Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion on Politics

Popular Trust and Distrust In Palestinian Politicians and Factions

Jerusalem Media & Communication Center
August 2000

WRITTEN BY Gil Friedman
DESIGN JMCC
PRINT Al-Kateb Printing Press Company - Ramallah
02-2987776

مركز القدس للإعلام والإتصال
JMCC
POB 25047, East Jerusalem
Tel 02-5819777 **Fax** 02-5829534
email jmcc@jmcc.org
Website: http://www.jmcc.org

Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion on Politics

Popular Trust and Distrust In Palestinian Politicians and Factions

written by: Gil Friedman

Jerusalem Media & Communication Center
August 2000

Preface

Since 1993, the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) has been regularly conducting public opinion polls. These surveys encompass a wide range of subjects that are of interest to the Palestinian public opinion. It also draws the interest of non-Palestinian parties who are, directly or indirectly, engaged with the Palestine question.

Furthermore, the JMCC Polling Unit conducts commissioned surveys for researchers whose research and analysis require an examination of public opinion.

The unit had participated in joint surveys such as regional polls on an Arab level and another poll with an Israeli research center.

Throughout the discourse of the periodic polls, it has been realized that there is inadequate usage of the accumulating technical data. Thus, leading us to expand the polling unit to include data analysis that will hopefully assist the reader, researcher and those interested in comprehending Palestinian attitudes towards the issues the polls deal with. JMCC before has published three analytical reports. The present study is the first of three public opinion analysis to do with popular political trust conducted by the author.

The Palestinian public opinion towards the peace process and the Palestinian leadership, who are ingrained within this process, is one of the most important subjects the surveys has traced since the beginning of this political process and the return of the Palestinian leadership.

The most important trend that are clear within in this discourse is the continuous and steady increase within the Palestinian people in the distrust of any leadership figure and leading factions in Palestinian politics.

The analysis attempts to specialize in studying the Palestinian people's trust and distrust of the political echelon, the political activists and the Palestinian political organizations by explaining the factors influencing these trends through an in-depth survey study.

Accordingly, the polls and the analytical studies constitute a worthy contribution in empowering the trust of the people in themselves as well as reinforcing accountability within the discourse of democratization of the Palestinian society.

Ghassan Khatib
Director

Introduction

Popular trust in political figures and factions is plainly a necessary condition for state- and nation-building, democratization, and social order. Confidence in political figures and factions promotes public compliance with state demands, organization and mobilization of the population for specialized tasks, the search for improvement or reform from within rather than without the burgeoning political system, and popular legitimization of the state's symbols and myths.[1] Public trust also encourages the popular participation and political competition upon which democracy is based.[2] In short, we may say of popular political trust what Ibn Khaldun (1967: 127) said of "group feeling," that it is "by necessity" required for "every mass [political] undertaking."[3]

While popular trust is necessary for state- and nation-building, democratization, and social order, Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC) public opinion polls have revealed that large proportions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, do not trust any political figure or faction. For the past few years, JMCC public opinion surveys have been asking respondents to indicate which political figure and faction they trust most. Responses to these questions are summarized in Graphs 1 and 2. In each graph, the proportion of those polled who indicated *trust* in some figure/faction is represented by the top band, and the proportion of those polled who claimed that they trust *no* political figure/faction is represented by the bottom band.[4] The graphs make evident that many Palestinians distrust political figures and factions. As is discernible from Graph 1, the proportion of the public sampled which reported distrust in political figures averaged 21.5%, and reached as high as 27.8% in May 1988. Over this same time period, as depicted in Graph 2, the proportion of the public sampled which expressed distrust in political factions averaged 26.8%, and reached as high as 37.7% in August 1996.

Various specific political developments have certainly contributed to the high level of distrust in Palestinian political figures and factions. Notably, this pervasive distrust is no doubt related to inadequate progress toward a satisfactory final status solution with Israel. For one, Israel's commitment to the spirit, if not also the letter, of the interim agreements has at best been highly questionable. According to a document published by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in July 1996,

---

[1]The following short and eclectic set of references is provided for the reader interested in scholarship on collective action and state-building: Olson (1965); Hirschman (1970); Poggi (1978); Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985); and Migdal (1988).

[2]On trust and political development, the reader may wish to consult Almond and Verba (1963, 1980), Pye and Verba (1965), Dahl (1971), Inkeles and Smith (1974), Linz (1978), Gambetta (1988), and Diamond (1993).

[3]Popular trust in political elites is also important in its capacity as a source of elite power. (Laumann and Pappi: 1976; Laumann and Knoke: 1987)

[4] The two thin lines enveloping each of the thick lines represent the 95% confidence interval surrounding the sample proportions.

The confidence interval is an important and straightforward concept. Simply, any sample drawn from a population inevitably varies to some extent from the population. For example, 27.8% of the sample of people surveyed by the JMCC in May 1998 reported that they do not trust any Palestinian political figure. Given that this *sample* is not *perfectly* representative of the *population*, we naturally expect the percentage of the Palestinian population that, in May 1998, distrusted Palestinian political figures not to be *exactly* 27.8%. Rather, we expect that slightly more or slightly less than 27.8% of the Palestinian population distrusted political figures in May 1998. The confidence interval, then, is a statistic that represents a range around, in this case, the percentage of the sample expressing trust/distrust in Palestinian political figures, that, based on the survey data, is highly likely to contain the true population percentage. The size of the likelihood that the population percentage falls within this range depends on how broad or narrow the range is. The broader the interval surrounding the sample percentage, the higher the likelihood that the interval contains the actual population percentage; and the narrower the interval surrounding the sample percentage, the lower the likelihood that the interval contains the actual population percentage. The convention in social scientific research is to construct confidence intervals that have a 95% probability of containing the population percentage (or population average, as the case may be). The confidence intervals represented by the thin lines enveloping each of the thick lines in Graph 1 and Graph 2 conform to this convention; that is, they have a 95% likelihood of containing the actual population percentages of the population who expressed trust and distrust in political leaders and factions.

Graph 1: Public trust and distrust in political figures, October 1995 to May 1998



Graph 2: Public trust and distrust in political factions, May 1995 to May 1998



Israel had by this date committed 23 types of violations of the interim agreements.[5] This trend was no doubt accentuated by the tenure of a right-wing Israeli government from July 1996 to July 1999. Furthermore, Israeli violations of the interim agreements have been accompanied by continued Israeli human rights violations, including detention and torture, house demolitions, and closures.[6]

Disaffection with Palestinian leaders is no doubt also related to failings of the PA. As was revealed by the May 1997 PA General Control Office investigation and confirmed by a special investigation headed by Tayib 'Abd al-Rahim in July 1997, various ministries and agencies of the PA have been plagued with extensive financial, administrative, and legal, corruption and ineptitude.[7] Perhaps equally troubling is Arafat's nominal if not insolent response to the Palestinian Legislative Council's (PLC's) demands for reforms following in the wake of the charges of the two investigations. As is well-known, moreover, the PA has committed extensive violations of basic civil and political liberties, such as the rights to due process of law, freedom of the press, expression, and assembly, and so on.[8] To this list of disconcerting political trends, one can add the stagnant if not worsening state of the economy of the West Bank and Gaza, the demobilization of many Palestinian oppositional factions, and the continued preponderance of Israeli power in relation to the Palestinians.

Such developments have no doubt affected the *aggregate* levels – that is, the population percentages – of popular trust and distrust in political figures and factions. Yet, such developments do not inform us about the factors that account for variation *within* the population *at any given point in time*. In other words, at any given point in time, some Palestinians do and other Palestinians do not trust political figures and factions. As the political developments delimited above are constant at any given point in time and as they impartially embrace all Palestinians of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, they cannot in themselves differentiate between people who trust and people who do not trust. Adequate understanding of popular trust and distrust thus requires identification of those variables that at any given point in time account for the tendency of *individual* Palestinians to trust or distrust political figures and factions. Simply put, the question raised is: what factors differentiate between individuals who trust political figures and factions and individuals who distrust political figures and factions?

It is the aim of this study to address this question by analyzing data collected in two JMCC public opinion polls, one conducted in November 1997 and the other in May 1998. These surveys enable us to examine the impact on the propensity toward political trust or distrust of factors that can roughly be fit into four categories: (1) views on issues to do with Palestinian-Israeli relations; (2) views on domestic political issues, such as the performance of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council; (3) socioeconomic attributes, such as age, gender, region of residence, i.e., West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, etc.; and (4) psychological factors, namely, optimism or pessimism about the future in general. The main aim of this study, then, is to estimate the absolute and relative impacts of individual members of these four distinct classes of factors upon people's tendencies to trust or distrust political figures and factions.

A subsidiary set of analyses conducted in this study examines the possibility that many respondents responded "no answer/don't know" to the survey questions on political trust in order to conceal support for Islamists or other rejectionists – support which may be understood by these respondents to be outlawed or at least disliked by the authorities. A substantial level of such misinformation is likely to bias the results of analyses of the factors accounting for trust/distrust in political figures and factions. More generally, dishonest responses pertaining to politically sensitive issues – such as support for Islamists, suicide bombings, armed struggle, etc. – may represent a major

---

[5] See "PA List of Israeli Violations of Oslo." *Journal of Palestine Studies* (1996): 26(1): 144-5.

[6] See, for example, annual human rights reports of LAW – The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment.

[7] See, for example, annual reports of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights.

[8] See, for example, annual reports of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights.

limitation of Palestinian survey research. Accordingly, the intention of the subsidiary analysis is to assess the extent to which the set of respondents reporting "no answer/don't know" to the survey questions on trust is comprised of people who are in reality sympathetic toward Islamists.

Among the most notable findings of this study are the following. **Firstly**, as concerns the relationship between trust in figures, on the one side, and trust in factions, on the other side, most people who trust (distrust) some figure also trust (distrust) some faction, and vice versa. At the same time, however, many people trust either some figure or some faction but not both. Thus, the relationship between trust in figures and trust in factions is positive but far from perfect. Furthermore, this study presents a basic approach for assessing the extent to which the Palestinian people identify figures with these figures' factional affiliations, and the extent to which the popular support of particular figures is dispersed across supporters of more than one faction. The importance of factional affiliation in trust toward figures and the dispersion of the support of particular figures across various factions could not be adequately assessed in this study due to major data constraints. Keeping in mind these constraints, Haidar Abdul-Shafi was found to enjoy a broader base of support, in terms of the factional sympathies of the respondents, than any other Palestinian figure.

As concerns the explanation of trust in factions and figures, by far the most important factor affecting a person's tendency to trust or distrust is the person's evaluation of the PA. The **second** most important factor affecting a person's tendency to trust or distrust is the person's evaluation of the PLC. Simply, negative views of the PA and/or the PLC promote the likelihood of distrusting all political figures and factions, and positive evaluations of the PA and/or PLC decrease the likelihood of distrust in all figures and factions. What is more, the tendency for criticism of the PA to lead to disaffection with the entire political system is particularly likely when this criticism is coupled with opposition to armed violence in the struggle with Israel and opposition to political Islam. Similarly, some evidence suggests that while opposition to negotiations with Israel by itself might not be meaningfully related to the propensity to trust any figure or faction, political distrust might be promoted by the conjunction of opposition to negotiations with Israel and opposition to confrontational policies toward Israel. The most general finding regarding socioeconomic variables is that no socioeconomic variable exerts a statistically significant effect across the various analyses of popular political trust/distrust conducted in this study. More specifically, age, gender, region of residence, i.e., West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and residence-type, i.e., city, village, refugee camp, were found to exert only statistically significant effects only sporadically across the various analyses of political trust/distrust conducted in this study.

As concerns the reasons people respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most survey questions, evidence which can only at best be described as moderate suggests that some respondents report "no answer/don't know" to survey questions on trust in figures and factions in order to conceal militant preferences. This finding enhances our confidence that the findings of this study to do with the factors that account for whether or not a person exhibits political trust or distrust are not biased by the tendency of Islamist sympathizers to conceal their preference for Islamists by responding "no answer/don't know." East Jerusalemites display a higher propensity to respond "no answer/don't know" to survey questions soliciting preferences over figures and factions than did Gaza and West Bank residents. Additionally, level of education appears to simultaneously exert an indirect positive effect – by increasing the knowledge with which a person can assess who he or she trusts most – and a direct negative effect – perhaps by increasing a person's criticism of Islamists or perhaps by increasing the person's general level of disappointment with the state of political affairs – on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the survey questions on political trust.

The remainder of this study is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the research design utilized to investigate the factors influencing people's tendencies to trust or distrust political figures and factions. Though this first part of the study is not absolutely necessary for understanding the ensuing analyses, it no doubt enhances the reader's understanding of these analyses. Furthermore, some sections of Part I – most notably those to do with scaling independent variables and examining the relationship between *trust/distrust* in figures/factions, on the one side, and *positive/negative opinion* on figures/factions, on the other –are substantively meaningful and may thus be of interest even to the reader who is not particularly interested in the methodology of this study. Part II reports the results of a set of analyses to do with the relationship between trust in figures, on the one side, and trust in factions, on the other. This set of analyses helps to guide the construction of models accounting for whether a person trusts or distrusts some figure/faction, and as such comprises a

component of the research design of this study. Regardless of the implications for this study's research design of the present analysis of the relationship between trust in figures and trust in factions, however, such analysis is substantively meaningful in its own right. Accordingly, the author encapsulates discussion of this analysis into an autonomous part of the study in order to encourage the non-methodologically inclined reader to read it. Part III summarizes and analyzes four models estimated with a statistical technique called logistic regression that account for respondents' likelihood of trusting or distrusting political figures and factions. The first of these models accounts for responses to the survey question on trust in figures with November 1997 data, the second model accounts for responses to the survey question on trust in figures with May 1998 data, the third model accounts for responses to the question on trust in factions with November 1997 data, and the four model accounts for responses to the survey question on trust in factions with May 1998 data. Lastly, Part IV summarizes and analyzes the findings of four models accounting for the tendency of respondents to respond "no answer/don't know" to the survey questions on trust. Concluding remarks recapitulate the main findings of this study and suggest areas for future survey research aimed at advancing our understanding of Palestinian public trust/distrust in political figures and factions.

Parts I and II may not be of primary concern to the reader interested in the main findings of the study. The reader interested in the main findings may wish to skip Parts I and II altogether and begin directly with Part III. Alternatively, the author has bolded the key points in the discussions of Parts I and II. Accordingly, the reader may wish to read only the bolded sections of Parts I and II, and then proceed to Part III. Meanwhile, because Parts III and IV, and in particular Part III, are of substantive interest and generally accessible to all readers, these parts do not place the main points in bold.

I. Research Design

The aim of Part I is to inform the reader of the research design employed in this study to account for popular trust and distrust in political figures and factions. Part I is divided into four sections. Section *A* discusses the conceptualization and measurement of this study's objects of explanation, or dependent variables, i.e., trust or distrust in political figures and factions. Section *B* conducts various analyses pertaining to the validity of the dependent variables delineated in Section *A*. Section *C* discusses the conceptualization and measurement of the factors that are treated as potential causes of the dependent variables, i.e. the independent variables. Lastly, Section *D* briefly presents some basic attributes of logistic regression, the statistical technique that is employed in this study to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables.

The reader may wish to skip this methodological discussion and proceed directly to the findings reported in Part II and/or Part III. This being said, some discussions in Part I – notably, the discussion of relationships *between* factors potentially influencing the probability an individual trusts/distrusts (Section *C*) and the discussion of analyses of various relationships between a person's trust or distrust in figures and factions, on the one side, and the person's level of "positive/negative opinion" toward figures and factions, on the other side (Section *B*) – are substantively and theoretically meaningful in their own right, and, as such, may be of interest to the reader who is not particularly concerned with the research design of this study. To facilitate the reader's grasping the content of Part I, the author has bolded the key points.

A. Conceptualizing and Measuring the Dependent Variables

In this study, as stated above, the objects of explanation, or dependent variables, are trust or distrust in political figures and in political factions. This study measures these dependent variables with two questions asked in both the May 1998 and November 1997 JMCC surveys: (1) "Which Palestinian personality do you trust most?" and (2) "Which Palestinian political or religious faction do you trust most?" Note that these are open-ended questions; that is, the respondent was free to give the name of any figure and any faction of his or her choosing. The frequency distributions of responses to these questions for the two surveys analyzed here are presented in Table IA.

Table IA: Frequency distribution of responses to the trust-faction and trust-figure survey questions
(1) Trust-faction; November 1997 survey

Faction	Frequency	Percent
Fatah	483	40.9%
Hamas	204	17.3%
PFLP	24	2.0%
DFLP	11	0.9%
Islamic Jihad	21	1.8%
PPP	8	0.7%
FIDA	5	0.4%
Democratic Coalition	1	0.1%
Pro-peace secularists	1	0.1%
Other Islamic factions	35	3.0%
PLO	8	0.7%
Other factions	4	0.3%
Do not trust any faction	204	17.3%
Don't Know/No answer	173	14.6%
Total	1182	100.1%

(2) Trust-faction; May 1998 survey

Faction	Frequency	Percent
Fatah	397	32.9%
Hamas	161	13.3%
PFLP	34	2.8%
DFLP	5	0.4%
Islamic Jihad	10	0.8%
PPP	14	1.2%
FIDA	4	0.3%
Pro-peace secularists	1	0.1%
Anti-peace secularists	4	0.3%
Other Islamic factions	47	3.9%
PLO	8	0.7%
Palestinian Authority	9	0.7%
Other faction	5	0.4%
Do not trust any faction	352	29.1%
Don't Know/No answer	157	13.0%
Total	1208	99.9%

(3) Trust-figure; November 1997 survey

Figure	Frequency	Percent
Yasir Arafat	547	46.3%
Ahmed Yasin	68	5.8%
George Habash	15	1.3%
Naif Hawatmeh	3	0.3%
Haidar Abd al-Shafi	62	5.2%
Faisal al-Husseini	17	1.4%
Hanan Ashrawi	24	2.0%
Saeb Erekat	32	2.7%
Mahmoud Abbas	11	0.9%
Other personalities	86	7.3%
Do not trust any figure	199	16.8%
Don't Know/No answer	118	10.0%
Total	1182	100.0%

(4) Trust-figure; May 1998 survey

Figure	Frequency	Percent
Yasir Arafat	468	38.7%
Ahmed Yasin	101	8.4%
George Habash	22	1.8%
Naif Hawatmeh	3	0.2%
Haidar Abd al-Shafi	41	3.4%
Faisal al-Husseini	11	0.9%
Hanan Ashrawi	29	2.4%
Saeb Erekat	11	0.9%
Mahmoud Abbas	13	1.1%
Other personalities	78	6.5%
Do not trust any figure	300	24.8%
Don't Know/No answer	131	10.8%
Total	1208	99.9%

The present study is concerned neither with explaining trust in *particular* figures/factions nor with the frequency with which particular figures/factions were named. It focuses, rather, on accounting for a person's tendency to express trust or distrust in *any* figure/faction in the first place. Accordingly, it is appropriate to transform, or recode, the original responses to the trust-questions in the following fashion. The original November 1997 and May 1998 data sets label each figure mentioned by one or more respondents with a distinct number. That is, each respondent is assigned a score of "1" if (s)he responded "Arafat," a score of "2" if (s)he responded "Yasin," a score of "3" if (s)he responded "Habash," a score of "4" if (s)he responded "Hawatmeh," a score of "5" if (s)he responded "Abdul-Shafi," and so on. To create from this coding scheme a variable measuring whether or not a person reported trusting *any* figure most, the author gave all of the

respondents who reported trusting *any* figure most, regardless of *which* figure, a score of "1," and all of the respondents who reported "not trusting any figure" a score of "0." The author created a variable with the same logic for the trust-faction question. **The coding of the two main dependent variables analyzed in this study are summarized below:**

> **1. *Dependent variable measuring trust/distrust in any figure*: scored "1" if respondent gives the name of some figure, and scored "0" if respondent reports that (s)he does not trust any figure.**
> **2. *Dependent variable measuring trust/distrust in any faction*: scored "1" if respondent gives the name of some faction, and scored "0" if respondent reports that (s)he does not trust any faction.**

The reader should be clear that these variables do not measure a person's *level* of trust/distrust, but rather *whether* a person trusts *or* distrusts. That is, these variables are categorical rather than numeric.[9]

B. Analyses Pertaining to the Validity of the Dependent Variables

The author conducted analyses to assess the ability of the two dependent variables to capture the property that they are intended to capture – namely, whether or not a person trusts or distrusts at least some part of the Palestinian leadership/party system. The motive for these analyses derives from the wording of the trust-figure and trust-faction survey questions; that is, from asking the respondent to name the *one* figure/faction he or she trusts the *most*. Specifically, **asking a respondent which single figure/faction he or she trusts "most" solicits by definition respondent assessment of the *relative* rather than *absolute* amount of trust he or she harbors across all figures/factions. It follows that a person may trust some figure/faction *most* – that is, trust some figure/faction *more than any other* – yet not trust that figure/faction *much in absolute terms*. Conversely, some respondents may trust two or more figures/factions *very much*, yet be hard-pressed to select the *one* out of the two or more figures/factions that they trust *most*. Many of these respondents might consequently view the "no answer/don't know" response as the response option that most closely approximates their true position vis-à-vis the trust-questions.** In this fashion, the wording of the trust-questions may encourage some respondents who indeed exhibit the property we are interested in analyzing – i.e., trust in a meaningful part of the political system – to respond "don't know/no answer."

The presence in the sample data of a substantial number of respondents who report trusting *most* some figure/faction that they do not trust *much in absolute terms* would mean that the two dependent variables do not adequately differentiate between those with substantial trust and those with substantial distrust. In simplest terms, the larger the proportion of respondents who report trusting most some figure/faction whom they do not trust much, the more our analysis will mistakenly identify characteristics which in reality are associated with absolute levels of distrust as characteristics which are associated with trust. Meanwhile, a tendency of some respondents who in reality harbor substantial trust to report "no answer/don't know" because they are unable to decide which figure/faction they trust *most* serves to reduce the sample size with which the regression models in Part III are estimated. The reason for this is that the statistical technique utilized here – regression analysis – treats respondents who respond "don't know/no answer" as "missing" data and thus does not use them to estimate models, i.e., to estimate the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. Any reduction in

---

[9]Numeric variables are variables with values that have a definite quantitative relationship to one another defined in terms of order and, in some cases, distance. For example, the values of a variable measuring age – i.e., 18 years old, 19 years old, 20 years old, etc. – have a definite order in the sense that an 18 year-old is younger than a 20 year-old, a 20 year-old is older than a 19 year-old, etc., and a definite distance in the sense that an 18 year-old is half the age of a 36 year-old, a 60 year-old is three times as old as a 20 year-old, etc. Other examples of variables generally treated as numeric include level of education and level of income. In contrast, the values of a categorical variable do not have a quantitative relationship to one another, such as more or less, lower or higher, etc. Examples of categorical variables include gender, i.e., male or female, marital status, i.e., single, married, divorced, or widowed, religion, i.e., Muslim, Christian, etc., residence-type, i.e., city, village, or refugee camp, and region of residence, i.e., Gaza, West Bank, East Jerusalem. Though values of a categorical variable do not have a quantitative relationship to one another, it is nonetheless necessary for the purpose of data analysis to assign a *numeric label* to each value of a categorical variable. For example, the region of residence variable in the surveys analyzed here have three values – West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Each respondent's region of residence is entered into the data set in numeric form, say West Bank=1, Gaza=2, East Jerusalem=3. These numbers serve only as *names* of the three categories of region of residence and say nothing about the relationship of these categories to one another. In like fashion, the decision to code those who trust some figure/faction as "1" and those who do not trust any figure/faction as "0" is completely arbitrary. Any other two distinct numbers would enable the statistical analyses reported below.

the sample size, in turn, reduces our confidence that the results of the statistical analyses accurately reflect realities in the population at large, as such confidence is in large part a function of the sample size with which the estimates were calculated.[10] The extent to which these two types of responses are present in the November 1997 and May 1998 data sets thus impinges upon the validity and reliability of the estimates of the factors which explain the likelihood of people to exhibit political trust or distrust that are discussed in Part III, and as such deserves to be investigated.[11]

The task at hand, then, is to ascertain: (1) the extent to which people who provide a name to the trust-most questions indeed have a positive orientation to at least part of the political system, and (2) the extent to which those with a positive orientation to more than one part of the political system were motivated to respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. The November 1997 survey data allow us to address, albeit only crudely, both of these tasks. Specifically, the November 1997 survey included a series of questions – or, as alternatively called, survey "items" – asking the respondent to report his or her opinion – i.e., very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, and very negative – on each of nine particular figures and seven particular factions. More specifically, the survey asked: (1) "I will read to you names of some Palestinian personalities. In response to each name, please tell me whether you have a very positive opinion, somewhat positive opinion, somewhat negative opinion, or very negative opinion, of that person, or whether you do not know enough about that person to give an opinion;" (2) "I will read to you names of some Palestinian parties and factions. In response to each party or faction, please tell me whether you have a very positive opinion, somewhat positive opinion, somewhat negative opinion, or very negative opinion, of that party or faction, or whether you do not know enough about that party or faction to give an opinion." To better familiarize the reader with the logic of these data as well as to simply provide the reader with the data, the frequency distributions of responses to these two sets of "opinion"-items are presented in Table IB1.

Table IB1: Frequency distributions of opinions on particular figures and factions

(a) Frequency distribution of opinions on particular figures

	Opinion					
Figure	very positive	somewhat positive	somewhat negative	very negative	don't know enough to judge	"no answer"
Y. Arafat	42.9%	38.6%	8.1%	2.9%	4.3%	3.2%
A. Qurei	10.3%	39.4%	14.6%	4.9%	25.5%	5.3%
J. Rajoub	11.0%	36.2%	14.3%	7.0%	26.3%	5.2%
F. Husseini	19.2%	54.5%	9.9%	2.5%	9.8%	4.1%
A. Yasin	41.9%	39.4%	6.6%	1.7%	7.2%	3.2%
M. Abbas	11.8%	40.0%	13.3%	5.2%	25.2%	4.5%
A. A. Rantisi	12.8%	39.9%	9.1%	2.1%	31.2%	4.9%
M. Dahlan	8.0%	29.7%	10.9%	4.7%	41.4%	5.3%
H. Abdul-Shafi	29.9%	43.9%	5.3%	2.7%	14.7%	3.5%

[10]We might also expect that some people respond "no answer/don't know" because they are trust-*neutral*. That is, assume a scale with one extreme being extensive trust and the other extreme being extensive distrust. Trust-neutrality refers to a *middle* position on such a scale. People characterized by a middle position on such a scale, in other words, harbor a very low level of either trust or distrust. Put yet differently, trust-neutral people *neither* trust *nor* distrust very much at all. We should expect that the closer a person approaches the midpoint of the trust-scale, the higher the likelihood of that person responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. Yet, as the concern of this study is to identify those factors which differentiate between those who *trust* and those who *distrust* and as it does so with a *binary* dependent variable – i.e., trust =1 and distrust = 0 – trust-neutral cases are by definition not particularly useful for the task at hand. Thus, any tendency for trust-neutral respondents to respond "no answer/don't know" and to consequently be omitted from the analyses of Part III is not troublesome.

[11]It merits emphasis that these two potential types of misleading responses to the trust-most survey questions are particularly problematic *given the research aim pursued in this study*, i.e., to explain *individual*-level variation in the propensity to trust/distrust, and that the trust-most format is indeed appropriate for other research objectives. Most notably, the trust-most format is useful for assessing *aggregate* levels of support for *particular* figures/factions. Thus, the present discussion does not imply that future survey research should categorically abandon the trust-most question format.

(b) Frequency distribution of opinions on particular factions

	Opinion					
Figure	very positive	somewhat positive	somewhat negative	very negative	don't know enough to judge	"no answer"
Fatah	35.3%	42.9%	10.5%	3.2%	5.3%	2.8%
FIDA	2.4%	22.8%	19.7%	6.4%	43.4%	5.3%
PPP	3.7%	26.7%	24.7%	9.1%	30.4%	5.4%
PFLP	5.7%	32.8%	29.6%	7.9%	19.2%	4.8%
DFLP	4.4%	29.9%	27.5%	9.1%	23.5%	5.6%
Hamas	25.6%	45.7%	13.2%	4.2%	7.2%	4.1%
Islamic Jihad	14.1%	48.5%	16.0%	4.3%	12.5%	4.6%

To gauge the proportion of respondents who report trusting some figure/faction *most* yet do not trust that figure/faction *much*, the author created two variables with the data summarized in Table IB1. The first variable measures what opinion – i.e., very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative – the respondent expressed toward the figure that he or she reported trusting most. The second variable measures what opinion – i.e., very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative – the respondent expressed toward the faction that he or she reported trusting most. The first variable was created by taking each respondent who reported trusting some figure most and determining the *particular* figure whom that respondent trusted most. If the particular figure named was one of the nine figures that the respondent was asked to evaluate on the four-point opinion scale, the respondent's score for the new variable is the score that he or she reported on that scale for that figure. Thus, for example, each person who responded "Arafat" to the trust-most figure question was assigned the score that that person gave to the survey item asking the respondent to indicate his or her opinion of Arafat, each person who responded "Yasin" to the trust-most figure question was assigned the score that that person gave to the survey item asking the respondent to indicate his or her opinion of Yasin, each person who responded "Habash" to the trust-most figure question was assigned the score that that person gave to the survey item asking the respondent to indicate his or her opinion of Habash, and so forth. The second variable embodies this exact same logic for the survey questions to do with political factions. Thus, in the new variable, each person who reported trusting Fatah most was assigned the score that that person gave to the survey question asking the respondent to indicate his or her opinion of Fatah, each respondent who reported trusting Hamas most was assigned the score that that person gave to the survey question asking the respondent to indicate his or her opinion of Hamas, etc. The frequency distributions of respondent scores on these two new variables are given in Table IB2.

Table IB2: Frequency distributions of the "opinions" – i.e., very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative – of respondents toward those figures and factions respondents reported trusting "most"

(a) Frequency distribution of the "opinions" of respondents toward those figures respondents reported trusting "most"

Categories of the opinion scale	Frequency	% of total sample (n_{total}=1182)	% of sample excluding missing data ($n_{excludingNA}$=701)
very positive	521	44.1	74.3
somewhat positive	161	13.6	23.0
somewhat negative	5	0.4	0.7
very negative	3	0.3	0.4
don't know enough to judge	11	0.9	1.6
no answer	481	40.7	---

(b) Frequency distribution of the "opinions" of respondents toward those factions respondents reported trusting "most"

Categories of the opinion scale	Frequency	% of total sample (n_{total}=1182)	% of sample excluding missing data ($n_{excluding\ NA}$=701)
very positive	515	43.6	68.7
somewhat positive	216	18.3	28.8
somewhat negative	12	1.0	1.6
very negative	1	0.1	0.1
don't know enough to judge	6	0.5	0.8
no answer	432	36.5	---

The first thing to note from Table IB2 is that *very few* people expressed a *negative* opinion about the figure/faction they reported trusting most. We see that only 1.1% (8/701) of the respondents for whom data are available[12] reported holding a somewhat or very negative opinion of the particular figures they reported trusting most. Similarly, only 1.7% (13/750) of the respondents for whom data are available reported holding a somewhat or very negative opinion of the particular factions they reported trusting most. Thus, the data suggest that very few people express a negative view in absolute terms of the figure/faction they report trusting most.

Conversely, Table IB2 reveals that the vast majority of respondents reported that they have a very positive or somewhat positive opinion about those figures and factions they indicated trusting most. Specifically, 74.3% (521/701) of respondents reported holding a *very* positive opinion about the figure they reported trusting most, and 23.0% (161/701) of respondents reported being *somewhat* positive about the figure they said they trusted most. Table IB2(b) confirms the corresponding trend for the faction-variable. Specifically, 68.7% (515/750) of those trusting some faction most reported having a *very* positive view of that faction, and 28.8% (216/750) of those trusting some faction most reported having a *somewhat* positive view of that faction. The author finds noteworthy that a substantial percentage of those trusting some figure/faction most reported an *only somewhat* positive, rather than *very* positive, opinion about that figure/faction, i.e., respectively, 23.0% and 28.8%.[13] Yet, the primary point in light of the present concern is simply that we can be quite confident that a respondent who reports trusting some figure/faction *most* is indeed highly likely to view this figure/faction positively in *absolute terms*.[14]

---

[12]Data for respondents can be missing for three reasons: (1) the respondent reported trusting a particular figure most for whom the survey did not include an opinion-item; for example, a person who reported trusting Ahmad Jibril most is treated as missing because the survey did not include a question asking respondents to report their opinion on Jibril; (2) the respondent reported that (s)he does *not* trust any figure; and (3) the respondent provided a "don't know/no answer" response to the trust-most question and/or a "no answer" response to the opinion-item that corresponds to the figure the respondent reported trusting most. The same logic holds for missing data for the variable to do with respondent opinion on factions.

[13]This consideration is relevant to future efforts to measure levels of support for particular figures and factions, a topic that is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

[14]At least three considerations limit the confidence we can have in this analysis. First, the analysis compares reports of "trust/distrust" to reports of "negative-positive opinion." Ultimately, however, "trust/distrust" and "negative-positive opinion" are, or at least may be viewed by respondents as, two distinct phenomena. We would have more confidence in the type of analysis conducted here if the set of items tapping views on particular figures/factions asked the respondents to express their absolute level of "trust/distrust," rather than "positive-negative opinion." A second limitation – or, more accurately, reservation – associated with this analysis is that some of the respondents who indicated a positive opinion about the figure/faction they reported trusting most may have been motivated to do so to appear to the interviewers as and perhaps also to themselves as holding *consistent* preferences. More specifically, the set of opinion-items on figures was presented to the respondent *immediately after* the item asking the respondent which figure he or she trusted most and which figure his or her friends trusted most, and the set of opinion-items to do with factions was presented to the respondent immediately after the items asking the respondent which faction he or she trusted most and which faction his or her friends trusted most. Given this ordering of the two sets of questions, it is possible that some respondents reported positive opinions on the figures and factions they trusted most, not because they sincerely held these positive opinions, but rather because they wished to demonstrate to the interviewers and perhaps to themselves as well that their "opinions" of figures and factions are consistent with their responses to the trust-items. The third limitation on the validity of the results of this analysis results from the fact that whereas the trust-most question does not include a "don't know" filter, the positive-negative opinion question does. A "don't know" filter refers to a survey question that *explicitly offers* the respondent the option of responding "don't know." The following reiteration of the November 1997 opinion-item italicizes the "don't know" filter: "I will read to you names of some Palestinian personalities (parties and factions). In response to each name, please tell me whether you have a very positive opinion, somewhat positive opinion, somewhat negative opinion, or very negative opinion, of that person (party or faction*), or whether you do not know enough about that person (party or faction) to give an opinion.*" In contrast, respondents to the trust-most question are certainly allowed to respond "don't know," but they are not *explicitly offered* this response-option. The presence of the "don't know" filter in the former set of questions but not in the latter diminishes somewhat our confidence in the analyses based on Table IB1 and Table IB2 for the following reason: In basically any survey, a "don't know" filter will encourage some people who would provide a substantively meaningful response in the absence of the "don't know" filter to respond "don't know." Accordingly, it is likely that a substantial proportion of respondents who reported trusting some figure most would have reported "don't know" if the trust-most question included a "don't know" filter. Schuman and Presser (1981) refer to those people who would give a substantively meaningful response (e.g., report trusting some figure/faction most and report a very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative opinion of some figure/faction) without the "don't know" filter, but who would give the "don't know" response with a "don't know" filter as "floaters." All things equal, it is plausible to suspect that floaters who report trusting some figure/faction most are less enthusiastic about the figure/faction they name than are non-floaters who report trusting some figure/faction most – that is, than people who

We now turn to a search for respondents reporting "don't know/no answer" to the trust-most questions because they trust at least two or more figures/factions very much. Specifically, the author created two sets of four variables from the series of positive-negative opinion questions. The first set of four variables counts the number of figures, out of the nine figures that the survey presented to the respondent, toward whom the respondent expressed (1) a very positive opinion, (2) a somewhat positive opinion, (3) a somewhat negative opinion, and (4) a very negative opinion. The second set of four variables counts the number of factions, out of the seven factions that the survey presented to the respondent, toward which the respondent expressed (1) a very positive opinion, (2) a somewhat positive opinion, (3) a somewhat negative opinion, and (4) a very negative opinion. The frequency distribution of respondent scores on these two sets of four variables are presented in Table IB3.

Table IB3: Frequency distributions of number of times each respondent expressed each of the four categories of opinion – i.e., very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, very negative – across the set of nine figures and seven factions

(a) Frequency distribution of number of times each respondent expressed each of the four categories of opinion across the set of nine figures

	Counts of the four different categories of opinion			
# of times possible to give any of the four categories of opinion	variable #1: # and % of figures on whom respondent reported very positive opinion	variable #2: # and % of figures on whom respondent reported somewhat positive opinion	variable #3: # and % of figures on whom respondent reported somewhat negative opinion	variable #4: # and % of figures on whom respondent reported very negative opinion
0	308 (26.1%)	145 (12.3%)	724 (61.3%)	977 (82.7%)
1	325 (27.5%)	96 (8.1%)	178 (15.1%)	122 (10.3%)
2	235 (19.9%)	156 (13.2%)	127 (10.7%)	38 (3.2%)
3	123 (10.4%)	192 (16.2%)	63 (5.3%)	18 (1.5%)
4	77 (6.5%)	186 (15.7%)	47 (4.0%)	11 (0.9%)
5	41 (3.5%)	155 (13.1%)	15 (1.3%)	3 (0.3%)
6	23 (1.9%)	108 (9.1%)	8 (0.7%)	7 (0.6%)
7	22 (1.9%)	67 (5.7%)	11 (0.9%)	4 (0.3%)
8	5 (0.4%)	46 (3.9%)	4 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)
9	23 (1.9%)	31 (2.6%)	5 (0.4%)	2 (0.2%)

n = 1182

would have reported trusting the figure/faction most even in the presence of a "don't know" filter. It follows that we should expect a greater proportion of potential floaters than of non-floaters in reference to the trust-most question to report holding a *somewhat* rather than very positive opinion of the figure/faction they reported as trusting most. It follows, in turn, that, if the type of analyses presented in Table IB2 were conducted with data from a trust-most question that included a "don't know" filter, a larger *proportion* of those who responded trusting some figure/faction most would have reported a *very* positive opinion of that figure/faction than is revealed in Table IB2. Conversely, if the "don't know" filter of the opinion-items were removed, we should expect a larger proportion of respondents reporting that they trust some figure/faction most to express that they hold only a *somewhat* positive rather than very positive opinion of that figure/faction. All told, the basic point is that valid estimation of the relationship between trusting some figure/faction most and absolute levels of positive-negative opinion for that figure/faction would benefit from reliance upon a "don't know" filter in either both or neither of the two types of survey questions. Parenthetically, by explicitly offering respondents a "do not have enough information to judge" category, the "don't know" filter filters those tempted to respond "no answer/don' know" out of the "no answer" category. The ordinal-level opinion questions thus generally have higher percentages of "don't know" responses and lower percentages of "no answer" responses.

(b) Frequency distribution of number of times each respondent expressed each of the four categories of opinion across the set of seven factions

	Counts of the four different categories of opinion			
# of times possible to give any of the four categories of opinion	variable #1: # and % of factions on which respondent reported very positive opinion	variable #2: # and % of factions on which respondent reported somewhat positive opinion	variable #3: # and % of factions on which respondent reported somewhat negative opinion	variable #4: # and % of factions on which respondent reported very negative opinion
0	515 (43.6%)	191 (16.2%)	559 (47.3%)	923 (78.1%)
1	408 (34.5%)	209 (17.7%)	173 (14.6%)	128 (10.8%)
2	151 (12.8%)	236 (20.0%)	152 (12.9%)	58 (4.9%)
3	80 (6.8%)	229 (19.4%)	127 (10.7%)	42 (3.6%)
4	18 (1.5%)	144 (12.2%)	90 (7.6%)	16 (1.4%)
5	7 (0.6%)	84 (7.1%)	49 (4.1%)	9 (0.8%)
6	2 (0.2%)	46 (3.9%)	21 (1.8%)	1 (0.1%)
7	1 (0.1%)	43 (3.6%)	11 (0.9%)	5 (0.4%)

n = 1182

To reiterate, the present task is to determine if people who trust more than one figure/faction very much have a substantial tendency to respond "don't know/no answer" to the trust-most question because they cannot determine which figure/faction they trust *most*. The variable presented in the first column of Table IB3 informs us on the number of figures/factions toward whom/which the respondent holds a very positive opinion, and as such *approaches* our need to measure the number of figures/factions that the respondent trusts very much.[15] Specifically, if the suspicion under consideration is correct, we should find that respondents who reported a very positive opinion about *two* figures/factions to exhibit a higher level of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-figure/trust-faction question than do respondents who reported having a very positive opinion about *only one* figure/faction. If the suspicion is correct, more generally, we should find that the greater the number of figures/factions toward whom/which a respondent holds a very positive opinion, the harder it is for the respondent to select the *one* figure/faction he or she trusts *most*, and thus the higher the tendency of the respondent to report "no answer/don't know" to the trust-figure/trust-faction question.

To test for this expectation, the author cross-tabulated a variable measuring whether or not a respondent reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most question by the variable measuring the number of figures/factions toward whom/which the respondent expressed a very positive opinion. This set of cross-tabulations is presented in Table IB4. To make the required assessments, we wish to compare the percent of "no answer/don't know" responses in column #1, i.e., respondents who have a very positive opinion of only one of the nine figures/seven factions, with the percent of "no answer/don't know" responses in the other columns, i.e., respondents who express a very positive opinion about more than one figure/faction. Since we can only have confidence in such comparisons if they involve columns with a sufficient number of cases, i.e., respondents, the assessment to do with figures, Table IB4a, focuses on columns 1-5, and the assessment to do with factions, Table IB4b, focuses on columns 1-3.

Table IB4: Cross-tabulations of whether or not respondent reported "no answer/don't know" to trust-most questions by # of figures/factions toward which the respondent reported a very positive opinion

[15] This measure is deficient in the sense that respondents who are very sympathetic to more than one figure or faction may hold such sympathy for one or more figures or factions that are not among the list, respectively, of nine figures and even factions included in the survey. Accordingly, respondents who express a very positive opinion of only one of the seven factions and/or one of the nine figures may in reality have a very positive opinion of more than one figure and/or faction.

Table IB4a: Cross-tabulation of whether or not respondent reported "no answer/don't know" to trust-figure question by # of figures on whom the respondent reported a very positive opinion

	Number of figures on whom the respondent expressed a very positive opinion								
Response to trust-figure item	1 (n=325)	2 (n=235)	3 (n=123)	4 (n = 77)	5 (n = 41)	6 (n = 23)	7 (n = 22)	8 (n = 5)	9 (n = 23)
no answer/ don't know (n = 50)	26 (8.0%)	11 (4.7%)	8 (6.5%)	1 (1.3%)	2 (4.9%)	1 (4.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (4.3%)
do not trust any figure (n = 95)	43 (13.2%)	28 (11.9%)	13 (10.6%)	5 (6.5%)	1 (2.4%)	3 (13.0%)	1 (4.5%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (4.3%)
trust some figure (n = 729)	256 (78.8%)	196 (83.4%)	102 (82.9%)	71 (92.2%)	38 (92.7%)	19 (82.6%)	21 (95.5%)	5 (100%)	21 (91.3%)

Table IB4b: Cross-tabulation of whether or not respondent reported "no answer/don't know" to trust-faction question by # of factions toward whom the respondent reported a very positive opinion

	Number of factions on whom the respondent expressed a very positive opinion						
Response to trust-faction item	1 (n=408)	2 (n=151)	3 (n = 80)	4 (n = 18)	5 (n = 7)	6 (n = 2)	7 (n = 1)
no answer/ don't know (n = 49)	31 (7.6%)	8 (5.3%)	5 (6.3%)	4 (22.2%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (100%)
Do not trust any faction (n = 40)	23 (5.6%)	11 (7.3%)	5 (6.3%)	0 (0.0%)	0 (0.0%)	1 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Trust some faction (n = 578)	354 (86.%)	132 (87.4%)	70 (87.5%)	14 (77.8%)	7 (100%)	1 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)

Beginning then with the assessment to do with figures, Table IB4a reveals that those who hold a very strong opinion about more than one figure do *not* have a higher tendency to report "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most figure question than do those who hold a very positive opinion about only one figure. Whereas 8.0% (26/325) of those expressing a very positive opinion about only one figure reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most figure question, 4.7% (11/235) of those expressing a very positive opinion about two figures reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most figure question, 6.5% (8/123) of those expressing a very positive opinion about three figures reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most figure question, 1.3% (1/77) of those expressing a very positive opinion about four figures reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most figure question, and 4.9% (2/41) of those expressing a very positive opinion about five figures reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most figure question. Thus, those who hold more than one figure in very high esteem do not have a higher likelihood of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most figure question than do those who hold only one of the nine figures in very high esteem.[16]

Table IIB4b reveals a similar trend. Specifically, whereas 7.6% (31/408) of those reporting a very positive opinion about only one faction responded "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most faction question, 5.3% (8/143) of those reporting a very positive opinion about two of the seven factions responded "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most faction question, and 6.3% (5/80) of those reporting a very positive opinion about three of the seven factions responded "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most faction question. Table IB4b thus suggests that holding two or more factions in high regard does *not* increase the likelihood of responding "don't know/no answer" to the trust-most faction question.

To summarize, **section *B* analyzed the following two hypotheses to do with the validity of the dependent variables employed in this study: (1) a substantial proportion of respondents who reported**

[16]If there is any association at all, it appears to be in the opposite direction, with those holding more than one figure in high regard having a lower likelihood than those who hold only one figure in high regard of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most figure question.

trusting some figure/faction *most* do *not* view that figure/faction very positively in *absolute terms*; and (2) a substantial proportion of respondents respond "no answer/don't know" to questions asking them to name the one figure/faction they trust most, not because they do not trust any figure/faction, but rather because they trust two or more figures/factions very much and thus find it difficult to determine who they trust *most*. The analyses conducted to assess the validity of these suspicions, though crude, did *not* provide evidence in support of either of these suspicions. Accordingly, the analyses in this section reinforce our confidence that those who report trusting some figure/faction most do indeed harbor a substantial amount of trust, faith, etc., in at least a meaningful part of the Palestinian political leadership and party system.

C. Conceptualizing and Measuring Independent Variables

The factors that are thought to affect a dependent variable are often called independent variables. As mentioned above, **the independent variables which may help to differentiate between whether or not a person trusts at least one political figure and faction can be classified according to four levels-of-analysis – regional-level, domestic political-level, socioeconomic-level, and psychological-level.** Certainly, some variables do not conform neatly to one of these four levels-of-analysis. More to the point, some factors reside on the *juncture* of two levels-of-analysis. For example, the inside (*dakhil*)-outside (*kharij*) cleavage, as the reader may know, differentiates between individuals residing inside the West Bank, Gaza, or East Jerusalem, prior to the September 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles and May 1994 Cairo agreement (*dakhil*), and individuals residing in the Diaspora preceding these agreements. The inside (*dakhil*)-outside (*kharij*) cleavage, then, is born out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the dispersion of Palestinians across interstate and/or disputed borders. Yet at the same time, it represents a crucial cleavage *within* the Palestinian society of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. To cite but one other example, while evaluation of the PA is most directly a domestic-level political phenomenon, the very existence and thus evaluation of the PA is fundamentally intertwined with the unfolding of Israeli-Palestinian relations. Though these four categories do not perfectly differentiate among concrete independent variables, however, they serve to organize analyses and to inspire thinking about the theoretical relationships between distinct types of phenomena. The basic objective of this study, then, is to estimate the absolute and relative effects on the tendency to trust or distrust political figures and factions of independent variables residing on the regional-, domestic political-, socioeconomic-, or psychological-level of analysis.

Each of the two surveys not only collects data on these types of independent variables, but also measures attitudes on some particular issues that the other survey does not. Notably, of the two surveys, only the May 1998 survey collects data on whether the respondent was residing inside the West Bank, Gaza, or East Jerusalem, prior to the September 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles and May 1994 Cairo agreement (*dakhil*), or was residing in the Diaspora preceding these agreements (*kharij*). Meanwhile, only the November 1997 survey provides data on respondent evaluation of the economic situation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Most of the independent variables examined in this study are comprised of responses to *individual* survey questions, or survey items. For example, data on the level-of-education variable are derived from only one survey question. In contrast, some sets of two, three, or more, survey questions, or survey items, might best be viewed as being different indicators of an underlying dimension that itself is directly relevant to the dependent variable we are trying to explain. Thus, for example, a survey may ask the respondent to indicate whether he or she agrees or disagrees with each of the following statements: (1) the EA is corrupt; (2) the EA lacks expertise; and (3) EA members are not committed to the Palestinian nationalist struggle. Rather than treat *each* of these statements as *individual* factors potentially influencing the tendency to trust or distrust, we may view each of these questions as representing a distinct indicator of a more general concept – i.e., evaluation of EA performance – and we may be interested in examining the impact of this more general concept on trust/distrust.

Various methods exist to combine distinct indicators of a more general concept into one variable; that is, to "scale" the distinct indicators, as the procedure is termed. The only such method considered and employed here is the simple addition of the scores of each respondent's response to each of the indicators in the scale. Thus, for the sake of illustration, assume that the respondent is asked to indicate his or her level of agreement with each of the three EA statements mentioned above, on the following four-point scale:

1=strongly agree
2=somewhat agree
3=somewhat disagree
4=strongly disagree

To create the more general EA-evaluation variable, the numbers referring to the respondent's response to each of these three items are simply summed. Thus, for example, a person who strongly agrees with each of the three statements is given a score of "3" (1 + 1 + 1), a person who strongly disagrees with each of these statements is given a score of "12" (4 + 4 + 4), a person who strongly agrees with the first statement, somewhat agrees with the second, and strongly disagrees with the third, is given a score of 7 (1 + 2 + 4), and so forth.

The primary justification for combining responses to two or more survey items – or of "scaling" two or more survey items – is that doing so has useful theoretical and statistical properties. First, some concepts of direct interest may be most accurately thought of as being comprised of a *set* of distinct and more specific attributes. Views on a diplomatic approach to the conflict with Israel, for example, might best be conceptualized and measured as a function of views on such more specific issues as the acceptability of previous agreements, the Israeli commitment to the peace process, the desirability of particular options for moving the peace process forward, the prospects of achieving a just settlement in the relatively near future, the option of armed struggle, and so on. Second, scales combining various survey items generally provide more variation in the independent variable than do single-item scales. For example, while respondents' responses to each of the three indicators of EA evaluation individually range from 1 to 4, the responses to each of these three indicators combined range from 3 to 12. Greater variability in the independent variables, in turn, enables more precise and discriminating analyses. Finally, scales made up of various survey items are less prone to random measurement error and are generally more reliable than are variables made up of single items. [17]

While scaling two or more survey items has important advantages, it is only appropriate to combine a set of survey items into a common summated scale if the members of this set are in fact highly and positively correlated with one another. In other words, to the extent that responses to the two or more survey questions are positively correlated, we can have confidence that these survey items indeed tap the same more general attribute. To test for the reliability of scaling a set of items, we utilize a measure of the correlation of the various survey questions called the alpha coefficient of reliability. The alpha coefficient of reliability measures the correlation of each survey item in the scale to the average of all other survey items in the scale. It is generally held to be valid to combine items into a scale if these items together achieve an alpha reliability coefficient exceeding 0.7.

The author examined the reliability of various possible scales of survey items with the November 1997 and May 1998 data. Of these examinations, the present discussion focuses on those scales actually employed in the analyses conducted below.[18] One reliable scale employed in this study, which is termed by the author "negotiate," is a scale derived from the November 1997 data that combines responses to two questions: "In general, do you support or oppose the current peace process between the Palestinians and Israel?" and "Do you support or oppose the continuation of negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis?" The alpha coefficient of reliability for the "negotiate" scale is .81, which means that it is reliable to treat these two questions as comprising a single, unidimensional scale. Again, the simple summation of survey items to create a scale is generally acceptable if these items achieve an alpha reliability coefficient exceeding .07. It should be mentioned that three other questions were not sufficiently correlated with the above two questions to be included in the scale: "How confident are you that the Palestinians and Israelis will reach a satisfactory agreement on final-status issues?" "Do you support or oppose the resumption of armed struggle against Israel?" and "What is your feeling towards the suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians in Israel?" Furthermore, the latter of these two questions – views on armed struggle and views on suicide bombing operations in Israel – were not highly correlated (r=.50) with one another, and for this reason were not combined into a separate scale tapping attitudes toward a confrontational approach to Israel.

Various questions in the November 1997 data set regarding evaluation of the performance of the PA and PLC were also subject to scaling reliability tests. Three questions were found to constitute a reliable, "PA evaluation," scale (alpha=.81): "In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance?" "Do you support or oppose the method that Yasser Arafat administers his work as the National Authority's president?" and "In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance in the field of human rights?" Three other questions did not merit inclusion in this scale: "Do you say that the system of government under the Palestinian Authority is a very democratic system, somewhat democratic, not democratic, or not democratic at all?" "In your opinion, how spread is the corruption, if found, in the Palestinian Authority's

---

[17]The reader interested in unidimensional scaling techniques may consult the following references: Gorden (1977), McIver and Carmines (1981), Jacoby (1991), and Spector (1992).

[18]The above discussion thus does not discuss sets of variables that were found not to constitute reliable scales. These sets of items refer to the following general concepts: views on the prospects of the peace process; perceptions of Israelis; preferences regarding the role of Islam in Palestinian politics; and levels of respondent political activism.

institutions?" and "What about the Palestinian Authority's attempts to deal with the corruption issue. Do you think that the Palestinian Authority is working greatly, working enough, or it is not doing enough to deal with corruption?" Lastly, a question measuring evaluation of the PLC's performance – "In general, how do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council's performance?" – could have been included in the "PA evaluation" scale. A scale with the three questions comprising the PA evaluation scale and the PLC evaluation question have an alpha reliability coefficient of .81. This latter question was kept separate from the PA evaluation scale, however, in order to assess the *relative* impact of evaluation of PA performance and evaluation of PLC performance on trust/distrust.

A scale tapping evaluation of the PA was also constructed for the May 1998 sample. This scale combines two questions – evaluation of the PA's "handling of the peace process" and evaluation of PA "performance." The alpha reliability coefficient for this scale is .76. As with the reliability analysis of the November 1997 data, responses to a survey question measuring respondent evaluation of the PLC also fit nicely into this scale, with the three variables together achieving an alpha reliability coefficient of .82. Evaluation of PLC performance, however, was not included in the scale so that the relative impact of PA and PLC evaluations on trust/distrust could be analyzed.

Another scale, called by the author "accommodation," was found to exert a significant impact neither in the analyses of trust/distrust presented in Part III nor on the analyses of "no answer/don't know" responses discussed in Part V, and so is not discussed in the following analyses. The "accommodation" scale nonetheless deserves mention, because it represents a highly reliable, though perhaps dated, scale tapping respondent preferences on concrete aspects of Palestinian-Israeli relations. The May 1998 survey asked respondents to indicate which of a series of six actions "were important to moving the peace process forward." Of the six actions, three referred to Israeli concessions – troop withdrawal, ending the closure policy, and freezing settlement construction, and three to Palestinian concessions – increasing security cooperation between the PA and Israel, enacting tougher measures against Hamas, and completing the revision of the Palestinian National Charter. The author combined respondent positions on the latter three items into a scale measuring the extent to which the respondent supported making concessions to Israel. The alpha reliability coefficient of this scale is .96, indicating that these items fit together extremely well. (These items, interestingly, did not fit with a question measuring "support for the peace process.") Though, as mentioned above, the accommodation scale was not found to exert a significant effect on levels of trust for *any* figure/faction, it may prove a useful variable in future analyses of trust for *particular* figures/factions.

To summarize, the following analyses usually treat responses to *individual* survey questions as comprising an individual independent variable that might possibly influence the probability that a person trusts or distrusts political figures and factions. Some sets of survey questions, however, are combined into scales, which, themselves, will be treated as independent variables. The individual survey questions and scales whose impact on trust and distrust are analyzed in Part III of this study are listed below. The scales in this list are italicized so as to distinguish them from the individual survey items. Furthermore, the list arranges the variables according to the four levels-of-analysis mentioned above.

November 1997

Regional-level

Negotiate (support/oppose "peace process" and support/oppose "negotiations")

"How confident are you that the Palestinians and Israelis will reach a satisfactory agreement on final status issues?"

"What is your level of satisfaction with America's role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?"

"What is your level of satisfaction with the European Union's role in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?"

"Despite the extent of your satisfaction with the role played by America now, what is the role that America should play?"

"To what extent do you have confidence that America will care for Palestinian interests in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations?"

"Do you support or oppose the resumption of armed struggle against Israel?"

"What is your feeling toward the suicide bombing operations against Israeli civilians in Israel?"

"How did the peace process between the Palestinians and Israel affect our economy?"

Domestic political-level

PA evaluation (evaluation of "PA's performance," evaluation of Arafat's method of administration," and evaluation of "PA on human rights")

"Do you believe that our system of government under the Palestinian Authority is very democratic, somewhat democratic, slightly democratic, or not democratic at all?"

"How spread is the corruption in the Palestinian Authority's institutions?"

"Do you think that the Palestinian Authority is working greatly, working enough, or not doing enough, to

deal with corruption?"
"How do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council's performance?"
"How do you describe the current economic situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip?"
"What is the role that Islam should play in the political life of the Palestinian society?"
"Should a Palestinian state be administered according to Islamic *Shari'a* or secular non-religious laws?"
Socioeconomic-level
Income
"Do you describe the economic situation of your family as very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?"
Education
Marital status
Occupation
Refugee status
Gender
Region of residence (West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem)
Residence-type (city, village, refugee camp)
Age
Psychological-level
"How optimistic or pessimistic are you toward the future in general?"

May 1998
Regional-level
"What is your level of support for Oslo?"
Accommodation (support/oppose "increased security cooperation with Israel," "support/oppose tougher measures against Hamas," and support/oppose "revising Palestinian National Charter")
"How confident are you that Palestinians and Israelis will be able to reach an agreement in final status negotiations by May 4, 1999?"
"What are the prospects of a peace between the Palestinians and Israelis in the next five years?"
"What is your level of agreement with the statement that peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis is possible?"
"What is your level of agreement with the statement that sometimes it is moral to use violence for political ends?"
"What is your level of agreement with the statement that the Palestinian and Israeli economies should be more independent of each other?"
"Do you think that Israelis support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?"
"To what extent do you think that Binyamin Netanyahu can be trusted to fulfill signed agreements?"
"To what extent do you think that the Israelis have fulfilled their commitments under the Oslo accords?"
"To what extent do you think that Palestinians have fulfilled their commitments under the Oslo accords?"
"Would you say that the U.S. has been more favorable to Israelis, the U.S. is neutral, or the U.S. has been more favorable to Palestinians?"
"Would you say that the E.U. has been more favorable to Israelis, the E.U. is neutral, or the E.U. has been more favorable to Palestinians?"
"How active a role do you think the United States should play in Palestinian-Israeli relations?"
"How active a role do you think the European Union should play in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations?"
Domestic political-level
PA evaluation (evaluation of "PA's handling of peace process" and evaluation of "PA's performance"
"How do you evaluate the performance of the PLC?"
Socioeconomic-level
Income
Education
Marital status
Job
Gender
Age
Region of residence (West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem)
Residence-type (city, village, refugee camp)
Refugee
Living inside or outside before 1993
Psychological-level
"How optimistic or pessimistic are you toward the future in general?"

It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to systematically and exhaustively speculate about the wide array of plausible hypotheses on the effects of the independent variables listed above on the propensity toward political trust/distrust. Rather, this study employs an essentially inductive approach, first seeking to identify those factors, which, based on the survey data, *do* exert an impact on the propensity to trust/distrust, and only then postulating explanations for these associations.

D. Estimating Models of Trust/Distrust with Logistic Regression

This study estimates the impact of the various independent variables delimited above on the likelihood of trusting/distrusting political figures and factions with a statistical technique called logistic regression.[19] **Two basic statistics used by logistic regression analysis to estimate models accounting for the dependent variable are the beta coefficient and p-value. Logistic regression analysis estimates one beta coefficient for each independent variable. The beta coefficient of an independent variable represents the estimated *effect* of that independent variable on the dependent variable. Each beta coefficient has two components – direction and size. The direction of a beta coefficient of a numeric independent variable refers to whether an increase in the value of the numeric independent variable causes an increase or a decrease in the value of the dependent variable, and is thus either positive or negative.** Simply, a negative beta coefficient of a numeric independent variable means that the larger the value of the independent variable to which the beta coefficient refers, the lower the value of the dependent variable. In the present case, therefore, a negative beta coefficient means that the higher the value of the corresponding independent variable, the lower the probability that a person trusts some figure/faction most. Conversely, a positive beta coefficient means that the larger the value of the independent variable to which the beta coefficient refers, the higher the value of the dependent variable. In the present study, therefore, a positive beta coefficient means that the larger the value of the corresponding independent variable, the higher the probability that a person trusts some figure/faction most. Of course, the substantive meaning of negative and positive relationships depends on the coding schemes of the corresponding independent and dependent variables.

The beta coefficients of qualitative variables are interpreted differently than are those of quantitative variables. For example, it makes no sense to claim that the "higher," "larger," etc., a person's region of residence, the "higher" (or "lower"), the probability that that person trusts some political figure/faction. Similarly, it makes no sense to claim that the more someone is a woman, the more or less likely the person to trust some political faction/figure. To gauge the effects of a qualitative variable, rather, we compare whether one category of the variable has a higher or lower likelihood of expressing trust in some figure than does another category. Thus, for example, we can estimate whether Gaza residents have a higher or lower tendency to trust than West Bank residents, whether refugee camp residents have a higher or lower tendency to trust than village residents, whether men have a higher or lower tendency to trust than women, etc.

Meanwhile, the size, or magnitude, of the beta coefficient of a numeric independent variable refers to the *amount* of change in the dependent variable associated with a one-unit change in the independent variable. Generally speaking, then, **the magnitude of a beta coefficient refers to the *extent to which* change in the corresponding independent variable alters the probability that a person exhibits one of the two responses to the binary dependent variable – that a person, in this case, trusts or distrusts some figure/faction most.**

The set of beta coefficients estimated in a logistic regression analysis can be used to calculate *actual numeric probabilities* of a score of "1" on the dependent variable – in the present case, of trusting some figure most. The present discussion is not interested in the *actual probabilities* that respondents with particular profiles – that is, with particular values on the set of independent variables in the model – will trust or distrust.[20] It is interested, rather, in using these predicted probabilities to assess the relative size of the effects of the individual variables in the model on trust/distrust in figures. To assess the relative size of the effects of individual

---

[19]On logistic regression analysis, see, e.g., Aldrich and Nelson 1984, Demaris 1992, and Long 1997.

[20] Several factors militate against placing much confidence in the actual predicted probabilities. First, and foremost, it is likely that one or more factors for which data are not available exert an important impact on the probability that people trust or distrust political figures. To name but one example, feelings of anomie – that is, of alienation, disillusionment, etc., resulting from social, economic, political, and cultural dislocation – might contribute to whether or not people trust or distrust figures. Second, the functional form of the model may need refinement. That is, whereas the models estimated here assume linear and additive relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variables, some of these relationships may in reality be non-linear and multiplicative. Furthermore, whereas regression imposes *one model on the entire set of cases (respondents)* with which the model is estimated, distinct models might ultimately best explain the trust-behavior of subsets of the population. In other words, distinct models may best account for the trust behavior of distinct sectors of society.

independent variables, we calculate the probability of trusting some figure most associated with the minimum value and the probability of trusting some figure most associated with the maximum value of each numeric independent variable in the model. The difference between the two probabilities represents the range of the impact of that variable on the probability of trusting some figure most. In other words, the larger the difference between the probabilities of trusting some figure associated with an individual variable's minimum and maximum values, the larger the impact of that variable on trusting some figure most. The range of the impact of a categorical variable, meanwhile, is ascertained by calculating the predicted probabilities of trusting/distrusting associated with each individual value of the categorical variable. The relative size of the impact of two or more variables can thus be assessed by comparing the amount of change in the probability of trusting some figure most that each of these variables effects when it shifts between its minimum value and maximum value, if it is a numeric variable, land between any two of its categories, if it is a categorical variable. While the method of calculating predicted probabilities is beyond the scope of this discussion, it deserve mention that the size of the impact of any individual variable on the probability of getting a score of 1 (or 0) on the dependent variable depends on the values of the other independent variables in the model. Accordingly, the author calculated predicted probabilities of trusting some figure most associated with the minimum and maximum values of each numeric variable and with each possible value of each categorical variable in the model, while holding all other numeric variables constant at their midpoint.

Each beta coefficient in the model has a p-value. The p-value is a measure of the "statistical significance" of the beta coefficient. Statistical significance refers to the likelihood that the effect summarized by a beta coefficient which is estimated with data from a sample is not a result of sampling variance, but rather actually exists in the population from which the sample was drawn. The p-value describes this likelihood. For example, a p-value of .05 for any independent variable means a 5% probability that the corresponding beta coefficient is a product of sampling error, and a 95% probability that this effect actually exists in the general population from which the sample was drawn. A p-value of .05 is in fact the criterion by which most scholarly research judges the relevance of individual independent variables in accounting for variation in the dependent variable. A variable that satisfies this criterion is said to be "statistically significant."

P-values can range from 0 (meaning a 100% likelihood that the estimated effect actually exists in the population) to 1, meaning a 0% chance that the estimated effect actually exists in the population. It is useful to consider two hypothetical p-values, p = .84 and p = .07. The first p-value, .84, means that there is a 16% chance (1 - .84 = .16) that the effect found in the sample exists in the population. The p-value equaling .07 means that there is a 93% chance (1 - .07 = .93) that the effect found in the sample exists in the population. These two examples are given not only to further reinforce the basic meaning of the p-value, but also to point out that statistical significance is ultimately a relative concept. That is, as mentioned above, social scientists tend to view a variable as statistically significant if p <= .05 (probability of estimated effect existing in population >= .95), and a variable as not statistically significant if p > .05 (probability of estimated effect existing in population < .95). Thus, while general practice is to consider both the variable with a p-value of .94 and the variable with the p-value of .07 statistically *non*-significant, we can clearly see that the estimated effects of the latter variable are much more likely to exist in the population than are the estimated effects of the former variable. The basic point is that the p<= .05 criterion for assessing the relevance of any particular independent variable on a dependent variables serves as a useful *rule of thumb* for assessing the relevance or irrelevance of an independent variable, but it is wise not to adhere to this rule of thumb rigidly. Specifically, we should be open to the effects of variables that *approximate* statistical significance.

One more comment on statistical significance deserves mention. A statistically significant effect is one that is likely to exist in the population *from which the sample was drawn.* As the surveys analyzed in this study were conducted at roughly six month intervals, it is possible that the distribution across the Palestinian population of key beliefs, attitudes, and demographic characteristics, changed during and/or since the time when the two surveys were conducted. The point is that, during and since the time periods when the surveys were conducted, the population of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, may have changed in various ways relevant to understanding trust/distrust. Thus, it is most accurate to think of statistically significant effects not as being highly likely to exist in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, *per* se, but rather as having been highly likely to exist in the population at the times during which the surveys were conducted – that is, May 1998 and November 1997.

In this study, the p-value was used as a primary criterion, in addition to substantive-theoretic justification, for identifying the set of variables in each survey data set that seemed to best account for the likelihood that respondents do or do not trust some figure/faction. More specifically, the researcher tested a large number of unique models, or combinations of independent variables, incrementally eliminating variables that did not consistently approach statistical significance. It was necessary to run so many analyses for at least two reasons, one statistical and the other substantive. The statistical reason is that the estimated effect of any

individual independent variable – that is, the p-value, and also direction and size of any particular beta coefficient – may vary depending upon the set of other independent variables in the equation. This is the case, suffice it to say, because multiple regression estimates the effects of each independent variable in the equation while *controlling* for the effects of all other variables in the equation. In other words, estimating the effects of individual independent variables within the context of different *sets* of independent variables amounts to estimating the effects of these variables under different control conditions. Thus, the running of many analyses provides a sense of the consistency and robustness of the impact of individual variables. The substantive reason for exploring so many combinations of independent variables is simply that the lack of decisive evidence to date regarding the factors accounting for trust/distrust in political figures/factions demands exhaustive exploration of the statistical relevance of a wide variety of plausible variables.

About thirty-five different models were tested for each of the two dependent variables of each of the two survey data sets. This study reports on one model for each of the four sets of 35 or so analyses which is highly satisfactory relative to the remaining thirty-four or so corresponding analyses in terms of substantive plausibility as well as statistical significance.

II. An Examination of the Relationship Between Trust in Figures and Trust in Factions

Before proceeding to discussion of the four sets of logistic regression models of trust/distrust, we consider a subject that is both relevant to the building of such models and interesting in its own right: the relationship between trust for figures, on the one side, and trust for factions, on the other side. To the extent that trust for figures and trust for factions are not strongly and positively correlated, it is appropriate to suppose that the sets of independent variables, or models, which account for variation in these two types of trust *differ* from one another. Simply, the view that trust for figures and trust for factions are distinct phenomena leads us to expect that different sets of factors, or models, explain the probability of trust or distrust in figures and the probability of trust or distrust in factions. In contrast, to the extent that trust for figures and trust for factions are strongly and positively related, it becomes appropriate to pursue either one of two strategies in the estimation of models accounting for the probability that a person exhibits political trust or distrust. The first strategy is (1) to view the strong positive association between trust for figures and trust for factions as evidence that both particular forms of trust are *indicators* of a common and *more general* concept, viz., trust in the political system, and, accordingly, (2) to combine responses to the two trust-questions into a common scale, thus analyzing *one* dependent variable tapping general trust in the political system.[21] Alternatively, we may (1) treat trust for figures and trust for factions as two autonomous, distinct, phenomena, (2) yet postulate that the same or similar models account for these two phenomena. Thus, before turning to the analyses of the factors accounting for trust/distrust in political figures and the factors accounting for trust/distrust in political factions, the author presents the results of basic analyses of the relationship between trust/distrust in political figures, on the one side, and trust/distrust in political factions, on the other side.

This examination is divided into two sections. Section *A* analyzes the association between trusting *any* figure, on the one side, and trusting *any* faction, on the other side, *without* regard for the extent to which the figures that respondents trust most are affiliated with the factions that respondents trust most. This latter concern comprises the topic of Section *B*. To facilitate the reader's quick grasping of the content of Part II, the author has bolded the key points.

A. The Relationship Between Trusting Any Figure and Trusting Any Faction

A cross-tabulation of responses to the two trust-most questions, presented in Table IIA, reveals a positive relationship between trusting/distrusting some figure most and trusting or distrusting some faction most. Simply put, people who trust some figure are quite likely to trust some faction, and people who distrust all figures are quite likely to distrust all factions. The cross-tabulation of the May 1998 responses to the two trust-most questions reveals that 77.0% (604/777) of respondents who trust some figure most also trust some faction most, and 86.4% (604/699) of respondents who trust some faction most trust some figure most. Similarly, 74.7% (224/300) of respondents who do not trust any figure also do not trust any faction, and 63.6% (224/352) of respondents who do not trust any faction also do not trust any figure. The November 1997 data confirms the positive association between trust/distrust in figures and trust/distrust in factions: 80.0% (692/865) of those who trust some figure most also trust some faction most, 85.9% (692/806) of those who trust some faction most also trust some figure most. Similarly, 48.7% (97/199) of those who do not trust any figure report not trusting any faction, and 47.5% (97/204) of those who do not trust any faction also do not trust any figure.

[21] As is evident from Part IA, the author did not opt for this strategy.

Table IIA: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question by responses to trust-figure question

(1) May 1998

	Trust-Figure		
Trust-Faction	Trust some figure	Do not trust any figure	No answer/ don't know
Trust some faction			
Frequency of response	604	64	31
% of total "trust some faction" responses	86.4%	9.2%	4.4%
% of total "trust some figure" responses	77.7%	21.3%	23.7%
% of total responses to the trust-questions	50.0%	5.3%	2.6%
Do not trust any faction			
Frequency of response	112	224	16
% of total "trust some faction" responses	31.8%	63.6%	4.5%
% of total "trust some figure" responses	14.4%	74.7%	12.2%
% of total responses to the trust-questions	9.3%	18.5%	1.3%
No answer/don't know			
Frequency of response	61	12	84
% of total "trust some faction" responses	38.9%	7.6%	53.5%
% of total "trust some figure" responses	7.9%	4.0%	64.1%
% of total responses to the trust-questions	5.0%	1.0%	7.0%

(2) November 1997

	Trust-Figure		
Trust-Faction	Trust some figure	Do not trust any figure	No answer/ don't know
Trust some faction			
Frequency of response	692	75	39
% of total "trust some faction" responses	85.9%	9.3%	4.8%
% of total "trust some figure" responses	80.0%	37.7%	33.6%
% of total responses to the trust-questions	58.6%	6.4%	3.3%
Do not trust any faction			
Frequency of response	89	97	18
% of total "trust some faction" responses	43.6%	47.5%	8.8%
% of total "trust some figure" responses	10.3%	48.7%	15.5%
% of total responses to the trust-questions	7.5%	8.2%	1.5%
No answer/don't know			
Frequency of response	84	27	59
% of total "trust some faction" responses	49.4%	15.9%	34.7%
% of total "trust some figure" responses	9.7%	13.6%	50.9%
% of total responses to the trust-questions	7.1%	2.3%	5.0%

Yet, a substantial proportion of people provide different types of responses to the two types of questions on political trust. The May 1998 data reveal that 22.3% (173/777) of those who trust some figure most report either not trusting any faction or "don't know/no answer," 13.6% (95/699) of those who trust some faction report either not trusting any figure or "don't know/no answer," 25.3% (76/300) of those who do not trust any figure report either trusting some faction most or "don't know," and 36.4% (128/352) of respondents who do not trust any faction report either trusting some figure most or "don't know/no answer." Similarly, November 1997 data reveal that 20.0% (173/865) of those who trust some figure most report either not trusting any faction or "don't know/no answer," 14.1% (114/806) of respondents who trust some faction most report either not trusting any figure or "don't know/no answer," 51.3% (102/199) of those who report not trusting any figure report either trusting some faction most or "don't know/no answer," and 52.5% (107/204) of those who report not trusting any faction express either trust in some figure or "don't know/no answer." Thus, as mentioned above, people who trust some figure are quite likely to trust some faction. **Yet, a substantial proportion of people provide different responses to the two types of political trust questions. Thus, while the two types of trust are positively related, the association is substantially far from perfect.**

It is worthwhile, furthermore, to examine the extent to which this positive relationship is cumulative. More specifically, **we might suspect that the vast majority of those respondents who**

trust some faction also trust some figure, while those who trust some figure do not necessarily trust some faction.[22] **One simple reason for this suspicion is that, given the vast number of individuals in politics, it seems that a respondent would more or less certainly be able to identify *some* political figure (s)he trusts extensively.** (Recall that the trust questions are open-ended). In contrast, the relatively limited number of relevant political and religious factions in the Palestinian polity (as in any other polity) constrains the probability that a respondent will trust some particular political faction. If a person can find a faction to trust extensively, the logic goes, the person can certainly find a figure to trust extensively.

Another basis for this hypothesis derives from the possibility that many people invoke distinct criteria or combinations of criteria in their evaluations of factions and of figures. Specifically, we can distinguish between two types of evaluation criteria – (1) the proximity of a figure's/faction's positions on key policy issues to one's own positions on these issues, and (2) views on the extent to which figures/factions exhibit qualities generally pertaining to individuals, such as charisma, intelligence, altruism, courage, trustworthiness, etc. It is likely that personal attributes are relatively more salient in the evaluation of figures than in the evaluation of factions, and, as a consequence, conversely, that policy agenda and ideology are relatively more salient in the evaluation of factions than in the evaluation of figures. Now, it is also quite likely that many people are currently dissatisfied with the policy agendas of the various stripes of the Palestinian political spectrum, to the extent that these agendas are even articulated in the first place. Such dissatisfaction is particularly likely in light of the conjunction of two premises: first, that feasible policy alternatives regarding the pursuit of Palestinian national interests and preferences over these alternatives are largely a function of structural conditions, and, second, that present structural conditions are not conducive to the achievement of Palestinian nationalist objectives. In the simplest of terms, Israel's huge preponderance of power over the Palestinians limits the viable options that Palestinian figures and factions can proffer in pursuit of Palestinian interests. It follows that many Palestinians see little to like about the policy agendas of figures and factions. Assuming the different criteria emphasized in the evaluation of figures and factions, then, such dissatisfaction with the spectrum of policy proposals may suffice to deter support for political factions, yet may not suffice to deter support for political figures who are viewed as having desirable personal characteristics. In other words, **while people may be reluctant to trust factions based on their policy agendas, they are likely to find at least one figure who, though lacking a convincing policy agenda, is viewed as charismatic, intelligent, altruistic, courageous, etc.** That figures greatly endowed with such qualities exist in any society is highly likely, if not inevitable.

To test, then, for the hypothesis that people who trust some faction are very likely to trust some figure, though people who trust some figure do not necessarily trust some faction, the author compared the relative number of times the following two pairs of responses were given: (1) trust some faction most but do not trust any figure, and (2) trust some figure most but do not trust any faction. The hypothesis would receive confirmation if the proportion of respondents who trust some figure but not any faction is substantially larger than the proportion of respondents who trust some faction but not any figure. The relative frequencies of these two pairs of responses, which are presented in Table IIA, generally do *not* confirm the hypothesized relationship. In the May 1998 survey, 112 respondents (9.3% of the total sample) reported that they trust some figure and do not trust any faction. But 64 respondents (5.3% of the total sample) reported that they trust some faction but not any figure. The May 1998 data thus suggests that the proportion of people trusting some figure but not trusting any faction is indeed higher than the proportion of people trusting some faction but not trusting any figure. But the difference between these two proportions is relatively marginal. Similarly, of those people who responded to the November 1997 survey, 89 (7.5% of the total sample) reported that they trust some figure but do not trust any faction, but 75 (6.4% of the total sample) reported that they trust some faction but not any figure. Of the four possible combinations of responses to the trust-figure question – excluding combinations that include the "no

[22] The reader should note that testing this hypothesis has implications for the construction of dependent variables measuring political trust. Specifically, to the extent that the hypothesis is borne out by the data, it is valid to construct what is called a Guttman scale of responses to the trust-figure and trust-faction questions.

answer/don't know" response – by far the largest pairwise outcome in both surveys is trust some figure and trust some faction (50.0% of the May 1998 sample and 58.6% of the November 1997 sample). The second most frequent pairwise outcome is do not trust any figure and do not trust any faction (18.5% of the May 1998 sample and 8.2% of the November 1997 sample.) The third most frequent pairwise outcome revealed by both surveys is trust some figure and do not trust any faction (9.3% of the May 1998 sample and 7.5% of the November 1997 sample).

One explanation for the lack of evidence in support of a cumulative relationship between trust for figures and trust for factions is that people, when asked to identify the figure they trust the most, are likely to consider only *high-ranking members* of factions. The tendency for people to consider only party leaders in evaluating who, if anyone, they trust most, may itself be explained by a tendency of people, when asked to identify the figure they trust most, to consider only those figures who are prominent in the public arena. Furthermore, the likelihood of considering only prominent figures is encouraged by the survey question itself, which asks the respondent to name the "personality" (*"shakhsieyyeh"*) (s)he trusts most. Within the Palestinian context in particular, as the reader may know, the term "personality" (*"shakhsieyyeh"*) refers to *prominent* Palestinian political figures. **By restricting their options to prominent figures, respondents both (1) decrease the number of figures they consider in the first place and thus the probability that they will come up with a figure they trust the most, and (2) increase the likelihood that they will consider faction leaders and thus the likelihood that they will associate the figures they consider with particular political factions.** Evidence that respondents tend to consider only prominent figures in their assessment of political trust is provided in Table IA. Simply, most of the figures named by respondents are high-ranking faction members, and only a small percentage of respondents – 6.5% and 7.3% in May 1998 and November 1997, respectively – named some other figure.[23]

B. The Strength of Party Identification within the Palestinian Populace

As mentioned above, the strength of the relationship between trust for figures and trust for factions is likely to be affected by the strength of party identification – that is, by the extent to which people associate political figures with their factional affiliation. Simply, the more people identify figures with factions, the more likely people's views on trust for figures and trust for factions to be positive and strongly correlated. Furthermore, the question of the strength of party identification is crucial in its own right, because the strength of party identification, and by extension of party discipline, is a factor which impinges upon processes of electoral behavior, government coalition and decision-making processes, and mass and elite mobilization and collective action.

The analysis of party identification in the Palestinian case is particularly warranted, moreover, given the fundamental developments in Palestinian resulting from the Oslo agreements. Specifically, strong party politics had comprised an integral component of Palestinian parties from the early days of the Palestinian nationalist movement to at least the duration of the *Intifada*. (See, e.g., Sahliyeh 1988; Hilterman 1991; Brynen 1994; Sayigh 1997) Brynen (1994) goes so far as to claim, in a chapter published in 1994, that a PFLP activist living in Nablus has far more in common with PFLP activists on the outside than with Fatah activist Faisal Husseini on the inside. Yet, as the reader may be well aware, the Oslo process has shattered traditional patterns of Palestinian nationalist politics. For one, rejectionist factions appear unable to articulate a viable alternative agenda than that espoused by more moderate factions, and large proportions of potential rank-and-file members and constituencies of factions have disengaged from the political process due to disillusionment with the unfolding of the interim period. Furthermore, the disenfranchisement of the PLO at the expense of the PA has served to undermine the primary institutional apparatus of leftist PLO factions. The decline of the PLO, moreover, has been particularly consequential for those secular factions that boycotted the PA/PLC elections of April 1996. A severe decrease in the availability of foreign governmental and non-governmental aid for various Palestinian factions in the wake of the Oslo agreements has further

[23] Of course, some of these other figures may also be leaders of some small Palestinian political faction.

aggravated the resource base of various Palestinian factions. On the note of PA elections, furthermore, the predominance of Fatah members in the PA/PLC elections served to remove party politics from processes of elections and governance. (Bishara 1997; Shikaki 1997) Furthermore, the partitioning of faction leaders, members, and constituents, across the inside-outside divide serves to separate these actors, not only geographically but also in terms of interests and policy preferences, and in so doing serves to strain the unity of various factions. One might add to this slew of obstacles to strong party politics, lastly, that party identification could only have suffered from Arafat's efforts to revitalize traditional political affiliations. Given the importance of examining the strength of party identification both for the building of models accounting for trust/distrust and as a fundamental phenomenon in its own right, it is to such an examination that we presently turn.

Measurement of the extent to which trusted figures come from trusted parties serves as an indicator of the level of strength of party identification in Palestinian politics. More to the point, the author suggests to measure the general strength of party identification in the Palestinian political system by first deriving measures of the extent to which the support of *individual* leaders is dispersed across constituents of distinct factions, and by then aggregating these individual-level scores across the set of leaders.[24] The first step in deriving measures of the extent to which the total number of trust-"votes" individual figures received from the survey sample are dispersed across factional boundaries is to cross-tabulate responses to the trust-figure question by responses to the trust-faction question. This set of cross-tabulations is presented in Table IIB. A set of crude measures of the extent to which figures' popular trust is dispersed across distinct factional constituencies that are derived from Table IIB are presented in Table IIC.

[24]Though not of direct relevance to the present study, the extent to which trust in *individual* leaders is contained within single constituencies or dispersed across various constituencies can be utilized as an indicator of the legitimacy, strength, or at least independence, of individual figures. Estimation of the factors accounting for variation in the extent to which individual figures' support is dispersed, additionally, represents a useful topic for future research. Such research, for one, might be compared to the findings of the Center for Palestine Research and Studies 1996 election-day exit poll, which asked the following question in close-ended format: "Which . . .[quality] was the most important factor in the selection of your preferred candidate?" Of those responding to this question, 28% responded "a fighter/activist," 24% responded "religious," 17% responded "having moral values," 16% responded "having served his/her district," 12% responded "education," and 3% responded "from an established family."

Table IIB: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure item by responses to trust-faction item

(a) May 1998

	Factional Constituency									
Figure	Fatah	Hamas	PFLP	DFLP	Islamic Jihad	PPP	FIDA	Other Islamist	Other faction	Don't trust any faction
Yasir Arafat (n=419)										
number of (trust) votes	316	34	1		4		1	11	1	51
% of figure's total votes	75.4%	8.1%	0.2%		1.0%		0.2%	2.6%	0.2%	12.2%
Ahmad Yasin (n=92)										
number of (trust) votes	1	74	2					2		13
% of figure's total votes	1.1%	80.4%	2.2%					2.2%		14.1%
George Habash (n=22)										
number of (trust) votes		1	18					1		2
% of figure's total votes		4.5%	81.8%					4.5%		9.1%
Nayef Hawatmeh (n=3)										
number of (trust) votes				3						
% of figure's total votes				100%						
Haidar Abdul-Shafi (n=36)										
number of (trust) votes	2	7	2		1	6	1	2		15
% of figure's total votes	5.6%	19.4%	5.6%		2.8%	16.7%	2.8%	5.6%		41.7%
Faisal Husseini (n=9)										
number of (trust) votes	5	1								3
% of figure's total votes	55.6%	11.1%								33.3%
Hanan Ashrawi (n=28)										
number of (trust) votes	11	3	2					1		11
% of figure's total votes	39.3%	10.7%	7.1%					3.6%		39.3%
Saeb Eraqat (n=7)										
number of (trust) votes	3	3								1
% of figure's total votes	42.9%	42.9%								14.3%
Abu Mazen (n=11)										
number of (trust) votes	9	2								
% of figure's total votes	81.8%	18.2%								
Don't trust anyone (n=285)										
number of votes	16	22	6	1	1	3		11	1	224
% of total "don't trust" votes	5.6%	7.7%	2.1%	0.4%	0.4%	1.1%		3.9%	0.4%	78.6%

(b) November 1997

Figure	Factional Constituency									
	Fatah	Hamas	PFLP	DFLP	Islamic Jihad	PPP	FIDA	Other Islamists	Other factions	Don't trust any faction
Yasir Arafat (n=486)										
number of (trust) votes	356	55	4	3	5			17	2	44
% of figure's total votes	73.3%	11.3%	0.8%	0.6%	1.0%			3.5%	0.4%	9.1%
Ahmad Yasin (n=65)										
number of (trust) votes	2	58			1			1		3%
% of figure's total votes	3.1%	89.2%			1.5%			1.5%		4.6%
George Habash (n=15)										
number of (trust) votes			13				1			1
% of figure's total votes			86.7%				6.7%			6.7%
Nayef Hawatmeh (n=3)	2			1						
number of (trust) votes	66.7%			33.3%						
% of figure's total votes										
Haidar Abdul-Shafi (n=52)										
number of (trust) votes	20	8		2	3	7		1	1	10
% of figure's total votes	38.5%	15.4%		3.8%	5.8%	13.5%		1.9%	1.9%	19.2%
Faisal Husseini (n=13)										
number of (trust) votes	6							2		5
% of figure's total votes	46.2%							15.4%		38.5%
Hanan Ashrawi (n=20)										
number of (trust) votes	9	7								4
% of figure's total votes	45.0%	35.0%								20.0%
Saeb Eraqat (n=27)										
number of (trust) votes	15	3						1		8
% of figure's total votes	55.6%	11.1%						3.7%		29.6%
Abu Mazen (n=11)	5	2	1							3
number of (trust) votes	45.5%	18.2%	9.1%							27.3%
% of figure's total votes										
Yasser Abd Rabbo (n=5)										
number of (trust) votes	1	1					2			1
% of figure's total votes	20.0%	20.0%					40.0%			20.0%
Musa Abu Marzuq (n=1)										
number of (trust) votes	1									
% of figure's total votes	100%									
Don't trust anyone (n=169)										
number of votes	18	35	3	2	5		1	8		97
% of total "don't trust" votes	10.7%	20.7%	1.8%	1.2%	3.0%		0.6%	4.7%		57.4%

Table IIC: Indicators of the extent to which figures' popular support (measured in terms of trust votes) is dispersed across distinct factional constituencies

(1) May 1998

Figure	1. # of constituencies from which figure received at least 1 vote[Ω]	2. # of constituencies from which figure received at least 5.0% of his or her votes	3. % of total votes coming from largest constituency	4. [# of non-main constituencies]/ [% of total votes from largest constituency]	5. [# of non-main (5.0% threshold) constituencies]/ [% of total votes from largest constituency]	6. [% of votes from non-main constituencies]/ [% from largest constituency]
Arafat	8	3	75.4%	8/.75 = 10.6	3/.75 = 4.0	.25/.75 = 0.33
Yasin	5	2	80.4%	5/.80 = 6.2	2/.80 = 2.5	.20/.80 = 0.24
Habash	4	2	81.8%	4/.82 = 4.9	2/.82 = 2.4	.18/.82 = 0.22
Hawatmeh	1	1	100.0%	1/1.0 = 1.0	1/1.0 = 1.0	.00/1.00 = 0.00
Abdul-Shafi	8	6	41.7%	8/.42 = 19.2	6/.42 = 14.4	.58/.42 = 1.40
Husseini	3	3	55.6%	3/.56 = 5.4	3/.56 = 5.4	.44/.56 = 0.80
Ashrawi	5	4	39.3%	5/.39 = 12.7	4/.39 = 10.2	.61/.39 = 1.54
Eraqat	3	3	42.9%	3/.43 = 7.0	3/.43 = 7.0	.57/.43 = 1.33
Abu Mazen	2	2	81.8%	2/.82 = 2.4	2/.82 = 2.4	.18/.82 = 0.22

[Ω]The indicators of dispersion of popular support treat "other Islamists," "other factions," and "do not trust any faction," as distinct constituencies

(2) November 1997

Figure	1. # of constituencies from which figure received at least 1 vote[Ω]	2. # of constituencies from which figure received at least 5.0% of his or her votes	3. % of total votes coming from largest constituency	4. [# of non-main constituencies]/ [% of total votes from largest constituency]	5. [# of non-main (5.0% threshold) constituencies]/ [% of total votes from largest constituency]	6. [% of votes from non-main constituencies]/ [% from largest constituency]
Arafat	8	3	73.3%	8/.73 = 10.9	3/7.3 = 4.1	.27/.73 = 0.37
Yasin	5	1	89.2%	5/.892 = 5.6	1/.892 = 1.1	.11/.89 = 0.88
Habash	3	3	86.7%	3/.867 = 3.5	3/.867 = 3.5	.13/.87 = 0.12
Hawatmeh	2	2	66.7%	2/.667 = 3.0	2/.667 = 3.0	.33/.67 = 0.50
Abdul-Shafi	8	5	38.5%	8/.385 = 20.8	5/.35 = 13.0	.62/.39 = 1.60
Husseini	3	3	46.2%	3/.462 = 6.5	3/.462 = 6.5	.54/.46 = 1.16
Ashrawi	3	3	45.0%	3/.45 = 6.7	3/.45 = 6.7	.55/.45 = 1.22
Eraqat	4	3	55.6%	4/.556 = 7.2	3/.556 = 5.4	.44/.56 = 0.80
Abu Mazen	4	4	45.5%	4/.455 = 8.8	4/.455 = 8.8	.55/.46 = 1.20
Abd Rabbo	4	4	40.0%	4/.40 = 10	4/.40 = 10	.60/.40 = 1.50
Abu Marzuq	1	1	100.0%	1/1.0 = 1	1/1 = 1	.00/1.0 = 0.00

[Ω] The indicators of dispersion of popular support treat "other Islamists," "other factions," and "do not trust any faction," as distinct constituencies

The columns in Table IIC report measures that are either indirectly or directly relevant to the measurement of the extent to which figures' support – measured in terms of trust-votes – is dispersed across factions, and the rows in Table IIC list the individual figures that respondents most frequently identified as those they trust most. The first column in Table IIC reports the number of distinct factional constituencies from which individual figures received at least one trust-vote. By factional constituency is simply meant the group of respondents who report that they trust some particular faction most (including "trust no faction" and "other" factions). In total, there are 10 such factional constituencies, or categories of responses to the trust-faction question – Fatah, PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, "other Islamic factions," "other factions," and "do not trust any faction." The number in the first column of Table IIC, then, refers to the number of factional constituencies from which the corresponding figure received at least one trust-vote. For example, Arafat receives a score of eight in the first column of Tables IIC1 and IIC2. This means that Arafat was selected as the figure trusted most by at least one member (respondent) from eight of the ten factional constituency categories listed on the top row of Table IIB. To cite another example, Saeb Eraqat exhibits a score of 3 in the first column of Table IIC1, and a score of 4 in the first column of Table IIC2. This means that, of the respondents to the May 1998 survey, respondents who reported trusting three different factions most also reported that they trust Eraqat most, and, of the respondents to the November 1997 survey, respondents who reported trusting four different factions most also reported that they trust Eraqat most.

The second column reports the number of factional constituencies from which individual figures received at least 5.0% of their total support from. The logic for such a column is to assess the number of faction-constituencies from which the figure receives *meaningful* support. Of the figures listed in Table IIC1, raising the threshold for what is considered a figure's factional constituency has the largest impact on the number of factional constituencies of Arafat. That is, column 1 reports Arafat as enjoying 8 factional constituencies, but when the 5.0% threshold is invoked, the number of factional constituencies enjoyed by Arafat drops to 3. Similarly, column 1 of Table IIC1 reveals that Yasin received at least one trust-vote from five different factional constituencies, and column 2 reveals that, when the definition of factional constituencies is defined in more demanding fashion than it is in column 1, Yasin is found to enjoy only 2 factional constituencies. Given the 5.0% threshold for factional constituencies, Haidar Abdul Shafi receives the support of more factional constituencies than any other figure in Table IIC1 (6 factional constituencies) and Table IIC2 (5 factional constituencies).

One can certainly make the argument that the threshold of 5.0% is quite low in the sense that a figure is really not that dependent on a constituency from which he or she receives only 5.0% of his or her support. But whether or not a threshold of 5.0% is more or less desirable for tapping meaningful bases of support is beyond the point of the present discussion. The more basic point the author intends to illustrate by presenting the clearly arbitrary threshold of 5.0% is that refined measures of the dispersion of individual leaders' support should take into account not only the number but also the actual relevance of the figures' various factional constituencies.

The third column of Table IIC reports the percentage of any individual figure's total number of trust-votes coming from the faction which represents the figure's largest factional constituency – coming, that is, from the factional constituency from which the figure receives the largest share of his or her trust-votes. Thus, for example, Table IIC1 reveals that Naif Hawatmeh received 100.0% of his support in May 1998 from his primary factional constituency (viz., DFLP). To cite another example, in May 1998, 80.4% of Yasin's total level of support, i.e., trust votes, came from Yasin's primary constituency (viz., Hamas), and in November 1997, 89.2% of Yasin's total level of support came from his primary constituency. To cite a final example of column #3, Haidar Abdul-Shafi received 41.7% of his total support in May 1998 from his largest factional constituency – those who reported not trusting any faction, and 38.5% of his total support in November 1997 from his largest factional constituency – those who reported trusting Fatah most.

The fourth, fifth, and six columns present crude indexes intended to reflect the extent to which a figure's constituency is dispersed across factions. Column 4 reports the ratio of the number of constituencies expressing support for a figure to the percentage of a figure's total support coming from the figure's largest constituency. In other words, column four divides the number of constituencies of a figure by the percent of the figure's total support coming from his or her largest constituency. The larger the numerator (i.e., number of constituencies) and the smaller the denominator (i.e., the percent

of support coming from the largest constituency), the higher a figure's score. Accordingly, the higher a figure's score, the more dispersed the factional constituency of that figure. Put differently, the higher a figure's score, the less dependent that figure on his or her primary constituency for popular support. The minimum possible score of this ratio is 1 (a person who receives 100% of his or her trust votes from one factional constituency) Given ten different factional constituencies, the maximum score, though highly unlikely for any figure in any political system, is 100 (a person who receives equal support, i.e., 10% of his or her total, from all 10 constituencies). According to this measure, Hawatmeh in May 1998, with a score of 1, is wholly dependent upon one constituency. In contrast, Abdul-Shafi, with a score of 19.2 in May 1998 and 20.8 in November 1997, Hanan Ashrawi, with a score of 12.7 in May 1998, Arafat, with a score of 10.6 in May 1998 and 10.9 in November 1997, Yasser Abd Rabbo, with a score of 10.0 in November 1997, and Abu-Mazen, with a score of 8.8 in November 1997, exhibit relatively highly dispersed constituent bases of popular support. Column 5 presents the exact same type of ratio as does column 4, with the only difference being that the numerator of the ratio in column 5 refers to the number of factional constituencies from which a figure received at least *5.0%* of his or her trust votes. Given that the logic of column 5 follows that of column 4, suffice it to say in reference to column 5 that this column may represent a more valid indicator of factional support than that presented in column 4 because, by adopting the 5.0% threshold, it accounts for the meaningfulness of factional constituencies.

Column 6, lastly, presents another crude measure of the level of dispersion of a figure's popular support. This column simply takes the ratio of the percentage of a figure's total amount of trust votes coming from all factional constituencies other than the figure's largest factional constituency to the percentage of support coming from the figure's primary constituency. In other words, this column divides the percentage of a figure's total number of trust-votes the figure received from all factional constituencies other than his or her largest factional constituency by the percentage of the figure's total number of trust-votes which he or she received from his or her primary constituency. The values of this ratio range from 0 – complete dependence on one factional constituency and approaches a maximum of 9 (equally dependent on all ten constituencies). A score of 1 reflects that the figure receives 50% of his or her total support from his or her primary constituency. In May 1998, Hanan Ashrawi receives the highest score on this index, 1.5, followed by Abdul-Shafi, with a score of 1.4, and Eraqat, with a score of 1.33. In November 1997, Abdul-Shafi receives the highest score, 1.60, followed by Yasser Abd Rabbo, with a score of 1.50, Ashrawi, with a score of 1.22, Abu Mazen, with a score of 1.20, and Faisal Husseini, with a score of 1.16.

To reiterate, the utility of the indexes presented in Table IIC to the present study is that individual-level scores on each index can be summed or averaged to provide a measure of the aggregate level of dispersion of support of the entire set of figures. The higher the level of dispersion of support across the entire set of figures, the logic goes, the lower the strength of party identification in the political system – that is, the lower the extent to which individual figures are perceived as agents of, and dependent upon, the political faction to which they are most closely affiliated. Again, the weaker party identification, the less likely we expect the same set of factors to account for *both* types of trust/distrust, i.e., of figures and of factions. Accordingly, the most relevant aspect of Table IIC at present is some summary measure, such as the average or sum, of the index scores across the figures. We could then compare the summary score for any particular index with some conception of *moderate* party identification, to assess if the index suggests low, moderate, or high, levels of party identification.

The author does not conduct such calculations and assessments here. First, the measures of the dispersion of popular support presented in Table IIC are crude, and more refined measures of this phenomenon must await future research. Second, all figures other than Arafat, and perhaps also Yasin, receive too few trust-votes from the survey samples for us to have confidence in analyses of properties of the group of votes that any of these figures get. Two factors limit the number of votes figures other than Arafat get: (1) the trust questions asks the respondent to name only the *one, most* trusted, figure, and (2) Arafat is vastly more popular than any other leader. For these reasons, the primary value of the above discussion of Tables IIB and IIC is to suggest a *type* of analysis useful for the evaluation of the

strength of party identification among the Palestinian populace, rather than to actually present conclusive findings of such an analysis.[25]

Conclusion

Part II has shown that most people who trust (distrust) some figure, trust (distrust) some faction, but that many people trust *either* some figure *or* some faction, but not both. Part II has also shown that, counter to the author's suspicions, the tendency for people to concomitantly trust some figure and distrust all factions is not substantially larger than the tendency for people to concomitantly trust some faction and distrust all figures. Lastly, Part II has presented a basic approach for analyzing the extent to which the Palestinian populace identifies figures with their factions, though it was unable to provide conclusive empirical evidence one way or the other in this regard.

The types of analyses presented in Part II are valuable in their own right. But of direct relevance to the main analyses of this study is that the analyses presented in Part II do not provide conclusive evidence for a strong and positive relationship between trust for figures and trust for factions. Thus, these analyses confirm the validity of the decision – presented in Part IA – to analyze trust for figures and trust for factions as (potentially) distinct phenomena accounted for by (potentially) distinct models.

[25] Accordingly, the collection of data that enable valid assessment of the diversity of support of individual figures other than Arafat and Yasin requires at least one of three measures: (1) asking the open-ended trust-most question, but not allowing the respondent to name Arafat; (2) asking the respondent to indicate the figure who he or she trusts second most as well as most; or (3) asking the respondent to indicate his or her level of trust for each of a set of particular figures.

III. Summary and Analysis of Estimated Models of Popular Political Trust and Distrust

This part of the study summarizes and analyzes the results of four individual estimated models of trust/distrust in figures and factions. More specifically, these four estimated models account for four distinct objects of explanation, or dependent variables – (1) the probability of trusting a figure most with data collected by the November 1997 survey; (2) the probability of trusting a figure most with data collected by the May 1998 survey; (3) the probability of trusting a faction most with data collected by the November 1997 survey; and (4) the probability of trusting a faction most with data collected by the May 1998 survey. As Part III represents the core of this study and should be accessible to all readers, the author does *not* place the key points in bold. Rather, the reader is encouraged to read Part III in its entirety.

Table III summarizes the results of the four estimated models of trust/distrust. Cells in this table with one or two asterisks ("*"/"**") refer to independent variables appearing in the corresponding model that achieve statistical significance. A cell reporting an effect that appears in an estimated model yet does not achieve statistical significance at the 95% confidence-level lists the p-value of this effect in parentheses. The signs ("+"/"-") of the beta coefficients of numeric variables are presented in this table not so much to enable identification of the substantive nature of the variables' effects – which of course requires reference to the coding schemes of the corresponding variables[26] – but rather simply to reveal whether or not the direction of the impact of a particular variable is the same across the set of estimated models in which it is included. For example, the beta coefficients measuring the direction of the effects of PA evaluation across the four models are all negative ("-"). This means that the direction of the effects of PA evaluation is consistent across the four models; namely, the more positive a person's evaluation of the PA, the higher the probability that the person will exhibit trust, rather than distrust, in some political figure/faction. Meanwhile, the signs of the beta coefficients of categorical variables – i.e., region, residence-type, and gender – have a straightforward interpretation: a positive beta coefficient means that people conforming to the first (left) category listed in each pair of categories have a higher probability of trusting some figure/faction than do people fitting the second (right) category. Thus, for example, the three positive signs ("+") in the cell corresponding to the effects of region of residence in the model of trust-figure based on the May 1998 data, mean that, in descending order, Gaza residents have a higher likelihood than West Bank residents of trusting a figure, Gaza residents have a higher likelihood than East Jerusalem residents of trusting a figure, and West Bank residents have a higher likelihood than East Jerusalem residents of trusting a figure. Conversely, a negative ("-") beta coefficient means that people fitting the first (left) category in the pair to which the beta coefficient corresponds have a lower probability of trusting some figure/faction than do people fitting the second (right) category. Thus, for example, the negative sign ("-") in the cell corresponding to the "women versus men" pairing of the November 1997 analysis of trust-figure means that this model estimates that women have a lower likelihood of expressing trust in some figure than do men.

The set of numbers in parentheses rank the relative magnitude, or size, of the effects of the independent variables in the corresponding model. Thus, for example, the first column reports that, of the independent variables in the model of trust in figures estimated with the November 1997 data, position on Palestinian negotiations with Israel had the relatively largest impact on the probability of trusting or distrusting some figure, followed, in order of decreasing size of effect, by evaluation of the PA, evaluation of the PLC, age, and gender. To cite another example, the column summarizing the results of the model of trust in factions estimated with the May 1998 data reports that evaluation of the PA had the largest impact on the probability of trusting some faction most, followed, in descending order, by a shift between city residence and village residence, a shift between refugee camp residence and village residence, and, lastly, a shift between city residence and refugee camp residence.

[26] It follows that the predominance of *negative* beta coefficients is not in itself substantively meaningful and is instead simply a function of the arbitrary coding schemes of the numeric variables.

Table III: Summary of the estimates of the four logistic regression models of trust/distrust

	Dependent Variable Survey Date			
Independent Variable	Trust-figure Novem. 1997	Trust-figure May 1998	Trust-faction Novem. 1997	Trust-faction May 1998
Position on negotiations	-** (1)	X	X	X
Position on further Palest. concessions	.	X	.	X
Position on armed struggle	X	.	X	.
Position on suicide operations	X	X	X	X
Morality of use of violence	.	X	.	X
Prospects of a peace agreement	X	X	X	X
Possibility of peaceful coexistence	.	X	.	X
Views on US, EU intervention	X	X	X	X
Evaluation of PA	-** (2)	-** (1)	-** (1)	-** (1)
Evaluation of PLC	-** (3)	-** (3)	-* (2)	X
Evaluation of economy	X	.	-* (4)	.
Law preference *Shari'a* versus secular law	X	.	X	.
Preferences on role Islam should play	X	.	X	.
insider (*dakhil*) versus returnee (*kharij*)	.	X	.	X
Residence-type city versus refugee camp city versus village refugee camp versus village	X	X	X	-(p=.346) (4) -** (2) -(p=.054) (3)
Refugee status non-refugee versus refugee	X	X	X	X
Region of residence Gaza versus West Bank Gaza versus E. Jerusalem WB versus E. Jerusalem	X	+** (4) +** (2) +(p=.366) (5)	X	X
Gender women versus men	-(p=.061) (5)	-(p=.085) (6)	X	X
Age	-** (4)	X	-* (3)	X
Level of education	X	X	X	X
Level of income	X	X	X	X
Optimism/pessimism about the future	X	X	X	X

Cells with a period (".") refer to variables for which data were not collected in the corresponding survey. Cells with an "X" refer to variables for which data were collected in the corresponding survey but which do not appear in the corresponding estimated model because they either did not consistently achieve or did not even approximate statistical significance in preliminary models. Lastly, the reader should note that the independent variables listed in the left-most column of the table are arranged into clusters at least roughly conforming to four distinct levels-of-analysis – regional-level, domestic political-level, socioeconomic-level, and psychological-level.

Discussion of possible explanations of the estimated effects summarized in Table III is organized according to the four distinct categories of variables mentioned above. Specifically, Section *A* of Part III analyzes effects of variables to do with regional-level issues, Section *B* discusses effects of domestic-level factors, Section *C* considers the effects of socioeconomic attributes, and Section *D* discusses effects to do with psychological, or, perhaps more accurately, socio-psychological, variables.[27]

[27] Because it is appropriate to focus a disproportionate amount of our attention on those independent variables found to exert a *robust* impact on the probability that a person trusts or distrusts a political figure/faction, a few preliminary comments on how to differentiate between robust and spurious effects deserve mention. Respondent evaluation of the PA exerts statistically significant effects in all four models, and respondent evaluation of the PLC exerts statistically significant effects in three of the four models. Thus, we can think of the effects of these two variables as being robust. In contrast, the remaining variables appearing in Table III exert a statistically significant effect in at most only two of the four analyses. The question at hand is whether or not it is appropriate to view these effects as robust.
On the one side, the appearance of a variable in only one or two models may be taken as a sign of the lack of robustness and generalizability of the impact of the variable. On the other side, however, a few considerations militate against overly hasty

A. Regional level-of-analysis

The regional-level factors tested in this study refer to respondent views on various issues to do with Palestinian-Israeli relations. The model on figure-trust estimated with the November 1997 data found that the stronger a respondent's opposition to Palestinian negotiations with Israel, the less likely the respondent to trust some figure most. On the one side, it is plausible to suspect that, particularly in polities characterized by an executive and/or political party that enjoy(s) a more or less hegemonic position within the domestic political spectrum, many people who are disappointed with the central policy orientation of the executive and/or dominant party – in this case, negotiations with Israel – are likely to lose confidence in the political leadership and party system *as a whole*. On the other side, the finding that opposition to negotiations increases the probability of not trusting *any* figure may strike the reader as counterintuitive, due to the expectation that opposition to negotiations with Israel should influence *not* the probability of trusting *any* figure, *per se*, but rather the probability that *particular* figures are trusted and distrusted.[28] More specifically, we might expect those opposed to negotiations not to have a higher probability of not trusting any figure, but rather to have a higher probability of trusting figures opposed to negotiations. We should expect people opposed to negotiations, that is, to trust figures opposed to negotiations. We might view as support for this proposition this study's finding that attitudes on negotiations exerted a significant impact in only one of the four sets of models, and that attitudes on other issues to do with Israel – namely, armed struggle, suicide operations, whether or not to grant further concessions to Israel, and the prospects of peace in the near future – did not exert robust effects on the probability of trusting some figure/faction.

One possible explanation for the arguably counterintuitive effects of views on negotiations estimated with the November 1997 data is that, while opposition to negotiations with Israel *by itself* might not be meaningfully related to the propensity to trust any figure/faction, political distrust might be promoted by the *conjunction* of opposition to negotiations with Israel *and* skepticism about the effectiveness of confrontational policies toward Israel. In other words, a person may simultaneously

---

omission of such a variable in present and future analyses of popular political trust/distrust. First and foremost, any empirical relationship found to be statistically significant is by definition quite likely to exist in the population from which the sample was drawn and is deserved of consideration on this basis alone. This being said, it is important to reiterate a point made in Part ID; namely, any particular population is defined by time as well as place, such that an effect which existed at one point in time in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, say, during November 1997, may not exist in another point in time in these regions, say, during May 1998. Though beyond the scope of the present study, analysis of change over time in the significance, direction, and magnitude of particular types of effects on the probability of trusting/distrusting political figures and factions, represents a worthwhile component of future research on Palestinian political trust.

Second, whether or not it is appropriate to be skeptical of an independent variable's robustness if it is found to be statistically significant in the estimated model(s) of only one of the two types of dependent variables largely depends on how we view the relationship between trust in figures and trust in factions. Simply, to the extent that we view trust in figures and trust in factions as similar phenomena, it is appropriate to be skeptical about the robustness of a variable which achieves statistical significance in only one of the sets of estimated models of *either* trust in figures *or* trust in factions. Conversely, to the extent that we view trust for figures and trust for factions as distinct phenomena, a variable's inconsistent statistical showing across models accounting for these two types of dependent variables should in fact be expected. As discussed in Part II, firm conclusions regarding the relationship between trust for figures, on the one side, and trust for factions, on the other side, must await further research. Accordingly, the failure of a variable to exert statistically significant effects in analyses of *both* trust in figures and trust in factions should not be viewed as evidence that this variable is not important in accounting for at least one of the two manifestations of trust.

A third reason for being cautious in the acceptance as well as rejection of particular independent variables is that the data sets used in this study to estimate models of trust/distrust do not include data on some variables that potentially exert important effects on people's propensity toward political trust/distrust. Such potentially relevant variables include whether or not the respondent harbors feelings of anomie, the political orientations of the respondent's parents and older siblings, and which figure(s) and/or faction(s) the respondent blames for main problems facing Palestinian society. As mentioned in Part ID, the statistical performance of independent variables may vary depending on the other independent variables included in and excluded from the model. More specifically, the p-value, direction, and magnitude, of an independent variable's beta coefficient may vary according to the set of independent variables included in and excluded from the estimated model. It follows that our ability to make firm conclusions regarding the robustness of particular effects estimated in this study must await future research that estimates models of popular political trust with data on all of the potentially relevant factors.

Given these considerations, it is appropriate to view the variables appearing only once or twice as at least potentially important and thus as deserved of future investigation. Accordingly, Part III deliberates, if at times only minimally, on the effects of all of the independent variables that exhibit statistically significant effects on the probability of trust/distrust in at least one of the four estimated models.

[28]Ghassan Khatib is to be credited for making this point to the author.

oppose negotiating with Israel *and* believe that the agendas of rejectionist figures/factions are at least as ineffective if not also as unprincipled as negotiating with Israel. This conjunction of opposition to negotiations and skepticism about the productivity or desirability of confrontation with Israel may be responsible for disillusionment or despair with *all* political alternatives to the PA/Fatah. Such disillusionment or despair, in turn, may oftentimes get translated into a *comprehensive* "distrust."

By a similar logic, we should expect that people who are opposed to both negotiations with Israel and the *ideologies of rejectionist figures/factions* to exhibit a higher propensity toward political disillusionment, distrust, etc., than that exhibited by people who are opposed to negotiations with Israel yet find the ideology of one or more rejectionist factions persuasive. More specifically, we should expect people who are opposed to negotiations with Israel yet who support political Islam to be less likely to express distrust in all figures/factions than people who oppose negotiations with Israel yet do not adhere to political Islam. This is particularly likely given the decreased resonance of the only rejectionist ideological alternative to political Islam – communism/socialism with a pan-Arabist hue –in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the participation of many Arab states, including Syria and Egypt, in the Western alliance against Iraq during the 1990 Gulf War.

It might be the case, parenthetically, that some combination of affiliational loyalty, social pressure, and plain inertia, serve to reinforce the general disillusionment of former supporters and rank-and-file members of rejectionist parties. Specifically, norms of loyalty, pressures and inducements of fellow supporters and members, and simply habit, may inhibit long-term supporters and members of any particular faction who lose faith in *that particular* faction from seeking membership in and engaging in the collective efforts of an alternative political association.

The author conducted a series of cross-tabulations to test the hypothesis that much distrust results, not from opposition to the peace process and to negotiations with Israel, *per se*, but rather from the conjunction of such opposition with (1) opposition to Palestinian resort to violence against Israel, and/or (2) opposition to political Islam. Table A1 reports on cross-tabulations derived from the November 1997 survey data of responses to the trust-faction and trust-figure questions by a variable which combines views on negotiations and views on armed struggle. This latter variable has four categories: (1) opposed to the peace process/negotiations and opposed to armed struggle; (2) opposed to the peace process/negotiations and supportive of armed struggle; (3) supportive of the peace process/negotiations and opposed to armed struggle; and (4) supportive of the peace process/negotiations and supportive of armed struggle. The hypothesis under consideration, then, proposes that, of these four categories, respondents who fit into the "opposed to the peace process/negotiations and opposed to armed struggle" category should exhibit the highest level of distrust in figures and factions.

Table A1: Cross-tabulations of responses to trust-most questions by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and armed struggle

Table A1a: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and armed struggle

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and on armed struggle			
Response to trust-faction item	Oppose both negotiations and armed struggle (n = 32)	Oppose negotiations and support armed struggle (n = 124)	Support negotiations and oppose armed struggle (n = 429)	Support both negotiations and armed struggle (n = 262)
Do not trust any faction	11 (34.4%)	25 (20.2%)	59 (13.8%)	28 (10.7%)
Trust some faction	20 (62.5%)	88 (71.0%)	311 (72.5%)	203 (77.5%)
No answer/don't know	1 (3.1%)	11 (8.9%)	59 (13.8%)	31 (11.8%)

Both cross-tabulations reported in Table A1 support the hypothesis. Whereas 20.2% of those who are opposed to the peace process/negotiations and supportive of armed struggle report not trusting any political faction, 34.4% of those who are opposed to both the peace process and armed struggle report distrust in political factions. As for trust in figures, whereas 33.9% of those who oppose the

peace process and support armed struggle report not trusting any political figure, 50.0% of those who are opposed to both the peace process and armed struggle express distrust in political figures.

Table A1b: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and armed struggle

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and on armed struggle			
Response to trust-figure item	Oppose both negotiations and armed struggle (n = 32)	Oppose negotiations and support armed struggle (n = 124)	Support negotiations and oppose armed struggle (n = 429)	Support both negotiations and armed struggle (n = 262)
Do not trust any figure	16 (50.0%)	42 (33.9%)	34 (7.9%)	26 (9.9%)
Trust some figure	15 (46.9%)	73 (58.9%)	366 (85.3%)	211 (80.5%)
No answer/don't know	1 (3.1%)	9 (7.3%)	29 (6.8%)	25 (9.5%)

This trend is corroborated by cross-tabulations, based on November 1997 data, of trust/distrust by a variable combining attitudes on the peace process and attitudes on suicide operations. These cross-tabulations are presented in Table A2. This table shows that 18.5% of those respondents who oppose negotiations and support suicide operations express distrust in political factions. Meanwhile, 29.5% of those respondents who oppose both the peace process and suicide operations distrust political factions. Similarly, those who oppose both negotiations and suicide operations have a higher tendency than those who oppose negotiations and support suicide operations to trust some figure most (respectively, 45.9%, 31.5%).

Table A2: Cross-tabulations of responses to trust-most questions by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and suicide operations

Table A2a: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and suicide operations

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and on suicide operations			
Response to trust-faction item	Oppose both negotiations and suicide operations (n = 61)	Oppose negotiations and support suicide operations (n = 92)	Support negotiations and oppose suicide operations (n = 560)	Support both negotiations and suicide operations (n = 134)
Do not trust any faction	18 (29.5%)	17 (18.5%)	78 (13.9%)	9 (6.7%)
Trust some faction	37 (60.7%)	68 (73.9%)	405 (72.3%)	105 (78.4%)
No answer/don't know	6 (9.8%)	7 (7.6%)	77 (13.8%)	20 (14.9%)

Table A2b: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and suicide operations

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and on suicide operations			
Response to trust-figure item	Oppose both negotiations and suicide operations (n = 61)	Oppose negotiations and support suicide operations (n = 92)	Support negotiations and oppose suicide operations (n = 560)	Support both negotiations and suicide operations (n = 134)
Do not trust any figure	28 (45.9%)	29 (31.5%)	48 (8.6%)	12 (9.0%)
Trust some figure	25 (41.0%)	59 (64.1%)	472 (84.3%)	104 (77.6%)
No answer/don't know	8 (13.1%)	4 (4.3%)	40 (7.1%)	18 (13.4%)

Complementary cross-tabulations relying on the May 1998 data generally agree with the analyses of November 1997 data in confirming the hypothesis at hand. Specifically, the May 1998 data asked respondents whether they believed the use of force/violence is morally justifiable. The author combined responses to this question with views on the peace process/Oslo, and then cross-tabulated this new variable with responses to the two trust-most survey questions. These cross-tabulations are presented in Table A3. As reported in this table, whereas 26.4% of respondents who are opposed to the peace process/Oslo and believe that violence is morally justifiable reported not trusting any faction, 50.0% of those who are opposed to the peace process/Oslo and believe that violence is *not* morally justifiable reported not trusting any faction. A corresponding trend is found to exist with reference to trust in figures. Whereas 27.6% of those who are opposed to the peace process/Oslo and believe that violence is legitimate reported not trusting any figure, 40.7% of those who are opposed to the peace process/Oslo and believe violence to be illegitimate express not trusting any figure.

Table A3: Cross-tabulations of responses to trust-most questions by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence

Table A3a: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence			
Response to trust-faction item	Oppose peace process and view violence as not justifiable (n = 54)	Oppose peace process and view violence as justifiable (n = 87)	Support peace process and view violence as not justifiable (n = 124)	Support peace process and view violence as justifiable (n = 71)
Do not trust any faction	27 (50.0%)	23 (26.4%)	24 (19.4%)	11 (15.5%)
Trust some faction	25 (46.3%)	60 (69.0%)	86 (69.4%)	55 (77.5%)
No answer/don't know	2 (3.7%)	4 (4.6%)	14 (11.3%)	5 (7.0%)

Table A3b: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence			
Response to trust-figure item	Oppose peace process and view violence as not justifiable (n = 54)	Oppose peace process and view violence as justifiable (n = 87)	Support peace process and view violence as not justifiable (n = 124)	Support peace process and view violence as justifiable (n = 71)
Do not trust any figure	22 (40.7%)	24 (27.6%)	20 (16.1%)	5 (7.0%)
Trust some figure	27 (50.0%)	53 (60.9%)	97 (78.2%)	66 (93.0%)
No answer/don't know	5 (9.3%)	10 (11.5%)	7 (5.6%)	0 (0.0%)

Similarly, the May 1998 data reveal – in cross-tabulations presented in Table A4 – that people who are pessimistic about the prospects of peace between Palestinians and Israelis in the relatively near future yet view violence as illegitimate tend to exhibit disproportionately high levels of distrust. Whereas 24.5% of respondents who are pessimistic about the prospects for Palestinian-Israeli peace in the "next five years" and view violence as legitimate reported distrusting factions, 41.1% of respondents who are pessimistic about the prospects for peace yet view violence as illegitimate expressed distrust in factions. Similarly, as reported in Table A4c, whereas 26.8% of respondents who were not confident about "reaching a final status agreement by the official end of the interim period" and who deemed violence as justifiable expressed distrust in factions, 37.8% of respondents who were not confident about achieving a final status agreement by the end of the interim period yet who deemed violence as unjustifiable reported not trusting any factions.

Table A4: Cross-tabulations of responses to trust-most questions by conjunction of views on the prospects of reaching a peace agreement in the "next five years" and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence

Table A4a: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question by conjunction of views on the prospects of reaching a peace agreement in the "next five years" and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence

	Conjunction of views on prospects of reaching a peace agreement in the "next five years" and views on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence			
Response to trust-faction item	Pessimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as not justifiable (n = 90)	Pessimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as justifiable (n = 110)	Optimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as not justifiable (n = 29)	Optimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as justifiable (n = 20)
Do not trust any faction	37 (41.1%)	27 (24.5%)	3 (10.3%)	6 (30.0%)
Trust some faction	47 (52.2%)	78 (70.9%)	22 (75.9%)	12 (60.0%)
No answer/don't know	6 (6.7%)	5 (4.5%)	4 (13.8%)	2 (10.0%)

Table A4b: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question and conjunction of views on the prospects of reaching a final status agreement (c18) and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence

	Conjunction of views on possibility of reaching a final status agreement by May 1999 and views on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence			
Response to trust-faction item	Pessimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as not justifiable (n = 172)	Pessimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as justifiable (n = 179)	Confident about reaching agreement and view violence as not justifiable (n = 24)	Confident about reaching agreement and view violence as justifiable (n = 16)
Do not trust any faction	65 (37.8%)	48 (26.8%)	4 (16.7%)	5 (31.3%)
Trust some faction	93 (54.1%)	115 (64.2%)	16 (66.7%)	11 (68.8%)
No answer/don't know	14 (8.1%)	16 (8.9%)	4 (16.7%)	0 (0.0%)

Corresponding cross-tabulations involving trust/distrust in figures reveal the same trend. Table A4c shows that, whereas 21.8% of those who are pessimistic about the prospects of reaching a peace agreement in the "next five years" and who believe that violence is legitimate reported not trusting any figure, 42.2% of those who are pessimistic about the prospects of concluding a peace agreement and believe that violence is not illegitimate reported not trusting any figure. Similarly, as is revealed in Table A4d, whereas 24.0% of those who were not confident about the possibility of reaching a final status agreement by May 1999 and who viewed violence as justifiable reported not trusting any figure, 32.0% of those who were not confident about reaching a final status agreement by May 1999 and who viewed violence as unjustifiable reported not trusting any figure.

Table A4c: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure question by conjunction of views on the prospects of reaching a peace agreement in the "next five years" and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence

	Conjunction of views on prospects of reaching a peace agreement in the "next five years" and views on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence			
Response to trust-faction item	Pessimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as not justifiable (n = 90)	Pessimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as justifiable (n = 110)	Optimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as not justifiable (n = 29)	Optimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as justifiable (n = 20)
Do not trust any figure	38 (42.2%)	24 (21.8%)	5 (17.2%)	7 (35.0%)
Trust some figure	42 (46.7%)	74 (67.3%)	22 (75.9%)	11 (55.0%)
No answer/don't know	10 (11.1%)	12 (10.9%)	2 (6.9%)	2 (10.0%)

Table A4d: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure question by conjunction of views on the prospects of reaching a final status agreement by May 1999 and on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence

	Conjunction of views on possibility of reaching a final status agreement by May 1999 and views on the moral justifiability of resorting to violence			
Response to trust-figure item	Pessimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as not justifiable (n = 172)	Pessimistic about reaching agreement and view violence as justifiable (n = 179)	Confident about reaching agreement and view violence as not justifiable (n = 24)	Confident about reaching agreement and view violence as justifiable (n = 16)
Do not trust any figure	55 (32.0%)	43 (24.0%)	3 (12.5%)	4 (25.0%)
Trust some figure	99 (57.6%)	114 (63.7%)	17 (70.8%)	12 (75.0%)
No answer/don't know	18 (10.5%)	22 (12.3%)	4 (16.7%)	0 (0.0%)

As mentioned above, popular disillusionment with the Palestinian political system may result not only from a sense of futility directly regarding the struggle with Israel, but also from a sense that there is no viable organizational and/or ideological alternative to, respectively, the PA/Fatah and its pragmatic and accommodationist approach to Israel. We might suspect, more specifically, that opposition to negotiations is particularly likely to encourage political distrust among people who are opposed to political Islam. The basic reason for this is the general absence – particularly in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of pan-Arabist ambitions – of a viable rejectionist ideology other than political Islam. For this reason, we should expect to find that people who are opposed to both the peace process/negotiations and political Islam exhibit a greater propensity toward political distrust than people who are opposed to the peace process/negotiations yet are sympathetic to political Islam. It should be added that some sociologists, particularly within the Durkheimian tradition, propose that religion can serve to integrate people who are living in an otherwise dislocated, uncertain, and thus alienating and anxiety-producing social system. This proposition reflects another way in which belief in Islam and by implication support for political Islam may deter a person from a wholesale disassociation from the political process. A final, related, possibility is that adherence to Islamic principles and doctrines may, all things equal, promote optimism, not only in general, but also that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will one day end favorably for the Palestinians.

To test the general postulation that those who oppose negotiations with Israel are particularly likely to exhibit distrust if they do not prefer political Islam, the author cross-tabulated responses to the trust-most questions by a variable combining views on negotiations and views on political Islam.[29]

[29]The survey items soliciting data on respondent preferences regarding "'*Shari'a*' and 'secular law'" and "the role that Islam should play in Palestinian society" are likely not very reliable measures of respondent preferences regarding political Islam.

These cross-tabulations are presented in Table A5. Beginning with Table A5a, whereas 23.9% of those who are opposed to the peace process and supportive of a major role for Islam in Palestinian society report distrusting Palestinian political factions, 38.9% of those opposed to a major political role for Islam as well as to the peace process express such distrust.[30] A similar variable was created to differentiate among respondents with the following four combinations of views: (1) oppose the peace process and prefer the *Shari'a* over secular law, (2) oppose the peace process and prefer secular law over the *Shari'a*, (3) support the peace process and prefer the *Shari'a* over secular law, and (4) support the peace process and prefer secular law over the *Shari'a*. A cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-faction question by this variable, reported in Table A5b, reveals that whereas 24.0% of those opposed to the peace process and supportive of the *Shari'a* express distrust in political factions, 31.8% of those who are opposed to the peace process and supportive of secular law express such distrust. Thus, these cross-tabulations provide some support for the suspicion that opposition to the peace process is particularly likely to entail political distrust for people who do not subscribe to an ideological orientation which has widespread credibility in Palestinian society.

Table A5: Cross-tabulations of responses to trust-most questions by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and political Islam

Table A5a: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and views on the role that Islam should play in Palestinian society

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and views on "the role that Islam should play in Palestinian society"			
Response to trust-faction item	Oppose both negotiations and major role for Islam (n = 18)	Oppose negotiations and support major role for Islam (n = 159)	Support negotiations and oppose major role for Islam (n = 85)	Support both negotiations and major role for Islam (n = 662)
Do not trust any faction	7 (38.9%)	38 (23.9%)	10 (11.8%)	86 (13.0%)
Trust some faction	11 (61.1%)	103 (64.8%)	62 (72.9%)	479 (72.4%)
No answer/don't know	0 (0.0%)	18 (11.3%)	13 (15.3%)	97 (14.7%)

Table A5b: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and preferences over the *Shari'a* and secular law

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and preferences over the *Shari'a* and secular law			
Response to trust-faction item	Oppose peace process and prefer secular law (n = 22)	Oppose peace process and prefer *Shari'a* (n = 150)	Support peace process and prefer secular law (n = 181)	Support peace process and prefer *Shari'a* (n = 554)
Do not trust any faction	7 (31.8%)	36 (24.0%)	30 (16.6%)	63 (11.4%)
Trust some faction	13 (59.1%)	99 (66.0%)	120 (66.3%)	413 (74.5%)
No answer/don't know	2 (9.0%)	15 (10.0%)	31 (17.1%)	78 (14.1%)

For one, many people may not understand the concrete socio-political implications of systems dominated by the *Shari'a* or secular law. What is more, many Palestinians may tend, when their opinion on "Islam" is solicited, to pay homage to Islam, and to do so *reflexively*. We might expect people's tendency to reflexively choose "Islamic" over "secular" institutions to be particularly prevalent when the two types of institutions are bluntly presented to the respondent as categorical alternatives. This is all the more likely in light of the tendency of some Palestinians to either attach a negative stigma to "secularism," or to fear that they themselves will be criticized for expressing support for "secularism" and opposition to "political Islam."

[30]The number of respondents fitting the "oppose both negotiations and major role for Islam" (n = 18) category and the "oppose negotiations and support secular law" category (n = 22) are small, however, and accordingly these findings do not serve as strong evidence. The same caveat applies to cross-tabulations involving the conjunction of views on the peace process and preferences over *Shari'a* and secular law.

Corresponding cross-tabulations to do with trust in figures, however, do not confirm the hypothesis that people who are opposed to both negotiations with Israel *and* political Islam have a higher tendency toward political distrust than people who are opposed to negotiations yet sympathetic to political Islam. Contrary to this hypothesis, those who oppose both the peace process and political Islam do not exhibit a disproportionately high tendency to distrust political figures. Specifically, as is reported in Table A5c, whereas 38.9% of those who oppose both the peace process and a large role for Islam in Palestinian society expressed distrust in Palestinian political figures, 39.6% of those who oppose the peace process and support a large role for Islam expressed distrust in "all" Palestinian political figures. Table A5d shows, similarly, that whereas 31.8% of respondents who are opposed to the peace process and supportive of secular law expressed distrust in political figures, 41.3% of respondents who oppose the peace process and support the *Shari'a* expressed distrust in political figures. Again, we must be skeptical about these results due to (a) the small sample size of respondents falling within the "oppose peace process and prefer secular law/minor role for Islam" category, and (b) the potential unreliability of the survey's measurements of political Islam.

Table A5c: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and views on the role that Islam should play in Palestinian society

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and views on "the role Islam should play in Palestinian society"			
Response to trust-figure item	Oppose both negotiations and major role for Islam (n = 18)	Oppose negotiations and support major role for Islam (n = 159)	Support negotiations and oppose major role for Islam (n = 85)	Support both negotiations and major role for Islam (n = 662)
Do not trust any figure	7 (38.9%)	63 (39.6%)	12 (14.1%)	54 (8.2%)
Trust some figure	10 (55.6%)	83 (52.2%)	63 (74.1%)	554 (83.7%)
No answer/don't know	1 (5.6%)	13 (8.2%)	10 (11.8%)	54 (8.2%)

Table A5d: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure question by conjunction of views on the peace process/negotiations and preferences over the *Shari'a* and secular law

	Conjunction of views on peace process/negotiations and preferences over the *Shari'a* and secular law			
Response to trust-figure item	Oppose peace process and prefer secular law (n = 22)	Oppose peace process and prefer *Shari'a* (n = 150)	Support peace process and prefer secular law (n = 181)	Support peace process and prefer *Shari'a* (n = 554)
Do not trust any figure	7 (31.8%)	62 (41.3%)	17 (9.4%)	51 (9.2%)
Trust some figure	14 (63.6%)	76 (50.7%)	141 (77.9%)	461 (83.2%)
No answer/don't know	1 (4.5%)	12 (8.0%)	23 (12.7%)	42 (7.6%)

To summarize, the main proposition advanced in Section *A* is that opposition to Palestinian negotiations with and accommodation of Israel is particularly likely to lead to political disillusionment, distrust, etc., when this opposition is conjoined with (1) opposition to armed struggle with Israel, and/or (2) opposition to political Islam. Section *A* details a series of cross-tabulations which consistently provide support for the first of these two propositions. A series of cross-tabulations intended to test the second hypothesis revealed mixed results, and in any event represent weak tests due to small sample size and potentially unreliable indicators of political Islam. A crucial implication of these findings is that at the root of much popular distrust in Palestinian political figures and factions is the absence of (1) a credible strategic alternative to negotiating with or resorting to force against Israel, and (2) a credible ideological alternative to political Islam.

B. Domestic level-of-analysis

This section considers the impact on the tendency toward political trust/distrust of three sets of factors which may be viewed as generally residing on the domestic level-of-analysis –respondent evaluation of Palestinian political institutions, respondent evaluation of the state of the Palestinian economy, and whether the respondent is a returnee or insider. Discussion begins with consideration of the general factor found in this study to most consistently influence trust – evaluation of Palestinian political institutions. In particular, the more negative a person's evaluations of the PA and PLC, the more likely the person to distrust political figures and factions. Of these two variables, PA evaluation exerts a larger and more robust effect on the propensity to trust or distrust than does PLC evaluation. Whereas the PA evaluation variable is statistically significant in all four models, the PLC evaluation variable is statistically significant in three of the four models. Furthermore, in the three models including both variables, the difference in the probabilities of trusting some figure and faction associated with a very critical and with a very positive evaluation of the PA is consistently greater than the difference in these probabilities associated with a very critical and with a very positive evaluation of the PLC. Simply, PA evaluation exerts a larger effect on the probability of trust/distrust than does PLC evaluation.

Given the predominant role of the PA and Arafat in Palestinian politics, social affairs, and economics, it is not surprising that evaluation of the PA exerts a larger and more robust impact on the propensity to trust or distrust than does evaluation of the PLC.[31] Yet, parallel to the potentially counterintuitive finding to do with views on the peace process discussed above, the tendency of negative evaluations of the PA and PLC to reduce the likelihood of trust in *any* figure or faction may seem counterintuitive. As the Palestinian polity is quite clearly differentiated into figures and factions in favor of and opposed to the PA, PLC, and Oslo process through which these institutions were built, we should expect criticism of the PA and PLC not to influence levels of trust in *any* faction or figure, *per se*, but rather to influence *which* figures or factions become the recipients/targets of trust and distrust.

It may be the case that disappointment with the PA and PLC encourages distrust of *any* figure or faction to the extent that it is accompanied by the belief that an attractive alternative to the current leadership does not exist. Simply, the conjunction of disappointment with the PA/PLC and the belief that an attractive alternative to the current leadership does not exist may engender disillusionment and despair. Many people so disillusioned and despairing, in turn, may translate this despair into feelings of "distrust" of "all" Palestinian figures and factions.

We can think of at least three reasons why a person may believe that no attractive alternative to the current leadership exists. First, assuming that people are generally attracted to a faction only if that faction is politically *viable* – that is, only if that faction has the ability to mobilize a meaningful amount of resources and to exert a meaningful amount of influence on the national-level – it is plausible to suspect that people who are critical of Hamas as well as the PA/Fatah are more likely to distrust all political figures and factions than are people who are critical of the PA but positive about Hamas. The basic point is that, because Hamas represents the only extant alternative to Fatah/PA that has a *credible* prospect of exercizing meaningful power, people who are opposed to Hamas as well as to the PA may despair at the lack of a sympathetic political option which is viable.

To test for this hypothesis, the author cross-tabulated responses to the trust-most survey questions by a variable combining evaluation of the PA and attitudes toward Hamas. Attitudes toward Hamas are measured with reference to three survey items which tap the respondent's "opinion" – i.e., "very positive," "somewhat positive," "somewhat negative," and "very negative" – about "Yasin," "Abdel Aziz Rantisi," and "Hamas." Simply, if a person evaluated at least two of these three stimuli positively, the person was coded as having a positive opinion of Hamas. Conversely, if a person

[31] A potentially interesting area for future research is to compare the relative magnitude of the effects on the probability of trust/distrust of people's evaluations of executives and legislatures across presidential and parliamentary systems. Specifically, we might expect that, all things equal, the propensity toward political trust of people in parliamentary systems is more greatly dependent on evaluations of the parliament than is the propensity toward political trust of people in presidential systems, given that legislatures in parliamentary systems are by definition more powerful, in terms of executive powers, than are legislatures in presidential systems.

expressed a negative opinion of at least two of these three stimuli, the person was coded as having a negative opinion of Hamas. [32] Turning then to the cross-tabulations presented in Table B1, we find that, whereas 15.1% of the respondents who are critical of the PA and positive about Hamas expressed distrust in all political factions, 43.8% of those critical of the PA and negative about Hamas expressed distrust in all political factions. Similarly, whereas 27.4% of respondents critical of the PA and positive about Hamas expressed distrust in all political figures, 43.8% of those critical of both the PA and Hamas reported not trusting any political figure.[33]

Table B1: Cross-tabulations of responses to trust-most questions by conjunction of evaluation of PA and opinion on Hamas

Table B1a: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-faction question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and opinion on Hamas

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and opinion on Hamas			
Response to trust-faction item	Negative evaluation of PA and negative opinion on Hamas (n = 16)	Negative evaluation of PA and positive opinion on Hamas (n = 73)	Positive evaluation of PA and negative opinion on Hamas (n = 19)	Positive evaluation of PA and positive opinion on Hamas (n = 199)
Do not trust any faction	7 (43.8%)	11 (15.1%)	1 (5.3%)	9 (4.5%)
Trust some faction	8 (50.0%)	57 (78.1%)	18 (94.7%)	169 (84.9%)
No answer/don't know	1 (6.3%)	5 (6.8%)	0 (0.0%)	21 (10.6%)

Table B1b: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and opinion on Hamas

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and opinion on Hamas			
Response to trust-figure item	Negative evaluation of PA and negative opinion on Hamas (n = 16)	Negative evaluation of PA and positive opinion on Hamas (n = 73)	Positive evaluation of PA and negative opinion on Hamas (n = 19)	Positive evaluation of PA and positive opinion on Hamas (n = 199)
Do not trust any figure	7 (43.8%)	20 (27.4%)	1 (5.3%)	5 (2.5%)
Trust some figure	8 (50.0%)	51 (69.9%)	18 (94.7%)	181 (91.0%)
No answer/don't know	1 (6.3%)	2 (2.7%)	0 (0.0%)	13 (6.5%)

A second and related reason that people may perceive no sympathetic alternative to the PA/Fatah is that they oppose ideologies espousing political Islam. Simply, all things equal, we should expect people critical of both the PA and political Islam to harbor a higher proclivity toward distrusting "all" figures and factions than people critical of the PA yet supportive of political Islam. Table B2 reports a set of cross-tabulations which contribute to the empirical assessment of this hypothesis. Table B2a reveals that, whereas 20.5% of those who are critical of the PA and supportive of the *Shari'a* expressed distrusting all political factions, 25.0% of those who are critical of the PA and

[32]The reader should note that this cross-tabulation is not tautological – that is, someone who expresses a "very positive opinion" about Hamas should not be expected to necessarily report "trusting Hamas most." The reason for this is that the data on positive/negative opinion toward Hamas are collected from a series of items that ask respondents to indicate their *absolute* level of positive/negative affect to *each* of seven factions and nine figures. Accordingly, a person may simultaneously express positive sentiment about Hamas, Yasin, and Rantisi, and about various other factions and figures. Thus, a respondent expressing positive sentiment about Hamas is not necessarily a Hamas supporter.

[33] The sample sizes with which the cross-tabulations were conducted are quite small because many respondents reported "don't know/no answer" to one or more survey items in the PA evaluation scale and/or the scale tapping views on Hamas. We must be particularly cautious about the reliability of percentages referring to the "negative evaluation of PA and negative opinion on Hamas" category, as only 16 respondents fit this category.

supportive of secular law expressed distrusting factions. Similarly, as is reported in Table B2b, whereas 20.8% of those who reported both a negative evaluation of the PA and support for a major role for Islam in Palestinian society expressed distrust in political factions, 37.5% of those who reported a negative view of the PA and support for a minor role for Islam expressed distrust in political factions.[34]

Table B2: Cross-tabulations of responses to trust-most questions by conjunction of evaluation of PA and attitudes on political Islam

Table B2a: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-faction question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences over the *Shari'a* and secular law

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences over the *Shari'a* and secular law			
Response to trust-faction item	Negative evaluation of PA and prefer secular law (n = 28)	Negative evaluation of PA and prefer the *Shari'a* (n = 83)	Positive evaluation of PA and prefer the *Shari'a* (n = 303)	Positive evaluation of PA and prefer secular law (n = 65)
Do not trust any faction	7 (25.0%)	17 (20.5%)	24 (7.9%)	4 (6.2%)
Trust some faction	17 (60.7%)	59 (71.1%)	241 (65.1%)	53 (81.5%)
No answer/don't know	4 (14.3%)	7 (8.4%)	38 (12.5%)	8 (12.3%)

Table B2b: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-faction question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences about "the role that Islam should play in Palestinian society"

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences about "the role that Islam should play in Palestinian society"			
Response to trust-faction item	Negative evaluation of PA and prefer minor role for Islam (n = 16)	Negative evaluation of PA and prefer major role for Islam (n = 96)	Positive evaluation of PA and prefer minor role for Islam (n = 38)	Positive evaluation of PA and prefer major role for Islam (n = 334)
Do not trust any faction	6 (37.5%)	20 (20.8%)	0 (0.0%)	28 (8.4%)
Trust some faction	8 (50.0%)	67 (69.8%)	31 (81.6%)	266 (79.6%)
No answer/don't know	2 (12.5%)	9 (9.4%)	7 (18.4%)	40 (12.0%)

Corresponding analyses involving trust for figures provide evidence *against* the hypothesis at hand. As Table B2c displays, the percentage of those who are critical of the PA and supportive of the *Shari'a* expressing distrust in political figures (38.6%) is larger than the percentage of those who are critical of the PA and supportive of secular law reporting distrust in figures (28.6%). Similarly, as Table B2d reports, the percentage of those who are critical of the PA and supportive of a major role for Islam who distrust political figures (36.5%) is larger than the percentage of those who are critical of the PA and supportive of a minor role for Islam who distrust political figures (31.3%). That distrust for figures differs from distrust for factions in being unaffected by the conjunction of criticism of the PA and lack of an attractive ideological alternative, might serve as an indication of the point made in Part IIA that ideological orientations play a larger role in a person's evaluation of factions than in a person's evaluation of figures. In any event, in light of the mixed results provided by this set of cross-tabulations, conclusive results on the matter require further research.

[34] All other things equal, the cross-tabulations to do with views on the "role of Islam" are less reliable than those to do with law preference, i.e., *Shari'a* versus secular law, because the number of respondents who fit the "critical of the PA and prefer minor role for Islam" category is small (n = 16). This applies as well to the corresponding cross-tabulations involving trust in figures which are reported presently.

Table B2c: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-figure question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences over the *Shari'a* and secular law

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences over the *Shari'a* and secular law			
Response to trust-figure item	Negative evaluation of PA and prefer secular law (n = 28)	Negative evaluation of PA and prefer *Shari'a* (n = 83)	Positive evaluation of PA and prefer secular law (n = 65)	Positive evaluation of PA and prefer *Shari'a* (n = 303)
Do not trust any figure	8 (28.6%)	32 (38.6%)	2 (3.1%)	12 (4.0%)
Trust some figure	17 (60.7%)	49 (59.0%)	58 (89.2%)	269 (88.8%)
No answer/don't know	3 (10.7%)	2 (2.4%)	5 (7.7%)	22 (7.3%)

Table B2d: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-figure question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences about "the role that Islam should play in Palestinian society"

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences about "the role that Islam should play in Palestinian society"			
Response to trust-figure item	Negative evaluation of PA and prefer minor role for Islam (n = 16)	Negative evaluation of PA and prefer major role for Islam (n = 96)	Positive evaluation of PA and prefer minor role for Islam (n = 38)	Positive evaluation of PA and prefer major role for Islam (n = 334)
Do not trust any figure	5 (31.3%)	35 (36.5%)	1 (2.6%)	13 (3.9%)
Trust some figure	10 (62.5%)	57 (59.4%)	31 (7.8%)	300 (89.8%)
No answer/don't know	1 (6.3%)	4 (4.2%)	6 (15.8%)	21 (6.3%)

A third reason that a person may believe that no attractive alternative to the PA/Fatah exists is that he or she disagrees with the strategic preference for confrontation with Israel generally characterizing rejectionist factions and figures. Simply, all things equal, we should expect people who are critical of the PA *and* opposed to a confrontational Palestinian strategy toward Israel to have a higher tendency to distrust "all" political figures and factions than people who are critical of the PA *and* supportive of a confrontational strategy. A set of cross-tabulations testing this basic supposition is presented in Table B3. These cross-tabulations generally corroborate the hypothesis. Table B3a and Table B3b show that, of people who are critical of the PA and opposed to armed struggle, 24.3% distrust factions and 35.1% distrust figures. These percentages are larger than the respective percentages of the people who are critical of the PA and supportive of armed struggle that distrust factions (21.1%) and distrust figures (32.4%).

Table B3: Cross-tabulations of responses to the trust-most questions by conjunction of evaluations of PA and preferences regarding a confrontational strategy toward Israel

Table B3a: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-faction question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences regarding armed struggle

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences regarding armed struggle			
Response to trust-faction item	Negative evaluation of PA and oppose armed struggle (n = 37)	Negative evaluation of PA and support armed struggle (n = 71)	Positive evaluation of PA and oppose armed struggle (n = 210)	Positive evaluation of PA and support armed struggle (n = 132)
Do not trust any faction	9 (24.3%)	15 (21.1%)	17 (8.1%)	8 (6.1%)
Trust some faction	24 (64.9%)	51 (71.8%)	167 (79.5%)	111 (%84.1)
No answer/don't know	4 (10.8%)	5 (7.0%)	26 (12.4%)	13 (9.8%)

Table B3b: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-figure question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences regarding armed struggle

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences regarding armed struggle			
Response to trust-figure item	Negative evaluation of PA and oppose armed struggle (n = 37)	Negative evaluation of PA and support armed struggle (n = 71)	Positive evaluation of PA and oppose armed struggle (n = 210)	Positive evaluation of PA and support armed struggle (n = 132)
Do not trust any figure	13 (35.1%)	23 (32.4%)	9 (4.3%)	4 (3.0%)
Trust some figure	23 (62.2%)	45 (63.4%)	194 (92.4%)	113 (85.6%)
No answer/don't know	1 (2.7%)	3 (4.2%)	7 (3.3%)	15 (11.4%)

Table B3c and Table B3d report that people critical of the PA and opposed to suicide operations have a higher tendency to distrust political factions (28.9%) and to distrust political figures (37.8%) than do people critical of the PA and supportive of suicide operations. Of this latter category, 17.9% distrust political factions and 30.4% distrust political figures.

Table B3c: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-faction question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences regarding suicide bombings within Israel

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences regarding suicide bombings within Israel			
Response to trust-faction item	Negative evaluation of PA and support suicide bombings (n = 56)	Negative evaluation of PA and oppose suicide bombings (n = 45)	Positive evaluation of PA and support suicide bombings (n = 68)	Positive evaluation of PA and oppose suicide bombings (n = 277)
Do not trust any faction	10 (17.9%)	13 (28.9%)	5 (7.4%)	20 (7.2%)
Trust some faction	41 (73.2%)	27 (60.0%)	53 (77.9%)	225 (81.2%)
No answer/don't know	5 (8.9%)	5 (11.1%)	10 (14.7%)	32 (11.6%)

Table B3d: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-figure question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences regarding suicide bombings within Israel

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences regarding suicide bombings within Israel			
Response to trust-figure item	Negative evaluation of PA and support suicide bombings (n = 56)	Negative evaluation of PA and oppose suicide bombings (n = 45)	Positive evaluation of PA and support suicide bombings (n = 68)	Positive evaluation of PA and oppose suicide bombings (n = 277)
Do not trust any figure	17 (30.4%)	17 (37.8%)	2 (2.9%)	12 (4.3%)
Trust some figure	38 (67.9%)	24 (53.3%)	58 (85.3%)	250 (90.3%)
No answer/don't know	1 (1.8%)	4 (8.9%)	8 (11.8%)	15 (5.4%)

Table B3e and Table B3f demonstrate that, of those respondents who are critical of the PA and view violence as morally unjustifiable, 51.4% distrust political figures and 55.7% distrust political factions. These percentages of distrust are substantially larger than the corresponding percentages for the group of respondents who are critical of the PA and view violence as morally justifiable. Of this latter group of respondents, specifically, 32.1% expressed distrust in political figures, and 29.8% expressed distrust in political factions.

Table B3e: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-faction question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and views on the moral justifiability of resort to violence

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and views on the moral justifiability of resort to violence			
Response to trust-faction item	Negative evaluation of PA and view violence as not justifiable (n = 70)	Negative evaluation of PA and view violence as justifiable (n = 84)	Positive evaluation of PA and view violence as not justifiable (n = 107)	Positive evaluation of PA and view violence as justifiable (n = 57)
Do not trust any faction	39 (55.7%)	25 (29.8%)	25 (23.4%)	9 (15.8%)
Trust some faction	30 (42.9%)	56 (66.7%)	72 (67.3%)	42 (73.7%)
No answer/don't know	1 (1.4%)	3 (3.6%)	10 (9.3%)	6 (10.5%)

Table B3f: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-figure question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and views on the moral justifiability of resort to violence

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and views on the moral justifiability of resort to violence			
Response to trust-figure item	Negative evaluation of PA and view violence as not justifiable (n = 70)	Negative evaluation of PA and view violence as justifiable (n = 84)	Positive evaluation of PA and view violence as not justifiable (n = 107)	Positive evaluation of PA and view violence as justifiable (n = 57)
Do not trust any figure	36 (51.4%)	27 (32.1%)	14 (13.1%)	8 (14.0%)
Trust some figure	28 (40.0%)	49 (58.3%)	87 (81.3%)	46 (80.7%)
No answer/don't know	6 (8.6%)	8 (9.5%)	6 (5.6%)	3 (5.3%)

As is reported in Table B3g and Table B3h, however, the difference in the percentage of distrusters between those who are critical of the PA and oppose negotiations and those who are critical of the PA and support negotiations is in the expected direction, but is very slight, particularly in regards to trust/distrust in figures.

Table B3: Cross-tabulations of responses to the trust-most questions by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences regarding negotiations

Table B3g: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-faction question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences regarding negotiations

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences regarding negotiations			
Response to trust-faction item	Negative evaluation of PA and oppose negotiations (n = 73)	Negative evaluation of PA and support negotiations (n = 42)	Positive evaluation of PA and oppose negotiations (n = 34)	Positive evaluation of PA and support negotiations (n = 337)
Do not trust any faction	18 (24.7%)	9 (21.4%)	3 (8.8%)	23 (6.8%)
Trust some faction	47 (64.4%)	30 (71.4%)	29 (7.7%)	269 (79.8%)
No answer/don't know	8 (11.0%)	3 (7.1%)	2 (5.9%)	45 (13.4%)

Table B3h: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-figure question by conjunction of evaluation of PA and preferences regarding negotiations

	Conjunction of respondent evaluation of PA and preferences regarding negotiations			
Response to trust-figure item	Negative evaluation of PA and oppose negotiations (n = 73)	Negative evaluation of PA and support negotiations (n = 42)	Positive evaluation of PA and oppose negotiations (n = 34)	Positive evaluation of PA and support negotiations (n = 337)
Do not trust any figure	27 (37.0%)	15 (35.7%)	3 (8.8%)	10 (3.0%)
Trust some figure	42 (57.5%)	26 (61.9%)	28 (82.4%)	305 (90.5%)
No answer/don't know	4 (5.5%)	1 (2.4%)	3 (8.8%)	22 (6.5%)

In sum, the main proposition advanced in Section *B* is that disappointment with the performance of the PA is particularly likely to lead to political disappointment and thus distrust when this disappointment is coupled with opposition to (1) the only viable organizational alternative to the PA/Fatah, namely, Hamas; (2) political ideologies espousing political Islam; and/or (3) a confrontational Palestinian orientation toward Israel. Relevant cross-tabulations provide support for the first of these propositions. The second proposition receives support when applied to trust in factions but not when applied to trust in figures, and the third proposition receives moderate support when applied to trust in both figures and factions. As the categories of respondents critical of the PA, on the one side, and opposed to Hamas, political Islam, and confrontation with Israel, on the other side, were quite small, the empirical assessments brought to bear on the three propositions is ultimately rudimentary. Accordingly, firm conclusions on the empirical validity of these propositions must await future research. In any event, it is clear that attitudes toward the PA comprise a key component of any worthwhile model of popular political trust/distrust.

Discussion now turns to a consideration of the role that assessments of the Palestinian economy play in the propensity toward political trust/distrust. The author limits this discussion to two points. The first point has to do with the finding that economic assessment was estimated with the November 1997 data to be significantly related to trust/distrust in *factions*. The point is simply that the differential performance of this variable in accounting for trust in *figures* and trust in *factions* may merit future research. It is fruitful to consider, that is, why economic assessment influences trust in factions but not trust in figures. One possible answer to this question is that people view economic policy agendas and outcomes in terms of party politics more than in terms of individual figures. This only begs the question of why people might identify economic performance with parties rather than individuals. What is more, given the extensive personalism characterizing Arafat's mode of rule, it is not at all clear why, in the Palestinian case, people would tend to identify economic performance more closely with factions than with figures.

The second and more fundamental point regarding the relationship between economic assessment and trust is as follows. Indeed, we should expect people's beliefs about basic issues facing Palestinian society, such as economic development, to have an impact on which figures and factions, if any, these people trust, prefer, etc. But the impact of such beliefs is mediated by two key factors – (1) a person's view on the *salience* of any given issue relative to that of other issues dominating the Palestinian political landscape, and (2) a person's view on which individual(s) and/or institution(s) are to blame for inadequate outcomes regarding the salient issues. Thus, for example, the magnitude of the impact that a person's assessment of the economic situation has on that person's preferences over a set of figures/factions depends, in the first place, on the importance of the economic situation to that person relative to other key issues, such as the Israeli occupation, internal law and order, democratization, political corruption and ineptitude, and the political and social roles of Islam. The more salient (less salient) the economic situation relative to these other issues, the greater (lesser) the impact of a person's economic assessment on the person's preferences regarding figures/factions. Thus, adequate understanding of the role of economic assessment on political trust/distrust – and of positions on such other issues as are listed above – require data on the relative salience to the individual of the various basic issues confronting Palestinian society.

We should expect, secondly, that the extent to which negative assessments of basic issues, such as the economic situation, influence people's tendency to trust or distrust Palestinian figures/factions, depends on the extent to which people *blame* these figures/factions for negative assessments. One can think of a general set of actors that one could possibly blame for major Palestinian problems – i.e., Israel, the PA, Hamas, Arab states, the West, and/or international institutions. Thus, for example, all things equal, a person who blames Israel for a weak Palestinian economy will have a greater tendency of trusting some Palestinian figure/faction than a person who blames Palestinian leaders and/or parties for a weak Palestinian economy. Furthermore, to the extent that a person levies blame for major problems on all Palestinian figures/factions broadly conceived rather than on one or two particular figures/factions, we should expect negative economic evaluation to lead the person to not trust any figure/faction. In contrast, a person who blames one or two figures/factions for problems may on this basis, rather than distrust *all* figures/factions, shift his or her trust away from these one or two figures/factions to one or more other figures/factions. For these reasons, future survey research on popular trust in Palestinian figures/factions would greatly benefit from collecting data on the respondent's views on the relative salience of the main issues facing Palestinian society, and on the person(s) and/or institution(s) responsible for the one or two issues the respondent deems most important.[35]

The last factor discussed in the section on domestic level-of-analysis factors is the insider (or *dakhil*)-returnee (or *kharij*) distinction. The inside (*dakhil*)-outside (*kharij*) cleavage, as the reader may know, differentiates between individuals residing inside the West Bank, Gaza, or East Jerusalem, prior to the signing of the September 1993 Declaration of Principles and May 1994 Cairo Agreement (*dakhil*), and returnees who had resided in the Diaspora preceding these agreements (*kharij*). Of the two survey data sets analyzed in this study, only the May 1998 survey collected data on whether the respondent is an insider or returnee. The two May 1998 models concur in finding the effect of the *dakhil-kharij* cleavage on the probability of trusting or distrusting to be non-significant. Suffice it to make three points related to this finding. First, whereas returnees share much in common with one another within the context of West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza society, returnees may ultimately not comprise a monolithic group. For one, returnees returned from various parts of the Middle East and indeed of the world, and accordingly have been subject to different cultural, social, and political experiences. Furthermore, of the people who returned to the West Bank/Gaza in the wake of the Oslo agreements, some came back primarily for political reasons, others primarily for economic reasons, and yet others for various miscellaneous reasons.

Differentiating between these *kharij* subgroups, moreover, is exacerbated by the fact that the survey asked only where the respondent was living before the peace accords and not when he or she originally departed for the Diaspora, why he or she remained in the Diaspora, and why he or she returned from the Diaspora. The survey collects data simply on *where* people lived prior to the Oslo accords. The question becomes whether or not we can differentiate among meaningful types of Diaspora experience, motives for returning, and ultimately among different political orientations, based solely on knowledge of the country from which the returnee returned. Perhaps this is possible only with those returning from Tunisia. The need to identify distinct subgroups of *kharij*, is exacerbated by the problem of small sample size. Of the 1208 polled, 21 came from Jordan, 20 from Gulf states (including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), 16 from Tunisia, 5 from Europe, 3 from Algeria, 1 from Pakistan, and 28 from Arab countries other than those listed above.[36]

Second, the *kharij-dakhil* cleavage is primarily operative on the elite level. That is, it does not represent a cleavage of the mass society. The *dakhil-kharij* cleavage derives its relevance from the competition between inside and outside leadership of (primarily PLO) factions. To the extent that this is so, we do not expect it to influence the propensity of the masses to trust or distrust political figures and factions.

---

[35] It should be added that such data are important for understanding vital concerns other than trust in figures/factions, such as internal Palestinian stability and Palestinian voting behavior, to name but two. One might add that such data, if heeded by leaders and politicians, could possibly contribute to more responsive and more responsible public policy formulation and implementation.

[36] Of the 1208 respondents, 96, or 7.9%, resided outside the West Bank/Gaza immediately before the interim agreements. This percent in itself is basically large enough for us to discern the role of *dakhil/kharij* on the tendency to trust or distrust figures/factions.

Third, to the extent that the cleavage is relevant, it may influence *which particular* figures and factions are trusted most rather than whether or not *any* figure or faction is trusted. The implications of this cleavage for trust/distrust in political figures may be that, all other things equal, (1) returnees are more prone than insiders to trust figures who themselves are returnees (because many of these people are likely to have either been in exile with the leaders or at least to sympathize with the Diaspora experience of the *kharij* leaders), and (2) returnees are more likely than insiders to support figures from factions committed to a diplomatic, two-state, solution to the conflict with Israel. The reason for this is that otherwise, the probability that Israel would have consented to their return would have been small.

Table B4 presents cross-tabulations of responses to the trust-questions by the categories of returnees that include a minimally meaningful number of respondents. This table reveals that returnees from Tunisia expressed a substantially higher level of support for Fatah and Arafat, and a substantially lower level of support for Hamas and Yasin, than did returnees from Jordan and the Gulf states. But even this category of people may include people who returned for various reasons. In addition, Table B4 suggests that returnees from Jordan may exhibit a markedly higher tendency to distrust figures than returnees from Tunisia. This tendency, however, is not corroborated by data on trust in factions.

Table B4: Cross-tabulations of country from which returnee returned by responses to trust-most questions

Table B4a: Cross-tabulation of country from which returnee returned by responses to trust-figure question

	Particular responses to trust-figure question			
Origin of returnee	Trust some figure	Do not trust any figure	Trust Arafat most	Trust Hamas figure most
Jordan (n = 17)	9 (62.9%)	8 (47.1%)	7 (41.2%)	2 (11.8%)
Tunisia (n = 12)	10 (83.3%)	2 (16.7%)	9 (75.0%)	1 (8.3%)
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states) (n=22)	17 (77.3%)	5 (22.7%)	11 (50.0%)	3 (13.6%)

Table B4b: Cross-tabulation of country from which returnee returned by responses to trust-faction question

	Particular responses to trust-faction question			
Origin of returnee	Trust some faction	Do not trust any faction	Trust Fatah most	Trust Hamas most
Jordan (n = 19)	13 (68.4%)	6 (31.6%)	6 (31.6%)	5 (26.3%)
Tunisia (n = 16)	12 (75.0%)	4 (25.0%)	8 (50.0%)	0 (0.0%)
Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states) (n = 20)	12 (60.0%)	8 (40.0%)	6 (30.0%)	6 (30.0%)

C. Socioeconomic level-of-analysis

Section *C* analyzes the role of residence-type, i.e., city, village, refugee camp, region of residence, i.e., West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, gender, age, and education, on political trust/distrust. Residence-type was found to exert a statistically significant impact on the propensity to trust/distrust in only one of the four models, i.e., May 1998 trust-faction. The statistically significant finding in this model is that both city and camp residents exhibited a lower tendency to trust some faction than village residents. Meanwhile, the only statistically significant finding regarding region of residence is that, in May 1998, Gaza residents exhibited a higher tendency than both West Bank residents and East Jerusalem residents to trust some figure most. The first point to make in regard to these findings is simply that the statistical significance of residence-type and region of residence in only one of the four

models itself suggests that we should be cautious in concluding that these two factors in fact generally exert an important impact on the probability that a person trusts or distrusts. Additionally, a binary variable measuring whether the respondent is a refugee or non-refugee was found not to exert a significant impact in each of the four sets of models. While, in the case of the May 1998 faction-trust model, any independent effect of the refugee-resident distinction may have been picked up by the residence-type variable, i.e., city, refugee camp, and village, we must nonetheless be all the more skeptical about the impact of refugee-resident status on the propensity toward political trust/distrust.

The second point to make is that, though the effects of residence-type and region of residence were found not to be robust, we might nonetheless find empirically meaningful differences in levels of trust/distrust between different types and regions of residence. The reason for this is that distinct regions of residence and distinct types of residence may be associated with other variables which themselves are important in distinguishing those who trust from those who do not trust. In other words, region of residence and residence-type may serve as *containers* of distinct distributions of attributes that are themselves directly related to the propensity to trust/distrust. Thus, a set of one or more factors significantly and positively related to trust/distrust may be more prevalent among people within one region/residence-type than among people within another region/residence-type.

For example, the November 1997 trust-figure analysis did not find region of residence to be significantly related to trust/distrust in figures. But at the same time, we see from cross-tabulation C1 that almost 20% more Gaza residents exhibited trust in figures than did East Jerusalem residents. This is a result of the fact that Gaza residents tended to be more positive than East Jerusalem residents about the PA, more supportive than East Jerusalem residents of negotiations, and younger than East Jerusalem residents, all factors found in the November 1997 analysis to be positively related to trust in figures. By the same logic, moreover, the prevalence in any given region/residence-type of both factors that *encourage* and factors that *discourage* political trust may help to account for the lack of robust findings regarding the effects of regional affiliation and residence-type across the four sets of analyses. For example, in November 1997, village residents tended to be slightly more positive than camp residents in their evaluation of the PA and PLC – tendencies that increase the probability of trust – but at the same time, villagers tended to be slightly older than camp residents – a tendency that decreases the probability of trust. This presence of countervailing distributions of trends across the two residence-types thus helps to account for why the November 1997 analyses did not estimate a significant impact for residence-type.

Table C1: Cross-tabulation of responses to the trust-figure question by region of residence (November 1997 data)

	Region of residence		
Response to trust-figure item	Gaza (n = 431)	East Jerusalem (n = 75)	West Bank (n = 674)
Do not trust any political figure	62 (14.4%)	13 (17.3%)	124 (18.4%)
Trust some political figure	338 (78.4%)	44 (58.7%)	483 (71.7%)
No answer/don't know	31 (7.2%)	18 (24.0%)	67 (9.9%)

Gender is the only variable significantly affecting both of the figure-trust analyses and neither of the faction-trust analyses. As concerns why women are less likely than men to express trusting some *figure* most, the only suspicion of this author is that some women, rather than being less likely to trust figures, may be less likely (1) to trust some one figure *most*, and/or (2) to *express* trust in any specific person. Logistic regression, as mentioned above, omits cases responding "no answer/don't know" from the analysis. When these cases are omitted from the November 1997 survey (see Table C2a), we find that 18.9% of women and 18.4% of men polled expressed not trusting any figure, and 81.1% of women and 81.6% of men expressed trust in some figure. When "no answer/don't know" responses are taken into consideration (see Table C2b), we indeed find that men and women differ less in their tendency to trust/distrust than in their tendency to respond "no answer/don't know." Of those

polled, 12.0% of women responded "no answer/don't know" and 7.2% of men respondent "no answer/don't know."

Table C2: Cross-tabulations of responses to trust-figure item by gender with and without "no answer/don't" responses (November 1997 data)

Table C2a: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure item by gender without "no answer/don't know" responses (November 1997 data)

	Gender	
Responses to trust-figure item	Female (n = 565)	Male (n = 499)
Do not trust any figure	107 (18.9%)	92 (18.4%)
Trust some figure most	458 (81.1%)	407 (81.6%)

Table C2b: Cross-tabulation of responses to trust-figure item by gender with "no answer/don't know" responses (November 1997 data)

	Gender	
Responses to trust-figure item	Female (n = 565)	Male (n = 499)
Do not trust any figure	107 (16.7%)	92 (17.1%)
Trust some figure most	458 (71.3%)	407 (75.7%)
No answer/don't know	77 (12.0%)	39 (7.2%)

Yet, in any event, we must be cautious about the existence and nature of the impact of gender estimated by the two figure-trust models. First, gender only approached but did not satisfy the p=.05 criterion for accepting the relevance of independent variables. This is particularly the case with the May 1998 trust-figure model, in which gender variable exhibits a p-value of .09.[37] Furthermore, gender exerted a smaller effect on the propensity to trust/distrust than all other independent variables in each of the two models in which it appeared. Thus, in the absence of further research on the matter, we can conclude only that gender does not play a meaningful role in people's tendency of trusting figures, and that, to the extent that it does, the most meaningful aspect of this role is for women to have a slightly higher tendency than men to respond "no answer/don't know."

As concerns the effects of age, analyses conducted with the November 1997 data estimate that older adults are less likely than younger adults to claim trust in some figure or faction. One might suspect that this finding may reflect a tendency for younger adults to be more politically engaged and enthusiastic than older adults. Data from November 1997 survey provide at best minimal support for this hypothesis. Younger cohorts did exhibit higher levels than older cohorts of having participated in "informal conversations intended to persuade others to vote for a particular bloc," but the differences in these levels are small and inconsistent. Furthermore, the November 1997 data do not reveal meaningful relationships between age, on the one side, and participation in formal political activities, participation in political meetings and/or rallies, and whether or not a person voted in the 1996 elections, on the other. What is more, the tendency for older cohorts to be less active than younger cohorts, even if pronounced, may be as much a result as a cause of distrust in political figures. These bivariate relationships are summarized in Table C3.

[37]The May 1998 cross-tabulations of trust-figure by gender with and without "no answer/don't know" responses, furthermore, do not suggest any meaningful relationship. When the "no answer/don't know" cases are omitted, 28.4% of women respondents and 27.1% of men respondents expressed distrusting figures, and 71.6% of women respondents and 72.9% of men respondents expressed trusting some figure. Meanwhile, 11.3% of women respondents and 10.4% of men respondents reported "no answer/don't know."

Table C3: A summary of cross-tabulations of various forms of political participation by age cohorts

	% of cohort participating					
Form of political participation	below 20	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
Informal political conversations to persuade others	31.4%	26.1%	23.5%	22.1%	19.4%	23.0%
Formal political activities	18.1%	15.4%	15.5%	16.7%	11.8%	18.9%
Political meetings and rallies	37.5%	38.9%	33.9%	36.0%	24.7%	28.0%
Voted in Palestinian elections	36.6%	69.6%	71.1%	78.0%	71.3%	82.7%

Suffice it to add on the effects of age on trust/distrust that one might expect age to have a curvilinear relationship with trust/distrust; that is, the size, or *magnitude,* of the effect of age on rust/distrust might be different for young adult, middle adult, and elderly cohorts. For example, increases in age at younger age-levels may exert a larger effect on the probability of trust than increases in age at older age levels. The estimation of a curvilinear relationship between age and political trust should be considered in future research on popular political trust/distrust.

Lastly, level of education did not achieve statistical significance in any of the four final models presented above.[38] One explanation of the non-significance of education is that education does indeed influence the propensity of a person to trust/distrust, but that it does so in two, countervailing, ways, which cancel out the aggregate-level effects of education. Specifically, while people with low levels of education may tend to be naturally more prone than people with high levels of education to the conspiratorial view that "all political leaders are in politics to serve their own self-interests," people with high levels of education tend to be more aware than people with low levels of education of actual cases of political corruption and ineptitude. The larger point is simply that the effects of education deserve future analyses.

D. Psychological-level

The only psychological-level attribute that the November 1997 and May 1998 surveys collected data for is the level of the respondents "optimism" or "pessimism" "about the future in general." This study found that responses to the survey item are not associated with responses to the trust-questions. This finding might surprise some of the readers, as it did the author, since it is plausible to expect pessimism to cause or at least be associated with political disillusionment, withdrawal from the political arena, distrust, etc.[39] One possible explanation of the non-significance of optimism/pessimism, is that people may harbor different conceptions of the *time horizon* connoted by the term "future" and people may harbor different conceptions of the *locus* of "optimism." By different conceptions of time horizon is simply meant that some people are likely to define "the future" in terms of weeks or months, others in terms of one or a few years, and still others in terms of one or a few decades. This variation may help to account for the lack of a substantial relationship between optimism/pessimism and trust/distrust. Specifically, all other things equal, people who are pessimistic only about the *near* future might have a higher chance of expressing trust in some figure/faction than people who are pessimistic in relation to a broader time horizon. By different conceptions of the *locus* of optimism and pessimism is simply meant that some people might take the terms "optimism" and "pessimism" to refer to the welfare of Palestinian collective interests, and other people may take the term to refer to personal and/or familial welfare. All things equal, we might postulate that the larger the proportion of respondents who conceive of optimism/pessimism in personal and/or familial terms, the lower the likelihood of a robust relationship between optimism/pessimism and political trust/distrust. Thus, the validity and reliability of future survey items tapping sentiment on pessimism/optimism may benefit by specifying the time horizon and locus of pessimism/optimism concretely. Additionally, future research on the crucial question of the impact of

[38] Level of education did, however, achieve or approximate statistical significance in some of the numerous preliminary models.

[39] For one, enough variation exists in responses to this variable to differentiate between those who trust and those who do not. Of respondents to the November 1997 survey, 72.3% expressed strong or moderate optimism, and 26.0% expressed strong or moderate pessimism. Of respondents to the May 1998 survey, 65.6% expressed strong or moderate optimism, and 33.5% expressed strong or moderate pessimism.

socio-psychological factors on trust/distrust may benefit from the collection of data on feelings of efficacy, anomie, and relative deprivation, rather than on optimism/pessimism, since theoretical literature on the role of socio-psychological orientations in politics (e.g., Gurr 1970) and some literature on Palestinian politics (e.g., Ahmad 1994) emphasize these phenomena.[40]

[40] Our understanding of the factors accounting for the tendency toward popular political trust/distrust would benefit from the inclusion in some future surveys of a follow-up question immediately after the open-ended trust questions which asks the respondent in open-ended format "why" he or she responded as he or she did to the trust-question. Certainly, the likelihood that some respondents will be unable and/or unwilling to reveal their true preferences represents an integral limitation on the utility of soliciting respondents' own assessments of why they trust/distrust or why they trust/distrust particular figures/factions. At the same time, however, such a follow-up question has important advantages. First, given the early state of research on popular political trust, such an open-ended follow-up question promotes the identification of factors impacting the tendency to trust/distrust which were generally not included in previous surveys and perhaps not previously suspected of influencing trust/distrust. Secondly, data collected from the follow-up question could be used as a check on explanations derived from analyses of independent variables for which data were collected without any connection to the respondents' views on trust/distrust. In other words, such a follow-up question could help to confirm or disconfirm the absolute and relative effects of the types of relationships considered above. In parallel fashion, furthermore, the follow-up question can help shed light on the motivations driving "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-questions.

Lastly, many interesting analyses can be done with such a follow-up question. These include assessment of attributes most often invoked to evaluate figures, comparison of the relative frequency with which people identify personal/anthropomorphic attributes or ideological orientation as the reason for trusting figures and factions, the relative importance of *particular* types of personal attributes in feelings of trust toward figures and perhaps also factions, and the relative salience of different policy issues driving attitudes regarding trust. In turn, the frequency of particular types of reasons for responses to the trust-questions can be correlated with other factors, including level of education to name but one, in order to enhance our understanding of the causal relationships accounting for the causes of trust/distrust themselves. Such a follow-up question, lastly, should include a "don't know" filter, as some respondents may simply not be able or willing to articulate why they support any given figure/faction most.

IV. Examining "No answer/don't know" Responses to the Survey Questions on Trust

A substantial number of respondents responded "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. Of the 1182 respondents to the November 1997 survey, 173 (14.6%) reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-faction question, and 118 (10.0%) reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-figure question. Of the 1208 respondents to the May 1998 survey, 157 (13.0%) reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-faction question, and 131 (10.8%) reported "no answer/don't know" to the trust-figure question. It is useful to analyze the motives for such responses, as doing so may refine our understanding of the findings discussed in Part III.

Part IA discussed a few motives for responding "no answer/don't know" related to the framing of the surveys' trust-most questions. Specifically, a person may respond "no answer/don't know" because he or she cannot decide which *single* figure/faction among a plurality of figures/factions he or she trusts *most*. Others may not distrust or trust any political figure/faction, but rather hold a trust-neutral position. That is, assume a scale with one extreme being extensive trust and the other being extensive distrust. Trust-neutrality refers to those people located in the *middle* of this scale. These people, in other words, may exhibit *moderate* or *slight* levels of trust or distrust. Such moderate sentiment, then, may induce respondents to respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. A third, more basic and likely more common, motive for responding "no answer/don't know," one which is not intrinsic to the framing of the surveys' trust-most questions, is simply that the respondent may view him- or herself as insufficiently informed to ascertain which figure/faction he or she trusts most.[41]

"No answer/don't know" responses resulting from one of these motives are not likely to bias the results of the estimated models presented in Part III.[42] That is, they are not likely to encourage estimates of beta coefficients that substantially differ in terms of sign, i.e., positive or negative, and size from the corresponding beta coefficients that actually characterize the *population*.[43]

---

[41]Just one, novel, piece of evidence that many of those responding "no answer/don't know" to a trust-most question do so due to insufficient information is provided by the November 1997 data. Specifically, in addition to asking the respondent to indicate the figure and faction that he or she trusts most, the November 1997 survey also asks the respondent to indicate which figure and faction his or her friends generally trust most. Many more respondents responded "no answer/don't know" to these latter two items than to the former two items. Specifically, 39.2% responded "no answer/don't know" to the item on the figure most trusted by friends, and 36.7% responded "no answer/don't know" to the item on the faction most trusted by friends.

[42]As the reader may recall, moreover, Part IB provided crude evidence suggesting that very few people are likely to have responded "no answer/don't know" because of an inability to decide which *one* figure/faction out of two or more figures/factions they trusted *most*.

[43] The reason for this is that "no answer/don't know" responses given by respondents who trust two or more figures factions equally or are trust-neutral are likely to be *un*correlated with any independent variables that *are* relevant to a person's likelihood of political trust/distrust, such as evaluation of the PA, ideological orientation toward Israel, socioeconomic factors, etc. In other words, we do not expect people who trust two or more figures or factions equally or who are trust-neutral to have a tendency to hold any *particular* position on the PA, on the peace process, etc., or to exhibit any *particular* demographic or socioeconomic attribute. It is plausible to assume, similarly, that "no answer/don't know" responses resulting from respondent belief that he or she does not have enough information to adequately determine which figure or faction is most trustworthy are uncorrelated with *particular* values on the independent variables found to exert statistically significant effects on the probability of trusting or distrusting figures and factions. It is even plausible to suspect that the group of people who tend to view themselves as inadequately knowledgeable to determine the figure/faction they trust the most is not disproportionately comprised of people with low levels of education. The reason for this is that the amount of knowledge a person deems as necessary to adequately formulate preferences over political figures and factions is as much a function of how much knowledge the person *surmises* is necessary to make an adequate assessment as it is a function of how much knowledge of political figures and factions the person *actually* has. For that matter, we might expect that, all things equal, those with high levels of education are particularly hesitant to formulate and express preferences in the absence of at least a satisfactory level of knowledge. Moreover, the validity of the data is preserved to the extent that those who view themselves as not having enough knowledge respond "no answer/don't know" rather than either randomly select an answer to satisfy the interviewer's expectation of a meaningful answer or, even worse, provide the name of a figure/faction that the respondent deems to be among the most socially or politically acceptable. (Bogart 1967; Converse 1970; Schuman and Presser 1981) It should be added that JMCC interviewers were instructed to accept "no answer/don't know" responses immediately rather than further prompt substantive responses.

Another, more problematic, motive that may encourage a "no answer/don't know" response is to conceal preferences the respondent is loath to reveal for fear of negative repercussions. For example, a respondent who wholeheartedly supports Hamas or Islamic Jihad may not reveal this preference in the survey interview for fear of his or her preference being reported to the Palestinian and/or Israeli authorities. Such respondent misinformation clearly leads to underestimates of the aggregate level of public support for Islamist/rejectionist figures and factions. Furthermore, and of direct concern to the models presented and analyzed in Part III, such error can bias the estimated effects of relevant independent variables on trust/distrust. For example, assume that a large proportion of respondents providing the "no answer/don't know" response did so to conceal preferences for Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Now, if these same respondents *honestly* reported, say, high levels of criticism of the PA, then Part III's estimates of the size of the impact of criticism of the PA on the probability of expressing trust or distrust in any faction become biased. The simple reason for this is that respondents providing one or more "no answer/don't know" responses to the variables in a model submitted to regression analysis are excluded from the regression estimation of that model. Thus, to the extent that Hamas and Islamic Jihad supporters respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most question, the logistic regression analysis is based on a set of cases with a larger ratio of people who are critical of the PA and do not trust any faction to people who are critical of the PA and trust some faction than actually exists in the population. As a result, the presence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad supporters who untruthfully report "do not know enough" yet express a sincere criticism of the PA will entail that the regression analyses will overestimate the impact of criticism of the PA on the probability of not trusting *any* faction.

Part IV reports the author's efforts to estimate the extent of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-most questions motivated by the desire to conceal preferences for Islamists. This estimation is based on logistic regression analyses of four dependent variables: (1) whether or not a person responded "no answer/don't know" to the trust-figure question with data derived from the November 1997 survey, (2) whether or not a person responded "no answer/don't know" to the trust-faction question with data derived from the November 1997 survey, (3) whether or not a person responded "no answer/don't know" to the trust-figure question with data derived from the May 1998 survey, and (4) whether or not a person responded "no answer/don't know" to the trust-faction question with data derived from the May 1998 survey.[44]

---

[44] More specifically, the author constructed the following dependent variables from the original trust-most questions:

1. *Dependent variable measuring whether or not a person responded "no answer/don't know" to trust-figure question*: 1=responded "no answer/don't know" for political figure, 0=gave name for political figure *or* responded "do not trust any figure."

2. *Dependent variable measuring whether or not a person responded "no answer/don't know" to trust-faction question*: 1=responded "no answer/don't know" for political faction, 0=gave name for political faction *or* responded "do not trust any faction."

The models accounting for the probability of scoring a "1" or a "0" on these dependent variables which are estimated here include three sets of independent variables. One of these sets is intended to tap the presence/absence or extent of sympathy for Islamists. Data tapping such sympathy is difficult to collect. The trust-most questions represent the one survey item in both surveys expressly intended to tap such sympathy and of course it is precisely "no answer/don't know" responses to these questions that serves as our dependent variable. Given this consideration, it is appropriate to assess responses to survey questions that might provide some *trace* – or, alternatively put, that might represent a correlate – of militant attitudes. The author has in mind, specifically, attitudes on political Islam, preferences regarding Palestinian strategy toward Israel, and views on the PA's performance regarding civil and political liberties. Simply, to the extent that "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-questions are motivated by a desire to conceal preferences for Islamists, we should expect a disproportionate amount of respondents reporting "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions to exhibit sympathy for political Islam. (This being said, the reader is reminded, as the author discussed in Part IIIB, that the data collected by the November 1997 and May 1998 surveys on respondents' preferences regarding political Islam may not be very reliable.) Similarly, criticism of the PA's performance in terms of democracy and basic political and civil liberties might serve as a trace of a pro-Islamist orientation, particularly because Islamists have borne much of the brunt of PA abuses of civil and political liberty. Additionally, opposition to the peace process and support for armed struggle and suicide attacks may be viewed as traces of Islamist positions on Palestinian strategy toward Israel. Data on respondent views on political Islam, the performance of the PA in terms of democracy, and armed struggle and suicide operations, are present in the November 1997 data set, and data on respondent views toward the peace process are present in both the November 1997 and May 1998 data sets.

Fortunately, the November 1997 survey enabled the construction of a variable that directly measures levels of respondent sympathy toward Islamist figures/factions. Specifically, as discussed in Part IB, the November 1997 survey

includes a battery of items asking the respondent to indicate his or her "opinion" – viz., "very positive," "somewhat positive," "somewhat negative," or "very negative" – on nine Palestinian political figures and seven Palestinian political factions. This battery of items includes items soliciting respondent "opinions" on Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Ahmad Yasin, and Abdel Aziz Rantisi. Logistic regression analyses based on November 1997 data were thus able to estimate the effects of such opinions on the probability that a person responds "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. The finding that favorable opinions on these stimuli – that is, on the four Islamist figures and factions the survey presented to the respondent – are positively associated with the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-questions would serve as evidence that the desire to conceal militant preferences drove some "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-most questions.

It is no doubt possible that a person who is fearful of revealing that he or she "trusts" some militant figure/faction "most" will likewise fear revealing "a very positive opinion" of that figure/faction. The larger the number of respondents who conceal Islamist sympathies in response to the "opinion"-items as well as in response to the "trust-most" items, in turn, the less reliable and valid the use of respondent opinions of the four Islamist figures and factions listed above to assess the prevalence of Islamists in the "no answer/don't know" category of the trust-most question. It is reasonable to assume, however, that many respondents who are fearful of reporting that they trust Islamists most are *not* fearful of reporting a very positive opinion of Islamists. The plausibility of this assumption derives from the fact that the battery of "opinion" items solicits attitudes on *seven* political factions and *nine* political figures. Specifically, because the battery of "opinion" items solicits attitudes on several figures and factions, the respondent may report positive attitudes toward a *plurality* of individual figures and factions, and may thus believe that reporting a positive attitude toward militant figures and factions does not clearly identify him or her as a (strong) supporter of these figures and factions. Put differently, the Islamist supporter has the option in responding to the set of "opinion" items of concealing his or her support for Islamists not only by reporting a negative opinion about Islamists and by reporting "no answer/don't know," but also by submerging his or her positive opinion of Islamists within reports of positive opinions toward *non*-Islamist figures and factions. In other words, the Islamist supporter could express positive opinions about non-Islamist as well as Islamist figures and factions in order to hide his or her true preference for Islamists. The fearful respondent adopting this approach thus provides his or her true opinions on the Islamist stimuli. Accordingly, there exists an arguably sound basis for assuming that responses to the items tapping "opinion" on Islamist figures and factions are generally reliable indicators of respondent views toward Islamists.

The second set of independent variables relevant to modeling "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-most questions refers to the respondent's level of general knowledge about Palestinian political figures and factions. As mentioned above, perhaps the most basic if not also the most common motive driving a respondent to give "no answer/don't know" responses is the belief that he or she does not have sufficient information to make an adequate judgment as to which figure/faction he or she trusts most. As mentioned above, such "no answer/don't know" responses are in themselves unlikely to bias the results of analyses accounting for the probability that a person trusts political figures/factions. Nonetheless, because insufficient knowledge is a basic and common cause of "no answer/don't know" responses, it is necessary to include a variable measuring this motive in models of "no answer/don't know" responses in order to more accurately estimate the independent effects of other independent variables in these models, most notably sympathy for Islamists.

The November 1997 data set fortunately provides data tapping respondent assessment of his or her general level of knowledge about political figures and factions. Specifically, as discussed in Part IB, each of the nine items soliciting respondent opinion on a particular figure and each of the seven items soliciting respondent opinion on a particular faction explicitly offer the respondent the option of responding that he or she does not have enough information about the figure/faction to give an opinion. Given these data, the author created a variable reporting the number of times the respondent gave the "insufficient information to judge" response to the set of nine items on figures and seven items on factions. The presence in the sample of respondents fearful of revealing their sincere sympathy for militant figures and/or factions would likely contribute to this variable's underestimation of the general level of knowledge of these respondents. The reason for this is that these respondents have the option of concealing their militant preferences not only by reporting a negative opinion about militant figures and factions, but also by reporting "insufficient knowledge to judge" these figures and factions. The larger the number of respondents who give this latter response to conceal militant preferences, the more the logistic regression analyses will overestimate the size of the negative relationship between level of political knowledge and the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. This is so because some respondents who exhibit a relatively low level of knowledge (those concealing favorable opinions of militant figures and factions) will simultaneously reveal a relatively high tendency to respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. Such responses, furthermore, would underestimate the positive relationship between favorable "opinion" on Islamists and the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions, since they reduce the number of respondents who both express positive views of Islamists and respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions.

As mentioned above, however, respondents who in reality sympathize with Islamists are likely to have been relatively uninhibited to express a positive "opinion" on the four Islamist stimuli – i.e., the four Islamist figures and factions in the set of "opinion" items – as a result of their opinions on Islamists being solicited in the context of a wide variety of figures and factions. That is, as mentioned above, the Islamist supporter had the option in responding to the set of "opinion" items of concealing his or her support for Islamists not only by reporting a negative opinion about Islamists or by responding "no answer/don't know" to the Islamist opinion-items, but also by submerging his or her positive opinion of Islamists within reports of positive opinions toward other, non-Islamist, figures and factions. In other words, the Islamist supporter could express positive opinions about non-Islamist as well as Islamist figures and factions in order to hide his or her true preference for Islamists. Thus, it is plausible to assume that a respondent's number of "don't have sufficient information" responses to the set of "opinion" items *does* reliably measure the respondent's general level of knowledge of political figures and factions.

The third and final set of independent variables that the author includes in models of the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions refers to socioeconomic and demographic attributes. The primary justifications for

The remainder of Part IV summarizes and analyzes the findings of four models estimated with logistic regression – respectively, a model of the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-figure question estimated with November 1997 survey data, a model of the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-figure question estimated with May 1998 survey data, a model of the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-faction question estimated with November 1997 survey data, and a model of the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-faction question estimated with May 1998 survey data. As the content of Part IV should be accessible to all readers, the key points are *not* bolded.

Table IV summarizes the estimates of the four logistic regression models accounting for "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-questions. Cells in this table with one or two asterisks ("*"/"**") refer to independent variables appearing in the corresponding model that achieve statistical significance. A cell reporting an effect that appears in the corresponding model yet does not achieve statistical significance at the 95% confidence-level lists the p-value of this effect in parentheses. The signs of the beta coefficients of numeric variables are presented in this table not so much to enable identification of the substantive nature of the variable effects – which of course requires reference to the coding schemes of the corresponding variables – but rather simply to reveal whether or not the direction of the impact of a particular variable is the same across the set of estimated models in which it is included. Meanwhile, the signs of the beta coefficients of categorical variables – i.e., law preference, region of residence, and residence-type – are included because they have a straightforward interpretation. Each possible pair of values of a categorical variable has its own beta coefficient. A positive beta coefficient means that people conforming to the first (left) category listed in each pair of values have a higher probability of responding "no answer/don't know" than do people fitting the second (right) category. For example, the positive sign ("+") referring to the "city versus refugee camp" pairing appearing in the May 1998 model of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-figure question means that city residents, the first and left value in the pair of categorical values, have a higher tendency to respond "no answer/don't know" than do camp residents, the second and right value in the pair. Conversely, a negative beta coefficient ("-") means that people fitting the first (left) category in the pair to which the beta coefficient corresponds have a lower probability of responding "no answer/don't know" than do people fitting the second (right) category. Thus, for example, the three negative signs in the cell corresponding to the effects of region of residence in the May 1998 model of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-figure question, mean that, in descending order, Gaza residents have a lower likelihood than West Bank residents of responding "no answer/don't know," Gaza residents have a lower likelihood than East Jerusalem residents of responding "no answer/don't know," and West Bank residents have a lower likelihood than East Jerusalem residents of responding "no answer/don't know."

The set of numbers in parentheses rank the relative magnitude, or size, of the effects of the independent variables in the corresponding model which achieve or approximate statistical significance. Thus, for example, the first column reports that, of the independent variables in the November 1997 model of "no answer/don't trust" responses to the trust-figure question, level of knowledge of figures exerts the relatively largest effect on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know," followed, in descending order, by opinion on Islamic Jihad and law preference. To cite another example, the column referring to the May 1998 model of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-faction question reports that the distinction between West Bank and East Jerusalem residence exerts the relatively largest impact on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know," followed, in descending order, by the distinction between Gaza residence and East Jerusalem residence, the distinction between city and refugee camp residence, the distinction between an 18 year-old and a 69 year-old, the distinction between camp residence and village residence, and, lastly, the distinction between strong opposition to and strong support for the Oslo agreements. Cells with a period (".") refer to variables for which data were not collected in the corresponding survey. Cells with an "X" refer to variables for which data were collected in the

---

including this set of variables are (1) simply to control for the independent effects that any of these variables might exert on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions, and (2) given the early stage of Palestinian survey research on popular political trust, it is appropriate to be open to the possibility of unanticipated effects.

corresponding survey but which do not appear in the corresponding estimated model because they did not consistently achieve or approximate statistical significance in preliminary models.

Table IV: Summary of the estimates of the four logistic regression models of "no answer/don't know" response to the trust-questions

	Dependent Variable Survey Date			
Independent Variable	"Na/dk"-figure November 1997	"Na/dk"-figure May 1998	"Na/dk"-faction November 1997	"Na/dk"-faction May 1998
Opinion on Hamas	X	.	X	.
Opinion on Yasin	+(p=.383)	.	X	.
Opinion on Rantisi	X	.	X	.
Opinion on Islamic Jihad	-* (2)	.	-(p=.390)	.
Law preference *Shari'a* versus secular law	-* (3)	.	-** (2)	.
Position on peace process/Oslo	X	+* (2)	X	-* (6)
Position on armed struggle	X	.	X	.
Position on suicide operations	X	.	X	.
Evaluation of PA on democracy	X	.	-(.091) (3)	.
Evaluation of PA on human rights	X	.	X	.
Knowledge of figures	-* (1)	.	-* (1)	.
Knowledge of factions	X	.	X	.
Level of education	+(p=.081)	X	+*	X
Residence-type city versus refugee camp city versus village refugee camp versus village	X	 +(p=.072) (3) +(p=.194) -(p=.430)	X	 +* (3) +(p=.539) -(p=.074) (5)
Region of residence Gaza versus West Bank Gaza versus East Jerusalem West Bank versus East Jerusalem	X	 -(p=.980) -** (1) -** (1)	X	 +(p=.527) -** (2) -** (1)
Age	X	X	X	+(p=.052) (4)

The speculation that some respondents may respond "no answer/don't know" in order to conceal militant views may be seen as receiving at best moderate support from the four sets of models. On the one side, the November 1997 model of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-figure question estimates that those who hold a favorable opinion of Islamic Jihad have a disproportionately high tendency to respond "no answer/don't know." This estimated effect achieves statistical significance at the 95% confidence-level. Furthermore, the analysis of responses to the trust-figure question with May 1998 data estimate that opposition to the peace process increases the likelihood of responding "no answer/don't know." This effect achieves statistical significance at the 95% confidence-level.

On the other side, however, other variables tapping (potentially) militant views do not provide support for the hypothesis that respondents with militant views respond "no answer/don't know" in order to conceal their preferences. Preliminary analyses found that variables measuring attitudes toward Hamas, Ahmad Yasin, and Abdel Aziz Rantisi, did not exert statistically significant effects on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know." In addition, opinions on Islamic Jihad did not exert an effect approaching statistical significance in the model of "no answer/don't know" responses to the November 1997 trust-faction question.[45] Furthermore, the variables measuring support for

[45] The reader should note that – while throughout the course of this study, the author reported models that exclude variables that do not even approach statistical analysis – the November 1997 "no answer/don't know"-figure model and the November 1997 "no answer/don't know"-faction model reported in Table IV include a variable that does not even approximate statistical significance, i.e., respectively, opinions on Yasin and opinions on Islamic Jihad. The reason for including these two variables in the models is simply to emphasize the failure of these two variables – which are of course central to the search for the phenomenon of respondents concealing Islamist preferences – to exert statistically significant effects in those models.

armed struggle and suicide missions, were not found, in the two analyses for which data were available, to exert a significant impact on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know."[46]

In addition, the estimated effects of positions toward the peace process/Oslo were inconsistent. First, these effects achieved statistical significance only in the two May 1998 models. Secondly, the estimated effects of position on the peace process in these two models are contradictory. On the one side, opposition to the "peace process" was estimated to increase the probability of providing a "no answer/don't know" response to the trust-figure question. On the other side, opposition to the "Oslo accords" was found to *decrease* the likelihood that a person will respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-faction question.[47]

In parallel fashion, views on the democraticness of the PA do not confirm the speculation that, all things equal, those who believe the PA to be undemocratic will be more likely than those who view the PA as democratic to fear negative repercussions of revealing hard-line policy preferences, and will thus be more likely to respond "no answer/don't know." For one, the variable measuring views on the PA's level of democraticness, with a p-value of .091, only approaches statistical significance, and only does so in one of the two sets of models of "no answer/don't know" responses for which such data were available, i.e., November 1997 "no answer/don't know"-figure and November 1997 "no answer/don't know"-faction. Furthermore, the two sets of November 1997 analyses found a variable measuring respondents' evaluations of the PA on human rights *not* to exert an effect on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions that did not approach statistical significance.[48]

The finding in the November 1997 model of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-figure question that supporters of the *Shari'a* are less likely than supporters of secular law to respond "no answer/don't know" counters the author's suspicion that – as a trace of support for Islamist figures/factions – support for the *Shari'a* might also be associated with the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-figure questions. But this finding by no means should be interpreted as indicating that many respondents responding "no answer/don't know" are not supporters of Islamists seeking to conceal their preferences. For one, as discussed in Part IIIB, the preferences over "the *Shari'a*" and "secular law" bluntly and vaguely, conceived, may not serve as a reliable indicator of views regarding political Islam and secularism. For that matter, relatedly, the very question of the relationship between responses to the "'*Shari'a*' or 'secular law'" question and support for Islamist figures and factions – and thus, the very validity of treating responses to the "'*Shari'a*' or 'secular law'" question as a trace of support for militant factions – is itself questionable.

What is more, the proposition articulated and corroborated in Part IIIA that people critical of the PA and opposed to political Islam are particularly prone to political disillusionment if not despair which in turn get translated into wholesale political distrust – suggests a plausible explanation for the finding that proponents of secular law exhibit a higher tendency toward responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions than do proponents of the *Shari'a*. Simply, criticism of the PA in conjunction with support for secular law, may encourage not only disillusionment but also confusion. That is, responding "don't know/no answer" seems a perfectly sensible response to the trust-most questions if one is critical of both the PA/Fatah and the only alternative approaching viability, namely, Hamas.

All told, then, the suspicion that Palestinians with militant views are afraid to reveal these views in public opinion polls receives at best moderate support from the analyses conducted in this study. Only one of the four items tapping opinions on Islamists is found to exert a statistically

---

[46]We might expect, however, that those not afraid to express support for armed struggle and particularly suicide attacks would not be afraid to express support for rejectionist individuals/factions.

[47] Opposition to Oslo may be a very weak correlate of sympathy for Islamists, however, since opposition to Oslo has been extensive.

[48] Again, we might expect evaluation of the PA in terms of democracy and human rights to be extensive, to transcend various ideological orientations, and, thus, to be a weak indicator, or trace, of militant factional sympathies.

significant effect in the expected directions, i.e., opinions on Islamic Jihad, and responses to this item achieve statistical significance in only one of the two models for which data on these opinions were available. The very reliability of responses to the four opinion-items to do with Islamist figures and factions must themselves be viewed with skepticism, and some sympathizers of Islamist figures and factions who feared revealing their "trust" in these figures and factions, might also have concealed their sympathy toward Islamists by responding either "no answer/don't know" or a negative opinions for the four opinion-items to do with Islamists. Furthermore, the variables tapping traces or correlates of sympathy toward Islamists both did not generally exhibit statistically significant effects in the expected direction, and in any event must be considered dubious indicators of sympathy for Islamists. Ultimately, it is warranted to view the models of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-most questions as models in need of further revision in an ongoing process of developing continuously more persuasive models. At the same time, however, the lack of compelling evidence in this study that people who view Islamists favorably are particularly prone to respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions enhances our confidence in the validity of the findings presented in Part III.

Discussion now turns to consideration of the effects of some socio-economic and demographic factors on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. As concerns level of education, the analyses found that level of education exerts a statistically significant impact on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" in the two models estimated with November 1997 data – and that in both of these models higher levels of education were associated with a higher probability of responding "no answer/don't know." One possible explanation for this is that more highly educated people do indeed demand more information than people with lower levels of education in the formulation of opinions on political trust. That is, we might suspect that people with higher levels of education are more intent on providing a *valid* and *reliable* response to the trust-most questions than are people with lower levels of education, and that, as a result, people with higher levels of education are more prone than people with lower levels of education to deem themselves as insufficiently knowledgeable to ascertain their views on figures and factions. This suspicion, however, is not borne out by the data. Table IV1 reports a cross-tabulation of the number times a respondent reported "don't have enough information to give an opinion" to the seven factions and nine figures, by level of education.

Table IV1: Cross-tabulation of number of times respondents reported "don't have enough information to give an opinion" by level of education

	Level of education				
Level of knowledge of figures and factions	Up to elementary	Up to preparatory	Secondary school	Some college	College or above
Reported limited knowledge of figures	25.2% (29)	14.7% (25)	12.4% (35)	7.3% (13)	8.2% (8)
Reported high knowledge of figures	24.3% (28)	35.9% (61)	45.4% (128)	49.7% (89)	51.5% (50)
Reported high knowledge of factions	44.2% (42)	56.7% (85)	61.1% (165)	67.1% (116)	68.8% (66)

This table clearly reveals a negative relationship between a person's level of education and the person's tendency to express insufficient knowledge to give an opinion about figures and factions. Specifically, people with higher levels of education exhibit a lower tendency than do people with lower levels of education to report insufficient information to discern their opinions on figures and factions. Parenthetically, this relationship appears to be non-linear. Specifically, the difference in the tendency to express sufficient knowledge to discern opinions on figures and factions is larger between people with elementary education and people with preparatory education, and between people with preparatory education and people with secondary education, than it is between people with some college and people with at least one college or university degree.

The November 1997 analyses thus appear to suggest that level of education exerts two distinct and countervailing effects on the probability that a person responds "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. On the one side, higher level of education increases the probability that a person does have knowledge about figures and factions, which, in turn, may increase the likelihood that a

person provides some response other than "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. In this way, level of education exerts an *indirect* and *negative* effect on the tendency to respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. On the other side, as is estimated in the analyses of the November 1997 data which are summarized in Table IV, level of education exerts a *direct* and *positive* effect on the probability that a person responds "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. Simply, as mentioned above, the higher a person's level of education, the more likely the person to respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions. One possible explanation for this finding is that higher levels of education may be associated with an aversion to political Islam (and with a propensity to a leftist/secularist ideology; see Shikaki 1998), and thus to uncertainty about the most desirable figure/faction. The reason for this, as mentioned above with respect to views on the *Shari'a* and secular law, is that criticism of the PA in conjunction with support for secular law, may encourage not only disillusionment but also confusion. That is, responding "don't know/no answer" seems a perfectly legitimate response to the trust-most questions for one who is critical of both the PA/Fatah and the only alternative approaching viability, i.e., Hamas. Alternatively, higher levels of education may encourage people to be critical but not despairing of the Palestinian political figures and factions, thus leading some people with higher levels of education to refrain simultaneously from expressing wholesale distrust in the political system and from identifying any particular figure/faction as particularly trustworthy. Lastly, the countervailing effects of level of education on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most questions may go a long way in explaining why level of education was not found to exert a statistically significant effect in the models estimated with the May 1998 data. Simply, the November 1997 analyses, by including data on both level of education and knowledge of figures/factions, is able to tease apart the two countervailing effects of level of education mentioned above. In contrast, the May 1998 analyses, which do not have explicit data on knowledge of figures/factions, cannot control for the independent effects of these two countervailing effects, thus canceling out both effects of level of education.

Age, meanwhile, was found to exert an effect approaching statistical significance only in the model of "no answer/don't know" responses to the trust-faction question estimated with May 1998 data. The model estimated, specifically, that older adults were more likely to respond "no answer/don't know" than younger adults. This finding might reflect a tendency for older people to have less knowledge about current political affairs than younger adults, and thus to have a lesser ability to determine which faction they trust most. To assess this hypothesis, the author cross-tabulated responses to the variables measuring respondent knowledge of figures and factions by age cohorts. These cross-tabulations are summarized in Table IV2.

Table IV2: Summary of cross-tabulations of knowledge of figures and knowledge of factions by age cohorts

	Age cohort					
	below 20	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60+
High level of knowledge of figures[Ψ]	52.5%	59.8%	54.8%	65.5%	58.2%	54.3%
High level of knowledge of factions	55.0%	61.8%	61.0%	67.6%	49.1%	60.5%

[Ψ]Low levels of knowledge of figures and factions are not reported in this table because small numbers of respondents fit these categories

This table does not provide support for this hypothesis. The cross-tabulation to do with knowledge of factions reveals no relationship between such knowledge and age cohorts. Meanwhile, the cross-tabulation to do with knowledge of figures is interesting in that it suggests the possibility of a curvilinear relationship between political knowledge and age – specifically, that young-adult and elderly cohorts exhibit lower levels of political knowledge than middle-age cohorts. This suggestion represents an area for future research.

Lastly, the May 1998 analyses reveal a robust and unexpected finding to do with the relationship between region of residence and the probability of responding "no answer/don't know." Specifically, East Jerusalem residents were estimated in these two models to be more likely than non-Jerusalem residents to respond "no answer/don't know." The author proposes three conjectures that may help account for the higher tendency of Jerusalemites to respond "no answer/don't know" than for Gaza and West Bank residents to do so. First, recalling the importance of knowledge on political

figures in accounting for the probability that a respondent gave the "no answer/don't know" response, Jerusalem residents – as they are not under direct Palestinian authority and as they are likely to allocate substantial attention to Israeli as well as Palestinian domestic politics – may generally have less knowledge of Palestinian political figures and factions than do Gaza and West Bank residents. For these same reasons, secondly, some Jerusalemites may identify less strongly with Palestinian leaders and factions than do West Bank and Gaza residents, thus reducing their certainty about which Palestinian figures and factions to trust.[49] Finally, Jerusalem Palestinians might be more fearful of expressing support for rejectionist figures and factions because they are more directly vulnerable to Israeli punishment than are Gazans and West Bankers.

Concluding Remarks

Among the most notable findings of this study are the following. Firstly, as concerns the relationship between trust in figures, on the one side, and trust in factions, on the other side, most people who trust (distrust) some figure also trust (distrust) some faction, and vice versa. At the same time, however, many people trust either some figure or some faction but not both. Thus, the relationship between trust in figures and trust in factions is positive but far from perfect. Furthermore, this study presents a basic approach for assessing the extent to which the Palestinian people identify figures with these figures' factional affiliations, and the extent to which the popular support of particular figures is dispersed across supporters of more than one faction. The importance of factional affiliation in trust toward figures and the dispersion of the support of particular figures across various factions could not be adequately assessed in this study due to major data constraints. Keeping in mind these constraints, Haidar Abdul-Shafi was found to enjoy a broader base of support, in terms of the factional sympathies of the respondents, than any other Palestinian figure.

As concerns the explanation of trust in factions and figures, by far the most important factor affecting a person's tendency to trust or distrust is the person's evaluation of the PA. The second most important factor affecting a person's tendency to trust or distrust is the person's evaluation of the PLC. Simply, negative views of the PA and/or the PLC promote the likelihood of distrusting all political figures and factions, and positive evaluations of the PA and/or PLC decrease the likelihood of distrust in all figures and factions. What is more, the tendency for criticism of the PA to lead to disaffection with the entire political system is particularly likely when this criticism is coupled with opposition to armed violence in the struggle with Israel and opposition to political Islam. Similarly, some evidence suggests that while opposition to negotiations with Israel by itself might not be meaningfully related to the propensity to trust any figure or faction, political distrust might be promoted by the conjunction of opposition to negotiations with Israel and opposition to confrontational policies toward Israel. The most general finding regarding socioeconomic variables is that no socioeconomic variable exerts a statistically significant effect across the various analyses of popular political trust/distrust conducted in this study. More specifically, age, gender, region of residence, i.e., West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, and residence-type, i.e., city, village, refugee camp, were found to exert only statistically significant effects only sporadically across the various analyses of political trust/distrust conducted in this study.

As concerns the reasons people respond "no answer/don't know" to the trust-most survey questions, evidence which can only at best be described as moderate suggests that some respondents report "no answer/don't know" to survey questions on trust in figures and factions in order to conceal militant preferences. This finding enhances our confidence that the findings of this study to do with the factors that account for whether or not a person exhibits political trust or distrust are not biased by the tendency of Islamist sympathizers to conceal their preference for Islamists by responding "no answer/don't know." East Jerusalemites display a higher propensity to respond "no answer/don't know" to survey questions soliciting preferences over figures and factions than did Gaza and West Bank residents. Additionally, level of education appears to simultaneously exert an indirect positive effect – by increasing the knowledge with which a person can assess who he or she trusts most – and a

[49]The author is reminded of an occasion on which, while waiting for a bus in East Jerusalem, he spoke in very broken Arabic to a Palestinian youth also waiting for the bus. The author asked the Palestinian youth which political figure he liked the most, and was surprised to hear him respond "Peres."

direct negative effect – perhaps by increasing a person's criticism of Islamists or perhaps by increasing the person's general level of disappointment with the state of political affairs – on the probability of responding "no answer/don't know" to the survey questions on political trust.

This study is ultimately and clearly an early step in an inevitably ongoing process of developing increasingly persuasive models accounting for popular trust, support, etc., in Palestinian figures and factions. Accordingly, this study concludes by briefly suggesting ways of enhancing future research on the subject of popular political trust. The first set of suggestions regard what is generally called model (re)specification. Suffice it to make two comments regarding model (re)specification. First, this study suggested that negative evaluations of the PA and opposition to negotiations with Israel are particularly likely to encourage political distrust when they are *conjoined* with opposition to Hamas, political Islam, and violent struggle with Israel. While this study provided support for this general hypothesis by reliance on bivariate cross-tabulations, the effects of this type of conjunction would be more reliably estimated by conducting regression analyses that explicitly model such interactive effects. The second point on model respecification is simply that some socioeconomic and demographic variables, such as level of education and age, may exert curvilinear rather than linear effects on the tendency toward political trust/distrust. Such curvilinear relationships, not adequately examined in this study, represent a topic for future explanations of political trust/distrust.

The second set of recommendations refer to data on potentially relevant independent variables. Simply, data on various attributes not collected by the surveys analyzed in this study require integration into future analyses of popular political trust. Future survey research on popular political trust, more specifically, would benefit from the collection of data on whether or not the respondent harbors feelings of anomie, the political orientation of the respondents' parents and/or older siblings, respondent views on the most important issue(s) facing Palestinian society, and which figure(s) and/or faction(s) the respondent holds accountable for unfavorable outcomes regarding these issues, and respondent attitudes regarding final status issues. may exert an important influence on levels of trust for particular factions and figures. Additionally, it may be worthwhile to include a follow-up question to the trust-most questions that asks the respondent in open-ended format to indicate why he or she provided the response that he or she gave.

The third issue regarding future research on popular political trust involves the measurement of popular political trust. For one, as concerns scaling the dependent variable, it was shown that trust for figures and trust for factions do not combine well in cumulative fashion. That is, little evidence was found for the author's suspicion that all those who trust a faction are highly likely to trust some individual, but that all of those who trust a figure will not necessarily trust a faction. While a cumulative scale for these two variables is thus unwarranted, however, we might attempt to combine responses to the two variables in an ordinal scale, scored "1" if the respondent *distrusts* both figures *and* factions, "2" if the respondent trusts a figure *or* a faction, and "3" if the respondent *trusts* both a figure *and* a faction.

But more importantly, future research on trust would benefit from adopting one of two measures. The first measure involves asking the respondent the figure and faction that he or she trusts *second*-most. This would provide rich measures of trust in the sense that we can distinguish not only between people who trust and people who distrust, but also between people who trust more than one figure/faction and people who trust only one figure/faction. The idea is simply that people who trust two figures/factions have a higher level of political trust than people who trust only one figure/faction. Furthermore, soliciting data on which figure/faction the respondent trusts second-most enables richer analyses of the ways in which and extent to which (1) popular trust in political figures is dictated by figures' factional affiliations, and (2) the popular support of particular figures is dispersed across people supporting various factions.

A second useful measure of political trust is to present respondents with a series of names and instruct them to evaluate each name according to an ordinal scale. This type of question not only serves to differentiate "don't know" from (a) "neither trust nor distrust" and (b) "don't trust *most,* " but also has important strengths in its own right. Perhaps most importantly, it allows more accurate measurement and comparison of the *level* of trust of *particular* figures and factions than does the "who do you trust most?" approach. This is so in large part because a respondent (1) can report his or her *level* of trust/distrust; and (2) can report trust for *more than one* figure. Furthermore, this measure provides a more finely-graded variability in levels of trust. By more finely graded variability in levels of trust is simply meant that the

"who do you trust most?" question enables categorizing respondents as either "trust" or "do not trust." But asking attitudes about a series of individuals/factions allows us to assess levels of trust that vary across a more refined range, say 1-11. This greater variability in the dependent variable of interest, in turn, enables conducting a larger and more discriminating set of statistical analyses. In addition, various types of novel analyses can be conducted with this type of trust data. To name two, this type of data enables investigation of (1) the extent to which particular factions/figures share common constituencies; and (2) the extent to which respondents' trust and distrust responses conform to or transcend the distinction between pro-negotiation and anti-negotiation figures/factions, or any other meaningful political boundaries for that matter. Finally, though asking a series of trust questions may appear to significantly extend the length and time requirements of the survey, evaluating a set of names according to an ordinal scale, say 1-5, is actually a much simpler cognitive task than is naming the one figure trusted most. The reason for this is that in the former case, the respondent does not have to come up with the names him or herself. Nor, more importantly, does (s)he have to rank the relative trustworthiness of pairs of figures/factions. In the "who do you trust most?" approach, by contrast, the respondent must, first, come up with a set of names him- or herself, and second, determine how much he trusts each individual *relative to each other individual* in this set of names.

References

- Ahmad, Hisham H. (1994). *From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society*. Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs: Jerusalem.
- Aldrich, John H. and Forrest D. Nelson (1984). *Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models*. Sage Publications: Newbury Park, London, and New Delhi.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1963). *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Development in Five Nations*. Sage Publications: Newbury Park, California.
- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba (1980). *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study*. Little, Brown: Boston.
- Bishara, Azmi (1997). "The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment." Gitelson Peace Publication, Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace: Jerusalem.
- Bogart, L. (1967). "No Opinion, Don't Know, and Maybe No Answer." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 31: 331-345.
- Brynen, Rex (1994). "The Palestinians and Confidence Building Measures in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Implications of Statelessness." In, Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds., *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*. Westview Press: Boulder, CO.
- Center for Palestine Research and Studies. *Results of Palestinian Election-Day Exit Poll, January 10, 1996.*
- Converse, Phillip E. (1970). "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue." IN, E.R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*. Addison-Wesley: Reading, Mass.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. Yale University Press: New Haven.
- Demaris, Alfred (1992). *Logit Modeling: Practical Applications*. Sage Publications, Inc.: Newbury Park, London, and New Delhi.
- Diamond, Larry, ed. (1993). *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Lynne Reinner Publishers: Boulder, Colorado.
- Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. (1985). *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Gambetta, Diego, ed. (1988). *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations*. Basil Blackwell: New York and Oxford.
- Gorden, Raymond L. (1977). *Unidimensional Scaling of Social Variables: Concepts and Procedures*. The Free Press: New York.
- Gurr, Ted R. (1970). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.
- Hiltermann, Joost R. (1991). *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the*
- *Occupied Territories*. Princeton University Press: Princeton.
- Hirschman, Albert O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Ibn Khaldun (1967). *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, in association with Secker and Warburg: London and New York.
- Inkeles, Alex and David Smith (1974). *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Nations*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.
- Jacoby, William G. (1991). *Data Theory and Dimensional Analysis*. Sage Publications: Newbury Park, London, and New Delhi.
- Khatib, Ghassan (1998). "New Cabinet?" *Palestine Report* 5(8):16.
- Laumann, Edward O. and David A. Knoke (1987). *The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy* Domains. University of Wisconsin Press: Madison.
- Laumann, Edward O. and Franz U. Pappi (1976). *Networks of Collective Action: A Perspective on Community Influence Systems*. Academic Press: New York, San Francisco, and London.
- Linz, Juan J. (1978). *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore.

- Long, J. Scott (1997). *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.* Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, London, and New Delhi.
- McIver, John P. and Edward G. Carmines (1981). *Unidimensional Scaling.* Sage Publications: Beverly Hills and London.
- Migdal, Joel S. (1988). *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World.* Princeton University Press: Princeton.
- Olson, Mancur (1965). *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- "Palestinian Authority List of Israeli Violations of Oslo." *Journal of Palestine Studies* (1996): 26(1): 144-5.
- Poggi, Gianfranco (1978). *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.* Stanford University Press: Stanford, Calif.
- Pye, Lucian and Sidney Verba, eds. (1965). *Political Culture and Political Development.* Princeton University Press: Princeton.
- Sahliyeh, Emile F. (1988). *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967.* Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.
- Sayigh, Yezid (1997). *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993.* Clarendon Press: Oxford.
- Schuman, Howard and Stanley Presser (1981). *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question Form, Wording, and Context:* Academic Press: New York and London.
- Shikaki, Khalil (1997). "The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment." Gitelson Peace Publication, H.S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace: Jerusalem.
- Shikaki, Khalil (1998). "Peace Now or Hamas Later." *Foreign Affairs* 77(4):29-43.
- Spector, Paul E. (1992). *Summated Rating Scale Construction: An Introduction.* Sage Publications: Newbury Park, London, and New Delhi.