Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion on Politics

# *Political Beliefs and Preferences Of People who Trust Fatah and People who Trust Leftist Factions*



**Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre**
**September 2000**

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**Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre**
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# Preface

Since 1993, the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) has been regularly conducting public opinion polls. These surveys encompass a wide range of subjects that are of interest to the Palestinian public. It also draws the interest of non-Palestinian parties who are, directly or indirectly, engaged with the Palestine question.

Furthermore, the JMCC Polling Unit conducts commissioned surveys for researchers whose research and analysis require an examination of public opinion.

The unit has participated in joint surveys such as regional polls on an Arab level and another poll with an Israeli research center.

Throughout the course of the periodic polls, it has been realized that there is inadequate usage of the accumulating technical data. This realization has led us to expand the polling unit to include data analyses that are intended to help government officials, political activists, researchers, journalists, and any other interested people, comprehend Palestinian attitudes towards the issues that are tackled by the polls. The JMCC has previously published five analytical reports. The present study is the third of three complementary public opinion analyses conducted by the author to do with popular political trust.

Palestinian public opinions on the peace process and on the Palestinian leadership who are ingrained within this process, are two of the most important subjects that JMCC surveys have tracked since the beginning of this political process and the return of the Palestinian leadership.

The most important trend that is clearly demonstrated by the polls is the continuous and steady increase within the Palestinian public in the distrust of all leading Palestinian political figures and factions.

The analysis presented herein studies compares the political views of Palestinian people who trust Fatah most, on the one side, and Palestinian people who trust Leftist factions most, on the other side. The study examines the distribution of political views within the constituency of Fatah.

Accordingly, the polls and the analytical studies constitute a worthy contribution in empowering the trust of the people in themselves as well as reinforcing accountability within the discourse of democratization of the Palestinian society.


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Director

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# Introduction

This study performs two main tasks. First, this study compares the political views of people who trust Fatah most, on the one side, and people who trust Leftist factions most, on the other side. The second task of this study is to examine the distribution of political views within the constituency of Fatah supporters. More specifically, this study examines the views of Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters on 21 issue/policy domains, 11 of which are most directly related to Palestinian-Israeli relations and 10 of which are most directly related to internal Palestinian politics. The 11 issue/policy domains regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations are: (1) preference on the "peace process," (2) preference on "Oslo," (3) preference on "negotiating" with Israel, (4) preference on armed struggle, (5) preference on suicide operations, (6) preference on suspending negotiations and resorting to popular protest, (7) preference on final status issues; (8) belief on the prospects of reaching a peace agreement, (9) belief on Israelis' orientations toward the Palestinians and the peace process, (10) belief on the role that the United States and European Union have played and are likely to play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, and (11) preference regarding the role that the United States and European Union should play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. The 10 issue/policy domains most directly to do with internal Palestinian political issues are: (1) evaluation of the general performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA), (2) evaluation of the performance of the PA along specific criteria, (3) evaluation of Arafat, (4) evaluation of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), (5) level of trust in Fatah political figures other than Arafat, (6) level of trust in independent political figures, (7) level of trust in George Habash, (8) preference on political Islam, (9) preferences on issues to do with Hamas, and (10) evaluation of the Palestinian economy. This examination is performed by analyzing the responses of supporters of the Leftist and Fatah factions to 67 survey questions asked in three public opinion polls conducted by the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre in November 1997, May 1998, and March 1999, on a sample of the general Palestinian population of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem.

By examining the attitudes of supporters of Fatah and supporters of Leftist factions, this study complements the two preceding studies of the author to do with popular Palestinian trust in political figures and/or factions. One of these studies analyzed the factors differentiating between people who trust and people who distrust Palestinian political figures and factions. The other study analyzed the factors that influence the probability that a person trusts some Islamist faction most. As emphasized in the latter of these two previous studies, since Fatah and Islamists together enjoy the vast majority of popular trust, analysis of the factors found to differentiate between those who trust Islamists most and those who trust some other faction most, essentially reduces to an analysis of the factors that differentiate between trust in Islamists, on the one side, and trust in Fatah, on the other side. As such, the study on popular trust in Islamists can be viewed as an analysis of the differences in socioeconomic attributes and political views between the center, i.e., Fatah, and right, i.e., Islamist, bands of the Palestinian political factional spectrum. The first objective of the present study, then, complements the previous study on Islamists by identifying the differences in socioeconomic attributes and political views between the center band and left band of the Palestinian political factional spectrum.

This study is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the methodology of this study. Part II compares the demographic and socioeconomic attributes of Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters. Part III summarizes and analyzes the levels of polarization/convergence characterizing the views of the Fatah and Leftist constituencies with respect to the 21 issue/policy domains to do with Palestinian-Israeli affairs and internal Palestinian politics. Part IV summarizes and analyzes the relative level of polarization/convergence characterizing the debate over particular issue/policy domains within the Fatah constituency, and estimates a multiple regression model accounting for levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures across the general population.

Readers interested primarily in the main results of this study may wish to follow some combination of the following guidelines: (1) to read merely the summary of the main findings that is provided in the introduction; (2) to skip the methodology part, Part I, altogether; (3) to read only the bolded sections of Part I; and (4) to skip the footnotes. Parts II, III, and IV focus on the main findings of this study and should be more or less accessible in their entirety to the non-methodologically inclined reader, and thus do not rely on the strategy of bolding the key points.

The remainder of the introduction summarizes some of the study's most notable findings. Beginning with the analysis of the socioeconomic composition of the two constituencies, the data suggest that the most noteworthy socioeconomic difference between the Fatah constituency and the Leftist constituency is that the Leftist constituency has a higher level of education than does the Fatah constituency. The percent of supporters of Leftist factions with only a primary- or preparatory-level education is lower than that of supporters of Fatah, and the percent of supporters of the Leftist factions with at least some college education is higher than that of supporters of Fatah. Other than level of education, no other socioeconomic characteristic was found to consistently and dramatically differentiate between members of the two constituencies. This being said, the data suggest the possibility that the Leftist constituency, unlike the Fatah constituency, is comprised of a disproportionately large number of West Bank residents, and a disproportionately small number of Gaza residents. As concerns residence-type, furthermore, the data suggest that residents of refugee camps may be underrepresented within the Leftist factional constituency, and, similarly, that nonrefugees may be over-represented, within the Leftist constituency. On the socioeconomic composition of the two factional constituencies, lastly, the data suggest that the Leftist constituency is comprised of a higher percentage of students than is the Fatah constituency, and of a smaller percentage of housewives than is the Fatah constituency.

As concerns a comparison of the beliefs and preferences of Fatah supporters, on the one side, and PFLP/DFLP supporters, on the other side, the survey data on the 21 issue/policy domains analyzed in this study suggest that, of these 21 issue/policy domains, the views of Fatah supporters and PFLP/DFLP supporters are most polarized with respect to (a) the strategic option of conciliation regarding Israel, i.e., the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, (b) the performance of the PA, and (c) the performance of Arafat. The vast majority of Fatah trusters support the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, and view the performance of the PA and of Arafat positively. In contrast, the vast majority of PFLP/DFLP supporters oppose the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, and are critical of the performance of the PA and Arafat.

Of the 21 issue/policy domains, conversely, the two factional constituencies are least polarized in their (a) beliefs on the orientations of the Israeli leadership and people toward the Palestinians and the peace process, (b) evaluations of the state of the Palestinian economy, (c) preferences on the role that the US and EU should play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, and (d) views on the strategic option of standing firm, to be distinguished from the strategic options of conciliation and escalation, vis-à-vis Israel. In general, both constituencies are negative on the Israeli orientation toward the Palestinians and the peace process, both constituencies are critical of the state of the Palestinian economy, both constituencies generally exhibit support for greater US and EU intervention in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, and each of the constituencies is quite internally divided over the strategic option of standing firm vis-à-vis Israel.

Furthermore, this study's comparison of the views of Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters reveals the following findings. Of the three general strategic alternatives regarding Israel, i.e., escalation, standing firm/intransigence, and conciliation, the Fatah constituency is most supportive of conciliation, and is more supportive of standing firm, i.e., halting negotiations and popular protest, than of escalation, i.e., armed struggle and suicide operations. The PFLP/DFLP constituency, meanwhile, is most supportive of armed struggle, is second most supportive of standing firm and suicide operations, and is least supportive of negotiations. While these findings suggest that the preferences of the two constituencies are ordinally structured, this

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ordinal structure appears to be violated in the case of the Fatah constituency. Specifically, though the most popular strategic alternative among Fatah supporters is conciliation, the percentage of the Fatah supporters who support popular protest is higher than the percentage of the Fatah supporters who support suspending negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power.

With respect to views on strategy toward Israel, furthermore, the data suggest that the inter-constituency gap in views on negotiating with Israel and the inter-constituency gap in views on resuming armed violence, decrease within the context of a dead-end in the peace process. This decrease in the gap of the views of the two constituencies is particularly pronounced with respect to armed struggle. Whereas the majority of the Leftist constituency and the minority of the Fatah constituency support armed struggle when this strategic alternative is framed in general terms, the majority of the Fatah constituency as well as of the Leftist constituency holds either a supportive or neutral view on armed struggle within the context of a dead-end in the peace process. Thus, the survey data suggest that support within the Fatah constituency for negotiations, and opposition within the Fatah constituency to armed struggle, are to a meaningful extent dependent upon Israeli conciliation, and that Leftist support for armed struggle and opposition to conciliation are high even when these strategic alternatives are framed in general terms rather than within the context of Israeli conciliation, such that a dead-end in the peace process brings the strategic preferences of the two constituencies closer together.

As concerns the issue/policy domain of American and European Union intervention in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, both constituencies share a more positive view of the EU than of the US. More specifically, a majority of Fatah supporters as well as a majority of Leftist supporters expressed "dissatisfaction" with US intervention, and "skepticism" that the US will care for Palestinian interests. At the same time, the proportion of the Leftist constituency expressing dissatisfaction with and skepticism about the US is substantially higher than the proportion of the Fatah constituency doing so, and in fact a meaningful proportion of the Fatah constituency expresses satisfaction with and confidence in the US. On the topic of American and European intervention, furthermore, the data suggest an apparently inconsistent tendency for a substantial proportion of the Fatah constituency and in the case of one survey item of the Leftist constituency to both express dissatisfaction with and skepticism toward US and EU intervention and to support increased US and EU intervention in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. In other words, a large proportion of people critical of the US and EU support the increased intervention of the US and EU in Palestinian-Israeli affairs.

On the views of the two constituencies to do with final status issues, perhaps the most notable finding is that the percentage of Fatah supporters who view Jerusalem as the most important final status issue is higher than the percentage of PFLP supporters who view Jerusalem as the most important issue. The data also suggest that the PFLP constituency may be slightly more prone to emphasizing the refugee issue than is the Fatah constituency. Furthermore, at least for the Fatah constituency, Israeli settlement of the occupied territories is the second most important issue. On the topic of final status issues, lastly, support for the proposal of a joint Palestinian-Israeli state in all of Palestine is not associated with support for armed struggle, the strategic alternative that the Palestinians must ultimately adopt to achieve such a state, at least in the foreseeable future. In other words, contrary to what one might expect, supporters of armed struggle share with opponents of armed struggle a tendency to oppose a joint Palestinian-Israeli state.

As concerns the prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement, the percentage of Fatah supporters expressing optimism about reaching a final status agreement is substantially larger than the percentage of Leftist supporters expressing this sentiment. At the same time, however, the data suggest that the percentage of Fatah supporters expressing optimism about the prospects of concluding a final status agreement in the relatively near future is lower than the percentage of Fatah supporters expressing optimism about the prospects of peace when these

prospects are framed by survey items in more general terms. Relatedly, there is generally no statistically significant difference between the two constituencies in terms of perceptions of the orientations of the Israeli leadership and masses with respect to the Palestinians and to the peace process. The majorities of the two constituencies share the view that Israelis are either divided or opposed to the peace process. Within each of the two constituencies, furthermore, the percentage of people who believe that Israelis oppose the peace process is higher than the percentage of people who believe that Israelis support the peace process. Additionally, a vast majority of the Fatah constituency as well as of the Leftist constituency believes that Israel has not satisfied its obligations as stipulated in the Oslo accords. On the topic of perceptions of Israelis, lastly, the majorities of the samples of the two constituencies expressed the view that the ascension to power of a Labor-led government would either not substantially alter or would worsen the current Palestinian political situation. At the same time, the percentage of Fatah supporters holding the belief that the rise to power of a Labor-led government would improve the Palestinian situation is substantially larger than the percentage of the Leftist constituency subscribing to this view.

Turning to views on the performance of the PA, this study finds that, across the general Palestinian population, while people's views on the peace process indeed influence people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA, people's evaluations of the human rights record of the PA exert a larger effect on people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA than do people's views on the peace process. At the same time, the data suggest that people's views on the peace process exert a slightly larger impact on people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA than do people's views on the PA's performance with respect to democracy, and that people's views on the peace process exert a substantially larger impact on people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA than do people's views on the level of corruption in the PA. Additionally, the data suggest that the effect of evaluations of the PA's human rights record on evaluations of the general performance of the PA is about twice as large as the effect of views on the PA with respect to democracy on evaluations of the general performance of the PA, and that the effect on evaluations of the general performance of the PA of evaluations of the PA with respect to democracy, in turn, is about three times as large as is the effect of the views on the level of corruption within the PA.

As concerns Fatah supporters' and Leftist supporters' evaluations of the PA's performance with respect to the peace process, human rights, democracy, and corruption, the views of the two constituencies on the PA's handling of the peace process are most polarized, and the views of the two constituencies with respect to PA corruption are least polarized. This latter finding confirms the hypothesis that, of the four types of criticisms, the criticisms of the two factional constituencies to do with PA corruption are likely to be most convergent because Fatah supporters are likely to feel less constrained about publicly revealing, i.e., to the interviewer, their true views on PA corruption, and because the members of the two factional constituencies are likely to have both similar notions of what constitutes extensive, moderate, and little, corruption, and similar information on the actual record of the PA on corruption. Contrary to the hypothesis that supporters of Fatah, on the one side, and supporters of the opposition, on the other side, exhibit greater polarization in their respective evaluations of the PA on human rights than in their respective evaluations of the PA on democracy, however, these two constituencies' evaluations of the PA's performance with respect to democracy are more polarized than are these two constituencies' evaluations of the PA's performance with respect to human rights.

Regarding the levels of trust of the two factional constituencies in Fatah, Arafat, the PFLP, and Habash, the data reveal that Fatah supporters' views on Fatah and Arafat are more similar to one another than are Fatah supporters' views on Habash and the PFLP. Similarly, PFLP supporters' views on Habash and the PFLP are more similar to one another than are PFLP supporters' views on Arafat and Fatah. The basic implication suggested by these data is that people associate their own faction, i.e., that faction which they most support, and the leader of their own faction more closely to one another than they associate other factions with the

respective leaders of these factions. Another finding regarding faction and faction leaders is that both constituencies exhibit a tendency to harbor higher levels of trust in the leaders of factions they do not support than they do in these factions themselves. More Fatah supporters express trust in Habash than in the PFLP, and less Fatah supporters express distrust in Habash than in the PFLP. Similarly, the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who trust Arafat is larger than the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who trust Fatah, and the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who distrust Arafat is lower than the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who distrust Fatah.

As concerns the views of the two factional constituencies on issues to do with Hamas, lastly, perhaps the most basic finding is that the Leftist constituency is more critical of Hamas than is the Fatah constituency. More specifically, the Leftist constituency exhibits significantly (a) lower levels of trust in Yasin and in Hamas than does the Fatah constituency, and (b) lower levels of support for Hamas taking or sharing political power than does the Fatah constituency.

Among the most notable findings of this study's analysis of variation in political views *within* the Fatah constituency are the following. The survey data suggest that, of the 21 issue/policy domains, the Fatah constituency is most internally polarized over (a) the strategic alternative of standing firm vis-à-vis Israel, and is then most internally polarized over (b) particular final status issues, perhaps most notably linkage with Jordan, (c) the strategic option of armed struggle vis-à-vis Israel, (d) beliefs on the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace, and (e) views on issues to do with Hamas. Conversely, the survey data suggest that members of the Fatah constituency are least internally polarized in terms of their evaluations of (a) Arafat's performance, and are then least internally polarized over (b) views on the role that the US and EU *should* play, and (c) views on the peace process.

Other notable findings of this study's examination of the views of Fatah supporters include the following. Concerning the preferences of Fatah supporters regarding strategy toward Israel, the survey data suggest that the Fatah constituency is more polarized over negotiations when negotiations are framed explicitly within the context of Israeli intransigence than when negotiations are framed in general terms. The Fatah constituency is also more internally polarized on the strategic option of armed struggle when armed struggle is framed within the context of Israeli intransigence than when armed struggle is framed in general terms. Not only is the Fatah constituency more internally divided over the strategic option of armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence than within a more general context, the Fatah constituency is more internally divided over the strategic option of armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence than it is over 64 of the other 66 survey items on which the views of Fatah supporters are compared. Within the context of Israeli intransigence, moreover, the Fatah constituency is more polarized with respect to the strategic option of popular protest than with respect to armed struggle.

As concerns the preferences of Fatah supporters regarding strategy toward Israel, furthermore, the data suggest that a substantial proportion of Fatah supporters hold seemingly inconsistent preferences. Perhaps most notably, a substantial portion of Fatah supporters express support for both armed struggle and conciliation. Furthermore, some Fatah supporters are simultaneously optimistic about the "prospects of peace" and pessimistic about the "Israeli commitment to peace."

Turning to the levels of trust that Fatah supporters exhibit toward Fatah leaders other than Arafat, the data suggest that at most about half of the Fatah constituency harbors full-fledged trust toward Abu Mazen, Saeb Eraqat, and Faisal Husseini. Furthermore, only a minority of the Fatah supporters polled expressed full-fledged trust in Preventive Security Service heads Jibril Rajoub and Mohammad Dahlan. Level of trust in both Rajoub and Dahlan tended to be highest among those Fatah supporters who support Oslo, who support the peace process, and who support the continuation of negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence. Moreover, whereas level of trust in Rajoub did not appear to be associated with views on issues to do with Hamas, level of

trust in Dahlan appeared to be associated with views on these issues. More specifically, the data suggest that people with views favorable to Hamas have a higher tendency than people with views unfavorable to Hamas to distrust Dahlan, and a lower tendency than people with unfavorable views on Hamas to trust Dahlan. This suggests that many Fatah supporters may associate the PA's policy of cracking down on Hamas more with Dahlan than with Rajoub.

On the views of Fatah supporters on issues to do with Hamas, the data suggest that the proportion of Fatah supporters who trust Hamas is much smaller than the proportion of Fatah supporters in favor of Hamas's participation in the formal Palestinian political process. This finding of course implies that some Fatah supporters concomitantly are trust-neutral toward Hamas or distrust Hamas and support Hamas's integration into formal Palestinian politics. Furthermore, views on political Islam at best influence the tendency of Fatah supporters to support the participation of Hamas in formal Palestinian politics only slightly. This at-best slight impact of views on political Islam in shaping preferences regarding the formal political participation of Hamas actually confirms what may be called the conventional wisdom that Palestinian party politics are driven much more by preferences regarding strategy toward Israel and by internal political interests than by views on political Islam.

Lastly, multiple regression models accounting for level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures suggest that, given the various types of views on which the surveys collected data, the following seven associations provide a persuasive account of levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures: (1) the higher a person's support for Oslo and the peace process, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (2) the higher a person's support for continuing negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence to salvage what can be salvaged, the higher a person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (3) the more pessimistic a person on the impact that the ascension to power of a Labor-led government would have on Palestinian national interests, the lower the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (4) the more favorable a person's evaluation of the general performance of the PA, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (5) the more favorable a person's evaluation of the general performance of the PLC, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (6) the more negative a person's evaluation of the PA's execution judgments, the lower the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; and (7) the more supportive a person of the formation of a national coalition government, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures. Of the seven independent variables in the regression model, furthermore, people's evaluations of Oslo and the peace process exert the largest impact on people's levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures.

# I. Methodological Considerations

This part of the study discusses the research design employed to examine the socioeconomic attributes and political beliefs and preferences of supporters of Fatah and supporters of Leftists. Section *A* of Part I discusses the survey data analyzed in this study. Section *B* discusses the type of statistical technique most extensively relied upon in this study, bivariate cross-tabulations. Lastly, Section *C* presents measures of intra- and inter-faction polarization that enable us to gauge the extent to which supporters of Fatah and of Leftist factions are polarized or unified on particular issues. Since this part of the study is not essential for the reader interested solely in the main results of this study, the author has placed the key points of this part in bold, in order to facilitate the reader's getting a quick grasp of the basic methodological issues of this study.

## A. Survey data

**This study analyzes data collected from three different Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC) public opinion polls – one conducted in November 1997, a second conducted in May 1998, and a third conducted in March 1999.** The primary justification for analyzing three rather than one or two data sets is that doing so enhances our confidence in the consistency of our findings concerning the political beliefs and preferences of Fatah supporters and of Leftist supporters. For example, all three surveys solicit respondent opinion on the peace process and the performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Thus, analyzing data from all three surveys promotes our understanding of the stability of the views on such issues of the two factional constituencies presently under investigation. Another, converse, advantage of analyzing data collected by three public opinion polls is that each poll contains survey questions, or survey items, that solicit attitudes on a few issues that are not solicited in the other two surveys. More specifically, the November 1997 survey alone solicited respondent opinion on the state of the Palestinian economy and the performance of the PA with respect to human rights, democracy, and corruption. The May 1998 survey is unique from the other two surveys in that it solicited respondent views regarding the attitudes of Israelis toward the peace process, the level of Israel's commitment to her obligations under the Oslo accords, and the PA's handling of the peace process. Meanwhile, the March 1999 survey solicited respondent views on various issues not broached in the May 1998 and November 1997 surveys, including popular struggle, binational Palestinian-Israeli statehood, and relations between Fatah and Hamas. It should be added that the March 1999 survey data – not analyzed in the author's studies of distrust in all political figures/factions and of trust in Islamists – are analyzed here because they are recent, and thus represent relatively up-to-date Palestinian public opinion.

## B. Statistical design: Bivariate cross-tabulations

**The author relied primarily upon a statistical technique called bivariate cross-tabulations in order to compare the socioeconomic attributes and views of Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters. Cross-tabulations are simply tables that compare the number and percentage of subjects who score particular combinations of values on two or more variables, or, in this study, survey items. A *bivariate* cross-tabulation is a cross-tabulation that compares the responses of only *two* variables or, in this case, survey items.** Thus, for example, a cross-tabulation of attitudes on the peace process by factional constituency reports the number and percentage of survey respondents from each possible factional constituency – e.g., Fatah and Leftist factions – who gave each of the possible responses to the question soliciting the respondent's attitude on the peace process – e.g., strongly support, somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, and strongly oppose.

To understand the justification for relying on bivariate cross-tabulations, it is first imperative to emphasize what this study means by "Fatah supporters" and "Leftist supporters." Each of the surveys analyzed in this study asked the respondent to indicate which faction the respondent trusts most. Throughout this study, those respondents who indicated trusting Fatah most are considered Fatah supporters, and comprise a sample of the Fatah "constituency," and those respondents who indicated trusting a Leftist faction most are considered Leftist supporters, and comprise a sample of

the Leftist "constituency." More will be said on the measurement of the Leftist constituency shortly.

For now, we return to the justification of relying on bivariate cross-tabulations in this study. Simply, the primary reason for relying on bivariate cross-tabulations is that only a small number of respondents to each of the three surveys reported trusting a Leftist faction most. Table B reports the number and percentage of respondents from each of the three survey samples that reported trusting most either Fatah or one of the four main Leftist factions, i.e., PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP. As can be viewed from this table, only 48 of the 1182 (4%) respondents to the November 1997 survey reported trusting one of the four main Leftist factions most, and only 57 of the 1208 (4.7%) respondents to the May 1998 survey reported trusting some Leftist faction most. Meanwhile, only 24 of the 1199 (2.0%) respondents to the March 1999 survey reported trusting the PFLP most. Furthermore, the JMCC data entry staff coded the few respondents to the March 1999 survey who reported trusting one of the three other main Leftist factions as having responded trusting some "other faction," and thus these respondents could not be treated as cases of supporters of Leftist factions in the present study. Suffice it to say that, given the small number of Leftist faction supporters, the author thought it best to rely on bivariate cross-tabulations rather than multiple regression.[1]

Table B: Frequency distribution of responses to the survey item asking the respondent which Palestinian political or religious faction he or she trusts most

Table B1: November 1997

| Faction | Frequency | % of sample |
|---|---|---|
| Fatah | 483 | 40.9% |
| PFLP | 24 | 2.0% |
| DFLP | 11 | 0.9% |
| FIDA | 5 | 0.4% |
| PPP | 8 | 0.7% |
| Hamas | 204 | 17.3% |
| Islamic Jihad | 21 | 1.8% |
| Other Islamist factions | 35 | 3.0% |
| Other factions | 14 | 1.2% |
| Do not trust any faction | 204 | 17.3% |
| Don't know/no answer | 173 | 14.6% |
| Total | 1182 | 100.1 |

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[1] Previous analyses of popular political trust conducted by the author relied on a general type of statistical technique called multiple regression. A main advantage of multiple regression is that it estimates the independent effects of the independent variables simultaneously. In other words, multiple regression estimates the independent effect of any individual variable while controlling for the independent effects of all other variables in the model. Multiple regression, however, is less appropriate for the analysis of the factors that differentiate between those who trust Fatah most and those who trust Leftist factions most. Relying on multiple regression analyses of models with various independent variables is not appropriate because doing so would further serve to reduce the number of cases of respondents who trust a Leftist faction most that are used in the estimation of the effects of the independent variables. The reason for this is that the regression technique calculates estimates of the effects of independent variables with data from only those cases (respondents) for which data are available for *each* variable in the model. The more variables in the model, in turn, the more likely a respondent to have missing data, i.e., "no answer" or "don't know," on at least one of these variables, and thus the larger the number of respondents that would be omitted from the calculations of the regression estimates. Another, secondary, advantage of relying on bivariate cross-tabulations rather than multiple regression is that the interpretation of multiple regression is less straightforward than is the interpretation of bivariate cross-tabulations, and thus relying extensively on bivariate cross-tabulations ensures the accessibility of the data analyses presented in this report to a wider audience.

Table B2: May 1998

| Faction | Frequency | % of sample |
|---|---|---|
| Fatah | 397 | 32.9% |
| PFLP | 34 | 2.8% |
| DFLP | 5 | 0.4% |
| FIDA | 4 | 0.3% |
| PPP | 14 | 1.2% |
| Hamas | 161 | 13.3% |
| Islamic Jihad | 10 | 0.8% |
| Other Islamist factions | 47 | 3.9% |
| Other factions | 27 | 2.2% |
| Do not trust any faction | 352 | 29.1% |
| Don't know/no answer | 157 | 13.0% |
| Total | 1208 | 99.9% |

Table B3: March 1999

| Faction | Frequency | % of sample |
|---|---|---|
| Fatah | 451 | 37.6% |
| PFLP | 24 | 2.0% |
| Hamas | 176 | 14.7% |
| Islamic Jihad | 31 | 2.6% |
| Other factions | 33 | 2.8% |
| Do not trust any faction | 372 | 31.0% |
| Don't know/no answer | 112 | 9.3% |
| Total | 1199 | 100.0% |

To conduct bivariate cross-tabulations comparing Fatah supporters and Leftist faction supporters, the author was confronted with the issue of which respondents to count as supporters of Leftist factions. Ideally, it is preferable to treat supporters of each Leftist faction as an individual category. Ideally, that is, we would wish to compare the attitudes and attributes of Fatah supporters with those of supporters of each Leftist faction taken individually. Treating each Leftist faction individually would not only enable comparison of the attitudes and attributes of trusters of Fatah, on the one side, and trusters of each Leftist faction, on the other, but also would enable comparison of the attitudes and attributes of trusters of the different Leftist factions to one another. It is not appropriate to conduct statistical analyses which treat each Leftist faction individually, however, because too few respondents reported trusting at least three of the four Leftist factions. This is illustrated in Table B presented above.

Accordingly, it is necessary to combine respondents supporting different Leftist factions into one or two groups, so that the number of respondents falling into these one or two categories is large enough for us to have some minimal level of confidence in the representativeness of the attitudes of these groups. The question becomes how to combine them. The author decided to create and analyze two groups of Leftist supporters. The first group is comprised of PFLP and DFLP trusters only, and excludes PPP and FIDA supporters. The second group is comprised of respondents expressing trust in any one of the four main Leftist factions – i.e., PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, and PPP.[2] It should be noted, additionally, that since the March 1999 survey data codes trusters of Leftist factions other than the PFLP as trusting some "other faction," analyses based on the March 1999 data compare the attitudes and attributes of

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[2] Trusters of Leftist factions other than the four Leftist factions listed above – perhaps most notably the PFLP-GC – were not included in this category because they were coded as having responded "other faction" to the trust-most question, and thus could not be identified as Leftist trusters.

**trusters of Fatah with those of trusters of the PFLP.**

Lastly, it is important to discuss a key element in the interpretation of cross-tabulations: the p-value. The p-value will be emphasized this study's discussions of cross-tabulations. The importance of the p-value derives from the simple fact that *any sample* inevitably *differs* from the *population* from which it was drawn in terms of the percentages of people holding particular beliefs, values, and preferences, and exhibiting certain characteristics. To take an example that will be discussed below, 30.5% of the sample of people who trust Fatah most reported that Israelis generally oppose the peace process, and 28.2% of the sample of people who trust either the PFLP or DFLP most reported that Israelis generally oppose the peace process. It is highly likely that the actual percentage of Fatah trusters and of PFLP and DFLP trusters who hold this view is slightly higher or lower than, respectively, 30.5% and 28.2%. The primary source of such differences between sample percentages and population percentages, otherwise known as "sampling variance," is simply that no sample is *perfectly* representative of the population from which it was drawn. The statistical issue becomes to assess the likelihood that *sample* tendencies – such as, for example, the higher tendency of Fatah trusters than of PFLP and DFLP trusters to believe that Israelis are generally opposed to the peace process – actually exist in the *population* from which the sample was drawn.

The p-value is the statistic that provides this assessment. While the mathematical formulas for the calculation of p-values are beyond the scope of the present discussion, the interpretation of the p-value is both important and easy to grasp. **The p-value of any cross-tabulation indicates the likelihood that a *sample* tendency – for example, the higher tendency of the sample of Fatah trusters than of PFLP/DFLP trusters to be skeptical of Israelis' commitment to the peace process – actually exists across these two sectors of the *population*.** The p-value ranges from 0 to 1 and how to interpret the p-value may be best grasped from a few examples. To cite some hypothetical examples, a p-value of .03 means that there is a 3% likelihood that the tendency found in the sample does *not* exist in the population and that there is a 97% likelihood (1 - .03 = .97) that the tendency found in the sample *does* exist in the population; a p-value of .16 means that there is a 16% chance that the tendency found in the sample does *not* exist in the population and that there is an 84% chance (1 - .16 = .84) that the tendency found in the sample *does* exist in the population; a p-value of .65 means that there is a 65% chance that the tendency found in the sample does *not* exist in the population and that there is a 35% (1 - .65 = .35) chance that the tendency found in the sample *does* exist in the population; and so forth. Social scientific convention is to consider an association as *statistically significant* – that is, as highly likely to exist in the population – if the association exhibits a p-value of .05 or less. In other words, an association is generally held to be statistically significant if the p-value reveals that this association has only a 5% chance of having resulted from sampling variance, and, conversely, a likelihood of 95% or higher of actually existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

*C. Measuring Levels of polarization/agreement on particular policy issues*

**Two basic aims of this study are (1) to investigate the extent of polarization/agreement characterizing the beliefs and preferences of supporters of Fatah, on the one side, and supporters of Leftists, on the other side (*inter*-constituency polarization/agreement), and (2) to investigate the extent of polarization/agreement characterizing the distribution of beliefs and preferences within the population of Fatah supporters (*intra*-constituency polarization/agreement).** Toward these ends, it is useful to develop objective standards by which to assess the relative levels of inter-factional and intra-factional polarization characterizing views on two or more issues. Developing such objective criteria is particularly warranted in light of the large amount of data this study concerns itself with. Accordingly, **the author developed measures that help us tap levels of inter-factional and intra-factional polarization/agreement.** These measures are discussed below.

The three surveys analyzed in this study generally ask respondents to indicate how much they support or oppose a particular policy or how much they agree or disagree with a particular statement about a policy, on a four- or five-point rank-order, or ordinal, scale. That is, many of the survey questions, alternatively known as survey items, present the respondent with a particular policy and ask the respondent to indicate his or her level of support or opposition on a four-point scale – i.e., strongly

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support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose – or on a five-point scale – i.e., strongly support, somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose. Other survey items ask the respondent to indicate his or her level of agreement or disagreement with a particular policy statement on a four-point scale – i.e., strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree – or on a five-point scale – i.e., strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree. Yet other survey items solicit respondent attitudes that, though not involving level of "support/opposition" or "agreement/disagreement," nonetheless conform to a rank-order, or ordinal, four- or five-point logic. For example, the November 1997 survey asks the respondent how confident he or she is about the prospects of reaching a Palestinian-Israeli final status agreement and provides the following four response-options: not confident at all, slightly confident, somewhat confident, very confident. To cite another example, the November 1997 survey asks respondents to respond to the following question: In what manner did the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel affect the Palestinian economy: very positively, somewhat positively, did not affect the economy, somewhat negatively, very negatively.

To tap the level of polarization/agreement of those who support Fatah and Leftist factions, then, it is necessary to measure the levels of each factional constituency that support/oppose, agree/disagree, are confident/not confident, etc., with respect to the particular issues. Simply, the higher the level of support among Fatah supporters for a particular policy, and the higher the level of opposition toward this policy among supporters of Leftist factions, the more polarized the two factional constituencies on this issue. Similarly, the higher the level of opposition to a particular policy among Fatah supporters, and the higher the level of support for this policy among supporters of Leftist factions, the more polarized the two factional constituencies on this issue. Conversely, the more similar the levels of support for and opposition to a particular policy among Fatah trusters and Leftist trusters, the less polarized these two factional constituencies along the policy. The same basic principle applies to the analysis of polarization/agreement within the group of people who trust Fatah most. Simply put, we are interested in tapping the extent to which the beliefs and preferences of Fatah supporters are unified or divided.

Perhaps the simplest way to measure level of polarization is to sum the percent of respondents who either "strongly" or "somewhat" support a particular policy, and to sum the percent of respondents who either "strongly" or "somewhat" oppose a policy. Thus, for example, in assessing the level of polarization between the Fatah constituency and the Leftist constituency with respect to the "peace process," we can add the percent of Fatah trusters who strongly support (strongly oppose) the peace process with the percent of Fatah trusters who somewhat support (somewhat oppose) the peace process, and we can add the percent of Leftist supporters who strongly support (strongly oppose) the peace process with the percent of Leftist supporters who somewhat support (somewhat oppose) the peace process. In other words, we can simply collapse the "somewhat" and "strongly" categories and examine percentages of people from each constituency who support/oppose, agree/disagree, etc.

This approach to the measurement of the level of polarization/convergence of beliefs and preferences, however, is inadequate. The reason for this is that it does not take into account the fact that, all other things equal, any one or more groups is more polarized around any given issue/policy domain the more *strongly* the members of the one or more groups subscribe to their opinions regarding this issue/policy domain. Simply put, **a measure that takes into account the extent to which people's support/opposition, agreement/disagreement, etc., is moderate, i.e., somewhat, and strong, gauges level of polarization among the groups more accurately than does a measure which does not attend to the *strength* of the respondents' policy positions.** Consider, by way of illustration, the *hypothetical* distributions of opinion depicted in Tables C1-4. In all four tables, 80% of Fatah trusters either moderately, i.e., "somewhat," or strongly support the peace process, and 80% of trusters of Leftist factions either moderately, i.e., "somewhat," or strongly oppose the peace process.

Table C: Hypothetical distributions of opinion on the peace process

Table C1: Distribution with high level of moderate, i.e., "somewhat," positions among both factional constituencies

| View | Fatah supporters | Leftist supporters |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 20% | 5% |
| somewhat support | 60% | 15% |
| somewhat oppose | 15% | 60% |
| strongly oppose | 5% | 20% |
| Total percent | 100% | 100% |

Table C2: Distribution with high level of strong positions among both factional constituencies

| View | Fatah supporters | Leftist supporters |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 60% | 5% |
| somewhat support | 20% | 15% |
| somewhat oppose | 15% | 20% |
| strongly oppose | 5% | 60% |
| Total percent | 100% | 100% |

Table C3: Distribution with high level of strong positions among Fatah supporters and high level of moderate, i.e., "somewhat," positions among Leftist factions

| View | Fatah supporters | Leftist supporters |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 60% | 5% |
| somewhat support | 20% | 15% |
| somewhat oppose | 15% | 60% |
| strongly oppose | 5% | 20% |
| Total percent | 100% | 100% |

Table C4: Distribution with high level of moderate, i.e., "moderate," positions among Fatah supporters and high level of strong positions among Leftist factions

| View | Fatah supporters | Leftist supporters |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 20% | 5% |
| somewhat support | 60% | 15% |
| somewhat oppose | 15% | 20% |
| strongly oppose | 5% | 60% |
| Total percent | 100% | 100% |

Though each of these tables provides the same measure of polarization when the two support categories are summed and the two oppose categories are summed, it is evident that each of these four scenarios actually represents a distinct type and level of polarization. In Table C1, most of the respondents who trust Fatah and most of the respondents who trust some Leftist faction hold a *moderate*, i.e., "somewhat," rather than strong, position on the peace process. In Table C2, conversely, most of the respondents hold a *strong*, rather than moderate, position on the peace process. Thus, the figures presented in Table C2 represent a higher level of inter-factional polarization than do the figures presented in Table C1. In Table C3 and Table C4, lastly, most members of *only one of the two*

*factional constituencies feels* strongly about their position on the peace process. This set of tables thus demonstrates the basic point that a measure of polarization benefits from taking into account that, **all other things equal, the larger the proportion of a group of people that feel strongly about their position, the higher the level of polarization, and the larger the proportion of a group of people that feel moderately about their position, the lower the level of polarization.**

Accordingly, the author developed measures of level of inter-constituency and intra-constituency levels of polarization that take into account the strength of respondents' positions. As a measure of the level of polarization of opinion between supporters of Fatah, on the one side, and supporters of Leftist factions, on the other side, with respect to any particular survey item, say item $X$, the author calculated the weighted average of (1) the difference between the percentage of the two factional constituencies that responded support/agree to item $X$, and (2) the difference between the percentage of the two factional constituencies that responded oppose/disagree to item $X$. The general formula for this equation is presented below:

$[|$ [%Strong support$_{Fatah}$ + W$_{weight}$(%Somewhat support$_{Fatah}$] - [%Strong support$_{left}$ + W$_{weight}$(%somewhat support$_{left}$)$|$ + $|$[%Strong oppose$_{Fatah}$ + W$_{weight}$(%Somewhat oppose$_{Fatah}$] - [%Strong oppose$_{left}$ + W$_{weight}$(%somewhat oppose$_{left}$] / 2

The weight (W) serves the function of de-emphasizing the impact of respondents who hold a moderate position on the polarization score relative to the impact on the polarization score of respondents who hold a strong position. The numeric value of the weight is ultimately arbitrary. That is, there is no clear-cut reason for valuing the impact on level of polarization of the positions of respondents who hold "strong" positions as 25% larger, as 50% larger, as 75% larger, etc., than respondents who hold moderate positions. The author decided to allot the weight a value of .67. That is, the author assumes that a respondent who holds a position moderately influences the level of polarization two-thirds (2/3) as much as a respondent who holds the same position strongly. The formula relied upon to measure the level of polarization on any given issue between Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters, then, takes the following form:

$[|$ [%Strong support$_{Fatah}$ + .67(%Somewhat support$_{Fatah}$] - [%Strong support$_{left}$ + .67(%somewhat support$_{left}$)$|$ + $|$[%Strong oppose$_{Fatah}$ + .67(%Somewhat oppose$_{Fatah}$] - [%Strong oppose$_{left}$ + .67(%somewhat oppose$_{left}$] / 2

Thus, this equation simply takes the weighted average of the following two terms: (1) the difference between the percent of the Fatah constituency that responded support to item $X$, and the percent of the Leftist constituency that responded support to item $X$, and (2) the difference between the percent of the Fatah constituency that responded oppose to item $X$ and the percent of the Leftist constituency that responded oppose to item $X$. It should be apparent that the larger the difference in the percentage of each factional constituency that expresses support in response to item $X$, and the larger the difference in the percentage of each factional constituency that expresses opposition in response to item $X$, the larger the inter-factional constituency polarization score of item $X$. The larger the inter-factional constituency polarization score associated with any survey item, then, the greater the extent to which the responses of the samples of the two constituencies are polarized. Conversely, the smaller the polarization score of a survey item, the less the difference in the percentages of Fatah supporters and of Leftist supporters who respond support/oppose to this survey item, and, therefore, the less polarized the two constituencies along the survey item. It is important to add that the measure of inter-factional constituency polarization is used primarily to tap the *relative*, rather than absolute, levels of polarization/convergence of the beliefs and preferences of the two constituencies with respect to various issue/policy domains.

The same basic logic was applied to develop a measure of *intra*-Fatah constituency polarization with respect to political beliefs and preferences. By intra-factional constituency polarization, we mean the presence of two parts of the constituency each of which (a) holds a preference on an issue that contradicts the preference of the other part; and (b) represents a substantial proportion of the size of the entire constituency. Thus, for example, given a four-point ordinal-level survey item tapping attitudes on the peace process – i.e., strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose – extreme polarization is characterized by 50.0% of the sample of Fatah supporters responding strongly support, and the other 50.0% of Fatah supporters responding strongly oppose.

The author calculated the following measure of intra-factional constituency polarization:

$$| [\text{Support}_{\text{strongly}} + (W_{\text{weight}})\text{Support}_{\text{somewhat}}] - [\text{Oppose}_{\text{strongly}} + (W_{\text{weight}})\text{Oppose}_{\text{somewhat}}]|$$

This equation measures the difference between (1) the weighted sum of the percentages of Fatah trusters who express strong and somewhat support in response to item $X$, and (2) the weighted sum of the percentages of Fatah trusters who express strong and somewhat oppose in response to item $X$. Again, the actual weight used in the calculation of this general equation – that is, the relative impact of a strong and of a moderate position on the intra-constituency polarization score – is arbitrary. The author decided to count moderate support/opposition as 2/3 (.67) as influential on the level of polarization as strong support/opposition. This results in the following equation:

$$| [\text{Support}_{\text{strongly}} + (.67)\text{Support}_{\text{somewhat}}] - [\text{Oppose}_{\text{strongly}} + (.67)\text{Oppose}_{\text{somewhat}}]|$$

As with the inter-constituency polarization measure, the intra-constituency measure will be used primarily to gauge the *relative* level of polarization accompanying particular types of beliefs and preferences.

**A crucial difference between the interpretation of the *inter*-constituency polarization scores and the interpretation of the *intra*-constituency polarization scores should be noted. In the case of the *inter*-constituency polarization measure, the larger the score, the larger the difference in the distributions of opinion across the two factions. In the case of the *intra*-constituency polarization measure, the larger the score, the larger the proportion of the constituency that holds some single view on a particular issue.** That is, the larger the score, the larger the size of the part of the constituency that holds the majority view, i.e., support policy $X$, oppose policy $X$, etc., and the smaller the size of the part of the constituency subscribing to the minority position. Thus, the larger the intra-constituency polarization score, the more unified the constituency, and the smaller the intra-constituency polarization score, the more divided the constituency.

Additionally, some survey items soliciting respondent views on issue/policy domains allowed the respondent only two or three response-options. For example, various close-ended survey questions to do with trust in particular figures and factions allowed the respondent to respond "trust," "in between," or "do not trust." To cite but one other example, two of the three surveys analyzed here ask the respondent to indicate whether he or she prefers the *Shari'a* or secular law as the basis of the legal system of a Palestinian state. Data from such survey questions are not applicable to the above formulas for measuring polarization, since they do not have "strong" and "moderate" categories. Because it is desirable to compare the relative level of inter- and intra-party polarization revolving around issues referenced in these questions, it is appropriate to transform the responses to the two- and three-response option questions so that they are compatible with the above equations. Toward this end, the author calculated the average percent, across the entire set of 4- and 5-point rank-order questions reported in this study, of (1) the sample of Fatah supporters who reported a strong position and who reported a moderate, i.e., "somewhat," position, and (1) the sample of PFLP/DFLP supporters who reported a strong and who reported a moderate position. For survey data that only provided the respondent two or three response-options, these averages were used to divide the "support/agree" responses into "support/agree strongly" and "support/agree somewhat" categories, and to divide the "oppose/disagree" responses into "oppose/disagree strongly" and "oppose/disagree somewhat" categories. The average distributions of the responses of respondents who reported trusting either Fatah or the PFLP/DFLP most are indicated in Table C5.

Table C5: Average percent of strong and moderate positions expressed in response to survey items measured on a 4- or 5-point ordinal scale

| Constituency | Either support/agree or oppose/disagree strongly | Either support/agree or oppose/disagree somewhat |
|---|---|---|
| Fatah trusters | 29.8% | 70.3% |
| PFLP/DFLP trusters | 40.7% | 59.3% |

This method of making responses to the two- and three-point survey items compatible with the polarization measures is certainly rough, as the actual percentage of people responding say, "support"

to a question allowing only a "support" or "oppose" response who in actuality support strongly and who in actuality support somewhat are likely to diverge from the average percent of respondents giving each of these two responses to the set of four- and five-point survey items. A more concrete example may clarify the point. As indicated above, on average, 29.8% of Fatah supporters report a strong position, and 70.3% of Fatah supporters report a moderate/somewhat position. In Table B1c in Part II, furthermore, we see that 384 (86.3%) of Fatah supporters expressed "support" to a March 1999 survey question soliciting respondent views on the peace process that allowed the respondent to respond only "support" or "oppose." The point at present, then, is simply that it is quite likely that the percentage of those 384 Fatah supporters who expressed "support" for the peace process who in actuality strongly support the peace process is different from 29.8%, and that the percentage of those same 384 Fatah supporters who in actuality support the peace process somewhat is different from 70.3%. Despite the crudeness of this transformation of the data obtained from two- and three-point questions, the transformation nonetheless enhances our ability to compare the level of factional polarization characterizing policy-debates for which only two- or three-point data were collected, on the one side, and policy-debates for which four- or five-point data were collected.

Lastly, two comments on the interpretation of the polarization measures of survey items measured on ordinal scales with different numbers of points, i.e., response-options, deserve mention. First, all things equal, scores on the polarization measures should on average be higher for opinions measured on a four-point scale than for opinions measured on a five-point scale. In other words, all other things equal, opinions on a four-point scale have a tendency to exhibit relatively higher levels of polarization and lower levels of convergence – than do opinions on a five-point scale. The reason for this is that the five-point scale includes a "neither support nor oppose/neither agree nor disagree" midpoint response-option. The presence of this midpoint response option tends to reduce the percentage of people who respond either support/agree or oppose/disagree, and thus enables lower polarization scores than might have otherwise been achieved if opinions were solicited on a four-point scale. Second, all other things equal, opinions solicited on a four-point scale have a tendency to exhibit relatively lower levels of polarization and higher levels of convergence – than do opinions solicited on a three-point scale with a midpoint. This is so in the event that the majority of a sample responding to a survey item defined along a three-point ordinal scale with a midpoint provide the midpoint response, because the polarization measure is based solely on the difference of the percent providing the support and the oppose responses. For example, imagine a case in which 80% of a sample expresses feeling "in-between" about a political figure, 10% of the sample expresses "trust" in this figure, and 10% of the sample expresses "distrust" in this figure. Since the polarization measures do not take into account this midpoint, and instead compare the levels of those who trust and distrust, the polarization score for this item would indicate a high level of polarization, even though the actual level of polarization is low.

These biases, however, do not represent grave deficiencies in the polarization measures. First, most of the data on public opinion discussed in this study were collected with a four-point rather than five-point scale or three-point scale. Second, high levels of polarization are certainly possible with opinions defined on a five-point scale, and low levels of polarization are as well possible with opinions defined on a three-point scale. Third, it is simply incumbent upon us to be cautious in our interpretation of the polarization scores and to constantly return to the raw data in assessing levels of polarization. Lastly, despite the deficiencies in the two polarization measures, they nonetheless remain an objective standard by which to assess the relative level of polarization characterizing a very large amount of opinion data.

## II. Comparing the Socioeconomic Attributes and Presenting the Political Beliefs and Preferences of Fatah Supporters and Leftist Supporters

This part of the study compares the socioeconomic attributes of Fatah trusters, on the one side, and Leftist trusters, on the other side. Estimates of the socioeconomic composition of the Fatah and Leftist constituencies are derived from a series of bivariate cross-tabulations of factional constituency by socioeconomic attribute. Tables A1 and A2 summarize these bivariate cross-tabulations. The p-value in each cell refers to the cross-tabulation of that cell.[3]

Table A1: Summary of cross-tabulations of socioeconomic attributes by factional constituency, i.e., the Fatah constituency and the PFLP/DFLP constituency

| Survey data<br><br>Socioeconomic attribute | 11/97 survey | 5/98 survey | 3/99 survey |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age | p = .93<br>Fatah:<br>18-22 yrs.: 20.6%<br>23-29 yrs.: 29.2%<br>30-39 yrs.: 25.8%<br>40-49 yrs.: 12.9%<br>50-59 yrs.: 6.5%<br>60+ yrs.: 5.0%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>18-22 yrs.: 25.7%<br>23-29 yrs.: 28.6%<br>30-39 yrs.: 28.6%<br>40-49 yrs.: 8.6%<br>50-59 yrs.: 5.7%<br>60+ yrs.: 2.9% | p = .43<br>Fatah:<br>18-22 yrs.: 21.8%<br>23-29 yrs.: 26.1%<br>30-39 yrs.: 25.8%<br>40-49 yrs.: 12.6%<br>50-59 yrs.: 8.2%<br>60+ yrs.: 5.5%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>18-22 yrs.: 23.7%<br>23-29 yrs.: 34.2%<br>30-39 yrs.: 23.7%<br>40-49 yrs.: 15.8%<br>50-59 yrs.: 0.0%<br>60+ yrs.: 2.6% | p = .34<br>Fatah:<br>18-23 yrs.: 24.2%<br>24-29 yrs.: 21.3%<br>30-39 yrs.: 24.9%<br>40-49 yrs.: 16.4%<br>50-59 yrs.: 7.6%<br>60+ yrs.: 5.6%<br>PFLP:<br>18-22 yrs.: 16.7%<br>23-29 yrs.: 37.5%<br>30-39 yrs.: 29.2%<br>40-49 yrs.: 8.3%<br>50-59 yrs.: 8.3%<br>60+ yrs.: 0.0% |
| Gender | p = .55<br>Fatah:<br>male: 46.2%; female: 53.8%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>male: 51.4%; female: 48.6% | p = .04<br>Fatah:<br>male: 46.9%; female: 53.1%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>male: 64.1%; female: 35.9% | p = .52<br>Fatah:<br>male: 52.5%; female: 47.5%<br>PFLP:<br>male: 45.8%; female: 54.2% |

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[3] Social scientific convention, as mentioned in Part IB, is to consider a variable to be statistically significant if it achieves a p-value of 0.05 or less. Thus, social scientific convention would generally treat Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters as exhibiting statistically significant differences along any particular socioeconomic attribute if the cross-tabulation of factional constituency by that socioeconomic attribute achieves a p-value of 0.05 or less. Such a p-value would mean that the difference in the scores of Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters along that socioeconomic attribute found in the *sample* has at most a 5% chance of *not* existing among the *populations* of the two constituencies, and, conversely, at least a 95% chance of actually existing among the *populations* of the two constituencies.

| Occupation | p = .38<br>Fatah:<br>worker: 12.3%;<br>employee: 16.1%;<br>housewife: 41.3%;<br>student: 12.9%;<br>farmer: 2.5%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>worker: 11.4%;<br>employee: 14.3;<br>housewife: 31.4%;<br>student: 25.7%;<br>farmer: 0.0% | p < .01<br>Fatah:<br>worker: 13.9%;<br>employee: 16.5%;<br>housewife: 40.2%;<br>student: 15.5%;<br>farmer: 2.1%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>worker: 12.8%;<br>employee: 17.9%;<br>housewife: 17.9%;<br>student: 23.1%;<br>farmer: 0.0% | p = .29<br>Fatah:<br>worker: 17.8%;<br>employee: 17.0%;<br>housewife: 42.7%;<br>student: 16.2%;<br>unemployed: 6.2%<br>PFLP:<br>worker: 19.0%;<br>employee: 33.3%;<br>housewife: 38.1%;<br>student: 9.5%;<br>unemployed: 0.0% |
|---|---|---|---|
| Family income | p = .55<br>Fatah:<br>much above avg: 2.3%<br>little above avg: 5.7%<br>about avg: 21.2%<br>little below avg: 26.9%<br>much below avg: 43.9%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>much above avg: 5.9%<br>little above avg: 5.9%<br>about avg: 26.5%<br>little below avg: 17.6%<br>much below avg: 44.1% | p = .48<br>Fatah:<br>much above avg: 1.8%<br>little above avg: 6.6%<br>about avg: 20.3%<br>little below avg: 27.3%<br>much below avg: 44.1%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>much above avg: 5.6%<br>little above avg: 11.1%<br>about avg: 19.4%<br>little below avg: 25.0%<br>much below avg: 38.9% | p = .04<br>Fatah:<br>much above avg: 2.0%<br>little above avg: 7.4%<br>about avg: 26.2%<br>little below avg: 34.8%<br>much below avg: 29.6%<br>PFLP:<br>much above avg: 4.2%<br>little above avg: 25.0%<br>about avg: 16.7%<br>little below avg: 29.2%<br>much below avg: 25.0% |
| Level of education | p = .06<br>Fatah:<br>primary: 17.2%<br>preparatory: 21.2%<br>secondary: 33.0%<br>some college: 20.2%<br>college+: 8.4%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>primary: 5.9%<br>preparatory: 11.8%<br>secondary: 32.4%<br>some college: 38.2%<br>college+: 11.8% | p < .01<br>Fatah:<br>primary: 15.9%<br>preparatory: 19.3%<br>secondary: 36.2%<br>some college: 23.7%<br>college+: 4.9%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>primary: 2.6%<br>preparatory: 17.9%<br>secondary: 23.1%<br>some college: 48.7%<br>college+: 7.7% | p < .01<br>Fatah:<br>primary: 11.0%<br>preparatory: 26.2%<br>secondary: 31.8%<br>some college: 22.6%<br>college+: 8.3%<br>PFLP:<br>primary: 0.0%<br>preparatory: 8.3%<br>secondary: 37.5%<br>some college: 25.0%<br>college+: 29.2% |
| Region of residence | p = .74<br>Fatah:<br>West Bank: 54.7%<br>Gaza: 40.8%<br>E. Jerusalem: 4.6%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>West Bank: 60.0%<br>Gaza: 34.3%<br>E. Jerusalem: 5.7% | p = .10<br>Fatah:<br>West Bank: 55.4%<br>Gaza: 40.1%<br>E. Jerusalem: 4.5%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>West Bank: 69.2%<br>Gaza: 23.1%<br>E. Jerusalem: 7.7% | p = .01<br>Fatah:<br>West Bank: 54.3%<br>Gaza: 41.0%<br>E. Jerusalem: 4.7%<br>PFLP:<br>West Bank: 62.5%<br>Gaza: 20.8%<br>E. Jerusalem: 16.7% |

| Residence-type | p = .24<br>Fatah:<br>city: 42.7%; camp: 24.8%; village: 32.5%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>city: 57.1%; camp: 20.0%; village: 22.9% | p = .27<br>Fatah:<br>city: 35.8%; camp: 23.2%; village: 41.1%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>city: 35.9%; camp: 12.8%; village: 51.3% | p = .60<br>Fatah:<br>city: 44.0%; camp: 16.7%; village: 39.3%<br>PFLP:<br>city: 50.0%; camp: 20.8%; village: 29.2% |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resident/refugee status | p = .37<br>Fatah:<br>refugee: 49.3%<br>nonrefugee: 50.7%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>refugee: 57.1%<br>nonrefugee: 42.9% | p = .31<br>Fatah:<br>refugee: 41.7%<br>nonrefugee: 58.3%<br>PFLP/DFLP:<br>refugee: 33.3%<br>nonrefugee: 66.7% | p = .07<br>Fatah:<br>refugee: 45.3%<br>nonrefugee: 54.7%<br>PFLP:<br>refugee: 26.1%<br>nonrefugee: 73.9% |

Table A2: Summary of cross-tabulations of socioeconomic attributes by factional constituency, i.e., the Fatah constituency and the Leftist constituency, i.e., PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA, combined

| Survey data<br><br>Socioeconomic attribute | 11/97 survey | 5/98 survey |
|---|---|---|
| Age | p = .94<br>Fatah:<br>18-22 yrs.: 20.6%<br>23-29 yrs.: 29.2%<br>30-39 yrs.: 25.8%<br>40-49 yrs.: 12.9%<br>50-59 yrs.: 6.5%<br>60+ yrs.: 5.0%<br>Left:<br>18-22 yrs.: 20.8%<br>23-29 yrs.: 25.0%<br>30-39 yrs.: 31.3%<br>40-49 yrs.: 14.6%<br>50-59 yrs.: 4.2%<br>60+ yrs.: 4.2% | p = .64<br>Fatah:<br>18-22 yrs.: 21.8%<br>23-29 yrs.: 26.1%<br>30-39 yrs.: 25.8%<br>40-49 yrs.: 12.6%<br>50-59 yrs.: 8.2%<br>60+ yrs.: 5.5%<br>Left:<br>18-22 yrs.: 25.5%<br>23-29 yrs.: 29.1%<br>30-39 yrs.: 23.6%<br>40-49 yrs.: 12.7%<br>50-59 yrs.: 1.8%<br>60+ yrs.: 7.3% |
| Gender | p = .06<br>Fatah:<br>male: 46.2%;<br>female: 53.8%<br>Left:<br>male: 60.4%;<br>female: 39.6% | p = .07<br>Fatah:<br>male: 46.9%;<br>female: 53.1%<br>Left:<br>male: 59.6%;<br>female: 40.4% |

| Occupation | p = .08<br>Fatah:<br>worker: 12.3%;<br>employee: 16.1%;<br>housewife: 41.3%;<br>student: 12.9%;<br>farmer: 2.5%<br>Left:<br>worker: 8.3%;<br>employee: 16.7%;<br>housewife: 25.0%;<br>student: 20.8%;<br>farmer: 2.1% | p < .01<br>Fatah:<br>worker: 13.9%;<br>employee: 16.5%;<br>housewife: 40.2%;<br>student: 15.5%;<br>farmer: 2.1%<br>Left:<br>worker: 15.8%;<br>employee: 21.1%;<br>housewife: 12.3%;<br>student: 19.3%;<br>farmer: 3.5% |
|---|---|---|
| Family income | p = .52<br>Fatah:<br>much above avg: 2.3%<br>little above avg: 5.7%<br>about avg: 21.2%<br>little below avg: 26.9%<br>much below avg:<br>43.9%<br>Left:<br>much above avg: 4.3%<br>little above avg: 8.5%<br>about avg: 25.5%<br>little below avg: 17.0%<br>much below avg:<br>44.7% | p = .80<br>Fatah:<br>much above avg: 1.8%<br>little above avg: 6.6%<br>about avg: 20.3%<br>little below avg: 27.3%<br>much below avg:<br>44.1%<br>Left:<br>much above avg: 3.7%<br>little above avg: 7.4%<br>about avg: 22.2%<br>little below avg: 29.6%<br>much below avg:<br>37.0% |
| Level of education | p < .01<br>Fatah:<br>primary: 17.2%<br>preparatory: 21.2%<br>secondary: 33.0%<br>some college: 20.2%<br>college+: 8.4%<br>Left:<br>primary: 4.3%<br>preparatory: 10.6%<br>secondary: 36.2%<br>some college: 38.3%<br>college+: 10.6% | p < .01<br>Fatah:<br>primary: 15.9%<br>preparatory: 19.3%<br>secondary: 36.2%<br>some college: 23.7%<br>college+: 4.9%<br>Left:<br>primary: 5.3%<br>preparatory: 19.3%<br>secondary: 28.1%<br>some college: 40.4%<br>college+: 7.0% |
| Region of residence | p = .18<br>Fatah:<br>West Bank: 54.7%<br>Gaza: 40.8%<br>E. Jerusalem: 4.6%<br>Left:<br>West Bank: 66.7%<br>Gaza: 27.1%<br>E. Jerusalem: 6.3% | p < .01<br>Fatah:<br>West Bank: 55.4%<br>Gaza: 40.1%<br>E. Jerusalem: 4.5%<br>Left:<br>West Bank: 75.4%<br>Gaza: 17.5%<br>E. Jerusalem: 7.0% |

| Residence-type | p = .14 <br> Fatah: <br> city: 42.7%; camp: <br> 24.8%; village: 32.5% <br> Left: <br> city: 56.3%; camp: <br> 14.6%; village: 29.2% | p = .04 <br> Fatah: <br> city: 35.8%; camp: <br> 23.2; village: 41.1% <br> Left: <br> city: 38.6%; camp: 8.8; <br> village: 52.6% |
|---|---|---|
| Resident/refugee status | p = .92 <br> Fatah: <br> refugee: 49.3% <br> nonrefugee: 50.7% <br> Left: <br> refugee: 50.0% <br> nonrefugee: 50.0% | p = .34 <br> Fatah: <br> refugee: 41.7% <br> nonrefugee: 58.3% <br> Left: <br> refugee: 35.1% <br> nonrefugee: 64.9% |

The most noteworthy socioeconomic difference between the Fatah and Leftist constituencies is that the Leftist constituencies – both the supporters of the PFLP and DFLP taken alone and the supporters of all four Leftist factions combined – have a higher level of education than does the Fatah constituency. All of the five cross-tabulations of level of education by factional constituency achieve or closely approximate statistical significance at the 95% confidence-level. The percent of supporters of Leftist factions with only a primary- or preparatory-level education is lower than that of supporters of Fatah, and the percent of supporters of the Leftist factions with at least some college education is higher than that of supporters of Fatah.

No socioeconomic attribute other than level of education consistently differentiates between members of the two constituencies. Nonetheless, the two tables reveal that Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters generally differ in their distribution across regions of residence. Perhaps the most notable finding in this regard is that, unlike the Fatah constituency, the Leftist constituency is comprised of a disproportionately large number of West Bank residents, and a disproportionately small number of Gaza residents. The most consistent finding concerning residence-type, furthermore, appears to be that residents of refugee camps are underrepresented within the Leftist factional constituency. Similarly, the survey data, while very inconsistent, hint that nonrefugees may be over-represented, and refugees underrepresented, within the Leftist constituency.

The two constituencies also appear to differ in terms of occupational status. The most notable difference in this regard is that the Leftist constituency includes a smaller percentage of housewives than does the Fatah constituency. Additionally, the Leftist constituency may be comprised of a higher percentage of students than is the Fatah constituency, though in one of the five cross-tabulations, i.e., Table A1, 3/99, the opposite was found to be the case.

The last socioeconomic attribute along which the two constituencies may vary is gender, with the Leftist constituency being disproportionately comprised of men. Lastly, the two constituencies do not appear to exhibit any meaningful differences in terms of age and level of family income.

## III. Summary and Analysis of the Similarities and Differences in the Political Beliefs and Preferences of the Fatah Constituency and the Leftist Constituency

This part of the study summarizes and analyzes the similarities and differences in the political beliefs and preferences of the Fatah constituency, on the one side, and the PFLP/DFLP constituency, on the other side. More specifically, the public opinion polls analyzed herein collected data on beliefs and preferences regarding what can be conceptualized as 11 more or less distinct issue/policy domains most directly to do with Palestinian-Israeli relations and 10 more or less distinct issue/policy domains most directly to do with internal Palestinian political issues. The 11 issue/policy domains to do with Palestinian-Israeli relations are as follows: (1) preference on the "peace process," (2) preference on the Oslo accords, (3) preference on negotiating with Israel, (4) preference on armed struggle, (5) preference on suicide operations, (6) preference on suspending negotiations and resorting to popular protest, (7) preference on final status issues; (8) belief on the prospects of reaching a satisfactory final status settlement in the relatively near future, (9) belief on the orientations of Israeli leaders and masses toward the Palestinians and the peace process, (10) belief on the role that the United States (US) and European Union (EU) have played and will most likely play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, and (11) preference regarding the role that the US and EU should play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. The 10 issue/policy domains most directly to do with internal Palestinian political issues are as follows: (1) evaluation of the general performance of the PA, (2) evaluation of the performance of the PA along specific criteria, (3) evaluation of Arafat, (4) evaluation of the PLC, (5) evaluation of Fatah political figures other than Arafat, (6) evaluation of more or less independent political figures, (7) evaluation of Habash, (8) preference on political Islam, (9) preferences on issues to do with Hamas, and (10) evaluation of the Palestinian economy.

Among the most noteworthy findings of this part of the study are the following. The survey data on the 21 issue/policy domains analyzed in this study suggest that, of these 21 issue/policy domains, the views of Fatah supporters and PFLP/DFLP supporters are most polarized with respect to (a) the strategic option of conciliation regarding Israel, i.e., the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, (b) the performance of the PA, and (c) the performance of Arafat. The vast majority of Fatah trusters support the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, and view the performance of the PA and of Arafat positively. In contrast, the vast majority of PFLP/DFLP supporters oppose the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, and are critical of the performance of the PA and Arafat.

Of the 21 issue/policy domains, conversely, the two factional constituencies are least polarized in their (a) beliefs on the orientations of the Israeli leadership and people toward the Palestinians and the peace process, (b) evaluations of the state of the Palestinian economy, (c) preferences on the role that the US and EU should play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, and (d) views on the strategic option of standing firm, to be distinguished from the strategic options of conciliation and escalation, vis-à-vis Israel. In general, both constituencies are negative on the Israeli orientation toward the Palestinians and the peace process, both constituencies are critical of the state of the Palestinian economy, both constituencies exhibit support for greater US and EU intervention in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, and each of the constituencies is quite internally divided over the strategic option of standing firm vis-à-vis Israel.

Furthermore, of the three general Palestinian strategic alternatives regarding Israel, i.e., escalation, standing firm/intransigence, and conciliation, the Fatah constituency is most supportive of conciliation, and is more supportive of standing firm, i.e., halting negotiations and popular protest, than of escalation, i.e., armed struggle and suicide operations. The PFLP/DFLP constituency, meanwhile, is most supportive of armed struggle, is second most supportive of standing firm and suicide operations, and is least supportive of negotiations. While these findings suggest that the preferences of the two constituencies are ordinally structured, this ordinal structure appears to be violated in the case of the Fatah constituency. Specifically, though the most popular strategic alternative among Fatah supporters is conciliation, the percentage of the Fatah supporters who support popular protest is higher than the percentage of the Fatah supporters who support suspending negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power.

With respect to views on strategy toward Israel, furthermore, the data suggest that the inter-constituency gap in views on negotiating with Israel and the inter-constituency gap in views on

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resuming armed violence, decrease within the context of a dead-end in the peace process. This decrease in the gap of the views of the two constituencies is particularly pronounced with respect to armed struggle. Whereas the majority of the Leftist constituency and the minority of the Fatah constituency support armed struggle when this strategic alternative is framed in general terms, the majority of the Fatah constituency as well as of the Leftist constituency holds either a supportive or neutral view on armed struggle within the context of a dead-end in the peace process. Thus, the survey data suggest that the support within the Fatah constituency for negotiations, and the opposition within the Fatah constituency to armed struggle, are substantially dependent upon Israeli conciliation, and that Leftist support for armed struggle and opposition to conciliation are high even when these strategic alternatives are framed in general terms rather than within the context of Israeli conciliation, such that a dead-end in the peace process brings the strategic preferences of the two constituencies closer together.

As concerns the issue/policy domain of American and European Union intervention in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, both constituencies share a more positive view of the EU than of the US. More specifically, a majority of Fatah supporters as well as a majority of Leftist supporters expressed "dissatisfaction" with US intervention, and "skepticism" that the US will care for Palestinian interests. At the same time, the proportion of the Leftist constituency expressing dissatisfaction with and skepticism about the US is substantially higher than the proportion of the Fatah constituency doing so, and in fact a meaningful proportion of members of the Fatah constituency express satisfaction with and confidence in the US. On the topic of American and European intervention, furthermore, the data suggest an apparently inconsistent tendency for a substantial proportion of the Fatah constituency and in the case of one survey item of the Leftist constituency to both express dissatisfaction with/skepticism toward US and EU intervention and to support increased US and EU intervention in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. In other words, a large proportion of people critical of the US and EU support the increased intervention of the US and EU in Palestinian-Israeli affairs.

On the views of the two constituencies to do with final status issues, perhaps the most notable finding is that the percentage of Fatah supporters who view Jerusalem as the most important final status issue is higher than the percentage of PFLP supporters who view Jerusalem as the most important issue. The data also suggest that the PFLP constituency may be slightly more prone to emphasizing the refugee issue than is the Fatah constituency. Furthermore, at least for the Fatah constituency, Israeli settlement of the occupied territories is the second most important issue. On the topic of final status issues, lastly, support for the proposal of a joint Palestinian-Israeli state in all of Palestine is not associated with support for armed struggle, the strategic alternative that the Palestinians must ultimately adopt to achieve such a state, at least in the foreseeable future. In other words, contrary to what one might expect, supporters of armed struggle share with opponents of armed struggle a tendency to oppose a joint Palestinian-Israeli state.

As concerns the prospects of a Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement, the percentage of Fatah supporters expressing optimism about reaching a final status agreement is substantially larger than the percentage of Leftist supporters expressing this sentiment. At the same time, however, the data suggest that the percentage of Fatah supporters expressing optimism about the prospects of concluding a final status agreement in the relatively near future is lower than the percentage of Fatah supporters expressing optimism about the prospects of peace when these prospects are framed by survey items in more general terms. Relatedly, there is generally no statistically significant difference between the two constituencies in terms of perceptions of the orientations of the Israeli leadership and masses with respect to the Palestinians and to the peace process. The majorities of the two constituencies share the view that Israelis are either divided or opposed to the peace process. Within each of the two constituencies, furthermore, the percentage of people who believe that Israelis oppose the peace process is higher than the percentage of people who believe that Israelis support the peace process. Additionally, a vast majority of the Fatah constituency as well as of the Leftist constituency believes that Israel has not satisfied its obligations as stipulated in the Oslo accords. On the topic of perceptions of Israelis, lastly, the majorities of the samples of the two constituencies expressed the view that the ascension to power of a Labor-led government would either not substantially alter or would worsen the current Palestinian political situation. At the same time, the percentage of Fatah supporters holding the belief that the rise to power of a Labor-led government would improve the Palestinian situation is substantially larger than the percentage of the Leftist constituency subscribing to this view.

Turning to views on the performance of the PA, this part of the study finds that, across the general Palestinian population, while people's views on the peace process indeed influence people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA, people's evaluations of the human rights record of the PA exert a larger effect on people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA than do people's views on the peace process. At the same time, the data suggest that people's views on the peace process exert a slightly larger impact on people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA than do people's views on the PA's performance with respect to democracy, and that people's views on the peace process exert a substantially larger impact on people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA than do people's views on the level of corruption in the PA. Additionally, the data suggest that the effect of evaluations of the PA's human rights record on evaluations of the general performance of the PA is about twice as large as the effect of views on the PA with respect to democracy on evaluations of the general performance of the PA, and that the effect on evaluations of the general performance of the PA of evaluations of the PA with respect to democracy, in turn, is about three times as large as is the effect of the views on the level of corruption within the PA.

As concerns the evaluations of Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters of the PA's performance with respect to the peace process, human rights, democracy, and corruption, the views of the two constituencies on the PA's handling of the peace process is most polarized, and the views of the two constituencies with respect to PA corruption are least polarized. This latter finding confirms the hypothesis that, of the four types of criticisms, the criticisms of the two factional constituencies to do with PA corruption are likely to be most convergent because Fatah supporters are likely to feel less constrained about publicly revealing, i.e., to the interviewer, their true views on PA corruption, and because the members of the two factional constituencies are likely to have both similar notions of what constitutes extensive, moderate, and little, corruption, and similar information on actual cases of PA corruption. Contrary to the hypothesis that supporters of Fatah, on the one side, and supporters of the opposition, on the other side, exhibit greater polarization in their respective evaluations of the PA on human rights than in their respective evaluations of the PA on democracy, however, these two constituencies' evaluations of the PA's performance with respect to democracy are more polarized than are these two constituencies' evaluations of the PA's performance with respect to human rights.

As concerns the levels of trust of the two factional constituencies in Fatah, Arafat, the PFLP, and Habash, the data reveal that Fatah supporters' views on Fatah and Arafat are more similar to one another than are Fatah supporters' views on Habash and the PFLP. Similarly, PFLP supporters' views on Habash and the PFLP are more similar to one another than are PFLP supporters' views on Arafat and Fatah. The basic implication suggested by these data is that people associate their own faction, i.e., that faction which they most support, and the leader of their own faction more closely to one another than they associate other factions with the respective leaders of these factions. Another finding regarding faction and faction leaders is that both constituencies exhibit a tendency to harbor higher levels of trust in the leaders of factions they do not support than they do in these factions themselves. More Fatah supporters express trust in Habash than in the PFLP, and less Fatah supporters express distrust in Habash than in the PFLP. Similarly, the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who trust Arafat is larger than the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who trust Fatah, and the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who distrust Arafat is lower than the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who distrust Fatah.

As concerns the views of the two factions on issues to do with Hamas, lastly, perhaps the most basic finding is that the Leftist constituency is more critical of Hamas than is the Fatah constituency. More specifically, the Leftist constituency exhibits significantly (a) lower levels of trust in Yasin and in Hamas than does the Fatah constituency, and (b) lower levels of support for Hamas taking or sharing political power than does the Fatah constituency.

The remainder of this part of the study is divided into two sections. Section A presents three tables which summarize and rank the levels of polarization of the two constituencies along particular survey items and issue/policy domains. Section B analyzes some of the more noteworthy findings of the tables presented in Section A. The reader is reminded that, as this part of the study focuses on main findings, it does not employ the strategy of bolding the key points. Rather, the reader is encouraged to read Part III in its entirety.

*A. Summary tables reporting data on the relative level of inter-factional constituency polarization characterizing particular issue/policy domains*

The present analysis revolves largely around Tables IIIA1-IIIA3. Table A1, which is directly relevant to Part IV as well as Part III, summarizes the results of 67 cross-tabulations.[4] The left-most column of Table A1 lists the 67 survey items. The remaining columns report the percentages of the members of the three factional constituencies – i.e., Fatah, PFLP/DFLP, and PFLP/DFLP/PPP/FIDA – who provided particular responses to each of these survey items. Most of the 67 survey items solicited "support" or "oppose" responses. Some survey items, in contrast, solicit other types of responses, such as level of "confidence/pessimism," level of "agreement/disagreement," "good" or "bad," and so forth. The cells in the rows referring to survey items that provide response-options other than level of "support/oppose" indicate the type of response-options provided to the respondent in the corresponding survey item. For example, row #19 summarizes the responses of the factional constituencies to the following question: "How confident are you that the Palestinians and Israelis will reach a satisfactory agreement on final status issues?" Since this question does not involve "support/oppose" responses, the type of responses it does afford, i.e., "confident/skeptical," are provided in the cells. Thus, we see that 67.3% of Fatah supporters expressed confidence in the prospects of reaching a satisfactory final status agreement, 32.6% of Fatah supporters expressed skepticism, 14.7% of PFLP/DFLP supporters expressed confidence and 85.3% expressed skepticism, and, of the four Leftist factions combined, 23.4% expressed confidence and 76.6% expressed skepticism. In contrast, the cells of each row which does not explicitly specify the type of response-option provided by the corresponding survey item report percentages of the constituencies which "support/oppose" the corresponding policy. Thus, for example, row #2 reports the responses to the following question: "How do you feel about the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?" The cells corresponding to this row indicate that 85.8% of the Fatah constituency expressed support for the peace process and 6.6% of the Fatah constituency expressed opposition to the peace process, of the PFLP/DFLP constituency, 25.6% expressed support for the peace process and 56.4% expressed opposition to the peace process, and, of the general Leftist constituency, 40.4% expressed support for the peace process and 40.4% expressed opposition to the peace process.

A few more aspects of Table A1 require explanation. First, the presence/absence of asterisks in the "PFLP/DFLP" and "Leftists" columns refer to whether or not the cross-tabulation reported in the corresponding row achieves statistical significance. More specifically, each row reports the results of *two* cross-tabulations: (1) responses to the survey item listed in the row by trust in Fatah or trust in the "DFLP/PFLP," and (2) responses to the survey item listed in the row by trust in Fatah or trust in "Leftists," i.e., PFLP, DFLP, PPP, or FIDA. That is, two sets of cross-tabulations were conducted, one comparing the opinions of Fatah supporters to the opinions of PFLP/DFLP supporters, and the other comparing the opinions of Fatah supporters to the opinions of all Leftist supporters, i.e., PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA, combined. The presence of asterisks in the PFLP/DFLP column means that the cross-tabulation comparing the views of Fatah supporters and the views of PFLP/DFLP supporters achieves statistical significance, and the absence of asterisks in the PFLP/DFLP column means that the cross-tabulation comparing the views of Fatah supporters with the views of PFLP/DFLP supporters does not achieve statistical significance. The same basic logic applies to the column reporting the cross-tabulations comparing the views of Fatah supporters and the views of "Leftist" supporters. Thus, for example, the percentages in the "PFLP/DFLP" and "Leftist" columns corresponding to row #1 (views on "current peace process") have asterisks. This means that both the cross-tabulation comparing the views on the current peace process of Fatah supporters and "PFLP/DFLP" supporters, and the cross-tabulation comparing the views on the current peace process of Fatah supporters and "Leftist" supporters, achieve statistical significance. Conversely, the percentages in row #28 (views on the

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[4] Actually, the author considers 68 cross-tabulations. The cross-tabulation involving views on the most important final status issue is excluded from Tables A1-A3 because views on the most important final status issue are of a categorical, rather than numeric, nature, and, because, as a result, inter- and intra-factional constituency polarization scores could not be calculated with the responses to the survey item tapping these views. This being said, the author does briefly discuss the responses to this survey item in this part of the study.

favoritism of the US), do not have asterisks. This means that neither of the two cross-tabulations achieve statistical significance. To cite one more example, the percentages in the PFLP/DFLP column corresponding to row #26 have asterisks, and the percentages in the Leftist column corresponding to this row do not have asterisks. This means that the cross-tabulation comparing the views of the Fatah constituency and the views of the PFLP/DFLP constituency on US intervention in the peace process achieves statistical significance, but that the cross-tabulation comparing the views of the Fatah constituency and the views of the Leftist constituency on US intervention in the peace process does not achieve statistical significance.

Additionally, many of the cells in the last column report points ("."). These points refer to the fact that the corresponding cross-tabulation was not conducted. As the reader may recall, the March 1999 data-set codes PFLP trusters as trusting the PFLP, but codes respondents expressing trust in the DFLP, PPP, or FIDA, as trusting some "other faction." As a result, it was simply not possible to construct a category of respondents who trusted any one of the four Leftist factions. For this same reason, the "PFLP/DFLP" column of Table A1 refers to PFLP or DFLP supporters for the November 1997 and May 1998 survey items, and only to PFLP supporters for the March 1999 survey items. Lastly, each survey item that is cross-tabulated is assigned a reference code that is provided in parentheses in the left-most column of the table. These reference codes will facilitate the discussion of the data analyses.

Table A1: Summary of results of bivariate cross-tabulations

| Survey item (cross-tabulation reference code, survey date) | Fatah | | PFLP + DFLP (11/97, 5/98) PFLP (3/99) | | Leftists (PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, and PPP) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % support | % oppose | % support | % oppose | % support | % oppose |
| 1. *Do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel?* (A1a, 11/97) | 93.5 | 6.5 | 22.9* | 77.1* | 43.8* | 56.2* |
| 2. *How do you feel about the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?* (A1b, 5/98)^ | 85.8 | 6.6 | 25.6* | 56.4* | 40.4* | 40.4* |
| 3. *In general, do you support or oppose the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel?* (A1c, 3/99) | 86.3 | 13.7 | 29.2* | 70.8* | . | . |
| 4. *How do you feel about the Oslo process?* (A2a, 5/98) | 90.6 | 9.4 | 27.8* | 72.2* | 45.3* | 54.7* |
| 5. *What is your opinion about the Oslo agreement?* (A2b, 3/99) | 83.8 | 16.2 | 29.2* | 70.8* | . | . |
| 6. *Do you support or oppose the continuation of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis?* (A3a, 11/97) | 90.0 | 8.5 | 31.4* | 68.6* | 45.9* | 54.2* |
| 7. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in continuing to negotiate with Israel to salvage what can be salvaged?* (A3b, 3/99)^ | 74.7 | 16.5 | 34.8* | 56.5* | . | . |
| 8. *Do you support or oppose the resumption of armed struggle against Israel?* (A4a, 11/97) | 35.6 | 64.3 | 71.9* | 28.2* | 55.6* | 44.5* |
| 9. *Do you support the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as an appropriate response in the current political conditions or do you oppose them as they harm the national interest?* (A4b, 3/99) | 23.7 | 76.3 | 56.5* | 43.5* | . | . |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: resume armed struggle?* *(A4c, 3/99)^* | 37.3 | 42.5 | 56.5 | 26.1 | . | . |
| 11. *What is your view on the following statement: "sometimes it is moral to use violence for political ends"?* *(A4d, 5/98)* | agree 41.1 | disagree 58.9 | agree 55.3* | disagree 44.8* | agree 46.4 | disagree 53.6 |
| 12. *What is your feeling towards the suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians in Israel?* *(A5a, 11/97)* | 18.6 | 81.4 | 56.3* | 43.8* | 42.3* | 57.7* |
| 13. *Do you see suicidal bombing operations as an appropriate response in the current political conditions or do you oppose them?* *(A5b, 3/99)* | 14.0 | 86.0 | 36.4* | 63.6* | . | . |
| 14. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: resume popular struggle?* *(A6a, 3/99)^* | 47.7 | 37.2 | 69.6 | 13.0 | . | . |
| 15. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: waiting for a favorable change in the balance of power?* *(A6b, 3/99)^* | 38.1 | 42.2 | 25.0 | 55.0 | . | . |
| 16. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: demand linkage with Jordan?* *(A7a, 3/99)^* | 38.2 | 36.6 | 18.2* | 72.7* | . | . |
| 17. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA demanding the establishment of a joint state for Palestinians and Israelis in all Palestine?* *(A7b, 3/99)^* | 25.5 | 59.9 | 16.7 | 75.0 | . | . |
| 18. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the idea of establishing a joint state for Israelis and Palestinians in all Palestine (Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip)?* *(A7c, 3/99)^* | 22.9 | 56.2 | 21.7 | 73.9 | . | . |

| 19. *How confident are you that the Palestinians and Israelis will reach a satisfactory agreement on final-status issues?* (*A*8a, 11/97) | confident 67.3 | not confident 32.6 | confident 14.7* | not confident 85.3* | confident 23.4* | not confident 76.6* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20. *In your opinion, what are the prospects of a peace between the Palestinians and Israelis in the next five years?* (*A*8b, 5/98) | likely 50.3 | unlikely 49.7 | likely 26.4* | unlikely 73.5* | likely 34.6* | unlikely 65.4* |
| 21. *What is your view on the following statement: "peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis is possible"?* (*A*8c, 5/98) | agree 76.8 | disagree 23.2 | agree 41.0* | disagree 58.9* | agree 56.2* | disagree 43.9* |
| 22. *In your opinion, to what extent do Israelis support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?* (*A*9a, 5/98)^ | 28.4 | 30.5 | 15.4 | 28.2 | 26.4 | 22.8 |
| 23. *To what extent do you think the Israelis have fulfilled their commitments under the Oslo accords?* (*A*9b, 5/98)^ | substantia l extent 2.3 | insubstant ial extent 85.7 | substantia l extent 5.2 | insubstant ial extent 89.8 | substantia l extent 3.6 | insubstant ial extent 87.7 |
| 24. *How would you characterize the basic values of Israelis compared to your own values?* (*A*9c, 5/98)^ | different 84.4 | similar 3.6 | different 82.1 | similar 5.1 | different 78.9 | similar 5.3 |
| 25. *If the Likud Party loses the elections and the Labor Party assumes power in the next elections, do you think the Palestinian political condition, in general, will become better, will stay the same, or will become worse?* (*A*9d, 3/99)^ | improve 38.6 | worsen 14.5 | improve 18.2 | worsen 22.7 | . | . |
| 26. *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the intervention of the United States in the peace process?* (*A*10a, 11/97) | satisfied 29.9 | dissatisfie d 67.0 | satisfied 8.8* | dissatisfie d 91.2* | satisfied 19.1 | dissatisfie d 80.8 |
| 27. *To what extent do you have confidence that America will care for the Palestinian interests in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations?* (*A*10b, 11/97) | confident 34.2 | not confident 65.8 | confident 8.6* | not confident 91.4* | confident 14.6* | not confident 85.4* |
| 28. *Would you say that the U.S. has been more favorable to Israelis, the U.S. is neutral and favors neither side, or the U.S. has been more favorable to Palestinians?* (*A*10c, 5/98)^ | favorable to Israel 97.2 | favorable to Pal's 0.5 | favorable to Israel 97.4 | favorable to Pal's 2.6 | favorable to Israel 98.2 | favorable to Pal's 1.8 |
| 29. *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the intervention of the European Union in the peace process?* (*A*10d, 11/97) | satisfied 53.9 | dissatisfie d 31.3 | satisfied 41.2* | dissatisfie d 58.8* | satisfied 48.9* | dissatisfie d 51.1* |
| 30. *Has the EU been more favorable to the Israelis, neutral, or more favorable to the Palestinians?* (*A*10e, 5/98)^ | favorable to Israel 42.4 | favorable to Pal's 10.9 | favorable to Israel 75.0* | favorable to Pal's 8.3* | favorable to Israel 72.2* | favorable to Pal's 5.6* |
| 31. *Despite the extent of your satisfaction with the role played by America now, what is, in your belief, the role that America should play?* (*A*11a, 11/97)^ | major role 60.3 | no role 17.7 | major role 30.3* | no role 54.5* | major role 37.0* | no role 43.5* |
| 32. *How active a role do you think the United States should play in Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations?* (*A*11b, 5/98)^ | more active 92.7 | less active 5.6 | more active 83.4 | less active 11.2 | more active 88.9 | less active 7.4 |
| 33. *How active a role should the EU play in Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations?* (*A*11c, 5/98)^ | more active 91.8 | less active 3.3 | more active 91.7 | less active 5.6 | more active 92.6 | less active 5.6 |

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| 34. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance?* (*B1a*, 11/97) | good 89.2 | bad 10.9 | good 30.3* | bad 69.7* | good 39.1* | bad 60.9* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 35. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance?* (*B1b*, 5/98) | good 86.8 | bad 13.1 | good 15.4* | bad 84.6* | good 28.1* | bad 72.0* |
| 36. *In general, how do you evaluate the PA's performance?* (*B1c*, 3/99) | good 83.9 | bad 16.1 | good* 39.1 | bad* 60.9 | . | . |
| 37. *Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the Palestinian Authority's handling of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process at the present time?* (*B2a*, 5/98) | satisfied 82.8 | dissatisfied 17.2 | satisfied 23.7* | dissatisfied 76.3* | satisfied 32.2* | dissatisfied 67.9* |
| 38. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance in the field of human rights?* (*B2b*, 11/97) | good 77.2 | bad 22.8 | good 28.6* | bad 71.5* | good 29.2* | bad 70.9* |
| 39. *In your opinion, how democratic is our system of government under the Palestinian Authority?* (*B2c*, 11/97) | democratic 73.0 | not democratic 21.0 | democratic 11.4* | not democratic 88.6* | democratic 16.7* | not democratic 83.4* |
| 40. *In your opinion, how spread is the corruption, if any, in the Palestinian Authority's institutions?* (*B2d*, 11/97) | spread 64.4 | not spread 35.6 | spread 88.6* | not spread 11.4* | spread 83.3* | not spread 16.7* |
| 41. *Do you support or oppose Arafat's performance as the National Authority's President?* (*B3a*, 11/97) | 91.6 | 8.4 | 40.6* | 59.4* | 47.8* | 52.2* |
| 42. *Do you think President Arafat is doing his job as president of the National Authority in a good, fair, bad, or very bad way?* (*B3b*, 3/99) | good 97.3 | bad 2.6 | good 56.5* | bad 43.5* | . | . |
| 43. *What is your level of trust in Arafat?* (*B3c*, 3/99)^ | trust 92.6 | distrust 1.6 | trust 13.0* | distrust 52.2* | . | . |
| 44. *In general, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council?* (*B4a*, 11/97) | good 80.7 | bad 19.4 | good 37.9* | bad 62.1* | good 40.4* | bad 59.5* |
| 45. *In general, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council?* (*B4b*, 5/98) | good 73.1 | bad 26.8 | good 15.8* | bad 84.2* | good 25.0* | bad 75.0* |
| 46. *In general, how do you evaluate the PLC's performance?* (*B4c*, 3/99) | good 69.1 | bad 31.0 | good 21.7* | bad 78.2* | . | . |
| 47. *Some participated in the PLC elections while others boycotted them. Now, three years after those elections, do you think the boycott decision was correct or wrong?* (*B4d*, 3/99) | correct 18.6 | wrong 81.4 | correct 70.0* | wrong 30.0* | . | . |
| 48. *What is your level of trust in Abu Mazen?* (*B5a*, 3/99)^ | trust 42.1 | distrust 11.2 | trust 8.3* | distrust 45.8* | . | . |
| 49. *What is your level of trust in S. Eraqat?* (*B5b*, 3/99)^ | trust 49.3 | distrust 8.3 | trust 16.7* | distrust 45.8* | . | . |
| 50. *What is your level of trust in F. Husseini?* (*B5c*, 3/99)^ | trust 52.5 | distrust 8.3 | trust 8.3* | distrust 45.8* | . | . |
| 51. *What is your level of trust in J. Rajoub?* (*B5d*, 3/99)^ | trust 29.6 | distrust 18.3 | trust 4.3* | distrust 60.9* | . | . |
| 52. *What is your level of trust in M. Dahlan?* (*B5e*, 3/99)^ | trust 22.2 | distrust 18.7 | trust 0.0* | distrust 50.0* | . | . |
| 53. *What is your level of trust in H. Ashrawi?* (*B6a*, 3/99)^ | trust 45.6 | distrust 12.9 | trust 16.7* | distrust 37.5* | . | . |
| 54. *What is your level of trust in H. Abdul-Shafi?* (*B6b*, 3/99)^ | trust 58.5 | distrust 6.3 | trust 29.2* | distrust 16.7* | . | . |

| 55. *What is your level of trust in G. Habash?* (B7, 3/99)^ | trust 12.2 | distrust 35.5 | trust 79.2* | distrust 12.5* | . | . |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 56. *In your opinion, what is the role that Islam should play in the political life of Palestinian society?* (B8a, 11/97) | major role 87.7 | minor role 12.2 | major role 70.5* | minor role 29.4* | major role 72.4* | minor role 27.6* |
| 57. *In your opinion, in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state, should this state be administered according to Islamic Shari'a or according to secular/non-religious laws?* (B8b, 11/97) | *Shari'a* 76.5 | secular 23.5 | *Shari'a* 47.1* | secular 52.9* | *Shari'a* 46.8* | secular 53.2* |
| 58. *In the case of the establishment of a Palestinian state, do you think the state should be run according to Islamic law or according to secular, non-religious, laws?* (B8c, 3/99) | Islamic 80.0 | secular 20.0 | Islamic 39.1* | secular 60.9* | . | . |
| 59. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the idea of establishing an Islamic state in all Palestine (Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip)?* (B8d, 3/99)^ | 65.7 | 15.4 | 43.4* | 52.2* | . | . |
| 60. *What is your level of trust in Yasin?* (B9a, 3/99)^ | trust 49.7 | distrust 13.8 | trust 16.7* | distrust 45.8* | . | . |
| 61. *What is your level of trust in Hamas?* (B9b, 3/99)^ | trust 33.4 | distrust 24.0 | trust 12.5* | distrust 50.0* | . | . |
| 62. *The Fatah movement is considered the main party in the Authority while Hamas is considered the main opposition. To what extent do you believe in the possibility of any cooperation between them?* (B9c, 3/99)^ | likely 16.1 | unlikely 21.3 | likely 4.5 | unlikely 40.9 | . | . |
| 63. *To what extent do you support or oppose having a national coalition government consisting of all the political and religious factions, including the opposition?* (B9d, 3/99)^ | 80.4 | 3.4 | 56.5* | 21.7* | . | . |
| 64. *To what extent do you support or oppose the idea of forming a national salvation authority through which Hamas can join in the ruling?* (B9e, 3/99)^ | 49.0 | 10.5 | 26.1* | 34.8* | . | . |
| 65. *Which position serves Hamas best: (a) taking power, (b) participating in the authority with others, or (c) not participating at all in the PA?* (B9f, 3/99)^ | taking power 6.7 | not participating at all 16.5 | taking power 0.0* | not participating at all 47.4* | . | . |
| 66. *In what manner did the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel affect our economy?* (B10a, 11/97)^ | positively 27.5 | negatively 65.5 | positively 14.3* | negatively 80.0* | positively 12.5* | negatively 75.0* |
| 67. *How do you describe the current economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza?* (B10b, 11/97) | good 22.1 | bad 77.8 | good 14.3 | bad 85.7 | good 16.7 | bad 83.4 |

* statistically significant cross-tabulation
^ the survey item provides a neutral midpoint response
· data were not available for this cross-tabulation

Table A2 summarizes the inter-factional constituency polarization scores of the responses to the 67 survey items cross-tabulated by factional constituency. First, it should be pointed out that the inter-factional polarization scores reported in this and the following table refer to the degree of polarization of responses of Fatah, on the one side, and *the PFLP/DFLP, and in the case of the March 1999 survey PFLP, constituency*, on the other side. The author did not calculate level of inter-factional polarization scores for the Fatah constituency, on the one side, and the general Leftist constituency, comprised of the PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA supporters, on the other side, because the calculation of inter-factional polarization scores for 67 survey items is a very time intensive endeavor. On the PPP and FIDA constituencies, suffice it to say that these two constituencies consistently display greater support for the peace process, Oslo, and negotiations, and lower support for escalatory policies, than does the PFLP/DFLP constituency. Furthermore, *though to this point this study has relied on the term "Leftist" to designate the constituency comprised of supporters of the four Leftist factions, from this point onwards, the term "Leftist" is used to refer to the PFLP/DFLP constituency.*

Turning to the logic of Table A2, the rows in this table present each of the 67 survey items presented above, and each cell reports the inter-factional polarization score exhibited by the responses of the Fatah and PFLP/DFLP constituencies to the survey item in the corresponding row. The logic and equation used to calculate the inter-factional constituency polarization scores are discussed in Part 1C. To reiterate, the most basic point regarding the interpretation of the inter-factional constituency polarization measure is that the larger the score of a survey item along this measure, the greater the level of polarization characterizing the respective responses of the two factional constituencies to this survey item. Conversely, the lower the inter-factional polarization score of a survey item, the lower the level of polarization exhibited by the respective responses of the two factional constituencies to this survey item.

Importantly, furthermore, the responses of the two constituencies to the 67 survey items in this table are arranged in order of increasing inter-factional constituency polarization scores, and thus in order of increasing levels of inter-factional constituency polarization. Thus, row #1, reporting the inter-factional constituency polarization score of 1.2, reveals that, of the 67 survey items, Fatah supporters and PFLP/DFLP supporters are least polarized and most united in their "characterization of the basic values of Israelis." Conversely, row #67, reporting an inter-factional constituency polarization score of 60.3, refers to the survey item on which the responses of Fatah supporters and PFLP/DFLP supporters were most polarized. In other words, given the inter-factional constituency polarization equation, Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters exhibited the relatively greatest divergence of opinion in response to the question specified in row #67, i.e. "Do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel?"

Additionally, Table A2 indicates (1) the polarization score that comes closest to the average polarization score across the 67 survey items, (2) the polarization score that is 1.0 standard deviations below the average polarization score, and (3) the polarization score that is 1.0 standard deviations above the average polarization score. These summary statistics are emphasized in Table A3 and will be used to enhance our understanding of the relative level of polarization across the two constituencies that characterize particular policy/issue domains.

Lastly, the rows with polarization scores with carrots ("^") refer to survey items that provided the respondent with a midpoint response-option, e.g., *neither support nor oppose, neither good nor bad, neither trust nor distrust,* etc. As discussed in Part 1C, all other things equal, a survey item that provides a midpoint response-option may be more likely to exhibit a lower level of polarization than a survey item that does not provide a midpoint response-option, because the midpoint response-option is likely to reduce the number of respondents who agree and the number of respondents who disagree, and who do so strongly. In other words, all other things equal, given a four-point survey item without a midpoint response-option and a 5-point survey item with a midpoint response-option that have the same polarization score, it is likely that views on the survey item with the midpoint response-option are in actuality more polarized than are views on the survey item without the midpoint response-option.

Table A2: Rank-ordered summary of the inter-factional constituency (Fatah PFLP / DFLP) polarization scores of the 67 survey items

| Survey item (cross-tabulation reference code, survey date) | Inter-factional constituency polarization score |
|---|---|
| 1. *How would you characterize the basic values of Israelis compared to your own values?* (*A9c*, 5/98) | 1.2^ |
| 2. *How active a role should the EU play in Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations?* (*A11c*, 5/98) | 2.4 |
| 3. *Would you say that the U.S. has been more favorable to Israelis, the U.S. is neutral and favors neither side, or the U.S. has been more favorable to Palestinians?* (*A10c*, 5/98) | 2.6^ |
| 4. *To what extent do you think the Israelis have fulfilled their commitments under the Oslo accords?* (*A9b*, 5/98) | 3.7 |
| 5. *In your opinion, to what extent do Israelis support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?* (*A9a*, 5/98) | 5.7^ |
| 6. *How active a role do you think the United States should play in Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations?* (*A11b*, 5/98) | 5.8^ |
| 7. *How do you describe the current economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza?* (*B10b*, 11/97) | 6.7 |
| 8. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: halting negotiations and waiting for a favorable change in the balance of power?* (*A6b*, 3/99) | 8.3^ |
| 9. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the idea of establishing a joint state for Israelis and Palestinians in all Palestine (Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip)?* (*A7c*, 3/99) | 9.2^ |
| 10. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA demanding the establishment of a joint state for Palestinians and Israelis in all Palestine?* (*A7b*, 3/99) | 9.6^ |
| 11. *If the Likud Party loses the elections and the Labor Party assumes power in the next elections, do you think the Palestinian political condition, in general, will become better, will stay the same, or will become worse?* (*A9d*, 3/99) | 11.1^ 1.0 std. dev. below avg. |
| 12. *The Fatah movement is considered the main party in the Authority while Hamas is considered the main opposition. To what extent do you believe in the possibility of any cooperation between them?* (*B9c*, 3/99) | 12.6^ |
| 13. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: resume armed struggle?* (*A4c*, 3/99) | 12.9^ |
| 14. *In what manner did the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel affect our economy?* (*B10a*, 11/97) | 13.0^ |
| 15. *What is your view on the following statement: "sometimes it is moral to use violence for political ends"?* (*A4d*, 5/98) | 13.4 |
| 16. *In your opinion, what is the role that Islam should play in the political life of Palestinian society?* (*B8a*, 11/97) | 14.6 |
| 17. *Has the EU been more favorable to the Israelis, neutral, or more favorable to the Palestinians?* (*A10e*, 5/98) | 14.7^ |
| 18. *Which position serves Hamas best: (a) taking power, (b) participating in the authority with others, or (c) not participating at all in the PA?* (*B9f*, 3/99) | 15.3^ |
| 19. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: resume popular struggle?* (*A6a*, 3/99) | 16.4^ |
| 20. *Do you see suicidal bombing operations as an appropriate response in the current political conditions or do you oppose them?* (*A5b*, 3/99) | 16.7^ |

| | |
|---|---|
| 21. *To what extent do you support or oppose having a national coalition government consisting of all the political and religious factions, including the opposition? (B9d, 3/99)* | 17.7 |
| 22. *What is your level of trust in H. Abdul-Shafi? (B6b, 3/99)~* | 18.2^ |
| 23. *To what extent do you support or oppose the idea of forming a national salvation authority through which Hamas can join in the ruling? (B9e, 3/99)* | 18.3^ |
| 24. *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the intervention of the European Union in the peace process? (A11b, 11/97)* | 18.4 |
| 25. *What is your level of trust in Hamas? (B9b, 3/99)* | 19.4^ |
| 26. *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the intervention of the United States in the peace process? (A10a, 11/97)* | 20.1 |
| 27. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: demand linkage with Jordan? (A7a, 3/99)* | 22.0 |
| 28. *In your opinion, what are the prospects of a peace between the Palestinians and Israelis in the next five years? (A8b, 5/98)* | 22.4 |
| 29. *In your opinion, in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state, should this state be administered according to Islamic Shari'a or according to secular/non-religious laws? (B8b, 11/97)* | 22.7^ |
| 30. *What is your level of trust in H. Ashrawi? (B6a, 3/99)* | 23.0^ |
| 31. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the idea of establishing an Islamic state in all Palestine (Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip)? (B8d, 3/99)* | 23.4 |
| 32. *To what extent do you have confidence that America will care for the Palestinian interests in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations? (A10b, 11/97)* | 24.4 |
| 33. *Do you support the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as an appropriate response in the current political conditions or do you oppose them as they harm the national interest? (A4b, 3/99)* | 25.4^ |
| 34. *In your opinion, how spread is the corruption, if any, in the Palestinian Authority's institutions? (B2d, 11/97)* | 25.4 |
| 35. *Despite the extent of your satisfaction with the role played by America now, what is, in your belief, the role that America should play? (A11a, 11/97)* | 26.1 |
| 36. *What is your level of trust in Yasin? (B9a, 3/99)* | 27.3^ average |
| 37. *What is your view on the following statement: "peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis is possible"? (A8c, 5/98)* | 29.9 |
| 38. *What is your level of trust in S. Eraqat? (B5b, 3/99)* | 31.4^ |
| 39. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in continuing to negotiate with Israel to salvage what can be salvaged? (A3b, 3/99)* | 31.5 |
| 40. *In the case of the establishment of a Palestinian state, do you think the state should be run according to Islamic law or according to secular, non-religious, laws? (B8c, 3/99)* | 31.8^ |
| 41. *What is your level of trust in J. Rajoub? (B5d, 3/99)* | 32.6^ |
| 42. *What is your level of trust in Abu Mazen? (B5a, 3/99)* | 32.7^ |
| 43. *In general, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council? (B4a, 11/97)* | 33.3 |
| 44. *What is your level of trust in M. Dahlan? (B5e, 3/99)* | 34.2^ |
| 45. *Do you support or oppose the resumption of armed struggle against Israel? (A4a, 11/97)* | 34.4 |
| 46. *In general, how do you evaluate the PLC's performance? (B4c, 3/99)* | 34.6 |
| 47. *What is your feeling towards the suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians in Israel? (A5a, 11/97)* | 34.9 |
| 48. *What is your level of trust in F. Husseini? (B5c, 3/99)* | 35.0^ |
| 49. *In general, how do you evaluate the PA's performance? (B1c, 3/99)* | 35.9 |
| 50. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance in the field of human rights? (B2b, 11/97)* | 40.2 |

| | |
|---|---|
| 51. *Some participated in the PLC elections while others boycotted them. Now, three years after those elections, do you think the boycott decision was correct or wrong?* (*B*4d, 3/99) | 40.3^ |
| 52. *Do you think President Arafat is doing his job as president of the National Authority in a good, fair, bad, or very bad way?* (*B*3b, 3/99) | 40.5 |
| 53. *What is your level of trust in G. Habash?* (*B*7, 3/99) | 40.8^ |
| 54. *What is your opinion about the Oslo agreement?* (*A*2b, 3/99) | 40.9 |
| 55. *How confident are you that the Palestinians and Israelis will reach a satisfactory agreement on final-status issues?* (*A*8a, 11/97) | 42.0 |
| 56. *In general, do you support or oppose the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel?* (*A*1c, 3/99) | 44.7^ 1.0 std. dev. above avg. |
| 57. *In general, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council?* (*B*4b, 5/98) | 45.6 |
| 58. *How do you feel about the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?* (*A*2a, 5/98) | 45.6 |
| 59. *Do you support or oppose Arafat's performance as the National Authority's President?* (*B*3a, 11/97) | 46.8 |
| 60. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance?* (*B*1a, 11/97) | 46.9 |
| 61. *Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the Palestinian Authority's handling of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process at the present time?* (*B*2a, 5/98) | 47.1 |
| 62. *In your opinion, how democratic is our system of government under the Palestinian Authority?* (*B*2c, 11/97) | 50.6 |
| 63. *What is your level of trust in Arafat?* (*B*3c, 3/99) | 50.7^ |
| 64. *Do you support or oppose the continuation of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis?* (*A*3a, 11/97) | 51.9 |
| 65. *How do you feel about the Oslo process?* (*A*2a, 5/98) | 52.1 |
| 66. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance?* (*B*1b, 5/98) | 57.3 |
| 67. *Do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel?* (*A*1a, 11/97) | 60.3 |

^ Survey item that provided midpoint response-option.
~ All of the polarization scores for the three-point trust-scores – i.e., trust, in between, do not trust – are calculated with the "don't have enough information to give an opinion" option omitted. These calculations are thus not based on the percentages presented in the corresponding cross-tabulations presented in Part II.

While Table A2 presents the rank-order of the polarization scores of the responses of Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters to the 67 survey items, of primary interest is the nature and level of polarization/convergence characterizing views on the 21 more general issue/policy domains. That is, each of the 67 survey items represents an indicator of one of 21 policy/issue domains most directly to do either with Palestinian-Israeli relations or internal Palestinian politics. Thus, to analyze the Fatah-Leftist debate, we want to conceive and examine the levels of inter-factional constituency polarization of the set of survey items tapping views on each of the 21 domains *as a set*. By looking at the multiple indicators of any individual issue/policy domain in unison, we of course generally get a clearer view of the concept these indicators combine to reflect.

Toward this end, the author derived summary polarization measures of the 21 issue/policy domains from the polarization scores and survey item rankings reported in Table A2. These summary issue/policy domain polarization scores are presented in Table A3. The top-left cell of Table A3 presents summary statistics of the 67 polarization scores listed in Table A2. Simply, the average inter-factional constituency polarization score across the 67 survey items is 27.3, with a standard deviation of 15.2. Table A3 has 21 rows, with each row referring to a distinct issue/policy domain. The first column in this table reports the rankings of the survey items collecting data on each type of issue/policy domain listed in the rows. Thus, for example, the cell in the first column that corresponds to beliefs on the views of Israelis regarding the Palestinians and the peace process, reports "1, 4, 5, 11." This means that specific survey items tapping beliefs on the views of Israelis regarding the Palestinians and the peace process occupy the first, fourth, fifth, and eleventh, positions in the ranking of the polarization scores presented in Table A2. Again, the higher the inter-factional constituency polarization ranking, the higher the relative level of inter-factional constituency polarization, and the

lower the inter-factional constituency polarization ranking, the lower the relative level of inter-factional constituency polarization. To cite another example, the first column of Table A3 reports that responses to survey items on final status issues occupy the 9th, 10th, and 27th, positions in the ranking of the polarization scores presented in Table A2.[5]

The second column of Table A3 reports the average of the polarization scores of the various survey items referring to each of the 21 issue/policy domains. Thus, for example, the cell corresponding to the second column and to views on the Palestinian economy lists "9.9." This figure represents the average polarization scores of the two survey items to do with views on the Palestinian economy reported in Table A2, and located in position 7 and position 14 of Table A2. To cite another example, the cell in the second column corresponding to issues to do with Hamas reports "18.4." This figure represents the average polarization score of the six survey items to do with Hamas, i.e., located in positions 12, 18, 21, 23, 25, and 36, of Table A2. Additionally, the cells in the second column of Table A3 report either "below" or "above." This refers to whether or not the average polarization score of the items tapping sentiment on the corresponding issue/policy domain is below or above the average polarization score of the 67 survey items, i.e., 27.3.

The third column of Table A3 reports the proportion of survey items referring to each of the 21 issue/policy domains that exhibits a polarization score above or below the average polarization score (again, 27.3). For example, the cell in the third column corresponding to beliefs on the views of Israelis regarding Palestinians and the peace process lists "4/4." This means that all four of the survey items to do with views on the beliefs of Israelis exhibit polarization scores below the average polarization score. The "5/6" reported in the cell corresponding to column #3 and views on issues to do with Hamas means that 5 of the 6 survey items tapping views on issues to do with Hamas exhibit below average polarization scores. The measure in column #3 thus serves the primary function of indicating the extent to which the location of the polarization scores of the various items pertaining to

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[5] It is important to note that the figures reported in column 1 of Table A3 reveal that responses to the various survey items tapping attitudes on any single issue/policy domain oftentimes do not fall together in Table A2. That is, oftentimes, the polarization scores of responses to various survey items tapping sentiment on the same issue/policy domain are not very similar. For example, the responses of the two factional constituencies to the various items tapping views on the roles that the US and EU actually play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs achieve quite divergent polarization scores, and, accordingly, are situated in various points within the ranking of the 67 polarization scores of Table A2.

This point should not surprise us. We should not be surprised of this point for the following reasons: (1) so many survey items are presented such that on pure chance alone we should expect that some items tapping sentiment on the same issue would exhibit some degree of divergence in terms of polarization scores; (2) attitudes regarding the same issue may change over the course of the three time periods during which the surveys investigated here were conducted; (3) some of the cross-tabulations from which inter-faction polarization scores were calculated compared data on the sentiment of the Fatah constituency with that of the PFLP and DFLP constituency combined, i.e., the November 1997 and May 1998 data, and other cross-tabulations from which inter-polarization scores were calculated compared the sentiment of the Fatah constituency with that of the PFLP constituency alone, i.e., March 1999 data; (4) the small size of the samples of the Leftist constituencies, and in particular of the March 1999 sample of the PFLP constituency, decreases the stability of the responses of these constituency samples; (5) survey items tapping sentiment on the same issue/policy domain were often framed differently, and variation in the framing of survey items may of course cause variation in responses; and (6) a few of the 21 issue/policy domains are comprised not only of survey items tapping sentiment on the same issue in different ways, but also of survey items tapping sentiment on qualitatively distinct topics; for example, the issue/policy domain comprised of issues to do with Hamas includes the following set of items, some of which are clearly qualitatively distinct from one another: level of trust in Yasin, level of trust in Hamas, beliefs on the possibility of Fatah-Hamas cooperation, preferences on the formation of a national coalition government, preferences on the formation of a national salvation authority, and preferences on Hamas gaining power. It is incumbent to emphasize that, despite the variation found in the polarization scores of the survey items of some issue/policy domains, (a) combining the polarization scores of the 67 survey items into 21 categories is warranted given the vast amount of data associated with the 67 items, (b) each of the 21 categories of survey items *do* generally tap sentiment on a more or less coherent issue/policy domain, and (c) the polarization scores of survey items reflecting individual issue/policy domains do generally exhibit a meaningful amount of consistency.

any particular issue/policy domain are consistently located below or above the average level of polarization.

The fourth column of Table A3 reports the proportion of the survey items pertaining to each of the 21 issue/policy domains that are 1.0 or more standard deviations above or below the average polarization score. Thus, for example, the "2/3" reported in the cell in the fourth column corresponding to views on the role that the US and EU should play means that 2 of the 3 survey items tapping sentiment on this issue/policy domain exhibit polarization scores that fall 1.0 or more standard deviations below the average. The purpose of the fourth column is to identify the extent to which the survey items measuring sentiment on any particular issue/policy domain exhibit extremely high or extremely low polarization scores relative to the other polarization scores in Table A2.

Importantly, lastly, Table A3 lists the 21 issue/policy domains in order of increasing inter-factional constituency polarization.

Table A3: Rank-ordered summary of the inter-factional constituency polarization scores of the 21 issue/policy domains

| Average polarization score: 27.3<br>Std. dev: 15.2<br>Std. dev + avg. = 42.5<br>Std. dev - avg. = 12.1<br><br>*Issue/policy domain* (cross-tabulation reference) | 1. Rank of the items in Table A2 | 2. Average polarization score of the items in the issue/policy domain | 3. proportion of items on the issue/policy domain that fall below or above the avg. polarization score | 4. proportion of Items on the issue/policy domain that fall more than 1 std. dev. from avg. {12.1; 42.5} |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. *Beliefs on Israeli views regarding Palestinians and the peace process* (A9) | 1, 4, 5, 11 | 5.4 below | 4/4 below | 4/4 below |
| 2. *Views on Palestinian economy* (B10) | 7, 14 | 9.9 below | 2/2 below | 1/2 below |
| 3. *Views on the roles that the US and EU should play* (A11) | 2, 6, 35 | 11.4 below | 3/3 below | 2/3 below |
| 4. *Views on standing firm vis-à-vis Israel* (A6) | 8, 19 | 12.4 below | 2/2 below | 1/2 below |
| 5. *Views on final status issues* (A7) | 9, 10, 27 | 13.6 below | 3/3 below | 2/3 below |
| 6. *Views on the roles that the US and EU actually play* (A10) | 3, 17, 24, 26, 32 | 16.0 below | 5/5 below | 1/5 below |
| 7. *Views on issues to do with Hamas* (B9) | 12, 18, 21, 23, 25, 36 | 18.4 below | 5/6 below | 0/6 below |
| 8. *Views on Abdul-Shafi and Ashrawi* (B6) | 22, 30 | 20.6 below | 2/2 below | 0/2 below |
| 9. *Views on armed struggle (including views on the morality of violence)* (A4) | 13, 15, 33, 45 | 21.5 below | 3/4 below | 0/4 below |
| 10. *Views on political Islam* (B8) | 16, 29, 31, 40 | 23.1 below | 3/4 below | 0/4 below |
| 11. *Views on suicide operations* (A5) | 20, 47 | 25.8 below | 1/2 below | 0/2 below |
| 12. *Views on the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace* (A8) | 28, 37, 55 | 31.4 above | 2/3 above | 0/3 above |
| 13. *Views on Fatah figures* (B5) | 38, 41, 42, 44, 48 | 33.2 above | 5/5 above | 0/5 above |
| 14. *Views on the PLC* (B4) | 43, 46, 51, 57 | 38.5 above | 4/4 above | 1/4 above |
| 15. *Views on Habash* (B7) | 53 | 40.8 above | 1/1 above | 0/1 above |
| 16. *Views on the performance of the PA along specific criteria* (B2) | 34, 50, 61, 62 | 40.8 above | 3/4 above | 2/4 above |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17. *Views on negotiating with Israel* (A3) | 39, 64 | 41.7 above | 2/2 above | 1/2 above |
| 18. *Views on Arafat* (B3) | 52, 59, 63 | 46.0 above | 3/3 above | 2/3 above |
| 19. *Views on the Oslo process* (A2) | 54, 65 | 46.5 above | 2/2 above | 1/2 above |
| 20. *Views on the general performance of the PA* (B1) | 49, 60, 66 | 46.7 above | 3/3 above | 2/3 above |
| 21. *Views on the peace process* (A1) | 56, 58, 67 | 50.2 above | 3/3 above | 3/3 above |
| 21'. *Views on negotiating with Israel, the Oslo process, and the peace process, combined* (A1, A2, A3) | 39, 54, 56, 58, 64, 65, 67 | 46.7 above | 7/7 above | 5/7 above |

Table A3 suggests that, of the 21 issue/policy domains, Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters are most polarized over the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, the performance of the PA, and the performance of Arafat. The vast majority of Fatah trusters support the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, and view the performance of the PA and of Arafat positively. In contrast, the vast majority of Leftist supporters oppose the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, and are critical of the performance of the PA and Arafat.

Of the 21 issue/policy domains, conversely, the two constituencies are least polarized with respect to beliefs on the orientations of Israelis regarding the Palestinians and the peace process, evaluations of the state of the Palestinian economy, preferences on the role that the US and EU should play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, and views on the strategic option of standing firm, to be distinguished from both conciliation and escalation, vis-à-vis Israel. In general, both constituencies are negative on the Israeli orientation regarding the Palestinians and the peace process, both constituencies are critical of the state of the Palestinian economy, both constituencies exhibit support for greater US and EU intervention, and each of the constituencies is quite *internally* divided over the strategic option of standing firm vis-à-vis Israel.

*B. Analysis of the similarities and differences in the views of the Fatah and Leftist constituencies with respect to specific issue/policy domains*

Beyond the abovementioned general observations, it is appropriate to examine the views of the two constituencies with respect to specific issue/policy domains in greater detail. Toward this end, Section *B* is divided into eight subsections that discuss, respectively, (1) preferences over strategic options vis-à-vis Israel, (2) beliefs and preferences regarding the intervention of the US and EU in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, (3) preferences to do with final status issues, (4) beliefs on the prospects of peace and on the orientation of Israelis toward the Palestinians and toward the peace process, (5) evaluations of the PA, Arafat, and the PLC, (6) level of trust in various Palestinian political figures, (7) preferences on political Islam, and (8) preferences on issues to do with Hamas.[6]

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[6] Before preceding to these analyses, an important caveat merits emphasis. The following subsections seek not only to identify various more or less nuanced tendencies to do with the beliefs and preferences of the two constituencies, but also to proffer possible explanations for these tendencies. The caveat is that addressing these topics adequately generally requires extensive deliberation and the collection and analysis of particular types of data that are in some cases not collected by any of the three surveys analyzed in this study. Simply put, most of the topics considered in the following subsections represent distinct topics meriting and requiring extensive research in their own right. Thus, the reader should view the analyses that follow as at best (1) partial explanations, (2) which may represent useful areas for future research, and (3) which in any case require further empirical corroboration.

1. Analysis of preferences on strategy toward Israel

To grasp the convergences and divergences of opinion across as well as within the two constituencies with respect to strategic options, it is appropriate to begin by viewing the various strategic options as together comprising an escalation-conciliation scale, and by locating the position of each of these options along this scale. Simply, that is, we can view the various Palestinian strategic options as falling on a scale with extreme escalation comprising one pole and extreme conciliation comprising the other pole. Figure B1a depicts the various strategic options along the escalation-conciliation scale.

Figure B1a: Theoretical escalation-conciliation scale



| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Escalate | suicide attacks | armed struggle | popular protest | halt negotiations | negotiate | Conciliate |

At least two comments on this scale deserve mention. First, the escalation-conciliation scale arranges the level of escalation-conciliation of each concrete policy option in ordinal- or rank-order. In other words, the scale assumes that suicide attacks are more escalatory and less conciliatory than armed struggle, that halting negotiations is more escalatory and less conciliatory than negotiating, etc. The primary implication of the ordinal nature of the scale is that we should expect that the closer a strategic option sits on the scale to a person's most preferred strategic option, the higher the likelihood that that person will support, if only moderately, that strategic option. Conversely, the farther a strategic option sits on this scale from a person's most preferred strategic option, the less likely that person to express some degree of support for that strategic option. For example, a person whose most favorite strategic option is negotiations will have a greater likelihood of being positively disposed toward halting negotiations than of being positively disposed toward armed force. Meanwhile, a person whose most favorite strategy is armed struggle will likely support popular protest more than halting negotiations alone.

A second point related to the escalation-conciliation scale is that it may be useful to view the "halt negotiations and await a favorable shift in the balance of power" option and the "popular struggle" option to represent two elements of the more general strategy called "standing firm" or "intransigence." That is, following much theoretical literature on strategic interaction, we can assume that the Palestinians can at any given point in time pursue one of three distinct strategic alternatives toward Israel – escalation, stand firm (intransigence), or conciliation. The author suggests, then, that halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power, and popular protest, represent two main elements of the standing firm strategic alternative. While the justification for treating abstention from negotiations as standing firm is self-evident, treating popular protest as standing firm requires some defense. The justification presented here is comprised of two basic points. First, popular protest intrinsically connotes resistance to rather than acceptance of the status quo, and in this respect is more consonant with refraining from concessions than with the making of concessions. As such, popular protest is more compatible with standing firm than with conciliation. Second, popular protest is generally non-violent and thus is qualitatively distinct from the strategic alternative of escalation, which is generally viewed as the threat or actual use of some type and degree of violence.[7]

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[7] Another point about the scale is that "suicide attacks" and "negotiate" do not sit, respectively, on the extreme escalation and extreme conciliation poles. The reason they do not is to emphasize the vital notion that how escalatory or conciliatory one views any given Palestinian strategic policy may depend on the strategy that Israel for her part adopts toward the Palestinians. Thus, to cite two hypothetical examples, Palestinian resort to armed struggle is more escalatory in the context of Israel making significant concessions than in the context of Israel itself resorting to coercive and repressive policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and Palestinian continuation of negotiations with Israel is more conciliatory within the context of Israeli refusal to make meaningful concessions than it is within the context of Israel making such concessions. The examination of the dependence of Palestinian preferences regarding strategic options on Israeli policy toward the Palestinians represents an important area for research that is briefly considered in the following discussion.

With these considerations in mind, the task becomes to locate the positions of the Fatah and PFLP/DFLP constituencies on each of the strategic options in the scale. This is done in Figure B1b below.

Figure B1b: Location of the preferences of the Fatah constituency and the Leftist constituency on the escalation-conciliation scale

| |_____|_____|_____|_____|_____|_____| |

| Escalate | suicide attacks | armed struggle | popular protest | halt negotiations | negotiate Conciliate |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | polariz: 25.8 | polariz: 21.5 | | polariz: 12.4 | polariz: 46.7 |
| | $Left_{supp}$: 46.4% | $Left_{supp}$: 63.6% | | $Left_{supp}$: 47.3%[8] | $Left_{supp}$: 28.7% |
| | $Fatah_{supp}$: 16.3% | $Fatah_{supp}$: 32.2% | | $Fatah_{supp}$: 42.6% | $Fatah_{supp}$: 86.4% |

The scale in figure B1b reports the average percentages of the samples of the two constituencies across the three surveys that support the various strategic options.[9] These averages make a basic point. The percentages of the members of each constituency who support each of the various strategic options generally conform to the ordinal-level logic of the scale. That is, we locate the strategic option that receives the most support from each constituency, and the farther in the scale each other strategic option from this most supported one, the less support this other option receives from the constituency. Specifically, the Fatah constituency is most supportive of negotiating with Israel, and is more supportive of standing firm than of armed struggle, and more supportive of armed struggle than of suicide operations. The PFLP/DFLP constituency, meanwhile, is most supportive of armed struggle, second most supportive of standing firm and suicide operations more or less equally, and least supportive of negotiations.

The ordinal structure of the preferences of the two constituencies, however, does appear to be violated when the two stand-firm options are considered individually. Specifically, the percentage of each constituency that supports popular protest is higher than the percentage of each constituency that supports suspending negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power. This violates the ordinal structure of the preferences of the Fatah constituency; that is, since the most preferred strategic policy of the Fatah constituency is negotiations, the ordinal logic of the scale suggests, assuming that halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power is a more conciliatory policy than popular protest, that, after negotiations, support within the Fatah constituency would be second highest for halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power. Contrarily, as mentioned above, the percentage of Fatah supporters who support popular protest is higher than the percentage of Fatah supporters who support halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power. More will be said shortly on the views of the constituencies regarding halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power.

Presently, the views of the PFLP constituency on popular struggle merit brief consideration. The percentage of the March 1999 PFLP constituency that expressed support for popular protest (69.6%) is in fact slightly higher than the average percentage of the PFLP/DFLP constituency that expressed support for armed struggle (63.6%). As the PFLP constituency's level of support for popular protest is derived from only one survey item and from a very small sample of PFLP supporters, and as the PFLP/DFLP constituency's level of support for armed struggle is derived from taking the average

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[8] The percentages of PFLP constituency and Fatah constituency support reported along the scale refer to the average of the percentages of support of these two constituencies for popular protest and halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power. The percentage of the PFLP constituency supporting popular protest is 69.6%, and the percentage of the Fatah constituency supporting popular protest is 47.7%. Meanwhile, 25.0% of the PFLP constituency expressed support for halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power, and 38.1% of the Fatah constituency expressed support for this option.

[9] These averages are crude (a) because they are based on survey items that are sometimes phrased differently, (b) because the data were collected at three different points in time, and (c) because the Leftist averages are based on the views of supporters of both the PFLP and DFLP combined for items from the November 1997 and May 1998 polls, and on the views of supporters of the PFLP alone for items from the March 1999 poll.

of four survey items and from a larger sample than the March 1999 PFLP sample, we should not conclude that the percentage of the PFLP/DFLP constituency that supports popular struggle is larger than the percentage of this constituency that supports armed struggle. Rather, the relative amount of the support for these two strategic options within the PFLP/DFLP constituency remains a question for future research.

When views on popular protest and halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power are combined, the two constituencies exhibit the highest level of polarization on the option of negotiation (polarization score = 46.7), the second-highest level of polarization on the option of suicide operations (polarization score = 25.8), and the third-highest level of polarization on the option of armed struggle (polarization score = 21.5). In contrast, we find that the level of polarization between the two constituencies with respect to standing firm is low. It is low, not only relative to the other polarization scores of the other strategic options in the escalation-conciliation scale, but also relative to the polarization scores of the 20 other issue/policy domains. That is, the strategy of standing firm represents one of the 21 issue/policy domains around which the two constituencies are least polarized. The primary source of this relatively low level of polarization is that both constituencies exhibit a higher level of support for popular struggle than opposition to popular struggle.

Furthermore, the data suggest that the percentage of Fatah trusters who support halting negotiations and waiting for a favorable shift in the balance of power (38.1%) is higher than the percentage of Leftist trusters who support this strategy (25.0%). To understand the views of the two constituencies on this strategic policy, it should first be pointed out that the survey item combines what are two compatible but ultimately distinct elements, i.e., (1) halting negotiations, and (2) awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power. Thus, respondents expressing opposition to this survey item might be opposed to only one of the two aspects of the policy described in the item, and respondents expressing support for this survey item might be supportive of only one of the two aspects of the policy described in this item. More specifically, it is likely that the vast majority of respondents who are Leftist supporters are opposed to the "await a favorable shift in the balance of power" and not to the halting of negotiations. Many Fatah supporters expressing opposition to this survey item, meanwhile, may be primarily opposed to the "halting negotiations" clause.

The finding that the percentage of Fatah trusters who support halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power is higher than the percentage of Leftist trusters who support this strategy might nonetheless be surprising. The reasons for this are that (a) the large majority of Fatah supporters, as well as the Fatah leadership itself, support the continuation of negotiations, and (b) the Leftist factions have throughout the history of the modern Palestinian nationalist movement emphasized precisely the cultivation of a more favorable distribution of power by strengthening pan-Arabic integration and developing the Palestinian society and economy. One possible explanation for the lower level of support within the Leftist constituency than within the Fatah constituency for halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power is that at least some Leftist supporters may have interpreted this policy option as representing a policy of *inaction*, and may have for this reason expressed opposition to it. Alternatively, some people may support this strategy in principle but not in practice because they simply are pessimistic about the likelihood that the balance of power will shift decisively in the Palestinian favor.

Beyond assessing the general preferences of the two constituencies on the various strategic options, it is important to examine the extents to which the preferences of the two constituencies are dependent upon whether or not Israel, for her part, adopts a conciliatory or escalatory/intransigent policy toward the Palestinians. Specifically, it is important to identify the proportion of each constituency that supports negotiations even if Israel is intransigent and that supports negotiations only if Israel is more or less conciliatory, and the proportion of each constituency that supports armed struggle even within the context of Israeli conciliation and that supports armed struggle only if Israel does not make concessions. Similarly, we are interested in whether or not the level of polarization between the two factional constituencies increases or decreases when we move from the context of Israeli conciliation to the context of Israeli intransigence/escalation.

To identify the proportion of each constituency that supports negotiations even if Israel is intransigent and that supports negotiations only if Israel is more or less conciliatory, we compare the responses of each constituency to two survey items. The first item asks the respondent to express his or her general level of support for the continuation of negotiations (A3a). The second survey item asks

the respondent to express his or her level of support for the continuation of negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence, i.e., "if the possibility of achieving Palestinian statehood reaches a dead end" (A3b).[10]

The data suggest that the inter-constituency gap in views on negotiations decreases in the context of Israeli intransigence. Levels of support for negotiations within the Leftist constituency appear to be generally uninfluenced by a shift in the framing of the issue from one of negotiations in general to negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence. More specifically, 31.4% of the PFLP/DFLP constituency expressed support for negotiations when framed in general terms (A3a), and 34.8% of the PFLP constituency expressed support for negotiations when framed within the context of a dead-end in the peace process (A3b). Meanwhile, the percentage of Fatah trusters who support negotiations within the context of a dead-end in the peace process (74.7%; A3b) is lower than the percentage of Fatah trusters who support negotiations framed in general terms (90.0%; A3a).

Turning to the analysis of the association of views regarding armed struggle with a shift in Israeli policy, the data suggest that the inter-constituency gap in views on armed violence, as does the corresponding gap in views on negotiations, decreases within the context of a dead-end in the peace process. Whereas the majority of the Leftist constituency (71.9%) and the minority of the Fatah constituency (35.6%) support armed struggle framed in general terms (A4a), the majority of the Fatah constituency (57.5%) as well as of the Leftist constituency (73.9%) holds either a supportive or neutral view on armed struggle within the context of a dead-end in the peace process (A4c). Thus, the survey data suggest that the support within the Fatah constituency for negotiations, and the opposition within the Fatah constituency to armed struggle, are substantially dependent upon Israeli conciliation, and that Leftist support for armed struggle and opposition to negotiations are high even within the context of Israeli conciliation, such that a dead-end in the peace process brings the strategic preferences of the two constituencies closer together.[11]

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[10] Comparison of the two sets of responses does not represent a conclusive assessment of the extent to which the preferences of each constituency are dependent upon Israel's own strategic orientation toward the Palestinians, because (a) the survey item tapping respondent level of support for negotiations in general does not frame this strategic option within the context of Israeli conciliation, but rather frames negotiations in general terms; (b) the two survey items appear in two different surveys, i.e., November 1997 and March 1999, and thus shifts in preferences on negotiations may be due at least in part to outright changes in preferences on negotiation over time, rather than to the fact that one survey item frames negotiations in general terms and the other frames negotiations explicitly within the context of Israeli intransigence, and (c) the size of the Leftist, i.e., PFLP, sample for the March 1999 survey is very small. While these deficiencies make the present analysis inconclusive, the present analysis is nevertheless suggestive of trends regarding an issue of fundamental importance.

[11] As with the analysis of shifts in views on negotiations associated with variation in Israeli policy, various deficiencies make the following analysis inconclusive. First, excluding the survey item on the "morality of violence," the three surveys combined include only three items to do with armed struggle. Moreover, only one of these three survey items (A4c) explicitly frames the option of armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence, i.e., "dead-end in the possibility of achieving an independent Palestinian state," and only one of these survey items (A4a) frames the option of armed struggle in general terms. The last of the three survey items to do with armed struggle (A4b) solicits respondent views on armed struggle within the context of "current political conditions." This last survey item was asked in the March 1999 survey, and thus during the tenure of the Netanyahu government. As such, it could certainly be argued that this survey item's emphasis on "current political conditions" approximates the scenario of Israeli intransigence or even escalation. The author nonetheless decided to exclude this survey item from consideration at present, given the inherent ambiguity of "current political conditions." Thus, the analysis is based on a comparison of responses to only two survey items. Second, the survey items come from two difference polls, i.e., November 1997 and March 1999, such that shifts in levels of support for/opposition to armed struggle might at least in part be a function not of a shift in the framing of the strategic option survey item across the surveys but rather an actual shift in views on armed struggle over time. Third, as mentioned above, the small size of the March 1999 PFLP sample limits the representativeness of the responses of PFLP supporters to the survey item on armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence.

By way of concluding discussion to do with strategic options, it is useful to emphasize a point on the conceptualization of political violence. Specifically, relying upon survey items which explicitly differentiate between violence targeting civilians within the Green Line, on the one side, and violence targeting military personnel and/or settlers in the occupied territories, on the other side, would refine our understanding of the opinions of the factional constituencies. The main reason for this is that some people may support violence against settlers and military personnel but not against Israeli civilians within the Green Line because, whereas Israeli settlers and military personnel are viewed as direct aggressors, Israeli civilians may be viewed as not directly responsible for Israeli escalatory and intransigent policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Stated differently, many Palestinians no doubt differentiate between violence against Israeli combatants, i.e., Israeli settlers as well as military personnel, on the one side, and violence against Israeli non-combatants, i.e., Israeli civilians within the Green Line, on the other side. Furthermore, the distinction between "suicide operations" and "military struggle" does not explicitly and necessarily correspond to the distinction between violence against civilians within the Green Line and violence against Israeli military personnel and settlers. Many respondents may indeed take "armed struggle" to mean violence against Israeli military personnel and settlers, and suicide operations to mean violence against Israeli civilians within the Green Line. But, for one, suicide operations may be directed against Israeli military personnel and settlers as well as against civilians within the Green Line. Conversely, "armed struggle" as well as "suicide operations" ultimately involves guerrilla or terrorist activities; that is to say, the Palestinian "armed struggle" option does not involve conventional military force, whether it be directed at civilians within the Green Line or at Israeli military personnel and settlers. The basic point is that the analysis of preferences on Palestinian strategic options would benefit from explicitly differentiating between violence against Israeli civilians within the Green Line and violence against Israeli military personnel and settlers.

## 2. Analysis of views on the roles of the US and EU in Palestinian-Israeli Affairs

US and EU intervention in Palestinian-Israeli affairs ultimately comprises an important component of the strategic interaction of the Palestinians and Israel. We can differentiate between the various survey items to do with this general issue/policy domain along two dimensions – (1) whether the survey item taps views on the role of the US or on the role of the EU, and (2) whether the survey item taps views (a) on the role that the US/EU has played in the past or is likely to play in the future, or (b) on the role that the US/EU *should* play. Cross-tabulating these two dimensions provides four types of survey items to do with the role of the US/EU in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. These types of items, and the actual responses of the two constituencies to these items, are summarized in Table B2a.

Table B2a: Typology of survey items to do with US and EU intervention, and summary of constituency responses to these items

| Descriptive versus normative view of US/EU role | Western power | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | United States | European Union |
| Role that US/EU has played in the past or is likely to play in the future | I<br>*How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the intervention of the United States in the peace process?* (*A*10a, 11/97)<br>Fatah$_{satisfied}$: 29.9%<br>PFLP/DFLP$_{satisfied}$: 8.8%<br>*To what extent do you have confidence that America will care for Palestinian interests in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations?* (*A*10b, 11/97)<br>Fatah$_{confident}$: 34.2%<br>PFLP/DFLP$_{confident}$: 8.6%<br>*Has the U.S. been more favorable to Israelis, neutral and favors neither side, or the U.S. has been more favorable to Palestinians?* (*A*10c, 5/98)<br>Fatah$_{Israel}$: 97.2%<br>PFLP/DFLP$_{Israel}$: 97.4% | III<br>*How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the intervention of the European Union in the peace process?* (*A*10d, 11/97)<br>Fatah$_{satisfied}$: 53.9%<br>PFLP/DFLP$_{satisfied}$: 41.2%<br><br>*Has the EU been more favorable to the Israelis, neutral, or more favorable to the Palestinians?* (*A*10e, 5/98)<br>Fatah$_{Israel}$: 42.4%<br>PFLP/DFLP$_{Israel}$: 75.0% |
| Role that the US/EU *should* play | II<br>*Despite the extent of your satisfaction with the role played by America now, what is, in your belief, the role that America should play?* (*A*11a, 11/97)<br>Fatah$_{major}$: 60.3%<br>PFLP/DFLP$_{major}$:30.3%<br>*How active a role do you think the United States should play in Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations?* (*A*11b, 5/98)<br>Fatah$_{more}$: 92.7%<br>PFLP/DFLP$_{more}$: 83.4% | IV<br>*How active a role should the EU play in Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations?* (*A*11c, 5/98)<br><br>Fatah$_{more}$: 91.8%<br>PFLP/DFLP$_{more}$: 91.7% |

Both constituencies share a more positive view of the EU than of the US. More specifically, a majority of Fatah supporters as well as a majority of Leftist supporters expressed "dissatisfaction" with US intervention, and "skepticism" that the US will care for Palestinian interests. Furthermore, no gap exists between the views of the two constituencies on whether the US has been more favorable to the Israelis, more favorable to the Palestinians, or neutral. In response to this survey item, the vast majority of both constituencies view the US as having been more favorable to Israel. Additionally, views on the roles that the US and EU actually play represent one of the less polarized of the 21 issue/policy domains. Perhaps most notably in this regard, no meaningful gap exists between the views of the two constituencies in terms of preferences on the role that the EU should play, with the large majority of both constituencies supporting a more active role for the EU.

At the same time, meaningful differences between the views of the two constituencies do exist. First, the proportion of the Leftist constituency expressing dissatisfaction with and skepticism about the US is substantially higher than the proportion of the Fatah constituency doing so. Second, the majority of the Leftist constituency expressed dissatisfaction with EU intervention, and the opinion of the majority of the Fatah constituency was inconsistent. On the one side, the majority of the Fatah

constituency expressed satisfaction with EU intervention. On the other side, the proportion of Fatah supporters viewing the EU as more favorable to Israel was found to be significantly higher than the proportion of Fatah supporters viewing the EU as more favorable to the Palestinians. Also, the minority within the Fatah constituency that views US intervention positively, and the minority within the Fatah constituency that views EU intervention positively, are larger than the corresponding minorities within the PFLP/DFLP constituency. Lastly, the level of polarization between the two constituencies in terms of the role that the US should play is inconsistent. Data collected by the November 1997 survey suggest that the majority of the Fatah constituency wishes for the US to play a more active role, and that about one-third of the PFLP/DFLP constituency wishes for an increased US role. In contrast, the May 1998 data suggest that the large majority of both constituencies support a more active US intervention.

Beyond these general observations, two important and related inconsistencies appear to exist in the views of many Fatah and Leftist supporters with respect to the role of the US and EU in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. First, while a meaningful proportion of Fatah supporters express satisfaction with and confidence in the US, the overwhelming majority of the Fatah constituency concomitantly expresses the belief that the US favors Israel. A second, and ultimately more noteworthy, apparent inconsistency suggested by the data is a tendency for a substantial proportion of the Fatah constituency and in the case of one survey item of the Leftist constituency to both express dissatisfaction with/skepticism toward US and EU intervention *and* to support *increased* US and EU intervention in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. In other words, as is revealed in Tables B2b-B2e, a large proportion of people critical of the US/EU support the increased intervention of the US/EU in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. Two survey items tap respondent views on the role that the US *should* play. In response to one of these survey items, the majority of the Fatah constituency expressed a desire for the US to play a more major role, and the majority of the Leftist constituency expressed the desire for the US to play no role. In response to the other survey item, the vast majority of the Leftist constituency as well as of the Fatah constituency expressed support for a more active US role. Similarly, whereas at most half of the Fatah constituency expressed satisfaction with the EU, and whereas more than half of the PFLP/DFLP constituency expressed criticism of EU intervention, both constituencies expressed overwhelming support for an increase in the role of the EU.

Table B2b: Views on the role that the US should play by level of confidence that America will protect Palestinian interests, on Fatah constituency sample (November 1997)

| Role America should play | Much confidence that US will protect Palestinian interests | Some confidence that US will protect Palestinian interests | Little confidence that US will protect Palestinian interests | No confidence that US will protect Palestinian interests |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| major role | 64.1% (25) | 67.3% (171) | 59.3% (175) | 45.2% (236) |
| secondary role | 28.2% (11) | 22.8% (58) | 20.7% (61) | 14.9% (78) |
| no role at all | 7.7% (3) | 9.8% (25) | 20.0% (59) | 39.8% (208) |

Table B2c: Views on the role that the US should play by level of satisfaction with past US intervention, on Fatah constituency sample (November 1997)

| Role America should play | Very satisfied with past US intervention | Somewhat satisfied with past US intervention | Slightly satisfied with past US intervention | Not satisfied at all with past US intervention |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| major role | 77.3% (34) | 64.1% (123) | 54.0% (183) | 50.4% (255) |
| secondary role | 20.5% (9) | 29.2% (56) | 19.5% (66) | 14.2% (72) |
| no role at all | 2.3% (1) | 6.8% (13) | 26.5% (90) | 33.4% (179) |

Table B2d: Views on the role that the US should play by views on whether the US has been more favorable to Israel, more favorable to the Palestinians, or neutral, on entire sample (May 1998)

| Role that the US should play | US more favorable to Israel | US neutral | US more favorable to the Palestinians |
|---|---|---|---|
| much more active | 78.6% (837) | 58.8% (20) | 66.7% (4) |
| somewhat more active | 11.0% (117) | 23.5% (8) | 0.0% (0) |
| about as active as at present | 2.7% (29) | 14.7% (5) | 16.7% (1) |
| somewhat less active | 3.4% (36) | 0.0% (0) | 16.7% (1) |
| much less active | 4.3% (46) | 2.9% (1) | 0.0% (0) |

Table B2e: Views on the role that the EU should play by views on whether the EU has been more favorable to Israel, more favorable to the Palestinians, or neutral, on Fatah and PFLP/DFLP constituency samples combined (May 1998)

| Role that the EU should play | EU more favorable to Israel | EU neutral | EU more favorable to the Palestinians |
|---|---|---|---|
| much more active | 80.2% (142) | 76.1% (134) | 54.8% (23) |
| somewhat more active | 9.6% (17) | 17.0% (30) | 38.1% (16) |
| about as active as at present | 4.5% (8) | 4.5% (8) | 7.1% (3) |
| somewhat less active | 2.8% (5) | 1.7% (3) | 0.0% (0) |
| much less active | 2.8% (5) | 0.6% (1) | 0.0% (0) |

Two types of factors might account for both of the related inconsistencies in the views of many Palestinians with respect to US and EU intervention. One of these two types of factors is psychological and more specifically involves irrational cognitive processes, and the other involves rational evaluations of the political situation. Beginning with the irrational cognitive process, we can think of some respondents as having a psychological need to be optimistic. We might expect people for whom this need is particularly strong to interpret their environment to the extent possible in ways that satisfy this psychological need. Now, the intervention in particular of the US and also of the EU clearly impacts the prospects of Palestinian achievement of Palestinian nationalist aspirations. As such, to the extent that a person tells himself or herself (as well as the interviewer) that the US/EU intervention is positive, from the perspective of Palestinian nationalist aspirations, the person satisfies his or her psychological need to be an optimistic person.

It is likely, in turn, that the three survey items tapping respondent beliefs on the actual role played by the US and EU provide the respondent with varying degrees of opportunity to express optimism. Specifically, whereas the first two survey items (A10a, A10b) solicit the respondent's level of satisfaction with/confidence in the US in absolute and general terms, the third survey item (A10c) asks the respondent to rank the US's concern for/favorability toward the Palestinians and the US's concern for/favorability toward Israel. In the case of a straight-out weighing of the US's favoritism vis-à-vis the Palestinians and Israel, it is not at all surprising that the overwhelming majority of the two factional constituencies expressed the view that the US favors Israel. In contrast, since the first two items are general and non-comparative, they allow the respondent to provide an optimistic response. In other words, while the absolute and general framings of these latter two survey items enable the respondent to rationalize satisfaction in and confidence with the US/EU, the survey item asking the respondent to assess whether the US/EU has been more favorable to Israel, to the

Palestinians, or neutral, is simply too direct and the answer to this survey item, at least in the case of the US, too clear-cut for the respondent to indicate that the US has been more favorable to the Palestinians, even if this undermines the respondent's satisfaction of his or her psychological need to retain optimism. Similarly, people may support an increased role for, in particular, the US, against their belief that the US favors Israel, as a method of retaining some degree of hope in an otherwise bleak situation.

The second set of factors potentially accounting for respondents simultaneously expressing inconsistent beliefs with respect to, in particular, US intervention, assumes that the respondents are providing rational responses given the political environment. First, people may view the US as more favorable to Israel, but as nonetheless more favorable to the Palestinians than is Israel. That is, given the predominant power of Israel, people may think that without US and perhaps also EU intervention the Palestinians would get even less than they would with US intervention. Furthermore, since the US positions on the final status issues, and perhaps those of the EU as well, are much closer to the position of Israel's mainstream-Left than to the position of the Palestinians' mainstream moderates, we should of course not expect US intervention, and perhaps EU intervention as well, to advance Palestinian objectives sufficiently. Accordingly, we might expect that people's satisfaction with US and perhaps also EU intervention will be relatively temporary, and will dissipate within the context of final status negotiations and a final status settlement.

Yet other people might simultaneously express dissatisfaction with and skepticism toward the US/EU and the desire for greater US/EU intervention because they subscribe to the strategy of regaining Palestine in stages. That is, Palestinians supporting the strategy of gaining Palestine in stages might be satisfied with the US, not because the US pushes for final status concessions that are adequate to even moderate Palestinians, but because the concessions the US pushes for put the Palestinians on better ground from which to continue the struggle against Israel.[12]

## 3. Analysis of views on final status issues

The present discussion considers attitudes on the following issues to do with final status: (1) views on the relative salience of the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, and Israeli settlement of the occupied territories, and (2) views on the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli state.[13] A March 1999 survey item solicited data on respondents' opinions on the most important final status issue.[14] Of

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[12] Given these considerations, future survey research may benefit from relying on survey items that explicitly indicate whether the satisfaction with/confidence in the US/EU refers to the short-term or long-term (or, instead of long-term, to a final status settlement).

[13] At various points, this study has emphasized that the reliability of the analyses of this study to do with the views of the Leftist constituency is limited because the sample of Leftist supporters is small. That is, the small size of the sample of Leftist supporters reduces the confidence we can have that the tendencies exhibited by the sample of Leftist supporters actually exist in the *population* of Leftist supporters. Of the various issue/policy domains analyzed in this study, the problem of a small Leftist sample is particularly troublesome in the analysis of the attitudes of the Leftist constituency on final status issues. The reasons for this are that (1) of the three surveys analyzed in this study, only the March 1999 survey collects data on views to do with final status issues, and (2) in this survey, as mentioned above, the sample of Leftists is comprised solely of 24 respondents who reported trusting the PFLP most. Another limitation of the present examination of attitudes on final status issues is that the March 1999 survey collects data on respondent opinions to do with issues that may be interpreted as strategic options as well as final status issues. Specifically, the March 1999 survey asks a series of questions that tap attitudes on the acceptability of particular final status proposals *within the context of the peace process reaching a dead end.* On one side, the proposals being suggested in these survey items do indeed refer to the final status of the Palestinian problem. On the other side, however, since these proposals are framed as possible *responses* to the peace process reaching a dead end, attitudes on these proposals may be viewed as strategic options — that is, as tactical responses to the particular dead-end context, rather than as preferences on specific proposals for a final status settlement. Given these considerations, the present analysis of the survey data to do with views on final status issues demands particular skepticism.

[14] This survey item collects qualitative rather than numeric data, and thus does not lend itself to the calculation of

the sample of Fatah supporters, 51.3% view Jerusalem as the most important issue, 16.0% view refugees as the most important issue, and 31.3% view settlements as the most important issue. Of the sample of PFLP supporters, 34.8% view Jerusalem as the most important issue, 21.7% view refugees as the most important issue, and 34.8% view settlements as the most important issue. To reiterate, we must be very cautious about the representativeness of the PFLP constituency figures given the small sample size of this constituency. With this in mind, perhaps the most notable finding suggested by these figures is that the percentage of Fatah supporters (51.3%) who view Jerusalem as the most important issue is higher than the percentage of PFLP supporters (34.8%) who view Jerusalem as the most important issue. The figures also suggest that the Leftist constituency may be slightly more prone to emphasizing the refugee issue than is the Fatah constituency. The figures suggest, lastly, that, of the three final status issues, Israeli settlement of the occupied territories is the second most important issue, at least for the Fatah constituency.

One factor which may account for the finding that the proportion of the Fatah constituency holding Jerusalem to be the most important final status issue is larger than the proportion of the PFLP constituency holding this view, is the prominent role that secularism plays in Leftist ideology. Simply, given that one of the main reasons that Jerusalem is important to Palestinians is Jerusalem's religious significance, and given that secularism is preferred by more Leftist supporters than Fatah supporters, we may expect the status of Jerusalem to be relatively more important for the Fatah constituency than for the Leftist constituency. By way of empirically assessing the validity of this hypothesis, the author cross-tabulated views on the most important final status issue by preferences on both "*Shari'a* versus secular law" and "the establishment of an Islamic state." These cross-tabulations are presented in Tables B3a and B3b.

Both of these tables suggest that preferences over political Islam do indeed influence the tendency of Fatah supporters and Leftist supporters to view Jerusalem, and, by implication, other final status issues, as the most important final status issue. More specifically, both tables reveal that support for political Islam is associated with a higher probability than is opposition to political Islam of viewing Jerusalem as the most important final status issue. Table B3a shows that, of those members of the Fatah and Leftist constituencies that express a preference for the *Shari'a* over secular law, 52.6% cite Jerusalem as the most important issue, and of those expressing a preference for secular law over the *Shari'a*, 42.4% cite Jerusalem as the most important issue. Meanwhile, of those preferring the *Shari'a*, only 13.7% express that the refugee problem is the most important issue, and, of those preferring secular law, 25.0% report the refugee problem as most important.

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polarization scores. What is more, while "support for" and "opposition to" any particular policy are mutually exclusive alternatives – that is, while a person may *either* support *or* oppose a policy – a person can view more than one final status issue as very salient. For example, a person that holds the issue of Jerusalem to be the *most* important final status issue may also, and is indeed likely to, find the issue of refugees to be extremely important as well. For that matter, one person may view Jerusalem as the *most* important issue, and another person may view refugees as the *most* important issue, and yet the second person may in absolute terms, assuming we can compare, care more about Jerusalem than does the first person. Lastly, people that disagree on the relative *salience* of various final status issues may nonetheless agree on the ideal *resolutions* of these issues. For example, two people may disagree in that one holds Jerusalem to be the most important issue and the other holds refugees to be the most important issue, and at the same time agree that the ideal resolution of the Jerusalem issue is for East Jerusalem to fall under the full sovereignty of a Palestinian state, and that the ideal resolution of the refugee problem is for all refugees and progeny of refugees to be given the opportunity to return to their homes. For these reasons, it is not appropriate to think of the Fatah and Leftist constituencies in terms of being *polarized* over the relative salience of various final status issues. For these reasons, moreover, the responses to this survey item are not reported in Tables A1-3.

Table B3a: Views on the most important final status issue by legal preferences, on Fatah constituency sample and PFLP constituency sample combined (March 1999)

| p = .02, X² = 9.5 | Preference regarding type of legal system | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| most important final status issue | *Shari'a* | secular law |
| Jerusalem | 52.6% (181) | 42.4% (39) |
| refugees | 13.7% (47) | 25.0% (23) |
| settlers | 32.6% (112) | 29.3% (27) |
| other | 1.2% (4) | 3.3% (3) |

The hypothesis that preferences on political Islam influence views on the relative salience of particular final status issues receives some corroboration from Table B3b. We should be skeptical of the representativeness of the trends in the "strongly oppose an Islamic state" column because it is comprised of a small number of respondents, i.e., 15. With this caveat in mind, we turn to the figures of Table B3b. As is revealed in this table, 58.1% of those who strongly support the establishment of an Islamic state reported Jerusalem as the most important issue, 52.7% of those who somewhat support the establishment of an Islamic state reported Jerusalem as the most important issue, 48.4% of those who somewhat oppose the establishment of an Islamic state reported Jerusalem as the most important issue, and 26.7% of those who expressed strong opposition to the establishment of an Islamic state reported Jerusalem as the most important issue. Meanwhile, the view that the refugee problem is the most important final status issue was expressed by 9.3% of those who strongly support an Islamic state, 17.4% of those who somewhat support an Islamic state, 22.6% of those who somewhat oppose an Islamic state, and 6.7% of those who strongly oppose an Islamic state. Table B3b thus suggests that preferences on an Islamic state are associated, if only moderately, with the tendency to view Jerusalem as the most important final status issue.

Table B3b: Views on the most important final status issue by preferences regarding the establishment of an Islamic state, on the Fatah constituency and PFLP constituency samples combined (March 1999)

| p < .01, X² = 31.1 | Establishment of an Islamic state | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Most important final status issue | strongly support | somewhat support | neither support nor oppose | somewhat oppose | strongly oppose |
| Jerusalem | 58.1% (50) | 52.7% (106) | 45.7% (37) | 48.4% (30) | 26.7% (4) |
| refugees | 9.3% (8) | 17.4% (35) | 13.6% (11) | 22.6% (14) | 6.7% (1) |
| settlers | 32.6% (28) | 28.9% (58) | 35.8% (29) | 29.0% (18) | 53.3% (8) |
| other | 0.0% (0) | 1.0% (2) | 4.9% (4) | 0.0% (0) | 13.3% (2) |

It should be added, on the higher tendency among Leftist supporters than among Fatah supporters to view the refugee problem as important, that this apparent divergence between the two constituencies may reflect not only the greater secularism of the Leftists, but also a relatively stronger connection of Leftist factions to the Diaspora. At the same time, the finding that the refugee problem is more important for Leftist supporters than for Fatah supporters may be surprising in light of the finding reported in Part II that Leftist supporters are underrepresented in refugee camps and within the refugee sector of the Palestinian population.

On the relative salience of settlements, lastly, Tables B3a and B3b suggest that people's preferences on political Islam do not appear to influence people's tendency to view settlements as the

most important final status issue. These tables suggest, more specifically, that roughly 30% of Fatah supporters and perhaps also of Leftist supporters who support political Islam view settlements as the most important issue, and that about 30% of those who oppose political Islam view settlements as the most important issue.

We now turn to the issue of the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli state. As is evident from Tables A2 and A3, the two constituencies exhibit a low level of polarization on this issue. A small proportion of each constituency supports this proposal, and the majority of each constituency opposes this proposal. The author finds it surprising that the majority of both factional constituencies oppose this proposal, because it represents a maximal gain for the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel. Perhaps the widespread opposition to a joint state exists not because people don't want such a state, but because they don't view this option as credible. That is, perhaps people like this option but view Israel as highly likely to reject it unconditionally. Thus, people may oppose this scenario more as a Palestinian strategy and less as an actual final status outcome.

Furthermore, we might expect people who support a joint Palestinian-Israeli state to be particularly prone to support armed struggle, because, given Israel's monolithic and vehement opposition to a joint Palestinian-Israeli state, the achievement of such a state would require Palestinian resort to force. To investigate whether those who support a joint Palestinian-Israeli state do indeed exhibit a disproportionately high tendency to support armed struggle, the author conducted the following cross-tabulations for the sample of Fatah supporters: (1) views on establishing a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on the peace process; (2) views on demanding a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on the peace process; (3) views on establishing a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on resuming armed struggle; (4) views on demanding a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on resuming armed struggle; (5) views on establishing a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on a return to armed struggle; and (6) views on demanding a joint-Palestinian-Israeli state by views on a return to armed struggle.[15]

In the two cross-tabulations involving attitudes toward the peace process, which are reported in Tables B3c and B3d, the *majority* of *both* those supportive of the peace process and those opposed to the peace process *oppose* the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli state. Thus, preferences on the peace process do not appear to be associated with views on a joint state, and, perhaps more to the point, people supportive of a joint Palestinian-Israeli state are not disproportionately prone to express opposition to the peace process.

Table B3c: Cross-tabulation of views on establishing a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on the peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

|  | Support peace process | Oppose peace process |
|---|---|---|
| Support establishing joint state | 23.5% (88) | 19.6% (12) |
| Oppose establishing joint state | 55.2% (207) | 62.3% (38) |

Table B3d: Cross-tabulation of views on demanding a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on the peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

|  | Support peace process | Oppose peace process |
|---|---|---|
| Support demanding joint state | 26.7% (100) | 18.6% (11) |
| Oppose demanding joint state | 59.1% (221) | 64.4% (38) |

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[15] The author did not conduct this set of cross-tabulations for the sample of PFLP trusters because of the small size of this sample.

Views on armed struggle also do not appear to be related to views on a joint Palestinian-Israeli state. In all four cross-tabulations of views on a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on armed struggle, which are presented in Tables B3e-B3h, the majority of Fatah supporters who support armed struggle actually oppose a joint Palestinian-Israeli state. These cross-tabulations thus suggest that views on armed struggle are not related to views on a joint Palestinian-Israeli state, and that supporters of armed struggle share with opponents of armed struggle a tendency to oppose a joint state.

Table B3e: Cross-tabulation of views on establishing a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on the resumption of military struggle as a suitable response to current political conditions, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

|  | Support resuming military operations | Oppose resuming military operations |
|---|---|---|
| Support establishing joint state | 16.9%<br>(17) | 24.1%<br>(77) |
| Oppose establishing joint state | 64.3%<br>(65) | 53.7%<br>(172) |

Table B3f: Cross-tabulation of views on establishing a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on returning to armed struggle within the context of a dead-end in the peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

|  | Moderately support return to armed struggle | Moderately oppose return to armed struggle |
|---|---|---|
| Support establishing joint state | 20.0%<br>(22) | 27.8%<br>(45) |
| Oppose establishing joint state | 63.6%<br>(70) | 45.1%<br>(73) |

Table B3g: Cross-tabulation of views on demanding a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on the resumption of military struggle as a suitable response to current political conditions, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

|  | Support resuming military operations | Oppose resuming military operations |
|---|---|---|
| Support demanding joint state | 24.2%<br>(24) | 26.3%<br>(84) |
| Oppose demanding joint state | 60.7%<br>(60) | 59.1%<br>(189) |

Table B3h: Cross-tabulation of views on demanding a joint Palestinian-Israeli state by views on returning to armed struggle within the context of a dead-end in the peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

|  | Moderately support return to armed struggle | Moderately oppose return to armed struggle |
|---|---|---|
| Support demanding joint state | 20.9%<br>(23) | 34.3%<br>(56) |
| Oppose demanding joint state | 66.4%<br>(73) | 52.8%<br>(86) |

4. Analysis of beliefs about the prospects of peace and the orientations of the Israeli leadership and masses toward the Palestinians and the peace process

We can view a person's beliefs about both the prospects of peace and the orientations of Israelis' toward the Palestinians and toward the peace process as beliefs which influence the person's preferences regarding Palestinian strategy toward Israel. In other words, a primary way that beliefs on the prospects of peace and on the Israeli commitment to the peace process may enter into internal Palestinian debate is as considerations pertinent to the desirability of negotiations, armed struggle, etc. Specifically, it is plausible to expect that a person's beliefs on whether or not the potential for achieving an adequate final status agreement is bright, and on whether or not Israelis are committed to the peace process and to making substantial concessions to the Palestinians, are likely to influence the person's willingness to support or oppose the peace process, negotiations, diplomacy, armed struggle, etc. Simply, it is plausible to suspect that, all other things equal, a person who is skeptical of Israel's commitment to making substantial concessions is less likely to support negotiations than a person who believes that such negotiations will in the end bear adequate fruit. Additionally, optimism/skepticism about the "prospects of peace" may ultimately or at least largely reduce to perceptions of Israel's commitment to a meaningful peace process. That is, given that Israel, due to its predominance of power, effectively controls the current status if not also future resolution of the final status issues, whether or not the Palestinians achieve satisfactory resolution of these issues depends largely on whether or not Israel is willing to make the corresponding concessions.

To the extent that we find it valid to interpret beliefs on the prospects of peace and perceptions of Israelis' own attitudes as factors that influence a person's strategic preferences, we would expect Fatah supporters to be both more optimistic about the prospects of peace and more optimistic about Israeli commitment to the peace process than are Leftist supporters. Simply, relying on backward induction, given that Fatah supporters are more supportive of the peace process than are Leftist supporters, we should expect that, all other things equal, Fatah supporters exhibit higher levels of optimism about the prospects of peace and higher levels of optimism about the Israeli commitment to a meaningful peace process than do Leftist supporters.

The relevant data indeed reveal statistically significant gaps between the responses of Fatah supporters and the responses of Leftist supporters regarding the "prospects of peace" survey items, with Fatah supporters being more optimistic than Leftist supporters. Importantly, the proportions of the two constituencies – and in particular of the Fatah constituency – that exhibit optimism and pessimism about the prospects of peace depends on the particular framing of the survey item. Specifically, of the three survey items reported in this study to do with the "prospects of peace," 76.8% of the Fatah constituency agrees with the general statement that "peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis is possible" (A8c), 67.3% of the Fatah constituency exhibits confidence about "reaching a satisfactory agreement on final status issues" (A8a), and a substantially smaller percentage of the Fatah constituency, 50.3%, believe that peace is "possible in the next five years" (A8b). Similarly, of the samples of PFLP/DFLP supporters, whereas 41.0% expressed agreement with the statement that "peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis is possible," 14.7% expressed being very or somewhat confident that the Palestinians and Israelis will reach a satisfactory agreement on final status issues," and 26.4% expressed that a peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis "in the next five years" is either very or somewhat possible. The point that the *framing* of survey items that tap sentiment on the prospects of peace influences respondents' responses to these items is an important one that will be addressed in subsection IVB2. At present, the primary point is that the data suggest that there exists a significant gap between the levels of optimism of the two factional constituencies with respect to the "prospects of peace." Furthermore, given the higher level of support for the peace process among Fatah supporters than among Leftist supporters, this finding confirms our expectation that people who support the peace process exhibit a higher level of optimism about the prospects of peace than do people who oppose the peace process.

The responses of Fatah and Leftist supporters to survey items tapping perceptions of Israelis toward the Palestinians and the peace process, however, run *counter* to both (a) the hypothesis that views on the prospects of peace, on the one side, and perceptions of the orientation of Israelis toward the peace process, on the other side, are highly inter-correlated, and (b) the hypothesis that support for the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, is largely dependent upon the perception that

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Israelis are committed to a meaningful peace process. The Fatah and Leftist constituencies do not exhibit statistically significant differences of opinion on the orientation of Israelis toward the peace process. The majority of Fatah supporters (71.5%) converge with the majority of Leftist supporters (84.6%) in viewing Israelis as either divided or opposed to the peace process (A9a). Within each constituency, furthermore, the percentage of people who believe that Israelis oppose the peace process is higher than the percentage of people who believe that Israelis support the peace process. Within each constituency, additionally, the percentage of people who believe that Israelis are divided is larger than the percentage of people who believe that Israelis support the peace process and larger than the percentage of people who believe that Israelis oppose the peace process. Furthermore, a vast majority of the Fatah constituency as well as of the Leftist constituency believes that Israel has not satisfied its obligations under Oslo (A9b). More specifically, 85.7% of the Fatah constituency expressed the view that the Israelis have fulfilled either only a few or none of their obligations, and 89.8% of the PFLP/DFLP constituency expressed this view. In contrast, 2.3% of the Fatah constituency, and 5.2% of the PFLP/DFLP constituency, expressed the view that Israel has satisfied either all or most of its obligations. Lastly, the majority of Fatah supporters (61.4%) as well as PFLP supporters (81.8%) maintained, prior to the last Israeli election, that the ascension to power of a Labor-led government would either not substantially alter or would worsen the current Palestinian political situation (A9d). At the same time, the percentage of Fatah supporters (38.6%) holding the belief that the rise to power of a Labor-led government would improve the Palestinian situation is substantially larger than the percentage of the PFLP constituency (18.2%) subscribing to this view. Suffice it to say, for now, that subsection IVB2 further investigates views within the Fatah constituency regarding the prospects of peace and the orientations of Israelis.

5. Analysis of evaluations of the PA, Arafat, and the PLC

The survey data suggest that evaluation of the PA and evaluation of Arafat represent two of the issue/policy domains around which the two constituencies are most polarized. Simply, the vast majority of Fatah supporters evaluate the PA and Arafat positively, and the vast majority of Leftist supporters evaluate the PA and Arafat negatively. This subsection discusses three issues regarding views on the PA, Arafat, and the PLC: (1) the relationship between evaluations of the general performance of the PA, on the one side, and evaluations of PA performance with respect to specific aspects of governance, on the other side, (2) comparison of evaluations of the PA, on the one side, and evaluations of Arafat, on the other side, and (3) comparison of evaluations of the PLC, on the one side, and evaluations of the PA, on the other side.

a. Analysis of the relationship between evaluations of the general performance of the PA and evaluations of PA performance with respect to specific aspects of governance

The divergence of opinion between the two factional constituencies on the PA is of course not surprising. Survey items asking people to report their general evaluation of the PA are no doubt viewed by many people as soliciting views on the *legitimacy of the PA as a governing institution, and as the Palestinian governing institution*. The legitimacy of the PA, in turn, comprises an integral element of the legitimacy of Fatah itself. The reasons for this, of course, are that the PA is a direct consequence and element of the Oslo accords, the Oslo accords were formulated and signed by the Fatah leadership, the policy of adhering to the Oslo framework is the cornerstone of the present Fatah agenda, and the PA is dominated by and comprised primarily of Fatah members. As such, it is only natural that the vast majority of Fatah supporters support the PA, and that the vast majority of the Leftist constituency opposes the PA.

To assess the hypothesis that people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA are largely driven by people's evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process and by people's own views on the peace process, the author conducted bivariate cross-tabulations and bivariate correlations of respondent evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process and respondents' own views on the peace process, on the one side, and respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA, on the other side. These analyses provide evidence in support of the hypothesis. The bivariate cross-tabulations are presented in Tables B5a-B5c. These three tables generally confirm that positive

evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process are associated with positive evaluations of the general performance of the PA, and that negative evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process are associated with negative evaluations of the general performance of the PA.

Table B5a: Evaluations of the general performance of the PA by views on the PA's handling of the peace process, on PFLP/DFLP constituency sample (May 1998)

| Evaluation of PA performance | very satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | somewhat satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | minimally satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | not at all satisfied with PA's handling of peace process |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very good | 0.0%<br>(0) | 0.0%<br>(0) | 0.0%<br>(0) | 0.0%<br>(0) |
| somewhat good | 50.0%<br>(1) | 57.1%<br>(4) | 6.3%<br>(1) | 0.0%<br>(0) |
| somewhat bad | 0.0%<br>(0) | 42.9%<br>(3) | 56.3%<br>(9) | 23.1%<br>(3) |
| very bad | 50.0%<br>(1) | 0.0%<br>(0) | 37.5%<br>(6) | 76.9%<br>(10) |

Table B5b: Evaluations of the general performance of the PA by views on the PA's handling of the peace process, on Leftist constituency sample[16] (May 1998)

| Evaluation of PA performance | very satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | somewhat satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | minimally satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | not at all satisfied with PA's handling of peace process |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very good | 0.0%<br>(0) | 0.0%<br>(0) | 0.0%<br>(0) | 0.0%<br>(0) |
| somewhat good | 50.0%<br>(1) | 75.0%<br>(12) | 12.5%<br>(3) | 0.0%<br>(0) |
| somewhat bad | 0.0%<br>(0) | 25.0%<br>(4) | 62.5%<br>(15) | 21.4%<br>(3) |
| very bad | 50.0%<br>(1) | 0.0%<br>(0) | 25.0%<br>(6) | 78.6%<br>(11) |

Table B5c: Evaluations of the general performance of the PA by views on the PA's handling of the peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (May 1998)

| Evaluation of PA performance | very satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | somewhat satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | minimally satisfied with PA's handling of peace process | not at all satisfied with PA's handling of peace process |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| very good | 45.3%<br>(34) | 8.3%<br>(20) | 7.3%<br>(4) | 0.0%<br>(0) |
| somewhat good | 50.7%<br>(38) | 82.2%<br>(198) | 58.2%<br>(32) | 45.5%<br>(5) |
| somewhat bad | 4.0%<br>(3) | 8.7%<br>(21) | 32.7%<br>(18) | 27.3%<br>(3) |
| very bad | 0.0%<br>(0) | 0.8%<br>(2) | 1.8%<br>(1) | 27.3%<br>(3) |

The results of the bivariate correlations are presented in Tables B5d-e. These tables show that respondent evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process and that respondent view toward the

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[16] This cross-tabulation was conducted on the sample of supporters of any of the four main Leftist factions.

peace process itself are indeed quite highly correlated with evaluation of the general performance of the PA. This finding supports the hypothesis that views on the PA are in large part a function of views on the peace process. Parenthetically, these tables also reveal that the correlations between evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process and views on the peace process itself, on the one side, and evaluations of the general performance of the PA, on the other side, are higher within the samples of supporters of the opposition factions than within the sample of Fatah supporters. This finding suggests that views of the PA's handling of the peace process and views on the peace process itself may generally play a somewhat larger role in the evaluations of supporters of the opposition factions regarding the general performance of the PA than they do in the corresponding evaluations of supporters of Fatah.

Table B5d: Correlation of general evaluation of the PA and evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process (May 1998)

| Factional constituency sample | correlation of general evaluation of PA and evaluation of PA's handling of the peace process |
|---|---|
| correlation for total sample | .61** |
| correlation for Fatah constituency sample | .44** |
| correlation for PFLP/DFLP constituency sample | .57** |
| correlation for Leftists constituency (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA) | .65** |
| correlation for Hamas constituency sample | .60** |

** p-value < .01; i.e., the positive correlation is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

Table B5e: Correlation of general evaluation of the PA and view on the peace process (May 1998)

| Factional constituency sample | correlation of general evaluation of the PA and view on the peace process |
|---|---|
| correlation for total sample | .47** |
| correlation for Fatah constituency sample | .24** |
| correlation for PFLP/DFLP constituency sample | .37* |
| correlation for Leftists constituency (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA) | .49** |
| correlation for Hamas constituency sample | .36** |

* .01 <= p-value <= .05; i.e., the positive correlation is estimated as having a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.
** p-value < .01; i.e., the positive correlation is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

The above data analyses, however, tell us little about the *relative sizes* of the effects on evaluations of the general performance of the PA of views on various specific aspects of the PA's rule. To be more precise, the surveys analyzed in this study provide data on respondent evaluation of the PA along four more or less specific criteria: its handling of the peace process, its record on human rights, its level of democraticness, and its level of corruption. Now, we can differentiate among these four criteria in terms of the relative extent to which each of these criteria is generally held to directly impinge upon the legitimacy of the PA. Specifically, we may expect that, of these four aspects of PA rule, the PA's legitimacy is based, firstly, on the course of the peace process, secondly, on its human rights record, thirdly, on its level of democraticness, and, lastly, on its level of corruption.

The author estimated the relative impact of variables measuring these four types of specific evaluations on evaluation of the general performance of the PA with multiple regression. As concerns these estimates, it should first be pointed out that we cannot directly compare the relative impact on general evaluations of the PA of the respondent's evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process, on the one side, and the respondent's evaluation of the PA with respect to human rights,

democracy, and corruption, on the other side, because the only survey that solicits respondent evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process is the May 1998 survey, and the only survey that collects data on respondent evaluation of the PA with respect to human rights, democracy, and corruption, i.e., the November 1997 survey, does not solicit respondent evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process. The author included the respondents' views on the peace process itself in the multiple regression analyses to compensate for the inability to directly estimate the relative impacts of evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process, on the one side, and the other three specific types of PA evaluation, on the other side.[17]

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[17] Before preceding to consideration of the results of the multiple regression analyses, a brief note on the two most basic statistics of multiple regression may benefit the reader who is unfamiliar with this technique. The two most basic statistics of multiple regression models are the beta coefficient and p-value. The multiple regression analysis estimates one beta coefficient for each independent variable. The beta coefficient of an independent variable represents the estimated *effect* of that independent variable on the dependent variable. Each beta coefficient has two components – direction and size. The direction of a beta coefficient refers to whether increases in the numeric value of an independent variable cause an increase or a decrease in the numeric value of the dependent variable, and is thus either positive or negative. An independent variable with a positive ("+") beta coefficient means that an increase in the numeric value of the independent variable is associated with an increase in the numeric value of the dependent variable, and that a decrease in the numeric value of the independent variable is associated with a decrease in the numeric value of the dependent variable. Conversely, an independent variable with a negative ("-") beta coefficient means that an increase in the numeric value of the independent variable is associated with a decrease in the numeric value of the dependent variable, and that a decrease in the numeric value of the independent variable is associated with an increase in the numeric value of the dependent variable. The interpretation of the beta value -- that is, of the relationship between the independent variable to which the beta coefficient refers, on the one side, and the dependent variable, on the other side -- depends on the coding of the two variables -- that is, on how numeric values are assigned to different measurement categories of each of the variables.

For example, the survey item asking the respondent to evaluate the general performance of the PA gave the respondent the following four ordinally-arranged response-options: very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, and very bad. These four response-options were assigned the following numeric values: very good = 1, somewhat good = 2, somewhat bad = 3, and very bad = 4. A regression model accounting for respondents' responses to this survey item that estimates a *positive* beta coefficient ("+") for any given independent variable, say independent variable $X$, means (a) that an increase in the numeric value of independent variable $X$ is associated with an increase in the numeric value of the variable measuring evaluation of the general performance of the PA, and thus, given the above coding scheme of the dependent variable, with a more negative evaluation of the general performance of the PA, and (b) that a decrease in the numeric value of $X$ is associated with a decrease in the value of the variable measuring respondents' evaluations of the general performance of the PA, and thus, given the above coding scheme, with a more favorable evaluation of the general performance of the PA. Conversely, a negative beta coefficient ("-") for $X$ means (a) that an increase in the numeric value of $X$ is associated with a decrease in the numeric value of the variable measuring respondents' evaluations of the general performance of the PA, and thus, given the above coding scheme, with a more positive evaluation of the general performance of the PA, and (b) that a decrease in the numeric value of $X$ is associated with an increase in the numeric value of the variable measuring respondents' evaluations of the general performance of the PA, and thus, given the above coding scheme, with a more negative evaluation of the PA.

We now turn to the second basic property of beta coefficients: size. The size, or magnitude, of the beta coefficient refers to the *amount* of change in the dependent variable associated with a one-unit change in the independent variable. Thus, the larger the beta coefficient of independent variable $X$, the greater the impact of variation in $X$ on the dependent variable, and the smaller the beta coefficient of $X$, the smaller the impact of variation in $X$ on the dependent variable. To compare the *relative* magnitude of the effects of each of the independent variables in the regression models, the author presents the *standardized* beta coefficients. Suffice it to say that a standardized beta coefficient expresses the size of the effect of each independent variable in terms of the number of standard deviations from the mean of the dependent variable that is associated with a one-unit change in the corresponding independent variable. By measuring the size of the effect of each independent variable in terms of standard deviations from the mean of the dependent variable, the effect of each independent variable is expressed on a common scale. As a result, the actual numeric values of the standardized beta coefficients enable us to directly assess the relative sizes of the effects of the various independent variables in the model on the dependent variable.

Each beta coefficient in the model has a p-value. The p-value is a measure of the *likelihood* that the effect summarized by a beta coefficient, which is of course estimated with data from a *sample*, is not a result of

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The regression models accounting for the impact of people's evaluations of specific aspects of PA governance on people's evaluations of the general performance of the PA are presented in Tables B5f-i. In each of these tables, the left-most column lists the independent variables. The second column from the left indicates the standardized beta coefficient for the corresponding independent variable. The presence or absence of one or two asterisks by each beta coefficient indicates whether or not the beta coefficient achieves statistical significance.[18] The third column from the left presents the coding schemes of the independent variables in the model.[19] Lastly, the one-cell column in the top-right corner present two basic pieces of information on the regression model. The "N" refers to the number of cases, i.e., respondents, with which the regression analysis estimated the model. The second statistic in this cell, $R^2$, alternatively known as the coefficient of determination, is a statistic that measures the extent to which the total amount of variation in the dependent variable is accounted for by the independent variables in the model.[20]

The results of the regression models presented in Tables B5f-i run *counter* to the expectation that, of the four types of specific evaluations of the PA, respondent preference on the peace process exerts the largest impact on respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA. As mentioned above, the standardized beta coefficients in these tables express the *relative sizes* of the effects of each type of view on respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA. The estimated standardized beta coefficients of the four views in each of the regression models suggest that respondent view on the PA's performance with respect to human rights has a greater impact on respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA than does respondent view on the peace process. More specifically, the regression models based on data from the total sample suggest that the effect on evaluations of the general performance of the PA of views on the PA's performance with respect to human rights is about twice as large as the effect on evaluations of the general performance of the PA of views on the peace process/negotiations (Table B5f: .42/.21=2.0; Table B5g: .42/.20=2.1). Similarly, the corresponding regression models based on data from the sample of Fatah supporters show that, within the Fatah constituency, the impact of evaluations of the PA's human rights record on evaluations of the general performance of the PA is about twice as large as that

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sampling variance, but rather actually exists in the *population* from which the sample was drawn. The numerical interpretation of the p-value of cross-tabulations was discussed in Part IB. As concerns the interpretation of p-values of beta coefficients, in general terms, the larger the value of the p-value, the smaller the probability that the corresponding estimated effect will be found in the population, and the smaller the value of the p-value, the higher the probability that the corresponding estimated effect will be found in the population. Social scientific convention is to treat a p-value of .05 as the minimum criterion for viewing an individual independent variable as exerting an effect on the dependent variable. In other words, an independent variable is considered to be "statistically significant" if it achieves a p-value of .05 or less. In accordance with this social scientific convention, the use of the term "statistically significant" throughout the course of the present discussion refers to an estimated relationship with a p-value of .05 or less.

[18] Specifically, the presence of one asterisk by a beta coefficient means that the effect expressed by that beta coefficient has a p-value that is greater or equal to .01 and less than or equal to .05. In words, an estimated effect with one asterisk has a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn. The presence of two asterisks by a beta coefficient means that the effect expressed by that beta coefficient has a p-value smaller than .01. In words, an estimated effect with two asterisks has a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn. A beta coefficient with no asterisk refers to an estimated effect of the corresponding independent variable that does not achieve statistical significance at the 95% confidence-level.

[19] These are provided to enable the reader to interpret the direction of the estimated effects. The reader is reminded that the coding scheme of the dependent variable, i.e., evaluation of the general performance of the PA, which is not listed in Tables B5f-i, is as follows: very good = 1, somewhat good = 2, somewhat bad = 3, and very bad = 4.

[20] Suffice it to add on the $R^2$ statistic that it varies from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning that all of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables in the model, and 0 meaning that none of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables in the model.

exerted by views on the peace process (Table B5h: .35/.18=1.9). Among Fatah supporters, the gap in the size of the effects on evaluations of the general performance of the PA, of evaluations of the PA's record on human rights, on the one side, and *negotiations*, on the other side, is even more pronounced. Specifically, Table B5i estimates that, among Fatah supporters, the effect on evaluations of the general performance of the PA of views on the PA's performance on human rights is about four or five times larger than that of views on negotiations (B5i: .37/.08=4.6) All told, these analyses suggest that views on the peace process may not be the *most* important of the four types of views in conditioning respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA.[21] At the same time, the tables suggest that views on the peace process *do* have a slightly larger impact than do views on the PA's performance with respect to democracy, and a substantially larger impact than do views on the level of corruption in the PA, on respondent evaluations of the general performance of the PA.

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[21] Though the findings regarding the relative effects of views on the peace and process and evaluations of the PA's record on human rights on evaluations of the general performance of the PA, are consistent and robust across the four regression models which estimate these relative effects, they require further corroboration from future research. First, as the reader may recall, the regression analyses used respondent views on the peace process as a substitute for respondent views on the PA's handling of the peace process, since data on evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process, on the one side, and evaluation of the PA with respect to human rights, democracy, and corruption, on the other side, were solicited in two distinct surveys. As is revealed in Table B5m below, though evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process are largely shaped by views on the peace process itself, they are by no means solely driven by views on the peace process itself. Accordingly, respondent views on the peace process do not represent a very satisfying substitute for respondent evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process. Simply, data permitting a direct comparison between the effects, on evaluation of the PA's general performance, of the PA's handling of the peace process, on the one side, and the PA's performance on human rights, on the other side, might reveal that the effect of evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process is larger than or equal to the effect of evaluations of the PA on human rights.

A second reason for more research on this topic is that multiple regression estimates the *direct* effects of each of the independent variables in a model on the model's dependent variable, and thus does not consider the *indirect* or *reciprocal* effects of these variables. Evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process, however, may exhibit a larger total effect on evaluation of the general performance of the PA than does evaluation of the PA's human rights record, when both the direct, indirect, and reciprocal effects of evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process and of the PA's human rights record are taken into account. In other words, it may be that evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process, as well as view on the peace process itself, may not only exert a direct effect on evaluation of the general performance of the PA, but also one or more indirect effects on this evaluation. Notably, perhaps evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process, as well as view on the peace process itself, directly influences evaluation of the PA on human rights. That is, we might expect support for the peace process to itself decrease the level of criticism of the PA on human rights, and opposition to the peace process to itself increase the level of criticism of the PA on human rights. The simple reason for this is that the Oslo accords stipulate that the PA is largely responsible for the maintenance of internal Palestinian security, and perhaps more to the point of Israeli security. Thus, future quantitative analyses that explicitly estimate the relative size of direct, indirect, and reciprocal, effects regarding views on the peace process and the PA's handling of the peace process and views on the PA's human rights record may find that views on the PA with respect to human rights do not exert a substantially larger impact on evaluations of the general performance of the PA than do views on the peace process and the PA's handling of the peace process.

Table B5f: Regression model accounting for respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA, estimated with data from the total sample (November 1997)

| Independent Variable | Standardized beta coefficient | coding scheme of independent variable | N=926 R²=.48 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent view on peace process | +0.21** | 1 = strongly support<br>2 = somewhat support<br>3 = somewhat oppose<br>4 = strongly oppose | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on human rights | +0.42** | 1 = very good<br>2 = somewhat good<br>3 = somewhat bad<br>4 = very bad | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on democracy | +0.18** | 1 = very democratic<br>2 = somewhat democratic<br>3 = minimally democratic<br>4 = not democratic at all | |
| Respondent evaluation of the level of corruption in the PA | +0.06* | 1 = no corruption at all<br>2 = corruption is slight<br>3 = corruption is moderate<br>4 = corruption is high | |

\* .01 <= p-value <= .05; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.
\*\* p-value < .01; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

Table B5g: Regression model accounting for respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA, estimated with data from the total sample (November 1997)

| Independent Variable | Standardized beta coefficient | coding scheme of independent variable | N=925 R²=.48 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent view on negotiating with Israel | +0.20** | 1 = strongly support<br>2 = somewhat support<br>3 = somewhat oppose<br>4 = strongly oppose | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on human rights | +0.42** | 1 = very good<br>2 = somewhat good<br>3 = somewhat bad<br>4 = very bad | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on democracy | +0.19** | 1 = very democratic<br>2 = somewhat democratic<br>3 = minimally democratic<br>4 = not democratic at all | |
| Respondent evaluation of the level of corruption in the PA | +0.07* | 1 = no corruption at all<br>2 = corruption is slight<br>3 = corruption is moderate<br>4 = corruption is high | |

\* .01 <= p-value <= .05; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.
\*\* p-value < .01; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

Table B5h: Regression model accounting for respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA, estimated with data from the sample of Fatah trusters (November 1997)

| Independent Variable | Standardized beta coefficient | coding scheme of independent variable | N=411 R²=.31 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent view on the peace process | +0.18** | 1 = strongly support<br>2 = somewhat support<br>3 = somewhat oppose<br>4 = strongly oppose | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on human rights | +0.35** | 1 = very good<br>2 = somewhat good<br>3 = somewhat bad<br>4 = very bad | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on democracy | +0.17** | 1 = very democratic<br>2 = somewhat democratic<br>3 = minimally democratic<br>4 = not democratic at all | |
| Respondent evaluation of the level of corruption in the PA | +0.07 (p = .11) | 1 = no corruption at all<br>2 = corruption is slight<br>3 = corruption is moderate<br>4 = corruption is high | |

* .01 <= p-value <= .05; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.
** p-value < .01; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

Table B5i: Regression model accounting for respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA, estimated with data from the sample of Fatah trusters (November 1997)  ·

| Independent Variable | Standardized beta coefficient | coding scheme of independent variable | N=411 R²=.29 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent view on negotiating with Israel | +0.08* | 1 = strongly support<br>2 = somewhat support<br>3 = somewhat oppose<br>4 = strongly oppose | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on human rights | +0.37** | 1 = very good<br>2 = somewhat good<br>3 = somewhat bad<br>4 = very bad | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on democracy | +0.18** | 1 = very democratic<br>2 = somewhat democratic<br>3 = minimally democratic<br>4 = not democratic at all | |
| Respondent evaluation of the level of corruption in the PA | +0.09* | 1 = no corruption at all<br>2 = corruption is slight<br>3 = corruption is moderate<br>4 = corruption is high | |

* .01 <= p-value <= .05; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.
** p-value < .01; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

We now turn to an assessment of the relative impact on respondent general evaluation of the PA of views on the PA's performance with respect to human rights, views on the PA's performance with respect to democracy, and views on the PA with respect to corruption. Tables B5f-i above provide estimates of the relative impact of the evaluation of the PA with respect to human rights, to

democracy, and to corruption, on the evaluation of the general performance of the PA. To gain further confidence in the trends exhibited in these tables, the author conducted multiple regression models including just these three variables (and excluding views on the peace process). The results of these regression analyses are presented in Tables B5j-k.

Table B5j: Regression model accounting for respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA, estimated with data from the total sample (November 1997)

| Independent Variable | Standardized beta coefficient | coding scheme of independent variable | N=947 $R^2$=.45 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on human rights | +0.46** | 1 = very good<br>2 = somewhat good<br>3 = somewhat bad<br>4 = very bad | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on democracy | +0.24** | 1 = very democratic<br>2 = somewhat democratic<br>3 = minimally democratic<br>4 = not democratic at all | |
| Respondent evaluation of the level of corruption in the PA | +0.08** | 1 = no corruption at all<br>2 = corruption is slight<br>3 = corruption is moderate<br>4 = corruption is high | |

* .01 <= p-value <= .05; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.
** p-value < .01; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

Table B5k: Regression model accounting for respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA, estimated with data from the sample of Fatah trusters (November 1997)

| Independent Variable | Standardized beta coefficient | coding scheme of independent variable | N=417 $R^2$=.28 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on human rights | +0.37** | 1 = very good<br>2 = somewhat good<br>3 = somewhat bad<br>4 = very bad | |
| Respondent evaluation of the performance of the PA on democracy | +0.19** | 1 = very democratic<br>2 = somewhat democratic<br>3 = minimally democratic<br>4 = not democratic at all | |
| Respondent evaluation of the level of corruption in the PA | +0.09* | 1 = no corruption at all<br>2 = corruption is slight<br>3 = corruption is moderate<br>4 = corruption is high | |

* .01 <= p-value <= .05; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.
** p-value < .01; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

All of these regression models agree that, of the three types of evaluations, views on the PA with respect to human rights exert the largest impact on respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA, views on the PA with respect to democracy exert the second largest impact, and views on the PA with respect to corruption exert the smallest impact. These tables also give us a sense of the *relative size* of the effects of the three types of PA evaluations. Specifically, the regression models based on data from the total sample of respondents estimate that (1) the effect of evaluations of

the PA's human rights record on evaluations of the general performance of the PA is (a) about twice as large as the effect of evaluations of the PA with respect to democracy (i.e., Table B5f: .42/.18=2.33; Table B5g: .42/.19=2.2; Table B5j: .46/.24=1.9), and (b) about six or so times as large as the effect of evaluations of the PA with respect to corruption (i.e., Table B5f: .42/.06=7; Table B5g: .42/.07=6; Table B5j: .46/.08=5.8); and (2) the effect of evaluations of the PA's performance with respect to democracy on evaluations of the general performance of the PA is about three times as large as the effect of evaluations of the PA with respect to corruption (i.e., Table B5f: .18/.06=3.0; Table B5g: .19/.07=2.7; Table B5j: .24/.08=3.0). The regression models estimated only with data from the sample of Fatah trusters basically confirm these trends.

Discussion now turns to a consideration of the evaluations of the Fatah and PFLP/DFLP constituencies with respect to the four specific types of evaluations of the PA. In this respect, the author proposes two basic hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the views of Fatah supporters, on the one side, and of the opposition factions, on the other side, are most convergent with respect to the PA on corruption, second most convergent with respect to the PA on democracy, and least convergent with respect to the PA on human rights. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is as follows. We may expect that the actual, or sincere, evaluations of Fatah supporters of the performance of the PA along the three dimensions are similar to those of supporters of the opposition factions. The reason for this is that basically *all* people are likely to view democracy, respect for human rights, and the uprooting of corruption, as universal goods.[22] Furthermore, since adequate information on the PA's performance with respect to democracy and corruption are generally available to and freely circulated within the public, we should expect supporters of different factions to have relatively similar empirical assessments of the PA's record on these two aspects of governance. At the same time, however, assuming that the PA's record on human rights bears more on the legitimacy of the PA than do the PA's performance with respect to democracy and the PA's performance with respect to corruption, and that the PA's performance with respect to democracy bears more on the legitimacy of the PA than does the PA's record on corruption, we should find the Fatah constituency least constrained to openly express criticism of the PA on corruption, second-least constrained to openly express criticism of the PA's performance in terms of democracy, and most constrained in its evaluation of the PA with respect to human rights. In contrast, the opposition factions are likely to feel less constrained, because they are not loyal to the PA, to openly express criticism of the PA along all of these three dimensions. Thus, the views of Fatah supporters on those aspects of PA performance that appear to bear less on the legitimacy of the PA are likely to be more similar to the views of the supporters of the opposition factions on these aspects of PA performance than are the views of Fatah supporters on those aspects of PA performance that *do* appear to bear substantially on the legitimacy of the PA.

To test for this hypothesis, we (1) consider the inter-factional polarization scores of each of the survey items measuring respondent evaluations of the performance of the PA with respect to human rights, democracy, and corruption, and (2) compare the means of these three types of evaluations of the PA across the Fatah and opposition constituencies. Simply, there should be more convergence in the evaluations of the various constituencies to do with PA corruption than in the evaluations of the various constituencies to do with the PA's human rights record, and there should be more convergence in the evaluations of the various constituencies to do with the PA's performance with respect to democracy than in the evaluations of the various constituencies to do with the PA's human rights record. In other words, we should expect to find that, of the three types of PA evaluation along specific criteria, the inter-factional polarization score to do with PA corruption is smallest, the inter-factional polarization score to do with the PA's performance in terms of democracy is second-smallest, and the inter-factional polarization score on evaluations of the PA's performance with respect to human rights is largest. Similarly, we should expect to find that the difference between the

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[22]Whereas governmental reliance on democratic practices, respect for human rights, and uprooting of corruption, are more or less universally held to be desirable, orientation toward the peace process refers to governmental policy. Thus, whereas the primary standards by which a respondent evaluates the PA's performance on democracy, human rights, and corruption, are more or less universal, the primary standard by which a respondent evaluates the PA's performance on the peace process is most likely the respondent's own policy preference on the peace process.

average response of the opposition constituency, on the one side, and the average response of the Fatah constituency, on the other side, is smallest with respect to corruption, second smallest with respect to democracy, and largest with respect to human rights.

Of the three inter-factional polarization scores, the score corresponding to views on the level of corruption in the PA is indeed the lowest, indicating that, of the views of the Fatah and PFLP/DFLP constituencies on the three types of PA evaluation, the two constituencies are least polarized in their views on the level of corruption in the PA. In fact, the polarization score for views on the level of corruption in the PA, i.e., 25.4, is just below the average inter-factional polarization score across the 67 survey items. This confirms the hypothesis that, of the three types of criticism, the criticisms of the two factional constituencies to do with PA corruption should be most convergent because Fatah supporters are likely to feel less constrained about publicly revealing, i.e., to the interviewer, their true views on this issue, and because the members of the two factional constituencies are likely to have both similar notions of what is extensive, moderate, and little, corruption, and similar information on the actual level of corruption in the PA. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the evaluations of the two constituencies of the PA's performance with respect to democracy exhibit a meaningfully higher degree of polarization (inter-factional polarization score = 50.6) than do the evaluations of the two constituencies of the PA's performance with respect to human rights (inter-factional polarization score = 40.2). This latter finding appears to run counter to the hypothesis that supporters of Fatah, on the one side, and supporters of the opposition, on the other side, will exhibit greater polarization in their respective evaluations of the PA on human rights than in their respective evaluations of the PA on democracy.[23] One possible explanation for the finding that the two constituencies' evaluations of the PA with respect to democracy are more polarized than the two constituencies' evaluations of the PA with respect to human rights, is that, even though supporters of opposition factions are not motivated by the desire to uphold the legitimacy of the PA to express a favorable view of the PA on human rights, many of these people are reluctant to express a negative view of the PA on human rights because they are afraid to publicly reveal such criticism.

The average evaluations of each factional constituency regarding the performance of the PA along the specific criteria are presented in Table B51. The substantive meaning of the averages is of course dependent upon the coding of the responses to the survey items. But we are concerned here not with the substantive meaning of average evaluations, but rather with the relative size of the differences in the average evaluations across the Fatah constituency, on the one side, and the opposition factional constituencies, on the other side. Furthermore, to test the first hypothesis, we are only interested in the figures presented in columns #1-3. These columns reveal that, of evaluations of the PA with respect to human rights, democracy, and corruption, the gap in the difference between the Fatah and Leftist constituencies is smallest with respect to views on PA corruption. This confirms the hypothesis that Fatah supporters are least constrained to reveal true preferences on PA corruption, and that it is more legitimate and acceptable to the PA leadership to receive criticism of corruption than criticism along human rights and democracy.

The table does not reveal, however, that of the three types of PA evaluations, the difference in the average views of the two constituencies on the PA's performance with respect to human rights is highest, and that the difference in the average of the views of the two constituencies on the PA's performance with respect to democracy is second-lowest. On the contrary, the table reveals that the gap between the Fatah constituency and the PFLP/DFLP constituency is largest with respect to views on the PA's performance with respect to democracy. As mentioned above, the finding that the views of the two constituencies on the PA's human rights record are more similar than the views of the two constituencies on the PA's democracy record may have resulted, at least in part, from the tendency of some Leftist supporters to wish to conceal their criticism of the PA's record on human rights.

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[23] The basis for this hypothesis, to reiterate, is that, (a) whereas Fatah supporters, assumed to recognize that the legitimacy of the PA is driven more by its human rights record than by its record on democracy, feel more compelled out of loyalty to Arafat and the PA to express support for the PA's human rights record than support for the PA with respect to democracy, (b) supporters of opposition factions are not compelled to uphold the legitimacy of the PA by evaluating its human rights record favorably.

Table B5l: Comparison of the average evaluation of each factional constituency on the PA's performance  with respect to human rights, democracy, corruption, and the PA's handling of the peace process\

| Factional constituency samples | 1. perform. of PA on hum rights mean response (11/97) | 2. perform. of PA on democ. mean response (11/97) | 3. perform. of PA on corruption mean response (11/97) | 4. PA's handling of the peace process mean response (5/98) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fatah trusters | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.0 |
| PFLP/DFLP difference in mean evaluations of PFLP/DFLP trusters and Fatah trusters | 3.1 3.1 - 2.2 = .9 | 3.3 3.3 - 2.2 = 1.1 | 3.5 3.5 - 2.7 = .8 | 3.1 3.1- 2.0 = 1.1 |
| Leftists (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA) difference in mean evaluations of Leftist trusters and Fatah trusters | 3.1 3.1 - 2.2 = .9 | 3.2 3.2 - 2.2 = 1 | 3.4 3.4 - 2.7 = .7 | 2.9 2.9 - 2.0 = .9 |
| Hamas difference in mean evaluations of Hamas trusters and Fatah trusters | 2.7 2.7 - 2.2 = .5 | 2.9 2.9 - 2.2 = .7 | 3.2 3.2 - 2.7 = .5 | 2.7 2.7- 2.0 = .7 |
| total sample excluding Fatah trusters difference in mean evaluations of total sample excluding Fatah trusters and Fatah trusters | 2.7 2.7 - 2.2 = .5 | 2.9 2.9 - 2.2 = .7 | 3.2 3.2 - 2.7 = .5 | 2.7 2.7 - 2.0 = .7 |

A second hypothesis considered here is that the views of the two constituencies with respect to the PA's handling of the peace process are likely to be highly polarized. The simple reason for this is that, whereas true evaluations of the PA with respect to corruption and perhaps also human rights and democracy, are based on more or less universally held standards, evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process are largely based on the respondent's own orientation toward the peace process. Evidence for this view is provided by Table B5m, which presents the correlation of respondent views on the peace process by respondent evaluations of the PA's handling of the peace process.[24] As the views of the two constituencies regarding the peace process are highly polarized, we should expect the two constituencies to be highly polarized over the PA's handling of the peace process. Of the four specific types of PA evaluation, the two constituencies were in fact most polarized in terms of the PA's handling of the peace process (inter-factional polarization score = 47.1). The high level of divergence characterizing inter-factional views on the PA's handling of the peace process is also reflected in the differences in the mean responses of the Fatah constituency and opposition constituencies presented in column #4 of Table B5l.

[24] This table also reveals the interesting finding that the correlation between the two variables within the Fatah constituency is lower than it is within all opposition faction constituencies.

Table B5m: Correlation of evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process and evaluation of view on the peace process itself (May 1998)

| Factional constituency sample | correlation of evaluation of the PA's handling of the peace process and view on the peace process itself |
|---|---|
| correlation for total sample | .55** |
| correlation for Fatah constituency sample | .29** |
| correlation for PFLP/DFLP constituency sample | .62** |
| correlation for Leftists constituency (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, and FIDA) | .61** |
| correlation for Hamas constituency sample | .51** |

** p-value < .01; i.e., the positive correlation is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

### b. Comparison of evaluations of the PA and evaluations of Arafat

As concerns the comparison of evaluations of the PA, on the one side, and evaluations of Arafat, on the other side, we might suspect that some Leftist supporters give Arafat a certain degree of automatic support on the basis of Arafat's preeminent role throughout the course of the modern Palestinian national movement. We might suspect this particularly in light of the personalistic style of rule of Arafat. We thus might expect the PFLP/DFLP constituency to be more critical of the PA than of Arafat, and therefore for the two constituencies to be less polarized in their views of Arafat than in their views of the PA. To investigate this hypothesis, we compare the summary measures of the polarization scores for views on the PA with the summary measures of the polarization scores for views on Arafat. The summary measures suggest, in contradiction to the hypothesis, that the two constituencies are equally polarized in both types of evaluation. This is suggested by the following data: (1) the average of the polarization scores of the survey items on the evaluation of Arafat (46.0) is basically equal to the average of the polarization scores of the survey items on the general evaluation of the PA (46.7); and (2) the proportion of the items tapping evaluations of the general performance of Arafat and the proportion of items tapping evaluations of the general performance of the PA that exhibit extreme polarization scores is the same (2/3). Thus, the two constituencies exhibit very similar levels of polarization across the two types of evaluations. In more concrete terms, the average percentage of the PFLP/DFLP constituency that expressed support for Arafat (48.6%) is indeed higher than the average percentage of this constituency that expressed support for the PA (28.3%). Yet, the Fatah constituency as well exhibited a slightly higher tendency to express support for Arafat (94.4%) than for the PA (87.0%).[25]

### c. Comparison of evaluations of the PLC and evaluations of the PA

Lastly, this subsection turns briefly to the views of the two constituencies with respect to the PLC. The data reveal that the two constituencies are polarized in their evaluations of the PLC, with the majority of Fatah trusters supporting and the majority of Leftist trusters opposing the PLC. The data suggest, furthermore, that the Fatah constituency may be slightly less supportive of the general performance of the PLC (80.7%, 73.1%, 69.1%) than of the general performance of the PA (89.2%, 86.8%, 83.9%), and that Leftists are not significantly more or less supportive of the PA (30.3%/39.1%; 15.4%/28.1%; 39.1%) than of the PLC (37.9%/40.4%; 15.8%/25.0%; 21.7%). The slight difference in levels of inter-factional polarization characterizing the views of the two constituencies on the two

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[25] The very reliability of the comparison of the summary polarization scores of the two sets of views, however, is questionable. First, the three surveys together included too few items to do with the evaluation of Arafat, i.e., 2 items, for us to be confident in a comparison of the polarization scores. (The author's calculation of the average percentage of support for Arafat omits responses to the three-point survey item tapping level of trust in Arafat, since this item is measured on a different scale than are the other two items.) Second, while the surveys included items tapping the evaluation of the PA along specific types of criteria as well as general performance, the surveys included survey items tapping the evaluation of Arafat only in general terms.

political institutions, is reflected in the inter-factional polarization scores. The average polarization score of general PA evaluation is 46.7, the average polarization score of PA evaluation along specific criteria is 40.8, and the average polarization score of general evaluation of the PLC is 38.5. Furthermore, the issue of the opposition's boycott of PLC elections is characterized by the same distribution of opinion as is the peace process, Oslo, and negotiations, and thus, seems to basically represent a referendum on the peace process/Oslo.

6. Analysis of level of trust in Fatah figures other than Arafat, independent figures, and Habash

We now compare the levels of trust of the two constituencies in three sets of figures: Fatah figures, independent figures, and Habash. Not surprisingly, the two constituencies exhibit above average levels of polarization in the evaluation of Fatah figures other than Arafat and in the evaluation of Habash. The Fatah constituency exhibits a substantially higher propensity to trust Fatah figures than does the Leftist constituency, and the Leftist constituency exhibits a substantially higher tendency than does the Fatah constituency to trust Habash. Additionally, the two constituencies are more polarized over views on Arafat than over views on Habash. The source for this appears to be that the proportion of Fatah supporters who express trust in Arafat (92.6%) is higher than the proportion of PFLP supporters who express trust in Habash (82.6%).[26] Also not surprising is that, of these three sets of figures, the two constituencies exhibited the lowest level of polarization with respect to the evaluation of independent figures, i.e., Haidar Abdul-Shafi and Hanan Ashrawi. The inter-constituency polarization score associated with levels of trust in independent figures, 20.6, is below the average polarization score for the 67 survey items. Though the gap between the level of trust in the two independent figures is relatively low, however, it should be pointed out that the proportion of the Fatah constituency that trusts Ashrawi and Abdul-Shafi is larger than the proportion of the Leftist constituency that trusts these figures. Indeed, supporters of Leftist factions have a very low tendency to trust *any* of the political figures considered in this study, other than Habash and possibly with the exception of Abdul-Shafi as well.

Two additional tendencies regarding the levels of trust of the two constituencies in political figures and factions are suggested by the data. First, of the group of respondents who expressed trusting Fatah most (in response to the open-ended survey item), the level of trust (along the 3-point close-ended scale) in Fatah and the level of trust in Arafat (along the 3-point close-ended scale) are more similar to one another than are the levels of trust among those who expressed trusting Fatah most (in the open-ended survey item) in the PFLP and the level of trust (along the 3-point close-ended scale) in Habash. Similarly, of the group of respondents who expressed trusting the PFLP most (in response to the open-ended survey item), the level of trust in the PFLP and the level of trust in Habash are more similar to one another than are the level of trust in Fatah and the level of trust in Arafat. Simply, for both factional constituencies, levels of trust in their own faction and in the leader of their own faction are more similar to one another than are levels of trust in the other faction and in the leader of the other faction. Specifically, of the PFLP constituency, 82.6% expressed trust in the PFLP, 13.0% expressed being trust-neutral toward the PFLP, and 4.3% expressed distrust in the PFLP. Meanwhile, of the Leftist constituency, 82.6% expressed trust in Habash, 4.3% expressed being trust-neutral toward Habash, and 13.0% expressed distrust in Habash. The correspondence between the Fatah constituency's level of trust in Fatah and level of trust in Arafat is also very high. Of the Fatah constituency sample, 94.9% expressed trust in Fatah, 4.3% expressed being trust-neutral toward Fatah, and 0.9% expressed distrust in Fatah. Meanwhile, 92.6% of the Fatah constituency expressed trust in Arafat, 5.8% expressed being trust-neutral toward Arafat, and 1.6% expressed distrust in Arafat.

In contrast, the difference within each constituency between level of trust in the other faction and level of trust in the other faction's leader, is more pronounced. Of the PFLP constituency, 8.3% expressed trust in Fatah, 25.0% expressed being trust-neutral toward Fatah, and 66.7% expressed distrust in Fatah. Meanwhile, 13.0% of the PFLP constituency expressed trust in Arafat, 34.8% expressed being trust-neutral toward Arafat, and 52.2% expressed distrust in Arafat. Of the Fatah constituency, 10.2% expressed trust in the PFLP, 28.3% expressed being trust-neutral toward the

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[26] All of the percentages reported here are calculated with "do not have enough information" responses omitted.

PFLP, and 61.5% expressed distrust in the PFLP. Meanwhile, 17.4% of the Fatah constituency expressed trust in Habash, 31.9% expressed being trust-neutral toward Habash, and 50.6% expressed distrust in Habash. Thus, we see that Fatah supporters' views on Fatah and Arafat are more similar to one another than are Fatah supporters' views on Habash and the PFLP. Similarly, PFLP supporters' views on Habash and the PFLP are more similar to one another than are PFLP supporters' views on Arafat and Fatah. The basic implication suggested by these data is that people associate their own faction, i.e., that faction which they most support, and the leader of their own faction with one another more closely than they associate other factions with the respective leaders of these factions.

The second tendency suggested by the data is simply that people appear to evaluate the leaders of factions they do not support more favorably than these factions themselves. As was just reported, more Fatah supporters express trust in Habash than in the PFLP, and less Fatah supporters express distrust in Habash than in the PFLP. Similarly, the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who trust Arafat is larger than the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who trust Fatah, and the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who distrust Arafat is lower than the proportion of the sample of PFLP supporters who distrust Fatah.[27] This tendency may be a function of the high level of personalism characterizing Palestinian politics, and, perhaps more to the point, of people's greater appreciation for the contribution to the Palestinian nationalist cause of faction leaders, at least those with long tenures as such, than of the factions themselves. Another partial explanation of this tendency may be psychological rather than political. Specifically, people may in general be less averse to expressing criticism of organizations than to expressing criticism of individuals.

7. Analysis of preferences on political Islam

Fatah supporters have a higher tendency to support political Islam than do Leftist supporters. The gap between the two constituencies is smaller regarding political Islam than regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations and PA/PLC evaluation. What is more, a primary reason for the relatively small size of this gap is, not that many Fatah supporters tend to oppose political Islam, but rather, and perhaps surprisingly, that many supporters of Leftist factions support political Islam.

Also, the Leftist constituency may be less averse to some degree of political Islam than to a wholesale Islamic state. This is suggested by the fact that the percentage of the Leftist constituency that expressed support for the idea that Islam should play a very major or somewhat major role in Palestinian society and politics (B8a: 70.5%, B8a: 72.4%) is substantially higher than the percentage of this constituency that expressed support for the reliance on *Shari'a* law as a categorical alternative to secular law (B8b: 47.1%, B8B: 46.8%, B8c: 39.1%). That is, the Leftist constituency may be particularly opposed both to wholesale political Islam, and to political Islam when framed as a categorical alternative to secular/non-religious law.

8. Analysis of preferences regarding issues to do with Hamas

Perhaps the most basic point regarding the views of the two factional constituencies on issues to do with Hamas is that the Leftist constituency is more critical of Hamas than is the Fatah constituency. More specifically, the Leftist constituency exhibits statistically significant (a) lower levels of trust in Yasin and in Hamas than does the Fatah constituency, and (b) lower levels of support for Hamas taking or sharing political power than does the Fatah constituency (B9a-B9f). At the same time, the inter-factional polarization scores reveal that the two factional constituencies are generally *moderately* polarized around issues to do with Hamas, relative to other issues. The average polarization score of the six issues to do with Hamas is 18.4, a score which is substantially lower than the average polarization score of the 67 items. Of the six survey items to do with Hamas, the two constituencies are most polarized in their levels of trust in Yasin and in Hamas. The four survey items tapping views on the integration of Hamas into the national political process, meanwhile, exhibit a quite low level of polarization relative to the polarization scores of the other 63 survey items.

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[27] This trend is further supported by the finding, discussed in Part IVB6, that the Fatah constituency is more trusting of Yasin than of Hamas.

Despite the relatively low level of polarization characterizing this issue/policy domain, it may be striking that the Leftist constituency is less supportive of Hamas than is Fatah. In all likelihood, one reason limiting the sympathy of the Leftist constituency for Hamas is the relatively large opposition of this constituency to political Islam. Yet, the strategic preferences of the Left to do with Israel are both more similar to those of Hamas than to those of Fatah, and generally held to play a more important part in Palestinian politics than does political Islam. This is reflected, to cite but one example, in the attempts of the two factions to form an oppositional bloc in the wake of the Oslo accords.

To reiterate a point emphasized throughout the course of this study, the small size of the sample of PFLP trusters makes it appropriate to leave analyses of the tendency for Leftist supporters to be more opposed to Hamas than Fatah supporters for future research. This being said, the PFLP constituency may be more opposed to Hamas joining a national salvation authority or a national coalition government than is the Fatah constituency because the PFLP constituency may *itself* be more opposed to the idea of a national salvation authority or national coalition government than is the Fatah constituency.

## IV.    Summary and Analysis of Variation in Political Beliefs and Preferences Within the Fatah Constituency

This part of the study summarizes and analyzes variation in political beliefs and preferences *within* the Fatah constituency. More specifically, this part of the study identifies the issues on which Fatah trusters are most and least unified, and analyzes various beliefs and preferences of Fatah trusters in some detail. This part of the study also presents a multiple regression model based on data from the total March 1999 survey sample that accounts for people's levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures. To examine the level of polarization among Fatah supporters around particular policy issues, we rely on a measure of *intra*-constituency polarization.[28] The reader is reminded that the number and percent of Fatah trusters who provided each possible response to each of the 67 survey items are reported in the cross-tabulations summarized in Table A1 of Part III. The discussion in the present part of the study will at times reference the cross-tabulations summarized in that table. The present discussion is organized into three sections. Section *A* presents two tables that summarize the relative levels of intra-Fatah constituency polarization around the 67 survey items and 21 issue/policy domains. Section *B* analyzes the deeper meaning and possible explanations of some of the more noteworthy findings summarized in Section *A*. Section *C*, lastly, presents the results of the multiple regression model accounting for people's levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures.

Among the most notable findings of this part of the study are the following. The survey data suggest that, of the 21 issue/policy domains on which the surveys analyzed in this study solicited respondent views, the Fatah constituency is most internally polarized over the strategic alternative of standing firm vis-à-vis Israel, and is then most internally polarized over particular final status issues, the strategic option of armed struggle vis-à-vis Israel, beliefs on the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace, and views on issues to do with Hamas. Conversely, the survey data suggest that members of the Fatah constituency are least internally polarized in terms of their evaluations of Arafat's performance, and are then least internally polarized over views on the role that the US and EU *should* play in Palestinian-Israeli affairs, and views on the peace process.

Among the most notable findings of Section *B* are the following. As concerns the preferences of Fatah supporters regarding strategy toward Israel, the survey data suggest that the Fatah constituency is more polarized over negotiations when negotiations are framed explicitly within the context of Israeli intransigence than when negotiations are framed in general terms. The Fatah constituency is also more internally polarized on the strategic option of armed struggle when armed struggle is framed within the context of Israeli intransigence than when armed struggle is framed in general terms. The Fatah constituency is not only more internally divided over the strategic option of armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence than within a more general context, but also more internally divided over the strategic option of armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence than it is over 64 of the other 66 survey items on which the views of Fatah supporters are compared. Within the context of Israeli intransigence, additionally, the Fatah constituency is more polarized with respect to the strategic option of popular protest than with respect to armed struggle.

As concerns the preferences of Fatah supporters regarding strategy toward Israel, furthermore, the data suggest that a substantial proportion of Fatah supporters hold seemingly inconsistent preferences. Perhaps most notably, a substantial portion of Fatah supporters express support for both armed struggle and conciliation. Furthermore, some Fatah supporters are simultaneously optimistic about the "prospects of peace" and pessimistic about the "Israeli commitment to peace."

Turning to the levels of trust that Fatah supporters exhibit toward Fatah leaders other than Arafat, the data suggest that at most about half of the Fatah constituency harbors full-fledged trust toward Abu Mazen, Saeb Eraqat, and Faisal Husseini. Furthermore, only a minority of the Fatah supporters polled expressed full-fledged trust in Preventive Security Service heads Jibril Rajoub and Mohammad Dahlan. Level of trust in both Rajoub and Dahlan tended to be highest among those Fatah supporters who support Oslo, who support the peace process, and who support the continuation of negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence. Moreover, whereas level of trust in Rajoub did not appear to be associated with views on issues to do with Hamas, level of trust in Dahlan appeared to

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[28] The method the author adopted to calculate these measures is discussed in Part IC.

be associated with views on these issues. More specifically, the data suggest that Fatah supporters with views favorable to Hamas have a higher tendency than Fatah supporters with views unfavorable to Hamas to distrust Dahlan, and a lower tendency than Fatah supporters with unfavorable views on Hamas to trust Dahlan. This suggests that many Fatah supporters may associate the PA's policy of cracking down on Hamas more with Dahlan than with Rajoub.

On the views of Fatah supporters on issues to do with Hamas, the data suggest that the proportion of Fatah supporters who trust Hamas is much smaller than the proportion of Fatah supporters in favor of Hamas's participation in the formal Palestinian political process. This finding of course implies that some Fatah supporters concomitantly are trust-neutral toward Hamas or distrust Hamas and support Hamas's integration into formal Palestinian politics. Furthermore, views on political Islam at best influence the level of support within the Fatah constituency for the participation of Hamas in formal Palestinian politics only slightly. This minimal impact of views on political Islam in shaping preferences regarding the formal political participation of Hamas actually confirms what may be called the conventional wisdom that Palestinian party politics are driven much more by preferences regarding strategy toward Israel and by internal political interests than by views on political Islam.

Lastly, the multiple regression model accounting for level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures estimates that, of the various types of views on which the surveys collected data, the following seven types of associations are most robust: (1) the higher a person's support for Oslo and the peace process, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (2) the higher a person's support for continuing negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence to salvage what can be salvaged, the higher a person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (3) the more pessimistic a person on the impact that the ascension to power of a Labor-led government would have on Palestinian national interests, the lower the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (4) the more favorable a person's evaluation of the general performance of the PA, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (5) the more favorable a person's evaluation of the general performance of the PLC, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (6) the more negative a person's evaluation of the PA's execution judgments, the lower the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; and (7) the more supportive a person of the formation of a national coalition government, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; conversely, the more opposed a person to the formation of a national coalition government, the higher that person's level of distrust in Fatah and Fatah figures. Of the seven independent variables in the regression model, furthermore, people's evaluations of Oslo and the peace process exert the largest impact on people's levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures.

*A. Summary tables reporting data on the relative level of intra-Fatah constituency polarization characterizing particular issue/policy domains*

Table A1 reports the absolute and relative levels of internal polarization characterizing the views of Fatah supporters with respect to the 67 survey items considered in this study. The left column of Table A1 lists these 67 survey items in the rows, and the right column reports the intra-Fatah constituency polarization score corresponding to the responses of Fatah trusters to each of these survey items. Thus, for example, the responses of Fatah supporters to the survey item reported in row #2 – "In your opinion, what are the prospects of a peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis in the next five years?" – exhibit an intra-Fatah polarization score of 0.3. Importantly, the table arranges the survey items in order of descending intra-Fatah polarization scores. That is, responses to the survey items at the top of the table exhibit the highest level of internal polarization among Fatah supporters, and the responses to the survey items at the bottom of the table exhibit the lowest level of internal polarization among Fatah supporters.[29]

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[29] The reader is reminded that, whereas in the case of *inter*-constituency polarization, the higher the inter-constituency polarization score, the higher the level of polarization, in the case of *intra*-constituency polarization, the lower the intra-constituency polarization score, the higher the level of polarization.

Table A1: Ranking of the intra-Fatah constituency polarization scores of the 67 survey items

| Survey item (cross-tabulation reference, survey date) | intra-Fatah polarization score |
|---|---|
| 1. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: demand linkage with Jordan?* (A7a, 3/99) | 0.1 |
| 2. *In your opinion, what are the prospects of a peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis in the next five years?* (A8b, 5/98) | 0.3 |
| 3. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: resume armed struggle?* (A4c, 3/99) | 1.1 |
| 4. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: halting negotiations and waiting for a favorable change in the balance of power?* (A6b, 3/99) | 3.5 |
| 5. *The Fatah movement is considered the main party in the Authority while Hamas is considered the main opposition. To what extent do you believe in the possibility of any cooperation between them?* (B9c, 3/99) | 4.0^ |
| 6. *What is your level of trust in M. Dahlan?* (B5e, 3/99)~ | 4.1^ |
| 7. *In your opinion, what is the level of Israeli support for the peace process* (A9a, 5/98) | 5.1 |
| 8. *What is your level of trust in Hamas?* (B9b, 3/99)~ | 7.3^ |
| 9. *Which position serves Hamas best: (a) taking power, (b) participating in the authority with others, or (c) not participating at all in the PA?* (B9f, 3/99) | 7.5^ |
| 10. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in taking the following positions: resume popular struggle?* (A6a, 3/99) | 11.0 |
| 11. *What is your level of trust in J. Rajoub?* (B5d, 3/99)~ | 12.9^ |
| 12. *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the intervention of the EU in the peace process* (A10d, 11/97) | 15.2 1.0 std. devs. below mean |
| 13. *What is your view on the following statement: "sometimes it is moral to use violence for political ends"?* (A4d, 5/98) | 17.2 |
| 14. *If the Likud Party loses the elections and the Labor Party assumes power in the next elections, do you think the Palestinian political condition, in general, will become better, will stay the same, or will become worse?* (A9d, 3/99) | 18.6^ |
| 15. *In your opinion, how spread is the corruption, if any, in the Palestinian Authority's institutions?* (B2d, 11/97) | 21.2 |
| 16. *How confident are you that the Palestinians and Israelis will reach a satisfactory agreement on final-status issues?* (A8a, 11/97) | 24.0 |
| 17. *Do you support or oppose the resumption of armed struggle against Israel?* (A4a, 11/97) | 24.1 |
| 18. *Has the EU been more favorable to the Israelis, neutral, or more favorable to the Palestinians?* (A10e, 5/98) | 24.2^ |
| 19. *What is your level of trust in G. Habash?* (B7, 3/99)~ | 25.6^ |
| 20. *In general, how do you evaluate the PLC's performance?* (B4c, 3/99) | 27.0 |
| 21. *What is your level of trust in H. Ashrawi?* (B6a, 3/99)~ | 27.8^ |
| 22. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose, the idea of establishing a joint state for Israelis and Palestinians in all Palestine (Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip)?* (A7c, 3/99) | 28.0 |
| 23. *What is your level of trust in Yasin?* (B9a, 3/99)~ | 28.9^ |
| 24. *What is your level of trust in Abu Mazen?* (B5a, 3/99)~ | 29.2^ |
| 25. *To what extent do you support or oppose the idea of forming a national salvation authority through which Hamas can join in the ruling?* (B9e, 3/99) | 29.6^ |

| | |
|---|---|
| 26. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA demanding the establishment of a joint state for Palestinians and Israelis in all Palestine?* (A7b, 3/99) | 29.6 |
| 27. *In what manner did the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel affect our economy?* (B10a, 11/97) | 31.3 |
| 28. *To what extent do you have confidence that America will care for the Palestinian interests in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations?* (A10b, 11/97) | 32.2 |
| 29. *In general, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council?* (B4b, 5/98) | 32.4 |
| 30. *Despite the extent of your satisfaction with the role played by America now, what is, in your belief, the role that America should play?* (A11a, 11/97) | 32.8^ |
| 31. *How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the intervention of the US in the peace process* (A10a, 11/97) | 35.4 |
| 32. *In your opinion, how democratic is our system of government under the Palestinian Authority?* (B2c, 11/97) | 36.4 |
| 33. *What is your level of trust in S. Eraqat?* (B5b, 3/99)~ | 37.1^ |
| 34. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance in the field of human rights?* (B2b, 11/97) | 38.4 |
| 35. *What is your level of trust in F. Husseini?* (B5c, 3/99)~ | 38.5^ below average |
| 36. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the idea of establishing an Islamic state in all Palestine (Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip)?* (B7d, 3/99) | 39.4 above average |
| 37. *Do you support the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as an appropriate response in the current political conditions or do you oppose them as they harm the national interest?* (A4b, 3/99) | 40.3^ |
| 38. *In your opinion, in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state, should this state be administered according to Islamic Shari'a or according to secular/non-religious laws?* (B8b, 11/97) | 40.8^ |
| 39. *What is your view on the following statement: "peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis is possible"?* (A8c, 5/98) | 42.0 |
| 40. *In general, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council?* (B4a, 11/97) | 44.7 |
| 41. *If the possibility of having an independent Palestinian state with sovereignty in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) reaches a dead end, to what extent do you support or oppose the PA in continuing to negotiate with Israel to salvage what can be salvaged?* (A3b, 3/99) | 45.5 |
| 42. *In the case of the establishment of a Palestinian state, do you think the state should be run according to Islamic law or according to secular, non-religious, laws?* (B8c, 3/99) | 46.0^ |
| 43. *What is your level of trust in H. Abdul-Shafi?* (B6b, 3/99)~ | 47.3^ |
| 44. *What is your opinion about the Oslo agreement?* (A2b, 3/99) | 48.0 |
| 45. *Some participated in the PLC elections while others boycotted them. Now, three years after those elections, do you think the boycott decision was correct or wrong?* (B4d, 3/99) | 48.3^ |
| 46. *In general, how do you evaluate the PA's performance?* (B1c, 3/99) | 48.5 |
| 47. *How do you describe the current economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza?* (B10b, 11/97) | 48.6 |
| 48. *Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the Palestinian Authority's handling of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process at the present time?* (B2a, 5/98) | 49.5 |
| 49. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance?* (B1b, 5/98) | 53.8 |
| 50. *Do you see suicidal bombing operations as an appropriate response in the current political conditions or do you oppose them?* (A5b, 3/99) | 55.4^ |
| 51. *In general, do you support or oppose the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel?* (A1c, 3/99) | 55.8^ |
| 52. *What is your feeling towards the suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians in Israel?* (A5a, 11/97) | 56.2 |
| 53. *In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance?* (B1a, 11/97) | 57.3 |
| 54. *How do you feel about the Oslo process?* (A2a, 5/98) | 58.8 |

| | |
|---|---|
| 55. *How do you feel about the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?* (A1b, 5/98) | 60.3 |
| 56. *How would you characterize the basic values of Israelis compared to your own values?* (A9c, 5/98) | 62.2^ <br> 1.0 std devs. <br> above mean |
| 57. *To what extent do you support or oppose having a national coalition government consisting of all the political and religious factions, including the opposition?* (B9d, 3/99) | 65.9 |
| 58. *To what extent has Israel satisfied its obligations under the Oslo accords?* (A9b, 5/98) | 68.6 |
| 59. *Do you support or oppose the continuation of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis?* (A3a, 11/97) | 69.3 |
| 60. *What is your level of trust in Arafat?* (B3c, 3/99)~ | 70.0^ |
| 61. *In your opinion, what is the role that Islam should play in the political life of Palestinian society?* (B8a, 11/97) | 71.4 |
| 62. *Do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel* (A1a, 11/97) | 72.0 |
| 63. *Do you support or oppose Arafat's performance as the National Authority's President?* (B3a, 11/97) | 73.7 |
| 64. *Would you say that the U.S. has been more favorable to Israelis, the U.S. is neutral and favors neither side, or the U.S. has been more favorable to Palestinians?* (A10c, 5/98) | 74.4^ |
| 65. *How active a role should the EU play in Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations?* (A11b, 5/98) | 83.8 |
| 66. *How active a role should the US play in Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations?* (A11c, 5/98) | 84.8 |
| 67. *Do you think President Arafat is doing his job as president of the National Authority in a good, fair, bad, or very bad way?* (B3b, 3/99) | 88.2 |

^Survey item with midpoint response-option

~All of the polarization scores for the three-point trust-scores – i.e., trust, in between, do not trust – are calculated with the "don't have enough information to give an opinion" option omitted. These calculations are thus not based on the percentages presented in the corresponding cross-tabulations presented in Part II.

Table A2 summarizes the polarization scores of the survey items comprising the 21 different issue/policy domains. The logic of this table is the same as that characterizing Table A3 in Part III. The cell in the upper-left corner of the table reports that the average intra-Fatah polarization score across the 67 survey items is 39.0, and the standard deviation from this average is 22.8. Column #1 reports the rankings that are reported in Table A1 of the intra-Fatah polarization scores of each of the survey items taping views on the corresponding issue/policy domain. Thus, for example, the cell in the first column corresponding to views on negotiating with Israel, i.e., row #18, reports "41, 59." This figure means that the two survey items to do with negotiations occupy the 41st and 59th positions in the ranking of the 67 intra-Fatah polarization scores in Table A1.

Column #2 reports the average intra-Fatah polarization score for the survey items tapping views on each issue/policy domain. Thus, for example, column #2 reports "22.1 below" in the cell corresponding to row #4, i.e., views on the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace. This figure represents the average of the three intra-Fatah polarization scores of the three survey items tapping sentiment on the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace. The "below" reflects that the average polarization score of these three items falls below the average polarization score of the 67 items. Accordingly, the summary measure reported in column #2 serves the function of describing whether or not the Fatah constituency generally exhibits an above or below average level of internal polarization around each individual issue/policy domain.

Column #3 reports the proportion of survey items tapping views on each individual issue/policy domain that have intra-Fatah polarization scores that fall either below or above the average of the 67 intra-Fatah polarization scores. Thus, for example, Column #3 reports "3/4 below" in the cell corresponding to Row #9, i.e., evaluation of the PA along specific criteria. This means that 3 of the 4 survey items tapping sentiment on the PA along specific criteria achieve intra-Fatah polarization scores falling below the average of the 67 intra-Fatah polarization scores. The measure in column #3 thus serves the primary function of assessing the extent to which the location of the

polarization scores of the various items pertaining to any particular issue/policy domain are consistently located below or above the average level of polarization of the 67 survey items.

Column #4 reports the proportion of survey items tapping views on each individual issue/policy domain that have intra-Fatah polarization scores that fall one standard deviation or more from the average of the 67 intra-Fatah polarization scores. For example, Column #4 reports "0/2" in the cell referring to Row #17, i.e., views on suicide operations. This means that neither of the two survey items tapping sentiment on suicide operations exhibits intra-constituency polarization scores exceeding one standard deviation from the mean. The purpose of the fourth column is to identify the extent to which the survey items representing particular issue/policy domains exhibit extremely high or extremely low polarization scores relative to the other polarization scores in Table A1.

Importantly, Table A2 lists the 21 issue/policy domains in order of decreasing polarization. That is, the higher an issue/policy domain in the table, the more internally polarized the Fatah constituency with respect to this domain, and the lower an issue/policy domain on the list, the less internally polarized the Fatah constituency with respect to this domain.[30]

Table A2: Rank-ordered summary of the intra-Fatah polarization scores of the 21 issue/policy domains

| Average polarization score: 39.0<br>Std. dev: 22.8<br>Std. dev + avg. = 61.8<br>Std. dev - avg. = 16.2<br><br>*Issue/policy domain* (cross-tabulation reference code) | 1. Rank of items in Table A1 | 2. Average polarization score of the items in the issue/policy domain | 3. proportion of items on the issue/policy domain that fall below or above the avg. polarization score | 4. proportion of Items on the issue/policy domain that fall more than 1 std. dev. from avg. {16.2; 61.8} |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Views on standing firm vis-à-vis Israel (A6) | 4, 10 | 7.3 below | 2/2 below | 2/2 below |
| 2. Views on final status issues (A7) | 1, 22, 26 | 19.2 below | 3/3 below | 1/3 below |
| 3. Views on armed struggle (including views on the morality of violence) (A4) | 3, 13, 17, 37 | 20.7 below | 3/4 below | 1/4 below |
| 4. Views on the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace (A8) | 2, 16, 39 | 22.1 below | 2/3 below | 1/3 below |
| 5. Views on issues to do with Hamas (B9) | 5, 8, 9, 23, 25, 57 | 23.9 below | 5/6 below | 3/6 below; 1/6 above |
| 6. Views on Fatah figures (B5) | 6, 11, 24, 33, 35 | 24.4 below | 5/5 below | 2/5 below |
| 7. Views on Habash (B7) | 19 | 25.6 below | 1/1 below | 0/1 below |
| 8. Views on the role that the US and EU actually play in Palestinian-Israeli relations (A10) | 12, 18, 28, 31, 64 | 36.3 below | 4/5 below | 1/5 below; 1/5 above |
| 9. Views on the performance of the PA along specific criteria (B2) | 15, 32, 34, 48 | 36.4 below | 3/4 below | 0/4 below |
| 10. Views on Abdul-Shafi and Ashrawi (B6) | 21, 43 | 37.6 below | 1/2 below | 0/2 below |
| 11. Views on the PLC (B4) | 20, 29, 40, 45 | 38.1 below | 2/4 below | 0/4 below |
| 12. Perceptions of Israelis vis-à-vis Palestinians (A9) | 7, 14, 56, 58 | 38.6 below | 2/4 below | 1/2 below; 2/2 above |
| 13. Views on Palestinian economy (B10) | 27, 47 | 40.0 above | 1/2 above | 0/2 above |

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[30] The reader is again reminded that, whereas, for the *inter*-factional polarization measure, the higher the score, the higher the level of inter-factional polarization, for the *intra*-factional polarization measure, the higher the score, the lower the level of intra-factional polarization.

| 14. Views on political Islam (B8) | 36, 38, 42, 61 | 49.4 above | 4/4 above | 1/4 above |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15. Views on the general performance of the PA (B1) | 46, 49, 53 | 53.2 above | 3/3 above | 0/3 above |
| 16. Views on the Oslo process (A2) | 44, 54 | 53.4 above | 2/2 above | 0/2 above |
| 17. Views on suicide operations (A5) | 50, 52 | 55.8 above | 2/2 above | 0/2 above |
| 18. Views on negotiating with Israel (A3) | 41, 59 | 57.4 above | 2/2 above | 1/2 above |
| 18'. Views on negotiating with Israel, the Oslo process, and the peace process, combined (A1, A2, A3) | 41, 44, 51, 54, 55, 59, 62 | 58.5 above | 7/7 above | 2/7 above |
| 19. Views on the peace process (A1) | 51, 55, 62 | 62.7 above | 3/3 above | 1/3 above |
| 20. Views on the role that the US and EU should play in Palestinian-Israeli relations (A11) | 30, 65, 66 | 67.1 above | 2/3 above | 2/3 above |
| 21. Views on Arafat's performance (B3) | 60, 63, 67 | 77.3 above | 3/3 above | 3/3 above |

As is revealed in Table A2, the survey data suggest that the Fatah constituency is most internally polarized over (1) the issue of the strategic alternative of standing firm vis-à-vis Israel, and is then most internally polarized over (2) particular final status issues, including, notably, the issue of linkage with Jordan, (3) the strategic option of armed struggle vis-à-vis Israel, (4) beliefs on the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace, and (5) views on issues to do with Hamas. Conversely, the survey data suggest that members of the Fatah constituency are least internally polarized in terms of their (1) evaluations of Arafat's performance, and are then least internally polarized over (2) views on the role that the US and EU *should* play, and (3) views on the peace process.

*B. Analysis of issue/policy debates within the Fatah constituency*

Beyond the abovementioned general observations, it is appropriate to analyze various issue/policy debates within the Fatah constituency in some depth. Toward this end, this section is divided into six subsections that discuss, respectively (1) preferences regarding strategy toward Israel, (2) beliefs about the prospects of peace and the orientations of the Israeli leadership and masses toward Palestinians and the peace process, (3) evaluations of the PA, Arafat, and the PLC, (4) evaluations of particular political figures other than Arafat, (5) preferences on political Islam, and (6) preferences on issues to do with Hamas.[31]

1. Analysis of preferences on strategy toward Israel

As was mentioned in Section IIIB, the majority of the Fatah constituency supports the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, and the majority of the Fatah constituency opposes both armed struggle and suicide operations. The first concern of this subsection is to ascertain whether the preferences of the members of the Fatah constituency are more internally polarized when these

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[31] Before preceding to these subsections, a basic caveat merits reiteration. The following subsections seek not only to identify various more or less nuanced tendencies to do with the beliefs and preferences of the Fatah constituency, but also to proffer possible explanations for these tendencies. The caveat is that addressing these issues adequately generally requires elaborate deliberation, the collection of data on specific views, and extensive analyses of these data. Adequately satisfying all of these requirements is simply beyond the scope of the present study. Accordingly, the reader should view the analyses that follow as at best (1) partial explanations, (2) which may represent useful areas for future research, and (3) which in any case require further empirical corroboration.

strategic options are framed within the context of Israeli intransigence than when these strategic options are framed in general terms.[32]

Discussion begins with comparison of the level of internal Fatah constituency polarization with respect to negotiations when negotiations are framed within a general context and within the context of Israeli intransigence. A comparison of the responses of Fatah trusters to the two survey items to do with negotiations reveals that the Fatah constituency is more polarized over negotiations when negotiations are framed explicitly within the context of Israeli intransigence than when negotiations are framed in general terms. Whereas the November 1997 survey item framing negotiations in general terms (A3a) achieves a polarization score of 68.6 (rank #59), which is more than one standard deviation above the average intra-Fatah polarization score, thus indicating minimal intra-Fatah polarization, the March 1999 survey item tapping views on negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence (A3b) achieves a polarization score of 45.5, which is above the average intra-Fatah polarization score, but not by much. More concretely, when negotiations are stated in general terms, 90.0% of the Fatah constituency either strongly or moderately supported negotiations, and 8.5% of this constituency either strongly or moderately opposed negotiations. In contrast, when negotiations are framed within the context of Israeli intransigence, 74.7% of the Fatah constituency expressed support for negotiations, and 16.5% of this constituency expressed opposition to negotiations.[33] All told, the data reveal that the Fatah constituency becomes somewhat more internally polarized over the option of negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence.

Whereas the shift in the level of intra-Fatah polarization over negotiations framed in general terms and within the context of Israeli intransigence is moderate, the shift in levels of intra-Fatah polarization over the issue of armed struggle accompanying Israeli intransigence is quite dramatic. A comparison of responses to the survey item framing the option of military struggle in general terms and responses to the survey item tapping views on military struggle explicitly within the context of Israeli intransigence suggests that the Fatah constituency is indeed more internally polarized on the strategic option of armed struggle when armed struggle is framed within the context of Israeli intransigence than when armed struggle is framed in general terms. The latter survey item achieves an intra-Fatah polarization score of 24.1, which is clearly below the average of the 67 intra-Fatah polarization scores, i.e., 39.0. Yet, the survey item that explicitly frames armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence is extremely low (1.1). As such, it is not only well below the intra-Fatah polarization score of the survey item that does not frame armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence, but also well below the average intra-Fatah polarization score of the 67 items. In other words, not only is the Fatah constituency more internally divided over the strategic option of armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence than within a more general context, the Fatah constituency is more internally divided over the strategic option of armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence than it is over 64 of the other 66 survey items on which the views of Fatah supporters are compared. In concrete terms, when the option of armed struggle is stated in general terms, 35.6% of the Fatah constituency supports armed struggle, and 64.3% of this constituency opposes armed struggle. While a substantial proportion of the Fatah constituency thus supports armed struggle even when armed struggle is not framed within the context of Israeli intransigence, the distribution of the views of Fatah supporters over armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence is substantially more polarized. Specifically, when armed struggle is framed within the context of a dead-end in the road toward Palestinian statehood, 37.3% of the Fatah constituency supports armed struggle, and 42.5% of the Fatah constituency opposes armed struggle.[34]

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[32] Various weaknesses in the following empirical analysis that make the following analysis inconclusive were discussed in subsection IIIB1. With these shortcomings in mind, we turn to a consideration of the views of Fatah supporters on negotiations, standing firm, and armed struggle.

[33] The latter item includes a midpoint "neither support nor oppose" response-option, and thus the difference in the levels of polarization characterizing responses to these two survey items may be exaggerated. (See Part IC).

[34] It is important to note, furthermore, that, whereas the survey item tapping views on armed struggle within the context of Israeli intransigence provides the respondent with the possibility of responding "neither support nor oppose," the survey item tapping views on armed struggle in more general terms does not. As discussed in

Both survey items to do with the strategic alternative of standing firm, i.e., popular struggle and halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power, are explicitly framed within the context of a dead-end in the path toward Palestinian statehood, and thus we cannot compare levels of internal Fatah constituency polarization on these strategic options in light of both Israeli intransigence and Israeli conciliation. It nonetheless deserves pointing out that the Fatah constituency is more polarized around this strategy option than around any other issue/policy domain. Of the two distinct elements of standing firm, moreover, the Fatah constituency is particularly internally polarized over the policy option of halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power.

The reader may have noticed an apparent inconsistency in the shifts in levels of intra-Fatah polarization within the context of Israeli intransigence associated with views on negotiations, on the one side, and views on armed struggle, on the other side. Simply, it appears inconsistent that Fatah trusters are more or less united in support of negotiations, yet are divided over armed struggle. This brings us to the second distinct issue discussed in this subsection, which is the consistency of the strategic preferences of members of the Fatah constituency. We first reiterate the point made in subsection IIIB1 that the percentages of the Fatah constituency that support each of the strategic options conforms to the ordinal logic of the escalation-conciliation scale. Specifically, given that the strategic option that receives the most support from the Fatah constituency is continuation of negotiations, we would expect, in accordance with the ordinal logic of the escalation-conciliation scale, that the strategic option that receives the second highest level of support among the Fatah constituency is standing firm, that the strategic option receiving the third-highest level of support among the Fatah constituency is armed struggle, and that the strategic option receiving the lowest level of support among the Fatah constituency is suicide operations. As is reported in Figure IIIA2, the expressed preferences of the sample of Fatah trusters indeed conform to this logic.

Yet, at the same time, we have seen that the proportion of Fatah trusters who support armed struggle is larger than the proportion of Fatah trusters opposing negotiations. This means that some proportion of Fatah trusters support *both* negotiations *and* armed struggle. The question becomes one of ascertaining the actual percentage of those Fatah supporters who express support for negotiations and support for armed struggle. Toward this end, we examine two sets of cross-tabulations. The first set cross-tabulates the views of Fatah trusters on the peace process, Oslo accords, and negotiations, on the one side, by the views of Fatah trusters on armed struggle and suicide operations, on the other side. In the spirit of the tractability of this study, these cross-tabulations were conducted only with data from the March 1999 survey. The second set of cross-tabulations cross-tabulates preferences regarding the option of popular protest by preferences regarding armed struggle and suicide operations. The results of the cross-tabulations are presented below in Tables B1a-g.

A meaningful amount of strategic preference inconsistency is to be found in these cross-tabulations. Of the four possible combinations of general views on armed struggle and Oslo – i.e., support Oslo and support armed struggle, support Oslo and oppose armed struggle, oppose Oslo and support armed struggle, and oppose Oslo and oppose armed struggle – the first of these combinations, i.e., support Oslo and support armed struggle, is inconsistent. The question becomes to ascertain the percentage of Fatah supporters who expressed this inconsistent combination of preferences. As is revealed in Table B1a, 68 out of the 413 respondents (16.5%) who expressed trust in Fatah revealed this inconsistent combination of preferences.

Section IC, all other things equal, the presence of the five-point ordinal scale with the midpoint response-option likely reduces the level of polarization relative to that characterizing responses to a four-point scale without a midpoint. That is, it is plausible to assume that the 20.2% of the Fatah constituency who responded "neither support nor oppose" to the item on armed struggle framed within the context of Israeli intransigence would be more or less split down the middle if forced to express either support or opposition. This assumption, in turn, suggests that the shift in the level of intra-Fatah polarization would be even more pronounced if the item specifying Israeli intransigence was measured on the same scale as was the item on views on armed struggle in general.

Table B1a: Cross-tabulation of views on Oslo by views on armed struggle, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| Views on Oslo | support armed struggle | oppose armed struggle |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 9.5% (9) | 11.0% (35) |
| somewhat support | 62.1% (59) | 76.1% (242) |
| somewhat oppose | 23.2% (22) | 12.9% (41) |
| strongly oppose | 5.3% (5) | 0.0% (0) |

Turning to the cross-tabulation of views on the peace process and military operations, we are interested in the percentage of the sample of the Fatah constituency that expressed both support for the peace process and support for the resumption of military operations. As is reported in Table B1b, 79 out of 424 Fatah trusters (18.6%) expressed support for this inconsistent set of preferences.

Table B1b: Cross-tabulation of views on the peace process by views on the resumption of military operations, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| Views on peace process | support resumption of military operations | oppose resumption of military operations |
|---|---|---|
| support | 79.0% (79) | 88.0% (285) |
| oppose | 21.0% (21) | 12.0% (39) |

Table B1c reports the percentage of the sample of Fatah supporters who hold inconsistent preferences with respect to negotiations and military operations. This table reveals that 72 out of 400 Fatah trusters (18.0%) reveal both support for negotiations and support for military operations.

Table B1c: Cross-tabulation of views on the continuation of negotiations by views on military operations, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| Continuation of negotiations | support military operations | oppose military operations |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 18.6% (19) | 27.1% (89) |
| somewhat support | 52.0% (53) | 49.7% (163) |
| neither support nor oppose | 5.9% (6) | 8.2% (27) |
| somewhat oppose | 20.6% (21) | 9.5% (31) |
| strongly oppose | 2.9% (3) | 5.5% (18) |

Of the four possible combinations of views on Oslo and suicide operations – support Oslo and support suicide operations, support Oslo and oppose suicide operations, oppose Oslo and support suicide operations, and oppose Oslo and oppose suicide operations – the first combination, i.e., support Oslo and support suicide operations, is of course the inconsistent combination. As is revealed in Table B1d, 41 out of 419 Fatah trusters (9.8%) expressed this combination of preferences.

Table B1d: Cross-tabulation of views on Oslo by views on suicide operations, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| Views on Oslo | support suicide operations | oppose suicide operations |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 5.0%<br>(3) | 12.0%<br>(43) |
| somewhat support | 63.3%<br>(38) | 74.1%<br>(266) |
| somewhat oppose | 26.7%<br>(16) | 13.1%<br>(47) |
| strongly oppose | 5.0%<br>(3) | 0.8%<br>(3) |

     Table B1e reports the cross-tabulation of views on the peace process by views on suicide operations. We are interested in the percentage of the Fatah constituency sample who expressed support for the peace process and support for suicide operations. As is reported in Table B1e, 42 out of 430 Fatah supporters (9.8%) expressed this inconsistent pair of preferences.

Table B1e: Cross-tabulation of views on the peace process by views on suicide operations, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| Views on peace process | support suicide operations | oppose suicide operations |
|---|---|---|
| support | 70.0%<br>(42) | 88.6%<br>(328) |
| oppose | 30.0%<br>(18) | 11.4%<br>(42) |

     Table B1f reports on the percentage of the sample of Fatah supporters who hold inconsistent preferences with respect to negotiations and suicide operations. This table reveals that 41 out of 436 Fatah trusters (9.4%) express both support for negotiations and support for suicide operations.

Table B1f: Cross-tabulation of views on the continuation of negotiations by views on suicide operations, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| Continuation of negotiations | support suicide operations | oppose suicide operations |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 16.4%<br>(10) | 26.7%<br>(100) |
| somewhat support | 50.8%<br>(31) | 50.4%<br>(189) |
| neither support nor oppose | 6.6%<br>(4) | 8.0%<br>(30) |
| somewhat oppose | 21.3%<br>(13) | 10.1%<br>(38) |
| strongly oppose | 4.9%<br>(3) | 4.8%<br>(18) |

     Turning to the possible combinations of preferences on armed struggle and preferences on popular struggle, we can view support for armed struggle and opposition to popular protest as being inconsistent. The thinking is simply that resort to armed struggle subsumes resort to popular protest as well, particularly in light of the fact that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (a) transcends international borders and directly engages substantial proportions of the masses of both rivals, and (2) involves an Israeli military occupation of the general Palestinian population. Table B1g cross-tabulates views of Fatah trusters on popular protest by views of Fatah trusters on armed struggle. This table reveals that 9 out of the 437 (2.1%) Fatah trusters express both (a) support for armed struggle, and (b) opposition to popular struggle, and 16 out of the 437 (3.7%) Fatah trusters express both (a) support for armed

struggle and (b) opposition or neutrality toward popular struggle. Thus, the amount of inconsistency within the Fatah constituency between preferences to do with armed struggle and preferences to do with popular struggle is minimal.

Tables B1g: Views on popular protest by views on armed struggle, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| Views on popular struggle | Views on the resumption of military struggle | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | strongly support | somewhat support | neither support nor oppose | somewhat oppose | strongly oppose |
| strongly support | 86.5% (45) | 14.3% (16) | 6.7% (6) | 3.0% (5) | 5.0% (1) |
| somewhat support | 7.7% (4) | 74.1% (83) | 29.2% (26) | 11.6% (19) | 25.0% (5) |
| neither support nor oppose | 3.8% (2) | 4.5% (5) | 51.7% (46) | 7.3% (12) | 0.0% (0) |
| somewhat oppose | 0.0% (0) | 6.3% (7) | 12.4% (11) | 75.0% (123) | 15.0% (3) |
| strongly oppose | 1.9% (1) | 0.9% (1) | 0.0% (0) | 3.0% (5) | 55.0% (11) |

By way of summarizing the above findings, the average percent of Fatah supporters across the four cross-tabulations of views on conciliation by views on armed struggle who express support for both conciliation and armed struggle is 17.7%. The average percentage of the Fatah constituency holding contradictory views on conciliation, on the one side, and suicide operations, on the other side is 9.7%. Lastly, little inconsistency appears to exist within the Fatah constituency with respect to preferences on armed struggle and popular struggle. We can thus conclude that a substantial portion of Fatah supporters indeed hold seemingly inconsistent preferences regarding strategy toward Israel, particularly with respect to preferences regarding conciliation and armed struggle.

One possible explanation of the substantial level of inconsistency in the strategic preferences of members of the Fatah constituency to do with conciliation and armed struggle is as follows: the Fatah party-line may be defined more in terms of the "peace process" than armed struggle. Accordingly, the Fatah faction, and thus many of its supporters, may express support for the peace process, negotiations, etc., automatically, even reflexively. In contrast, members of the Fatah constituency may be left more freely to their own devices in their expression of views on armed struggle. Another possible explanation is that the Fatah trusters expressing these inconsistent views consider one strategic option as a principle and the other as a tactic. Specifically, some Fatah supporters may view negotiating with Israel at present as a worthwhile tactic, and may support armed struggle not as current policy but as a policy that in principle is legitimate. Along the same lines, some people may simultaneously support negotiations as the appropriate *short-term* tactic and may support armed struggle as the appropriate tactic in the *more distant future*.[35] Another possible resolution of the apparent inconsistency in preferences is that some people view a two-track Palestinian strategy toward Israel, whereby (1) Arafat and the PA adopt the general policy of conciliation, and (2) opposition groups adopt the general policy of escalation. This resolves the inconsistency of preferences in the sense that any single set of actors is pursuing a coherent policy.[36]

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[35] A basic methodological implication of this is that survey items may benefit from relying on items tapping views on these strategic options that specify as clearly as possible the time frame for relying upon the strategic option.

[36] A final consideration has to do with the framing of the survey items. Specifically, the survey items considered here solicit respondents' views on both general types of strategic alternatives, i.e., conciliation and escalation, in absolute, rather than relative, terms. That is, they do not ask the respondent which of the distinct strategic

2. Analysis of beliefs about the prospects of peace and the orientations of the Israeli leadership and masses toward the Palestinians and the peace process

As mentioned above, and as is evident from Table A2, beliefs on the prospects of Palestinian-Israeli peace comprise one of the issue/policy domains over which the Fatah constituency is relatively more internally polarized. The first point to make in this regard is that, as was discussed in greater detail in subsection IIIB4, the actual size of the tendencies of the Fatah constituency to exhibit optimism and pessimism about the prospects of peace depends on the particular framing of the survey questions. Namely, the more explicitly the survey item frames the prospects of peace in terms of an actual agreement on final status issues, and the more specific it is about the proximity of the conclusion of this agreement, the less optimistic and confident Fatah supporters on the prospects of peace.

Secondly, as was implicit in the discussion of inter-factional polarization over the prospects of peace and the Israeli commitment to the peace process, some Fatah supporters are simultaneously optimistic about the "prospects of peace" and pessimistic about the "Israeli commitment to peace." This combination of beliefs appears to be inconsistent. The extent of this apparent inconsistency within the Fatah constituency is reported in Tables B2a-d. In Table B2a, 45 out of the 365 Fatah trusters, comprising 12.3% of the Fatah trusters, expressed both the belief that the Israelis are either somewhat or strongly opposed to the peace process and that peace is very or somewhat possible. In Table B2b, 148 out of the 367 Fatah trusters, or 40.3% of the Fatah trusters, expressed both the view that Israel has satisfied only a few or none of its commitments to Oslo, and that peace is very or somewhat possible.

Table B2a: Cross-tabulation of views on the prospects of peace by views on how Israelis feel about the peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (May 1998)

| | In your opinion, how do Israelis feel about the peace process? | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prospects of a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis in the next 5 years | strongly support | somewhat support | divided | somewhat oppose | strongly oppose |
| very possible | 20.0% (3) | 4.4% (4) | 6.8% (10) | 5.0% (3) | 3.7% (2) |
| somewhat possible | 60.0% (9) | 61.1% (55) | 39.0% (57) | 36.7% (22) | 33.3% (18) |
| only slightly possible | 20.0% (3) | 27.8% (25) | 45.2% (66) | 46.7% (28) | 51.9% (28) |
| not possible at all | 0.0% (0) | 6.7% (6) | 8.9% (13) | 11.7% (7) | 11.1% (6) |
| $X^2 = 26.5, p < .01$ | | | | | |

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alternatives the respondent prefers *most*, but rather the extent to which the respondent supports or opposes each of these alternatives taken individually. That a respondent finds a strategic alternative desirable thus does not mean that, of the set of options, the respondent finds this option *most desirable*. As we are ultimately concerned with the political behavior of people, it is useful to collect data on the relative desirability of various strategic alternatives. Accordingly, to gain purchase on the extent to which respondent views are consistent, and thus to understand preferences on armed struggle and conciliation, it is warranted to rely on survey items that ask the respondent to *rank* the two or so most preferable strategic options from the set of strategic options comprising the full range of the escalation-conciliation scale.

Table B2b: Cross-tabulation of views on the prospects of peace by views on the extent to which Israel has satisfied its obligations under the Oslo accords, on Fatah constituency sample (May 1998)

| | In your opinion, how many of Israel's obligations under the Oslo accords has Israel satisfied? | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Prospects of a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis in the next 5 years | all | most | some | only a few | none |
| very possible | 33.3% (1) | 16.7% (1) | 6.7% (3) | 4.1% (7) | 6.9% (10) |
| somewhat possible | 33.3% (1) | 33.3% (2) | 62.2% (28) | 47.9% (81) | 34.7% (50) |
| only slightly possible | 33.3% (1) | 50.0% (3) | 22.2% (10) | 42.6% (72) | 45.1% (65) |
| not possible at all | 0.0% (0) | 0.0% (0) | 8.9% (4) | 5.3% (9) | 13.2% (19) |
| $X^2 = 24.2$, p = .02 | | | | | |

Table B2c confirms that a substantial proportion of Fatah trusters exhibit both the view that Israel is not committed to the peace process, and optimism about the prospects of peace. Specifically, of the 382 Fatah respondents who gave responses to the two survey items in Table B2c, 85, or 22.3%, expressed both that the Israelis are either somewhat or strongly opposed to the peace process, and that peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians is possible.

Table B2c: Cross-tabulation of views on the possibility of peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis by views on how Israelis feel about the peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (May 1998)

| | In your opinion, how do Israelis feel about the peace process? | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis is possible | strongly support | somewhat support | divided | somewhat oppose | strongly oppose |
| strongly agree | 46.7% (7) | 25.5% (24) | 28.4% (44) | 15.0% (9) | 27.6% (16) |
| somewhat agree | 40.0% (6) | 54.3% (51) | 49.0% (76) | 60.0% (36) | 41.4% (24) |
| somewhat disagree | 0.0% (0) | 14.9% (14) | 14.2% (22) | 18.3% (11) | 19.0% (11) |
| strongly disagree | 13.3% (2) | 5.3% (5) | 8.4% (13) | 6.7% (4) | 12.1% (7) |
| $X^2 = 14.3$, p = .28 | | | | | |

Lastly, Table B2d presents the most dramatic combination of these seemingly inconsistent views. Of the 384 Fatah supporters responding to the survey items on the extent to which Israel has fulfilled its obligations under Oslo, and the possibility of peaceful coexistence, 251, or 65.4%, expressed both the view that the Israelis have fulfilled either only a few or none of their obligations,

and either strong or moderate agreement with the statement that peaceful coexistence between the two peoples is possible.

Table B2d: Cross-tabulation of views on the possibility of peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis by views on the extent to which Israel has satisfied its obligations under the Oslo accords, on Fatah constituency sample (May 1998)

| | In your opinion, how many of Israel's obligations under the Oslo accords has Israel satisfied? | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis is possible | all | most | some | only a few | none |
| strongly agree | 33.3% (1) | 33.3% (2) | 32.6% (15) | 22.9% (41) | 28.0% (42) |
| somewhat agree | 33.3% (1) | 50.0% (3) | 45.7% (21) | 56.4% (101) | 44.7% (67) |
| somewhat disagree | 33.3% (1) | 16.7% (1) | 17.4% (8) | 15.1% (27) | 14.7% (22) |
| strongly disagree | 0.0% (0) | 0.0% (0) | 4.3% (2) | 5.6% (10) | 12.7% (19) |
| $X^2 = 12.1$, p = .44 | | | | | |

One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that some respondents may have invoked a much shorter time horizon in order to evaluate the Israeli commitment to peace than they did to evaluate the prospects of a peace agreement and of peaceful coexistence. In other words, some respondents may view the current intransigence of Israel and the current divisions within Israel over the peace process as more or less short-term phenomena that will inevitably give way over the longer term to a more conciliatory Israeli orientation toward the Palestinians, and thus to a more peaceful form of coexistence between the two nations. Another possible explanation mirrors an argument made in subsection IIIB2. Specifically, some people may view "the prospects of peace" as a general principle or value – as an outlook on life, if the reader wills – and "Israeli commitment" as a more concrete, empirical assessment.[37]

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[37] This brings us to a final point of both substantive and methodological relevance. The terms "Israeli commitment" and "prospects of peace" are by themselves quite imprecise. Furthermore, respondents presented with survey items on the "Israeli commitment" and "prospects of peace" that specify these phenomena only in general terms may interpret the more or less concrete meanings of "peace agreement" and "Israeli commitment" differently. Thus, the validity of our comparison's of people's responses to survey items that frame "peace agreement" and "Israeli commitment" only in general terms is restricted. Conversely, beliefs on the "prospects of peace" and "level of Israeli commitment" are meaningful, and our comparisons of such beliefs are increasingly valid, to the extent that these beliefs are explicitly associated with concrete aspects of a peace agreement and Palestinian-Israeli relations. The author suggests that a valid approach to thinking about and measuring sentiment on the prospects of a peace agreement and on the extent of Israeli commitment to the peace process is to link people's perceptions on the orientations of Israelis and of the predominant stripes of the Israeli political spectrum, i.e., Labor and Likud, to specific final status proposals. Ultimately, these final status issues, and certainly some of the issues addressed in Oslo II as well, comprise the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and thus of any Palestinian-Israeli final status settlement. As such, we should expect people's views on the prospects of peace to be driven most directly by people's assessments of the prospects of reaching adequate resolutions with respect to these issues. The author is suggesting, to give a timely example, that we can gain a more meaningful view of a person's assessment of the likely course of Palestinian-Israeli relations by asking the person what he or she thinks when he sees or reads about Barak standing in Ma'ale Adumim proclaiming that Ma'ale Adumim will remain an integral part of Jerusalem, and that Jerusalem will remain the united capitol of Israel forever, than we can by soliciting the person's view about "the prospects of a peace agreement in the near

On the topic of the views of Fatah trusters on the prospects of peace and the Israeli commitment to peace, lastly, to the extent that Fatah trusters are not confident about Israel, we may wonder why they are so supportive of the peace process. One possible explanation is that Fatah trusters support the peace process out of loyalty to Arafat and the Fatah party-line, at least in the relatively short-term. Another possible explanation for the fact that much of the Fatah constituency is skeptical about Israel's commitment to peace, and yet exhibits substantial support for the peace process, has to do with the pragmatism of the Fatah constituency. That is, Fatah supporters may tend to be skeptical of Israel, but to nonetheless view negotiations as a sort of "least of all evil" options that may salvage the relatively little that can be salvaged. All told, analysis of the factors that impact the propensity to be optimistic/pessimistic about the prospects of peace, and of the impact that such optimism/pessimism has on preferences regarding strategy toward Israel, represents a vital area for future research.

3. Analysis of evaluations of the PA, Arafat, and PLC

The present subsection briefly considers (1) the evaluations of Fatah supporters to do with four specific aspects of PA governance, (2) the relative level of support within the Fatah constituency for the PA and for Arafat, and (3) the relative level of support within the Fatah constituency for the PA and for the PLC.

Subsection IIIB5 presented evidence that evaluations of the PA with respect to human rights may exert a larger impact on the legitimacy of the PA than do views on the peace process, that views on the peace process exert the second largest impact on the legitimacy of the PA, that views on the PA's performance with respect to democracy exert the third largest impact on the legitimacy of the PA, and that views on PA corruption exert the smallest impact on the legitimacy of the PA. We might expect that the larger the effect, on evaluations of the general performance of the PA, of one of the four specific PA evaluations relative to the effects of the other three specific evaluations, the higher the percentage of Fatah supporters expressing a favorable evaluation of the PA on this specific type of PA evaluation, relative to the percentages of Fatah supporters expressing favorable evaluations on the other three specific types of evaluations. Simply put, we might expect that, out of loyalty to the PA, the Fatah constituency exhibits the highest level of support for the performance of the PA on that aspect of PA governance that was found to most influence the legitimacy of the PA, i.e., the PA's human rights record. Conversely, given that the PA's performance with respect to corruption exhibited the smallest impact on the legitimacy of the PA, we might expect Fatah supporters to feel less compelled to reflexively express a favorable evaluation of the PA on corruption.

The data, however, provide mixed support for this expectation. On the one side, the percentage of the Fatah constituency evaluating the PA's performance with respect to corruption favorably (64.4%) is indeed lower than the percentage of the Fatah constituency evaluating the PA's performance with respect to the other three aspects of PA governance favorably. Furthermore, the percentage of the Fatah constituency evaluating the PA with respect to democracy favorably (73.0%) is lower than both the percentage of the Fatah constituency evaluating the PA with respect to human rights favorably (77.2%) and the percentage of the Fatah constituency evaluating the PA's handling of the peace process favorably (82.8%). On the other side, the percentage of the Fatah constituency evaluating the PA's handling of the peace process favorably (82.8%) is higher than the percentage of the Fatah constituency evaluating the PA's human rights record favorably (77.2%).

The survey data thus suggest the following discrepancy: on the one side, for Fatah supporters as well as for the total sample, views on the general performance of the PA are driven more by evaluations of the PA's human rights record than by views on the peace process itself; yet, on the other side, the proportion of the Fatah constituency that expressed support for the PA's handling of the peace process is larger than the proportion of this constituency that expressed support for the PA's record on human rights. As was discussed in subsection IIIB5, firm conclusions on the exact nature

future" and about "Israel's commitment to the peace process." In more precise terms, the author suggests that analysis of the views of Palestinians to do with the "prospects of peace/Israeli commitment" would benefit from soliciting their assessments of Israel's likelihood of making particular, and, from the Palestinian perspective, at least minimally satisfactory concessions on final status issues.

and relative sizes of the effects of the PA's handling of the peace process and the PA's human rights record on the PA's legitimacy ultimately merits future research. Nonetheless, the apparent discrepancy raises, but in no way confirms, the speculation that the assessments of the PA and of Fatah supporters of the relative size of the impact of the two main types of specific PA evaluations on the PA's legitimacy might be mistaken. Specifically, both the PA and the majority of Fatah supporters may mistakenly view the course of the peace process to impinge upon its legitimacy more than does its human rights record. The PA may thus demand and enforce greater acceptance, if not support, from the Fatah constituency with respect to the peace process than with respect to its human rights record, and the Fatah constituency, out of loyalty to the PA, may thus exhibit a greater tendency to reveal support for the PA's handling of the peace process than for the PA's record on human rights.

Discussion now turns to the relative level of support within the Fatah constituency for the PA and for Arafat. As is revealed in Table A2, the intra-Fatah constituency exhibits more dissent in its general evaluation of the PA than in its general evaluation of Arafat. All three survey items soliciting general evaluations of the PA indeed achieve above average intra-Fatah polarization scores, meaning that the general evaluation of the PA is actually not contentious within the Fatah constituency relative to most other issue/policy domains. But the intra-Fatah polarization scores of these three items are not higher than one standard deviation from the average intra-Fatah polarization score, and thus the general evaluation of the PA does not appear to be one of the least contentious issues within the Fatah constituency. In contrast, as can be discerned from Table A2, evaluation of Arafat's performance by far represents the least polarized issue within the Fatah constituency. In concrete terms, the average percentage of Fatah trusters evaluating the general performance of the PA positively across the survey items tapping such sentiment is 86.6%, and the average percentage of Fatah trusters evaluating Arafat positively is 94.8%.[38] We thus see that, among Fatah trusters, support for Arafat is more unanimous than is support for the PA.

A few straightforward considerations may account for this difference. First, though the PA is dominated by Arafat and Fatah, it is ultimately a national body including members of some other factions as well as Fatah. In contrast, Arafat is not only head of the PA but also head of Fatah. Thus, it is only natural for Fatah trusters to identify more closely with Arafat than with the PA. Second, given the high level of personalism characterizing Palestinian politics, it is likely that the Fatah constituency identifies more with the leader than with the executive branch of the Palestinian regime. Thirdly, people may feel more inhibited to publicly reveal, i.e., to the interviewer, disfavor with Arafat than to reveal disfavor with the PA.

Turning to the relative level of support within the Fatah constituency for the PA and for the PLC, the survey data reveal that the Fatah constituency exhibits slightly more support for the PA than for the PLC. While 74.0% of the Fatah supporters on average across the three surveys expressed a positive evaluation of the PLC, as mentioned above, 86.6% of this constituency on average across the three surveys expressed a positive evaluation of the PA. The following considerations may help to account for the higher level of support for the PA than for the PLC within the Fatah constituency. First, though the PLC is of course dominated by Fatah, the PA (EA) is even more dominated by Fatah than is the PLC. Second, as Arafat is head of the PA, loyalty to Arafat represents another motivation for Fatah supporters to evaluate the PA positively that is absent from their evaluations of the PLC. Furthermore, the Fatah constituency may have more freedom to criticize the PLC than the PA given the conjunction of (1) loyalty to Arafat/Fatah, and (2) the general tendency to associate the PA more with Fatah/Arafat than with the PLC. An additional reason for being critical of the PLC is outright disappointment with the performance of the PLC. Though PLC performance is certainly limited, however, one could quite justifiably place more blame on the PA and Arafat than on the PLC itself for the limited performance of the PLC. In other words, one would suspect that disappointment with the

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[38] The survey item tapping level of trust in Arafat was taken to be 95.5 = 92.6 + 5.8/2. This calculation is intended to correct for the presence of a midpoint response-option in this and only this survey item out of the three survey items on general PA evaluation and the three survey items on Arafat evaluation.

poor performance of the PLC would be reflected as much in criticism of the PA and Arafat as in direct criticism of the PLC.[39]

4. Analysis of levels of trust in political leaders of Fatah other than Arafat and in Dahlan and Rajoub

This subsection focuses on two topics to do with the level of trust expressed by the Fatah constituency in political leaders of Fatah other than Arafat and in Dahlan and Rajoub. First, the March 1999 survey data reveal that at most about half of the Fatah constituency expressed full-fledged trust in Abu Mazen, Saeb Eraqat, and Faisal Husseini. One might view this finding as striking because one would expect the substantial majority of the constituency of any particular faction to trust the leaders of that faction. To further fill the picture, while Fatah supporters do not overwhelmingly trust Fatah leaders other than Arafat, they are not polarized into two camps, with one trusting and the other not trusting. Rather, the vast majority of Fatah trusters either trust or are trust-neutral ("in between") toward Fatah leaders other than Arafat. Specifically, of the Fatah supporters polled, 86.2% expressed either trust or trust-neutrality toward Abu Mazen, 90.3% expressed either trust or trust-neutrality toward Eraqat, and 90.7% expressed either trust or trust-neutrality toward Faisal Husseini.[40] By way of analyzing this finding, given both the high level of personalism characterizing Palestinian politics, and the tremendous extent to which Arafat monopolizes decisionmaking power, it is possible that these figures are not to a great extent identified as "Fatah leaders." Alternatively put, assuming the differentiation of the Fatah leadership into a first stratum, inhabited by Arafat alone, and a second stratum, inhabited by various other figures, it is possible that the second stratum of the Fatah leadership is not identified as "Fatah leadership." To the extent that this second stratum of Fatah figures are not viewed as Fatah leaders, in turn, many Fatah supporters might feel less compelled to harbor and reveal positive sentiment toward this second stratum than they are with respect to Arafat. This could help explain the moderate levels of full-fledged trust exhibited toward these figures by Fatah supporters.[41]

The second topic discussed in this subsection is the finding that only a minority of the Fatah supporters express full-fledged trust in Preventive Security Service heads Jibril Rajoub and Mohammad Dahlan. The most frequent response of the sample of Fatah supporters to the two survey items on trust in Rajoub and trust in Dahlan is "I do not have enough information to say," the second most frequent response is "I trust," and the percentage of the Fatah constituency that expressed not trusting Rajoub and Dahlan is slightly higher than the percentage of this constituency that expressed not trusting Abu Mazen, Eraqat, and Husseini. Thus, we may conclude that the Fatah constituency is cautiously acceptant but not particularly supportive of the two Preventive Security Services heads. This is further reflected in the intra-Fatah constituency polarization scores, which reveal that, of the 67

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[39] One could also of course blame Israel for the limited performance of the PLC, given that Oslo II provides the PLC with a highly circumscribed legislative jurisdiction.

[40] These percentages were calculated with the don't have information to say" responses omitted.

[41] Another point relevant to the moderate levels of trust exhibited by Fatah supporters in Abu Mazen, Eraqat, and Husseini, is methodological. The survey items tapping level of trust in individual political figures and factions do not allow the respondent to express different *levels* of trust and distrust. That is, the respondent is given the choice, in addition to the choice of "distrust," of "trust" or "neither trust nor distrust." It is possible, furthermore, that many respondents interpret the "trust" option as a more or less *full-fledged* endorsement of the figure/faction. Respondents faced with these three response-options and interpreting "trust" as full-fledged trust are thus likely to be hesitant to provide the "trust" response in reference to figures/factions that they do not completely endorse. By the same logic, for that matter, we should expect that a proportion of those responding "neither trust nor distrust" may in actuality feel some moderate degree of distrust for the figure, but not full-fledged distrust. The implication of these considerations is that, though the three-point level of trust survey item has at least the one advantage of being a shorter and perhaps less time-consuming survey item, future survey research on popular trust in political figures/factions would benefit from experimenting with the following types of survey items as well: (1) 4-point – trust much, trust somewhat, distrust somewhat, distrust much; and (2) 5-point – trust much, trust somewhat, neither trust nor distrust, distrust somewhat, and distrust much.

survey items, the Fatah constituency exhibits the sixth highest level of polarization on level of trust in Dahlan, and the 11th highest level of polarization on level of trust in Rajoub.

It is reasonable to suspect that, of the various elements of the Fatah constituency, those elements most critical of Oslo, negotiations with Israel, and the peace process, and most supportive of Hamas, are likely to be most critical of the Preventive Security Services heads. This suspicion is founded on the basic premises that the PSS (1) is a direct result of the Oslo accords, and (2) that the raison d'etre of the PSS is precisely to crack down on sectors of Palestinian society opposed to the PA/Arafat and committed to obstructing the peace process. To assess this suspicion, the author conducted cross-tabulations of trust in Rajoub and Dahlan by views on Oslo, the peace process, negotiations, armed struggle, suicide operations, and issues to do with Hamas.

Tables B4a-c report the subset of these cross-tabulations involving level of trust in Rajoub that achieve or approximate statistical significance. Table B4a shows that distrust in Rajoub is highest amongst those Fatah supporters who are opposed to Oslo, and that trust in Rajoub is highest among those Fatah supporters who support Oslo. Table B4b, similarly, shows that trust in Rajoub is highest among those Fatah supporters who support the peace process, and that distrust of Rajoub is highest among those Fatah supporters who oppose the peace process. Table B4c provides moderate confirmation for this trend.

Table B4a: Level of trust in Rajoub by views on Oslo, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| $p < .01$, $X^2 = 37.6$ <br><br> Level of trust in Rajoub | View on Oslo | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | strongly support | somewhat support | somewhat oppose | strongly oppose |
| trust | 60.6% (20) | 44.4% (95) | 20.5% (8) | 33.3% (1) |
| in between | 24.2% (8) | 33.2% (71) | 12.8% (5) | 33.3% (1) |
| distrust | 15.2% (5) | 22.4% (48) | 66.7% (26) | 33.3% (1) |

Table B4b: Level of trust in Rajoub by views on peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| $p < .01$; $X^2 = 11.0$ | View on the peace process | |
|---|---|---|
| Level of trust in Rajoub | support | oppose |
| trust | 46.4% (117) | 28.6% (12) |
| in between | 30.2% (76) | 23.8% (10) |
| distrust | 23.4% (59) | 47.6% (20) |

Table B4c: Level of trust in Rajoub by views on the continuation of negotiations, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| $p < .06$, $X^2 = 14.8$ <br><br> Level of trust in Rajoub | View on the continuation of negotiations with Israel to salvage what can be salvaged | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | strongly support | somewhat support | neither support nor oppose | somewhat oppose | strongly oppose |
| trust | 40.8% (31) | 51.0% (74) | 38.5% (10) | 37.8% (14) | 14.3% (2) |
| in between | 26.3% (20) | 30.3% (44) | 26.9% (7) | 24.3% (9) | 42.9% (6) |
| distrust | 32.9% (25) | 18.6% (27) | 34.6% (9) | 37.8% (14) | 42.9% (6) |

The author also cross-tabulated level of trust in Rajoub by views on the following other issue/policy domains: the resumption of military operations, views on a return to armed struggle, views on suicide operations, level of trust in Hamas, the formation of a National Salvation Authority including Hamas, and the best solution for Hamas, i.e., whether Hamas should gain formal political power. None of these cross-tabulations achieved or approach statistical significance. In other words, there was no significant difference in levels of trust in Rajoub, between those who support these proposals, on the one side, and those who oppose these proposals, on the other side.

It appears that level of trust in Rajoub is largely a function of views on the peace process, Oslo, and negotiations, in the sense that Rajoub and his authority are viewed as a more or less direct result of and part of the peace process.

We now examine cross-tabulations to do with level of trust in Dahlan. Tables B4d-f reveal that, as with trust in Rajoub, level of trust in Dahlan is highest among those Fatah supporters who support Oslo, who support the peace process, and who support the continuation of negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence. Conversely, as with level of trust in Rajoub, level of trust in Dahlan is lowest among those Fatah trusters who oppose Oslo, who oppose the peace process, and who oppose or are neutral on the continuation of negotiations with Israel within the context of Israeli intransigence.

Table B4d: Level of trust in Dahlan by views on Oslo, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| $p < .01$, $X^2 = 25.7$ | View on Oslo | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Level of trust in Dahlan | strongly support | somewhat support | somewhat oppose | strongly oppose |
| trust | 39.4% (13) | 35.0% (76) | 13.0% (6) | 33.3% (1) |
| in between | 45.5% (15) | 41.9% (91) | 32.6% (15) | 0.0% (0) |
| distrust | 15.2% (5) | 23.0% (50) | 54.3% (25) | 66.7% (2) |

Table B4e: Level of trust in Dahlan by views on peace process, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| $p < .01$, $X^2 = 9.0$ | View on peace process | |
|---|---|---|
| level of trust in Dahlan | support | oppose |
| trust | 34.9% (90) | 19.0% (8) |
| in between | 42.6% (110) | 23.8% (10) |
| distrust | 22.5% (58) | 57.1% (24) |

Table B4f: Level of trust in Dahlan by views on the continuation of negotiations, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| $p = .03$, $X^2 = 17.0$ | View on the continuation of negotiations with Israel to salvage what can be salvaged | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Level of trust in Dahlan | strongly support | somewhat support | neither support nor oppose | somewhat oppose | strongly oppose |
| trust | 32.1% (25) | 40.8% (58) | 18.2% (6) | 24.3% (9) | 7.1% (1) |
| in between | 42.3% (33) | 36.6% (52) | 51.5% (17) | 32.4% (12) | 57.1% (8) |
| distrust | 25.6% (20) | 22.5% (32) | 30.3% (10) | 43.2% (16) | 35.7% (5) |

Furthermore, the author cross-tabulated levels of trust in Dahlan by two distinct survey items tapping Fatah supporter sentiment on military operations. One of these cross-tabulations did not achieve or approximate statistical significance. The message of this cross-tabulation is that the views of Fatah supporters on military operations do not influence their levels of trust in Dahlan. The second cross-tabulation achieved statistical significance. The results of this cross-tabulation, however, are themselves ambiguous. On the one side, support for armed struggle was associated with a slightly higher or at least equal tendency of trusting than of distrusting Dahlan, and, on the other side, opposition to armed struggle was associated with a slightly higher tendency to trust than to distrust Dahlan. Meanwhile, a cross-tabulation of level of trust in Dahlan by view on suicide operations does not achieve or approximate statistical significance. Simply, Fatah trusters who support suicide operations and Fatah trusters who oppose suicide operations do not exhibit significant differences in their tendency to trust, be trust-neutral toward, or distrust, Dahlan. Thus, the data suggest that, among Fatah supporters, level of trust in Dahlan, similarly to level of trust in Rajoub, is in significant part a function of views on the peace process, Oslo, and negotiations, but is not directly related to views on military struggle and suicide operations.

Level of trust in Dahlan, however, does seem to differ from level of trust in Rajoub in at least one important way. The reader is reminded that level of trust in Rajoub did not appear to be dependent on views on Hamas and on Hamas's integration into formal Palestinian politics. More specifically, the cross-tabulations not reported but only mentioned of level of trust in Rajoub by level of trust in Hamas, the formation of a National Salvation Authority including Hamas, and the best solution for Hamas, i.e., whether Hamas should gain formal political power, did not even approximate statistical significance. In contrast, the cross-tabulations of level of trust in Dahlan by views on these survey items either achieve or approach statistical significance. These cross-tabulations are presented in Tables B4g-B4i. These tables suggest that Fatah supporter level of trust in Dahlan, unlike Fatah supporter level of trust in Rajoub, may be influenced by Fatah supporter views on Hamas. More specifically, these tables generally suggest that people with views favorable to Hamas have (a) a higher tendency than people with views unfavorable to Hamas to distrust Dahlan, and (b) a lower tendency than people with unfavorable views on Hamas to trust Dahlan. Table B4g shows that (a) whereas 35.6% of Fatah supporters who trust Hamas trust Dahlan, 41.2% of Fatah supporters who distrust Hamas trust Dahlan, and (b) whereas 31.1% of Fatah supporters who trust Hamas distrust Dahlan, 21.2% of Fatah supporters who distrust Hamas distrust Dahlan.

Table B4g: Level of trust in Dahlan by level of trust in Hamas, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| $p = .06$, $X^2 = 9.0$ | Level of trust in Hamas | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Level of trust in Dahlan | trust Hamas | in between | distrust Hamas |
| trust | 35.6% (32) | 24.8% (30) | 41.2% (35) |
| in between | 33.3% (30) | 47.9% (58) | 37.6% (32) |
| distrust | 31.1% (28) | 27.3% (33) | 21.2% (18) |

Table B4h, similarly, suggests that Fatah supporters who oppose the formation of a national salvation authority that includes Hamas have a higher tendency to trust Dahlan than do Fatah supporters who support the formation of a national salvation authority. More specifically, (a) whereas 58.3% of Fatah supporters who oppose the formation of a national salvation authority express trust in Dahlan, 32.6% of Fatah supporters who support the formation of a national salvation authority express trust in Dahlan, and (b) whereas 25.0% of Fatah supporters who oppose the formation of a national salvation authority express distrust in Dahlan, 30.5% of Fatah supporters who support the formation of national salvation authority express distrust in Dahlan.

Table B4h: Level of trust in Dahlan by view on national salvation authority including Hamas, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| p < .01, $X^2$ = 19.4 | View on formation of national salvation authority including Hamas | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Level of trust in Dahlan | support | in between | oppose |
| trust | 32.6% (46) | 24.0% (29) | 58.3% (21) |
| in between | 36.9% (52) | 50.4% (61) | 16.7% (6) |
| distrust | 30.5% (43) | 25.6% (31) | 25.0% (9) |

Table B4i provides some evidence actually running *counter* to the hypothesis that Fatah supporters who view Hamas favorably have a higher tendency to distrust Dahlan than do Fatah supporters who view Hamas unfavorably. The cross-tabulation in this table reports that whereas 29.4% of Fatah supporters who do *not* wish Hamas to share authority express trust in Dahlan, 33.3% of Fatah supporters who do wish that Hamas share authority express trust in Dahlan. Conversely, the table shows that, whereas 37.3% of Fatah supporters who believe that Hamas should not share authority express distrust in Dahlan, 23.7% of those who believe Hamas should share authority express distrust in Dahlan. It is important, however, to be skeptical about the reliability of the views of Fatah supporters on this issue because the survey item tapping these views may have been interpreted in two difference ways by respondents. In its English translation, the survey question reads· as follows: "Which position serves Hamas best, taking power, participating in the authority with others, or not participating at all in the authority." It may be that some respondents interpreted this question to mean "which position serves *Hamas* best, regardless of your own preferences on Hamas?" and that other respondents interpreted this question to mean "which position would you like to see Hamas take?"

Table B4i: Level of trust in Dahlan by view on Hamas's sharing power in the PA, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| p = .14, $X^2$ = 7.0 | View on Hamas gaining formal political power | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Level of trust in Dahlan | Hamas should gain authority | Hamas should share authority | Hamas should not share authority |
| trust | 26.1% (6) | 33.3% (73) | 29.4% (15) |
| in between | 30.4% (7) | 42.9% (94) | 33.3% (17) |
| distrust | 43.5% (10) | 23.7% (52) | 37.3% (19) |

Given the present scope of this study, suffice it to make two suggestions regarding the potential tendency among at least Fatah supporters for level of trust in Dahlan to be influenced by views on Hamas and for level of trust in Rajoub not to be influenced by views on Hamas. First, this apparent difference in level of trust in Rajoub and level of trust in Dahlan may result from a tendency of Fatah supporters to associate cracking down on Hamas more with Dahlan than with Rajoub. Such an association, in turn, might result from Hamas's greater popularity in Gaza than in the West Bank. Secondly, future survey research aimed at addressing this specific issue would benefit from collecting data on levels of trust in the one or two security figures in addition to Rajoub and Dahlan that are most prominently engaged in Israeli and internal Palestinian security.

5. Analysis of preferences on political Islam

Fatah has through the years consistently adopted a pragmatic approach to Islam. Being broad-based, consensus seeking, and pragmatic, Fatah did not criticize political Islam as Leftist factions often did. Indeed, Fatah generally relied on a political discourse that paid homage to Islam. Parenthetically,

a comparison of the views of the sample of Fatah supporters toward political Islam and the views of the total sample toward political Islam confirms the belief that the views of Fatah supporters on political Islam mirror those of the general population. The frequency distributions of the views of the Fatah constituency sample and of the general sample are reported in Tables B5a and B5b.

Table B5a: Summary of frequency distributions of the responses of the sample of Fatah trusters, the portion of the total sample that did not express trusting Fatah most, and the total sample, to the following survey item: "What role should Islam play in Palestinian politics and society?" (November 1997)

| Sample on which frequency distribution is reported | very major role | somewhat major role | somewhat minor role | very minor role |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sample of Fatah trusters | 63.8% | 23.9% | 11.4% | 0.8% |
| sample of those not trusting Fatah most | 72.2% | 18.6% | 4.1% | 5.0% |
| total sample | 69.0% | 20.5% | 7.6% | 3.0% |

Table B5b: Summary of frequency distributions of the responses of the sample of Fatah trusters, the portion of the total sample that did not express trusting Fatah most, and the total sample, to the following survey item: "In your opinion, in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state, should this state be administered according to Islamic *Shari'a* or according to secular/non-religious laws?" (November 1997)

| Sample on which frequency distribution is reported | prefer *Shari'a* | prefer secular law |
|---|---|---|
| sample of Fatah trusters | 80.0% | 20.0% |
| sample of those not trusting Fatah most | 85.7% | 14.3% |
| total sample | 83.5% | 16.5% |

In any event, at least two comments relevant to the views of Fatah supporters on political Islam merit mention. First, the four survey items to do with political Islam (B8a-B8d) achieve intra-Fatah polarization scores which are above average, meaning that the Fatah constituency is less internally polarized on these items than on most of the other 67 items. More specifically, in all four cases, the majority of Fatah supporters expressed a preference for political Islam. The second point is that, of the four survey items to do with political Islam, the Fatah constituency is clearly less polarized in its views on political Islam when framed in general and absolute terms, on the one side, and is more polarized in its views on political Islam when framed in more precise and relative terms, on the other side. Specifically, responses to the survey item asking whether or not the respondent believes Islam should play a major role in Palestinian society exhibited a higher level of support and thus exhibited a lower level of polarization, than did responses to survey items tapping whether or not the Palestinians should establish an Islamic state and whether a Palestinian state should be based on the *Shari'a* or secular law.[42]

6. Analysis of preferences on issues to do with Hamas

The last topic considered in this section is the distribution of preferences within the Fatah constituency on issues to do with Hamas. Fatah trusters appear to be quite divided in their level of trust in Hamas. Of the sample of Fatah trusters, 34.3% expressed trust in Hamas, 41.0% expressed

[42] One of the most important implications of this finding is methodological. Specifically, Palestinian survey research may benefit from soliciting preferences over concrete elements of political Islam rather than over political Islam broadly conceived, or, perhaps even better, from soliciting preferences on the salience of political Islam *relative* to other basic values of Palestinian society, such as resolving the conflict with Israel, improving the economy, and democratization.

neither trust nor distrust in Hamas, and 24.7% expressed distrust in Hamas. The Fatah constituency appears to be substantially less divided in its level of trust toward Yasin than in its level of trust toward Hamas, with in fact about half of Fatah trusters expressing trust in Yasin. Specifically, of the sample of Fatah trusters, 52.1% expressed trust in Yasin, 33.4% expressed trust-neutrality toward Yasin, and 14.5% expressed distrust in Yasin.[43]

The survey data suggest that members of the Fatah constituency are less polarized in their views regarding the participation of Hamas in formal Palestinian politics than they are in their levels of trust in Hamas and Yasin. More specifically, the majority of the Fatah constituency (80.4%) supports the formation of a national coalition government consisting of all political and religious factions, including opposition factions. The majority of the Fatah constituency (76.7%) similarly supports the notion of Hamas participating in the PA. The Fatah constituency appears to exhibit a lower level of support (49.0%), and to be more divided, on the proposal of forming a national salvation authority including Hamas.[44]

At least two substantive points merit mention on the views of Fatah supporters on issues to do with Hamas. First, we may find it striking that the proportion of Fatah supporters who trust Hamas is much smaller than the proportion of Fatah supporters in favor of Hamas's participation in the formal Palestinian political process. This finding of course implies that there are Fatah supporters who are trust-neutral toward Hamas and who distrust Hamas who support Hamas's integration into formal Palestinian politics. One main reason for this finding may be statistical. As discussed in subsection IVB4 on trust in figures, many people may harbor some level of trust in a figure or faction, but respond "in-between" to the three-point trust scale because they interpret the "trust" response-option of this scale to reflect *full-fledged* trust. Thus, survey items allowing the respondent to express strong *or* moderate trust might rectify the apparent inconsistency. A substantive reason for the finding that the proportion of Fatah supporters who trust Hamas is substantially smaller than the proportion of Fatah supporters in favor of Hamas's political integration, may be that some Fatah supporters distrust Hamas but nonetheless view Hamas's integration into the political system as politically expedient, as better for Fatah, Oslo, etc., than is excluding Hamas.

A second point is simply that, all other things equal, we should expect those Fatah supporters who favor political Islam and who oppose the peace process to be more favorable toward Hamas than Fatah supporters who oppose political Islam and support the peace process. Tables B6a-c reveal at best minimal support for the view that Fatah supporters favoring political Islam have a higher tendency than those who do not to support Hamas's political integration. Table B6a reports the cross-tabulation of the views of the sample of Fatah trusters on the formation of a national salvation authority by this sample's preferences regarding the *Shari'a* and secular law. This cross-tabulation does not achieve statistical significance, but may nonetheless reveal a tendency for Fatah supporters who prefer the *Shari'a* to be slightly more likely to support the formation of a national salvation authority than are Fatah supporters who prefer secular law.

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[43] The calculation of these figures excluded those Fatah supporters who gave the "don't have enough information to say" response.

[44] Preferences on the formation of a national salvation authority were solicited on a three-point scale comprised of the following response-options: support, in-between, oppose. This may help to account for the lower level of support a national salvation authority for the reason that some people who only *moderately* support the formation of a national salvation authority may interpret the "support" response-option as referring to strong, or full-fledged, support.

Table B6a: Views on national salvation authority by legal preference, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| p = .28<br>View on formation of national salvation authority including Hamas | Prefers *Shari'a* | Prefers secular law |
|---|---|---|
| support | 51.3%<br>(173) | 43.5%<br>(37) |
| in between | 39.5%<br>(133) | 42.4%<br>(36) |
| oppose | 9.2%<br>(31) | 14.1%<br>(12) |

Meanwhile, Table B6b suggests that no difference whatsoever exists in the attitudes regarding Hamas's gaining power of Fatah supporters who prefer the *Shari'a* and Fatah supporters who prefer secular law.

Table B6b: Views on best solution for Hamas by legal preference, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| p = .67<br>View on best solution for Hamas | Prefers *Shari'a* | Prefers secular law |
|---|---|---|
| gain authority | 6.0%<br>(20) | 8.3%<br>(7) |
| share authority | 78.2%<br>(259) | 75.0%<br>(63) |
| not share authority | 15.7%<br>(52) | 16.7%<br>(14) |

Table B6c, lastly, reports the cross-tabulation of Fatah supporter view on the formation of a national coalition government that includes the opposition factions by Fatah supporter legal preference. This cross-tabulation reveals no difference between the views of Fatah supporters who prefer the *Shari'a* and the views of Fatah supporters who prefer secular law on the proposal of forming a national coalition government.

Table B6c: Views on the formation of a national coalition government that includes the opposition factions by legal preference, on Fatah constituency sample (March 1999)

| p = .93<br><br>Views on the formation of a national coalition government that includes the opposition | Prefers *Shari'a* | Prefers secular law |
|---|---|---|
| strongly support | 44.4%<br>(152) | 46.0%<br>(40) |
| somewhat support | 35.7%<br>(122) | 35.6%<br>(31) |
| neither support nor oppose | 16.7%<br>(57) | 13.8%<br>(12) |
| somewhat oppose | 2.6%<br>(9) | 3.4%<br>(3) |
| strongly oppose | 0.6%<br>(2) | 1.1%<br>(1) |

These cross-tabulations suggest that views on political Islam at best influence the Fatah constituency's level of support for the participation of Hamas in formal Palestinian politics only slightly. The minimal impact of views on political Islam in shaping preferences regarding the formal political participation of Hamas actually confirms what may be called the conventional wisdom that Palestinian party politics are driven much more by preferences regarding strategy toward Israel and by internal political interests than by views on political Islam. In any event, the conclusion that preferences regarding political Islam play a minor role in defining the views of Fatah supporters in terms of Hamas's political participation leaves the crucial question of identifying the factors that do account for views on Hamas largely unanswered. This key question remains an important area for future research.

## C. Estimation of the factors accounting for level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures

The present section seeks to estimate the effects of various types of beliefs, preferences, and demographic characteristics, on the tendencies of Palestinians to exhibit trust or distrust in Fatah and Fatah figures. Toward this end, the author estimates a multiple regression model accounting for level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures.

To begin, it is important to emphasize what exactly is being explained by the model presented below. The March 1999 survey asked respondents to indicate their level of trust, on a three-point ordinal scale, in particular Fatah figures, i.e., Arafat, Abu Mazen, F. Husseini, S. Eraqat, J. Rajoub, and M. Dahlan. The March 1999 survey also solicited both respondent level of trust in Fatah and respondent evaluation of Arafat's job performance. All told, then, the March 1999 survey included eight survey items tapping views on either Fatah or Fatah leaders. The author suspected that the responses to these survey items might best be viewed as indicators of the more general notion of level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures. In other words, the author suspected that *combining* the responses to the various survey items tapping sentiment toward particular Fatah figures and toward Fatah might provide a more reliable measure of respondent level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures than any of these survey-items taken alone. Suffice it to say that, based on the author's investigations, a valid measure of "trust in Fatah and Fatah figures" is achieved by scaling, or combining, respondents' responses to the following subset of the 8 items: (1) level of trust in Arafat, (2) level of trust in Husseini, (3) level of trust in Abu Mazen, (4) level of trust in Eraqat, and (5) level of trust in Fatah.[45]

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[45] More specifically, the author thought it may be appropriate to combine the responses to these eight survey items into a variable called a Likert scale. A Likert scale, in the case of the present study, is a variable constructed by simply summing the responses of respondents to two or more survey items. The main justification for constructing Likert scales from two or more survey items is that such scales are more reliable measures of the underlying dimension tapped by each of the survey items in the scale than is each of the survey items taken individually. The question becomes one of assessing the extent to which the two or more items one wants to combine into a Likert scale in fact tap a common underlying dimension. The statistic that is generally held to be the most effective indicator of this assessment is called the alpha coefficient of inter-item reliability. It should suffice to make two comments on the alpha coefficient of inter-item reliability. First, this statistic is a measure of the extent to which a group of items are inter-correlated. Second, general convention is to treat a set of items as sufficiently inter-correlated to combine into a Likert scale if the alpha coefficient of these items is .07 or higher. In simple terms, to the extent that a set of items suspected of tapping the same underlying dimension exhibits a high level of inter-correlation, it is legitimate to combine this set of items into a common Likert scale.

The alpha reliability coefficient for the responses to the 8 survey items on Fatah figures and Fatah is .92, thus indicating that the responses to these various survey items are highly inter-correlated and that it is valid to combine the responses to these items into one Likert scale measuring respondent level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures. The author, however, chose *not* to combine the responses to *all* of the 8 items into a single scale. The reason for this is that a large proportion of the respondents reported "don't have enough information to say" to one or more of these 8 survey items. As a result, many respondents exhibit a score of "don't know" on a scale that combines the responses to *all* of these survey items. These respondents would be treated as missing data in multiple regression analyses involving such a scale. The reason for this is simply that, in scaling a set of items, each case, i.e., respondent, that exhibits a score of "don't know" on one or more of the items in the set is treated as having incomplete data, and thus is thrown out of the analysis. As concerns the combination of responses to all of the 8 items, only 549 out of the 1199 people polled responded a substantively meaningful answer, rather

The possible values of this measure range from 5 to 15, with a score of 5 representing maximal trust in Fatah figures and Fatah, and a score of 15 representing maximal distrust in Fatah figures and Fatah.

The results of a "persuasive" regression model accounting for respondent's scores on the scale measuring level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures are presented in Table C.[46] The left-most column of the table lists the independent variables. The middle column indicates the unstandardized beta coefficient for the corresponding independent variable. The presence or absence of one or two asterisks by each beta coefficient indicates whether or not the beta coefficient achieves statistical significance.[47] The right-most column presents the coding schemes of the independent variables in the model. These are provided to enable the reader to interpret the direction of the estimated effects.[48] Lastly, the one-cell column in the top-right corner present two basic pieces of information on the

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than "don't know," to each of the eight items, and thus the majority of the respondents to the survey would be treated as missing data in the multiple regression analysis of a dependent variable that combined the responses to all of these survey items. Accordingly, it is appropriate to construct a scale out of only some *subset* of the 8 items that both (a) adequately measures level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures, and (b) preserves the data on as many of the cases, i.e., respondent's, as possible. Suffice it to say that, based on the author's investigations, a valid construct of "trust in Fatah and Fatah figures" is achieved by scaling the following subset of the 8 items: (1) level of trust in Arafat, (2) level of trust in Husseini, (3) level of trust in Abu Mazen, (4) level of trust in Eraqat, and (5) level of trust in Fatah. The alpha reliability score for these five survey items is sufficiently high to treat these items as comprising a single construct measuring level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures (alpha = .88). Additionally, this scale preserves 776 respondents of the total sample, and thus preserves many more of the cases than does the scale with all 8 items on trust in Fatah figures and Fatah, i.e., 549. The specific variable constructed by the author is simply the sum of the respondents' responses to each of these five items.

[46] The model accounting for respondent scores on this variable that is presented in this section was derived by the author's conducting a long series of incrementally adjusted multiple regression models. In other words, the author conducted a long series of multiple regression analyses in which each multiple regression analysis included a *distinct set* of independent variables. The author conducted this series of analyses until he arrived at a model that, given the survey data, persuasively accounts for variation in the dependent variable. The primary criteria by which the "persuasive" model was assessed are the size of the sample with which the regression model was estimated, the p-values of the beta estimates of individual independent variables, and the author's intuitive assessments of the importance of individual independent variables in accounting for levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures.

The author found it appropriate to run many multiple regression analyses for each dependent variable for at least two reasons, one statistical and the other substantive. The statistical reason is that the performance of any individual independent variable -- that is, the p-value, and also the direction and size of any particular beta coefficient -- may vary depending upon the set of other independent variables in the equation. This is the case, suffice it to say, because multiple regression estimates the effects of each variable in the equation while *controlling* for the effects of all other variables in the equation. Thus, the running of many analyses provides a sense of the consistency and robustness of the impact of individual independent variables on the dependent variable. The substantive reason for exploring so many combinations of independent variables is simply the lack of adequate pre-existing quantitative evidence regarding the factors that do and do not influence level of trust in Fatah. Thus, the estimation of models accounting for variation in levels of trust in Fatah warranted an exhaustive review of the statistical relevance of a wide variety of independent variables on which the survey collected data.

[47] Specifically, the presence of one asterisk by a beta coefficient means that the effect expressed by that beta coefficient has a p-value that is greater or equal to .01 and less than or equal to .05. In words, an estimated effect with one asterisk has a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn. The presence of two asterisks by a beta coefficient means that the effect expressed by that beta coefficient has a p-value smaller than .01. In words, an estimated effect with two asterisks has a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn. A beta coefficient with no asterisk refers to an estimated effect of the corresponding independent variable that does not achieve statistical significance at the 95% confidence-level.

[48] On this note, it should be reiterated that the values of the dependent variable are integers ranging from 5 to 15, with 5 representing maximal trust in Fatah and Fatah figures and 15 representing maximal distrust in Fatah and Fatah figures.

model. The "N" refers to the number of cases, i.e., respondents, with which the regression analysis estimated the model. As mentioned in subsection IIIB5, the second statistic in this cell, $R^2$, is a statistic that measures the extent to which the total amount of variation in the dependent variable is accounted for by the independent variables in the model.[49]

Table C: Regression model accounting for respondents' levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures

| Independent Variable | Standardized beta coefficient | coding scheme of independent variable | N=672 $R^2$=.56 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent view on Oslo and the peace process | +0.27** | The numeric values of this Likert scale range from 2-8, where 2 = strong support for Oslo and the peace process, 8 = strong opposition to Oslo and the peace process[50] | |
| Respondent view on the continuation of negotiations to salvage what can be salvaged within the context of Israeli intransigence | +0.16** | 1 = strongly support 2 = somewhat support 3 = neither support nor oppose 4 = somewhat oppose 5 = strongly oppose | |
| Respondent assessment of whether the political situation would improve, remain the same, or worsen, if Labor were to beat Likud in the Israeli elections | +0.17** | 1 = would improve 2 = would remain as it is 3 = would worsen | |
| Respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA | +0.13** | 1 = very good 2 = somewhat good 3 = somewhat bad 4 = very bad | |
| Respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PLC | +.18** | 1 = very good 2 = somewhat good 3 = somewhat bad 4 = very bad | |
| Respondent view on PA executions | +0.07** | 1 = support executions 2 = in between 3 = oppose executions | |
| Respondent view on the formation of a national coalition government including the opposition | +0.16** | 1 = strongly support 2 = somewhat support 3 = in between 4 = somewhat oppose 5 = strongly oppose | |

* .01 <= p-value <= .05; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a 95%-99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.
** p-value < .01; i.e., the effect is estimated as having a greater than 99% probability of existing in the population from which the sample was drawn.

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[49] The $R^2$ statistic varies from 0 to 1, with 1 meaning that all of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables in the model, and 0 meaning that none of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables in the model.

[50] This independent variable is a Likert scale that was constructed by summing respondent responses to a survey item tapping views on "Oslo" and a survey item tapping views on the "peace process." The alpha reliability coefficient of this scale is .79.

The model presented in Table C estimates that the views of the total sample on the following seven issues exert statistically significant effects on the level of people's trust in Fatah and Fatah figures: (1) Oslo and the peace process, (2) the continuation of negotiations to salvage what can be salvaged within the context of Israeli intransigence, (3) whether the political situation would improve, remain the same, or worsen, if Labor were to beat Likud in the Israeli elections, (4) the general performance of the PA, (5) the general performance of the PLC, (6) the PA execution judgments, and (7) the formation of a national coalition government including the opposition. In order to interpret the direction of the effects of these seven independent variables on respondents' levels of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures, it is necessary to refer to the coding schemes of these variables. Given these coding schemes, the interpretation of the seven effects is as follows: (1) the higher a person's support for Oslo and the peace process, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (2) the higher a person's support for continuing negotiations within the context of Israeli intransigence to salvage what can be salvaged, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (3) the more pessimistic a person on the impact that the ascension to power of a Labor-led government would have on Palestinian national interests, the lower the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (4) the more favorable a person's evaluation of the general performance of the PA, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures ; (5) the more favorable a person's evaluation of the general performance of the PLC, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; (6) the more negative a person's evaluation of the PA's execution judgments, the lower the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; and (7) the more supportive a person of the formation of a national coalition government, the higher the person's level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures; conversely, the more opposed a person to the formation of a national coalition government, the higher that person's level of distrust in Fatah and Fatah figures.

The standardized beta coefficient measures the effects of each of the independent variables on the same scale, and thus allows us to directly compare the relative size of the effects of the independent variables in the model. Of the seven independent variables in the model presented in Table C, we see that respondent evaluation of Oslo and the peace process exerts a substantially larger impact on level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures than do any of the other six independent variables in the model. Excluding the effect of respondent evaluation of Oslo and the peace process, respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PLC, respondent assessment of whether the political situation would improve, remain the same, or worsen, if Labor were to beat Likud in the Israeli elections, respondent view on the continuation of negotiations to salvage what can be salvaged within the context of Israeli intransigence, and respondent view on the formation of a national coalition government including the opposition, exert the largest and more or less equally-sized effects on respondent level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures. Of the seven independent variables in the model, respondent evaluation of the general performance of the PA exerts the second smallest effect on respondent level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures. Lastly, respondent opinion on previous PA execution judgments exerts the relatively smallest effect on level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures.

At least two noteworthy points with respect to these estimated effects deserve emphasis. First, the basis for the strong association between views on the PLC and PA, on the one side, and views on Fatah, on the other side, are ultimately the result of a reciprocal relationship between these two sets of factors. Specifically, whereas the regression model presented above estimates the effects of PA and PLC evaluation on level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures, it is no doubt the case that level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures exerts an effect on PA and PLC evaluation. Similarly, views on the PA summary executions are likely to be in part a result as well as a cause of level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures. The relative size of each of these reciprocal effects remains an area for future research. Second, the regression model estimates that evaluation of the PLC exerts a greater impact on level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures than does evaluation of the PA. This result may seem surprising, given the assumption that Fatah is more closely associated with the PA than with the PLC. Again, the specification of the various direct, indirect, and reciprocal relationships, between views on the PA, the PLC, Fatah, and various other political beliefs and opinions, is a basic topic deserved of ongoing research.

Lastly, it is important to collate information not only on those independent variables that are estimated to exert statistically significant effects, but also on those independent variables that are estimated not to exert statistically significant effects.[51] Toward this end, we can differentiate between independent variables that do not appear in the "persuasive" model presented in this section because they only rarely achieved and/or only approximated statistical significance in the series of preliminary analyses, on the one side, and independent variables that do not appear in the "persuasive" model presented in this section because they do not even approximate statistical significance. The following variables achieved and/or meaningfully approached statistical significance sporadically across the various preliminary models: views on (1) Palestinian linkage with Jordan in the event that the road toward Palestinian statehood reaches a dead-end, and (2) the demanding of an Islamic state in all of Palestine in the event that the road toward Palestinian statehood reaches a dead-end. The preliminary models including views on Palestinian linkage with Jordan estimated that support for linkage with Jordan is associated with a higher tendency to trust Fatah and Fatah figures, and that opposition to linkage with Jordan is associated with a higher tendency to distrust Fatah and Fatah figures. The preliminary models including views on demanding the establishment of an Islamic state estimated that the higher a person's level of support for demanding, within the context of Israeli intransigence, the establishment of an Islamic state in all of Palestine, the lower the person's tendency to trust Fatah and Fatah figures.

In contrast, variables not achieving and/or approaching statistical significance at all across the series of preliminary models of level of trust in Fatah and Fatah figures are the following: (1) respondent view on demanding, in the face of Israeli intransigence, the establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli state, (2) respondent view on halting negotiations and awaiting a favorable shift in the balance of power in the face of Israeli intransigence, (3) respondent view on armed struggle, (4) respondent view on popular struggle, (5) respondent level of education, and (6) respondent age.

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[51] As was mentioned above, the single regression model presented here is a product of an incremental series of regression model-building. The point is that the author estimated the effects of various independent variables on each dependent variable that do not appear in the final model reported here.

# Conclusion

A summary of this study's findings is presented in the introduction to this study and in the introductions to Part III and Part IV. Rather than reiterate this summary, here, the author concludes by emphasizing some of the most important topics for future research considered in this study. As concerns public opinion regarding Palestinian-Israeli relations, one topic meriting further research is the extent to which people's preferences with respect to strategic options, such as negotiating, armed struggle, and popular protest, are associated with Israel's own strategic orientation toward the Palestinians. The most basic requisite for such research is that polls include survey items that tap preferences on Palestinian strategic options explicitly within the context of Israeli conciliation and Israeli intransigence/escalation.

Another topic for future research is the perceptions of Palestinians on the orientations of the Israeli leadership and masses toward the peace process. Such perceptions not only help to shape people's strategic policy preferences, but also, as this study has shown, directly influence levels of trust in Fatah and perhaps also in other Palestinian political factions. This study has suggested, furthermore, that to measure the perceptions of Palestinians on the orientations of the Israeli leadership and masses adequately, it is appropriate to solicit the perceptions of Palestinians on the views of the Israeli leadership and masses on *concrete aspects* of a Palestinian-Israeli final status agreement. Ultimately, these final status issues comprise the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and thus of any Palestinian-Israeli final status settlement. As such, we should expect people's views on the prospects of peace to be driven most directly by people's assessments of the prospects of reaching adequate resolutions in regards to these issues.

As concerns public opinion on issue/policy domains most directly pertaining to internal Palestinian politics, one major topic for future research is the estimation of models accounting for the level of favorability of evaluations of the PA. Such models should take into account the direct, indirect, and reciprocal effects of people's views on the PA's performance with respect to Israel, human rights and democracy, and corruption. Additionally, explanations of the legitimacy of the PA should take into account the inter-relationships between views on the PA, Arafat, Fatah, and the PLC.

## List of JMCC Public Opinion Polls Analytical Reports:

❖ **Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion on Politics:**
*Popular Trust in Palestinian Islamist Factions* (JMCC, pp. 46, September 2000)

❖ **Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion on Politics:**
*Popular Trust and Distrust in Palestinian Politicians and Factions,* (JMCC, pp. 76, August 2000)

❖ **Palestinian Support for the Peace Process,** (JMCC, pp. 49, February 1999).

❖ **Palestinian Public Opinion Since the Peace Process,** (JMCC & Arab Thought Forum, pp. 102, July 1998)

❖ **Palestine's Interim Agreement with Democracy** (JMCC, pp. 177, May 1998)

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