.3	71.4%
1984	447.8	126.5	28.2%	321.1	71.7%
1985	457.7	130.0	28.4%	327.7	71.6%
1986	468.9	132.8	28.3%	336.1	71.7%
1987	482.6	136.5	28.3%	346.1	71.7%
1988	493.5	139.6	28.3%	353.9	71.7%
1989	504.1	142.6	28.3%	361.5	71.7%
1990	524.5	146.3	27.9%	378.2	72.1%
1991	544.2	151.3	27.8%	392.8	72.2%
1992	556.5	155.5	27.9%	401.0	72.1%
1993	567.2	160.8	28.3%	406.4	71.7%
1994	578.8	166.9	28.8%	411.9	71.2%
1995	602.7	181.8	30.2%	420.9	69.8%
1996	613.6	184.6	30.1%	426.2	69.5%
1997	622.1	189.5	30.5%	429.1	69.0%
1998	633.7	200.1	31.6%	433.6	68.4%

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1998*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1999, Table III/2, p. 40.

As noted above, the number of ID card holders is not synonymous with the number of Palestinians actually living in the city. Palestinian estimates are that in fact only around 86,000 ID card holders (and some say as few as 50,000) actually live in the city. The rest moved either outside the city (70,000) or abroad (50,000).²⁰ Finally, one must factor in the segment of Palestinians without Jerusalem ID cards. It is estimated that from 30,000 to 50,000 of these live in inside the municipal boundaries.²¹

Setting the Context



Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem – 1998*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1999, p. 51.

This population map shows the areas of Arab population concentration and the north-south distribution. It also shows the influx of Jews into East Jerusalem.

Metropolitan Jerusalem: Arabs in the Majority, for Now

In Metropolitan Jerusalem *beyond* the municipal boundaries, Arabs are at least at parity and perhaps in the majority and they have the advantage of higher birth rates, which, all other things being equal, should cause an increase.²² According to Meron Benvenisti, former Deputy Mayor of the city under Mayor Teddy Kollek, "In the metropolitan area surrounding Jerusalem, however, the Arab population is growing at a tremendous rate...The Arabs will soon have a numerical majority because of their high birthrate."²³ The government, all too aware of this fact, has poured resources into settling the outer ring of Jewish settlements (including Giv'at Zeev in the north, Ma'ale Adumim in the east, and Betar and Efrata in the southwest). Throughout the 1990s, these settlements have experienced significant growth and are targeted for future intensive settlement.²⁴

In addition to the plans for outer ring Greater Jerusalem settlements, the Israeli government adopted "Master Plan No. 35" in May 1998. This plan entails a *westward* expansion of the city (i.e., into suburban areas populated solely by Jews), in order to preserve the demographic balance. The plan is intended to counter the projected rises in Arab population in the east.²⁵

Setting the Context

Planning and Housing in Jerusalem

The municipality uses a thousand tricks to make sure Palestinians cannot use the land.

-- **Sarah Kaminker**, former Jerusalem councilwoman in charge of planning East Jerusalem, in an interview at her home in Jerusalem, June 22, 1999

Q: Shlomo Goldstein [current Advisor on Arab Affairs to Mayor Ehud Olmert] says it is very hard to determine where to draw the blue line. He says the Arabs can't always prove their ownership and they conceptualize the boundaries of their villages in an abstract way, so the municipality has to determine where the exact boundary of the village is. Is this true?

Kaminker: I want to tell you that this is a complete lie. For each village there is a map that was set by the British, and each village has a determined boundary. Everyone knows. If we expropriated land to build the French Hill, we had to know it belonged to al-Isawiyyeh. They know. Boy do they know.

-- **Sarah Kaminker**, interview, June 22, 1999

Ethnic cleansing by bureaucratic strangulation? Yes, it definitely is. It is very bureaucratic and very Kafkaesque.

--**Jeff Halper**, Coordinator, Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, in an interview at his home in Jerusalem, June 22, 1999

What right do the Israelis have to have a room for each girl? For each couple? While I sleep in the same room with my wife and my seven children? What right do they have? What makes them better than me?

--**Palestinian Jerusalemite, al-Isawiyyeh resident**, quoted during the al-Isawiyyeh town meeting program produced by al-Quds University and shown on cable TV in East Jerusalem

Pressure on the man creates psychological pressure on the woman and on the entire [Arab] family. The Jews have much more than they need. If they would just give us a little.

--**Jerusalem housewife**, quoted during one of the town hall programs produced by al-Quds University

It is well-established that the "demographic balance" policy is what drives all of Israeli planning and housing policies in Jerusalem. An in-depth analysis of these policies is beyond the scope of this report, and has been documented elsewhere.²⁶ Below, we briefly review the policy tools and acts that have enabled Israel to restrict Palestinian housing, then we summarize its results for Palestinians' daily lives (see box ahead).

Setting the Context


The government has expropriated vast amounts of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem. Within the area added to the city in 1967, one-third of the land has been expropriated by the government. Much of this land, though not all, was expropriated from private Arab owners (see table).

Table 4.: Land Expropriated in East Jerusalem, 1967 - 1991

Date of Expropriation	Area in km ²	Of which, % Arab Owned	Arab Towns Affected	Jewish Settlements Built on Expropriated Lands (See Map)
June 10, 1967	.120	100%	Old City (Maghrib Qtr.)	Wailing Wall Plaza
January 8, 1968	3.830	Most	Shaykh Jarrah Shu'fat Al-Issawiyeh	French Hill Mount Scopus Ramot Eshkol Ma'alot Dafna
April 14, 1968	0.881	25.0%	Old City (south)	Neve Ya'akov Old City (Jewish Quarter)
August 30, 1970	12.280	81.4%	Malha Sur Baher Bayt Jala Shu'fat	Neve Ya'akov Ramot Allon East Talpiyyot Gilo This land was also used for: Shu'fat Ridge (unpopulated area) Atarot (industrial area) Gai Ben Hinom (public area) Jaffa Gate (public area) Ramat Rahel (kibbutz)
March 20, 1980	4.400	NA	Bayt Hanina Hizma	Pisgat Zeev
July 1, 1982	0.137	NA	NA	Atarot (industrial area)
May 16, 1991	1.850	22.7%	Umm Tuba Sur Baher Bayt Sahur Bethlehem Bayt Safafa Bayt Jala	Har Homa (settlement under construction)
Total	23.498			

Sources: B'Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning and Building in East Jerusalem*, January 1997, pp. 56 & 59; Jerusalem Unit, LAW, "Land & Settlement Policy in Jerusalem." Jerusalem: LAW – Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights, January 2000, p. 9.; Allison B. Hodgkins, *The Judaization of Jerusalem: Israeli Policies Since 1967*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, December 1996, p. 24.

Setting the Context



The confiscated land, seized ostensibly for “public purposes,” has in fact been used solely for the purpose of settling the Jewish public. The Jerusalem settlements are shown in the map, above, color-coded for the three stages of their development. As of 1995, 38,500 Jewish (public) housing units had been built on this land; by contrast, *not one* unit was built for Palestinians.²⁷ As the lawyer (an Israeli resident of West Jerusalem) petitioning on behalf of

Setting the Context

residents of Umm Tuba and Bayt Sahur against the land expropriated in 1991 for Har Homa wrote:

Although the Arab residents [of Jerusalem] are among the 'public' whose property is vulnerable to expropriation (at a far higher risk than that faced by the Jewish population), they have never been included among the 'public' that is entitled to benefit from the fruits of expropriation or its purposes. Maliciously or not, this concept of the term 'the public' falls in the category of cognitive dissonance. In other words, the public on whom these 'obligations' are imposed is made up (mainly) of Arab residents, whereas the public to which the 'rights' accrue – those who will enjoy the fruits of the expropriation – is always composed exclusively of Jews. The expropriations are always in East Jerusalem, and in the majority of cases, the land was owned by Arabs, yet the expropriations are always intended to serve the Jewish population and have never had the purpose of meeting the housing needs of Jerusalem's Arab residents.²⁸

Most land remaining for Palestinian use is either already built up or zoned as a "Green Area," which means building is not allowed there. Town plans deliberately minimize the amount of land available for Palestinian construction. Among other things, the planner uses two techniques in particular:

- **The "blue line."** On each plan, the town planner outlines in blue the areas where construction is allowed. Generally, these are synonymous with the areas that have already been built.²⁹ Arabs owning lands outside the "blue line," even if the land legitimately belongs to that village and to that individual, can do nothing with their land and have no recourse to appeal this zoning designation. Land within the blue line can be built on; land outside it cannot be built on. The blue line in theory should be drawn around *all* lands that are owned by landowners in a given village. In fact, in Jerusalem, it is tightly drawn around village lands that are *already* built upon. Arab-owned land that falls outside the blue land is "absolutely valueless," according to Sarah Kaminker, former Jerusalem city councilwoman who was charged with planning in East Jerusalem for four years. She adds: "Of course as soon as a Jew buys it and proposes a plan, it will be approved. So for a Jew it has value."³⁰



- **The "Green Area."** This land, set aside ostensibly to preserve land for environmental or recreational purposes, is in fact a zoning

Aerial View of Town Planning Scheme for Arab a-Sawahra. Source: Ir Shalem. *East Jerusalem: The Current Planning Situation*. Jerusalem: November 1998, p. 43

Setting the Context

tactic. Areas are zoned “green” to remove them from use by their Arab owners and hold them until such time as there is a need for land for Jewish housing.³¹ On planning maps, it is vividly apparent how many Arab towns are encircled by green areas. This is another way to physically limit the growth of Arab areas.

There is no Master Town Plan for the entire city or for all of East Jerusalem, only local plans for each neighborhood. This piecemeal approach has not benefited the Palestinian residents of the city at all, since there was no integrated, regional consideration of community needs. Plans were all begun and finished at separate points in time, without benefit of a unified approach.

Planning follows a “mosaic” model. The mosaic model was former Mayor Teddy Kollek’s preferred construct for describing his vision of Jerusalem. This meant that the city was composed, not of two separate (potentially redivable) ethnic blocs, but of neighborhoods that together made up a beautiful mosaic.³² However, this mosaic concept only applied to Jewish settlement in Arab East Jerusalem. Any Arab attempt to build a “tile” in the “mosaic” of Jewish West Jerusalem would not have been allowed.

Town plans for Palestinian areas are deliberately held up in bureaucratic limbo for years. While the design and completion of a town plan for a Jewish housing complex – featuring all manner of community facilities such as kindergartens, schools, playgrounds, community centers, parks, shopping areas, and libraries, can be completed in a matter of months, town planning schemes for Arab areas, which primarily include housing only, can take years and years. According to Cheshin, former Advisor on Arab Affairs to Mayor Teddy Kollek, “The foot dragging method served one aim: to reduce Arab construction in the city and thereby limit the increase of the Arab local population...”³³

Time to Completion of Some Arab Town Planning Schemes

Plan Name	No. of Years
Bayt Hanina/Shu’fat	14 +
Al-Isawiyyeh	12
Ras al-Amud	13
Abu Tor	12
Bayt Safafa	13
A-Tur/Jabal al-Zeitoun/A-Shaykh	13
Jabal Mukaber	10+
Arab a-Sawahra	15+

Once approved, Town Planning Schemes:

- **Restrict building solely to already built-up areas, so residents who own any land outside of these areas can do nothing with it.** This is done by means of the “blue line,” described above.
- **Limits the number of additional houses allowed to be built in Arab areas; these limits derive solely from demographic considerations, not residents’ needs.** The government of Israel set a permanent, finite housing quota for Arabs in East Jerusalem of 15,000 in the early-1970s. “Any planning act that would expand the borders so they could exceed the quota would not be allowed.” The quota was never revisited.³⁴ The limits are solely intended to preserve the “demographic

Setting the Context

balance.” Each Arab neighborhood has a set number of “potential units;” this number absolutely determines how many new units the municipality will allow to be built there. However, “Potential units” does not mean the potential number of units that could be built in each neighborhood, based on certain assumptions about required space, city services, traffic patterns, and so on. The municipality did not carry out an urban planning study to determine such a number. Instead, ‘Potential units’ refers to the maximum number of units the Israeli administration had determined could be built in each Arab neighborhood without precipitating a change in the ratio of Arabs to Jews in the city population.³⁵ For example, in at least four of the Arab neighborhoods (Wadi Joz, A-Tur, Silwan, and Shu’fat Refugee Camp,) the number of ‘potential units’ equals the number of ‘existing units,’ which means that no further building will be allowed there, period.³⁶ Moreover, Israeli officials readily admit that this number is not the actual number of units that will be realistically be feasible. In fact, they estimate that number to be far lower. For example, for the Bayt Hanina/Shu’fat plan, they estimate that only 2,000-3,000 houses can actually be built out of the 7,500 allowed.³⁷

Table 5.: Allowed Housing Units vs. Actual Population in Selected Arab Neighborhoods

Neighborhood	Currently Existing (Already Built) Units	Maximum Allowable Potential Units Under Quota	Remaining Possible Units That Can be Built (Maximum – Existing)	Population 1998
Bayt Hanina-Shu’fat	4,500	12,000	7,500	44,704
Shu’fat Refugee Camp	1,300	1,300	0	
Issawiyyeh	700	1,500	800	8,333
Shaykh Jarrah	1,100	1,900	800	2,475
Wadi Joz	900	900	0	6,177
A-Tur	1,230	1,230	0	13,843
Silwan	1,200	1,200	0	7,908
Ras al-Amud	1,240	1,800	560	10,137*
Abu Tur, Jabal Mukaber, and Arab es-Sawahra	1,400	1,750	350	22,613**
Sur Baher	1,120	1,900	780	
Sur Baher	990	2,350	1,360	9,006†
Bayt Safafa	800	2,700	1,900	4,689††
Wadi Hilweh	400	500	100	NA
Kufr Aqab	590	1,300	710	9,567†††

Sources: Cheshin et al. *Separate But Unequal*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 31, and, for population figures, Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, No. 16, 1998. Jerusalem: Israel Institute for Jerusalem Studies, 1999, Table III/13.

* This is the figure for both Ras al-Amud and Har HaMashhit combined; the Yearbook only lists the combined figure.

** This figure includes population of Hirbet, Bayt Sahur, and Arnon Ha Natziv, because the Yearbook combines this with the figures for Abu Tur.

† This figure also includes population for Umm Tuba, as presented in the Yearbook.

†† Yearbook only lists this as population for South Bayt Safafa.

††† Yearbook combines this figure with population for Atarot Industrial Zone.

Setting the Context

- **Restrict the building percentages (or number of housing units that can be built up into one structure) to low levels for Arab homes.** Palestinian housing units are generally restricted to low percentages of 10-50% in one to two floors. By contrast, Jewish housing units can go up to 200% in eight floors. Thus, even when if they have the resources and good fortune to get a building permit, “Palestinians can’t even build on their whole property.”³⁸

In sum, Town Planning Schemes for Arab residents are not for the benefit of the residents. Kaminker describes: “When I was a councilwoman, I was placed in charge of planning East Jerusalem neighborhoods. After four years of seeing all the plans rejected, I realized that what I was actually being asked to do was to plan for the confinement, not the development, of Arab neighborhoods.”³⁹ A recent study by B’Tselem of the Town Planning Scheme Laws found that “...the plans for Palestinian neighborhoods are not really town planning schemes at all, but ‘demarcation plans.’ Their purpose is to grant legal validity to the prevention of building in most of the area of the Palestinian neighborhoods.”⁴⁰


All construction, to be legal, requires a building permit.

- **Among Palestinians, building permits can only be issued to Jerusalem ID holders.** This policy enables Israel to control and curtail Palestinian building in Jerusalem, since residency permits are very difficult to get (see Chapter 4). Thus, Palestinians who live in the city but are from other areas are not entitled to build there. No such parallel restriction exists for Jews who wish to build in the city; they can come from as far away as the Soviet Union and be more than welcome to build.
- **Building permits can only be issued if a Town Planning Scheme (TPS) has been approved.** While a TPS is in progress, no permits are allowed to be issued at all. However, in the absence of a Town Planning Scheme, no permits can be issued. If a Plan is in progress but not yet approved, no building permit can be issued, therefore no legal building can be legally done. This has left many Palestinians in Jerusalem with no choice but to move or leave the city.⁴¹
- **The process for applying for a building permit is cumbersome, intrusive, time-consuming, and expensive.** To receive a building permit, a Palestinian resident must provide copious documentation including proof of ownership through the property tax office, proof of residency, and prepayment of water. In the current political climate, these can be difficult and risky things to try to do. Proof of residency alone has been subjected to stringent requirements, with the consequence for failure to prove being loss of residency altogether (see Chapter 4). Permits can cost up to \$30,000 – an exorbitant figure relative to the standard of living for a Palestinian in Jerusalem. And it can take up to five years for a single permit to be issued.⁴² (Note that Jews generally don’t need to apply for building permits on an individual basis, because they purchase public apartments that have already been built, and the contractor takes care of all the permits.)⁴³

Setting the Context

- **Homes built without permits are considered “illegal” and can be demolished.**
The graph below shows the number of home demolitions in East Jerusalem each year since 1988. It is noteworthy that the greatest number of demolitions in a given year occurred in 1993, the year the Declaration of Principles was signed.

Graph 3: Number of Government-ordered Demolitions of Arab Homes in East Jerusalem, 1988-1999



Source: Jerusalem Unit, LAW. "The Demographic Imperative." Jerusalem: LAW--Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Right, 2000, p. 16.

The government funds for housing go almost exclusively to Jewish housing.


Resources earmarked for development in East Jerusalem are generally channeled into Jewish housing.⁴⁴ Only one public housing project has been completed in East Jerusalem within the municipal boundaries, the Nusseibeh complex, with about 400 apartments, built in the early 1970s.⁴⁵ The only other public housing project was built in al-Izariyyeh, outside the municipal boundaries, in 1982. It had several dozen housing units.⁴⁶ Arabs cannot move into public housing built by the government for Jews, because, as non-Jews, they are not entitled to any of the subsidies or loans that would enable them to purchase those homes, and even if they could afford to buy a home with their own funds, they would not be allowed to buy there because the land is "state owned" and as such, can only be sold to Jews by law. The Israeli High Court upheld the policy of "Jews-only" housing in Jerusalem.⁴⁷

Cost of Palestinian construction is entirely privately borne. As Palestinian Jerusalem ID holders are not entitled to any of the low-interest government loans, tax breaks, or subsidies that Jewish Jerusalemites can get, they must cover the expense of building entirely from their own funds. This is another factor limiting construction. By contrast, 80% of construction of Jewish urban settlements within the municipal boundaries is publicly funded.⁴⁸

Setting the Context

Up Against the Wall: Palestinians' Housing Crisis in Jerusalem at a Glance

Little land is left in East Jerusalem for building



On remaining available land:

Planning schemes may not be complete

- For East Jerusalem, 8 of 27 plans (on 1/3 of the land) await approval

If plan exists, it only allows building in already built-upon areas, and number of allowed units is determined by demographic quota, *not* population need

- Only 15,000 new units allowed by all plans for rapidly growing population of 200,000

If land is available, and quota allows, building permit is hard to obtain:

- Permit costs up to \$30,000 and can take 5 years to process
- Only 150-200 Arab permit requests are approved on average each year
- In our 1999 Jerusalem poll, 40.6% said they had been unable to get permits to build or improve housing

If permit is granted, allowed size of home is restricted



Arab Homes:
1-2 floors allowed

Jewish Homes:
Up to 8 floors allowed

Average housing density:
3.3 units/dunum 8.6 units/dunum

If house is built illegally without permit, demolition is a constant fear and frequent reality

- 12,000 Arab homes are built illegally
- Of these, 2-4,000 Arab homes have active outstanding demolition orders and could be demolished at any time
- 25-50 Arab homes are demolished each year in the city
- In 1999, 131 Palestinian Jerusalemites, of whom 68 were children, lost their homes



End Result: Existing conditions are intolerable

- Little or no possibility to renovate or enlarge existing home
- Little or no possibility to build new home
- Number of people per room is very high (2.2 on average; over 3 in 28% of Arab homes); 62% of Palestinians in the city live in overcrowded conditions
- Extremely stressful living conditions have negative psychological impact on families and adverse consequences for society as a whole (for example: children who have no suitable quiet space to study become frustrated in school and drop out; extended families living in cramped quarters quarrel endlessly over space; teens who seek an escape marry very young; young married couples who find no housing move out of the city)
- Families whose homes are demolished undergo severe trauma and often have nowhere to live
- Frustration, anger, and fear permeate daily life

Sources: Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (LAW). Jerusalem Unit. B'Tselem. Israel Commission Against Home Demolitions. Ir Shalem. Ein Shalom. interviews

Municipal Services and Taxation

[Former Jerusalem Mayor Teddy] Kollek: We said things without meaning them, and we didn't carry them out. We said over and over that we would equalize the rights of the Arabs to the rights of the Jews in the city – empty talk... Both Levi Eshkol and Menachem Begin promised them equal rights – both violated their promise... Never have we given them a feeling of being equal before the law. They were and remain second- and third-class citizens.

Ma'ariv (Hebrew daily): And this is said by a Mayor of Jerusalem who did so much for the city's Arabs, who built and paved roads and developed their quarters?

Kollek: Nonsense! Fairy tales! The Mayor nurtured nothing and built nothing. For Jewish Jerusalem I did something in the past twenty-five years. For East Jerusalem? Nothing! What did I do? Nothing. Sidewalks? Nothing. Cultural Institutions? Not one. Yes, we installed a sewerage system for them and improved the water supply. Do you know why? Do you think it was for their good, for their welfare? Forget it! There were some cases of cholera there, and the Jews were afraid that they would catch it, so we installed sewerage and a water system against cholera...⁴⁹

It is beyond the scope of this report to examine municipal services in East Jerusalem in detail. However, a few observations will suffice to set the context.

Municipal Budget

When Israel occupied Jerusalem and extended its rule to the wider area of municipal Jerusalem, the infrastructure in the newly incorporated area was outdated and sorely in need of modernization. Thus, East Jerusalem was disadvantaged vis á vis West Jerusalem right from the start. However, municipal spending patterns since then have caused this gap to become a chasm, rather than addressing it and enabling it to narrow.

Israeli law stipulates that the portion of budget received by any given sector of the population must be equal to the portion of taxes that they pay. Although Arabs are 30% of the city population, and pay about 30% of the taxes, they have consistently received only 2% to 12 %, of the municipal budget, with the difference being in funding between different departments. Education, for example, received 12%.⁵⁰ On a per capita basis, the city spends six times more on each Jewish resident than it does on each Arab resident.⁵¹

There are two types of funds:

- the **regular city budget**, raised from taxes
- the **exceptional budget**, which comes from outside sources such as government ministries and foundations

The government transfers funds to the city each year to help close the gaps between services in the East and West. Repeatedly, funds that are supposed to be allocated for Arab development mysteriously get redirected to Jewish projects, both before they leave the Ministry and after they are in the municipality's hands. For example, in 1994, the government contributed about \$10 million for this purpose, but the "special projects"

Setting the Context

that it was spent on included the construction of a new City Hall, the construction of the “Teddy” football stadium in Malha, and the construction of a new zoo.⁵² While these projects might at first blush seem to benefit the city as a whole, the reality is that all are located in West Jerusalem and would likely benefit the Jewish sector far more than the Arab sector. All are also “nice to have” items, while the Arab population’s still unmet needs are far more basic and essential.

Until 1997, such budgetary policies meant that Arab East Jerusalem got next to nothing. After 1997, when Ehud Olmert was elected mayor, there was some attempt at improvement, but funds still fell far short of what was needed. Daniel Seidemann, an Israeli lawyer who also plays a leading role in the local Jerusalem organization Ir Shalem, concedes, “Whatever Olmert has done has been drops in the bucket. What has been clear is that Olmert is not willing to improve services and infrastructure at the expense of the level of services in West Jerusalem.”⁵³ Below, for example, is an excerpt of a recent news report:

The government has withdrawn its decision to develop East Jerusalem – Early this year, it decided to transfer NIS 130 million (about \$40 million) to City Hall for development projects in East Jerusalem, but it has transferred only NIS 58.4 million (\$18 million)...The government ministries have thus far transferred to City Hall just NIS 58.4 million of the NIS 130 million that the government decided to invest in infrastructure development in East Jerusalem... The Finance Ministry transferred just NIS 22 million of the earmarked NIS 60 million and the Interior Ministry did not transfer one *agora* [penny] of the NIS 10.1 million it had allocated for the purpose... The report indicates that most of the investment projects underway in East Jerusalem are being implemented in neighborhoods that border on Jewish neighborhoods and areas where there are concentrations of Jewish settlements...⁵⁴

This has led Amir Cheshin, former Advisor on Arab Affairs to longtime Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek, to conclude: “...in the present situation regarding municipal structure and the distribution of budgets, no significant changes in the approach to East Jerusalem can be expected. The solution must be drastic and extreme, even if it leads to a change in Israel’s ideological perception.”⁵⁵ As a result, municipal services provided to the Arabs in Jerusalem are wholly inadequate and vastly inferior to those provided to Jews.⁵⁶

Municipal Government

The proportion of Arab representation in the municipal government structure is way below their demographic proportion in the city. On the municipal council itself, which is elected, there are 31 Jews and 0 Arabs. Among the employees, only 17% are Arab, and two-thirds of these are manual laborers doing maintenance or sanitation. The few white collar workers – such as engineers, social workers, and physicians, “serve the Arab population exclusively.”⁵⁷ According to Meron Benvenisti, former Deputy Mayor of the city:

The complete absence of Arab city council members and the decided inferiority of the status of Arabs in municipal administration has produced a municipal decision-making process that is not responsive to the demands and needs of the Arab sector. The dimensions of this neglect and discrimination were traditionally revealed shortly before municipal elections...⁵⁸

Roads

Roads in East Jerusalem are not adequately maintained, unlike roads to Jewish neighborhoods. A municipal report published in July 1995 found that hundreds more kilometers of paved roads are needed.⁵⁹ Many Arab neighborhoods have unnamed streets to this day.⁶⁰ Some have names but no signs. An internal Israeli government memo written in 1986 noted that "In most east Jerusalem neighborhoods the local roads are no more than unpaved dirt paths without sidewalks or electricity..."⁶¹ The street lighting has not been upgraded since 1967.⁶² A survey of roads done by the Special Projects Unit at the Orient House found most roads to be small and in "very poor" to "good" condition. Only one road (the new Bayt Hanina road) was larger than two lanes; a number of internal roads were only one lane. Lighting on many roads was not continuous along the whole road. Signs and road markings were either totally absent or in poor condition. Only about half of the roads had curbs. Only the access road to Silwan was found to have been "recently" paved.⁶³ It is not unusual to see a road switch from newly paved highway (installed to lead to a new Jewish settlement) to narrow, barely two-lane, bumpy, poorly maintained path right at the entrance to an Arab area.

Roads that do exist often lack sidewalks. Whereas in Jewish areas there are 690 residents per kilometer of sidewalk, in Arab areas, there are 2,917 residents per kilometer of sidewalk.⁶⁴



Setting the Context

Garbage Collection

Garbage collection in Arab areas is erratic and infrequent. A 1986 government memo noted that in 60% of the East Jerusalem neighborhoods, there was no garbage collection at all.⁶⁵ In some of the other 40%, garbage collection was only intermittent.⁶⁶ Cheshin notes that "There are Arab areas of the city that no municipal trash truck has entered even once since 1967."⁶⁷ Passing through East Jerusalem, especially in outlying areas, one often notices curling smoke arising from trash bins at the side of the street. This is



because garbage collection is so inadequate that residents resort to burning garbage periodically.

Sewage

The city as a whole has a severe problem with inadequate sewage disposal. A 1991 Ministry of Environment report called the Jerusalem sewage situation "appalling."⁶⁸ Arab neighborhoods are affected both directly and indirectly. First, many Arab neighborhoods, especially in rural areas of the city, still have no sewage system.⁶⁹ A municipal report, released in July 1995, found that 150 more kilometers of sewers are needed in East Jerusalem.⁷⁰ In these neighborhoods, such as Jabal Mukaber, sewage flows freely out from houses into the street. Only recently did the municipality finally agree to put in a sewage system in al-Isawiyyeh, provided the residents paid for the cost of its construction.⁷¹ The disparity between sewage networks in Arab and Jewish areas is huge: There are 743 Jews per kilometer of sewer line vs. 2,809 Arabs.⁷²

Second, Arab neighborhoods stand in danger of contamination from wastewater dumpage by Jewish settlements. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics found that groundwater pollution is occurring at 3 settlements within the municipal boundaries and 15 outside, within the Jerusalem District. Ecological damage to flora and fauna was

found near 10 settlements, 4 inside and 6 outside the city.⁷³ Overall, as one expert on the city observed:

One should note that the contamination of water sources, the degradation of the environment, and possible long-term ecological damage are being carried out in fulfillment of an ideological commitment to expanding Israeli Jewish population in the area. This commitment is at the expense of the necessary planning and irrespective of the need to install the required infrastructure. Of particular concern to the Palestinian community is that by contaminating the water aquifers on the eastern side of the city, such neglect on the part of the Israeli government and Municipality of Jerusalem may pre-empt the development of a Palestinian controlled water abstraction and distribution system in the future.⁷⁴

Water

Water has been more consistently supplied, but not without problems. After the 1967 war, Israel hooked all Arab villages in the newly expanded municipal area to the Jerusalem water system. However, it was done too quickly – water lines were built above ground and kept small. This meant they were easily broken. As lines needed to be replaced, the lack of Town Planning Schemes for Arab areas meant that the location of the water lines was hard to determine. “That was enough reason for Israel simply to ignore East Jerusalem’s water problem. Today, some East Jerusalem neighborhoods still do not have proper water lines.”⁷⁵

Fire Stations

East Jerusalem has only one fire station, located on the east side of the Old City. This fire station provides all services, such as fire fighting and investigations of fire incidents in East Jerusalem and the northern neighborhoods.⁷⁶

Recreational Facilities

There are only three playgrounds in all of East Jerusalem, despite the high percentage of children in the population. These are located in near the Rockefeller Museum, in Shaykh Jarrah, and in Bayt Hanina.⁷⁷ A recent survey of planning in East Jerusalem done by the organization Ir Shalem found that “Overall, there is a profound shortage of open public land, i.e. parks and developed public gardens for the use of the local population. Approximately 2.2% of the total area of the plans is allocated for public spaces.”⁷⁸ This is despite the fact that 7 square km. of East Jerusalem land (15.4% of the area’s land remaining, after accounting for expropriations) has been designated as “Green Area” by the existing Town Planning Schemes.⁷⁹

There are only two libraries (vs. 26 for Jews) and not one swimming pool for Arabs in the city. There are only 33 sports centers (vs. 531 for Jews).⁸⁰

Setting the Context

Business Tax (*Arnona*)

The business tax, or *arnona*, in East Jerusalem is the same as it is in West Jerusalem. Ziad al-Hamouri, Director of the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights, says the Jerusalem rate of NIS 245 per square meter per year is the highest in Israel. For a business owner who rents an average-sized store, this could mean his *arnona* totals eight times his yearly rent. By contrast, just outside the city borders in A-Ram, for example, *arnona* is only a few dinars a year, “peanuts by comparison.” Al-Hamouri also notes that in other cities there are sliding scales, with lower allowed rates for less profitable locations, but in Jerusalem there are no such breaks.⁸¹ This puts Arab merchants at a distinct disadvantage, since the profit they can make in the eastern half of the city is considerably less than that a Jewish merchant can make in the West.

Merchants who cannot pay the *arnona* have property confiscated for nonpayment in surprise raids. Such raids are not uncommon. Hamouri says the raids occur without any prior notice, and businessmen who owe back taxes live with constant fear. His center did a survey and found that fully 95% of East Jerusalem merchants owed some amount of *arnona* to the municipality.

Hamouri describes the perception of this policy among the Arab community: “We felt that it was a political, not a municipal tax, and in the end it will lead to confiscation of houses and shops. We published a figure which we took from the municipality that Palestinians owe the municipality roughly \$300 million, which is a lot.”⁸²

Summary

This brief survey of the results of policy on the Arabs in East Jerusalem sets the context for the survey results to follow in the next few chapters. It is clear that because Jerusalem is governed on a strictly demographic policy basis, the quality of life overall for Arabs in the city is extraordinarily substandard. As a result, there is an acute housing crisis, and even more than that, there is a complete absence of rational planning to meet a rapidly growing population's needs. Planning has been done on a piecemeal basis and has been completely subjugated to the overall political imperative of populating the city with Jews. Municipal services are fair at best, and budgets that should have been available, inadequate though they were, have been rechanneled to fund services in the Jewish neighborhoods of the city.

3:

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem: Closure and Its Impact

Jerusalem has become the city of its residents, not the metropolitan center of the West Bank.

--**Salim Tamari**, Director, Institute of Jerusalem Studies, in an interview in his office in Jerusalem, July 1, 1999

With the closure, East Jerusalem is dying as the cultural, political, economic center of Palestinian life on the West Bank.

--**Jeff Halper**, Coordinator, Israeli Committee Against Home Demolitions, in an interview at his home in Jerusalem, June 22, 1999

The closure was like a knockout for East Jerusalem as a center of Palestinian life. The center of life moved to the suburbs.

--**Hanna Amiri**, Jerusalem resident and expert, in an interview at his home in Jerusalem, May 18, 1999

In the late 1980s, the demographic imperative mandated a new approach to ensure a Jewish majority in Jerusalem. The intifada and subsequent acts of resistance reinforced, in the mind of Israel's political leadership, the need for separation of the two populations. Yet nowhere were they more intermingled than in Jerusalem and the surrounding area. In the wake of the intifada, under the shadow of the Gulf War, when it seemed legitimate, and in a proactive response to the changes foreseen to be imposed by Oslo, Israel imposed a closure on the city of Jerusalem (along with other travel restrictions within and between the territories) that has done more to change the way of life in the city than any other single factor.

The reason given for the closure was security. Each time an incident occurred, the closure tightened. However, residents interviewed for this study saw the closure differently. Some thought it was economic; others, political. They did not believe in the security rationale, because several stated that no closure can be completely hermetic; any Palestinian knows that if someone really wants to get through without a permit, he can – by taking back roads on foot. The closure would not deter a fanatic suicide bomber. Yet, it has lasted for nine years, and it seems to be in place for the foreseeable future.

Closure is a policy that is little known or appreciated outside of the city, even in Israel itself. Therefore we devote a considerable amount of attention to the closure, its nature, and its effects.


Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

Evolution and Nature of the Closure Policy

The policy of closure began gradually. From 1972 until June of 1989, a general exit permit was issued that applied to all residents of the West Bank and Gaza and enabled them to move freely between the territories, Israel, and Jerusalem during the day. There were no checkpoints on the roads or other indicators of where one area ended and the other began. Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza, clearly identified by their different-colored ID cards and license plates, were not allowed to stay overnight in Jerusalem, or to be found between the hours of 1 and 5 a.m. In June of 1989, at the height of the intifada, Israel began to restrict the general exit permit such that some individuals were not allowed to exit the territories. However, the general exit permit still applied to anyone else who was not deemed a "security risk." Thus, restricted individuals were still a minority.

In January of 1991, during the Gulf War, Israel suspended the general exit permit and issued a directive replacing it with *personal* exit permits.⁸³ To enforce this policy, Israel set up nine checkpoints, one on each main road entering the city (see map). On these roads, at points determined by Israel (and not always along the municipal boundary⁸⁴, permanent, round-the-clock Israeli military checkpoints were set up. In effect, this closed the border between the territories and Jerusalem. The basic premise of the closure is that free Palestinian access to the city of Jerusalem is restricted to residents – Palestinians who hold Jerusalem ID cards⁸⁵ – only. All other Palestinians required an individual permit to enter the city. It is important to realize that there are many Palestinians who consider themselves to be "Jerusalemites" but do not hold ID cards because they live – for whatever reason – outside the municipal boundaries. These people were also unable to enter their own city. For the first time, the closure also applied to foreign workers and international NGOs. However, at no time did any restrictions apply to Jewish settlers living in the West Bank or Gaza. They were always able to travel freely.

But even then, the full impact of closure was not yet felt. According to the Israeli human rights organization, B'Tselem: "The effect of revocation of the general exit permit on Occupied Territories residents was not immediate. At first, Israel issued many permits for relatively long periods, and except for days in which a total closure on the Occupied Territories was imposed, most Palestinians could continue to enter Israel routinely.



Source: Special Technical Unit, Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation

Larger copy of the same map can be found at the end of the book.

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

However, Israel's permit policy gradually became stricter.⁸⁶ The Jerusalemites interviewed for this study all had differing accounts of when the closure actually began, which underscores the gradual nature of its imposition. On March 31, 1993, after a violent incident in which Israelis were killed by Palestinians from the occupied territories, the closure became total and, for a while, hermetic. Permits "were granted sparingly and according to criteria unknown to Palestinians."⁸⁷

One interviewee recalled the closure being made permanent in April 1994, under Labor: "In April 1994, it was physical and final. They put up the [soldiers'] shelters, the bathrooms, the lighting, and the watchtowers. It was probably a process," he said. "The Israelis thought, there is peace and we have to act on Jerusalem. We have to get the non-Jerusalemites used to the concept of no Jerusalem and the Jerusalemites used to the concept that it is under Israeli control."⁸⁸

The Entrance Permit



Obtaining the entrance permit. To enter Jerusalem, Palestinians without Jerusalem IDs must apply for a permit. Obtaining the permit is a lengthy, humiliating, and arbitrary process. Considerable documentation is required. The applicant must present proof of tax payment, a letter from an employer (if the permit is job-related), and other personal data. According to Kassem Abu Dayyeh, a researcher at the Arab Studies Society who has worked in Jerusalem but lived outside for seven years: "If you go to any Israeli military headquarters, where they issue these permits, you will see that many Palestinians who apply there to get a permit are asked to come and speak to an Israeli intelligence officer beforehand in

order to bargain with him. They use it as a pressure and ask for collaboration beforehand."⁸⁹

Laborers are caught in a Catch 22: "It is not easy to get a permit unless you are employed by a big institution. If you are a laborer, you have to find an employer in Israel to sponsor you, and how can you find an employer without having a permit to go and locate one first?"⁹⁰

There are no published criteria for receiving permits, and there is no requirement to state reasons for denying one. Nor is there any avenue of appeal for Palestinians denied permits.

Since the Interim Agreement was signed, applications have been formally submitted to the Palestinian District Coordinating Office (DCO). However, the DCO simply forwards the

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

application to the Israeli official who controls all permit decisions. According to one human rights organization, “The Palestinian officials play no real role – they are like the mailman who delivers the application to the Israelis.”⁹¹

Short-term, limited, jurisdiction of permit. If granted, permits are usually for short terms only and must be renewed for each new entrance into the city. The permit specifies the hours in which the holder is allowed to be in the city (e.g., 5 a.m. to 5 p.m.) and even the exact areas where the holder is allowed to go (e.g., Jerusalem zone only). This prevents a permit holder from going any farther into Israel than Jerusalem. Generally overnight stays are not allowed, even for people with compelling reasons to stay, such as work requirements or critically ill relatives. Abu Dayyeh describes: “They would grant me a one-month permit [to go to my job], and it was liable for renewal. So I used to go and have it renewed every month. But now and then I faced problems. Sometimes I didn’t succeed to have it renewed; sometimes I did. It was intermittent, and depended upon the security and the political situation in the area. And sometimes it depended on the whims of the soldiers on duty.”

Holding a permit does not in and of itself guarantee access at any given time. Israel can choose at will to impose a total closure on Jerusalem, which supersedes and cancels all permits granted. The number of days of closure imposed over the years are shown below.

Table 6.: Number of Days of Closure: West Bank/Jerusalem

Year	Israeli Government Figures	Palestinian Authority Figures
1988	--	7
1989	--	5
1990	--	6
1991	6	41
1992	3	--
1993	1	8
1994	33	58
1995	67	66
1996	88	108
1997	91	78
1998	20	NA

← Signing of the
Declaration of Principles
September 13, 1993

Source: B’Tselem. Oslo: *Before and After. The Status of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories*. Jerusalem, B’Tselem. May 1999.

Permit for person only. As of 1992, the permits covered only the person, *not* his or her vehicle. A separate permit was required for vehicles, and few had the time, energy, or funds to chase down two permits for a simple trip to the city. Cars with West Bank or Gaza plates are not allowed in Jerusalem. Drivers must leave cars at borders, even doctors who have the requisite permits to enter the area for work purposes. The only exception to the vehicle entrance was private taxis. These, at first, could get permits without too much difficulty. But even permits for taxis have become scarce, as Fayez Hussein describes: “Little by little, these taxi permits stopped coming, and when they were issued, they were not reliable. If there was

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

a security problem, the permit was withdrawn. Taxi drivers could not make a living that way.⁹²

Restrictions on leaving the city. Palestinians with Jerusalem IDs can travel freely in the West Bank and Israel, but, also as part of the closure policy, must get permits to go to Gaza.

Introduction of magnetic cards. In the year 2000, the policy was tightened even further. Palestinians with West Bank identifications who wish to travel to Jerusalem now must register for Israeli-issued magnetic ID cards before they even apply for permission to visit Jerusalem. This is the same technique that has been used in Gaza since 1989. The magnetic ID card gives the soldier on duty instant computerized access to a person's security file, making it even more intimidating to enter the city.⁹³

Enforcement Measures

The closure and permit policy is enforced in numerous ways. First, at the checkpoint itself, many Arabs are stopped and checked. This includes taxis that have permits to enter the area. Thus, a car with an Israeli plate is waved right through, while a car with a Palestinian plate is stopped, pulled to the side, and documentation collected and scrutinized from each person. If one person in a taxi of seven has no permit, that person is ordered out and not allowed to cross into the city.

There is a disparity in the degree to which the border checks are done at different points. By all accounts, the checkpoint on the road from Bethlehem and Hebron is much more "hermetic" than the one on the road from Ramallah. "From Bethlehem it is impossible, impossible. They stop every car... Yet people without permits from Ramallah can pass through, because they don't always check there.... Bethlehem is a permanent international border; A-Ram [on the road to Ramallah] is a checkpoint."⁹⁴ This observation was

validated when Israel began to construct a new military checkpoint in Bethlehem that same year. The checkpoint will be two-tiered: "According to recent construction and an Israeli map handed to the Palestinian DCO office in Bethlehem, the new checkpoint will create two arteries into Jerusalem: One for Palestinians and one for Jewish settlers, tourists, and VIPs. From Rachel's Tomb to the Gilo Junction, Palestinians will be separated from the Hebron Road and forced to use an alternative route, park unauthorized cars in a 700-car parking lot, and walk 650 meters to a new checkpoint."⁹⁵



Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

Second, Arabs can be and are stopped in the city itself at any time. When the closure was first implemented, if one was caught without a permit within the city limits, Israelis levied fines from NIS 400 to NIS 15,000 with imprisonment terms lasting from a few days up to nine months. By one estimate, in 19 December, 1996, an average 1,000 Palestinians were being detained each week in Jerusalem or Israel for permit violations. Third, the permit policy enables police and soldiers to round up suspects randomly in the event⁹⁶ a random bomb goes off or there is some other incident. Palestinians in the vicinity who do not hold permits to be there are instantly prime suspects, regardless of their reasons for being there or for not having a permit. This possibility in itself, combined with the hassle of obtaining a permit, instills enough fear to keep people at home on all but the most essential of occasions.

After the arrival of the Palestine National Authority, fines reportedly became less common.⁹⁷ From that point on, brief imprisonment or detention was the primary enforcement measure, along with transport to the nearest checkpoint and on-the-spot “deportation,” so to speak.

Today, nearly nine years later, closure remains a basic fact of life. Jeff Halper, Coordinator of the Israeli Commission Against Home Demolitions and a longtime Jerusalem resident, calls the closure “the most dramatic change since Oslo.” He says, “The closure has had a real effect in terms of general movement of Palestinians, because they have to take the crazy road all the way around and this has affected the movement of people and goods.”

Table 7.: Impact of Closure on Freedom of Movement

Q: Jerusalem has been closed in front of the people from West Bank and Gaza for several years. How has the closure affected the following aspects in your life:

Freedom of movement	West Bank & Jerusalem Respondents n. = 763	Gaza Respondents n. = 437	Total n. = 1200
A very positive effect	0.4%	0.0%	0.3%
A positive effect	1.4%	2.1%	1.7%
It didn't have any effect	17.3%	8.2%	14.0%
A negative effect	31.2%	34.8%	32.5%
A very negative effect	47.3%	50.8%	48.5%
No answer	2.4%	4.1%	3.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

In our survey, 81% said that the closure had had a negative or very negative effect on their freedom of movement.

Although the closure is actually more objectively porous than it was at the beginning, it has nonetheless become much more subjectively solid in Palestinians' minds. This is why the vast majority abide by it and stay out of Jerusalem. This is why Jerusalem has become, in the eyes of one interviewee, “a ghost city.”⁹⁸

Impact of the Closure on Palestinian Institutions

The closure of Jerusalem has led to a massive exodus of Palestinian institutions from Jerusalem. Other factors were also involved, such as the acute housing shortage and construction policies in Jerusalem, which made it very difficult to find or expand office space, and Israel's insistence that no Palestinian national activity be conducted in Jerusalem. The Israeli Knesset passed the Gaza-Jericho Implementation Law (Limiting of Activities) on December 26, 1994. It prohibits Palestinian political activities in Jerusalem and requires that any institution that has any connection with the PLO or PNA must obtain Israeli permission to set up an office. After this law was passed, numerous large Palestinian institutions such as the Orient House, Al-Quds University, Maqassad Hospital, and others, were targeted for harassment or closure at various times. Also, the Oslo Agreement stipulated that the status of Jerusalem should not change, and donor countries – including the World Bank – agreed not to fund anything in Jerusalem until the political question was resolved. This has hit the larger institutions, especially the hospitals, very hard. The general closure of Jerusalem, however, was no doubt most the detrimental factor.⁹⁹ The reason is simple: These offices were wholly dependent upon Palestinians from the occupied territories, whether as staff members, clients, or consumers. There are less than a quarter of a million Palestinians in Jerusalem alone – this is not enough to sustain an organizational infrastructure that had been previously serving larger populations.

How to account for the exact number of institutions that have left the city? According to the director of one Jerusalem institute:

The question is, 'who remained?' not, 'who moved?.' The small ones remained. The ones that deal with the press remained, because they have to be here. Ones that are not connected to political groups have remained. And a few international agencies remained, although many, such as the World Bank office and PECJAR moved to A-Ram because their clientele had no access to them.¹⁰⁰

Sari Nusseibeh, President of al-Quds University, agrees: "If you look at the [Palestinian] institutions in Jerusalem, you will find that maybe 90% of them, if not more, have basically emigrated."¹⁰¹ All kinds of institutions have relocated to offices just outside the Jerusalem municipal boundaries, in A-Ram, Dahiyet al-Barid, or farther away, in Ramallah, where both Jerusalemites and West Bankers can access them freely, albeit less conveniently.¹⁰² This is equally true of foreign NGOs, think tanks, human rights organizations, and even diplomatic missions and consulates. Consulates remained in the city for political reasons, but nonetheless most opened branches in the West Bank and Gaza to issue visas to the population there.

It is one kind of statement to relocate to Jerusalem satellite areas just beyond the Israeli municipal checkpoint, such as A-Ram or Dahiyet al-Barid. But it is altogether another to relocate to Ramallah, which is a large city now under Palestinian control. Ironically, even the Palestinian government offices located themselves in Ramallah. They did not have the option to open offices in municipal Jerusalem, since the Israeli-Palestinian agreements forbid that. But they could have located in border neighborhoods like Dahiyet al-Barid or A-Ram.

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

“Early on, there was a political slogan, ‘we want to move to Jerusalem, but Dahiyet al-Barid and A-Ram are as good.’ After being on the border next to the checkpoint for a while, they all moved out – the Ministry of Planning, Industry, Economy and Trade – all moved to Ramallah. Only PECNDAR stayed.”¹⁰³

Institutions that did not have the choice to relocate and nonetheless relied on ties with the West Bank and Gaza to survive have had an extremely hard time. Two examples, hospitals and schools, will suffice to briefly illustrate.

East Jerusalem Hospitals

Among the Palestinian institutions hardest hit by the closure are the private Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem.¹⁰⁴ Most of these hospitals were established before 1967; Al-Maassad was just opening its doors. They provide services that are unique in the entire Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza region. The five main hospitals are listed in the table below.

Table 8.: Private Palestinian Hospitals in East Jerusalem

Hospital	Unique Services Offered	Primary Clientele
Augusta Victoria	Refugee referral, pediatric kidney dialysis	Refugees requiring referrals from all over Palestine
Al-Maassad	Cardiovascular, cardiac surgery, orthopedic & neonatal	All over West Bank and Gaza
St John's Hospital	Ophthalmic specialty	All over West Bank and Gaza
St. Joseph's Hospital	General & neurosurgery	Jerusalem, Ramallah & Bethlehem area
Palestine Red Crescent Hospital	Maternity	Jerusalem, Ramallah & Bethlehem area

Source: Interview with Dr. Rafiq Hussein

Prior to the closure, these hospitals or medical facilities in Jerusalem used to draw 90% of their patients and 70% of their medical personnel from the surrounding West Bank and Gaza.¹⁰⁵ But with the closure, patients from the West Bank and Gaza needed permits to enter Jerusalem. Few permits are granted for medical reasons, even in emergencies. In any case, there is no clear definition of what constitutes an emergency; the decision is verbal, therefore there is no accountability, and there is no appeal.¹⁰⁶

Since the closure, unless you are a patient in an ambulance, it is very difficult to get into Jerusalem. Permits are not given for this. They [the authorities] just ask, “Why do you want to go to Maassad? Why don't you go to a hospital in Ramallah?” Some patients do sneak in, but most don't want to take the risk. Because it is a risk. And all that has to happen is a bomb goes off somewhere, and if you are caught nearby you are a prime suspect, so apart from your illness that has not been treated, you get a few months in jail. People don't want to risk that.¹⁰⁷

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

The closure has had numerous devastating effects on patients, both those in and out of the hospitals, their families, doctors, and the hospitals themselves. These effects are summarized in the table below.

Table 9.: Problems Created for Hospitals, Doctors, and Patients by Closure

Person/institution affected	How affected
Patients from outside Jerusalem	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cannot obtain treatment for chronic diseases, such as chemotherapy or dialysis • Cannot receive "outside" relatives as hospital visitors, even if they are dying
Doctors and medical staff from outside Jerusalem	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unless they have a permit, they can't reach their place of work • Must renew exit permits monthly; renewal process can take 4-5 days • If a political problem arises, permit can be summarily cancelled; takes days to renew • Must wait in long lines to reach the checkpoint, then leave cars at the checkpoint and continue to place of work some other way • For a busy specialist for whom time is money, this is an impossible way to work. So ...they began moving to Ramallah hospitals to work.
East Jerusalem hospitals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to cash shortages, they do not have access to medical supplies they need, including medication. • All these hospitals are referral hospitals, so they rely on patient payments to survive. Their patient base has dwindled away. • Occupancy rates are way down. • When the patient base dwindles, Israel refuses to grant permits for new medical equipment, putting hospitals in a catch-22 • All hospitals have had to introduce severe cost cutting measures to continue to function.

Source: Dr. Rafiq Hussein, Head, East Jerusalem Hospitals Forum

New competitive pressures. Both the closure and the arrival of the Palestine National Authority (PNA) in 1994 have resulted in yet another pressure on East Jerusalem hospitals: competition. The PNA Ministry of Health is unable to do much for East Jerusalem hospitals and in any case wishes to channel its funds to the West Bank and Gaza hospitals, which were "in a total mess when we received them from the Israelis in 1994. So people see it as a priority to upgrade these hospitals."¹⁰⁸ As a result, the health sector in the West Bank and Gaza (especially the private sector) is flourishing. And the doctors who have left the Jerusalem Hospitals as a result of the closure are eager to bring their medical facilities up to

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

par with the ones they left. "Ramallah Hospital, for example, wants to open a cardiac surgery unit. But from a political point of view, if that is done, Maqassad is dead."¹⁰⁹

End result: Financial and morale crisis. The closure, along with other aspects of Israeli policy¹¹⁰ (such as requiring Jerusalemites to take the Israeli National Insurance, paying inferior insurance reimbursal rates to Palestinian hospitals, enforcing strict permit regulations, etc.) as well as Palestinian policy that are beyond the scope of this report have gradually pushed Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem into dire financial straits. East Jerusalem hospitals all had deficits totalling nearly 13 million dollars in 1997 alone; hospitals no longer have the financial base to be self-sufficient. "The hospitals are in an absolute crisis. Maqassad is in an absolute crisis and it may close. Augusta Victoria was on the verge of closure."¹¹¹ They have been stripped of their patient base, both within and outside Jerusalem, and cut off from many of their medical professionals. Of all of the factors behind the crisis, the closure is among the most significant.

Table 10.: Crisis Indicators for Private Palestinian Hospitals in East Jerusalem / 1997

Hospital	Deficit for 1997	No. of Beds in 1994	No. of Beds in 1997*	% Bed Occupancy, 1997	% Decline in Beds, 1994-1997
Augusta Victoria	- \$3,121,329.00	141	63	64%	Over 60%
Al-Maqassad	-\$6,866,200.00	264	207	80%	22%
St John's Hospital	-\$1,390,400.00	82	76	45%	7%
St. Joseph's Hospital	-\$ 65,000.00	NA	73	52%	NA
Palestine Red Crescent Hospital	-\$1,315,570.00	NA	30	72%	NA
Total	-12,758,499.00	NA	449	64%	NA

*At year end

Adapted from "Surviving to Serve the Palestinian Community Beyond the Year 2000: A Document Identifying Medium- and Short-Term Strategies and Needs for Hospitals in East Jerusalem," prepared by The East Jerusalem Hospitals Forum, August, 1997

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

Table 11.: Cost Cutting Measures Taken by East Jerusalem Hospitals, 1996-97

Hospital	Measures Taken
Augusta Victoria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No. of beds cut by over 60% • Staff cut by 17% • Staff re-engineering plan initiated; many positions made redundant • Physician contracts changing to part-time • Cheaper employee benefit plan introduced • Bids for medicines and supplies re-tendered to obtain more competitive prices • All hospital operations examined to cut costs and raise efficiency
Al-Maqassad	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No. of beds cut by 22% • Staff cut by 17%; all new appointments frozen • New administrative director with health management experience appointed • Internal auditing system established
St. John's Hospital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No. of beds cut by 7% • Administrative staff cut by 20% • Medical staff made redundant • Retiring medical staff not replaced or replaced at a lower grade • Under-utilized assets sold

Adapted from *Surviving to Serve the Palestinian Community Beyond the Year 2000: A Document Identifying Medium- and Short-Term Strategies and Needs for Hospitals in East Jerusalem*, prepared by The East Jerusalem Hospitals Forum, August, 1997

East Jerusalem Schools

Today in East Jerusalem there are 34 non-municipal (private, Waqf, and UNRWA) schools and 35 government- (municipality) run schools. As noted above, the private schools had historically served students from the territories and even beyond, from the Arab world. Both institutions have been hard hit by the closure. Walid Zagha, Director General of the Palestinian Ministry of Education, stated in 1996 that more than 70,000 students were unable to come to class.¹¹² Sometimes there was no choice but to break the rules: "A lot of kids who live in middle class areas outside Jerusalem and go to private schools in Jerusalem have to smuggle themselves in to go to school,"¹¹³ said one interviewee.

Not only were students unable to come to class, but teachers as well. According to a 1999 report by the Palestinian Ministry of Education, one-third of teachers are affected by the closure and cannot get to work on a reliable basis. To cope with the dearth of pupils and staff, some schools had to merge different grades together, with dubious results.

But private schools have had the hardest time, because they do not have government funding to support them and Israel restricted the funds they could receive from Jordan or

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

the PLO. After a while, teachers from the territories who had been employed in Jerusalem schools had little choice but to seek work elsewhere, and “you stopped being able to get the good teachers from the overall region. Therefore, you [the private school] began to compete for teachers within Jerusalem. Now [if you are a private school in Jerusalem], with whom are you competing? With the government-run schools, which give relatively higher salaries than the private schools. So naturally, the best people go there, and the quality of private schools begins to go down, and this was a quality that was very special. As a result, these schools begin to look for a way out, and this is why so many of them have started looking for Israeli subsidies in order to be able to compete.”¹¹⁴

So on top of a lack of personnel, the schools are also facing severe financial hardship.

The education that children receive is, as a result, spotty at best. And the outcome is that 30% of elementary school students in East Jerusalem are illiterate and 40% of high school students drop out.¹¹⁵ “When I was young, everyone wanted to finish his education and have a future,” says Khalil Toufakji, Director of the Division of Cartography and Land Survey at the Orient House. “Now, at 17, they want to quit school and drive a car, and that’s it.”

Bottom Line: De-Institutionalization

However one looks at it, there is no denying that East Jerusalem is in the end stages of a process of de-institutionalization, as far as Palestinian institutions go. Most Arab institutions have either left the city or, if they have remained, they have been reduced to a shadow of their former selves. The only exceptions to this are al-Quds University, which has numerous campuses in the city and beyond, and has managed to grow and thrive, Orient House, which is self-sustained and receives foreign grants, and press offices, which do not wholly depend on clientele or staff from outside the city. This trend, which began in 1991 with the first closure and intensified greatly after Oslo, has enormous implications for the Palestinians of Jerusalem. The Palestinian National Authority is not allowed to operate in Jerusalem, and the independent organizations that were there have left. Those that remain are not providing any significant services. So to whom do the city’s residents turn? They are increasingly stranded in political limbo.

Impact of Closure on the Palestinian Economy

Economic and commercial data about the Palestinians in Jerusalem are extremely hard to obtain, if not nonexistent. Yet it is clear from the interviews and survey data that the closure has had a significant impact on the economy of the Palestinians in Jerusalem, and this must be described. What follows is not an exhaustive or data-based study, but rather an impressionistic picture of trends that emerged from the surveys and interviews.

Our survey data confirms that Palestinians feel that closure has been very harmful to them economically (see Tables). When asked how closure has affected commerce in general, only 2.8% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza indicated that it had a very positive or positive effect. By contrast, 79.2% said that it had a negative or very negative effect. As Mohammad Amin, head of the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce, put it: "The worst thing for commerce is closure. I can't sell to Jerusalem. I don't have a permit for myself, for my car. So I would need to get a Jerusalem car and bring it here, and I can't do that. It's impossible. So I buy from here."¹⁶

Table 12.: Impact of Closure on Commerce

Q: Jerusalem has been closed in front of the people from West Bank and Gaza for several years. How has the closure affected the following aspects in your life:

Commerce in general	West Bank & Jerusalem Respondents n. = 763	Gaza Respondents n. = 437	Total n. = 1200
A very positive effect	0.6%	0.1%	0.4%
A positive effect	3.5%	0.5%	2.4%
It didn't have any effect	15.3%	11.7%	14.1%
A negative effect	31.7%	30.9%	31.4%
A very negative effect	45.9%	51.3%	47.8%
No answer	3.0%	5.5%	3.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

When asked how closure has affected their own personal work situation (see table), only 2.2% said it had had a positive or very positive effect, while 67.6% said it had had a negative or very negative effect. Nearly 24% said it had had no effect.

Table 13.: Impact of Closure on Work Conditions

Q: Jerusalem has been closed in front of the people from West Bank and Gaza for several years. How has the closure affected the following aspects in your life:

Work conditions	West Bank & Jerusalem Respondents n. = 763	Gaza Respondents n. = 437	Total n. = 1200
A very positive effect	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
A positive effect	2.0%	1.4%	1.7%
It didn't have any effect	24.9%	21.5%	23.7%
A negative effect	25.0%	21.0%	23.6%
A very negative effect	44.8%	42.6%	44.0%
No answer	2.8%	13.0%	6.5%
Total	100	100	100

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

The East Jerusalem economy was always very services based due to its central location and small productive industrial base. There is no agriculture to speak of, since there is so little land left available to Palestinian use. Industry employs only 15% of the labor force. While there are 10 construction companies, industries in Jerusalem are mostly of a small scale, such as the repair workshops located in the Wadi Joz neighborhood. Tourism is a key sector, because more than 93% of the two million tourists who visit the country yearly visit Jerusalem, and most stay for several days.¹¹⁷ More than 58% of the economic activity in East Jerusalem is tourism.¹¹⁸ Likewise retail has also been important, since Jerusalem was the central point for so many different types of travellers, foreign and Palestinian alike. More than 65% of the Jerusalem labor force is employed in trade, restaurants, hotels, transportation, communication, and public services.¹¹⁹

One interviewee described how things were before the closure: "Jerusalem was the hub of the economy for Palestinians. Everyone used to drive down to Jerusalem or up. For shopping, tourism, medical services, the mosque, and even outings to West Jerusalem. It had a special symbolism of the better quality, the better service. In the summertime, West Bankers would shop for all their wedding things from Jerusalem because they truly believed the goods were better there. And the public transportation system was one of the indicators of the quality of the city. There were so many taxis from all the cities of the West Bank."¹²⁰

The picture that emerged from interviews was one of a city whose economic resources were gradually draining out of her, like water out of a sieve. This stands to reason, since closure is the best way to cut off tourism and trade. Again, while there are other significant policies and regional political developments that have played a major role in the economic weakening of East Jerusalem,¹²¹ the closure stands out as the single most significant.

The three main trends that were repeatedly mentioned are briefly described below.

Crippling of Main Sectors of the East Jerusalem Economy: Tourism, Retail, and Transportation

Tourism. Before the intifada and the closure, there were three main sources of tourism in East Jerusalem: foreigners, Israelis, and Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who came to worship, to honeymoon, to shop, or to visit family.

Foreigners have not been directly affected by the closure of Jerusalem. In fact, most probably do not even know of it. This segment of the market has been lured away by the explosion of far superior facilities available in Israeli West Jerusalem. Although East Jerusalem accommodates 7% of the total number of tourists visiting Israel,¹²² according to the Director of the Arab Chamber of Commerce, even if they start off in East Jerusalem, foreigners quickly move to the West where they can find the five-star hotels and quality of service they expect. Quality is definitely inferior in East Jerusalem, because hotels have been unable to combat the impossibility of getting a building permit from the municipality, the relatively high *arnona* rates, and the lack of sources for acceptable credit available to Palestinians in Jerusalem. It has also been reported in the Israeli press that some Israeli tour guides have been overheard warning foreign visitors against visiting Arab areas and making any purchases.¹²³

Table 14.: Hotels in East vs. West Jerusalem

Indicator	East Jerusalem	West Jerusalem
No. of hotels		
1967	39	4
Today	41	100+
No. of hotel beds		
1967	4,000	400
Today	4,000	19,500

Source: Interview with Azzam Abu Saud, Director, Arab Chamber of Commerce, Jerusalem

As for Israeli tourists, they have not felt safe since the intifada and have virtually stopped coming to East Jerusalem altogether. To this day, many Jewish taxis won't even enter Arab areas, although the intifada has been over for years.¹²⁴

The West Bank and Gaza Arabs were a mainstay of the East Jerusalem tourist industry. Today, their numbers have dwindled considerably. Even on religious holidays, people are less inclined to come and worship.

As a small indication of the extent of overall losses sustained by the tourist industry in East Jerusalem, one report calculated the total direct losses due to closures in the short period from February 25 to April 4, 1996 as being \$14,400,000.¹²⁵

Retail. East Jerusalem used to be a stopping point for traders who were traveling from the northern to southern West Bank. East Jerusalem was formerly the main shopping outlet for wholesale and retail shoppers from neighboring areas in the West Bank. The East Jerusalem retail sector began to be adversely affected during the intifada, when daily strikes were

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

ongoing. This was exacerbated by the closure, which greatly reduced the number of customers passing through the city. "People in the Jerusalem governorate used to shop in the city. Today, they don't want to bother themselves crossing the checkpoint."¹²⁶

According to one source, trade growth rates for 1996 were -17%, a reflection of the erosion of this sector.¹²⁷ One article written in 1994 claimed that retail sales in East Jerusalem had gone down more than 80%.¹²⁸ "Retail has been hit the worst," according to Fayez Husseini, an economist. He notes that stores that close in East Jerusalem are not generally replaced by new ones, a sure indication of a dying marketplace.¹²⁹ Another indicator is the precipitous drop in the "key price," or sale value (which is based on visits per day, per year, seasons, turnover, etc.), of a shop on Salah ad-Din, the main shopping street in East Jerusalem. Five years ago, it was \$500,000; today, it is only \$250,000.¹³⁰ "There are complaints from the commercial street about their revenues," says Abu Ayman, a Jerusalem resident who owns a large factory in Ramallah. "When you have a closure and it is evident that Salah ad-din shops lost a huge percentage of their business and another huge percentage by the Israelis not coming to shop there since the intifada, it means they are not doing business."¹³¹

Transportation: The "Transit" phenomenon and its social repercussions. Jerusalem used to have an extensive transportation network. The busses were all based and licensed in Ramallah. Taxis were licensed on an individual basis; they came in from all over the West Bank and went out of Jerusalem. With the closure, these licenses gradually ceased to be granted, so most taxis and busses from outside the city could no longer work there. Eventually, "The closure completely destroyed the public transportation sector."¹³²

Since transport is a critical need even under a closure, an alternative "industry" has cropped up to fill the gap. A huge number of illegal "Transit" vans monopolize the main roads. One source estimates their number at 1,000 and their monthly individual income at NIS 10,000 to 15,000.¹³³ Most of these vans are not licensed or insured. Their drivers are young high-



school graduates or drop outs who have just gotten their licenses. Indeed, many sport "New Driver" signs in the back window. Of course, they all have Jerusalem IDs, because that is what enables them to move between Jerusalem and other West Bank cities without a permit. Their driving is notoriously terrible, and they are often involved in accidents. When accidents occur,

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

passengers discover that there is no insurance, and therefore no coverage to cover the cost of treating their injuries. They have virtually no recourse to recover it any other way.

Nobody knows why these transit vehicles are allowed to continue to work illegally. The community is convinced that the Jerusalem police could stop this phenomenon altogether if they wished to. Consequently, conspiracy theories about this phenomenon abound in Jerusalem.¹³⁴ One rumor is that the drivers are collaborators who have bought old police vans and work for the police. A second is that the Israelis “want these hoodlums to run the city: to create chaos, fights, sexual harassment, and finish destroying the moral fabric of the society with their blue lights and disco music and disco balls in their cars.”¹³⁵ And the third is that they are gangs who are collaborators with the *Shabac*, the Israeli General Security Service. “Two months ago, I was in a Transit coming to Jerusalem with my wife. Near Shu’fat, the police stopped him. The driver wanted to fight the policeman, so he called his friend in the *Shabac*. Every one of those drivers has a [*Shabac*] captain.”¹³⁶ Part of the reason for the popular assumption that the Israelis are somehow behind this phenomenon is that the Transit vans are allowed to continue operating, despite the fact that many of the drivers have neither license nor insurance. They are also allowed to park illegally *en masse* outside the walls of the Old City, blocking traffic on the main Sultan Sulciman road, just down from Damascus Gate.

Whatever the reason, this ever-expanding group has a vested interest in the continuation of the closure and is now quite dependent on Israel’s good will to survive. It is also a powerful draw for frustrated youth.

Another type of “checkpoint economy” that has sprung up since the closure is the checkpoint car park. Some people have established impromptu “parking lots” in the vicinity of the checkpoints to capitalize on people’s need to leave their cars behind when they enter Jerusalem, since their permits only apply to themselves. Like the Transit drivers, these parking lot operators have become dependent on the continuation of the closure.

Poverty in Jerusalem

Despite the protection of medical and social benefits afforded by their permanent residency, Arabs in Jerusalem are still disproportionately poor relative to Jews. Surveys by the Orient House Special Projects Unit found that unemployment has been rising and the low income class (about 30% of the residents) is growing at the expense of the middle class (about 60% of the residents).

A recent report by the Ein Shalom organization found that:

- 60% of Palestinian families and 70% of Palestinian children live under the official Israeli poverty line.
- 95% of nonprofessional laborers in the city are Palestinians.

Sources: Special Projects Unit, Orient House, *Jerusalem Profile*, p. 29, and *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, Issue 7, 2000. “Jerusalem Chronology,” 1 January, 2000. www.jqf-jerusalem.org/journal/2000/jqf7/chronology.html

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

Brain and Capital Drain

The decline in Jerusalem's fortunes has corresponded with a rise in neighboring Ramallah's. Over the latter half of the 1990s, Jerusalemites either moved their businesses to Ramallah or opened second branches that soon far outgrew the original Jerusalem one. Those with big plans and capital invested in Ramallah, not Jerusalem. Numbers are hard to determine, but "Many, many of the businessmen in Jerusalem moved to Ramallah. Personally, I know that. We are not only one example; there are hundreds like us. If you go to the main street in Ramallah, most of the people on the main street are from Jerusalem. The major investors in Ramallah are Jerusalem ID holders."¹³⁷ Jerusalemites took retail stores, food factories, restaurants, accounting firms, health clinics to Ramallah. The reasons for this migration are clear. As Abu Ayman, a prominent businessman who still lives in Jerusalem and used to own shops in the Old City but has built many food factories in Ramallah describes: "We were very much welcomed by the municipality of Ramallah. We were given permits. We had no trouble finding good employees. We felt we are more part of society. You talk to Palestinians who can understand the issues you raise.... People have the same culture, the same belief, the same vision."¹³⁸

The license to open a business in Ramallah "is not expensive and is usually granted. The license is easily renewed every year. The Chamber of Commerce permit is also renewed without any problem and for a simple amount."¹³⁹

New Ramallah Businesses Owned by Jerusalemites Mentioned by Interviewees

Specific Businesses

- All six big auditing firms (Price Waterhouse, Deloitte Touche, etc.)
- PIDCo
- Arab Health Care
- Bali Curtains
- Oasis Perfumery
- Antiqua Restaurant
- Qobti Law Firm
- Sbitani (TVs and refrigerators)
- Jaafar (sweets)
- Ta'im
- Abu Khalaf (clothes)
- Sandoka (electrical appliances)
- Slaha ad-Din
- Sbitany

General Types of Businesses

- Furniture stores
- Restaurants and leisure
- Construction companies

The Palestinian Authority has also created some powerful tax incentives that are particularly attractive to Jerusalemites. New businesses are exempt from taxes altogether for three to five years. And the rate of income tax on companies was lowered from 38.5% to 20% at the beginning of 1999. In Israel, the tax rate is 36%. In mid-1999, according to numerous interviewees, the Israeli Department of Income Tax in West Jerusalem tried to close this loophole by announcing that Jerusalem ID holders who own businesses outside Jerusalem would have to declare their balance sheets in Israel according to Article 3a of the tax law. "If this will happen, it will be a disaster. If a Jerusalem investor in Ramallah has to pay 36% despite the benefits that he gained from investing in Palestine... Israel wants to evaluate your income and take the 20% from the Palestinian authorities for themselves – *retroactively* five years back! It will also

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

affect the Israelis who are willing to invest in border areas. I don't know why they are raising this issue today, not five years ago. I think that the real motive of this measure is to weaken the Palestinian treasury and prove that Jerusalem citizens are Israelis."¹⁴⁰ The head of the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce also sees this as politically motivated: "This is another measure aimed at forcing Jerusalemites to give up their IDs and make a permanent and irrevocable move or to reinforce their obligation to Israel and their being subject to Israeli control."¹⁴¹

The location of the Palestinian Authority offices in Ramallah caused a mini boom as well. "All of a sudden the amount of money spent by the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah in terms of employment and infrastructure and employment and rejuvenation of the city circulates and therefore the shopping power of the person in Ramallah has gone up. The bait is there, so if they could, they shifted to Ramallah. Those who can afford a second shop opened one. Those who couldn't shut down in Jerusalem and opened in Ramallah. Many people who had capital and a business plan invested in Ramallah, rather than in Jerusalem."¹⁴²

Abu Ayman concedes that his place of work has greatly influenced his personal shopping habits as well. "Once we became part of this area and part of the city, we became not only investors here but we had developed our commercial and social relations with the city of Ramallah. Even if you live in Jerusalem, if you work in Ramallah, you do most of your shopping there after work – especially if more goods are readily available and cheaper, which they are, since rents and taxes in Ramallah are far cheaper. We as a family have started doing most of our shopping from Ramallah, even though we are still living in Jerusalem. Because it is natural for people to do what is easy."¹⁴³

Conclusion: Dying Ghost Town Eclipsed by Emerging 'Golden Cage'

It is impossible not to conclude that commercial Arab Jerusalem is gradually being eclipsed by the newly emergent vibrant Ramallah. In the words of the interviewees:

Until the early 1990s, Ramallah was a suburb of Jerusalem. Today, it is exactly the opposite.¹⁴⁴

Most professionals have left Jerusalem and gone to the West Bank or to work abroad. What is the city left with? The hooligans of the transit vans, the dishwashers, and the like. And when the professional or the middle businessman tries to return to the city, he is told by the authorities that he cannot.¹⁴⁵

Ramallah has become an irresistible magnet, the 'golden cage' of Palestine. Why is it a cage? Because more people are coming in than are going out. We wish that this volume of people can go to Jerusalem every day.¹⁴⁶

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

Impact of Closure on Palestinian Social and Cultural Life

To understand the impact that the closure of Jerusalem has had on Palestinian social and cultural life, one first must understand that the Palestinians in Jerusalem and those in the West Bank and Gaza are the same people, share the same national identity, speak the same languages, and, in many cases, are related to one another. The extended family is the center of Palestinian life, and extended families tend to live near one another. In Jerusalem in particular, Israel's planning and development policies have made it virtually impossible for Palestinians to find housing within the city boundaries, so there has tended to be an outward migration of population. Thus, extended families are spread throughout the area, with one arm of the family living in the city while several others live in outlying suburbs. Before the closure, the city and its environs were a symbiotic unit, with Jerusalem as the center. Weddings, cultural events, night life, restaurants, and sports events were all centered in Jerusalem.

Table 15.: Impact of Closure on the Family/Jerusalem Sample, 1996

Q: Was your family situation affected by closures imposed on Jerusalem?

Rating	Total
Not affected	39.0%
Negatively affected	54.1%
Positively affected	24.5%
Total	100%

Palestine Human Development Profile, 1996-1997. Ramallah: Bir Zeit University Press, 1997, p. 129.

Table 16.: Impact of Closure on Family Relations

Q: Jerusalem has been closed to residents of the West Bank and Gaza for several years. How has the closure affected the following aspects in your life:

Family relations (with relatives in Jerusalem/West Bank)	West Bank & Jerusalem Respondents n. = 763	Gaza Respondents n. = 437	Total n. = 1200
A very positive effect	1.1%	0.9%	1.0%
A positive effect	2.2%	1.4%	1.9%
It didn't have any effect	28.2%	25.9%	27.3%
A negative effect	31.5%	21.3%	27.8%
A very negative effect	32.2%	35.2%	33.3%
No answer	4.8%	15.3%	8.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

For the most part, the closure has brought this type of activity to a grinding halt. Weddings, the high point of a Palestinian's life and the primary social occasion in Palestinian society, are often not held in Jerusalem, since relatives from the territories would not be able to attend. In Arab society, where honor, integrity, and reputation are all-important, it would be unthinkable to hold a party that deliberately excluded any extended family member. As a result, the locus of social and cultural activity has shifted out beyond the checkpoints, to Ramallah, where everyone can enjoy it. One need only stroll down the main streets of East

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

Jerusalem and Ramallah at around 10 pm to substantiate this – there is no need for social science. East Jerusalem stores are shuttered down and streets are empty at 5:00 pm. After that time, it looks like an abandoned ghetto. Ramallah, by contrast, is thronged with crowds and cars and jumping until the wee hours of the night, and sometimes through the night. Many of the cars have yellow (Israeli) plates – meaning that their owners have come from East Jerusalem or Israel to Ramallah for a good time.

Until the early 1990s, Ramallah was a suburb of Jerusalem. Today, it is exactly the opposite. Come on a Thursday or Friday night and look at the number of yellow [Israeli] license plates next to restaurants and cafes. And Jerusalem it is dead. West Jerusalem is alive, but Palestinians' level of income cannot afford their prices. Ramallah is catered to the Palestinian level of income. It is affordable in Ramallah.¹⁴⁷



Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

Cultural offerings in Jerusalem have been curtailed as well. One informal measure of this is found in the weekly calendar publication, *This Week in Palestine*. Consistently, the events listing in Ramallah is two to three times longer than that in Jerusalem. Ramallah has become the center of cultural life, as evidenced by the decision of the founders of the new al-Kasaba theatre to locate it there, not in Jerusalem. Data from our survey reinforces this conclusion. Only 3% answered that the closure had had a positive effect on cultural opportunities, whereas 61.3% said it had either a negative or very negative effect.

Table 17.: Impact of Closure on Cultural Life

Q: Jerusalem has been closed in front of the people from West Bank and Gaza for several years. How has the closure affected the following aspects in your life:

Cultural opportunities	West Bank & Jerusalem n. = 763	Gaza n. = 437	Total n. = 1200
A very positive effect	0.1%	0.6%	1.0%
A positive effect	2.1%	3.7%	1.9%
It didn't have any effect	28.7%	25.2%	27.3%
A negative effect	29.9%	24.7%	27.8%
A very negative effect	32.6%	34.6%	33.3%
No answer	6.6%	11.2%	8.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

Another aspect of social life that has been severely disrupted by the closure is sports. Although it is not as popular as in the U.S. (due to lack of facilities), the sports activities that did exist provided a sorely needed outlet for youth to get involved in constructive social activities. The closure has meant that sports clubs in Jerusalem are unable to compete with teams from the territories, thus in effect nearly eliminating this type of activity.¹⁴⁸

Sari Nusseibeh, President of al-Quds University, the largest and best functioning Palestinian institution in the city, summed Jerusalem's decline succinctly:

The whole of East Jerusalem, this part, the Shaykh Jarrah district, developed as a fashionable area, both in terms of residence as well as in terms of business or shopping. And even in terms of the institutions, for instance the hospitals, the schools....At one stage, people sent their children to be educated in Jerusalem from Jordan, from Syria, because this was supposed to be the classy part of the district of the region. Now this conglomeration of activities and elements typifying a certain social type, if you like, this concentration of wealth, education, institution-building, cultural activity, even political prominence, has been undergoing a total transformation. Over time. Due to this historical transformation of access. And this has in fact speeded this process of transformation in the past few years, paradoxically as a result of also the establishment of Ramallah as a major political center since the signing of Oslo. Unless this is changed or somehow rectified, the Arab presence in Jerusalem that we see today will be the remnant, so to speak, of past glory, rather than the seeds of a new reality.¹⁴⁹

Overall Impact: A Shifting Geography of the Mind

The deepest impact the closure has had has been on the collective Palestinian psychology. Nine long years of closure have established in a very real way that East Jerusalem is part and parcel of Israel. De facto, the closure declares: "This [Jerusalem] is Israel; this [West Bank] is *not* Israel." Of no less significance is the fact that Palestinian Jerusalemites are now required to apply for permits to go to Gaza. By virtue of closure and permits, Israel is trying to reinforce in a powerful, bureaucratic way that Palestinian Jerusalemites are no longer an integral part of the Palestinian people. And, as one interviewee commented, "We ask people to come to the city and evade the checkpoints. But the warrior mentality or the spirit of the fighter is gone. No one is willing to do this any more."⁵⁰

This impact is perhaps even greater on Palestinians who live outside of Jerusalem, in the West Bank and Gaza. To them, Jerusalem is becoming an unreachable foreign land. This is especially true of the young generation who have grown up in the shadow of the intifada and who take closure for granted. Salim Tamari, a Bir Zeit professor, related: "Periodically, I ask my undergraduate students how many have been to Jerusalem. Over half have never, never been to Jerusalem! They have not visited the city. They have no idea what it looks like except from TV. Can you imagine? It is insane! It is the one big city in the whole country, and they have not been to it. Then I ask those who have been when was the last time they went – generally it is a year, two, three years ago."⁵¹

Issam Nasr, another Bir Zeit faculty member and Ramallah resident who works in Jerusalem, described a student's first visit to Jerusalem. "First, she had no idea at all how to get here, how to get around. Then, her father equipped her with the mobile phone and insisted that she check in with him every 30 minutes. It was as if she was entering enemy territory."⁵²

And one Jerusalemite who has owned a large factory in Ramallah since 1982 but still lives in Jerusalem says, "It seems that the new generation of Palestinians, those under 10 years old, were brought up with this reality of checkpoints being there, part of the geography of the territories and of the daily routine of life. This is a political sign, not a security issue: It is making the statement that Jerusalem citizens are not really Palestinians, in a way."⁵³

Table 18.: Impact of Closure on the Palestinian Mind

Q: Jerusalem has been closed in front of the people from West Bank and Gaza for several years. How has the closure affected the following aspects in your life:

Psychologically – feeling isolated	West Bank & Jerusalem Respondents n. = 763	Gaza Respondents n. = 437	Total n. = 1200
A very positive effect	0.5%	0.0%	0.3%
A positive effect	1.4%	0.3%	1.0%
It didn't have any effect	10.0%	6.6%	8.8%
A negative effect	36.7%	30.4%	34.4%
A very negative effect	48.0%	60.4%	52.5%
No answer	3.4%	2.3%	3.0%
Total	100%	100%	100

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

Palestinian Access to Jerusalem

Thus today even when the checkpoints are more permeable than they have been in the past, Palestinians from the territories do not go to Jerusalem. As a result, the Palestinians in Jerusalem have gradually come to feel a sense of apartedness, even abandonment, as they have watched the locus of Palestinian life migrate away from their city, leaving them behind.

Gradually, over time, these divisions introduce an experiential divide between the two groups of people, creating a kind of local mentality; each group has its separate set of problems and needs. Ibrahim Dakkak, a prominent Palestinian engineer and intellectual who has been a lifelong Jerusalem resident, put it this way:

The closure of Jerusalem...concretized the feeling that we are separate. We are not like the Palestinians in Israel, and we are not like the Palestinians in the West Bank. We are stateless under the whims of the Israeli government. It was there before, but we never felt it materially. Now it was concretized by these checkpoints. We became different. We can go to the West Bank, but they can't come to us. For weddings, funerals – we can go there, but they cannot come here. The difference became much sharper, clearer. Our identity became clearly more different than any Palestinians, wherever they are. We are not refugees, but we are stateless. We are on our land, we have a right to stay here as long as we abide by their rules, but at a certain moment they can chase us out. There is a feeling of isolation; there is even more than that. There is a feeling of abandonment. I have a sense that a solution will come, but there are people who feel that they have been abandoned by the Arab world, by the Palestinians, and by everyone, and left at the mercy of the Israelis.¹⁵⁴

4:

Permitted Existence: Residency and Social Issues

Until five years ago, people in Jerusalem were invincible. They could get a *laissez passer* overnight, leave the country as often as they wanted – they had a sense of superiority, and saw themselves as more privileged – mobile, more stable. What has happened now is a reversal. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza get three-year [Palestinian] passports and don't have to get an entry permit every time they travel, whereas Jerusalemites have to camp out for two weeks at the [Israeli] Ministry of Interior. And to even to get their *laissez passer* or ID renewed is a nightmare, because they have to prove they have lived here for the past seven years. The feeling of privilege has been reversed.

--Salim Tamari, Director, Institute for Jerusalem Studies, in an interview at his office in Jerusalem, July 1, 1999

[As a Jerusalem resident], you are considered to be a semi-Israeli citizen but are not treated as one – for example, if I have to go to Gaza, I have to get a permit. Sometimes I am treated like any other person, and other times I am treated like a complete alien.

--Ibrahim Dakkak, Engineer who headed the Al-Aqsa restoration team and political analyst who co-founded and for many years directed the Arab Thought Forum, in an interview at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem, May 16, 1999

This chapter looks briefly at the status Palestinians in Jerusalem have as permanent residents in the city, benefits that are attached to that status, and the evolution and impact of the “center of life” policy that was in effect from 1995 until early in 2000.¹⁵⁵

Permanent Resident Status and Associated Benefits

On June 26, 1967, following the war, Israel conducted a census of the areas within the newly expanded municipal boundaries of Jerusalem. Any Arab who was present at the time of the census was counted as a *bona fide* resident of the city (total: 66,000). Israel declared that any resident wanting Israeli citizenship was entitled to it, but within the framework of the law. Among the conditions for receiving citizenship are:

- Swearing allegiance to the state of Israel
- Relinquishing citizenship of another country
- Demonstrating knowledge of Hebrew

These conditions, particularly the first two, were unacceptable to Palestinians in Jerusalem and, in any case, they largely refused to accept Israeli citizenship for political reasons, since they did not wish to do anything that would legitimize the Israeli occupation of the city. Another deterrent was the length of time involved in the process: As non-Jews, Arabs would have to acquire citizenship by naturalization, which could take five or six years.

The status that Israel chose to confer on this population was that of permanent resident. Thus, any person counted in the census received a blue ID card that designated him or her as a permanent resident. With this status, Arabs could continue to hold their Jordanian passports that many of them had acquired in the years since 1948 (when East Jerusalem was under Jordanian rule). This meant that the government viewed Palestinians in Jerusalem on a par with other permanent residents of Israel, despite the fact that they had not chosen to leave their homes and settle elsewhere, but rather had been compelled against their will to live under an authority whom they did not choose.¹⁵⁶ Arab residents who happened for whatever reason not to be in the area at the time of the census lost all claims to residency, even if their immediate relatives qualified. The only way they could regain their residency was by a family reunification application, which was a long, arduous, and often unsuccessful process.¹⁵⁷

As residents, Palestinians in Jerusalem were entitled only to some of the benefits of citizenship but required to fulfill most of the obligations (except for army service), with some additional restrictions. These are summarized in the table below.

Table 19.: Benefits and Obligations of Permanent Residency

Benefits to Permanent Resident	Obligations/Restrictions upon Permanent Resident*
Able to live and work in Israel without special permit	NA
Subject to Israeli civil judicial system (rather than military courts that operate in the territories)	NA
Until 1995, able to travel freely abroad, to occupied territories, and to neighboring Arab countries	Must obtain travel documents: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Laissez passer</i> to leave through Ben-Gurion airport (valid for one year) • Exit permit with re-entry permit (valid for 3 years) to leave through bridges to Jordan In order to leave and re-enter the city more than once, resident must repeatedly reapply for these
Entitled to receive National Insurance Institute (NII) allotments (for medical care, pregnant women, children, elderly, disabled workers, unemployed persons, mothers, widowers)	Required to pay all Israeli taxes, both to government and to municipality Required to pay all NII obligations
Entitled to vote in municipal elections	Not entitled to vote in national (Israeli) elections
NA	Status does not automatically pass to spouse or child; specific, restrictive conditions must be met
NA	Status is not secure; Minister of Interior has the discretion, by law, to revoke this status at any time; status can also simply 'expire'
Allowed to retain Jordanian citizenship in addition to residency	Not allowed to obtain any citizenship other than Jordanian without losing residency

*Note: Many of these restrictions apply only to Arab, not Jewish, permanent residents.

Permitted Existence

Role of IDs in Daily Life

The ID card is a vital document for any Palestinian living in Jerusalem. Every change in family status must be reported to the Interior Ministry and registered on the ID card. A new address, for example, must always be reported. Young couples who marry must register this change in status on their ID cards. Couples with a newborn must register the child on their ID. Children who turn 16 must be dropped from their parents' IDs and apply for their own ID cards. Persons who die must be removed from a card.

Each and every such request is processed by the Ministry of Interior, which has a separate facility for East Jerusalem Palestinians than the one for Jews in the West. Unlike Jews, who may mail in their requests, Palestinians must go in person to process any request. This facility is notoriously inefficient and "user unfriendly." Residents begin lining up in the middle of the night in order to get in; office hours go only until noon. The wait is hours and hours, and the conditions of the line are extremely uncomfortable. It is the norm to wait for 6-7 hours only to be told to go home when the office closes at noon. There is nowhere to sit, no shade, no water fountain, no cafeteria, no bathroom. On average there are 95 people waiting outside between 8-10 a.m. each day.¹⁵⁸ A recent article in the Hebrew daily *Ha'aretz* describes the scene:

If you want to see how Israel treats its Palestinian residents, those it annexed to itself forever, according to broad Israeli consensus, go to Nablus Road in Jerusalem. There, at the corner, under the sign for the Golden Saloon, you will see the whole story. Under the blazing sun hundreds of residents of all ages and from every level of society crowd around daily in a compact and sweaty queue, in a desperate attempt to somehow enter the local office of the Interior Ministry. The road of afflictions that Palestinians must travel to register a change in address, obtain a new identity card, a birth certificate, or death certificate, is almost impassable and certainly inhumane.... Wait and wait, squeezed and pushed, bearing their humiliation and suffering... And when they do succeed in getting in, perhaps they will discover that they didn't bring the right form or the document or paper they need. Then the clerk will send them home to bring it. When they return, they will again have to endure this Jerusalem Via Delorosa. And all for the permission without which Palestinian life, much more than Jewish life, is no life at all...¹⁵⁹



For the Arab population in Jerusalem, daily existence is truly “permitted” in the sense that ID cards govern everything in their lives. The ID card must be shown repeatedly for a myriad of daily needs that go way beyond registering changes at the Ministry of Interior. Some of the instances in which a Palestinian must display his ID card include:

- To re-enter the city after a visit to the suburbs, at any of the nine checkpoints
- To re-enter the country upon return from abroad
- To get any kind of medical care
- To apply for or renew a driver’s license or take a driving test
- To open a bank account
- To receive NII allotments
- If stopped by any policeman, soldier, or other authority
- To take university exams



So Jerusalemites hold on to that little document for dear life. In response to a survey question about how important IDs are to Jerusalem Palestinians, 91% said they are very careful with them, and for good reason. Loss of an ID is not just a routine matter of replacement. It can be devastating, as will become clear in the next section.

Table 20.: Importance of ID Cards

Q: To what extent do [Jerusalem] Palestinians care for their IDs?

Response	Total n. = 500
Absolutely careless	2.0%
In between	5.0%
Very careful	90.8%
No answer	2.2%
Total	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll, October, 1999

Evolution and Nature of the “Center of Life” Policy

Until 1995, the Israeli Government adopted the “Open Bridges” policy, according to which Palestinians were allowed to leave their place of residence and exit via the bridges to Jordan to work and study abroad.¹⁶⁰ As long as residents did not obtain citizenship in a foreign country other than Jordan and did not stay abroad longer than seven years (by which was meant, returned for a visit at least once every seven years), their ID cards would be renewed without a problem, provided they had not expired. Relatives in the city could apply for an extension on behalf of relatives who were abroad.

Yet, the notion that ID cards could be retracted did have roots in the city’s history. The Jerusalem municipality had long used the threat of revocation of ID cards as a “stick” to frighten Arabs into voting in elections. Authorities had deliberately created a “rumor mill” around election time that threatened that the ID cards would be withdrawn if Arabs did not receive a stamp indicating that they had voted.¹⁶¹

Israeli officials spread the rumors and then were careful to hint of their truthfulness in all sorts of unofficial ways.... The rumor mill was something only a few of Kollek’s closest aides knew about, and which they kept secret.... Not just in 1968 but also in every local and national election since, Kollek aides and Labor Party activists have spread unfounded stories about the ill consequences of not voting, in hopes of bringing Arab residents to the polling stations.¹⁶²

However, until the intifada began in December 1987, these tactics were only scare tactics and were not carried out in any systematic, widespread way.

Problems began to arise in 1988, with the case of Mubarak Awad. Mubarak Awad founded the Center for the Study of Non-Violence in Jerusalem. He had studied in the U.S., married an American, and obtained American citizenship. Nonetheless, he had returned to Jerusalem for regular visits and work and was in compliance with the law as he understood it at that time. The legal decision in his case established that a “reality of permanent residency” was required to maintain the status of resident. “When this reality disappears, there is no longer anything to which the permit can adhere, and it is automatically revoked, without any necessity for formal revocation.”¹⁶³ He was the first person whose residency was not renewed after a 10-year stay abroad. After that time, several dozen IDs were revoked each year (see Graph 4).

In December 1995 (perhaps in anticipation of a flood of returning Jerusalemites in the wake of the Oslo Accord¹⁶⁴), the Interior Ministry began to behave as if it had changed its policy, although determining as much was nearly impossible, since policy in East Jerusalem “is conducted on the basis

Documents Arabs Must Submit to the Ministry of Interior to Prove that Their “Center of Life” is Jerusalem

- Confirmation of place of employment
- Tax, electricity, water, and telephone bills for the previous seven years
- Residential lease or purchase papers or, if applicant lives in family home, a lawyer’s affidavit to that effect
- Confirmation from NII that the individual receives allotments from NII
- Confirmation that all children have been enrolled in Jerusalem schools since age 6

of unwritten criteria and unclear procedures.”¹⁶⁵ No public notice was given of the change. Under the new policy, Arabs with Jerusalem IDs were required to prove continuous residency in Jerusalem by submitting copious documentation (see box) to demonstrate that they had actually resided in the city for the previous seven years. The requirements were so stringent that “...even persons who have lived their entire lives in Jerusalem have difficulty meeting it.”¹⁶⁶

Not only was this a dramatic change of policy, but it was also applied retroactively: Arabs living outside the municipal boundaries (even by a few meters) who had scrupulously adhered to the prior policy and had received no notice of the change in policy were nonetheless held accountable to it and, in many cases, made to lose their residency and all health and social benefits.

The Interior Ministry’s current policy is totally different from the policy it had implemented over the years.... Today the ministry...applies this new policy retroactively to those who had innocently planned their lives according to the previous policy. The Interior Ministry never warned East Jerusalem Palestinians that their routine renewal of exit permits was insufficient to ensure their status and rights. Consequently, they could not, nor need to, have supposed that their moving outside the municipal borders of Jerusalem would jeopardize their status.¹⁶⁷

Finally, the ministry’s decisions could be given verbally, without any justification or explanation. Arabs were not allowed to appeal the decisions. They were simply informed that they had to leave the city.

While the “center of life” policy was in effect, an Arab resident was vulnerable to being targeted for an investigation into his residency at any point at which he had to show his ID card to any authority. For example, below is the case of a youth who wanted to take a driving test:

In 1994, I went to the Interior Ministry and obtained my own identity card for the first time. Then I obtained an exit permit to Jordan and went to Amman to complete my studies. That was in August 1994. I stayed there until June of 1995. When I returned, I registered at ORT [school] in East Jerusalem to continue my academic studies. A year before that I had started to study driving at the Amjad Driving School in East Jerusalem. It took a long time, and in October 1996 I took the road test. The examiner looked at my identity card and told me it was torn, and that I had to go to the Director of the Licensing Department. The director looked at my identity card and told me I had to replace it, otherwise I could not take the test. In November 1996, I went to the Interior Ministry’s office in East Jerusalem to replace my identity card. They took my card and gave me a slip confirming that I had submitted the request. They told me to come back in a week. When I returned, they told me to bring documents like *arnona* and telephone bills. I went back a week later with all the documents, and they told me to come back in another week. On 23 December 1996, I returned.... The clerk gave me a form signed by the head of the office, Aharon Luzon. The form stated that I was no longer a resident, that my identity card had been revoked, and that I had to leave the country.¹⁶⁸

By the same token, anyone whose ID card was revoked was then barred from doing any one of these activities that required an ID and vulnerable to arrest for being in the city illegally (without an ID or valid permit).

Permitted Existence


Investigations into residency were also not limited to one-time events. A resident might have a number of serial needs from the Interior Ministry within the same year or two – registering a marriage, a newborn, and applying for health insurance for the newborn, for example. For each of these bureaucratic requests, the residency investigation would have to be repeated, even if the Ministry still had all the documentation in its possession.

Finally, after significant pressure was brought to bear by human rights organizations in the city, the Interior Minister, Natan Sharansky announced in July of 1999 that the policy would end. However, it in fact continued¹⁶⁹ until Sharansky officially informed the High Court of the Ministry's intention to end this policy in March of 2000. In a reversal, the Ministry announced that Arabs with Jerusalem IDs who live outside the city will no longer lose their rights as residents. And the Ministry promised that all those who lost their residency in the past could have it reinstated by living for two consecutive years in the city.¹⁷⁰

Impact of the “center of life” Policy on Palestinians’ Quality of Life and Feeling About Their City

The impact of the “Center of Life” policy was widespread and quite profound. At the most basic level, a total of about 3,093¹⁷¹ ID cards were withdrawn (see graph). Arabs whose “center of life” was determined not to be in Jerusalem were compelled to turn them in on the spot and to leave the city within 15 days.¹⁷² It is important to note that this policy was applied solely to Arabs, not to any other ethnic group in the city.¹⁷³

Graph 4: No. of Jerusalem ID Cards Revoked Before and During the “Center of Life” Policy



Sources: Israeli Ministry of Interior, as cited in “The Deportation of Protected Persons,” Jerusalem Unit, August 1999 (figures for 1988-1994) and badil, at www.badil.org/alQuds/Statistics/jerstats8.htm, (figures for 1995-1999, which are most up to date figures released by the Israeli Ministry of Interior itself).

Revocation of ID cards had enormous reverberations throughout the whole community. Some of these ramifications are listed and briefly described below.

Minor children of the affected ID card holder also lost their residency. This occurs because minor children are registered in their parents' IDs. Thus, while only about 3,093 ID cards were revoked, the number of people actually stripped of their residency about was closer to at least triple that, if not higher.¹⁷⁴ The entire number of people adversely affected by the revocations was far higher yet, if one considers that extended, and even nuclear families were forcibly separated by the policy (e.g., if one spouse lost an ID but the other did not).

All affected individuals immediately lost their NII (health-care and other) benefits and thereby all access to health coverage. By law, health insurance in Israel is publicly, not privately, provided. As of January 1, 1995, Israeli law compelled all Palestinians in Jerusalem to take Israeli State health insurance. Once this insurance is cancelled, an Arab in Jerusalem has few, if any, other viable insurance options. As Israeli law considered revocation of residency final and provided no forum for an appeal process, health needs were completely excluded from the decision to revoke. This included minor children and patients with chronic illnesses.¹⁷⁵ Hospitals require non-resident patients to pay all their own hospital costs in full, even sometimes before accepting them for treatment at all.¹⁷⁶

Minor children of the affected individuals may have had to leave school. Possession of a valid Israeli ID is a requirement to register in Jerusalem public schools. Students are required to prove that they live in the neighborhood in which the school is located. Students who were pulled from school midyear had a hard time finding new spots.¹⁷⁷

The entire community was placed on "alert" for a five-year period. For each person who failed the "center of life" test, there could be hundreds of others who passed, but were nonetheless subjected to the anxiety-provoking, time-consuming, and highly stressful procedure of residency qualification. And of course there were thousands of others who were lucky enough to avoid coming in contact with the Ministry, but lived in dread of having to do so. In this sense, the "center of life" policy could be said to have affected literally each and every Arab ID card holder, whether by virtue of their actually undergoing this process, or by virtue of their living in fear of being arbitrarily summoned to undergo this process -- with a completely unknown, unpredictable, and immutable outcome. It was a collective trauma.

On the collective level, the policy profoundly changed the way that Arabs in Jerusalem felt about themselves and their status in their city. As with any life-threatening experience, the "center of life" policy may have made Arabs even more acutely aware of how much they valued and cherished their residency in the city. Paradoxically, the policy spawned the very phenomenon it had sought to abort. Afraid of losing their residency, thousands of Palestinians with ID cards moved back into the city, living in absurdly crowded quarters, to ensure they retained their rights and their place in their home town.

Permitted Existence

During the intifada, a lot of Jerusalemites went to live in areas that are in the West Bank. With the implementation of the “center of life” law, a lot of those people returned to live in Jerusalem. They wanted to rent a house, so they found any place anywhere so they could be in Jerusalem.¹⁷⁸

In addition, for the first time, the change in policy made Palestinians in the city feel less privileged than their compatriots in the territories, whose residency and freedom of movement during that same period were greatly improved due to the arrival of the PNA.¹⁷⁹ The long-term effect of these changes remain to be seen.

National Insurance Institute Inquiry Policy

Residency troubles are not limited to the “center of life” policy, and have not dissipated with its elimination. There are many other policies that make residency particularly difficult for Arabs to get, notably the family reunion policy (particularly the policies regarding married couples, the policy on registering children, and the policies of the National Insurance Institute (NII).)¹⁸⁰ To explore all of these is beyond the scope of this report. But the NII policies, which still cause tremendous residency problems for Arabs in the city, are worthy of note.

Loss of health benefits not only occurred because of ID cards being revoked by the Interior Ministry, but because of NII investigations as well. The NII conducts its own investigations into a recipient’s “center of life,” for the purpose of determining eligibility for social and health benefits. Such investigations are conducted only for Arabs, not for Jews.¹⁸¹ Since 1988, a Palestinian living outside the municipal boundaries, even if in possession of an ID card, is no longer entitled to any NII benefits.¹⁸² In April 1995, the Interior Ministry and the NII agreed to share data about findings of investigations. The NII would forward to the Interior Ministry the names of those whom its investigation had determined no longer met the “center of life” test. The Ministry would then revoke these individuals’ ID cards, despite the fact that the NII’s criteria concerning residency were different than the Ministry’s.¹⁸³ Thus:

In practical terms, [this agreement between NII and the Ministry] meant that if an East Jerusalem Arab made a claim from the [National Insurance] Institute of whatever nature, the Institute would launch its own residency investigation to verify the claimant’s abode. The investigation would consist of largely two to three questioning sessions conducted in Arabic but recorded in Hebrew, at the end of which the interviewee would be required to sign the testimony given to the investigator. Though the investigator would read back to the interviewee their responses to the questions asked, the scope for malpractice is fairly wide, particularly if the individual in question cannot read Hebrew. The NII also conducts an environs investigation to further confirm the claimant’s address. The environs investigation in itself is also problematic and is open to abuse. Hearsay can often be taken as fact, and any information collected during the course of the environs investigation is not furnished to the individuals in question. Moreover, it has been reported that in instances where the

investigators are unable to find the claimant's house, they automatically assume that the individual is a non-resident and if the neighbors don't cooperate in the investigation, the same assumption is made.¹⁸⁴

Thus, the NII inquiry could also trigger an ID revocation. This policy, unlike the "center of life" policy, remains in effect, although it has been modified. In April 1999, the NII announced it would grant immediate medical benefits to Palestinians who returned to live in Jerusalem after residing outside the municipal boundaries. Remaining social benefits, however, were contingent on a residency investigation. In August 1999, the policy was changed again such that those who lived on the city's "periphery" but worked in the city and educated their children in the city could qualify for benefits. The NII, however, has not clearly defined what qualifies as "periphery." Arab residents in the city remain subject to lengthy investigations in which the heavy burden of proof rests solely upon them. Their existence, for all intents and purposes, remains a "permitted" one.

Summary

Palestinians' existence in Jerusalem today is truly a "permitted" existence – both because it is absolutely controlled by permits, and because, as the "center of life" policy made so abundantly clear, it is only by virtue of Israeli permission that they are allowed to live in the city at all. Ironically, the extent to which this holds true became clear only after the Oslo Accords. Once peace was a real possibility, the existence of Arabs in Jerusalem suddenly became vastly more precarious. This is one paradox. But another is that Israel's policy, designed to prevent Arabs from returning under conditions of peace, backfired and triggered exactly such a return. Thus, the experience of collective trauma inflicted by the "center of life" policy apparently had the paradoxical effect of reinvigorating Arabs' commitment to retain their rights in Jerusalem at any cost.

5:

Political Predicament: Caught in the Crossfire

The people who are living here in Jerusalem – to whom will they be? Each side says, ‘We don’t want them.’ So where can we go? I am very afraid about this.

--**Khalil Toufakji**, Director, Cartography Department, Orient House, in an interview at his office in Jerusalem, July 9, 1999

After Oslo and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, our problems became much more difficult. We are now the only Palestinians here who do not have any state. We are stateless and we are Palestinians. This situation is very difficult to adapt to. But there is a very strong trend among Jerusalemites who would like to acquire permanent residency in Jerusalem. There is some kind of attachment, magic, and chemistry, between the people and the city itself.

--**Ibrahim Dakkak**, Engineer who headed the Al-Aqsa restoration team and political analyst who co-founded and for many years directed the Arab Thought Forum, in an interview at the Ambassador Hotel in Jerusalem, May 16, 1999

If the Palestine National Authority comes to Jerusalem as a result of negotiations, we will become part of that system and they will start providing for us. But if it doesn’t happen, we also have to be aware of the possibility and we shouldn’t cut off our limbs or ties, potential ties, with the Israeli system.

--**Sari Nusseibeh**, President, al-Quds University, in an interview at his office in Jerusalem, July 19, 1999

Since 1967, Palestinians in Jerusalem have been unwittingly caught in the crossfire between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel wanted them to have a marginal, low-profile existence in the city, to provide “color” to the “mosaic” and serve as decorative testament to the beneficence of Israeli rule over the “successfully united” city without having any political or economic clout. Israel wanted the status quo in which “all...contact [between Arabs and Jews in the city] is of a paternalistic nature; the Arabs are always the petitioners and the Jews are always the dispensers.”¹⁸⁵ The Palestinian national movement, on the other hand, wanted the Arabs to spearhead the resistance to the occupation and transformation of Jerusalem. The core of Palestinian national political strategy in Jerusalem has always been to refrain from doing anything that could grant Israel any modicum of legitimacy or recognition as the city’s sovereign. Since 1967, therefore, Palestinian residents of the city have:

- Refused, for the most part, to accept Israeli passports
- Boycotted Israeli municipal elections
- Avoided any formal dealings with the municipality, including, until the early 1990s, even meeting with them to protest the grave injustices wrought upon Arab residents in the city

Political Predicament

- Refrained from using the Israeli legal system as an avenue of recourse because 1) It would legitimize the occupation of East Jerusalem and 2) It might create legal precedents that are even worse than the existing situation
- Refused to accept any form of monetary compensation for expropriated land so as not to legitimize expropriation in any way
- Frozen the Chamber of Commerce elections since 1967
- Refused to surrender control over education and curriculum to the Israeli municipality, even if it meant shutting the schools down for a while

The thrust of the policy is articulated in an excerpt from a press release calling for the Arabs to boycott the latest municipal election (see box, below).

The paradox has been that in a sense, this Palestinian national policy has played right into Israeli nationalist goals. The Palestinians in Jerusalem have accepted to live as individual third- or lower class citizens, disorganized, atomized, and disenfranchised, rather than as a concerned, organized community with an active collective life and a say in their own affairs. This steadfastness, which was nationally conceptualized but locally embraced and carried out, while politically effective in some ways, has come at an extremely heavy price for each Palestinian resident of Jerusalem, as journalist Daoud Kuttab explains:

We [Jerusalem residents] lose big from that [policy].... [Arab Member of Israeli Knesset] Azmi [Bishara] said recently that there has never been an anti-colonialist movement in history that prohibited participation in elections. It is all mixed up and confused. So we don't vote and the Israelis do whatever they want. When they vote [in the municipal council], they have to [do so by] show of hands, because they are one ethnic group voting on behalf of others who are not present... of 31 people on the [Jerusalem municipal] council, not one is Arab.¹⁸⁶

Call for Arab Boycott of the Jerusalem Municipality Elections
(Excerpts from a Press Release put out by the Lobby for Human Rights in Jerusalem)
7 October 1998

We as independent Palestinian institutions who – for years – have worked to assist the Palestinian people of Jerusalem in protecting their rights as native inhabitants of the city, categorically reject the current efforts to legitimize the candidacy of an Arab list to the Israeli municipal elections....The principles of our rejection are based on international law and standards...which declare Israeli annexation of 1967 occupied East Jerusalem and all its subsequent legal and institution changes in the city as illegitimate and illegal. The candidacy of and the support for the “Arab List” violates all international law and norms, and seriously undermines the prospects for a successful struggle of the Palestinian people to liberate their capital, Jerusalem.

....we are deeply puzzled and concerned by this candidacy, which comes in a period of concerted and explicit Israeli effort to take permanent control of the occupied city... What does the “Arab List” think to achieve as a small minority in a municipality run by the Olmerts and Suissas of the Likud or their counterparts in the Labor Party? It is this municipality which, in conjunction with Israeli governments, has designed and implemented a policy which resulted in the annexation, closure, and Judaization of Jerusalem... The question of Jerusalem is a political question and not a question of civil rights under occupation!

**A VOTE IN THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IS A VOTE AGAINST PALESTINE
AND ITS CAPITAL JERUSALEM!...**

As we have seen, the political strategy of non-recognition has allowed Israel to, among other things:

- Charge the same rates of business tax in East as in West Jerusalem despite the fact that per capita income is only one-third as large in the East; conduct massive tax raids and close down businesses that do not pay on time
- Expropriate Arab taxes and spend them mainly for the benefit of the Jewish residents, since Arabs pay 30% of the taxes and get only 2-12% in return
- Discriminate against East Jerusalem in all aspects of municipal services
- Expropriate one-third of privately owned Arab land and build on it for exclusively Jewish use
- Build large all-inclusive settlements with community centers, stores, parks, sports facilities for Jews, and neglect to build public housing for Arabs
- Make it bureaucratically very difficult for Arabs to get building permits
- Create master plans for Arab towns that allow for nearly zero, or even in some cases, negative, growth
- Encourage Arabs to move beyond city limits and then punish them for doing so by rescinding their residency irrevocably without appeal

Political Predicament

Sarah Kaminker, former Jerusalem councilwoman and current advocate for Palestinian rights in the city, believes the price of nonparticipation has been even steeper:

What does 30 years of prohibition to conduct a civic life do to your self-concept, to energy for power, to reactions to what is going on in your world? What effect does it have on traditional forms that have to change to accommodate and are not permitted to change or have to change in a very under the table ways? It kills a society. This outlawing of civic life for Palestinians in East Jerusalem has had deleterious effects on the whole psyche of the people.¹⁸⁷

As we have seen, the context of demographic, housing, and municipal policies has been in place since 1967. But in the last decade, watershed events – the intifada, the Oslo Accords, the closure, and the arbitrary retraction of residency via the “center of life” policy, have changed the very nature of daily life as Palestinians in Jerusalem had always known it before. The question, then, is have their attitudes changed? If so, how? And with what implications? This study examined three broad issues:

- Degree of integration with/apartness from Israeli society
- Evaluation of existing services and political strategies
- Political options for the future of the city



Integration with/Apartedness from Israeli Society

As we have seen, most Palestinians in Jerusalem are not citizens of the area in which they live. Some already carry Jordanian passports; others have only their Israeli ID cards and therefore can claim no citizenship in any state. Nationally and emotionally, however, they have historically been part of the Palestinian people and have never integrated in any way with Israeli society. Given the developments since Oslo -- closure, the arrival of the PNA, the implementation of the "center of life" policy -- it is reasonable to wonder whether they have become more integrated with or more apart from Israeli society. To fully examine this question in depth would require a separate study. In this study, we only looked briefly at three indicators -- knowledge of Hebrew, passport preference, and importance of medical and social services.

Knowledge of Hebrew

We asked Palestinians in Jerusalem about their knowledge of Hebrew in a number of different ways:

- General (passive) understanding
- Ability to hold a conversation
- Ability to read
- Ability to write
- Usage

These questions were asked of a larger representative sample of Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza. Results have been broken down according to region. So while we cannot claim that the Jerusalem segment alone was fully representative, it is highly indicative. The sample as a whole is representative.

It is not surprising to learn that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza know little Hebrew, but it is surprising to discover that Palestinians in Jerusalem have at best only a very rudimentary understanding of the language. On the one hand, it is true that the curriculum used in all the schools in East Jerusalem (municipally and privately run) is the Jordanian one. The municipality only succeeded in having Hebrew added after a long struggle, and even then, only as a course that was not required to graduate and was therefore not paid much attention.¹⁸⁸ On the other hand, this population is, according to Israeli law, part of "unified" Jerusalem; it would seem that they would need to learn some Hebrew just for purposes of daily living.

There does appear to be a small minority (8%) that can confidently read and write; however, only 2.3% know how to hold a fluent conversation, which suggests that the minority learned to read and write in school or for work purposes, they are not using it to intermingle in Israeli society. Fully 49% of the Jerusalem sample said they understand *nothing at all* of spoken Hebrew. The figures increase with each level of knowledge: 55.6% know nothing at all of how to hold a conversation in Hebrew; 59.7% know nothing at all of how to read in Hebrew, and 66.7% know nothing at all of how to write in Hebrew.

Political Predicament

Table 21.: Jerusalemites' Understanding of Hebrew

Q: On a scale of 1 through 5, how would you evaluate your proficiency in the Hebrew language (comprehension)?

Rating	West Bank Respondents n. = 687	Gaza Respondents n. = 435	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 72	Total n. = 1194
I know nothing at all (1)	70.3%	69.2%	48.6%	68.6%
I don't know (2)	10.3%	5.7%	12.5%	8.8%
In between (3)	10.5%	12.2%	25.0%	12.0%
I know a little (4)	4.1%	6.0%	12.5%	5.3%
Fluent (5)	4.8%	6.9%	1.4%	5.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

Table 22.: Jerusalemites' Use and Knowledge of Hebrew (Oral Conversation)

Q: On a scale of 1 through 5, how would you evaluate your proficiency in oral conversation in the Hebrew language?

Rating	West Bank Respondents n. = 688	Gaza Respondents n. = 436	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 72	Total n. = 1196
I know nothing at all (1)	72.3%	69.3%	55.6%	70.2%
I don't know (2)	9.6%	8.7%	12.5%	9.4%
In between (3)	9.0%	10.8%	18.1%	10.2%
I know a little (4)	4.1%	5.3%	11.1%	5.0%
Fluent (5)	5.0%	6.0%	2.8%	5.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

Table 23.: Jerusalemites' Knowledge of Hebrew (Reading)

Q: On a scale of 1 through 5, how would you evaluate your proficiency reading in the Hebrew language?

Rating	West Bank Respondents n. = 688	Gaza Respondents n. = 435	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 72	Total n. = 1195
I know nothing at all (1)	83.3%	76.3%	59.7%	79.3%
I don't know (2)	5.8%	9.4%	8.3%	7.3%
In between (3)	4.8%	8.0%	15.3%	6.6%
I know a little (4)	2.6%	3.0%	8.3%	3.1%
Fluent (5)	3.5	3.2%	8.3%	3.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

Table 24.: Jerusalemites' Knowledge of Hebrew for (Writing)

Q: On a scale of 1 through 5, how would you evaluate your proficiency writing in the Hebrew language?

Rating	West Bank Respondents n. = 687	Gaza Respondents n. = 435	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 71	Total n. = 1193
I know nothing at all (1)	84.7%	78.2%	66.2%	81.2%
I don't know (2)	4.5%	9.2%	2.8%	6.1%
In between (3)	4.7%	7.1%	15.5%	6.2%
I know a little (4)	2.3%	2.5%	7.0%	2.7%
Fluent (5)	3.8%	3.0%	8.5%	3.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

If we combine the two lowest categories for the Jerusalem segment of this sample, the percentages go up as follows:

Table 25.: Knowledge of Hebrew Among Jerusalem Segment

I know nothing at all or only very little of...	Jerusalem Respondents Knowing Nothing at All or Only Very Little n. = 71
Understanding spoken Hebrew	61%
Holding a conversation in Hebrew	68%
Reading Hebrew	68%
Writing Hebrew	69%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

The picture becomes a bit clearer when we consider the ways that Palestinians in Jerusalem use Hebrew. Results suggest that they use Hebrew for pragmatic purposes for which, mainly, they have no choice:

- At work (46.2%)
- For official bureaucratic matters (20.5%)
- To watch TV (15.4%)

Political Predicament

Only a handful (5%) report that they use it to socialize or listen to radio news. They do not read Hebrew newspapers or use it to watch or listen to educational subjects.

Table 26.: When Palestinians in Jerusalem Use Hebrew

Q: When do you usually use the Hebrew language?

Rating	West Bank Respondents n. = 244	Gaza Respondents n. = 141	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 39	Total n. = 424*
To watch TV	16.8%	39%	15.4%	24.1%
To listen to news on the radio	0.8%	0.0%	5.1%	0.9%
To read newspapers	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%
For official bureaucracy issues	7.4%	1.4%	20.5%	6.6%
At work	53.3%	42.6%	46.2%	49.1%
To socialize/talk to friends	6.1%	2.8%	5.1%	5.0%
To watch/listen to educational subjects	6.6%	7.1%	2.6%	6.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

*This is a small n because 776 people did not answer the question, presumably because they do not usually use Hebrew.
JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

In sum, these results suggest that the Palestinians in Jerusalem still remain considerably alienated from Israeli society and have not in any significant sense “integrated” even at the most rudimentary level, which is one of language. In some ways, this is not surprising, since the city is so wholly segregated that all daily needs can be met without coming into contact with any Hebrew speakers at all, and the curriculum used in schools is an Arab one. Nonetheless, it is a distinct indicator of distance and apartedness, which in fact is a reflection of how they have been treated by Israeli society, and how they themselves have chosen to live.

Passport Preference

Palestinians have historically refused to take Israeli passports and citizenship, which would indicate a willingness to integrate into Israeli society. According to one source, only 1,765 Arab East Jerusalemites applied for Israeli citizenship from 1967-1996; of these, about one-third (500) were in 1994 and 1995 alone.¹⁸⁹ Data show that a few years ago, in 1995, 80% of Palestinian Jerusalemites said they were opposed to taking Israeli passports and 66% said they would prefer Palestinian citizenship. Even if the choice was a drastic one, between taking citizenship or living outside Jerusalem, about half still were unwilling to consider taking the citizenship.

Table 27.: Attitudes on Israeli Passports / Jerusalem Sample 1995

Q: Do you agree with the steps taken by some Jerusalem Palestinians, who have obtained Israeli passports?

Response	Total n. = 489
Yes	10.6%
No	78.9%
No opinion	10.5%
Total	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 8, August 1995

Table 28.: Attitudes on Israeli Passports / Jerusalem Sample 1995

Q: Which passport would you prefer to have?

Passport	Total n. = 489
Jordanian	16.4%
Israeli	9.2%
Palestinian	66.1%
No opinion	8.4%
Total	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 8, August 1995

Table 29.: Citizenship Preference / Jerusalem Sample 1996

Q: A friend asks for your advice on the following difficult matter: He is faced with two choices: either to live outside Jerusalem or to receive Israeli citizenship. What would be your advice?

Option	Total n. =
Reside outside Jerusalem	48.5%
Adopt Israeli citizenship	51.5%
Total	100%

Palestine Human Development Profile, 1996-1997. Ramallah: Bir Zeit University Press, 1997, p. 132.

Political Predicament

In our more recent survey, this had changed. We asked this question a number of ways:

- If you had the choice today, what passport would you prefer?
- If there were peace, what passport would you prefer to hold?
- If there were peace, what passport do you think the majority of Palestinians would prefer to hold?

In our 1999 survey, 41.8% said they would prefer Palestinian citizenship today, and 15.5% said they would opt for Israeli citizenship, making Israeli citizenship even more popular than Jordanian (10.3%). Joint Israeli-Palestinian citizenship was also a popular option: 26.3% said they would choose that today. In essence, this could be construed to mean that nearly 42% of Palestinians in Jerusalem are now ready to accept some form of Israeli citizenship, and that is a significant shift. Willingness to take some form of Israeli citizenship is greatest among Palestinians who live within the municipal boundaries. Among this group, it reaches nearly 45%.

Under conditions of peace, Israeli, Jordanian, joint Israeli-Palestinian citizenship become slightly less attractive, while Palestinian citizenship becomes slightly more so, and international citizenship becomes significantly more so.

Table 30.: YOUR Citizenship Preference Today, and in Peace

Q: If you had the choice *today*, what citizenship (passport) would you prefer to hold?


Q: If a peace agreement is signed between Israel and the Palestinians, and you are to make a choice, which citizenship (passport) would you prefer to hold?

Preferred Passport	Respondents Living Inside Municipal Boundaries n. = 253		Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, in Refugee Camps n. = 25		Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, not in Refugee Camps n. = 198		Total n. = 476	
	Today	If Peace	Today	If Peace	Today	If Peace	Today	If Peace
Israeli	21.7%	16.4%	4.0%	8.0%	9.1%	4.1%	15%	10.9%
Jordanian	13.0%	10.0%	8.0%	8.0%	7.1%	2.6%	10.3%	6.8%
Palestinian	24.5%	26.4%	60.0%	64.0%	61.6%	63.6%	41.8%	43.8%
Joint Israeli-Palestinian	33.2%	30.4%	20.0%	16.0%	18.2%	15.9%	26.3%	23.6%
International	3.6%	15.2%	4.0%	4.0%	0.5%	12.3%	2.3%	13.4%
None of the above	3.6%	1.2%	4.0%	0.0%	2.0%	0.0%	2.9%	0.2%
Other than that, (define...)	0.3%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	1.5%	0.8%	0.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll October, 1999

Graph 5: Citizenship Preference in Peace: YOURS vs. THE MAJORITY's

Q: In case of achieving an agreement of peace between Israel and Palestinians, and you are to make a choice, what citizenship do you believe the majority of Palestinians would prefer to hold?



JMCC Jerusalem Poll October, 1999

Finally, we asked a third comparator question to ensure we were not missing some trend. We asked how, under conditions of peace, the respondent felt the majority of Palestinians in Jerusalem would feel about passport preference. This brought the Israeli number back up to nearly 15% of the sample, and made the Jordanian option even less attractive. The Palestinian option, however, remained exactly the same; there is consistency between those who chose this option and how they view society's attitudes at large. There is a significant difference on this issue among Palestinians who live within the municipal boundaries. Only 26.7% of them believe that the majority would choose Palestinian citizenship, while 20% believe the majority would choose Israeli citizenship and nearly 32% believe the majority would choose Israeli-Palestinian citizenship. This means that roughly half of Palestinians who live inside the city boundaries think that the majority of Palestinians in Jerusalem would be willing to accept some form of Israeli passport under conditions of peace.

Political Predicament

Attitudes Toward Medical and Social Benefits

Some Arab observers assume that Arab Jerusalemites value their residency in the city in large part because of the medical and social benefits they receive from the NII. This becomes, in essence, a political question: Are Arabs in the city so attached to their benefits that they would rather live under Israeli authority than under Palestinian, despite the great political cost? We explored answers to this question through surveys.

Survey data exists on attitudes toward medical care in 1996 and in 1999. The 1996 survey questions showed that Jerusalemites rated their health insurance and social security services highly. About a fifth of the sample thought they were excellent, while about two-thirds thought they were good or average. A majority (nearly 50%) said they would expect the PNA to provide the same services in the event of Palestinian administration. However, they were not optimistic that this demand would be met: Fully two-thirds did not think the PNA would provide the same services as Israel, while another 20% said they did not know.

Table 31.: Rating of Israeli Health Care / Jerusalem Sample 1996

Q: What is your evaluation of health insurance and social security services provided in the city of Jerusalem?

Rating	Total n. = 489
Excellent	21.3%
Good	34.8%
Average	26.2%
Below Average	13.1%
Bad	4.6%
Total	100%

Palestine Human Development Profile, 1996-1997. Ramallah: Bir Zeit University Press, 1997, p. 131.

Table 32.: Future PNA Health Care and Social Services / Jerusalem Sample 1996

Q: In the case of the PNA's extension of authority to Jerusalem, would you ask the PNA to provide the same services to the Jerusalemites?

Response	Total n. =
Yes	49.3%
To a large extent	17.3%
To a certain extent	18.6%
No	8.5%
I do not know	6.3%
Total	100%

Palestine Human Development Profile, 1996-1997. Ramallah: Bir Zeit University Press, 1997, p. 131.

Table 33.: Expectations for Future PNA Health Care and Social Services

/ Jerusalem Sample 1996

Q: Do you expect to receive the same services under the PNA?

Response	Total
Yes	21.4%
No	62.2%
I do not know	16.4%
Total	100%

Palestine Human Development Profile, 1996-1997. Ramallah: Bir Zeit University Press, 1997, p. 131.

The 1999 surveys support the 1996 findings. Jerusalemites evaluate their medical care relatively much more highly than residents of the territories. Thus, 50% of Jerusalem respondents in the sample rated their health care excellent or very good, vs. 14% of the sample overall, 11.6% of West Bankers, and 12.3% of Gazan respondents.

Of those who thought their health care was fair or weak, Jerusalemites were only a fraction: While 33% of the overall sample rated their health care fair or weak, only 8.2% of Jerusalem respondents did so (vs. 30% of West Bank and 43% of Gazan respondents).

Moreover, it is clear from the results that Jerusalemites are far more likely to be insured than West Bankers or Gazans. Only 2.7% of Jerusalem respondents said they had no health insurance, vs. 36.3% of West Bank and 22.4% of Gazan respondents.

Table 34.: Evaluation of Current Health Care

Q: How do you evaluate your health insurance system and the health care provided to you?

Rating	West Bank Respondents n. = 683	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 72	Gaza Respondents n. = 429	Total n. = 1184
Excellent	6.3%	14.0%	2.8%	5.5%
Very Good	5.3%	36.1%	9.5%	8.7%
Good	22.25%	39.0%	22.1%	23.2%
Fair	15.0%	5.5%	23.2%	17.3%
Weak	15.0%	2.7%	19.8%	16.0%
I don't have health insurance	36.3%	2.7%	22.4%	29.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

Political Predicament

Clearly, overall evaluation of quality of care affects willingness to switch. Survey results confirm this. In a random sample of Jerusalem residents only, 55% said they would “definitely not” consider switching from Israeli health care to that offered in the PNA areas, while 18% declined to answer this question. Only 10% were definite that they would switch.

A breakdown by area of residence shows clearly that these 10% who were willing to switched were mostly residing outside the municipal boundaries of the city. Of those inside, only 4% said they would definitely switch and fully 73% said they would definitely not switch. Most of those declining to answer the question lived outside the municipal boundaries, another interesting finding.

Table 35.: Willingness to Switch from Israeli to Palestinian Health Care

Q: If you were offered the opportunity to switch from the Israeli health care to that available in the PNA areas, would you make the switch?

Response	Respondents Living Inside Municipal Boundaries n. = 239	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, in Refugee Camps n. = 25	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, not in Refugee Camps n. = 130	Total n. = 480
Yes-definitely	3.9%	28.0%	15.1%	9.8%
Maybe	16.8%	16.0%	19.1%	17.7%
No-definitely not	73.0%	56.0%	31.2%	54.6%
No answer	6.6%	0.0%	34.7%	17.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll, October, 1999

Moreover, our data show that this reluctance to switch for all preferred passports. Respondents preferring every type of passport were more likely to answer “no” on this question than “yes.” Only among those wishing to carry a Palestinian passport do we see a significantly greater willingness to switch to Palestinian health care, and even then, it only reaches about 17% (with 21% saying “Maybe”). That is a powerful indication of how highly Jerusalemites value their health insurance.

In sum, all Arabs in the city, regardless of political persuasion, also value and wish to retain the benefits they receive from the Israeli government. This, together with the background on the “center of life” policy helps to explain, in part, the increased willingness to take Israeli passports. It seems that this is a pragmatic willingness, born of insecurity and fear engendered by the prospect or very real experience of losing everything.

Evaluation of Existing Situation and Political Strategies

In this section, we report on findings about how the Palestinians in Jerusalem evaluate their existing situation and some of the political strategies they have taken thus far.

Assessment of Main Problem Today

Palestinians living in Jerusalem clearly are beset by a myriad of problems. Which do they see as the main one? The surveys show that in 1995, housing and building permits were considered the main problem, with taxes a close second. In 1999, however, this assessment changed: taxes and settlements rose to the top of the list. When these results are further broken down by area of residence, we find that for Arabs living inside the Israeli municipal boundaries, 36% rated taxes as the main problem, while only 22% rated occupation and settlements as the main problem. The exact opposite is true for Palestinians outside the boundaries: for them, settlements is the most pressing problem and taxes are far less so. The problem receiving the lowest percentage among Palestinians living within the borders was closure and feeling of loneliness (6%).

Table 36.: Main Problem Jerusalemites Face / Jerusalem Sample 1995/1999

Q: What would you say is the main problem that Palestinian Jerusalem residents face?

Definition	1995 Total n. = 489	1999 Total n. = 474
Taxes	22.5%	28.1%
Housing/building permits	25.6%	20.0%
Closure/feeling of isolation	16.0%	8.6%
Settlements/occupation	7.1%	28.9%
General situation	11.7%	NA
Racism	3.9%	13.5%
Other (including imprisonment, drugs, and social breakdown)	5.4%	NA
No opinion	7.8%	0.8%
Total	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 8, August, 1995 and JMCC Jerusalem Poll, October 1999



Political Predicament

Evaluation of Israeli Municipal Services

Earlier in this report (Chapter 2), we briefly described the situation with regard to municipal services in East Jerusalem. In his book, *Municipal Policies in Jerusalem – An Account From Within*, Amir Cheshin cites a survey from 1987-88 in which 84% of the Arab residents said they were not satisfied with the level of services provided. In our survey, the level of public satisfaction had improved.

Table 37.: Municipal Services Provided by Israel

Q: In general, what is the level of services provided by the Israeli municipality to serve the Palestinian population in Jerusalem?

Rating	Respondents Living Inside Municipal Boundaries	Respondents Living Outside Boundaries, in Camp	Respondents Living Outside Boundaries, Not in Camp	Total n. = 480
Good or very good	33.6%	52.0%	33.7%	34.6%
Satisfactory	31.6%	28.0%	20.1%	26.7%
Poor or very poor	34.4%	20.0%	33.2%	33.1%
No answer	3.7%	0.0%	13.1%	5.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll October, 1999

In fact, 61.3% (65.2% of those living inside the boundaries) rated the services either satisfactory or better.

Further validation of this finding can be seen in the general survey results of Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza, presented below:

Table 38.: Satisfaction with Municipal Services in Your Area

Q: In general, how do you evaluate the local services which the municipality/village council provides in your city or village?

Rating	West Bank Respondents	Gaza Respondents	Jerusalem Respondents	Total n. = 1148
Excellent or very good	13.4%	6.3%	13.9%	10.8%
Good	34.2%	18.0%	41.7%	28.7%
Fair or weak	41.6%	75.7%	44.4%	60.6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August, 1999

In this survey, while the level of dissatisfaction is higher, it still remains that 55.6% of respondents from Jerusalem felt these services were good or above. This is a much higher level of satisfaction than exists in Gaza, and about equivalent to the level of satisfaction in the West Bank.

Political Predicament

Since the services in Jerusalem have not objectively improved all that much,¹⁹⁰ one can only speculate as to why this change in attitude has come about. Further study would be required to arrive at a definitive answer.

Evaluation of the Palestine National Authority's Handling of Jerusalem

In addition to asking how residents rated the Israeli municipality's services, we asked how they evaluated the PNA's caring about the city and the services it provides to Palestinians there. In an earlier survey in 1995, 38.9% had said they thought the PNA was doing enough on the issue of Jerusalem, while nearly 50% thought it was not.¹⁹¹ In 1996, nearly 50% still thought the PNA's interest in Jerusalem was below average or bad, while 24.6% rated it good or excellent.

Table 39.: PNA Interest in Jerusalem / Jerusalem Sample 1996

Q: What is your evaluation of the PNA's interest in the city of Jerusalem?

Rating	Total
Excellent	5.6%
Good	19.0%
Average	16.4%
Below average	15.7%
Bad	30.2%
No opinion	13.1%
Total	100%

Palestine Human Development Profile, 1996-1997. Ramallah: Bir Zeit University Press, 1997, p. 132

In 1999, these ratings were about the same, with one-quarter of the Jerusalemites in the larger sample thinking the PNA cares enough and three-quarters saying it does not care enough.

Table 40.: PNA Caring About Jerusalem Issues

Q: Some people think that the Palestinian Authority cares about Jerusalem issues, others believe that the Palestinian Authority ignores it; what do you think?

Response	West Bank Respondents n. = 655	Gaza Respondents n. = 437	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 64	Total n. = 1156
The Palestinian Authority cares enough about Jerusalem issues.	38.8%	30.4%	25.0%	34.9%
The Palestinian Authority cares about Jerusalem issues, but not enough.	42.3%	52.7%	51.6%	46.7%
The Palestinian Authority doesn't care about Jerusalem issues.	18.9%	16.9%	23.4%	18.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

Political Predicament

In the random sample of Jerusalemites, which asked specifically about municipal services, the opinion had grown significantly worse. With the caveat that the PNA is not allowed specifically to provide 'government services' to Jerusalem but nonetheless plays a more ambiguous role, at least in the residents' expectations, the results are nonetheless striking. Three quarters of the sample rated the PNA-provided services as poor or very poor. Among those living within the municipal boundaries, this number was far higher – 86.1%. Jerusalemites outside the city borders were somewhat more satisfied with PNA performance. It is not clear whether this is because the PNA was actually able to do more outside the municipal boundaries (since Israel does not allow it to do anything within the boundaries), or whether, despite the same level of services, there is simply a more favorable attitude toward the PNA in general outside the municipal boundaries.

Table 41.: Municipal Services Provided by the Palestinian Authority

Q: In general, what is the level of services that are provided by the Palestinian National Authority to serve the needs of Palestinian in Jerusalem?

Rating	Respondents Living Inside Municipal Boundaries n. = 216	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, in Refugee Camp n. = 24	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, not in Camp n. = 182	Total n. = 422
Very good or good	6.1%	16.7%	24.7%	14.7%
Satisfactory	7.9%	4.2%	18.1%	12.1%
Poor or very poor	86.1%	79.2%	57.1%	73.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll October, 1999

Earlier corroborating evidence for these findings can be found in a research document entitled *Jerusalem Profile*, published by the Special Projects Unit of the Orient House. The *Profile* reports that an informal survey of Jerusalem residents and officials found that:

...despite their reservation on political grounds, Palestinians perceive these [main Israeli institutions] as efficient providers of services. Palestinian institutions are seen as inexperienced and unprepared in comparison with the Israeli institutions... As for the large, official Palestinian institutions, including PA institutions which were established since 1993, large organizations and NGOs, the Waqf Department, the Jerusalem District Electricity Company, the Palestinian Housing Council, Orient House, Palestinian hospitals, schools and village councils -- These institutions are considered as nuclei of a Palestinian institutional structure, but their method of operation, performance, appointment of employees, and priorities are viewed negatively; indeed, there are doubts about their ability to provide services to the residents.¹⁹²

The *Profile* goes on to note that some of those interviewed were understanding of the problems and perceived the Israeli occupation as the main obstacle to efficient performance, but others felt internal factors were also to blame.

Representation and Support

The degree of alienation that Palestinians in Jerusalem feel from both the Israeli municipality and the PNA comes into even sharper relief with the results on representation and support. When asked to choose which individual or group better represents their interests as a Jerusalem Palestinian, the response most often given, by 42% of Jerusalemites, was *no one*. Palestinians within the municipal boundaries were even more likely to give this answer (49%). The next most frequent response was the Jerusalem municipality, named by 24.5% of respondents (33.5% of residents inside the boundaries) as best representing their interests.

For the sample as a whole, the PNA was the next most frequent answer, listed by only 10.4%. Residents within the boundaries were much less likely to choose the PNA: Only 2% listed it as the party that best represents them. The Palestine Legislative Council, too, was not considered representative. Finally, Faisal Husseini and Orient House were also quite low on the list: Only 6.8% of the general sample and 2.4% of those living inside the boundaries believed that this "shadow municipality" best represents their interests.

Table 42.: Political Representation Preference

Q: Which of the following bodies or individuals do you feel best represents your interests as a Jerusalem Palestinian?

Political Body/Organization	Respondents Living Inside Municipal Boundaries n. = 251	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, in Camp n. = 24	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, not in Camp n. = 184	Total n. = 459*
Israeli Jerusalem Municipality	33.5%	12.5%	13.6%	24.4%
Israeli Knesset	5.2%	4.2%	1.6%	3.7%
Palestinian National Authority	2.0%	4.2%	24.5%	11.1%
Palestinian Liberation Organization	4.0%	29.2%	9.8%	7.6%
Palestinian Legislative Council (Jerusalem representatives)	2.0%	8.3%	2.2%	2.4%
Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce	2.0%	0.0%	2.2%	2.0%
Faisal Husseini/Orient House	2.4%	12.5%	12.0%	6.8%
No one	49.0%	29.2%	34.2%	42.0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll October, 1999

From these results, it is possible to conclude that the Arab residents of Jerusalem do not feel adequately represented by any party, organization, or leader. The residents within the municipal boundaries feel the least represented. And compared to those who live outside, they feel significantly less represented by Palestinian agencies and more represented by the Israeli municipality, albeit inadequately.

Political Predicament

The sense of alienation also comes across in the responses to another question that was asked of the entire West Bank and Gaza sample about sources of support in a crisis. The most common answer given was “relatives” (by 36% of the whole sample and 40% of the Jerusalem subsample); the second most common, “No one” (by 24% of the sample and 15% of the Jerusalem subsample). This means that about half of the Jerusalem respondents felt they would turn first to a private source of support in a crisis; about another 16% felt they had no one to turn to; about a quarter indicated they would turn to some kind of Palestinian organization (the most popular being the *Mukhtar*, or traditional village chief, with far less reliance on the national organizations). Less than a tenth said they would turn to the Israeli municipality. These results show that generally speaking, Arabs in Jerusalem do not feel supported by an organizational community that can help them in times of crisis. Part of this is due to the traditionally strong role of the family in a patriarchal society, but part is also due to the fact that no viable external support system exists.

Table 43.: Sources of Support in a Crisis

Q: If you need urgent help on a social issue, to whom do you resort first?

Political Body/Organization	West Bank Respondents n. = 659	Gaza Respondents n. = 404	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 70	Total n. = 1133
The municipal council	12.6%	2.0%	7.1%	8.47%
The Palestinian Authority representative of my area or the Palestine Legislative Council's member	7.1%	6.4%	7.1%	6.8%
The representative of my political faction (ex. Fateh, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, etc.)	8.0%	4.2%	2.9%	6.4%
The local Chamber of Commerce	0.5%	0.5%	1.4%	0.5%
Local religious person in charge	3.9%	3.0%	2.9%	3.5%
Mukhtar (Chief of village)	4.2%	14.6%	14.3%	8.6%
Foreign NGOs	0.3%	0.0%	1.4%	0.3%
The neighbors	1.4%	2.5%	5.7%	2.03%
Charitable organization	2.0%	0.7%	1.4%	1.5%
A relative (husband, wife, etc.)	33.7%	39.6%	40.0%	36.2%
No one (No one will listen)	24.1%	24.3%	15.7%	23.7%
Other	1.7%	2.2%	18.6%	2.9%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August 1999

There are clear indications that the Palestinians in Jerusalem are increasingly upset with this lack of support from the Palestinian authorities. In a series of town hall meetings organized by Al Quds University and broadcast last year, residents spoke out angrily, describing their sense that there is a “roadblock” between them and the PNA. Participants, all Jerusalemites, related that often their requests do not even receive the dignity of a response, and that for the most part promises they do manage to extract are not kept. Some residents’ comments included:

Political Predicament

Why don't you lawyers and all of you do something to help us? We are defending Jerusalem and guarding it for the Palestinian people. Why don't you do something? We are not people of al-Isawiyyeh only but of the whole Palestinian people.

Until now not one project has been undertaken by the PNA in Jerusalem! In Gaza they invest 40, 50 million dollars – we have a 5 million dollar project on sewage for al-Isawiyyeh and until today [we have received] nothing whatsoever. Why can't we afford to take some of the profits of the Jericho casino and invest them in Jerusalem?

We are under occupation and this is what we expect from occupiers and more. But what have we done as Palestinians to stop this?

We wanted a football field for Issawiyyeh. We got approval from everyone, but the PNA refused it. Is that really something that would threaten Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem? We raised NIS 250,000 for a club and football field. They [the PNA] refused to build it, because they said it would mean this is an Israeli village. I want to ask you legally, would this change the political status? Isn't this pathetic?

We brought here the person in charge of the [PNA] Ministry, and we showed him all the houses that are designated for demolition. We asked for his help. To our regret, he has not yet responded.

There is a "roadblock" between the people in Jerusalem and the PNA. Why? Why? We are nationalists, some of us served time in prison. Why is there this roadblock between us?

Comments from the individual interviews done for this study supported this finding. A selection of these is presented below:

The PNA has completely neglected Jerusalem, completely. We don't know why. It's an apathy that goes way, way back to before the PNA arrived. Even in the intifada. [The city of] Nablus and the [Palestine National] Authority work as one but here in Jerusalem, no. Part of it is competition between the national leadership and the local leadership here. Part of it is apathy of the people. There is no real core of a Jerusalem constituency here. Even if Israel withdrew tomorrow, there would be a vacuum. Most people who are truly from Jerusalem have left and others have come in who are more tied to their towns of origin than to here. Here is just their place of business. There is no constituency that you could develop or call on....

I don't know why the PNA is so disinterested in Jerusalem. Either because it is a business town or because they just have kind of given up and are resigned to not having any of it so they don't want to invest in it.

--**Daoud Kuttub**, Director, Institute of Modern Media at al-Quds University, Jerusalem resident, co-Chair, Jerusalem Information Center, in an interview in his Jerusalem office, June 23, 1999

The PNA's policy [on Jerusalem] is hands off. Since it came, there has been no interest in Jerusalem. There is a big crisis here in education, health, institutions. Before they came, there was more interest, although we had no crises. Maybe there is a concept or scenarios about it, [some agreement] between the PNA and Israel. So they leave these people 'without, like gypsies.'

--**Khalil Toufakji**, Director, Department of Cartography and Land Survey, Orient House, in an interview in his Jerusalem office, July 9, 1999

Political Predicament

Why not support the institutions in Jerusalem – Orient House, Al-Quds University, Maqassad Hospital? A lot can be done. [They could] hold a session with the Israelis on a simple non-status quo issue – such as the problem of the line at the Ministry of Interior. Invest a few thousand shekels to make it better... The problem is that no one is paying attention. Neither the municipality nor the PNA.

--**Fayez Hussein**, economist, in an interview in his Ramallah office, July 7, 1999

It is not clear to me what the PNA attitude is... But what sort of help can they give? They are not helping the Palestinian people. It is [because of] access to resources. When Israel comes and bulldozes a house, what are the PNA to do – send the army?... The biggest challenge to the PNA is to start a delivery system of services that could unhook the Palestinians from the Israelis. We are talking about something that will cost several billion dollars. The total budget of the PNA is \$800 million. The total health budget is even less than that. Anything physical they cannot do.

--**Salim Tamari**, Director, Institute of Jerusalem Studies, in an interview in his Jerusalem office, July 1, 1999

In sum, it is clear that, at least at this point in time, Palestinian Jerusalemites feel profoundly unrepresented and unsupported by both sides. But while they expected this from the Israeli authorities and were not surprised by it, they did not expect the same from the Palestinians. The fact that the PNA is legally, economically, and politically stuck with its hands tied behind its back is not clear to the residents, whose quality of life has sunk to such an abysmal level. They undoubtedly had high hopes from the arrival of the PNA in 1994 that finally, someone could do something, anything to help. But that help has not materialized, and the anger they feel over this abandonment is abundantly clear. It is far greater when the authority in question is one that they perceived as, in some way, their own. And the lack of response from the PNA may have had the deeper, boomerang effect of making the Israeli authorities somehow look better by comparison.

Evaluation of Political Strategy

How do Palestinians in Jerusalem evaluate their 30-year-old political strategies today? We will look briefly at two of them: the decision not to participate in Israeli municipal elections, and the decision not to work with the Israeli municipality. Then, we describe some new types of initiatives that have lately begun to emerge at the grassroots level.

Participation in municipal elections. Since 1967, when the Arabs in Jerusalem were granted the right to vote in municipal elections by virtue of their permanent resident status, the national leadership has adhered to the position that any participation in elections is taboo, because it would legitimize Israeli rule over East Jerusalem, a governance that Arabs maintain is completely against international law. The position is also rooted in the conviction that the problems of the Arabs in East Jerusalem cannot be ameliorated by a minority participation in municipal politics, because they derive from national policies that can only be changed at the highest level.¹⁹³ Thus, according to this line of thinking, by participating in local politics, Arabs will only be providing the cover of legitimacy without the possibility for effecting genuine change. Daoud Kuttab explains that there are other considerations as well: "We are not allowed to vote in the municipal elections, because the nationalists are afraid that if they said OK on that, then people would ask for [Israeli] passports and the whole thing would break wide open."¹⁹⁴

Until the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September of 1993, Palestinian participation in the Jerusalem municipal elections was so minimal as to be virtually irrelevant. In 1989, for example, only 3 percent of eligible Arab voters cast votes.¹⁹⁵ According to Benvenisti, those who voted were more or less on the fringe of society, turning traditional political theory on its head: "In Arab Jerusalem, thus, the norm was the opposite of that in most democratic societies: the greater the political consciousness, the less the participation in elections."¹⁹⁶ In November 1993, just after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, there was the hint of a shift in the attitude of the Arab public on the question of elections. For the first time, the possibility came up of establishing an Arab slate to run and support Mayor Kollek, who was then facing a stiff challenge from Likud contender Ehud Olmert. Benvenisti describes the outcome:

In a reversal of the traditional stance that the Arabs must boycott the municipal elections in order to demonstrate their nonacceptance of the annexation of East Jerusalem, a proposal was made to establish a slate that would run in the municipal elections...After extensive deliberations, the PLO leadership decided to adhere to the traditional position and did not take an active part in the election campaign. However, in contrast to past elections, prominent leaders made neither public declarations calling for a boycott nor threats against anyone who might dare to vote.¹⁹⁷

In this election, about 6-7%¹⁹⁸ of qualified Arab voters cast votes. While this represented an increase over the previous election's turnout, it still was marginal and not nearly enough to make any impact on the election outcome.¹⁹⁹ Indeed, Teddy Kollek lost the election to Likud nationalist Ehud Olmert. About two years later, a JMCC poll found there was still overwhelming public support for the decision not to participate in elections.

Political Predicament

Table 44.: Participation in Municipal Elections / Jerusalem Sample 1995

Q: If Israeli elections for the Jerusalem Municipality were held today, would you participate?

Response	Total n. = 489
Yes	13.1%
No	83.2%
No opinion	3.7%
Total	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No 8, Jerusalem 1995

In 1998, for the first time, an independent Arab list actually did run in Jerusalem. Moussa Alayan, a Bayt Safafa resident who is an Israeli citizen, headed the list. In a pre-election interview, Alayan described some of the factors that motivated him to run:

Q: But you know, of course, there has been a boycott for 31 years. This [candidacy] will change everything.

Alayan: Yes, but until 1993, there was no connection between Israelis and Palestinians. It was forbidden, the communication between the two. But after 1993, with the Oslo agreement, at that time we accepted that there were two people. And in the agreement, it was contained that Jerusalem is one of the things that will be solved in the final status agreements....I announced and wrote that I don't have any right to interfere politically in the status of Jerusalem...I am just asking for my rights, my needs. It is nothing political. There is no law in the world that says that if I get my rights where I am living now that I must relinquish what was taken from me before by the occupation of my land. We have to differentiate between our daily life and my duty to my land....even if there are international laws, why must the garbage be related to the land? This has been our mistake for the last 50 years....They take the *armona*, but we don't get any services...The Israelis come and ask me for the *armona* to pay the settlements of Gilo and Pisgat Zeev to make their gardens. And the garbage that is in front of my house, they don't take it. Do I have to stay silent?²⁰⁰

Alayan did not win more than a few hundred votes, and he did not change the Arab turnout. In fact, it was lower than it had been in previous elections, the lowest, by some estimates, since 1967.²⁰¹ In addition to the fact that he was not generally very popular, he faced a united and very public opposition from the nationalist leadership within and outside the city, unlike in 1993.

Two interviewees offer explanations for why this happened:

In the latest municipal elections, there was for the first time maybe a clear indication that there were possibilities for an Arab, a stronger Arab participation in municipal affairs. But therefore you noticed and for the first time, much stronger rhetoric on the part of the Palestinian Authority against this. If you go around now in the city, you will see graffiti on the wall calling people who will participate in the election 'traitors.' You would not have found it last time. There was no need for the Palestinian Authority to take this pronounced position. They felt they wanted to take this position because there was growing readiness on the part of sectors of the population to participate.²⁰²

--Sari Nusseibeh, President, al-Quds University, in an interview in his Jerusalem office, July 19, 1999

Political Predicament

Part of the reason for the adamant PNA stance was that this was the one election where the negotiations on the status of Jerusalem were much closer and there was a feeling that the results could hurt the Palestinian cause. Also these elections took place after the return of the PLO, and with the establishment of the PNA and its security apparatus, the reality of a Palestinian state became more real. One more thing is that the [Palestinian] undercover security people were working for the first time in large forces in Jerusalem, so whether it was direct or indirect people felt that voting at this particular time was not a good idea. Finally, the candidate was not very attractive, politically.

—**Daoud Kuttab**, Director, Institute of Modern Media at al-Quds University, Jerusalem resident, co-Chair, Jerusalem Information Center, in an interview in his Jerusalem office, June 23, 1999

We did not ask about willingness to participate in elections in the current survey, because the numbers from the recent election speak for themselves. Numbers notwithstanding, the Alayan candidacy is an indication of change stirring among Jerusalem's Arab residents. The essence of the change can be summed up in Alayan's own words: "I dream for myself that I will be able to speak a word for myself, without a person or party telling me what to say. I want to be free in myself."²⁰³

Working with the Israeli municipality. The survey results on this issue are indisputable: In a clear departure, Palestinians in Jerusalem think it is time to abandon their non-cooperation policy and work with the Israeli municipality to improve their own daily lives. Fully 84% of the respondents answered yes to this question. And the percentage among those living within the municipal boundaries was much higher: it reached 92%.

Table 45.: Working with the Jerusalem Municipality

Q: In general, do you think that Palestinian Jerusalem residents should work with the Israeli municipality to try to improve services and daily life?

Response	Respondents Living Inside Municipal Boundaries n. = 226	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, in Camps n. = 17	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, Not in Camps n. = 117	Total n. = 431
Yes	92.2%	70.8%	72.2%	83.5%
No	7.8%	29.2%	27.8%	16.5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll October, 1999

Even more significantly, this opinion appears to be shared equally by residents of all political persuasions. In the table below, we cross-referenced the "yes/no" answers on the question of cooperation against the expressed passport preference. A very solid majority, indeed consensus in some cases, was in favor of changing this policy no matter what passport they would prefer to have today. Even among those least inclined to support this policy, which was residents who would take the Palestinian passport today, over two-thirds still answered "yes."

Political Predicament

Table 46.: Working with the Jerusalem Municipality by Current Passport Preference

Q: In general, do you think that Palestinian Jerusalem residents should work with the Israeli municipality to try to improve services and daily life?

Breakdown among...	Yes, they should work with the municipality	No, they should not work with the municipality	Total
Respondents who would take an Israeli passport today	100%	0.0%	100%
Respondents who would take a Jordanian passport today	95.8%	4.2%	100%
Respondents who would take a Palestinian passport today	70.4%	29.6%	100%
Respondents who would take a joint Israeli-Palestinian passport today	90.2%	9.8%	100%
Respondents who would take none of above passports today	92.9%	7.1%	100%
Total n. = 430	84.8%	15.1%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll, October 1999

Part of the reason for this shift is Oslo in general. According to Sari Nusseibeh, president of al-Quds University, "There is more readiness to deal with the Israelis and make use of Israel at every level. Jerusalem is part of this. It is mostly in the 1990s that Jerusalem institutes have developed ties with Israel – hospitals, schools, and so on. And mostly also after Oslo, [it's] as if there is a recognition, a realization, maybe unexpressed, deeper down, that maybe Jerusalem is not going to really be regarded as part of the Palestinian areas [in the final agreement]."²⁰⁴ But the shift appears to go even beyond that.

New types of initiatives. One theme that was sounded repeatedly in the interviews done for this study was that in the past few years, the Palestinians in Jerusalem have begun to try new types of initiatives. One type is the independent, self-initiated, grassroots effort. The other type is the joint activism with the assistance of new progressive, nongovernmental, increasingly active, Israeli organizations that are spearheaded by Israelis who cannot tolerate the status quo of discrimination.

Ziad al-Hamouri, a Jerusalem merchant who began with political activism and recently founded a nonprofit center called the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights, typifies the first kind of activism. In 1992, in response to a series of particularly brutal tax raids by the municipal authorities in East Jerusalem, he organized merchants and residents into a committee called the follow-up *arnona* committee. The committee decided to go right to the top:

We sent a letter to [then Mayor] Kollek, asking to meet with him. We met with [then Advisor on Arab Affairs] Amir Cheshin. We told Cheshin that if you want to sit with us, you must first of all declare you are stopping all these police raids and open negotiations. We succeeded. We started to negotiate. We started, but we didn't get anywhere, because the municipality started to attack us as a committee. They thought they could pressure us and

Political Predicament

direct us to act in the way they wanted. They said we are not a real committee. They considered us a political committee, not one that defends peoples' rights....I think that it was very good work, this committee. We worked for several years and we held demonstrations and strikes, including one in front of the municipality itself, about the problem of *arnona*.... We didn't say that we didn't want to pay. We want to pay the tax, but according to our situation. We wanted them to come up with a new classification for East Jerusalem considering all the social and economic factors, and the way of life here.²⁰⁵

In 1994, the committee took an even bolder step – radical in the context of East Jerusalem politics: They recruited Avigdor Feldman, a prominent Israeli human rights lawyer, and took the case to the Israeli High Court in 1994, requesting that the *arnona* classification be changed. Hamouri recalls:

This was the first time that Jerusalem was trying [to do something]. At that time, when we raised the issue, some of the Arab newspapers wrote that it was strange....Even to negotiate with the municipality is not recognized. We Palestinians sometimes differ over this. We are concerned about the political issue, but you must also deal with daily life. In our negotiation with the municipality, we told them right off, 'We don't want to enter into politics. If you raise political issues, we will not sit with you.' But we have daily problems [that need to be addressed]. When we thought to go to the High Court, we thought of the daily problems which people are suffering.²⁰⁶

The court case was inconclusive. The court determined that some papers were missing and "they asked the municipality kindly to review their *arnona* rates," says Hamouri. Still, he does not feel that this was a wasted effort. And he indicated that the committee was preparing to try with the High Court yet again.

According to Hamouri, the municipality attacked him in a very personal way for his action:

They said we are frightening the people. Even [Mayor Ehud] Olmert himself declared, in the spring of 1997, 'I will teach Hamouri a lesson.' He was having a press conference and he attacked me in a very personal way—he said it was either me or him. They took a court decision [to seize my shop] without telling me. He sent all the municipality lawyers to take all the steps, in June 1998. They confiscated all my merchandise and my car, and they took a step that they hadn't ever taken in 30 years – they put their hands on my shop and declared it foreclosed. I knew they would attack me, but I didn't know it would be like that.²⁰⁷

Hamouri has continued with this activism, establishing a center, waging personal protests against the conditions on the line at the Ministry of Interior, and overseeing a comprehensive comparative study of municipal spending in the Arab vs. the Jewish sectors, published in 1999.

Political Predicament

In the second category, of work with Israeli progressive groups, there are a number of organizations that have made a real difference, including:

- **B'Tselem**, The Israeli information center for human rights in the occupied territories
- **HaMoked**, Center for the Defense of the Individual
- **Ir Shalem** (Hebrew for “whole city,” a play on words on the Hebrew word for Jerusalem, which is “Yerushalayim)
- **The Israeli Committee Against Home Demolitions (ICAHD)**
- **The Alternative Information Center**

Such groups have opened an extragovernmental channel of activism to the Palestinians in Jerusalem, and Palestinians are taking advantage of this channel more and more. For example, Palestinians threatened with expulsion from the city turn to HaMoked and B'Tselem for high quality legal representation and expertise. Both these organizations played key roles in making the “center of life” policy into a big international issue and eventually getting it revoked. Each home demolition is widely publicized and protested by Palestinians and Israelis working together in the Israeli Commission Against Home Demolitions; they have drawn international attention. Finally, Ir Shalem has successfully fought some housing plans, notably in Sur Baher and Umm Tuba, where they and local residents submitted alternative plans allowing for higher construction densities (and thus more housing units). The Jerusalem District and Planning Committee revised the TPS for these neighborhoods in response to this pressure. Sarah Kaminker, who has been instrumental in Ir Shalem, describes how it works:

Now there are coalitions of Israeli organizations that are fighting demolitions and that are presenting alternative plans to the ones the municipality put forward. We go into a neighborhood, we call the people who had demolition orders, every *mukhtar*, and they follow us every step of the way, and then we hire lawyers, and we also negotiate to change the planning scheme. We do it with them for political reasons.²⁰⁸

She believes this is indicative of a new trend:

So why now is there an awakening of a wish to fight the planning process? Why do we now see so much opposition to the plans of the municipality? I think it is because Palestinians and Israelis have found a way to work together and Israelis do it because we as Israelis cannot stand that this is what is going on.²⁰⁹

Daniel Seidemann, lawyer and prominent activist within Ir Shalem, concurs:

The organization that we are seeing now is in anticipation that the rules of the game are changing slowly and will change more rapidly and there will be business opportunities that are available that were not in the past....We are looking seriously, under the assumption that sovereignty is not really possible, that we midwife new terms of interaction between Israeli authorities and Palestinians from the background. We have received approaches from both. This is the wave of the future.²¹⁰

Political Predicament

In any case, indications are that Palestinians in the city are weary of being asked to bear the lion's share of the price for the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the city and that they are cautiously trying out new strategies to effect change. This change is still in its nascence and it could be stillborn. In the long run, though, it could also grow into something that might enable residents to become empowered at improving the quality of their own lives until such a time as a genuine peace solution for the city is reached.

Political Predicament

Outlook for the Future

Importance of Jerusalem

It is widely believed that Jerusalem is the most difficult issue of dispute between Israelis and Palestinians in particular, and Israel and the Arab world in general. While many polls have examined how Israeli Jews feel about this issue, and some have looked at how Palestinians overall see it, few have considered how the city's Palestinian residents feel about the future of their city. Below, we present some results that begin to speak to that question.

Two findings demonstrate that Palestinians in general as well as Jerusalem Palestinians in particular feel very strongly about the issue of Jerusalem. In a representative sample of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem taken in March of 1999, the greatest number of respondents (46%) named Jerusalem as the most important problem facing the Palestinian people. This number was the same in the West Bank/Jerusalem as it was in Gaza, so there is a consensus on this.

Table 47.: Importance of Jerusalem to the Palestinians

Q: Which of the following problems do you believe is the most important facing the Palestinian people?

Problem	West Bank & Jerusalem Respondents n. = 761	Gaza Respondents n. = 438	Total n. = 1199
Jerusalem	45.2%	47.9%	46.2%
Refugees	14.5%	15.5%	14.8%
Settlements	31.4%	29.7%	30.8%
Other	2.1%	2.1%	2.1%
No answer	6.8%	4.1%	6.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 31, March 1999

In another representative sample taken in August, fully 95% of respondents did not agree that if Jerusalem is the last obstacle to peace, they would be willing to concede to Israel's demand that Jerusalem remain the united capital of Israel. This means that there is near unanimous agreement among Palestinians that it is worth sacrificing the prospect of peace altogether in order to prevent Israel from securing international recognition of Jerusalem as its capital. This is fairly powerful validation of Chairman Arafat's decision to turn down Prime Minister Barak's offers of compromise at Camp David, since they did not go far enough on Jerusalem. In this regard, at least, it would appear that public opinion is solidly behind Arafat. And, as is clear from the breakdown by area of residence, Jerusalemites are nearly equally in agreement on this issue.

Table 48.: Importance of Peace vs. Jerusalem

Q: If Jerusalem represents the last obstacle for signing the peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, would you then support the idea of making Jerusalem the unified capital of Israel?

Response	West Bank Respondents n. = 680	Gaza Respondents n. = 430	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 70	Total n. = 1181
Agree	2.1%	1.2%	7.0%	2.0%
Disagree	95.3%	96.0%	88.7%	95.2%
I don't know	2.6%	2.8%	4.2%	2.8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August, 1999

Preferred solution for Jerusalem

Other results shed some light on what solution Arab Jerusalemites prefer for their city. In a 1995 representative sample of Jerusalem Palestinians, only .4% thought that the best solution was for Jerusalem to be the united capital of Israel. The majority wanted to see East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. Presumably this meant including the Old City, and with West Jerusalem being the capital of Israel.

Table 49.: Preferred Solution for Jerusalem / Jerusalem Sample 1995

Q: What, in your opinion, what is the best and final solution for the problem of Jerusalem?

Solution	Total n. = 489
Unified capital of Israel	0.4%
East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian State	41.5%
International Jerusalem	23.3%
Jerusalem as an open city and a capital of the two states	15.3%
West Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, the Old City is under joint sovereignty, and East Jerusalem is under Palestinian sovereignty	6.7%
Other	7.0%
No opinion	5.7%
Total	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 8, August 1995

Political Predicament

Data from four years later, although not directly comparable, are still insightful. While the total consensus against having unified Jerusalem as the capital of Israel has not changed, opinions appear to have shifted on which option is preferred. Support overall for an international Jerusalem was still holding strong at 25% in all groups but those living in refugee camps, among whom this option won *no* supporters. Support for the notion of East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state with West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel has declined: from 41.5% to 10%, although the option “Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine” could conceivably have been understood to be the same thing by the respondents, and that was supported by 20% of Jerusalemites overall (11% of those within the municipal boundaries). There was little interest in sharing sovereignty over the Old City with Israel – only 7% (the same as in the '95 sample) thought this would be best. The option of Jerusalem being the capital of an Islamic nation was strikingly popular: fully 20% of the representative sample thought this would be the *best* solution for Jerusalem, and this was the most popular solution among those in refugee camps. And unified Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine won 12% of the total.

Table 50.: Preferred Solution for Jerusalem (Jerusalemites only)

Q: In your opinion, what is the better and final solution for Jerusalem?

Response	Respondents Living Inside Municipal Boundaries n. = 251	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, in Camp n. = 25	Respondents Living Outside Municipal Boundaries, Not in Camp n. = 198	Total n. = 474
Unified capital of Israel	1.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%
West Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, Old City under joint Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty and East Jerusalem under Palestinian sovereignty	7.6%	16.0%	4.0%	6.5%
East Jerusalem is capital of the Palestinian state and west Jerusalem is capital of Israel	10.0%	16.0%	9.1%	9.9%
Jerusalem is an open city and a capital for the two states	17.9%	8.0%	6.6%	12.7%
Jerusalem is international	25.1%	0.0%	25.0%	17.7%
Jerusalem is the unified capital of Palestine	9.16%	12.0%	16.7%	12.5%
Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine	10.75%	20.0%	22.2%	20.7%
Jerusalem is the capital of the Islamic nation	17.5%	28.0%	19.7%	19.0%
Other	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Jerusalem Poll October, 1999

In a representative sample of West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza Palestinians taken around the same time as the previous survey, these same trends hold strong. Not even one Palestinian Jerusalemite chose unified Jerusalem as the capital of Israel as the best solution. Nor did any want to share sovereignty with Israel in the Old City. On the other hand, Jerusalem Palestinians were not as quite as sure of entrusting Jerusalem to Palestinian rule as their counterparts in the occupied territories were. While a solid minority (nearly 16%) chose the option “Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine,” this was still a lot lower than the 25-30% of West Bankers and Gazans who favored that option. Jerusalemites seemed more in favor of solutions that removed Jerusalem altogether from single sovereignty – open city, international city. The most popular solutions, among Jerusalem Palestinians, did not even entail secular Palestinian rule: international Jerusalem (nearly 27%) and Jerusalem as capital of an Islamic nation (23%). In both surveys, the support for the ‘Islamic solution’ is surprisingly high, reflecting the return to religion that is so visible throughout the occupied territories. Overall, these results can be taken as a reflection of the degree of alienation from existing authorities on both sides that this group is currently experiencing.

Table 51.: Preferred Solution for Jerusalem (West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza)

Q: In your opinion, what is the better and final solution for Jerusalem?

Response	West Bank Respondents n. = 674	Gaza Respondents n. = 435	Jerusalem Respondents n. = 70	Total n. = 1179
Unified Jerusalem is the capital of Israel	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
West Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, Old City under joint Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty and East Jerusalem under Palestinian sovereignty	4.3%	1.4%	0.0%	3.0%
East Jerusalem is capital of the Palestinian state and west Jerusalem is capital of Israel	13.1%	6.9%	10.0%	10.6%
Jerusalem is an open city and a capital for the two states	5.9%	2.3%	15.7%	5.2%
Jerusalem is international	6.1%	4.4%	28.6%	6.8%
Unified Jerusalem is capital of Palestine	20.6%	32.6%	5.7%	24.2%
Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine	25.1%	27.8%	15.7%	25.5%
Jerusalem is the capital of the Islamic nation	24.5%	24.6%	22.9%	24.4%
Other	0.3%	0.0%	1.4%	0.3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 32, August, 1999

Political Predicament

And the most recent JMCC survey, from June 2000, shows that Palestinians by majority (62.3%) do not support the solutions that were being floated at the Camp David meetings. Roughly 30% are not sure: They either want to study the issue further before drawing a conclusion, or they say they don't know. Only 6% would favor such an option.

Table 52.: Compromise Solution for Jerusalem / West Bank & Gaza Sample 2000

Q: During the current final status negotiations on Jerusalem, there are suggestions of compromise solutions, including: "The Palestinian Authority will have total responsibility over religious sites, the Aqsa and Holy Sepulchre, as well as administrative responsibilities over East Jerusalem. The capital of Palestine will become parts of Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Abu Dis, while postponing final resolution of the political future of East Jerusalem to the future. What is your opinion of this suggested solution?

Response	West Bank & Jerusalem Respondents n. = 762	Gaza Respondents n. = 438	Total n. = 1200
The mentioned solution is acceptable.	5.4%	7.3%	6.2%
The mentioned solution should be studied and seriously considered before coming to an opinion of it.	28.6%	22.4%	26.3%
The mentioned solution is bad and unacceptable.	59.1%	68.0%	62.3%
I don't know	4.9%	2.1%	3.8%
No answer	2.0%	0.2%	1.4%
Total	100%	100%	100%

JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 37, June 2000

Clearly, the Israeli and Palestinian positions on this issue, which Palestinians rate as the most important to be resolved, remain completely polarized, among Jerusalemites as well as among residents of the West Bank and Gaza. In this regard, there *is* an absolute Palestinian consensus.

Summary

Politically, the Palestinians in Jerusalem are today in an impossible predicament. They have been doubly abandoned, tangibly speaking, by both the Israeli government and the PNA in terms of actual support for remedying problems of daily life.²¹¹ The Israelis, who have the resources to offer such support, withhold it for political reasons. The Palestinian authorities, who have the will and desire to offer such support, do not have the resources to offer it. Whereas before Oslo, Arabs in Jerusalem could be upstanding nationalists and keep a low profile in the city, since Oslo, the cost has become too high to bear.

In general, we found that while Palestinians in Jerusalem remain staunchly Arab nationalist in their political views and preferences for the future, they are desperately in need of help finding pragmatic solutions to the immense problems they confront in daily life, problems which have paradoxically been greatly exacerbated by the very peace process itself. As a community, according to Sari Nusseibeh, they are disorganized and atomized:

It is not clear to me that the problem [in Jerusalem] is that the Palestinian Authority is not willing to help or that the people are not able to organize themselves properly to seek help. I suspect it is the latter. Jerusalemites are not organized in such a way that they have, they know what they want, and by that they present their case and follow it up in such a way as to get some part of what they want from the authorities. The authority has appointed a person or agency to give that leadership, but, and I am happy to say this, I think it is a failed leadership.²¹²

For years, Arabs in Jerusalem have been caught in the crossfire: Palestinians outside insisted that Arabs in the city be on the front lines of the national struggle at their own expense. Israelis wanted them to play the role of the quiescent, contented, integrated residents despite the wholesale transfer of assets in the city from Arab to Jewish hands. Neither side, really, had the genuine interests of the Arabs in the city at heart. Today, it appears that Arabs in Jerusalem may be more ready than in the past to integrate where unavoidable into Israeli society (i.e., passports and benefits) and make some changes in their political strategies for surviving on a day-to-day basis in the city. These shifts, which no doubt are partly driven by the events of the past decade, appear to be purely pragmatic, rather than indicative of political or ideological transformation. Some of the shifts are inherently contradictory. For example, there appears to be some more willingness to take Israeli citizenship, at the same time as there is a hardening of views on what would be the optimal final solution for the city. Because it goes along with zero interest in seeing Israeli rule perpetuated, this willingness to take Israeli passports should be seen as a pragmatic measure born of desperation, a response to the deep existential insecurity experienced by all Jerusalem Palestinians due to the "center of life" policy. Other types of shifts include increased readiness to break ranks and take independent initiatives, as Mousa Alayan and Ziad al-Hamouri did, and new willingness to partner with non-governmental, political, progressive, and sympathetic Israeli organizations who can take on some of the responsibility for political risks, such as filing cases with the Israeli High Court (as when the Orient House was threatened with closure just before the Israeli elections).

Political Predicament

As a whole, this trend can be characterized as one of seeking ways to take the initiative to proactively improve conditions of daily life in the short term *without* necessarily conferring political legitimacy on what remains, for Arabs, a wholly unacceptable political reality.

Conclusion

This report has explored key aspects of what it is like to live as a Palestinian in Jerusalem today. It began by exploring the very concept of Jerusalem, and concluded that there is a profound disconnect between the Israeli and Palestinian concepts of Jerusalem. In over 30 years, Palestinians have not even begun to embrace the Israeli concept of Jerusalem, even though it governs much of their lives. But it also found a disconnect between the Arab residents' concept of Jerusalem and that of their own leadership, the PNA. What, after all, *is* Jerusalem? The discussion of "Jerusalem," or "al-Quds" in Arabic, has been postponed for so long while the city itself has undergone such drastic transformation on the ground that Jerusalem has become a fuzzy and disarticulated concept. It is no longer clear to the Palestinian public what Jerusalem even *is*. Is Abu Dis, for example, the neighborhood that Israel has declared it will turn over to Palestine for its capital, "Jerusalem?" It lies within the Palestinian *mubafazha*, but outside of Israeli municipal Jerusalem. There is an urgent need for a Palestinian vision of Jerusalem to be concisely and clearly articulated, both to the Palestinian public and to the world at large.

This report then posed the question, what is reality like for a Palestinian in Jerusalem today? The answer is that it is a harsh reality, an existence of extreme uncertainty and alienation, one that has become far more precarious over the past decade. This population has been neglected, even abandoned, by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority – deliberately by the former, and by virtue of lack of resources and access, by the latter. Since the occupation began, Israel has made it clear that Arabs in Jerusalem were at best, tolerated, and at worst, *persona non grata*. Their status as permanent residents, at the behest of Israel, made that clear, as did the single-minded focus on demographic superiority at any cost and the ethnically exclusive planning and housing policies that left Palestinians with so few options for urban living space. Until the Oslo Accords, however, this population was in a position to benefit in at least some respects from the political limbo in which it found itself. At least insofar as individual status, benefits, and freedom of movement were concerned, they felt more advantaged than their compatriots in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They did not need permission to leave the country; they felt their residency was secure as long as they abided by clear rules, which they generally did. As a community, their institutions could receive PLO and Jordanian funds from abroad, enabling them to develop leadership and a collective voice that was heard around the world.

Since the Oslo Accords, their world has gradually fallen apart, piece by piece. First, Israel closed the city, severing them from their families and leaving them isolated and economically bereft of markets, customers, workers, and clients alike. Then, the PNA returned, casting a large shadow over the local Jerusalemites who had emerged as potential leaders and the city's potential leadership role. It set up a power base in Ramallah, which became a magnet for institutions and business to leave Jerusalem and move to where opportunity existed. Moreover, with the PNA in such close proximity, Israel passed a law forbidding the PNA to have any involvement in Jerusalem, and continuously harassed Palestinian institutions in the city that gave any appearance of doing so. Thus, the PNA was no longer able to offer any financial support. Other major sources of funding, such as the World Bank, agreed to refrain from channeling any funds to Jerusalem as long as its status was politically unclear.

Conclusion

As a result, Palestinian East Jerusalem has been all but de-institutionalized, and the remaining large functioning institutions, under all kinds of pressures, are increasingly capitulating to the need to seek Israeli funding to continue to survive, as Sari Nusseibeh explains:

It is mostly in the 1990s that most of these [Jerusalem] institutions have developed ties with Israel, hospitals, schools, and so on. And mostly also after Oslo, as if there is a recognition, a realization, maybe unexpressed, deeper down, that maybe Jerusalem was not going to really be regarded as part of the Palestinian areas.²¹³


As if this were not enough, Israel unleashed its “center of life” policy, at which point the bottom dropped out of the Palestinian Jerusalemite’s world. Suddenly, he was as existentially insecure, if not more so, than the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Where the Palestinian in the territories came under an independent authority that, if not perfect, was at least serving in their interests, the Jerusalemite suddenly became completely insecure. The most innocuous bureaucratic visit – renewing a license, for example, could end in utter disaster with one’s residency was taken away. And for those thousands who did lose their residency, there were hundreds of thousands of more who lived in terror of losing it. In terror of being “found out” for whatever reason. Their existence became truly “permitted,” dependent wholly on a small permit, issued, renewed, or annulled at the whim of the Israeli bureaucrat who happened to be serving them that day. The deeper effects of the collective trauma caused by this policy will not quickly be erased, despite its cessation. There is no question but that it has erased whatever remaining trust there was in the Israeli authorities, and that reestablishing the trust could take a very, very long time. Existential insecurity was also heightened by the increase in the number of demolitions of Arab homes in the city. These were extraordinarily callous and short-sighted policies for a government that is ostensibly trying to make peace and work out new ways of coexistence under whatever political arrangement is finally agreed upon.

At the same time, the PNA was at best, hamstrung and unable to do anything concrete to help the Palestinians in Jerusalem, and at worst, indifferent and ready to give them up in a political settlement of convenience. Stories from the territories about abuses of power, corruption, and inefficiency perpetuated by the PNA were not lost on Jerusalem’s Arabs. The optimism they may have initially had about the advent of Palestinian rule has begun to fade. Arabs in Jerusalem have no clear understanding of why the PNA is not supporting them, and they are angry over this and feel abandoned. Communication here is urgently required. The PNA needs to make its policy and the limitations of that policy clearer to the people, and to seek ways to make whatever symbolic gestures it can that convey support without entailing massive investment of resources.

Despite it all, Palestinians in Jerusalem remain determined and as committed as ever to remain and flourish in their city. They resisted the “center of life” policy by moving back to the city in droves at great personal cost. They are building more “illegal” homes than ever before, in defiance of Israel’s demographically based planning policies. In these and other ways, Palestinians are telling Israel that Jerusalem belongs just as much to them, as well, and that they will not easily be erased from its landscape.

Conclusion

To summarize, a graphic depiction of the reality of Palestinians in Jerusalem today might look like this:



How were the Palestinians in Jerusalem, caught in a worsening no-win situation, affected by all of these developments? There is a clear shift in favor of a willingness to interact with the Israeli municipality on a purely pragmatic basis, to improve daily life in the short term. There is also a new energy springing from the joint efforts of Palestinians and Palestinian human rights groups in the city. These are not fundamental ideological shifts, however. As far as the long-term future of the eastern half city goes, its Arab residents are solidly in favor of it reverting to Arab or international control. They do not wish to remain under Israeli rule.

Yet the data also show the reality of Palestinians in Jerusalem today is fraught with contradictions. For one, our data clearly show that they do value the benefits Israeli rule has given them, and that they would not willingly give up those benefits. This means they are in somewhat of a self-contradictory position. Another is that Palestinians in Jerusalem are caught between two nationalist imperatives – Israel's, which wants to reduce them to a kind of decorative, impotent element in the city, and their own, which wants them to remain steadfast and resist legitimizing the occupation at the cost of their community's collective well-being. Neither of these "grand designs" accommodates the actual needs of the Arab community in Jerusalem itself.

Israel has its own contradiction when it comes to this population. As Daniel Seidemann explains, Israel has treated its own residents as unwelcome strangers and subjected them to a generation of abject neglect.

Conclusion

Everything the Jerusalem municipality has done [in the city] has been geared to consolidating Israeli rule over East Jerusalem. Even in the absence of anything sinister, there is no real shared community between Israelis and Palestinians except in very rare exceptions. Since 1967, the municipality has never been geared to accommodate for the needs of the Palestinian population, period.²¹⁴

The data expose the fallacy of Israel's claim to have united the city. In reality, the entity it governs is profoundly divided along ethnic lines by policies of explicit segregation. The "mosaic" of neighborhoods is a mosaic in which neighborhoods populated by Jews are modern, well tended, and fully equipped with all needed infrastructure, while those populated by Arabs are run down, filthy, and neglected. Today, more than ever, there are two distinctly different Jerusalems. Palestinians in Jerusalem have tried where they can to fill the gaps, such as services provided by Orient House, but the needs are so enormous that it would require a complete redefinition of city government to begin to address them.

And finally, the Palestine National Authority's contradiction as regards this segment of its people is that the process of peacemaking stipulated by the Oslo Accord is fraught with the peril of losing its support. The structure of the process, with its key pillars of gradualism and postponement of Jerusalem to the very end, has left Israel with free rein to accomplish as much as possible on the ground in a frantic rush to make its sole sovereignty an irreversible fact. It will be tragic if, during the protracted process of reaching an agreement on Jerusalem, Palestinians in the city are left in such untenable circumstances that many decide either to move out or to apply for Israeli citizenship before a final agreement is reached, thereby creating a reality that, at the final hour of decision, makes Palestinian claims to sovereignty ring sorely hollow.

Appendix: Measurement Equivalencies

Throughout this report, reference is made to areas in dunums and square meters. Below is a listing of measurement equivalencies for readers unfamiliar with these measurements.

Measurement Unit	Measurement Equivalent
1 meter	39.37 inches 1.0936 yards
1 kilometer	0.62137 mile
1 mile	1.6094 kilometers
1 square meter	1.196 square yards
1 dunum	.2471 acre 1,000 square meters
1 acre	4.04 dunums .4047 hectare
1 hectare	10 dunums 2.471 acres
1 square kilometer	0.386 square miles
1 square mile	2.59 square kilometers

Notes

¹ Data from three previously unpublished 1999 surveys are cited in this report. (Methodological notes from earlier surveys cited in this report are not included, since these surveys have been previously published and the sampling and other information can be found in the original publications, cited in the notes.) In the first survey, a random sample of 1200 people over age 18 were interviewed face-to-face throughout the West Bank and Gaza on August 26 and 27, 1999. The interviews were conducted in randomly selected homes, and the subjects inside each home were also selected randomly according to Kish tables. The interviews were conducted in 60 sampling points chosen randomly according to population.

Sampling data for the August, 1999 survey is listed in the tables below.

WEST BANK n. = 763	Towns/Villages
Jenin	Jenin, Toubas, Al-Far'aa refugee camp, Silat al-Harthieh, 'Uraba, Silat al-Thahr
Nablus	Nablus, Bidia, Salfit, Burqa, Nafoura, Beit Fureek, Huwara, Balata refugee camp
Tulkarm	Tulkarm, 'Ateel
Qalqilia	Qalqilia, 'Azzoun
Hebron	Hebron, Yatta, a-Dhahiria, Halhoul, Idthna, Beit-Kahel, Al-Shyoukh
Bethlehem	Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Za'tara, Sheisheh refugee camp, Husan, al-Khader
Jericho	Jericho, Aqbat Jaber refugee camp
Ramallah/ Jerusalem	Al-Bireh, al-'Amari refugee camp, Shu-fat, Shu'fat refugee camp, Old City of Jerusalem, Ras al-Amoud, al-Izarriyeh, Abu Dis, Kufr 'Aqab, Bir Nibala, Silwan
GAZA STRIP n. = 437	Towns/Villages
Gaza North	Jabalia refugee camp, Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun
Gaza	Sheikh Radwan, a-Darji, a-Tufah, Sabra, al-Meghraqa, a-Zeitoun, a-Nasser, a-Shujacih, a-Rimal north and south, Shati refugee camp
Deir al-Balah	Nusseirat refugee camp, Deir al-Balah refugee camp, Deir al-Balah
Khan Younis	'Abassan al-Saghira, Khan Younis refugee camp, Khan Younis, al-Qararah, Bani Suheila
Rafah	Rafah, Rafah refugee camp, Tal al-Sultan refugee camp, Shawkat al-Soufi.

Sampling data for August, 1999 survey (continued)

Background Variable	% of Sample
Territory	
West Bank	57.6%
Gaza	36.4%
Jerusalem	6.0%
Residency	
Village	39.3%
Refugee camp	16.4%
Town/city	44.3%
Sex	
Male	45.6%
Female	54.4%
Marital status	
Single	28.8%
Married	65.2%
Divorced	1.3%
Widowed	3.6%
NA	1.1%
Average age	34

In the second survey, a random sample of 500 people over age 18 was interviewed face-to-face throughout Jerusalem and environs on October 3 and 4, 1999. (Locations are listed in the text of the report, page XX). The interviews were conducted in randomly selected homes, and the subjects in each home were also selected randomly according to Kish tables. The interviews were conducted in 19 sampling points chosen randomly according to population. **The margin of error is 3%, with a confidence level of 95.** Some general background data on this sample is listed in the table below.

Background Variable	% of Sample
Residency	59.6%
Village	11.2%
Refugee camp	29.2%
Town/city	
Sex	37.4%
Male	62.6%
Female	
Marital status	24.4%
Single	66.8%
Married	1.6%
Divorced	5.4%
Widowed	1.8%
NA	
Average age	34

Notes

In the third survey, a random sample of 1200 people over age 18 was interviewed face-to-face throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip on June 22 and 23, 2000. The interviews were conducted in randomly selected homes, and the subjects inside each home were also selected randomly according to Kish tables. The interviews were conducted in 60 sampling points chosen randomly according to population. **The margin of error is 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.** Sampling data for the June, 2000 survey is listed in the tables below.

WEST BANK n. = 762	Towns/Villages
Jenin	Jenin, Toubas, Jenin refugee camp, al-Yamoun, Kufr Ra'ee, 'Arrabeh, al-Zababdeh, Maythaloun, Sanour
Nablus	Nablus, 'Azmout, 'Askar refugee camp, Haris, Bidia, Nus Jbeil, Beit Imreen, Huwwara, Beta
Tulkarm	Tulkarm, 'Anabta, Deir al-Ghousoun, Kufar Jmal, 'Ateel, Tulkarem refugee camp
Qalqilia	Qalqilia, 'Azzoun
Hebron	Hebron, Bani Na'im, al-Sasmmou', Dura, Idthna, al-Fawwar refugee camp, Beit Ummar, S'eer
Bethlehem	Bethlehem, Husan, Bateer, Bet Ta'mar, Dheisheh refugee camp
Jericho	Jericho, Aqbat Jaber refugee camp
Ramallah/ Jerusalem	Al-Bireh, Jalazoun refugee camp, Ramallah, Bir Zeit, Kufr Malik, Ni'lin, Abu Dis, al-Izarriyeh, Bir Nibala, Beit Liqia, Kufr 'Aqab, Qalandia refugee camp, Jabal al-Mukabber, Old City, Shu-fat, Bayt Hanina, Wadi al-Joz, Sheikh Jarrah
GAZA STRIP n. = 438	Towns/Villages
Gaza North	Jabalia refugee camp, Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun
Gaza	Sheikh Radwan, a-Darji, a-Tufah, Sabra, a-Zeitoun, a-Nasser, a-Shujacih, a-Rimal north and south, Shati refugee camp
Deir al-Balah	Nusseirat refugee camp, al-Maghazi refugee camp, Deir al-Balah
Khan Younis	'Abassan al-Saghira, 'Abassan al-Kabira, Khan Younis refugee camp, Khan Younis, Bani Suheila
Rafah	Rafah, Rafah refugee camp, Tal al-Sultan refugee camp

Background Variable	% of Sample
Residency	
Village	28.7%
Refugee camp	15.8%
Town/city	55.6%
Sex	
Male	50.9%
Female	49.1%
Marital status	
Single	26.7%
Married	64.3%
Divorced	1.6%
Widowed	4.6%
NA	2.9%
Average age	34

- ² The *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem – 1998* states that the exact actual area has now been found to be 126.4 sq. km, after some measurement adjustments. M. Choshen and N. Shahar, Eds, *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem – 1998*, p. 3. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1999, p. 3.
- ³ Michael Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 33.
- ⁴ Ibid. and M. Choshen, *Jerusalem on the Map: Basic Facts and Trends, 1967-1996*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 1998, p. 5.
- ⁵ Dumper, op. cit., p. 39.
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 42; Amir Cheshin, Bill Hutman, and Avi Melamed. *Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 37; B'Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning, and Building in East Jerusalem*. Jerusalem: B'Tselem, January 1997, p.17; Meron Benvenisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 66.
- ⁷ Benvenisti, *City of Stone*, op. cit., pp. 64-5; M. Benvenisti, "A City of Stone – The Hidden History of Jerusalem." PASSIA roundtable meeting, April 7, 1997, in M. Abdul Hadi, Ed., *Dialogue on Jerusalem: PASSIA Meetings 1990-1998*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, November 1998, p. 108.
- ⁸ Muna Hamzeh Muhaisen, "Preempting Jerusalem." *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, No. 3, Winter 1999, p. 32-33. Interview with Jeff Halper, Head of the Israeli Commission Against Home Demolitions, in his home in Jerusalem, June 22, 1999.
- ⁹ Amir Cheshin. *Municipal Policies in Jerusalem: An Account from Within*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, August 1998, p. 22.
- ¹⁰ PASSIA, "Government and Administration," Section 14 of the Appendix on Palestine in the *PASSIA 1999 Directory*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1999, p. 255.
- ¹¹ This information was compiled from two sources: The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics website, "Methodology," Section 1, "Administrative Borders and Geographic Coverage, at www.pcbs.org/english/jer_book/method.htm, and Martina Rieker, "Résumé 1997: The Year That Was." *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, Issue No. 1, Spring 1998, p. 6 (footnote #6).
- ¹² Sampling points for the October 1999 JMCC Jerusalem survey included Silwan, Wadi Joz, al-Isawiyyeh, Bayt Hanina, Hizma, Shu'fat, Shu'fat refugee camp, Samiramees, Bir Nibala, al-Izariyyeh, Abu Dis, Kufr Aqab, the Old City, Qalandya, Qalandya refugee camp, al-Za'im, Anata, a-Ram, and Dahiyet al-Barid.
- ¹³ Some of the many excellent references on demography and housing issues include Dumper, op. cit.; Benvenisti, *City of Stone*, op. cit., Choshen, *Jerusalem on the Map*, op. cit., B'Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination*, op. cit., Ir Shalem, *East Jerusalem: The Current Planning Situation*. Jerusalem: B'Tselem, November 1998, Cheshin et. al. *Separate...*, op. cit., Amir Cheshin, *Municipal Policies in Jerusalem: An Account from Within*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, August 1998.
- ¹⁴ The survey was done by the Guttman Institute and the University of Maryland.
- ¹⁵ This policy is based on the decision of the Interministerial Committee to Examine the Rate of Development for Jerusalem (Gafni Committee), which determined that the ratio should remain as it was at the end of 1972. *Recommendations for Coordinated and Consolidated Rate of Growth, Jerusalem*, August 1973, cited in B'Tselem, *The Quiet Deportation: Revocation of Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians*, Jerusalem: B'Tselem, April 1997., p. 8
- ¹⁶ "Israel's Uncertain Victory in Jerusalem." *A Special Report of the Foundation for Middle East Peace*. Spring 1999, p. 7.
- ¹⁷ Dumper, op cit., p. 81.
- ¹⁸ LAW Jerusalem Unit. "The Demographic Imperative." Occasional Paper Series No. 1, Jerusalem: LAW, 2000, p. 7.
- ¹⁹ *In Jerusalem*, Volume 8, No. 9, November 26, 1999.

Notes

- ²⁰ "Palestinian Population Continues to Shrink in East Jerusalem." *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*, Foundation for Middle East Peace, July-August 1997, p. 6.
- ²¹ Foundation for Middle East Peace. *Israel's Uncertain Victory in Jerusalem. A Special Report*. Spring 1999, p. 1.
- ²² Jan de Jong, "Greater Jerusalem," *A Special Report for the Foundation for Middle East Peace*, Summer 1997, p. 4SR.
- ²³ Meron Benvenisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 175.
- ²⁴ Choshen, op. cit., p. 48. Also the *PASSIA Diary* 1999, op cit., Jerusalem segment, Section 2, "Demography," p. 267, notes that "Currently, the population of these settlements stands at 50,000 – 60,000, but settlement plans already underway anticipate an increase to 250,000 within 15 years."
- ²⁵ Jerusalem Watch. "Metropolitan and Greater Jerusalem." www.jerusalemwatch.org/facts/greater-p.htm; Jan de Jong, "Israeli Greater Jerusalem: The Alienation of Palestine's Metropolitan Core." Unpublished paper, p. 6.
- ²⁶ See, for example, Dumper, op. cit, Chapter 4, "Planning and Housing Policy: Conquest by Other Means?" pp. 89-127; B'Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination*, op. cit.; LAW Jerusalem Unit. "Land & Settlement Policy in Jerusalem," Jerusalem: LAW, January 2000; Ir Shalem, *East Jerusalem: The Current Planning Situation – A Survey of Municipal Plans and Planning Policy*. Jerusalem: Ir Shalem, November 1998; Cheshin et. al, op cit. (See especially the chapter, "When Giants Sleep," pp. 29-66.)
- ²⁷ B'Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination*, op. cit., p. 58.
- ²⁸ Petition in HCJ 5601/94, Ouda Aiyda Abu Tir et al v. Prime Minister et al, par 18(h). Cited in B'Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination*, op cit., p. 67.
- ²⁹ Interview with Sarah Kaminker at her home in Jerusalem, June 22, 1999. Cheshin et. al, op cit, p. 37.
- ³⁰ Interview with Sarah Kaminker, op cit.
- ³¹ Cheshin et al. *Separate...*, op cit., p. 37.
- ³² Local Town Planning Scheme for Jerusalem – 1978: Explanatory Remarks for the Discussion by the District Planning and Building Committee (in Hebrew), Jerusalem Municipality, Municipal Planning Department, pp. 7-8. Quoted in B'Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination*, op cit., p. 50.
- ³³ Cheshin, *Municipal Policies...* op. cit., p. 18; B'Tselem. *A Policy of Discrimination*, op cit., p. 76-7
- ³⁴ Interview with Sarah Kaminker, op cit.
- ³⁵ Cheshin et al. *Separate...*, op cit, p. 31.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ B'Tselem, *Policy of Discrimination*, op cit., p. 91.]
- ³⁸ Interview with Jeff Halper, op. cit.
- ³⁹ Sarah Kaminker. "Housing and Community Development Through Land Reclamation: A Proposal for Planning and Building New Communities in East Jerusalem." Summary of a roundtable held 19 May 1994, in *Dialogue on Jerusalem: Meetings 1990-1998*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, November 1998, p. 45.
- ⁴⁰ B'Tselem, *A Policy of Land Discrimination*, op. cit, p. 79.
- ⁴¹ Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, op cit., p. 50.
- ⁴² Jerusalem Unit, LAW. *Land & Settlement Policy in Jerusalem*. Jerusalem: LAW, January 2000, p. 15.
- ⁴³ Interview with Daniel Seidemann in his office in Jerusalem, July 7, 1999.
- ⁴⁴ B'Tselem, *A Policy of Discrimination*, op cit., p. 51.

- ⁴⁵ Cheshin, *Separate...*, op. cit., p. 43.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid, pp. 64-65.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, pp. 61-2.
- ⁴⁸ Dumper, op. cit, p. 120.
- ⁴⁹ *Ma'ariv* Hebrew Daily Newspaper, October 10, 1990. Quoted in B'Tselem. *A Policy of Discrimination: Land Expropriation, Planning, and Building in East Jerusalem*. Jerusalem: B'Tselem, January 1997, p. 54.
- ⁵⁰ Interview with Ziad al-Hamouri at his office in Jerusalem, May 25, 1999, Cheshin. *Municipal...* op cit. p. 25; Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, p. 67.
- ⁵¹ Cited in "Equal Funding Policy," Jerusalem Watch: A Report on the Status of Jerusalem, Volume 1, November 1998, p. 1. Available from www.peacenow.org/news/docs/jwatchp7.htm.
- ⁵² Cheshin, *Municipal...*, op cit., p. 63.
- ⁵³ Interview with Daniel Seidemann, op cit.
- ⁵⁴ Cheshin, *Municipal...*, op cit., p. 86.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 81]
- ⁵⁶ Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, op.cit, p. 21.
- ⁵⁷ Data on municipal government in this section come from Benvenisti, *City of Stone*, op cit. p. 127.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, p. 124.
- ⁶¹ "In most east Jerusalem neighborhoods the local roads are no more than unpaved dirt paths without sidewalks or electricity..." "Development Plans for the Arab Sector," Internal Jerusalem Municipality Report, City Planning Department, July 1986. Cited in Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, p. 21.
- ⁶² "Equal Funding Policy," in *Jerusalem Watch: A Report on the Status of Jerusalem*, Volume I, November 1998, by Peace Now. Available from: www.peacenow.org/news/docs/jwatchp7.htm.
- ⁶³ Special Projects Unit, Orient House. *Jerusalem Profile*. Unpublished, undated, but circa 1997. Appendix 7.2.3/1. Note that this appendix covered the whole governorate of Jerusalem, not only the municipal area. Due to uncertainty over which roads exactly fell within the city boundaries, exact percentages and numbers are not cited.
- ⁶⁴ B'Tselem. "Jerusalem: Injustice in the Holy City." Newsprint supplement, December 1999, p. 10.
- ⁶⁵ Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, op cit., p. 21.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 126 notes that municipal officials in charge of collecting had a map with areas marked in colors codes as follows:
 Green= Regular trash pick up
 Blue = Trash pick up from time to time
 Red = No trash pick up
- ⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ⁶⁸ Dumper, op. cit, p. 147.
- ⁶⁹ Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, op. cit., p 25.
- ⁷⁰ Benvenisti, *City of Stone*, op. cit., p. 127.
- ⁷¹ Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, op cit., p. 70.

Notes

- ⁷² B'Tselem, "Injustice in the Holy City," op. cit., p. 10.
- ⁷³ From the website of the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics:
www.pcbs.org/english/jer_book/tables/enven3.htm
- ⁷⁴ Dumper, op. cit., 154.
- ⁷⁵ Cheshin et. al, *Separate...*, op. cit., p. 130).
- ⁷⁶ SPU, Orient House, *Jerusalem Profile*, op. cit., p. 86.)
- ⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 86.
- ⁷⁸ Ir Shalem, op. cit., p. 12.
- ⁷⁹ B'Tselem, "Injustice in the Holy City," op. cit., p. 5.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 10.
- ⁸¹ Interview with Ziad al-Hamouri, op. cit.
- ⁸² Ibid.
- ⁸³ B'Tselem, *Divide and Rule: Prohibition on Passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank*. Jerusalem: B'Tselem, May 1998, p. 5.
- ⁸⁴ As can be seen on the map, not all checkpoints are along the border. In particular, the checkpoint at the entrance point on the main road from Ramallah, in Dahiyat al-Barid, is a full three kilometers beyond the actual ending boundary line for the city. Palestinians interviewed believe this is an indication of where Israel believes the final boundary of the city and the country should ultimately be – just beyond the last Jewish settlement of Neve Yaakov, and eliminating the odd finger-shaped tip between a-Ram and Kufr Aqab, which is heavily populated with Arabs but was probably initially included in the city to retain access to the Atarot Airport and Industrial Zone. Likewise, the Ras al-Amoud checkpoint is slightly inside the boundary.
- ⁸⁵ For a detailed description of Israel's policies on ID cards, see Chapter 4 of this report, "Permitted Existence: Residency and Social Issues."
- ⁸⁶ B'Tselem, *Divide and Rule*, op. cit, p. 5.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ Interview with Fayeze Husseini, at his office in Ramallah, July 7, 1999.
- ⁸⁹ Interview with Kassem Abu Dayyeh at his office in Jerusalem, June 16, 1999.
- ⁹⁰ Ibid.
- ⁹¹ Human Rights Watch interview with HaMoked representative, East Jerusalem, February 9, 1996. Cited in *Israel: Israel's Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, Human Rights Watch/Middle East, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1996.
- ⁹² Interview with Fayeze Husseini, op. cit.
- ⁹³ Department of International Relations, Orient House, "Forced Eviction and Dispossession of Palestinians in Occupied Jerusalem by Current Israeli Policies." (Unpublished paper). Jerusalem: February 2000, p. 16.
- ⁹⁴ Interview with Salim Tamari in his office in Jerusalem, July 1, 1999.
- ⁹⁵ Department of International Relations, Orient House. "Forced Eviction and Dispossession of Palestinians in Occupied Jerusalem by Current Israeli Practices." Unpublished document, Jerusalem: Orient House, February 2000, p. 16.
- ⁹⁶ UN Program of Cooperation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for 1998-99, cited in PASSIA, "Israeli Municipal Policies and Services," Section 7 of the Appendix on Jerusalem in the *PASSIA 1999 Directory*. Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1999, p. 274.

⁹⁷ According to this interviewee, the fines were levied less often after the Palestine National Authority was established—the Oslo agreement stipulated that Israel should turn over all fines collected for permit violations to the PNA. Because Israel did not wish to swell the PA's coffers, it refrained from imposing fines. Interview with Kassem Abu Dayyeh, op cit.

⁹⁸ Interview with Hanna Amiri at his home in Jerusalem, May 11, 1999.

⁹⁹ Interview with Dr. Rafiq Hussein at his office in Ramallah, June 16, 1999.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Salim Tamari, op cit.

¹⁰¹ Interview with Sari Nusseibeh in his office at al-Quds University, Jerusalem, July 19, 1999.

¹⁰² Orient House International Relations Center. "Forced Eviction and Dispossession of Palestinians in Occupied Jerusalem by Current Israeli Policies." Unpublished report. Jerusalem: Orient House, February 2000, p. 16.

¹⁰³ Interview with Faye Hussein, op. cit.

¹⁰⁴ Information in this section was obtained from Dr. Rafiq Hussein, then-Secretary General of the Palestine Academy for Science and Technology as well as Coordinator of the East Jerusalem Hospitals Forum. Dr. Hussein was also the former Director General of the Palestine Council on Health, which was the precursor to the Health Ministry after the transfer of power in the West Bank in 1994. Interview, op.cit.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ B'Tselem. *Without Limits: Human Rights Violations Under Closure*. Jerusalem: B'Tselem, April 1996.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Dr. Rafiq Hussein, op. cit.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² *Jerusalem Times*, March 15, 1996. Quoted in B'Tselem *Without Limits*, Human Rights Under Closure, April 1996, p. 32.

¹¹³ Interview with Jeff Halper, op cit.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Sari Nusseibeh, op cit.

¹¹⁵ Rely Sa'ar, "East Jerusalem Schools Sub-Standard, *Ha'aretz*, August 10, 1999.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Mohammad Amin, Head of the Ramallah Chamber of Commerce, at his office in Ramallah, July 7, 1999.

¹¹⁷ *Jerusalem Profile*, op. cit, p. 53.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Azzam Abu Saud, Director of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, in his office in Jerusalem, July 12, 1999.

¹¹⁹ This economic information came from Special Projects Unit, Orient House. *Jerusalem Profile*, op. cit., pp. 46-59.

¹²⁰ Interview with Faye Hussein, op cit.

¹²¹ Among these are the fallout from the Intifada and the Gulf War, Israel's strict policy forbidding Palestinian national involvement in Jerusalem, agreement of foreign donors such as the World Bank to withhold funding from Jerusalem institutions and projects until final status is determined, and the construction in recent years of large Israeli malls in the city that have siphoned off potential customers.

¹²² Orient House. East Jerusalem: *Glory of the Past, Promise of the Future*. Undated pamphlet, p. 9.

Notes

- ¹²³ Interview with Fayez. Husseini, op. cit.
- ¹²⁴ Interview with Azzam Abu Saud, op. cit.
- ¹²⁵ Arab Economist's Association, 1996, cited in Sustainable Human Development Project, *Palestine Human Development Profile, 1996-1997*. Ramallah, Palestine: Bir Zeit University Press, 1997, p. 33.
- ¹²⁶ Interview with Azzam Abu Saud, op cit.
- ¹²⁷ *Jerusalem Profile*, op cit., p. 59.
- ¹²⁸ American Friends' Service Committee. *Jerusalem – Reclaiming a Divided City*. Chicago: AFSC, 1994.
- ¹²⁹ Interview with Fayez Husseini, op. cit.
- ¹³⁰ Interview with Abu Ayman, CEO, Sonukrut Chocolate Factories, at his office in Ramallah, July 11, 1999.
- ¹³¹ Interview with Fayez Husseini, op cit.
- ¹³² Ibid.
- ¹³³ SPU, Orient House, *Jerusalem Profile*, op cit.
- ¹³⁴ Information on these theories came from interviews with Fayez Husseini, op. cit., and Khalil Toufakji, Director of the Land Survey and Cartography office at Orient House, July 9, 1999.
- ¹³⁵ Interview with Fayez Husseini, op. cit.)
- ¹³⁶ Interview with Khalil Toufakji, op. cit.
- ¹³⁷ Interview with Abu Ayman, op. cit.
- ¹³⁸ Ibid.
- ¹³⁹ Interview with Mohammad Amin, op. cit.
- ¹⁴⁰ Interview with Abu Ayman, op. cit.
- ¹⁴¹ Interview with Mohammad Amin, op. cit.
- ¹⁴² Interview with Fayez Husseini, op. cit.
- ¹⁴³ Interview with Abu Ayman, op cit.
- ¹⁴⁴ Interview with Fayez Husseini, op. cit.
- ¹⁴⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁶ Interview with Abu Ayman, op cit.
- ¹⁴⁷ Interview with Fayez Husseini, op cit.
- ¹⁴⁸ Rwaidy, A. *The Israeli Restrictions on Arab Presence and Promotion of Jewish Presence in Jerusalem*. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Women, 1997, p. 21.
- ¹⁴⁹ Interview with Sari Nusseibeh, op. cit.
- ¹⁵⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁵¹ Interview with Salim Tamari, op cit.
- ¹⁵² Interview with Issam Nasar, Associate Editor of the *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, at his office in Jerusalem, June, 1999.
- ¹⁵³ Interview with Abu Ayman, op cit.
- ¹⁵⁴ Interview with Ibrahim Dakkak, Ambassador Hotel, Jerusalem, May 16, 1999.

¹⁵⁵ For more detailed discussions of these issues, see: B'Tselem and HaMoked *The Quiet Deportation: Revocation of Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians*, Jerusalem: B'Tselem, April 1997; Ibid., *The Quiet Deportation Continues: Revocation of Residency and Denial of Social Rights of East Jerusalem Palestinians*, Jerusalem: B'Tselem, September 1998; LAW Jerusalem Unit, "The Deportation of Protected Persons," Jerusalem: LAW, August 1999; LAW Jerusalem Unit, "The National Insurance Institute and the Violation of the Rights of Pregnant Women and their Newborn in East Jerusalem," Jerusalem: LAW, November 1999; Anita Vitullo, "Israel's Social Policies in Arab Jerusalem," *Jerusalem Quarterly File*, No. 2, Fall 1998, pp. 10-30; Usama Halabi, "Revocation of Permanent Residency Status of Palestinian Jerusalemites By Ministry of Interior and the Israeli Supreme Court: A General Background," unpublished paper obtained from advocate Usama Halabi, April, 1999; "ID Confiscation and Removal of Residency Rights," www.jerusalemwatch.org/facts/resid/htm; Center for Studies of Civil and Social Rights, "Report 1998-1999," unpublished paper obtained from Azmi Abu Saud, center Director; "Human Rights in the Holy City," *The B'Tselem Human Rights Report*, Volume 8, Spring 2000, pp. 4-5; Nathan Krystall, "Urgent Issue of Palestinian Residency in Jerusalem," second revised edition, June 1994, available from www.badil.org/ALQuds/Publications/res4htm.

¹⁵⁶ B'Tselem, *The Quiet Deportation*, op cit., p. 7.

¹⁵⁷ In 1994, for example, 109 of 136 applications were rejected. For more information on the family reunion process, see B'Tselem and LAW papers listed in note 154.

¹⁵⁸ B'Tselem, "Injustice in the Holy City, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁵⁹ "MVD Control," by Gideon Levy, *Ha'aretz*, May 7, 1999.

¹⁶⁰ Speech of Moshe Dayan before the Knesset, 4/2/94, in *Divreb Ha Knesset*, 1974, Booklet 12, pp. 696-699.

¹⁶¹ Cheshin et al., *Separate*, p. 92.

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 92.

¹⁶³ B'Tselem, *The Quiet Deportation*, p. 6.

¹⁶⁴ In her letter in response to B'Tselem's report, *The Quiet Deportation*, Interior Ministry Spokesperson Tova Ellinson stated: "Moreover, it is necessary to reiterate that these rules have been in force for many years, and they have not been changed recently. *The reason that the issue only recently arose is that since the peace agreements, persons who had left Israel many years ago have been streaming back, a phenomenon that had not existed prior to these agreements.*" [Emphasis added]. This is also intimated in a High Court decision on the same matter: "The policy of the Interior Ministry is not at all new.... That the residents of East Jerusalem include some who chose to take root elsewhere, based on one faulty assumption or another, and now, with the changing times, want to create a new life, cannot lead to the understanding that the Respondents' policy is new." [Emphasis added]. HCJ 9499/96, *Najwa Atrash v. Ministry of Interior*. Cited in *ibid*, p. 17.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 12

¹⁶⁶ B'Tselem, *The Quiet Deportation Continues*, op cit., p.

¹⁶⁷ B'Tselem, *The Quiet Deportation*, op cit., p. 19.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, testimony of Abd al-Hamid Adel Abd al-Hamid Samarah, age 19, p. 16.

¹⁶⁹ LAW reported the following numbers of ID revocations for each month after the announcement:

July, 1999:	27
August, 1999:	12
September, 1999:	17
October, 1999:	6
November, 1999:	9
December, 1999:	3

"411 IDs confiscated from Palestinian Jerusalemites in 1999." *LAW Weekly Update*, August 4, 2000, available from www.jerusalemwatch.org.

¹⁷⁰ "Human Rights in the Holy City," *The B'Tselem Human Rights Report*, Spring 2000, p. 4; Joel Greenberg, "A Gain for Arabs in East Jerusalem," *The New York Times*, Monday, October 18, 1999, p. A4.

Notes

¹⁷¹ "411 IDs confiscated from Palestinian Jerusalemites in 1999." 8/4/00, LAW weekly update on www.jerusalemwatch.org.

¹⁷² B'Tselem, *The Quiet Deportation*, p. 14.

¹⁷³ "Injustice in the Holy City," op. cit, p. 8.

¹⁷⁴ BADIL, the Center for Residency and Refugee Rights, estimates that 11,248 Palestinian residents were affected by this policy. "Update on Jerusalem ID Card Confiscation," BADIL Press Release, September 16, 1999.

¹⁷⁵ In an effort to provide some kind of safety net in these circumstances, the Center for Studies of Civil and Social Rights at Orient House provided health insurance for those who lost it when their IDs were confiscated. The replacement insurance entitled the holder to receive medical care from Arab hospitals. According to a 1999 report, the center had provided such medical assistance to more than 4,000 people. Of these, 344 suffered from chronic diseases such as heart and circulation problems, kidney failure, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, asthma, mental retardation, and others. Nine of the patients (six of whom were children) in such circumstances died. ("Problems Facing Jerusalemites and Statistical Analysis of Cases," unpublished report, Center for Studies of Human and Social Rights, Orient House, 1999 (no page numbers).

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Azmi Abu Saoud, Director, Center for Studies of Civil and Social Rights, Orient House, at his office, July 1999.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Salim Tamari, op. cit.

¹⁸⁰ For more information on these, see, "The National Insurance Institute and the Violation of the Rights of Pregnant Women and their Newborn in East Jerusalem," op cit.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² This policy was not always in effect. In fact, in the 1970s, the municipality had specifically promised residents that they would be allowed to keep their benefits if they moved out to housing projects in neighborhoods beyond the boundaries, such as in al-Izariyyeh. Despite the fact that these commitments given publicly and even, in some cases, in writing, those who moved assuming they could not lose their benefits lost them with the change in policy in 1988. Ibid, and Cheshin et. al., *Separate...*, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁸³ LAW, "The National Insurance Institute and the Violation of the Rights of Pregnant Women and their Newborn in East Jerusalem," op. cit.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Benvenisti, *City of Stone*, op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with Daoud Kuttub at his office in Jerusalem, June 23, 1999.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Sarah Kaminker, op. cit.

¹⁸⁸ Cheshin, *Municipal...* op. cit. August, 1998, p. 74.

¹⁸⁹ Jacob Dalal, Jerusalem Post, March 29, 1996, as cited in "Jerusalem –Action Alert: ID Card Confiscation from Palestinian Jerusalemites Living Outside the City Borders, www.badil.org/Art74/1996/art15i.htm.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Daniel Seidemann, advocate, in his office in Jerusalem, July 7, 1999.

¹⁹¹ JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 8, Jerusalem Survey, August 1995.

¹⁹² Special Projects Unit, Orient House. *Jerusalem Profile*, op. cit.

¹⁹³ See, for example, "Call for Arab Boycott on the Jerusalem Municipality Elections," Press release by Lobby for Human Rights in Jerusalem, 7 October 1988, available at www.badil.org/Press/press27.htm.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Daoud Kuttub, op. cit.

¹⁹⁵ Benvenisti, *City of Stone*, op. cit, p. 114.)

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 111.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 112.

¹⁹⁸ Two very knowledgeable source differ on the number of voters: Benvenisti, says that 7% of 100,00 qualified Arab voters took part (*City of Stone*, op cit., p. 112); Cheshin says that 5,000 of 85,000 qualified voters, or 5.8%, took part (*Separate...* op. cit., p. 100).

¹⁹⁹ Benvenisti, *City of Stone*, op cit., p. 112.

²⁰⁰ Seitz, C. and M. Brubacher. "Interview with Mousa Alayan," BADIL press release, September 31, 1998, obtained from www.users.palnet.com/~badil/Press/press31a.htm.

²⁰¹ "Palestinians Boycott Israeli Municipal Elections in Jerusalem." *Article 74*, (BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights quarterly newsletter), Issue No. 26, December 1998. Article obtained from BADIL's website: www.badil.org/Art74/1998/26k.htm, p. 1 of 2.

²⁰² Interview with Sari Nusseibeh, op. cit.

²⁰³ Seitz, and Brubacher, op cit.

²⁰⁴ Interview with Sari Nusseibeh, op. cit.

²⁰⁵ Interview with Ziad al-Hamouri, op. cit.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Interview with Sarah Kaminker, op cit.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Interview with Daniel Seidemann, op. cit.

²¹¹ Interview with Khalil Toufakji, op. cit.

²¹² Interview with Sari Nusseibeh, op. cit.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.




EAST AND WEST JERUSALEM BEFORE 1967


Legend

- Palestinian Built-up Area
- Israeli Colonies
- Jerusalem Municipality
Border between (1949-1967)
(Area = 5 square kilometers)
- Municipal Border since 1967
(Area = 70 square kilometers)
- Green Line



Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation
Special Technical Unit





Copy of map on page 3

