


Palestine's Interim Agreement with
DEMOCRACY



Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre

COPYRIGHT © Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre
May 1998

All Rights Reserved

WRITTEN BY Isabelle Daneels
EDITED BY Rose-Marie Barbeau
DESIGN JMCC
PRINT National Computers Printer

With thanks to the following people for their invaluable contributions: Jamil Rabah; Manal Warrad; Salah Ilayan; Bassim Barhoum; Nidal Abdel Salam; Samar Hawari; the PLC members who participated in the survey; all the fieldworkers and staff of the JMCC Public Opinion Polling Unit.

Information in this publication may be quoted providing the JMCC is fully credited.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, or stored in any retrieval system of any nature, without the prior express written permission of the JMCC.

مركز القدس للإعلام والاتصال

JMCC


POB 25047, East Jerusalem

Tel 02-5819777 Fax 02-5829534

Email jmcc@baraka.org

Webpage: www.jmcc.org

Palestine's Interim Agreement with
DEMOCRACY



Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Acronyms</i>	v
<i>Foreword</i>	ix
<i>Introduction</i>	1
<i>Methodology</i>	3
 <i>Part One:</i>	
Voting Patterns of the Palestinian Electorate	7
 I. Explanation of the Election Results Using Survey Materials	9
1. <i>Perceptions of the Electorate</i>	9
2. <i>Perceptions of Council Members</i>	35
 II. Prospective Voting Behavior in Future Elections	45
 <i>Part Two:</i>	
Evaluation of the Performance of the Legislative Council	61
 i. General Impressions of the Legislative Council	63
1. <i>Perceptions of the Electorate</i>	63
2. <i>Perceptions of Council Members</i>	78
 ii. Perceptions of Whether the Legislative Council Represents the Population	85
1. <i>Perceptions of the Electorate</i>	85
2. <i>Perceptions of Council Members</i>	87
 iii. The Council's Relations With Different Sectors of Palestinian Society and the Executive Authority	95
 iv. Perceptions of the Legislative Council's Level of Democracy	109
 <i>Conclusion</i>	123
 <i>Annexes</i>	127
<i>Annex 1: Results of Poll on the Legislative Council Elections</i>	
<i>Annex 2: Results of Survey of Legislative Council Members</i>	

ACRONYMS

JMCC	Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre
CEC	Central Elections Commission
DOP	Declaration of Principles
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestine National Council
PA	Palestinian Authority
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
EA	Executive Authority
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
CM	Council Member
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PPP	Palestinian Peoples Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

The story of the Legislative Council is the story of unfulfilled expectations in the success of the Parliament, and how the Council is viewed by the parliamentarians themselves and by the people — the question of the differing expectations of two parties, each of them frustrated. ...None of us — the members of Parliament, the government, or Yasser Arafat — has delivered what the people were expecting just prior to the elections.

*Dr. Nabil Sha'ath
Minister for Planning and
International Cooperation
Palestinian Authority*

Foreword

Public opinion polls are new in Palestine. It was only five years ago that regular scientific polls based on proper methodology were first carried out. This coincided with the emergence of political debate in Palestine over the issue of participation in the peace process, debate which began in 1991 and flourished after the establishment of a Palestinian Authority and the election of a Legislative Council.

Policy research and analysis based on public opinion polls is an even newer phenomenon in Palestine, and this is due largely to the lack of familiarity with this new discipline by society and policy-makers, but also to the gap existing in general between the process of research and research circles and the process of decision-making and decision-making circles.

Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, which has been active in conducting regular public opinion polls since March 1993, realized that, in spite of the rich data sources emerging from opinion polls conducted in and about Palestine, there was only minimal utilization of these in research. As a result, JMCC decided to expand its Public Opinion Polls Unit to include and produce data analysis based on its polling work. *Palestine's Interim Agreement With Democracy* is our first attempt in this direction.

JMCC is proud to introduce this major contribution to researchers and politicians concerned with the issues of democracy and the efforts at democratization in Palestinian society. This study, which is based on an extensive public opinion poll and intensive interviews with politicians in addition to a survey within the Council itself, examines the public perceptions of the Council's contribution to the democratization process and the extent to which the Council is really representative of the public, the Council's impressions of its performance and its level of democracy in general, and includes intensive interviews with Palestinian Authority politicians and opposition figures.

Ultimately, this study attempts to assess the level of the Council's contribution to Palestinian democracy. In order to accurately gauge the change in the democratization process and the Council's contribution to this process, this study utilized another extensive survey on these same issues which was conducted one year before the existence of the Legislative Council, as a baseline in order to study the changes and measure the Council's impact.

We hope that this study will prove useful to all those who read it, including the legislators whose performance is placed under scrutiny.

Ghassan Khatib
Director
JMCC

Introduction

The aim of this study is to examine the role of the Palestinian Legislative Council, its contribution to democratic governance, and how it is perceived by the Palestinian public at large. The information on which this study is based has been obtained through a comprehensive public opinion poll, a survey conducted within the Legislative Council, and interviews with key members from across the political spectrum. The combination of a popular survey and a survey within the Legislative Council enabled us to target several core issues where the Legislative Council and the public diverge, or agree, in this critical stage in Palestinian state-building. Secondly, this two-track approach allowed us to analyze perceptions of the Legislative Council from the point of view of both the public and the Council in order to provide a balanced and accurate picture.

In September 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel — after having conducted secret talks for eight months — signed the Declaration of Principles in Washington. Although the Declaration of Principles did not specifically refer to the establishment of a Palestinian state, it nonetheless envisaged an entity with most of the elements required for a sovereign state. A legislative body is one of these requirements and, therefore, the election of the first Palestinian Legislative Council was considered by many as not only a major step in the establishment of a future Palestinian state, but also as an essential component in the establishment of a *democratic* Palestinian state.

In January 1996, the majority of Palestinians were proud and excited over the chance to participate in their first national elections, despite the fact that these elections were an outcome of the Oslo agreements — towards which many Palestinians have a negative attitude. For the Palestinian electorate, these elections were an unprecedented experience and the opportunity to express their desire for change. They considered the elections not only as a first step towards national independence, but hoped that by voting they could help usher in a democratic, effective and more orderly political system, which would provide them with stability and economic prosperity. More than a year and a half has passed since then, and many Palestinians have yet to come to terms with the fact that democracy does not depend on elections alone, but is based on a whole range of democratic prerequisites which have been largely absent in Palestinian society and which take time to develop. As a result, the high expectations in regard to the first elected Legislative Council have been followed by disillusionment. Neither democracy nor political and economic prosperity came overnight, and now the Legislative Council is — in part wrongly — being held responsible. Most recent public opinion polls have rated the Legislative Council as either negative or ineffective.

This report will place this fairly bleak public evaluation of the Legislative Council in perspective. Does the blame fall entirely on the Council and its members? Do they know the limitations of their jurisdiction? Do they understand the needs of their constituencies? Or, do restrictions by the Executive Authority play a major role in impeding the

independence of the Legislative Council? What about the limitations put upon the Council by "Oslo II": how much can the Council maneuver within the perimeters laid out in this interim agreement? To what extent is the gap between the expectations of the public and the expectations of Council members a valid factor? Or does lack of experience on the part of Council members have a major influence?

In examining the Council's performance, it is important to take into consideration the fact that there is no opposition bloc within the parliamentary body, due to the boycott of the elections by those parties opposed to the Oslo accords. Moreover, the majority of the Council is affiliated with Fateh, the party of the president and most highly placed Palestinian Authority officials. This by itself places certain limitations on the level of democracy which can be achieved.

Part I of this study will provide a short analysis of the election results. It will give an overview of the election results, explain why the opposition groups did not participate in the elections and the consequences of this boycott. Moreover, Part I will also analyze how people voted during the last elections, whether they would vote differently in future elections, and what the Council members think about the voting patterns of the population.

Part II will first give evaluations of the Legislative Council's performance by the electorate and by the Council members themselves. Part II will also analyze to what extent the Legislative Council is perceived to have fulfilled the expectations of the Palestinian people, and what the obstacles are. Were people expecting the Legislative Council to bring them economic improvement, political stability or a democratic independent Palestinian state? If so, do they feel the Council has met these expectations? If not, why not? Is the Legislative Council effective in representing the population? Is it democratic or to what extent is there an understanding of democratic tenets within the Council? To what extent is the efficiency of the Council affected by the hegemony of the Executive branch of the Palestinian Authority?

In the conclusion, the findings of this study will be summarized and a final evaluation on the performance of the Legislative Council will be given.

Methodology

The following components form the methodology of this study:

1. A public opinion poll
2. A survey conducted within the Legislative Council
3. Interviews

1. Public Opinion Poll

a. Methodology

A public opinion poll¹ was conducted on 20-22 August 1997, exploring the Palestinian electorate's voting record, their assessment of the Council and their Council members, and whether their attitudes towards these issues are changing. The survey also includes questions on if and how Palestinians would vote in the future and on what basis. The survey was conducted within a short time-frame of only three days, to increase the probability of finding potential respondents at home, and preventing a lengthy time lapse in which sudden events could occur which might influence people's responses.

A random sample of 1,195 people over the age of 18 were interviewed face-to face throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, 756 people were surveyed. In the Gaza Strip, 439 people were surveyed. The margin of error is 3 percent and the level of confidence rates at 95 percent.

To reduce the risk of bias from the interviewers, each fieldworker received only 20 questionnaires. Therefore, with a sample size of 1,195 people, 60 fieldworkers conducted the interviews in 60 different sampling points. The interviews were conducted by skilled interviewers, with extensive experience and training in the field.

All 450 population concentrations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip were considered for selection. These concentrations include cities, towns, villages, and refugee camps. Hamlets were excluded, as many of their residents reside also in other concentrations. Moreover, only concentrations with more than 700 residents comprise the sampling frame.

Based on published population estimates provided by the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (PBS) and the Health, Development, Information and Policy Project (HDIP), population concentrations were subdivided into sampling points. The number of sampling points per population is proportionate to the center's size. In practice, each population concentration was divided by 1,000, i.e., if a certain village has a population of 10,000, then it would be

¹ For questionnaire in English, see Annex 1.

assigned 10 sampling points. Since the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip totals 2.4 million, the overall number of potential sampling points is 2,400.

Using the computer database in Excel, 60 sampling points were randomly selected from the combined West Bank and Gaza population base. Jericho was selected as a sampling point in any case. This was required because while its small population size makes the probability of its selection small, while its political significance makes its selection necessary.

In the West Bank, people from the following areas were surveyed:

Jenin: Jenin, Jenin refugee camp, Sanour, Maythaloun, al-Shuhada, 'Arabeh, al-Yamoun, Burqueen, Qabatia and Zababdeh.

Nablus: Nablus, Nablus and Balata refugee camp, Beit Dajan, 'Asira, Salfit, Bureen-Madama.

Tulkarem: Tulkarem, Tulkarem refugee camp, Nazlet Issa, Baqa Sharqia, Zeita, Sida.

Qalqilia: Qalqilia.

Bethlehem: Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Dheisheh refugee camp.

Hebron: Hebron (2), Fawar refugee camp, Beit Ummar, Dura, Bani Na'im, Beit Ula.

Jerusalem: Old City, A-Ram and Dahyat al-Bareed, Beit Hanina and refugee camp, Silwan, Ras al-Amoud, Sheikh Jarrah, and Wadi al-Joz.

Jericho: Jericho.

Ramallah: Ramallah, al-Bireh, Jalazoun refugee camp, Jifna, Beitunia, al-Mizra' al-Sharqia.

In the Gaza Strip, people were surveyed from Khan Younis (3), Rafah, Rafah/Bloc, Maghazi refugee camp, Sabra, Khan Younis refugee camp, Sheikh Radwan, al-Darag al-Tuffah, al-Nasr, Jabalia refugee camp, Shati refugee camp, Breige refugee camp, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun, Shaboura refugee camp, al-Rimal, Shoujai'a, Jabalia al-Balad, Deir al-Balah, Tal al-Sultan, Nseirat refugee camp.

From a randomly selected starting location in each sampling point, households were systematically selected using a predetermined selection interval. Since most population concentrations are not well-planned, nor is there a well-defined bloc system, interviewers — particularly in villages and refugee camps — were asked to go to a specific place (mosque, primary school, etc.) to begin their route. They were instructed to start from that place and then take, for example, the fourth street on their left. After having determined the street, they were instructed to choose the third house on their right, the following third house on their left, etc. The number of floors in each house was also taken into consideration as was the number of streets where the households were selected from. In cities, the same method was used, but included the division of the city into neighborhoods. When the 60 primary sampling points are selected from 2,400 units, a city like Gaza could be expected to be chosen 10 times since it has a population of 250,000. Due to size and for interview purposes, therefore, cities were divided into neighborhoods, which were also randomly selected and treated in the same way as a village for the selection of households.

Respondents within the households were selected using Kish tables. The Kish table is an objective, internationally accepted selection procedure. It consists of the interviewer asking the two following questions: (1) How many people aged 18 years and older reside in this household? and (2) How many of those are women? Based on the answer on these questions, the adult to be interviewed is selected according to the table below.

	1 Adult	2 Adults	3 Adults	4 or More Adults
No women	Adult 1	Eldest 3	Middle-aged 6	2nd oldest male 10
1 woman	Adult 2	Male or female 4	Youngest male 7	Middle-aged man 11
2 women		Youngest woman 5	Oldest woman 8	Oldest or youngest man 12
3 women			Middle-aged 9	Middle-aged woman 13
4 or more women				2nd youngest woman 14

Usually, three attempts are made to interview the selected household member. If, after three attempts, an interview has not been completed, a replacement household will be randomly selected from the next household block.

Validation procedures were conducted on 30 percent of the data to ensure accurate selection, recording, coding, and data entry of completed interviews.

b. Sample Distribution

- 56.4% of the respondents were from the West Bank, 6.9% from Jerusalem, 36.7% from the Gaza Strip.
- 31.6% said they live in villages; 23.9% in refugee camps; 44.5% in towns/cities.
- 51.2% were male; 48.8% were female.
- 59.2% were married; 28.8% single; 4.9% widowed; 1.4% divorced; 5.7% no answer.
- Average age of the respondents was 33 years.

c. Occupation of Respondents

- Students: 14.6%
- Laborers: 11.3%
- Housewives: 31.9%
- Farmers/fishermen: 1.8%
- Retired: 1.9%
- Businesspeople/Private business: 8.4%
- Employees (e.g., secretaries, municipal employees, teachers, nurses): 19.6%
- Professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers): 2.1%
- Unemployed 4.8%
- No answer: 2.4%

2. Survey of the Legislative Council

In September 1997, JMCC conducted a survey² within the Legislative Council in order not only to analyze the public's views, but also to take into account the opinions of the Council members themselves. Anonymity was emphasized in the research and the Council members were not obliged to mention their names on the questionnaires. Some of the questions asked of Council members were similar to those asked of people in the public opinion poll, in order to check potential discrepancies between the answers of Council members and the public.

Prior to the survey within the Legislative Council, JMCC sought and was given the cooperation of the office of the Speaker of the Legislative Council, Mr. Ahmad Qrei'. Two JMCC researchers attended 15 Council sessions, approaching the Council members to fill in the questionnaires. JMCC also handed out copies of the Oslo agreements during these Council sessions. Moreover, in each constituency, fieldworkers were sent out to approach those Council members who had not yet filled in their questionnaires. After one month, out of the 88 Council members, 43 filled in their questionnaires.

3. Interviews

To complete the picture, interviews were conducted with some key Council members, members of the Executive Authority, and members of the opposition groups. The interviewees were asked predetermined questions, some consistent with those asked in the survey for the Council members, and some additional questions depending on the affiliation and position of the interviewee.

² For questionnaire in English, see Annex 2.

PART ONE:

**VOTING PATTERNS OF THE
PALESTINIAN ELECTORATE**

I. EXPLANATION OF THE ELECTION RESULTS USING SURVEY MATERIALS

1. Perceptions of the Electorate

When examining the role of the Palestinian Legislative Council and its potential contribution to a more democratic environment, it is necessary to first examine how people voted and what factors moved them to vote for certain candidates, while rejecting others. Indeed, the composition of parliaments is not only a result of the type or political affiliation of the candidates and those politicians who did not participate in elections, but is also partly dependent upon the voting behavior of the electorate. Over the past year and a half, the role of the Legislative Council and its democratic responsibility¹ have come under scrutiny and criticism by the Palestinian public. However, democratic responsibility does not only go one way, from the elected Legislative Council to the electorate, but is a two-way channel; voters also have a responsibility² to elect Council members who respect democratic values. The main questions to be answered in this section, therefore, will be whether the Palestinian electorate behaved in a democratically responsible way during the elections. What were the main factors determining the vote or non-vote of members of the electorate? Was there a significant difference in voting behavior between people from the Gaza Strip and people from the West Bank? Or were gender, education, age, or even refugee status more important factors influencing voting behavior?


1.1. Did people vote in the 1996 elections?

Out of 1,195 people surveyed, 64.6% said that they voted in the elections of January 1996; 34.4% said they had not.³ While no striking differences were found between men and women or refugees and non-refugees in the decision to vote or not, area, education and age proved to be important factors. Also, as shown in Figure 1 below, voter participation was comparatively higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. In our sample, 72.7% of the interviewees in Gaza confirmed that they voted in the 1996 elections, compared to only 59.9% in the West Bank.

¹ Throughout this report, the term “democratic responsibility” of the Legislative Council implies the responsibility of Council members to represent the public in a democratic manner by adhering to certain accepted principles of democracy.

² Throughout this report, the term “democratic responsibility” of the public implies the responsibility of the electorate to elect a democratic, representative Legislative Council.


³ For full results of the public opinion poll, see Annex 3.

Figure 1

The fact that voter participation was higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank might be explained by the fact that at the time of the elections, people in the Gaza Strip felt the presence of the Palestinian Authority much more than people in the West Bank; Israeli troops redeployed from the major West Bank cities barely a month before the national elections, and most areas around these cities still remain under Israeli control. The redeployment map below (Figure 2) shows the subdivision of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into areas A, B and C. Area A consists of less than 3% of the West Bank and is the only area which falls under total Palestinian jurisdiction. In Area B, the Palestinian police assume responsibility for public order for the Palestinians and are deployed to accommodate Palestinian needs and requirements. However, in Area B, Israel continues to have the overriding responsibility for security. This area consists of approximately 22% of the West Bank. Area C, 75% of the West Bank, continues to fall under full Israeli jurisdiction.

Figure 2:

Oslo II Map Outlining Areas A, B, and C



Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace

Furthermore, Table 1 below indicates that the more educated people were, the more likely they were to have voted; older people tended to vote less than the younger generation. Indeed, 67.8% of the surveyed people who had a college education or above responded that they voted in the January 1996 elections, compared to 58.8% of the people who had up to primary school education. Similarly, 63.6% of the surveyed people between 18 and 25 years of age said that they voted in the January 1996 elections, compared to only 45.5% of the people over 55 years old.

Table 1: Did you vote in the January 1996 elections?

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary N=119	Up to prep N=221	Up to sec N=388	Some college N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Yes	58.8%	64.3%	65.7%	65.3%	67.8%	63.6%	64.2%	71.4%	69.5%	45.5%
No	38.7%	34.8%	34.0%	33.1%	31.3%	35.6%	35.5%	28.1%	28.6%	50.0%
No answer	2.5%	0.9%	0.3%	1.6%	0.9%	0.8%	0.3%	0.5%	1.9%	4.5%

1.2. Voting according to political affiliation

When analyzing voting behavior according to political affiliation, it should be noted that not all political factions participated in the January 1996 elections. Parties and factions such as Hamas, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) all decided to boycott the elections.

The main reason given by the opposition parties for boycotting the elections was that participation would have legitimized the Oslo agreements, which they feel do not sufficiently take into account fundamental Palestinian national rights and are an imposition of American-Israeli ideas on the Palestinians. As Qais 'Abdul Karim, a leader of the DFLP in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, better known as Abu Leila⁴, states:

The Legislative powers of the Council are restricted according to the Oslo agreements. We were keen to make clear to the Palestinian public that they would not be electing a parliament with the least degree of sovereignty or power to solve any of the main problems facing the Palestinian community. We wanted to make it clear that the Council that was going to be elected was a consultative body rather than a legislative body. The actual objective of the elections was to legitimize the Oslo agreements rather than to elect a body that represents the people.

⁴ The interview with Qais 'Abdul Karim was conducted in Ramallah on 29 July 1997.

The decision taken by opposition parties to boycott the elections was not an easy one. The question of whether or not to participate in the first Palestinian elections sparked intense debate and led to the formation of pro- and anti-participation camps within the different factions. The rift which emerged within the PFLP before the elections is one example. Riad Malki⁵ was the most prominent member of the PFLP to want the organization to participate in the elections. He explains his argument and why he feels the PFLP made a mistake by not entering the elections as follows:

Their arguments were very convincing, but you cannot take them out of context and speak in the abstract. You need to see the whole picture and be more realistic in terms of assessing and understanding the situation. Then, you cannot accept these arguments, you have to look for other arguments... I was saying that to protect the future of my political organization it was very important to enter the elections, because [the elections] would create new realities and historical changes. They will bring new faces, new realities, and a new status quo. And people who live in the past will be ignored and forgotten. I was saying that we cannot just say 'no' all the time [simply] because it is the easiest way. The most difficult thing is to say 'yes' and to see how this yes could be translated into a position, whereby you become more flexible in terms of how to adjust to new realities without losing your own identity and principles.

Nabil Sha'ath⁶, Council member and Palestinian Authority Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, summarized the arguments of the boycotting opposition parties more bluntly. In his opinion, there were two reasons why the opposition parties did not take part in the elections: one official and one real.

Their official reason, which to my mind was rubbish, was that if they had participated, it would have been an indirect approval of the Oslo accords. But, they said, had this been municipal council elections, we wouldn't have minded [participating]! That was their stated reason. The real reason was that at the time of the elections they felt that their chances of electing a decent contingent to the Council was so slim that they would really be scarred for a long time to come.

Indeed, it must be remembered that at the time of the elections, all facts on the ground were in favor of the political factions and figures supporting Oslo. The elections took place immediately after Israeli redeployment from the major West Bank towns and Palestinian flags were flying everywhere. Israeli flags had gone down and the Palestinian soldiers marching into West Bank towns were being received with great joy. At that time, people supported Oslo, because they were finally being given reason to hope. Political factions in support of Oslo benefited from this euphoric mood.

⁵ The interview with Riad Malki was conducted on 18 August 1997.

⁶ The interview with Dr. Nabil Sha'ath was conducted on 21 August 1997.

Table 2⁷ identifies each political party which took part the elections in January 1996, the number of candidates and winners from each participating party, and the percentage of the vote each political party received.

Table 2:

Affiliation	No. of candidates	No. of winners	Percentage of votes
Independent	503	35	57.51%
Fateh	77	50	30.90%
Palestinian People's Party	26	0	2.93%
Popular Struggle Front	12	0	0.74%
FIDA	11	1	2.04%
NDC	5	1	2.25%
Arab Liberation Front	8	0	0.65%
Liberty & Independence Bloc	5	1	1.64%
Palestinian Liberation Front	4	0	0.11%
Islamic Jihad Movement	4	0	0.24%
Future Bloc	4	0	0.19%
National Democratic Movement	3	0	0.19%
Islamic Struggle Movement	2	0	0.35%
Progressive National Bloc	2	0	0.05%
National Movement for Change	2	0	0.08%
Baath Party	1	0	0.06%
Palestinian National Coalition	3	0	0.08%
Total	672	88	100%

Source: CEC


Taking a closer look at Table 2, the most remarkable fact is that only 77 of 672 candidates ran on the Fateh list. This relatively small number can be explained by the fact that, at that time, PLO chairman and Fateh head Yasser Arafat did not want the Council elections to end up as internal Fateh elections. There were only 88 seats available in the Council. If more Fateh supporters were allowed on the Fateh list, the elections would have turned into an internal Fateh contest. Therefore, Arafat refused to allow many Fateh leaders to run on the party list, even when those candidates had been successful in the Fateh primaries, which had been held prior to the national elections. 'Abdel Fatah Hamayel, for example, a Fateh leader, came out first in the Ramallah constituency during the Fateh primaries. Nevertheless, he was not allowed to run as a Fateh candidate in the January 1996 elections, and consequently ran and won as an independent candidate. Other examples are people such as Qadoura Faris, also from the Ramallah area; Salah Tamari (Bethlehem); or Ziyad Abu Zayad (Jerusalem).

⁷ The data given in Table 2 are part of the official election data distributed by the Central Election Commission (CEC).

Some well-known, popular Fateh *intifada* leaders were also refused permission to run on the Fateh ticket. In this way, Arafat tried to prevent militant Fateh people winning the elections. The classic example is Hussam Khader, who ran and won in Nablus. He was a young, outspoken Fateh activist during the *intifada* from Balata camp near Nablus, and had been jailed by the Israelis as such. After being refused permission to run on the Fateh list, he joined the Liberty and Independence Bloc and became their only successful candidate. In an attempt to expand the boundaries of Fateh beyond young, popular *intifada* activists and respected long-time Fateh leaders, who were likely to gather a lot of support even when running outside the Fateh list, Arafat made sure that less well-known people and representatives of the traditional prominent families were included on the Fateh list. Arafat was to a large extent successful in his strategy. However, after the elections, a growing tendency surfaced. Within the Legislative Council, the Fateh people who ran outside the Fateh list proved to be more independent and more vocal than the people who had run on a Fateh ticket. People who ran as individuals were chosen for their own qualities and this became their strength, while some of the people who ran on the Fateh list now owe a lot of their success to Fateh. They are often less outspoken and their main loyalty appears to be to Fateh and to its head, Yasser Arafat.

Table 2 above also shows that 50 of the 77, or 65% of the Fateh candidates running for the Council elections were successful, and they received 30.90% of the votes. At first, this might seem inconsistent with Figure 3, which shows that 63.1% of the voters in our survey claimed that they voted for Fateh. However, the calculations below show that the official numbers of 30.9% and the 63.1% of the survey do not necessarily contradict one other.


Figure 3



The sample size for Figure 3 is 772 people. Consequently, according to the survey, 64.6% ($772 \div 1,195 \times 100$) of the people surveyed voted, while 35.4% of the interviewees did not vote ($1,195 - 772 = 423$. $423 \div 1,195 \times 100 = 35.4\%$). Of the 64.6% of the people who voted, 63.1% confirmed that they voted for Fateh, which corresponds with about 40.6% of people who actually voted for Fateh ($0.63 \times 772 = 486$ people who voted for Fateh. $486 \div 1,195 = 40.6\%$ of the total sample frame, who actually voted for Fateh).

The figure of 40.6% is relatively close to the official number, 30.9%, of people who voted for Fateh. Moreover, the fact that the 40.6% who said in our August 1997 survey that they had voted for Fateh corresponds with the 39.2% of people who said in a JMCC opinion poll in February 1996 (immediately after the elections) that they trusted Fateh most out of all political factions (see Figure 4), can only strengthen our belief in the reliability of these polls.

Figure 4



JMCC, February 1996

Although Hamas officially boycotted the elections, some of the candidates and winners had strong Hamas affiliations, mostly in the Gaza Strip. The results of the survey show that in the West Bank, 1.5% of the surveyed people voted for Hamas, compared to 4.1% in the Gaza Strip, almost three times higher. Moreover, younger and more educated people tended to vote more for Hamas than older and less educated people. This is not an unusual trend. In most countries, the young and more educated people tend to be more politically involved and militant. For example, the riots in several European countries at the end of the 1960s were instigated by the young and by students. More recently, the memory of Chinese

students rioting in Beijing's Tienamen Square is still fresh in people's minds. Main reasons for radical stands are usually a desire for change, frustration, or unemployment.

Table 3: Voting for Hamas according to:


Education (N=750)		Age (N=724)	
Up to primary school	2.9%	18-25	3.3%
Up to preparatory school	2.8%	26-35	2.6%
Up to secondary school	2.7%	36-45	2.1%
Some college	2.0%	46-55	2.7%
College and above	3.8%	55+	—

1.3. Reasons for not voting

According to a book on the first Palestinian National elections recently published by the Central Election Commission, the total number of Palestinians who registered to vote was 1,028,280 — 672,755 in the West Bank and 355,525 in the Gaza Strip.⁸ Eventually, an average of 75.86% of the population turned up and voted. As shown in Figure 5 below, voter turnout in general was lower in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, and was the lowest in Jerusalem and Hebron — the last large Palestinian towns remaining under occupation.

Figure 5

Voter turnout in the 1996 Palestinian elections



⁸ CEC book, p. 320.

As shown in Table 4 below, the three most important reasons given by survey respondents for not voting were:

1. **I didn't find candidates for whom I would cast my vote:** Younger and more educated people in particular cited this reason. This reason could be judged the most rational motive for not voting. People who gave this reason had decided not to vote out of rejection rather than apathy. Younger, educated people tended to be more critical, and hence more skeptical. They examined the candidates' qualifications, and perhaps also found that the political groups they support did not take part in the elections. They appear to be less compromising. By not voting, they were sending a message.
2. **I didn't register on time:** Less educated people tended to give this reason more frequently than those with higher education levels. Refugees cited this reason for non-voting more frequently than non-refugees.
3. **I didn't believe that it would make a difference:** This reason was given nearly twice as much by the least educated people than by the more educated people.

The second and third reasons appear to result more from indifference and apathy rather than active decision-making.

Table 4 also indicates that many of the respondents (31.6%) answered "other reasons" for not taking part in the elections. These 31.6% comprise mostly people who (1) were sick on the day of elections; (2) are 18 years old now, but were not at the time of the elections; (3) are returnees who did not receive their identity card in time for the elections.

Table 4: Why didn't you vote?


	Total	Refugee Status		Age				
		Non-refugee	Refugee	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=411	N=239	N=155	N=135	N=130	N=57	N=30	N=33
I didn't register on time	17.0%	14.6%	21.9%	20.0%	14.6%	10.5%	23.3%	24.2%
I didn't believe that it would make a difference	13.4%	12.1%	13.5%	11.1%	14.6%	14.0%	13.3%	15.2%
I didn't find candidates for whom I would cast my vote	21.9%	21.8%	21.9%	23.0%	23.8%	21.1%	13.3%	15.2%
Others	31.6%	32.6%	31.0%	29.6%	30.8%	33.3%	36.7%	39.4%
I am opposition/against Oslo	1.2%	1.3%	1.3%	1.5%	0.8%	3.5%	—	—
Not convinced	2.7%	2.9%	1.9%	3.7%	3.1%	3.5%	—	—
I was out of the country	5.1%	5.4%	4.5%	5.9%	3.8%	5.3%	3.3%	—
No answer	7.1%	9.2%	3.9%	5.2%	8.5%	8.8%	10.0%	6.1%

	Up to primary N=46	Up to prep. N=77	Up to sec. N=132	Some college N=104	College & above N=36
I didn't register on time	23.9%	14.3%	16.7%	20.2%	8.3%
I didn't believe that it would make a difference	15.2%	13.0%	13.6%	14.4%	8.3%
I didn't find candidates for whom I would cast my vote	10.9%	26.0%	22.7%	21.2%	27.8%
Others	45.7%	33.8%	30.3%	21.2%	36.1%
I am opposition/against Oslo	—	—	—	4.8%	—
Not convinced	—	2.6%	3.8%	3.8%	—
I was out of the country	2.2%	1.3%	4.5%	7.7%	13.9%
No answer	2.2%	9.1%	8.3%	6.7%	5.6%

1.4. Platforms and campaign slogans


Of the actual voters, it is clear that male voters were more familiar with the campaign slogans than female voters. Not only did 81.3% of male voters respond that they knew the platforms of the candidates, compared to only 66.0% of female voters, but nearly twice as many female voters, 27.7%, said that they were not familiar with the campaign slogans, compared to only 14.8% of male voters.

Figure 6



This does not necessarily mean that male voters were more responsible voters. The fact that women were less familiar with campaign slogans than men is partly because women often may be unable or are not allowed to attend campaign rallies or meetings. When JMCC asked in an opinion poll in February 1996 whether people had participated in any campaign rallies or meetings, only 29.0% of the interviewees replied positively, 41.3% of the men and only 18.1% of the women. About 68.7% of the surveyed people did not participate. Again, women participated less in campaign rallies than men. Of the men interviewed, 56.3% responded that they did not participate in any campaign meetings, while 79.6% of the women admitted that they did not take part in any rallies or meetings. Figure 7 below explains more about the reasons for not participating in such rallies.

Figure 7



Source: JMCC, February 1996

Women responded that they could not participate in a mixed meeting three times as frequently as men. Moreover, 55.3% of those men who did not participate in campaign rallies cited disinterest in such activities as the reason, compared to only 40.0% of women.

Table 5 below shows more differences which are compatible with the differences found in some of the tables above on voter behavior. The younger, more educated people knew the campaign slogans of the candidates much better than older and less educated people. This may be due to higher literacy rates among this group; it also could be that younger and more educated people, who also had a higher turnout, knew the platforms of the candidates better than the less educated and older people. As noted in Section 1.3, the more educated

better than the less educated and older people. As noted in Section 1.3, the more educated people who did not vote chose not to primarily because there was no candidate for whom they were prepared to cast their vote. If, for the purposes of this study, "democratic responsibility" is defined as voting for a democratic and representative Council, then younger and more educated people can be considered more responsible voters than older and less educated members of the electorate.

Table 5: When voting, were you familiar with the platform/campaign slogans of the candidates?

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Yes	54.3%	61.3%	74.5%	84.9%	87.2%	78.8%	72.8%	78.6%	%	%
No	42.9%	29.6%	20.4%	11.7%	10.3%	16.2%	23.0%	20.7%	%	%
No answer	2.9%	9.2%	5.1%	3.4%	2.6%	5.0%	4.3%	0.7%	5.5%	%

Knowledge of campaign slogans among the different sectors of Palestinian society largely corresponded with their answers when asked about the importance of campaigning in influencing their voting behavior in the 1996 elections. As Table 6 shows, the influence of campaigning was greater on men than on women, and was more important for the more educated Palestinian than the less educated voter.

Table 6: How important was the campaign when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Education				
		Male	Female	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	37.2%	40.9%	33.0%	32.9%	29.6%	37.3%	42.4%	43.6%
Important	32.3%	30.9%	34.0%	20.0%	35.2%	35.3%	34.6%	25.6%
Somewhat important	14.0%	14.8%	13.0%	12.9%	18.3%	13.7%	10.2%	17.9%
Not important	13.2%	11.0%	15.4%	21.4%	15.5%	12.5%	8.8%	10.3%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	1.5%	1.3%	1.4%	1.4%	0.4%	3.4%	—
No answer	1.9%	0.8%	3.2%	11.4%	—	0.8%	0.5%	2.6%

1.5. Important factors when voting

The people who voted in the January 1996 Palestinian elections were asked to rate the importance or influence of 13 factors on their voting behavior. Figure 8 ranks the factors according to the percentage of interviewees who said that a certain indicator was either "very important" or "important".

Figure 8

Importance of factors influencing voting behavior in 1996 elections

According to the public

	Important	
Education	92.8%	
Reputation	91.5%	
History of political struggle	89.5%	
Democratic values	88.3%	
Political affiliation	70.4%	
Campaign	69.5%	
Religion	64.7%	
Religious values	60.8%	
Socio-economic status	45.9%	
Family relations	43.4%	
Residence	43.3%	
Gender	32.7%	
Age	30.6%	

Of those 13 factors, there is a general agreement among the surveyed people concerning the degree of importance of (1) political affiliation; (2) history of political struggle, (3) socio-economic status, and (4) reputation. On some other factors, opinions were more divided, whether according to age, area, education, gender or refugee status.

1.5.1. Democratic values

The perceived adherence to democratic values by candidates was far more important for more educated people than for those people with less education.

Table 7: How important were democratic values, when you cast your vote?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=772	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	59.8%	41.4%	51.4%	60.8%	66.8%	74.4%
Important	28.5%	32.9%	39.4%	27.1%	24.9%	15.5%
Somewhat important	6.7%	10.0%	4.9%	8.2%	4.4%	7.7%
Not important	2.2%	7.1%	1.4%	2.0%	2.4%	—
Absolutely not important	0.8%	—	1.4%	0.8%	1.0%	—
No answer	1.9%	8.6%	1.4%	1.2%	0.5%	2.6%

1.5.2. Religion and religious values

Examining the results, it becomes clear that people are divided over the issues of religion and religious values. The only variable which does not seem important here is age group. All other factors affect the importance of religion and religious values considerably and in a similar manner. As Tables 8 and 9 indicate, religion and religious values are more important for women than for men, refugees than non-refugees. In the Gaza Strip, the importance of religious values and religion was rated higher than in the West Bank. Also, the more education people have, the less important religion and religious values seemed to be as an influence on their voting behavior.

There is a certain consistency with facts illustrated earlier. In Section 1.2, we said that people in the Gaza Strip voted for Hamas more often than people in the West Bank, which corresponds with the greater value placed on religion and religious values there. However, although religion and religious values appear to be less important factors for the more educated voter, Table 3 shows that the more educated appear to have voted for Hamas more frequently than the less educated. This apparent inconsistency can be explained by the fact that the more educated tend to look at Hamas from a political rather than religious standpoint, and thus support Hamas for its political agenda more than for its religious message.

Table 8: How important was religion when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	39.4%	32.0%	46.8%	29.4%	53.6%	33.2%	47.3%
Important	25.3%	27.4%	23.4%	23.8%	27.3%	26.2%	24.2%
Somewhat important	11.9%	14.3%	9.3%	14.6%	8.2%	13.9%	9.0%
Not important	19.3%	22.0%	16.5%	26.3%	9.4%	22.2%	16.1%
Absolutely not important	2.5%	2.8%	2.1%	4.0%	0.3%	2.8%	1.7%
No answer	1.7%	1.5%	1.9%	2.0%	1.3%	1.8%	1.7%

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	48.6%	38.0%	42.4%	36.1%	32.1%
Important	18.6%	28.2%	28.2%	23.9%	23.1%
Somewhat important	4.3%	12.7%	9.8%	15.1%	12.8%
Not important	17.1%	20.4%	18.0%	18.5%	24.4%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	—	1.2%	4.9%	5.1%
No answer	8.6%	0.7%	0.4%	1.5%	2.6%

Table 9: How important were religious values when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	34.2%	29.9%	38.6%	25.2%	47.0%	28.7%	41.1%
Important	26.6%	24.3%	29.0%	23.6%	30.7%	27.7%	26.2%
Somewhat important	16.3%	17.1%	15.4%	20.3%	10.7%	17.6%	14.4%
Not important	18.1%	22.8%	13.3%	24.1%	9.7%	19.9%	15.5%
Absolutely not important	2.3%	3.3%	1.3%	4.0%	—	2.8%	1.4%
No answer	2.5%	2.6%	2.4%	2.9%	1.9%	3.3%	1.4%

	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	44.3%	34.5%	36.5%	31.7%	23.1%
Important	21.4%	33.1%	27.8%	23.4%	24.4%
Somewhat important	8.6%	17.6%	17.3%	16.6%	16.7%
Not important	12.9%	14.8%	16.5%	21.5%	25.6%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	—	0.8%	4.9%	5.1%
No answer	10.0%	—	1.2%	2.0%	5.1%

1.5.3. Education


Candidates' educational level was a more important factor for people with higher education than for people with less education. However, in general, education was the most important factor for all voters when considering their vote for a certain candidate.

Table 10: How important was education when you cast your vote?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=772	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	59.3%	51.4%	62.0%	55.3%	62.4%	67.9%
Important	33.5%	31.4%	33.1%	37.6%	31.2%	26.9%
Somewhat important	3.0%	2.9%	2.1%	5.1%	1.5%	2.6%
Not important	2.2%	5.7%	2.8%	1.6%	2.0%	1.3%
Absolutely not important	0.4%	8.6%	—	0.4%	1.0%	—
No answer	1.6%	—	—	—	2.0%	1.3%

As a result of the high value placed on candidates' educational level in the election, the educational background of the majority of the Council members is impressive. As shown in Figure 9, 13 of the 88 Council members carry PhD's; eight hold a Master's degree, one has a Diploma, while 54 Council members studied for a Bachelor's degree. In other words, 76 out of the 88 Council members have at least one university degree.


Figure 9



Another way of illustrating the high level of education among Council members is by looking at their professions. As Figure 10 shows, a sizable number of Council members are involved in such professions as medicine, teaching, and law. Moreover, a large number of the Council members could be labeled as “career politicians”, because — even before being elected to the Council — they were involved in politics, whether as PA officials, ambassadors, negotiators, or mayors. There is a noticeable lack of Council representatives from the labor movement.

Figure 10

Council members / distribution by profession



1.5.4. Residence and family relations

The factors of residence and family relations are similar in their impact. Both factors did not have a significant influence on voting behavior. However, as shown in Tables 11 and 12 below, more educated people found residence and family relations less of an issue than people with less education. Moreover, the factors of residence and family relations remain more important in the Gaza Strip and among refugees than in the West Bank and among non-refugees. This may be explained by the fact that almost 80% of the population in the Gaza Strip are refugees⁹. Also, women in particular thought of residence as a more important factor than men. All these differences according to variables such as education, area, refugee status, and gender indicate a split in Palestinian society albeit on issues which have less influence on voting behavior. A part of Palestinian society continues to think and vote in a more traditional manner, with residence or family connections remaining key factors. Nonetheless, across all variables, a more modern society is emerging, and these Palestinians are more interested in the qualifications of candidates than in more traditional values.

⁹ UNRWA, Fact Sheet.

Table 11: How important was residence when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	19.7%	17.1%	22.6%	17.0%	23.5%	15.1%	25.4%
Important	23.6%	21.2%	26.3%	25.2%	21.3%	24.2%	22.8%
Somewhat important	19.4%	19.9%	18.9%	19.6%	19.1%	23.2%	15.8%
Not important	32.5%	36.1%	28.5%	33.8%	30.7%	33.0%	31.3%
Absolutely not important	2.6%	3.3%	1.6%	2.6%	2.5%	2.3%	2.8%
No answer	2.2%	2.3%	2.1%	1.8%	2.8%	2.3%	2.0%

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	12.9%	23.2%	21.6%	21.5%	10.3%
Important	22.9%	24.6%	29.0%	22.9%	11.5%
Somewhat important	22.9%	19.7%	18.4%	16.6%	23.1%
Not important	30.0%	31.0%	28.2%	33.2%	48.7%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	0.7%	1.6%	4.9%	1.3%
No answer	8.6%	0.7%	1.2%	1.0%	5.1%

Table 12: How important were family relations when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	15.8%	15.6%	15.4%	13.0%	19.7%	12.6%	19.4%
Important	27.6%	26.6%	28.7%	28.9%	25.7%	29.0%	25.9%
Somewhat important	19.6%	20.5%	18.6%	19.9%	19.1%	23.2%	15.5%
Not important	31.3%	31.2%	31.9%	33.3%	28.5%	30.5%	33.0%
Absolutely not important	3.6%	4.3%	2.9%	2.9%	4.7%	3.0%	3.9%
No answer	2.1%	1.8%	2.4%	2.0%	2.2%	1.8%	2.3%

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	18.6%	17.6%	14.9%	16.1%	12.8%
Important	18.6%	28.9%	32.9%	28.3%	16.7%
Somewhat important	20.0%	21.8%	17.6%	19.0%	21.8%
Not important	27.1%	29.6%	30.6%	30.7%	41.0%
Absolutely not important	5.7%	2.1%	3.9%	3.9%	2.6%
No answer	10.0%	—	—	2.0%	5.1%

1.5.5. Gender

The importance of gender seems to vary depending on which subgroup of Palestinian society is examined. The data show that the issue of gender is more important to women than to men, and that it is also more of an issue in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.

The greater importance of gender for women could be interpreted as the search for women to play a more significant role in Palestinian society, especially in the Gaza Strip, where the male remains the main breadwinner. Similarly, Gazan men may still be thinking largely in the traditional manner about women, where their role is primarily that of homemaker. Furthermore, more educated people seem to attach less importance to gender than less educated people. This phenomena can be explained by the fact that also the less educated may continue to see the role of women more traditionally, and thus give gender more importance. In contrast, gender is no longer an issue for the more educated people, because they recognize that a woman's professional capabilities could be equal to or better than those of a man. With more educated people, the traditional role model of women is declining.

Table 13: How important was gender when you cast your vote?

	Total	Gender		Area	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319
Very important	15.0%	13.8%	16.5%	12.1%	19.1%
Important	17.7%	15.9%	19.9%	15.7%	20.7%
Somewhat important	15.7%	17.4%	13.8%	16.6%	14.4%
Not important	44.3%	45.0%	43.1%	47.2%	40.1%
Absolutely not important	4.4%	5.6%	3.2%	5.5%	2.8%
No answer	2.8%	2.3%	3.5%	2.9%	2.8%

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	21.4%	14.1%	16.9%	14.1%	10.3%
Important	12.9%	19.7%	18.4%	18.5%	12.8%
Somewhat important	5.7%	18.3%	18.8%	13.2%	15.4%
Not important	44.3%	43.7%	42.4%	44.4%	51.3%
Absolutely not important	7.1%	2.1%	2.7%	6.8%	6.4%
No answer	8.6%	2.1%	0.8%	2.9%	3.8%

It is worth noting the success story of Palestinian female candidates in the first national elections. Five women out of a total of 88 Council members were elected to the Legislative Council, taking about 5.7% of the Council seats. This is a relatively high success rate for women when compared to the number of women in parliaments in other countries. In the recent elections in Jordan, for example, not a single woman managed to win a seat.


member Marwan Bargouthi¹⁰, who is also the Secretary-General of Fateh in the West Bank, explains further:

...[A] very important group of Palestinians respect women and are ready to elect women. They are different from the [people in other] Arab societies. Most of the Arab parliaments don't have women. For the first time, after a hundred years, in Jordan they elected one woman, four years ago. But among Palestinians, five women were elected. In the Israeli Knesset, they have nine women out of 120 [Knesset members]. So, if you compare the number of 5 out of 88 against 9 out of 120 in Israel, I think it is a positive point for the Palestinians.

Three out of the five female winners are from the Gaza Strip, an area which, as mentioned earlier, is more traditional in its thinking. Moreover, as Figure 11 illustrates, if we compare the number of successful women candidates with the success rate of male candidates, the success rate of women was comparatively higher. About 19.2% of female candidates were successful, compared to only 12.8% of the male candidates. Moreover, out of the five female Council members, two also became ministers. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi (Jerusalem) became Minister of Higher Education, and Intisar al-Wazir (Gaza City) was appointed Minister of Social Affairs.

Figure 11

Comparison between the number of candidates and winners
By gender



¹⁰ The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on 19 September 1997.

1.5.6. Age

The factor of age is the least important factor influencing the Palestinian voter. In general, people across the board attached similar weight to this factor, although more educated people saw age as even less important than those with lower educational levels.

The assessment that age was not a very important factor and that people did not necessarily vote for older people, who are traditionally considered as being wiser, corresponds with the fact that the Legislative Council is a relatively young parliament. The average age of the Council members is about 50.

Table 14: How important was age when you cast your vote?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=772	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78
Very important	11.7%	14.3%	8.5%	13.7%	12.2%	9.0%
Important	18.9%	12.9%	16.9%	25.1%	18.0%	11.5%
Somewhat important	19.6%	11.4%	26.1%	17.3%	20.5%	21.8%
Not important	43.9%	42.9%	45.8%	41.2%	42.9%	51.3%
Absolutely not important	3.8%	8.6%	1.4%	2.0%	4.9%	3.8%
No answer	2.2%	10.0%	1.4%	0.8%	1.5%	2.6%

1.6. Satisfaction with the Legislative Council

The people who voted in the first national elections were asked about their level of satisfaction with those candidates who made it to the Legislative Council, and for whom they themselves had voted. Two trends appear: first, older people voted less than younger people, but they expressed greater satisfaction with the Council members they voted for; and second, people with less formal education expressed greater satisfaction with elected Members they had voted for than more educated people. Further details on the Palestinian electorate's satisfaction with the Council will be provided in Part II of this report.

Table 15: Regarding the people you voted for who made it to the Council, are you satisfied with them, somewhat satisfied or dissatisfied with them?

	Total	Age				
		18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=772	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Satisfied	15.9%	14.9%	14.5%	18.6%	15.1%	26.7%
Somewhat satisfied	45.6%	51.5%	41.3%	44.1%	49.3%	40.0%
Dissatisfied	27.7%	22.8%	32.3%	29.7%	21.9%	20.0%
None made it to the PLC	7.9%	7.1%	9.4%	5.5%	12.3%	6.7%
No answer	2.8%	3.7%	2.6%	2.1%	1.4%	6.7%

	Education				
	Up to primary N=70	Up to prep. N=142	Up to sec. N=255	Some College N=205	College & above N=78
Satisfied	31.4%	16.2%	17.3%	9.8%	11.5%
Somewhat satisfied	32.9%	40.1%	45.1%	53.2%	48.7%
Dissatisfied	22.9%	34.5%	26.7%	25.9%	30.8%
None made it to the PLC	4.3%	7.7%	9.0%	7.8%	9.0%
No answer	8.6%	1.4%	2.0%	3.4%	—

1.7. Expectations

Asking people whether the election results met their expectations provided another way of measuring their level of satisfaction with the Legislative Council. The answers to this question at first seemed inconsistent with the trends which started to appear above. More educated people answered far more often that the election results met or somewhat met their expectations than less educated Palestinians. Moreover, nearly twice as many young people answered that the election results met or somewhat met their expectations than people 55 and over. Keeping in mind the skepticism of more educated voters, what could be seen as their higher level of responsibility in voting, and their greater dissatisfaction with the candidates who made it to the Legislative Council, the answers to the current question seem logical only when one acknowledges that the fulfillment of expectations is not necessarily positive, but could also be negative. In other words, the high percentage of more educated and younger Palestinians who responded that the election results had met their expectations should be interpreted as another expression of their skepticism and disappointment with the current situation.

Table 16: Did the election results meet your expectations?

	Total	Age				
		18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=1195	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Met my expectations	19.5%	17.9%	18.3%	23.6%	25.7%	16.7%
Somewhat met my expectations	37.7%	41.7%	39.3%	30.0%	37.1%	16.7%
Did not meet my expectations	28.3%	26.4%	29.0%	36.9%	21.0%	31.8%
No answer	14.5%	14.0%	13.4%	9.4%	16.2%	34.8%

	Education				
	Up to primary N=119	Up to prep. N=221	Up to sec. N=388	Some college N=314	College & above N=115
Met my expectations	18.5%	16.7%	19.8%	20.1%	25.2%
Somewhat met my expectations	22.7%	29.0%	37.6%	47.8%	43.5%
Did not meet my expectations	29.4%	37.1%	31.2%	22.0%	20.9%
No answer	29.4%	17.2%	11.3%	10.2%	10.4%

1.8. Level of rationality and responsibility in voting

When examining the results of the public opinion poll conducted on these first Palestinian elections, we found that there were major differences in voting behavior according to such variables as gender, area, refugee status and age. There were often significant differences between the voting behavior of less educated Palestinians and those with a higher formal education level. We had assumed that perceptions of rationality in personal voting behavior increased parallel to education. The data below affirm this assumption. When we asked respondents whether they thought people in general had voted rationally and responsibly, the less educated Palestinian thought so more than the more educated Palestinian. However, when asked if they themselves had voted rationally and responsibly, the Palestinians with less education responded that they voted less rationally and responsibly than people in general. More educated Palestinians, on the other hand, thought that they themselves voted more rationally and responsibly than people in general.

Table 17: Do you think people voted rationally or irrationally? What about you?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some College	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Rationally	44.6%	53.8%	45.7%	46.1%	40.4%	39.1%
Irrationally	43.8%	34.5%	38.5%	44.3%	49.0%	48.7%
No answer	11.6%	11.8%	15.8%	9.5%	10.5%	12.2%

Table 18: Do you think you voted rationally or irrationally?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Rationally	50.1%	43.7%	49.8%	52.8%	49.4%	53.9%
Irrationally	10.5%	9.2%	10.0%	12.6%	10.2%	7.0%
I did not vote	28.7%	32.8%	28.5%	26.3%	28.3%	28.7%
No answer	10.6%	14.3%	11.8%	8.2%	12.1%	10.4%

Table 19: Do you think people voted responsibly or irresponsibly?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Responsible	55.6%	57.1%	63.3%	59.0%	47.5%	47.5%
Irresponsibly	33.2%	30.3%	25.8%	31.7%	37.6%	45.2%
No answer	11.2%	12.6%	10.9%	9.3%	15.0%	7.0%

Table 20: Do you think you voted responsibly or irresponsibly?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Responsible	51.8%	45.4%	52.0%	54.4%	50.3%	57.4%
Irresponsibly	8.5%	7.6%	10.4%	8.8%	8.3%	4.3%
I did not vote	28.9%	33.6%	28.5%	27.1%	28.3%	27.8%
No answer	10.9%	13.4%	9.0%	9.8%	13.1%	10.4%

2. Perceptions of Council Members

In order to assess where, if any, the gaps are between the Palestinian public and its elected representatives and to complete the picture of the first Palestinian national elections, Council members were asked some of the same questions as the electorate: What factors do Council members think influenced people to vote for a certain candidate or not? How do Council members evaluate the Palestinian electorate? Do they feel Palestinian voter behavior was rational or irrational, responsible or irresponsible? To what extent do Council members feel that they have lived up to their promises, and how does their estimation correspond with the public's evaluation?

2.1. Important factors in voting

Council members were asked to determine the influence of 13 factors upon the voting behavior of the electorate, the same factors as those used in the public opinion poll (*see Section 1.5*) to evaluate the importance of certain influences upon the voting behavior of the electorate. The percentage in Figure 12 labeled "total" is the sum of the answers of Council members who responded that a certain factor was "very important" or "important". Figure 13 is a duplicate of Table 11 in Section 2A.5. It is reprinted here to clarify the differences in opinions between the general public and Council members concerning the importance of certain factors which influenced people when casting their votes in the first Palestinian national elections in January 1996.

In general, Council members know how people cast their votes in the last elections. The general public ranked education, reputation and history in the national struggle as the three most important factors influencing their voting behavior, and so did the Council members, albeit in a different order. The Council members overestimated the importance of history of political struggle, while underestimating the importance of education in the eyes of the electorate.

In some instances, however, Council members did not realize how influential some factors had been on voting behavior. For, example, the electorate ranks "democratic values" fourth with 88.3%; Council members placed it sixth in importance with 55.8%. Moreover, while Council members overestimated the importance of religious values in influencing Palestinian voters, they underestimated the importance of religion. Council members also thought gender was more of an issue for the public; 48.9% of Council members saw gender as important compared with only 32.7% of the electorate.

Figure 12

Importance of factors influencing voting behavior in 1996 elections

According to Council members

	Total	Very important	Important
History of struggle	88.4%	55.8%	32.6%
Reputation	83.7%	62.8%	20.9%
Education	74.5%	23.3%	51.2%
Religious values	65.1%	16.3%	48.8%
Political affiliation	60.5%	25.6%	34.9%
Democratic values	55.8%	30.2%	25.6%
Campaign	51.2%	16.3%	34.9%
Family relations	51.2%	18.6%	32.6%
Gender	48.9%	14.0%	34.9%
Socio-economic status	41.9%	9.3%	32.6%
Religion	37.3%	14.0%	23.3%
Residence	34.9%	2.3%	32.6%
Age	25.6%	2.3%	23.3%

Figure 13

Importance of factors influencing voting behavior in 1996 elections

According to the general public

	Important
Education	92.8%
Reputation	91.5%
History of struggle	89.5%
Democratic values	88.3%
Political affiliation	70.4%
Campaign	69.5%
Religion	64.7%
Religious values	60.8%
Socio-economic status	45.9%
Family relations	43.4%
Residence	43.3%
Gender	32.7%
Age	30.6%

2.2. Electorate's rationality and responsibility in voting

In order to explain the results of Tables 22 and 23 below, some calculations are in order. The numbers 1 to 10 in Tables 22 and 23 were given the following codes:

Table 21:

#	Codes
1 & 2	very responsible/ very rational
3 & 4	moderately responsible/ moderately rational
5 & 6	neither
7 & 8	moderately irresponsible/moderately irrational
9 & 10	very irresponsible/very irrational

The calculations below, explain the data in Tables 22 and 23:

Concerning the level of rationality:

- $(1 \times 4) + (2 \times 5) + (3 \times 14) + (4 \times 5) + (5 \times 12) + (7 \times 3)$
 $= 4 + 10 + 42 + 20 + 60 + 21$
 $= 157$
- $157 : (N=43) = 3.65$
- Result: Council members give Palestinian voters in the last elections a positive evaluation of 3.65, which can be translated as moderately rational.

Concerning the level of responsibility:

- $(1 \times 4) + (2 \times 7) + (3 \times 10) + (4 \times 9) + (5 \times 4) + (6 \times 2) + (7 \times 6) + (8 \times 1)$
 $= 4 + 14 + 30 + 36 + 20 + 12 + 42 + 8$
 $= 166$
- $166 : (N=43) = 3.86$
- Result: Council members gave Palestinian voters a positive evaluation of 3.86, which can be translated as moderately responsible.

Table 22: On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very rational and 10 very irrational, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	5	11.6%
3	14	32.6%
4	5	11.6%
5	12	27.9%
6	—	—
7	3	7.0%
8	—	—
9	—	—
10	—	—

Table 23: On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very responsible and 10 very irresponsible, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	7	16.3%
3	10	23.3%
4	9	20.9%
5	4	9.3%
6	2	4.7%
7	6	14.0%
8	1	2.3%
9	—	—
10	—	—

As shown above, in the minds of Council members, the Palestinian voter scored rather well in terms of their rational and responsible voter behavior. When compared with the results of the public opinion poll on the level of rationality and responsibility in voting (*see Section 1.8*), we can deduce that the Council members rated the rationality and responsibility of the voter higher than the public itself did. However, compared with the rating of individual voters concerning their own rationality and responsibility, the Council members' rating of moderate rationality and moderate responsibility is lower and probably more accurate. In order to perform a further check on the opinions of the general public and Council members concerning the level of rationality and responsibility of the Palestinian electorate, both the electorate and the Council members were asked whether, in their opinion, people know how to vote for the right candidate.


Table 24 shows that the responses of the interviewees in the public survey were rather harsh. Only 23.5% of the interviewees felt that people knew how to vote for the right candidate. Moreover, trends similar to those shown in Tables 17 and 19 (*see Section 1.8*) appear. Here also, more educated people are more skeptical than less educated Palestinians. While 35.3% of the interviewees who received up to primary level schooling answered that, in general, people knew how to vote for the right candidate, only 17.4% of the interviewees who went to college and above shared this opinion.

Table 24: Do you think that, in general, people know how to vote for the right candidate?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Yes	23.5%	35.3%	27.6%	22.4%	18.8%	17.4%
Some	51.8%	44.5%	48.4%	54.1%	54.5%	54.8%
No	20.0%	13.4%	20.4%	20.1%	21.0%	24.3%
No answer	4.7%	6.7%	3.6%	3.4%	5.7%	3.5%

Figure 14 indicates that, in general, Council members have a better opinion of the people's ability to vote for the right candidate than the electorate itself does. Among the general public, only 23.5% feel positively about the people's knowledge of how to vote for the right candidate, compared to 32.6% of Council members. Moreover, 20% of the interviewees in the public opinion poll answered that people do not know how to vote for the right candidate, compared with only 2.3% of Council members

Figure 14



2.3. Promises and campaign slogans

This section will examine whether Council members think that, in general, they have lived up to the promises made during their campaigns and how their evaluation compares with that of the electorate.

Table 25 presents a summary of the campaign promises made by successful candidates, and is based on a study conducted by JMCC in October 1996.¹¹ This study includes the details of all Council members and the five priorities listed by Council members. It should be noted, though, that out of the 88 Council members, 26 members failed to provide a list of their priorities. The purpose of the summary provided in Table 25 below, therefore, is to

¹¹ For further information, see: The Palestinian Council, JMCC, October 1996. A second edition of the Arabic version is available, and a second edition of the English version is forthcoming.

give a general idea of Council members' promises as a source of information. However, it does not fully represent the promises of all successful candidates.

Table 25:

Promises & campaign slogans	#
1. Establishing uniform laws, encouraging social justice, rule of law, separation of powers, and good administration; activate the Legislative Council; consolidate parliamentary life; issue Council bylaws	32
2. Social and economic development; independent national economy; investment encouragement	31
3. Democracy	23
4. Upgrading education	22
5. Women's rights, equality	17
6. Health care; health insurance	16
7. Fight corruption; curtail favoritism	15
8. Human rights	14
9. Institution-building	13
10. National unity; national integration; conciliation between political forces & Authority	12
11. Improved infrastructure	10
12. Reduce unemployment; create job opportunities	10
13. Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital; strengthen Palestinian presence in Jerusalem	7
14. Freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of press	7
15. Rural development; opportunities in agricultural & border areas	7
16. Continue process of national independence and the implementation of the agreements with Israel; achieve a better future and state	6
17. Environment	6
18. Development of cultural dimensions	6
19. Continue and follow-up with the peace process and the final status negotiations	5
20. Solve the housing problem; improve living conditions; provide secure accommodation for all; reduce high prices of renting & housing	5
21. End settlements and bypass roads	5
22. Strengthen regional & international relations	5
23. Release prisoners & detainees	5
24. Solve the refugee problem	4
25. Monitor the PA	4
26. Youth & development	4
27. Independent judiciary	3
28. Coordination between the different security apparatuses	3
29. Water	3
30. Development for poor, martyrs' families, and wounded	3
31. Increase in wages	3
32. Care for needs of childhood	2
33. Development of tax systems	2
34. National programs to link the West Bank with the Gaza Strip; safe passage	2
35. Create independent sources of energy	2
36. Upgrade the performance of the negotiators	2
37. Establish free industrial zones	2
38. Create an environment of security & stability	2
39. Others (Establish Ministry of Prisoners, Martyrs & Wounded; encourage cooperative & non-governmental activities; remove settlers from inside Hebron; passports for Diaspora Palestinians; compliance with Islam; include Samaritan community; end Israeli occupation; establish a multi-party system; role of the mosques in society, etc.)	14

When Council members were asked whether the Council in general has lived up to campaign promises, only 14.0% answered positively; 23.3% answered negatively. However, when Council members were asked whether they themselves, as individuals, had lived up to their campaign slogans, 41.9% answered positively and only 7.0% negatively. Therefore, it seems safe to say that Council members have a more favorable opinion of their own performance in this respect than of their colleagues'.


Figure 15 below shows that a high number of Council members felt that the Council in general and even they themselves had only lived up to their campaign slogans to "some extent". Perhaps this could be interpreted in an apologetic manner. Council members might have wanted to live up to their promises, but found barriers on their way. Dr. Nabil Sha'ath, Council member and Minister of Planning and International Trade, explains what happened to him in his constituency of Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip:¹²

I remember, I was in the unique position of being the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation when I ran for the elections. ...I signed the contract [for the building of the harbor] and [French] President Chirac came to inaugurate the port which is only about 10 kilometers to the north of Khan Younis. I knew it was going to employ 3,000 people. So, I told them [his Khan Younis constituency] that I was sure that 'out of these 3,000 people, at least 2,000 will come from your community. So, not only will you be building a port that will open up your roads to freedom, but you will be employed for the next two years building it.' Where is the port? I was not able to achieve it. Where is the harbor? Not even one stone has been put to building it. ...Is it because I failed as a Minister or as a member of the Parliament? ...Before the Council's first meeting, the bombs started ticking and two months later, Netanyahu started ticking, so the whole Authority has not delivered anything. In fact, we have nothing but setbacks, we are going back all the time. The sieges are worse, the closures are more horrible, Israel's settlements are expanding tenfold. So, if you want to relate this to the failure of the Parliament, it has failed miserably! It was not able to achieve anything! This is what they call spurious correlation. I mean, when you correlate, let's say, over 10 years the price of whiskey in New York and the salaries of clergymen in Cuba. They will correlate, but they have nothing to do with each other.

¹² Interview conducted with Dr. Nabil Sha'ath on 21 August 1997.

Figure 15

Opinions of Council members on whether they themselves, and Council Members in general, have lived up to their campaign slogans




When the Palestinian electorate was surveyed on the issue, only 12.9% of those interviewed felt that Council members had kept their promises, while 62.2% felt that they had not. It should be noted, however, that interviewees in the public opinion poll were not given the option of answering that Council members had lived up to their promises "only to a certain extent". This was done intentionally in order to push the interviewees to give a clear positive or negative answer.

There were no significant differences in people's opinions on this issue across the variables of gender, area, age or education. However, as Figure 16 below indicates, refugees responded more often than non-refugees that Council members have not lived up to their promises. This may be explained by the fact that the expectations of refugees were higher than those of non-refugees. Due to their living conditions and status, refugees are the subgroup of Palestinian society which has seen the least benefits from the peace process. In January 1996, refugees particularly viewed the election of a Legislative Council as a first step on the road to an independent Palestinian state. Instead, the peace negotiations have been stalled for much of the past two years; the Palestinian Authority has been confronted with an intransigent Netanyahu government; and frustration and unemployment has been growing due to the worsening economic conditions and the continuing closure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The refugees were not only expecting a lot from the Legislative Council, but they are the ones hardest hit by the deteriorating political and economic situation. Moreover, they may feel that their expectations were misplaced, as it seems that the policy of the Palestinian leadership is to

the policy of the Palestinian leadership is to postpone doing anything about the refugee problem until the issue of refugees is addressed in final status negotiations with Israel.

Figure 16




II. PROSPECTIVE VOTING BEHAVIOR IN FUTURE ELECTIONS

The previous sections examined the voting behavior of the general public in the first Palestinian national elections in January 1996, both from the public's point of view and from the perspective of Council members. This section will address the question of future elections and, by asking similar questions as in the previous sections, will attempt to shed some light on how the general public may vote in the future, whether the turnout will be as high as in the last elections, and whether people will vote according to the same criteria. If not, which factors will gain in importance and which factors will have less influence in people's voting decisions? For what reasons would people decide not to vote in future elections?

1. Would People Vote in Future Elections?

Out of the 1195 people surveyed, 67.5% said that they would vote again in the next elections; 25.8% replied that they would not. Less people now said that they would not vote in future elections than said they had not voted in 1996. Also, whereas concerning the last elections, only 1.0% of the interviewees did not answer the question in the poll of whether or not they had voted, in this instance, 6.7% of them did not answer. Regardless of whether or not this 6.7% will decide to vote in the future, voter turnout will be even higher than in the last elections. In general, it is clear that people remain enthusiastic about participating in any future elections.

Figure 17



As shown in Figure 17 above, Gazans remain more enthusiastic than West Bankers about participating in the next elections. While 72.4% of the interviewees in Gaza replied that they would participate in the next elections, only 64.7% of the surveyed people in the West Bank responded positively. Moreover, about 5% more people in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip stated that they would not vote in the next elections. However, although there is a gap between the levels of enthusiasm between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the results of the survey indicate that it has become less pronounced than at the last elections. In fact, with regard to the last elections it was assumed that people in the Gaza Strip voted more than people in the West Bank because they felt the presence of the Palestinian Authority more. The fact that the gap between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has now decreased — with more people in the West Bank now saying they will vote in future elections — may be explained by the fact that people in the West Bank also increasingly feel the presence of the Palestinian Authority, and thus feel a greater desire or national obligation to participate in the next elections.

Table 26 indicates that better educated Palestinians replied that they would participate in the next elections with greater frequency than less educated people. Compared to the results on the question on voter participation during the last elections (*Chapter One, Section 1.1*), the gap between less educated and more educated people concerning participation in elections increased further. About 73.0% of the people with a college education or more confirmed that they would vote in the next elections, compared to only 59.7% of the interviewees with only primary level schooling. In addition, whereas 30.3% of the surveyed people with primary school education said that they would not participate in the next elections, only 20.9% of the people who went to college and above said so.

Table 26: Would you say that you would vote again in the next elections?

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	59.7%	62.0%	70.4%	69.4%	73.0%	70.4%	63.7%	68.0%	74.3%	54.5%
No	30.3%	31.7%	25.3%	22.9%	20.9%	23.2%	29.5%	25.1%	18.1%	33.3%
No answer	10.1%	6.3%	4.4%	7.6%	6.1%	6.3%	6.8%	6.9%	7.6%	12.1%

Those people who answered that they were going to vote in the next elections were then asked whether or not they would vote according to the same criteria. In general, out of the 807 people who said that they would vote in the next elections, 23.8% replied that they would vote according to the same criteria, 27.9% answered that they would not vote in quite the same way; and 27.6% said that they would vote in a totally different way. About 17.2% said that they could not make a comparison, because they did not participate in the last elections.

Table 27: Would you vote according to the same or not quite the same criteria, or would you vote in a totally different way?


	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=807	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
According to the same criteria	23.8%	29.6%	24.1%	21.6%	25.2%	20.2%
Not quite in the same way	27.9%	25.4%	26.3%	27.8%	29.8%	25.0%
Vote in totally different way	27.6%	22.5%	24.1%	33.0%	24.3%	32.1%
Didn't vote	17.2%	18.3%	19.7%	16.1%	16.5%	19.0%
No answer	3.5%	4.2%	5.8%	1.5%	4.1%	3.6%

	Age				
	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
According to the same criteria	21.0%	26.2%	22.5%	28.2%	30.6%
Not quite in the same way	32.2%	24.5%	26.1%	26.9%	25.0%
Vote in totally different way	27.3%	28.3%	32.6%	24.4%	16.7%
Didn't vote	16.9%	2.6%	13.0%	17.9%	19.4%
No answer	2.6%	18.5%	5.8%	2.6%	8.3%

Legislative Council members were also asked to state their opinion on whether or not the electorate in the next elections would vote according to the same criteria or not quite. Significantly, only 7.0% of Council members thought that people would vote according to the same criteria. The majority of Council members, 69.8%, said that people would not vote in quite the same way in the next elections; 20.9% responded that the electorate would vote in a totally different way in the future.

The value of the Council members' responses lies in the fact that only a few Council members think that people would vote according to the same criteria used in the last elections. This might indicate that Council members know that people are not very satisfied with their elected representatives, and are bound to amend their criteria when casting their vote in the next elections. Moreover, the results imply an implicit acknowledgment by Council members that something in the performance of the Legislative Council is not quite right.

Figure 18



2. Reasons for not Voting in Future Elections

Of those surveyed, 25.8%, or 308 interviewees, who had responded earlier that they would not vote in the next elections were asked about the reasons for this decision. As indicated in Table 28 below, 44.5% answered that they would not vote in the next elections because they do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people. The second reason, given by 26.0% of these people, is that voting would not make a difference. Both reasons are negative, the former more specific and the latter more general.

People in the Gaza Strip and refugees in general said that they do not believe the PLC represents the interests of the people more frequently than people in the West Bank and non-refugees. Indeed, 53.6% of the people in the Gaza Strip who said that they would not vote in the next elections said it was because they do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people; only 40.3% of the surveyed people in the West Bank said this. Of refugees, 48.9% said that they would not vote in the next elections because they do not think that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people, compared to only 39.6% of non-refugees. As noted earlier, refugees had higher expectations of the Legislative Council than non-refugees, but were at the same time the hardest hit by the deteriorating conditions in the autonomous areas. This could also explain why people in the Gaza Strip cite this reason more often, as the number of refugees living

in the Gaza Strip is disproportionately higher than the number of refugees living in the West Bank.

A closer look at the results in Table 28 also reveals that better educated people answered that they would not vote in the next elections because they do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people far more frequently than those with less education. Indeed, in our sample, only 19.4% of the people with primary school education replied that they would not vote in the next elections because they do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people, compared to 54.2% of the surveyed people who went to college and above. In addition, while only 20.8% of the people who went to college and above responded that they would not vote because it would not make a difference, 25.0% of the people who only went up to primary school cited this reason. Again, this could be explained by the fact that more educated people may be more informed about political developments or the lack of achievements by the Legislative Council, and therefore more critical. So, perhaps for this reason, more educated people are more inclined to give a specific reason for their refusal to vote in the next elections, such as that they do not believe that the Legislative Council represents the interests of the people. The more general reason for not voting in the next elections — because it would not make a difference — was cited more by people with lower educational levels, possibly because they are less informed and thus less critical. The same trend can be detected in regard to the variable of age. The younger generation — more critical and militant — gave the specific reason for not voting in the next election five times more frequently than the older generation of people over 55 years old.

Table 28: Why wouldn't you vote again?

	Total	Area		Refugee or Not	
		West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=308	N=211	N=97	N=164	N=135
It wouldn't make any difference	26.0%	24.2%	29.9%	23.2%	29.6%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	44.5%	40.3%	53.6%	39.6%	48.9%
Other reasons	21.4%	26.1%	11.3%	26.2%	16.3%
Don't believe in the PLC/ they're not going to fulfill their promises	1.0%	1.4%	—	1.2%	0.7%
No answer	7.1%	8.1%	5.2%	9.8%	4.4%

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=36	N=70	N=98	N=72	N=24
It wouldn't make any difference	25.0%	31.4%	24.5%	23.6%	20.8%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	19.4%	42.9%	49.0%	51.4%	54.2%
Other reasons	47.2%	18.6%	15.3%	19.4%	25.0%
Don't believe in the PLC / they are not going to fulfill their promises	—	1.4%	2.0%	—	—
No answer	8.3%	5.7%	9.2%	5.6%	—

	Age				
	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=88	N=108	N=51	N=19	N=22
It wouldn't make any difference	23.9%	26.9%	23.5%	15.8%	27.3%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	56.8%	42.6%	45.1%	42.1%	9.1%
Other reasons	13.6%	17.6%	25.5%	42.1%	50.0%
Don't believe in the PLC / they are not going to fulfill their promises	1.1%	1.9%	—	—	—
No answer	4.5%	11.1%	5.9%	—	13.6%

3. Important Factors When Voting in Future Elections

In order to be able to measure the influence of certain factors on voting behavior in future elections, those surveyed were asked to determine the importance of the same set of factors cited earlier in this report in the assessment of voting behavior during the last elections. Figure 19 ranks the selection of factors which the interviewees said would be relevant when deciding to vote for a certain candidate in future elections, according to their importance.

Of those 13 factors, there was general agreement with regard to the degree of importance of (1) political affiliation, (2) age, and (3) reputation. On some other factors, opinions remain more divided, whether by the subgroups of gender, area, refugee status, education, or gender. In comparison with voting behavior of the surveyed people during the last elections, it is clear that some gaps between these subgroups increased, while others decreased.

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=36	N=70	N=98	N=72	N=24
It wouldn't make any difference	25.0%	31.4%	24.5%	23.6%	20.8%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	19.4%	42.9%	49.0%	51.4%	54.2%
Other reasons	47.2%	18.6%	15.3%	19.4%	25.0%
Don't believe in the PLC / they are not going to fulfill their promises	—	1.4%	2.0%	—	—
No answer	8.3%	5.7%	9.2%	5.6%	—

	Age				
	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=88	N=108	N=51	N=19	N=22
It wouldn't make any difference	23.9%	26.9%	23.5%	15.8%	27.3%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	56.8%	42.6%	45.1%	42.1%	9.1%
Other reasons	13.6%	17.6%	25.5%	42.1%	50.0%
Don't believe in the PLC / they are not going to fulfill their promises	1.1%	1.9%	—	—	—
No answer	4.5%	11.1%	5.9%	—	13.6%

3. Important Factors When Voting in Future Elections

In order to be able to measure the influence of certain factors on voting behavior in future elections, those surveyed were asked to determine the importance of the same set of factors cited earlier in this report in the assessment of voting behavior during the last elections. Figure 19 ranks the selection of factors which the interviewees said would be relevant when deciding to vote for a certain candidate in future elections, according to their importance.

Of those 13 factors, there was general agreement with regard to the degree of importance of (1) political affiliation, (2) age, and (3) reputation. On some other factors, opinions remain more divided, whether by the subgroups of gender, area, refugee status, education, or gender. In comparison with voting behavior of the surveyed people during the last elections, it is clear that some gaps between these subgroups increased, while others decreased.

Figure 19**Importance of 13 factors when voting in future elections**

According to the general public

	Important	
Education	92.6%	
Democratic values	92.4%	
Reputation	90.4%	
Struggle history	88.4%	
Campaign	75.0%	
Political affiliation	67.5%	
Religious values	61.1%	
Religion	60.8%	
Socio-economic status	48.6%	
Residence	43.7%	
Family relations	41.1%	
Age	35.7%	
Gender	33.9%	

For the purpose of comparison, Figure 20 below was added, ranking the influence of these factors on voting behavior in the last elections. In general, a comparison between the results of Figures 19 and 20 indicate that in the next elections the importance of education will remain the same. Moreover, the influence of the candidates' perceived adherence to democratic values will gain in importance when people voting in the future, prevailing slightly over the importance of reputation and history of political struggle in evaluating potential Council members. In addition, the results indicate that in the next elections more attention will be given by the electorate to the candidates' campaigns. In fact, there could be a trend whereby the content and quality of the campaigns become more important than candidates' political affiliation. The remaining factors, such as religious values, religion, socio-economic status, residence, family relations, age, and gender fluctuate a little in importance, but not sufficiently to produce major changes in the way people are going to cast their votes in the next elections.

Figure 20**Importance of factors influencing voting behavior in last elections**

According to the general public

	Important	
Education	92.8%	
Reputation	91.5%	
History of political struggle	89.5%	
Democratic values	88.3%	
Political affiliation	70.4%	
Campaign	69.5%	
Religion	64.7%	
Religious values	60.8%	
Socio-economic status	45.9%	
Family relations	43.4%	
Residence	43.3%	
Gender	32.7%	
Age	30.6%	

3.1. Democratic values

As indicated in Table 29 below, 92.4% of the surveyed people found adherence to democratic principles by a candidate either important or very important in deciding whether or not to vote for that candidate in the next elections. Only 1.3% of the people thought that adherence by a candidate to democratic principles was irrelevant in their decision to vote for him/her in the next elections. Although the results give an encouraging picture of voters' developing sense of democratic responsibility, the gap which emerged in the last election between more educated and less educated people remains. Whereas 84.5% of the surveyed people with primary level education thought that a candidate's adherence to democratic values would be important (very important or important) when voting in future elections, 91.6% of those who went to college and above thought so.

Table 29: How important will be democratic values when you vote in coming elections?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=807	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	65.1%	53.5%	51.8%	68.9%	72.5%	70.2%
Important	27.3%	31.0%	41.6%	26.0%	20.2%	21.4%
Somewhat important	3.7%	5.6%	5.8%	3.3%	3.2%	2.4%
Not important	1.2%	2.8%	—	1.1%	0.5%	1.2%
Absolutely not important	0.1%	—	—	—	0.5%	—
No answer	2.6%	7.0%	0.7%	0.7%	3.2%	4.8%

3.2. *Religion and religious values*

The factors of religion and religious values are discussed together because the results of the survey indicate many similar trends between these two factors. The importance of the factors of religion and religious values lies in the level of division which appears between the different subgroups of those surveyed where these values are concerned. All the gaps in opinion found between the different subgroups in regard to the influence of religion and religious values on voting behavior in the last elections, remain consistent.

Religion and religious values remain more important for women than for men. While 54.7% of the surveyed men said that religion was important (very important or important), 67.3% of the women found this factor important. Similarly, whereas respect for religious values by a candidate was important (very important or important) for 56.6% of the male interviewees, it was important for 66.0% of the women.

Religion and religious values remain also more important in the Gaza Strip and among refugees than in the West Bank and among non-refugees. Only 53.0% of West Bankers think that religion is going to be an important (very important or important) factor when casting their votes in the next elections, compared to 73.0% of Gazans. And while 56.4% of non-refugees feel that religion will play a role in their votes in the next elections, 67.9% of refugees think that religion will be an important factor influencing their selection of candidates. Similarly, 49.2% of the people surveyed in the West Bank felt that religion and religious values would have an impact on their voting behavior, compared to 79.3% of the people in Gaza Strip who said so. In addition, 56.6% of non-refugees interviewed answered that religious values will be an important factor when casting their vote in the next elections, compared to 68.7% of refugees.

As usual, there is also a gap in opinion caused by differing levels of education. Religion and religious values appear to be much less important for more educated people than for less educated people. While 69.0% of the people who received up to primary schooling replied that religion would have an important impact when casting their vote in the next elections, only 50.0% of the people who went to college and above agreed. Also, only 50.0% of the people who went to college and above felt that religious values would be an important asset for a candidate in the next elections, compared to 70.4% of the surveyed people who only went up to primary school.

Table 30: How important will religion be when you vote in coming elections?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	36.4%	30.0%	42.8%	29.7%	46.9%	32.0%	44.0%
Important	24.4%	24.7%	24.5%	23.3%	26.1%	24.4%	23.9%
Somewhat important	16.0%	17.7%	14.2%	18.2%	12.6%	18.1%	12.6%
Not important	18.2%	21.5%	14.7%	23.5%	10.1%	21.1%	14.4%
Absolutely not important	2.7%	3.9%	1.5%	3.5%	1.6%	2.6%	2.6%
No answer	2.2%	2.2%	2.3%	1.8%	2.8%	1.9%	2.6%

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	49.3%	34.3%	39.9%	34.9%	21.4%
Important	19.7%	28.5%	27.1%	19.7%	28.6%
Somewhat important	11.3%	17.5%	13.2%	17.9%	19.0%
Not important	11.3%	19.0%	16.5%	20.2%	23.8%
Absolutely not important	4.2%	-	2.6%	4.1%	3.6%
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.7%	3.2%	3.6%

Table 31: How important will religious values be when you vote in coming elections?

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	34.3%	30.0%	38.7%	24.5%	49.4%	28.1%	44.0%
Important	26.8%	26.6%	27.3%	24.7%	29.9%	28.5%	24.7%
Somewhat important	14.7%	15.5%	13.9%	17.6%	10.4%	16.5%	12.1%
Not important	19.0%	23.0%	14.4%	26.8%	6.9%	21.8%	14.4%
Absolutely not important	2.6%	2.7%	2.6%	4.1%	0.3%	3.0%	1.7%
No answer	2.6%	2.2%	3.1%	2.2%	3.1%	2.1%	3.2%

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	47.9%	32.8%	35.2%	33.9%	22.6%
Important	22.5%	28.5%	30.4%	21.6%	27.4%
Somewhat important	8.5%	16.1%	12.8%	16.5%	20.2%
Not important	14.1%	19.7%	16.8%	22.9%	21.4%
Absolutely not important	2.8%	—	2.9%	3.2%	4.8%
No answer	4.2%	2.9%	1.8%	1.8%	3.6%

3.3. *History of political struggle*

In general, the influence of a candidate's history of political struggle remains an important factor in people's decision whether or not to vote for him or her. However, a trend is appearing whereby the more educated people are, the less important the factor of a candidate's history of struggle appears to be. Indeed, while 84.5% of the people who had a primary school education continue to see a candidate's history of struggle as an important factor (very important or important), only 79.8% of the people who went to college and above thought so. Also, twice as many people who went to college and above replied that a candidate's history of struggle would not be important when voting in the next elections as people with only primary level education.

This trend might be an indication that more educated people becoming less impressed with what a candidate did in the past and increasingly interested in a candidate's ability to improve their lives in the future.

Table 32: How important will a candidate's history of political struggle be when you vote in future elections?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=807	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	55.6%	54.9%	46.0%	61.2%	61.0%	41.7%
Important	32.8%	29.6%	40.9%	31.1%	28.4%	38.1%
Somewhat important	5.2%	5.6%	6.6%	4.0%	5.0%	7.1%
Not important	3.7%	5.6%	4.4%	1.8%	2.8%	10.7%
Absolutely not important	0.4%	—	—	0.4%	0.9%	—
No answer	2.2%	4.2%	2.2%	1.5%	1.8%	2.4%

3.4. *Education*

According to the results of the survey, education was the most important factor influencing the electorate's voting behavior during the last elections, and will continue to be the most important factor moving people to vote for a certain candidate in the next elections. An overwhelming majority of 92.8% of the surveyed people responded that the factor of education was either very important or important. Moreover, the gaps in opinions according to level of education which are clear in the results of the last elections, remain with regard to the next elections. Concerning future elections, only 83.1% of the people with primary school education consider the factor of education either very important or important, compared to 95.2% of the people who went to college and above.

Table 33: How important will education be when you vote in coming elections?

	Total	Area		Education				
		West Bank	Gaza	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=807	N=489	N=318	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	58.6%	54.6%	64.8%	57.7%	52.6%	59.0%	57.8%	69.0%
Important	34.0%	37.6%	28.3%	25.4%	40.1%	34.1%	36.7%	26.2%
Somewhat important	4.5%	5.3%	3.1%	7.0%	5.8%	5.5%	2.8%	2.4%
Not important	1.1%	1.2%	0.9%	5.6%	0.7%	1.1%	0.5%	—
Absolutely not important	0.1%	—	0.3%	—	—	—	—	—
No answer	1.7%	1.2%	2.5%	4.2%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%	2.4%

3.5. Socio-economic status

The results of the opinion poll indicated that during the last elections there was a general agreement among the people surveyed about the importance of a candidate's socio-economic status. However, with regard to future elections, people seem to be more divided, with particularly noticeable change in the opinions of women and people with less education. Women seem prepared to attach more importance to the socio-economic status of potential Council members in the next elections than they did in the previous elections. About 10% more women than men, 53.8%, said that the socio-economic status of candidates will be important (very important or important) when voting in the next elections. Moreover, while 34.2% of the surveyed men replied that the socio-economic status of the candidates would not be important (not important or absolutely not important) when voting in the next elections, only 26.5% of the women shared this opinion.

Table 34: How important will socio-economic status be when you vote in future elections?

	Total	Gender		Education				
		Male	Female	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	15.9%	12.6%	19.3%	16.9%	16.1%	15.4%	17.0%	9.5%
Important	32.7%	31.2%	34.5%	35.2%	30.7%	35.2%	31.2%	28.6%
Somewhat important	18.6%	19.4%	17.5%	14.1%	24.1%	16.1%	19.3%	21.4%
Not important	27.8%	30.8%	24.7%	23.9%	26.3%	30.4%	25.7%	35.7%
Absolutely not important	2.7%	3.4%	1.8%	5.6%	1.5%	1.8%	4.1%	1.2%
No answer	2.4%	2.7%	2.1%	4.2%	1.5%	1.1%	2.8%	3.6%

3.6. Gender

The division in opinions between the subgroups of gender and area concerning the importance of a candidate's gender when voting continues with regard to the next elections. Women will attach more importance to gender in the next elections than men do, and — although for different reasons — gender is more of an issue in the Gaza Strip than it

is in the West Bank. The issue of gender, in general, however, is the least important of all the listed factors which people felt was likely to influence their voting behavior in the next elections.

Table 35: How important will gender be when you vote in coming elections?


	Total	Gender		Area	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318
Very important	12.6%	11.9%	13.7%	10.4%	16.0%
Important	21.3%	18.4%	24.5%	19.6%	23.9%
Somewhat important	14.9%	16.0%	13.7%	14.3%	15.7%
Not important	44.0%	45.5%	42.5%	49.1%	36.2%
Absolutely not important	4.8%	6.1%	3.1%	4.5%	5.3%
No answer	2.4%	2.2%	2.6%	2.0%	2.8%

	Education				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	12.7%	10.2%	17.2%	11.0%	7.1%
Important	21.1%	24.1%	20.1%	23.9%	14.3%
Somewhat important	8.5%	11.7%	14.7%	17.0%	17.9%
Not important	47.9%	48.9%	42.9%	39.4%	51.2%
Absolutely not important	5.6%	3.6%	3.3%	6.9%	6.0%
No answer	4.2%	1.5%	1.8%	1.8%	3.6%

3.7. Age

Age is another factor less likely to influence the Palestinian voter in the next elections. In general, only 30.6% of the interviewees thought that the factor of age might play a role in their decision to vote for a certain candidate in the next elections. However, the gap in opinions between less educated people and those with more education disappears completely with regard to the importance of age. Indeed, all subgroups seem to agree on the lack of importance of age as a factor in their voting behaviour in the next election.

Figure 21



3.8. The campaign

Electoral campaigns have gained importance in people's minds since the last elections. Whereas in general during the last elections, 69.5% of the people thought that a candidate's campaign was an important factor in their decision to vote for him/her, 75.0% of the surveyed people now said that electoral campaigns would play an important role (very important or important) in determining their votes.

More men than women found candidates' campaigns important in the last elections. Concerning future elections, however, this gap should be disappearing. As shown in Table 36 below, women plan to give nearly as much attention to electoral campaigns as men do. During the last elections, more educated people tended to find the campaign of election candidates more important than those with less education. This gap appears to be narrowing with regard to future elections, reinforcing the impression that electoral campaigns will become a far more important factor for the electorate in general in the future.

Table 36: How important will a candidate's campaign be when you vote in coming elections?

	Total	Gender		Education				
		Male	Female	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84
Very important	37.8%	42.6%	32.5%	29.6%	34.3%	38.1%	42.2%	40.5%
Important	37.2%	33.7%	41.5%	40.8%	43.1%	37.0%	34.9%	33.3%
Somewhat important	13.3%	12.3%	13.9%	8.5%	10.9%	13.9%	15.1%	13.1%
Not important	9.2%	8.7%	9.8%	14.1%	10.9%	10.6%	4.1%	8.3%
Absolutely not important	0.6%	0.7%	0.3%	1.4%	—	—	1.4%	1.2%
No answer	2.0%	1.9%	2.1%	5.6%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%	3.6%

PART TWO:

**EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL**

I. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

This chapter intends to measure the level of satisfaction with the Legislative Council, among both the Palestinian electorate and Council members, using five criteria which can be considered fundamental characteristics of a functioning, democratic parliament. An overview will be given of the main reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council by both the general public and the Council members.

Lastly, some light will be shed on the future. Are Palestinians looking to see some improvement in the Legislative Council's performance in the future? What is the vision of Council members in terms of the Council's future performance; are they optimistic or pessimistic?

1. Perceptions of the Electorate

1.1. Evaluation of the Legislative Council according to five criteria

The electorate was asked to evaluate the Legislative Council using the following criteria: democracy, effectiveness, responsiveness, independence from the Executive Authority, and pluralism. By looking at the results of the public's evaluation, it becomes easier to form a general idea of the Legislative Council's performance. The higher any parliament scores on these five criteria, the higher its performance can be rated, since the five are generally accepted as key characteristics of a well-functioning parliament.

Table 37 below indicates that the Palestinian electorate rates its parliament highest in terms of democracy, with 62.9% of respondents perceiving the Council as democratic. Judgments according to other criteria, however, were negative. Only 42.0% of the interviewees see the Legislative Council as responsive; only 39% think the Council is effective. Furthermore, only 37.0% sees that Legislative Council as a pluralistic institution, and only 27.5% of the electorate feel that the Council is independent of the Executive Authority.

Table 37: How would you rate the Legislative Council in terms of the following:

	Value Label	Percentage of Respondents
Democracy	Democratic	62.9%
	Undemocratic	34.6%
Effectiveness	Effective	39.0%
	Ineffective	58.9%
Responsiveness	Responsive	42.0%
	Unresponsive	55.2%
Independence from the EA	Independent	27.5%
	Dependent	68.3%
Pluralism	Pluralistic	37.0%
	Unpluralistic	58.1%

1.1.1. Democracy

Democracy is the most general of the five selected concepts. To some extent, one could even argue that democracy encompasses effectiveness, responsiveness, independence from the Executive Authority, and pluralism. The Legislative Council was only evaluated positively by the Palestinian electorate in terms of democracy; on specifics the public assessment was harsher. Moreover, as shown in Table 38 below, Palestinians with a college-level education or above did not have as high an opinion of the Council's democratic nature as those with less education.

Table 38: In general, how would you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in terms of its democratic nature?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Very democratic	6.8%	6.7%	6.3%	6.4%	6.4%	7.8%
Democratic	56.1%	58.8%	57.0%	55.9%	57.6%	49.6%
Not democratic	27.4%	21.8%	25.3%	29.4%	28.0%	32.2%
Very undemocratic	7.2%	5.9%	9.5%	6.2%	6.7%	9.6%
No answer	2.6%	6.7%	1.8%	2.1%	1.3%	0.9%

1.1.2. Effectiveness


In total, 39.0% of the interviewees consider the Legislative Council effective (very effective or effective), compared to a majority of 58.9% who think that the Council is ineffective (ineffective or very ineffective). Again, the more educated respondents were, the more negative their answers. Table 39 also indicates that women were less harsh in their evaluation of the Council's effectiveness. Besides the argument already put forward in Chapter One, that in a still traditional society women tend to be less concerned with voting or less involved with politics, there may be an additional explanation why women — in this case — evaluate the Legislative Council more positively.

Table 39: In general, how would you rate the Palestinian Legislative Council's effectiveness?

	Total	Gender		Education				
		Male	Female	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Very effective	3.5%	2.3%	4.8%	7.6%	4.1%	2.1%	2.9%	1.7%
Effective	35.5%	32.1%	38.6%	39.5%	32.1%	37.1%	34.4%	35.7%
Not effective	49.2%	53.3%	45.3%	39.5%	49.3%	50.3%	54.1%	50.4%
Very ineffective	9.7%	11.0%	8.3%	7.6%	12.7%	9.0%	8.3%	10.4%
No answer	2.1%	1.3%	2.9%	5.9%	1.8%	1.5%	0.3%	1.7%

In a public opinion poll conducted by JMCC in May 1995, the following two questions were asked: (1) Which in your opinion is/are the best source/s of information about politics? and (2) Are you willing to put more effort into finding more information on the political situation? As shown in Figure 22 below, people get most of their information from radio and television. It is also apparent that women rely more on radio and television as a source of information than men do. Only 30.5% of men rated radio and television as the best source of information about politics, compared to 49.0% of women. Men seem to rely more on informal sources of information, such as political leaflets, religious sermons and publications, and meetings and conferences. Therefore, men are more exposed to more pluralistic forms of information, while women, who identified radio and television as their main source of information, are in fact exposed to the official source of information, which might at times be less critical or even censured. As such, women might well develop a less critical view of the political events taking place within Palestinian society.

Figure 22




Source: JMCC, May 1995

In addition, Figure 23 below reveals that women are less interested in trying harder to find more information on the political situation. Of the female interviewees, 70.4% responded that they were willing to put more effort into finding more information on the political situation, compared to 80.2% of the men. Moreover, 24.6% of the women said that they were not willing to put more effort into getting more information about the political situation, compared to 19.6% of the men. The combination of women's main source of

information being radio and television, and greater unwillingness to look for more information on the political situation, might help to explain women's more positive view of political events and institutions.

Figure 23

Willingness to put more effort into getting information on the political situation
By gender




1.1.3. Responsiveness

In general, the majority of the Palestinian public appears to see the Legislative Council as unresponsive. Some 42.0%, of the interviewees consider the Council responsive (very responsive or responsive), compared to 55.3% who felt that the Council is unresponsive (unresponsive or very unresponsive). There are no major differences across any of the subgroups, whether according to gender, area, refugee status, education or age. People across all lines agreed in their negative evaluation (and the degree) of the Legislative Council's responsiveness.

Figure 24

Evaluation of Legislative Council's responsiveness



1.1.4. Independence from the Executive Authority


The Legislative Council was evaluated most negatively in terms of its level of independence from the Executive Authority. Only 27.5% of the people surveyed think that the Council is very independent or independent, while a large majority of 68.3% regard the Council as either dependent or very dependent on the Executive Authority. More educated people were the most critical in their judgment of the Council; 58.8% of the people who received up to primary level schooling thought that the Council was dependent (dependent or very dependent) on the Executive Authority, compared with 71.3% of the people who went to college and above.

Table 40 below also indicates a big gap in opinions between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the subject of the Council's independence from the Executive Authority. While the Council was rated negatively in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip on its level of independence from the Executive Authority, people in the Gaza Strip were less harsh in their evaluation. In the Gaza Strip, 32.8% of the interviewees responded that the Council was either very independent or independent of the Executive Authority, compared to only 24.5% in the West Bank. Moreover, in the Gaza Strip, 60.6% of the people surveyed considered the Council dependent or very dependent on the Executive Authority, compared to 72.4% in the West Bank.

Table 40: In general, how would you rate the Palestinian Legislative Council's level of independence from the EA?

	Total	Area		Education				
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=1195	N=756	N=439	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Very independent	3.3%	2.0%	5.7%	5.9%	3.6%	3.9%	1.9%	2.6%
Independent	24.2%	22.5%	27.1%	28.6%	28.5%	23.5%	22.3%	22.6%
Dependent	54.7%	58.3%	48.5%	47.9%	48.0%	57.2%	59.2%	54.8%
Very dependent	13.6%	14.4%	12.1%	10.9%	15.4%	11.6%	15.0%	16.5%
No answer	4.2%	2.8%	6.6%	6.7%	4.5%	3.9%	1.6%	3.5%


This divergence in opinions between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank could be explained by a number of different reasons. First, however, the general context should be taken into consideration. In the Gaza Strip, even given the closure, the fruits of peace are more visible (lower presence of Israeli military and settlers), which could be why Gazans are usually more supportive about the peace process than West Bankers. Figure 25 illustrates this trend over a period of one year, from August 1996 to July 1997.

Figure 25

On the other hand, previous opinion polls showed that people in the Gaza Strip, where the Palestinian Authority has greater presence, are more critical of the Authority, because of

what they see as mismanagement and corruption which have caused increasing hardship among the population. Figure 26 gives the results of poll questions on corruption in the Palestinian Authority, asked in August 1997¹³. While people in the West Bank are highly critical about the corruption issue, people in the Gaza Strip are even more so.

Figure 26



However, according to the results shown in Table 40 above, Gazans were less critical of the Council and its relation with the Executive Authority, which seems to be inconsistent with the trends illustrated in Figures 25 and 26. This could be partially explained by the fact that the question here is not exclusively concerned with the Palestinian Authority, but more specifically with the relation between the Executive and the Council. The dependency of the Legislative Council upon the Executive Authority might be less obvious in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, for several reasons. During the 1996 elections, 57 Council seats were available in the West Bank to represent a population of approximately 1.5 million.¹⁴ This means that, on average, in the West Bank each Council member represents about 29,395 people. In the Gaza Strip, this ratio is much lower. In the Gaza Strip, 37 seats were reserved for Council members to represent a population of 750,700, resulting in each Council member representing on average about 20,485 people. These numbers clearly

¹³ Results in Table 41 are part of a public opinion poll conducted by JMCC in August 1997.


¹⁴ The population numbers are based on data from the Health, Development, Information and Policy Project.

illustrate that people in the Gaza Strip are better represented than in the West Bank. In addition, the Gaza Strip is more geographically concentrated than the West Bank. The opportunities are far greater for Gazan constituents to meet or get to know their representatives. The combination of higher representation and a better possibility for interaction with Council members might cause Gazans to perceive a greater degree of independence among their Council members than people in the West Bank. However, in general, both Gazans and West Bankers consider the Legislative Council to be highly dependent on the Executive Authority.

1.1.5. Pluralism

The second lowest rating given to the Legislative Council is in terms of pluralism. Only 37.0% of the interviewees found the Council pluralistic (very pluralistic or pluralistic), compared to 58.1% who find the Council unpluralistic (unpluralistic or very unpluralistic). This low score for the Legislative Council is hardly surprising, when one considers the actual composition of the Council. As Figure 27 illustrates, 61% of the Council is composed of Fateh members. In addition 14% more Fateh members ran as independents and won seats in the Legislative Council. Thus, in total, 75% or 66 Council members share the same political affiliation. The remaining 22 Council members ran as independents, but some of them are known to be close to Hamas, PFLP, or Fida. Also, groups such as the DFLP, PFLP, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad boycotted the elections, further reducing the chances for a pluralistic parliament.

Figure 27



Source: JMCC, The Palestinian Council, 1997.

More educated people were more critical of the Legislative Council in terms of pluralism than the less educated. What was initially somewhat more surprising, however, is that fact

that the older generation thinks that the Council is less pluralistic than the younger generation (see Table 41 below). Whereas 40.9% of the interviewees between the age of 18 and 25 thought that the Council was pluralistic (very pluralistic or pluralistic), only 24.3% of the interviewees over 55 years old shared this opinion. In addition, 55.2% of the people surveyed between the age of 18 to 25 did not see the Council as pluralistic (not pluralistic or very unpluralistic), compared with 63.7% of the people over the age of 55.

In terms of the issues under discussion in this chapter, this is the first time where the factor of age made a significant difference. In Chapter One, concerning the elections and voting behavior, younger people tended to more radical in their perceptions than the older generation. In this instance, however, the opposite is the case. One possible reason why younger people might consider the Legislative Council more pluralistic than the older generation is that they voted for more outspoken or pluralistic personalities. Council members such as Marwan Bargouthi, Hussam Khader, or Khadoura Faris owe much of their success to the younger generation. Young people trusted these activists with their vote because although they are Fateh, they were seen as different from the older generation within Fateh, and they are considered more pluralistic, because they speak out for their constituencies, sometimes against their own Fateh bloc. This outspokenness might give younger people some hope for future improvement in the strength of the Council, despite current frustrations.

Table 41: In general, how would you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in terms of pluralism?

	Total	Education				
		Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above
	N=1195	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115
Very pluralistic	5.9%	6.7%	5.0%	7.0%	4.8%	2.6%
Pluralistic	31.1%	31.9%	34.8%	32.5%	31.2%	23.5%
Not pluralistic	45.0%	42.9%	39.8%	45.9%	45.5%	55.7%
Very unpluralistic	13.1%	10.9%	15.8%	10.8%	15.0%	14.8%
No answer	4.9%	7.6%	4.5%	3.9%	3.5%	3.5%

	Age				
	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very pluralistic	6.1%	5.2%	6.9%	7.6%	6.1%
Pluralistic	34.8%	32.5%	27.6%	39.0%	18.2%
Not pluralistic	44.6%	45.9%	42.4%	40.0%	48.5%
Very unpluralistic	10.6%	12.3%	17.2%	8.6%	15.2%
No answer	4.0%	4.1%	5.9%	4.8%	12.1%

1.2. *Levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council*

Given the negative evaluation of the Legislative Council on the five selected criteria, discussed in Section 1.1, it is not surprising that the electorate's satisfaction with the Council's performance is outweighed by the levels of dissatisfaction.

In general, only 38.3% of the people are satisfied (very satisfied or satisfied) with the performance of the Legislative Council, compared to 55.8% who are dissatisfied (dissatisfied or very dissatisfied) with its performance. Women are more positive than men, possibly due to the same reasons discussed earlier in Section 1.1.2.

Refugees are less satisfied with the performance of the Council than non-refugees. As indicated earlier, this phenomenon can easily be explained by the fact that refugees had higher — and perhaps misplaced — expectations of Council members, and were therefore more easily disappointed. However, it seems that even if Council members have not lived up to their campaign promises or performed as they should, they cannot totally be blamed for the greater disappointment with the Council among refugees compared to the Palestinian electorate in general.

Of the people who have only primary school education, 42% are satisfied and 45.4% dissatisfied with the Council's performance, compared to 35.7% satisfaction and 62.6% dissatisfaction among interviewees with a college education and above. The same trend appears when distributed by age group. Among people aged 18 to 25, 38.0% are satisfied with the performance of the Council and 56.5% are dissatisfied. In comparison, among the surveyed people who are older than 55, 43.9% are satisfied with the performance of the Council, compared to 45.5% who are dissatisfied.

Table 42: Looking back at the last year and a half since the elections, what is your opinion of the Council's performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

	Total	Gender		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=642	N=515
Very satisfied	5.2%	5.6%	4.8%	4.5%	5.8%
Satisfied	33.1%	30.3%	36.2%	35.0%	30.5%
Dissatisfied	38.7%	41.9%	35.7%	37.7%	40.6%
Very dissatisfied	17.1%	18.4%	15.3%	16.7%	17.9%
No answer	5.9%	3.8%	7.9%	6.1%	5.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary N=119	Up to prep. N=221	Up to sec. N=388	Some college N=314	College & above N=115	18-25 N=379	26-35 N=366	36-45 N=203	46-55 N=105	55+ N=66
Very satisfied	10.1%	4.1%	4.6%	3.5%	6.1%	2.9%	6.6%	5.4%	4.8%	12.1%
Satisfied	31.9%	33.9%	33.5%	33.8%	29.6%	35.1%	29.2%	33.5%	42.9%	31.8%
Dissatisfied	30.3%	37.1%	38.1%	41.4%	49.6%	40.1%	41.5%	38.4%	29.5%	28.8%
Very dissatisfied	15.1%	15.4%	20.6%	16.9%	13.0%	16.4%	18.0%	16.7%	17.1%	16.7%
No answer	12.6%	9.5%	3.1%	4.5%	1.7%	5.5%	4.6%	5.9%	5.7%	10.6%


1.3. Reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council

Having established that more people are dissatisfied than satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, it is important to know the reasons behind the general public's evaluation of the Legislative Council. What are the most important reasons behind people's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Council's performance? Is the general public in agreement on the reasons for their evaluation of the Council, or are the gaps in opinion between the various subgroups of the society, discussed earlier, being reinforced?

1.3.1. Reasons for satisfaction

In general, out of 38.3% of the surveyed people who said they were satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, 41.7% cited its democratic nature as the most important reason for their satisfaction. Courage, at 13.3%, was the second most important, and responsiveness the third.

Figure 28



More specifically, there are some remarkable differences across the different subgroups in terms of how much importance they attach to the three most popular reasons for their satisfaction with the Legislative Council. Looking at the variables of education and age in Table 43 below, younger and more educated people cited democracy as the reason for their satisfaction with the Council much more than less educated and older people. About 41.5% of the people who went to college and above said that democracy was the most important reason for their satisfaction with the Council, compared to less than half of the people with primary school education, at 18.0%. Also, whereas 49.3% of the people between the age of 18 and 25 responded that democracy was the most important reason for their satisfaction with the Council, this was the case with only 34.5% of the people over the age of 55. Therefore, even if, as Table 42 above shows, younger and more educated respondents expressed less satisfaction with the Legislative Council than older or less educated people, those who were satisfied rated the Council higher on democracy than older or less educated people.

Also noteworthy is the fact that whereas better educated Palestinians cited democracy as the reason for their satisfaction with the Council far more often than less educated people, the reverse was true when they were questioned about the Council's courage and responsiveness. About 22.0% of the people with primary level education cited courage as the most important reason for their satisfaction with the Council, compared to only 12.2% of people who had a college education or more. Similarly, only 9.8% of the interviewees who went to college and beyond felt satisfied with the Council because of its responsiveness, compared to 20.0% of the people who had only primary level education.


Table 43: Which of the following is the most important reason for your satisfaction with the Council?

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=50	N=84	N=148	N=117	N=41	N=144	N=131	N=79	N=50	N=29
Responsiveness	20.0%	8.3%	12.8%	10.3%	9.8%	11.1%	13.7%	12.7%	6.0%	13.8%
Democracy	18.0%	42.9%	43.9%	47.0%	41.5%	49.3%	38.9%	41.8%	38.0%	34.5%
Effectiveness	6.0%	9.5%	6.8%	6.8%	9.8%	5.6%	9.2%	6.3%	8.0%	6.9%
Independence	4.0%	9.5%	8.1%	8.5%	4.9%	11.1%	6.9%	6.3%	8.0%	—
Courage	22.0%	9.5%	14.2%	12.8%	12.2%	8.3%	14.5%	15.2%	20.0%	13.8%
Accessibility	12.0%	8.3%	3.4%	6.0%	7.3%	4.9%	6.1%	6.3%	4.0%	13.8%
New experience	—	1.2%	0.7%	0.9%	2.4%	1.4%	0.8%	1.3%	—	—
Other reasons	10.0%	3.6%	4.7%	6.8%	7.3%	4.9%	5.3%	3.8%	8.0%	6.9%
No answer	8.0%	7.1%	5.4%	0.9%	4.9%	3.5%	4.6%	3.3%	8.0%	10.3%

Finally, the results in Figure 29 reinforce the findings about Gazans' less negative assessment of the Council's dependence on the Executive Authority discussed in Section 1.1.4. above. As Figure 29 shows, nearly twice as many Gazans than West Bankers are satisfied with the Legislative Council because of its responsiveness. Again, this could be explained by the fact that people in Gaza enjoy a higher Council member/constituent ratio,

and live in a more geographically concentrated area which allows greater interaction and personal contact with their Council members. This may well cause them to cite Council members' responsiveness more frequently than West Bankers as the reason for their satisfaction with the Legislative Council.


Figure 29



1.3.2. Reasons for dissatisfaction

In general, out of the 55.8% who said that they were dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, 42.1% gave its lack of effectiveness as the most important reason for their dissatisfaction. As illustrated in Figure 30 below, lack of independence on behalf of the Council was the second most frequently cited reason for people's dissatisfaction with the performance of the Council, while the lack of responsiveness by the Council was ranked third.

Figure 30




Popular dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council's performance because of its perceived ineffectiveness is unsurprising given the constraints under which the Council has been operating. Besides the Council's lack of legitimacy in the eyes of constituents due to its short existence, Council members are facing major challenges, such as (1) their lack of experience, (2) the continued Palestinian-Israeli friction, which often leaves the Council overwhelmed or powerless, and (3) not least, the power struggle within Palestinian structures, which inspire attempts to limit the influence of the Legislative Council and have an impact on its effectiveness.¹⁵

The results in Figure 31 below clearly illustrate that the general public is aware of the difficulties facing the Legislative Council. When the general public was asked in previous JMCC opinion polls whether they thought that the Legislative Council represents the aspirations of the Palestinian people, the majority of interviewees responded that they feel the Council does represent the people, but to no effect.

¹⁵ Further details about the obstacles facing the Legislative Council will be discussed in the following chapters.

Figure 31



1.4. Level of optimism about the Legislative Council in the future

While people were primarily negative about the Legislative Council's performance in its first year and a half, they are more optimistic about its performance in the future. About 59.1% of the people surveyed said that they were optimistic (very optimistic or optimistic) about the future performance of the Legislative Council, compared to 36.7% who were pessimistic (pessimistic or very pessimistic). Moreover, the results in Table 45 summarize and confirm many of the trends noted earlier in this section.

First of all, the results in Table 44 reinforce the trend noticed before that women tend to be more positive than men in their evaluation of the Legislative Council and the political situation. Furthermore, people in Gaza are more optimistic than the people in the West Bank about the future of the Legislative Council, which is also consistent with previous findings. Thirdly, the better educated — as discussed earlier — are more polarized in their views, highly critical of the Legislative Council while believing in the principles this Council embodies. Table 44, however, shows that for most Palestinians, hope for improvement in the future outweighs their current criticisms, with higher levels of optimism among more educated respondents. Of the interviewees with primary school education, 56.3% expressed optimism about the Legislative Council's future performance, compared with 62.6% of those with a college education or more. Similarly, 37.0% of those with primary school education are pessimistic about the Council's future performance, compared with only 33.9% of those with a college education or more.

The same pattern appears when comparing the levels of optimism and pessimism between the younger and older generations. While at times the younger generation's evaluation of the Legislative Council was more negative than that of the older generation, younger people proved more hopeful about the Council's performance in the future. However, one should keep in mind that the strong element of hope influencing younger and more educated Palestinians to be more optimistic about the Council's future performance may prove to have a down side if their expectations are not met. In such scenario, the strongest forces of opposition could be expected to come from within this group.

Table 44: In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future performance of the elected Legislative Council?

	Total	Gender		Area	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439
Very optimistic	11.4%	10.2%	12.8%	9.4%	14.8%
Optimistic	47.7%	44.2%	51.0%	44.2%	53.8%
Very pessimistic	11.8%	13.8%	9.5%	12.8%	10.0%
Pessimistic	24.9%	28.0%	21.9%	29.4%	17.1%
No answer	4.3%	3.8%	4.8%	4.2%	4.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very optimistic	21.0%	12.2%	8.8%	8.6%	11.3%	10.0%	7.9%	13.8%	19.0%	16.7%
Optimistic	35.3%	43.9%	51.8%	48.7%	51.3%	53.3%	48.4%	45.3%	41.9%	34.8%
Very pessimistic	11.8%	13.1%	11.1%	12.7%	8.7%	8.2%	14.2%	16.7%	6.7%	10.6%
Pessimistic	25.2%	26.2%	24.7%	26.4%	25.2%	24.0%	25.7%	20.2%	29.5%	27.3%
No answer	6.7%	4.5%	3.6%	3.5%	3.5%	4.5%	3.8%	3.9%	2.9%	10.6%

2. Perceptions of Council Members

2.1. Evaluation of the Legislative Council

Council members were asked to evaluate the Legislative Council according to the same five criteria presented to the general public. Comparing Council members' answers with those of the public helps to identify the gaps between the two groups. In general it appears that Council members' evaluation of the Legislative Council is far more positive than that of the general public.

Table 45 below indicates that Council members rate the Legislative Council highest in terms of democracy, with 88.4% saying that the Council is democratic. Council members and the public agree on this, as both groups rated the Council highest in terms of its democratic nature.

Table 45 also shows that Council members' ratings of the Legislative Council are positive in all five criteria, except pluralism, which is also the single characteristic on which the Council members' evaluation is more negative than that of the general public. While 37.0% of the public see the Legislative Council as a pluralistic institution, this view is shared by only 23.3% of Council members.

Council members and the public disagree on the degree of importance of the remaining three criteria. About 81.4% of Council members consider the Council responsive, compared with only 42.0% of the electorate. Moreover, while the majority of the Council members, 74.4%, felt that the Legislative Council is independent of the Executive Authority, only 27.5% of the public shared this view — this was the area in which the public gave the Council their lowest rating. Finally, 72.1% of the Council rated the Council as effective, compared with only 39.0% of the public.

Table 45: How would you evaluate the Legislative Council in the following:

	Value Label	Council Members	Public
Democracy	Democratic	88.4%	62.9%
	Undemocratic	7.0%	34.6%
Effectiveness	Effective	72.1%	39.0%
	Ineffective	25.6%	58.9%
Responsiveness	Responsive	81.4%	42.0%
	Unresponsive	11.6%	55.2%
Independence from the EA	Independent	74.4%	27.5%
	Dependent	23.3%	68.3%
Pluralism	Pluralistic	23.3%	37.0%
	Unpluralistic	95.4%	58.1%


2.2. Level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council

As Figure 32 below shows, Council members are far more satisfied with the Legislative Council's performance than the general public. Indeed, 67.4% of the Council members expressed themselves as either very satisfied or satisfied with the Council's performance, compared to only 38.3% of the general public. Similarly, only 32.6% of the Council members said they are very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with the Council's performance, compared to 55.8% of the general public.

It is hard to explain this gap in opinions between Council members and the general public. Are Council members over-estimating the success of their Council or were popular expectations of the Legislative Council too high to begin with? The answer most probably lies somewhere in between. On the one hand, the people were perhaps somewhat unrealistic in their hopes for this, their first Legislative Council, which could partly explain their negative evaluation of its current performance. Council members, on the other hand, while acknowledging that their performance has not been what it could, also realize that they have come a long way since they first took office. Indeed, besides the restrictions on the Legislative Council imposed by the Executive Authority and the political situation, one should also consider the Council members' lack of legislative experience. They are involved in a learning process, as is the country, and this takes time. And, as Council member Marwan Bargouthi¹⁶ explains, that is not all:

Many of the Council members don't work hard to develop themselves and to understand what the job of a parliamentarian consists of. We started from zero together. I met with many parliamentarians from many countries and I read a lot about the experience of other parliaments, because I have to understand. I have to study, we have to study, because we don't have any parliamentary experience. We were in Israeli jails! So it is not a problem if I didn't know, but it is a problem to continue not to know! I also think that there are shortcomings with Council members. I think they have to work hard, and that doesn't necessarily mean that they only have to work two or three hours a day, and only three days a week. They have to be more serious than before. I still believe that we have a chance for it to work. Now is a very difficult time for the Executive Authority, for the Council, and for the people.

Figure 32



¹⁶ The interview with Council member Marwan Bargouthi was conducted on 19 September 1997.


2.3. *Reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council*

2.3.1. *Reasons for satisfaction*

Council members were asked, as the public was, to provide two main reasons for their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Legislative Council. Figures 33 and 34 below indicate the frequency of the reasons given by the Council members.


Out of the 67.4% of surveyed Council members who were satisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council, an average of 31.0% listed democracy as the main reason for their satisfaction. Independence was the second most important reason for Council members' satisfaction, while responsiveness was the third reason most frequently cited reason behind satisfaction with the Council's performance.

Figure 33



In rating the Council's democratic nature as the most important reason for their satisfaction with the Council's performance, Council members are in agreement with the general public. However, whereas Council members cited independence as the second reason for their satisfaction, the general public listed courage. It is possible that the independence cited by Council members is perceived by the general public as courage. The general public thinks that the Legislative Council is courageous in some of the positions it has taken over the last two years. However, perhaps for the public, this courage does not necessarily imply independence, because it does not see the sometimes courageous Council resolutions translated into actual legislation or action. The Legislative Council may have to have more concrete output before it will be considered independent rather than courageous. In terms of responsiveness, Council members and the public again agree on its importance. In short, in general the Council members and the general public agree to a large extent on the reasons for their satisfaction with the performance of the Legislative Council.


Figure 34



2.3.2. Reasons for dissatisfaction


Of the 32.6% of Council members who are dissatisfied with the Council's performance, 35.7% cited ineffectiveness as the main reason for their dissatisfaction. Lack of independence was cited as the second reason for their dissatisfaction, while members' preoccupation with personal issues was third. This last reason was not included in the original list, but some dissatisfied Council members thought it was important enough to be included.

Figure 35



The Council members and members of the general public who are dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council agreed on the two main reasons for their dissatisfaction — ineffectiveness and lack of independence. However, whereas the Council members cited preoccupation with personal issues as the third major impediment to satisfactory performance by the Legislative Council, the general public listed the Council's lack of responsiveness third. It could be, of course, that because Council members are too involved in their personal business, they fail to be responsive to the needs of the public.

Figure 36



2.4. *Level of optimism about the Legislative Council in the future*

As discussed in Section 1.4, the general public remains optimistic about the future performance of the Legislative Council; Council members themselves are even more so. No less than 86.0% of the surveyed Council members said that they were optimistic about the Legislative Council in the future, compared to only 11.6% who said that they were pessimistic. According to these results, the hope, will and spirit among the majority of Council members to continue to improve the Council's legislative performance is still strong. However, this is not the case for all Council members. In October 1997, one of the most trusted, but critical, Council members, Dr. Haidar 'Abdel Shafi handed in his resignation. In an article he published in the local press explaining his action, 'Abdel Shafi wrote:


...The people placed their trust in the president of the National Authority just as it placed its trust in the members of the Legislative Council. For this reason, it is obligatory that the relationship of the Council with the president and his executive apparatus be one of coordination and cooperation on a constitutional basis, according to a Basic Law. We are still awaiting its ratification...The national unity which is required to confront the present challenges will not be achieved except through response to these considerations...We have a long, hard road ahead which demands honesty, patience and strengthening of our unity...to see us through. This is what I had hoped for when I sought membership in the Legislative Council. However, and unfortunately, none of this was achieved. Therefore, I cannot fool myself or my fellow citizens in continuing to be a member of this Council.

‘Abdel Shafi does note, however, that:

In the final analysis...we must remember that this Council is unique due to its special situation. That is, it is a Legislative Council for a national liberation movement and its affairs cannot be measured by what takes place in the Councils of independent countries.

Figure 37


Council members' optimism about the future performance of the Legislative Council



As shown in Figure 38 below, 18.6% of Council members were very optimistic and 69.8% cautiously optimistic. Another 9.3% of Council members were cautiously pessimistic about the Legislative Council in the future, and a minority of 2.3% were very pessimistic.

Figure 38

Optimism about the future performance of the Legislative Council
According to the Council Members



II. PERCEPTIONS OF WHETHER THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPRESENTS THE POPULATION


This chapter will first examine whether or not, in the Palestinian public's opinion, the elected Council represents the concerns of the people and is aware of constituents' needs. After comparing the results of the poll of the public with the results of the Council survey, a more in-depth look at Council members' responses will reveal whether Council members actually know what the people need and what the most acute problems in Palestinian society are, and on what basis they make their assessments.

The analysis in this chapter will shed further light on one of the biggest issues of the Legislative Council — whether the Palestinian electorate has been expecting too much from their Council members, or if there is also a need for improvement in the performance of the Council.

1. Perceptions of the Electorate

When asked if the elected Council members represent the views or concerns of the people, only 13.2% of the electorate replied positively, while 54.3% answered that Council members represent people's concerns to some extent. About 27.2% of the interviewees replied negatively.

Figure 39 Do Council members represent the views/concerns of the people?
According to the general public



As shown in Table 46, the more educated the interviewees were, the more negative their opinions appeared to be. Only 11.3% of the surveyed people who went to college and above thought that the elected Council represents the views and concerns of the people, compared to 23.5% of the people with primary school education. Also, consistent with earlier trends, younger people said more frequently than older people that the Council did not represent the people's concerns. Indeed, whereas 25.6% of the people between 18 and

25 years old responded that they did not think that the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people, only 16.7% of the people above 55 thought so.

Table 46: Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people?

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	23.5%	12.2%	13.4%	10.2%	11.3%	13.5%	12.3%	14.8%	15.2%	13.6%
To a certain extent	50.4%	52.0%	53.9%	57.0%	57.4%	56.2%	49.5%	55.2%	57.1%	57.6%
No	19.3%	26.2%	30.9%	27.7%	27.0%	25.6%	33.3%	24.6%	22.9%	16.7%
No answer	6.7%	9.5%	1.8%	5.1%	4.3%	4.7%	4.9%	5.4%	4.8%	12.1%


A comparison of the results of a similar question, asked in an opinion poll conducted by JMCC shortly after the January 1996 elections, reveals that the general public's belief in Council members' ability to represent their views has declined over the last year and a half.

As illustrated in Figure 40 below, in February 1996, 23.6% of the surveyed people responded that the elected members represented their points of view, whereas now only 13.2% think that the elected members represent the views of the people. Also, in February 1996 less people said they felt that Council members represented their views only to a certain extent. Indeed, it seems that people who were absolutely positive back in February 1996 that Council members represented their points of view, increasingly think that the elected members only represent their views and concerns to a certain extent. It is this realization among the Palestinian electorate which might lead them to vote according to different criteria in future elections.

Figure 40

Given the election results, to what extent would you say that the elected members represent your point of view?

According to the general public




Source: JMCC, February 1996

Similarly, the electorate was critical when asked if they thought that Council members know what people need. Only 29.3% of the surveyed people answered that Council members knew a lot about the needs of the people. The majority evaluated Council members negatively, with 50.5% of the interviewees saying that Council members do not know a lot about what the people need, and 16.2% replying that Council members do not know at all what the people need.

Figure 41

To what extent do Council members know what people want/need?

According to the general public



The results shown in Table 46 and Figures 39/40/41, taken together, give the clear message that people do not think highly of Council members as far as their knowledge of the views or the needs of their constituents is concerned.

2. Perceptions of Council Members

As becomes clear from looking at Figures 42 to 45 below, Council members have a far higher opinion of themselves than the general public does concerning their ability to represent the electorate's views and their knowledge of the needs of the people.

The results in Figure 42 indicate that 41.9% of the members think they represent the views and concerns of the people well. Although this is more than three times higher than the percentage of the public who thought they were well-represented by the Council, one should keep in mind that, even among the surveyed Council members, less than 50% answered the question positively. The majority of Council members, 51.2%, replied that they thought they were representing the views and concerns of the people to a certain

extent. However, only 2.3% of Council members thought that they did not represent the concerns of the people at all, compared to 27.2% of the general public.

Figure 42

Comparison between views of Council members and the general public on whether Council members represent the views/concerns of the people





Figure 43 shows that more Council members think that they know the needs of the people than think that they represent the people's views well. Indeed, while 55.8% of Council members think that they know a good deal about the needs of the people, 34.9% think that they do not know a lot about what the people want. None of the Council members replied that the Council does not know the needs of the people at all.

Figure 43

How well do Council members know what people want/need?


According to Council members



Whereas Figure 43 shows what Council members thought they — as an elected body — were familiar with the people's needs, Figure 44 shows whether they as individuals think they know what people want. As was the case when Council members were asked whether they thought they themselves lived up to their campaign promises (*see Chapter One, Part One*), it is clear here that they value themselves higher than their colleagues. Figure 44 shows a majority of 67.4% of Council members think that they personally know the needs of their constituents. Only 27.9% of Council members agreed that they did not know a lot about the needs of the people. Again, none of Council members who answered this question said that they personally did not know at all what the needs of the people are.

Figure 44

Do you yourself know what people want/need?
According to Council members




Finally, Figure 45 below provides a summary of the differences in opinions between the general public, Council members in general, and Council members as individuals, on the question of whether Council members know the needs of the people.

Figure 45

Council's knowledge of the needs of the public

Comparison between the views of the general public,
the Council in general, and individual member




2.1. Council members' knowledge of the needs of the people

How fairly is the general public evaluating the Council when the majority of people say that Council members do not know a great deal about what people need? Are the majority of Council members really unaware of the needs of the Palestinian people?


Figure 46 shows the results when Council members were asked to identify the two most important problems facing Palestinian society. About 25.1% of Council members identified the economic situation as the biggest problem confronting Palestinians today, followed by the political situation, at 17.5%.

Figure 46 Most important problems currently facing Palestinian society
According to Council members



It is clear that the people and Council members are in agreement about the problems facing Palestinian society. When people were asked in a public opinion poll conducted by JMCC in April 1996 to identify the most important issue facing Palestinian society, 39.8% of the interviewees answered "improvement of the economy". Moreover, as shown in Figure 47 below, 23.1% of the surveyed people thought the completion of negotiations with Israel was the most important issue, while 11.8% thought achieving democracy and freedom of expression were most pressing.

Figure 47




Source: JMCC, April 1996

From Figures 46 and 47, it is safe to say that Council members and the general public hold similar views about the nature of the problems facing Palestinian society. Both Council members and the public agree that the economic situation is the most pressing problem. Moreover, as shown in Figure 47, while members of the public surveyed cited as the second and third most pressing problems the completion of negotiations with Israel, and the achievement of democracy and freedom of expression, these sum up what Council members more generally referred to as the political situation, which they listed second in importance. Therefore, Council members and the general public also seem to agree on the gravity of the problems facing Palestinian society. Judging by this, it would appear not only that Council members are aware of the concerns of the people but that the Palestinian electorate's evaluation of the Council in this respect might be too harsh.

To test this assumption, Council members were also asked to identify the three most important needs of the people. Figure 48 below provides the results of their choices. The people's most pressing need — according to Council members — is for democracy, law and justice, closely followed by the need for improvement in the economy. While 21.7% of Council members said that democracy, law and justice are important needs for the people, 20.9% said that an improvement in the economy was an important need. In addition, 14.7% of Council members mentioned unemployment as an issue which the people need to see resolved. This only reinforces the point that Council members do realize that an improvement in the Palestinian economy is of utmost importance to their constituents.

Figure 48



However, there remains unresolved the issue of whether Council members are aware of the problems and needs of their constituents. As shown above, Council members, in general, do realize the needs of the people, but the people still evaluate them negatively and up to this point are rather dissatisfied with the performance of the Legislative Council. This cannot only be blamed on an unfair judgment by the public, and may also be a result of the ineffectiveness of the Legislative Council. It is not enough for Council members to know the problems facing Palestinian society, they should also have the power to act on that knowledge. Some of the Council's ineffectiveness could be explained by Council members' inexperience, but there are also other factors restricting the Council's performance. These additional influences will be discussed in Chapter Three.

2.2. *Information-gathering tools*

Figures 42 and 43 earlier in this chapter indicated that Council members, although feeling that they represent the views of the people well and know the needs of the people, answered these questions relatively modestly. Perhaps Council members think that, while in general they are aware of the needs of people, there is still room for improvement. It is therefore important to know what tools Council members use to assess and verify the needs of the public.

Figure 49 below shows the results when Council members were asked which three tools they use in order to know the needs of the people. Meetings were the most popular, with 31.8% of Council members favoring this method of information-gathering. About 18.6% of Council members answered that they also get a lot of information from the letters or complaints sent to them by constituents. The third most popular information-gathering tool, cited by 8.56% of Council members, is field visits; this was followed closely by attendance at lectures and workshops.

The question here is how many people Council members can meet in their constituencies. How much of a representative picture does a Council member acquire from reading letters and complaints or conducting field visits? Most likely, the Council member is able to form a general idea of the needs of his constituents through these means. However, in order to become better informed on the specifics and put the needs of the people into perspective, greater reliance on scientific means might be required. For example, only 1.53% of Council members found opinion polls an important source of information to know the needs of their constituents. However, a follow-up by Council members with the regularly conducted opinion polls, reflecting people's views and revealing trends over time, might provide them with a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of the needs of the people. The same remark is valid concerning newspapers and workshops.

Figure 49





Figure 50 below reinforces the trend shown in Figure 49 above, in that Council members, by relying on more scientific means might acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people. About 23.2% of Council members replied that they verify their evaluation of what they think the public's needs are by listening and communicating directly with the people, while 15.5% use incoming complaints. About 10.9% of Council members answered that they felt sure of the needs of the people, because they consider themselves as being part of the people. While this last group seems to rely heavily on intuition to know the needs of the people, there was another group of Council members following very closely who said they rely on research and studies to confirm their initial identification of the public's needs.

Figure 50

How do you as a Council member verify that you have identified the needs of the people?



III. THE COUNCIL'S RELATIONS WITH DIFFERENT SECTORS OF PALESTINIAN SOCIETY AND THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

This chapter is concerned primarily with examining the relationships between the Legislative Council and the various sectors of Palestinian society, including the Palestinian Authority, and what influence, if any, these relationships have on the Council. How does the Palestinian public view the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, and what do Council members themselves think of this relationship? How do they assess the levels of communication between the Council and PA president Yasser Arafat? To what extent do his policies affect the Legislative Council? The relationship between the Legislative Council and the people, the Council and the media, will also be examined. Finally, how do Israeli policies and practices affect the Council's performance?

As part of the context, however, it is important to note certain facts related to the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO, which continue to have an impact on the Legislative Council and the way in which it is perceived by the different sectors of Palestinian society.

First, it must be remembered that the structures of the Palestinian Authority are a result of the Oslo agreements and their mandate is limited in time to the five-year interim period. To many Palestinians, however, the Palestinian Authority is a permanent structure replacing the PLO. This is not the case, as is clear from Article III.4 of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed in Washington on 28 September 1995:

The Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be elected for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994.

In addition, in the agreements the descriptions of the tasks of the different branches of the Palestinian Authority are ambiguous. This can be explained by the fact that only in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement is the name "Palestinian Authority" mentioned; in the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement, the Palestinian Authority is referred to as "the Council". Part of the public's confusion about the jurisdiction of the Legislative Council, and the antagonism between the Legislative and Executive branches, is due to the language used in the agreements. In the Interim Agreement, "the Council" does not only imply the parliament, but the entire Palestinian Authority, whereas, in reality, the term "Council" is only used to refer to the Legislative Council, which is part of the Palestinian Authority. Nabil Sha'ath¹⁷ affirms:

¹⁷ The interview with Dr. Nabil Sha'ath was conducted in al-Ram on 21 August 1997.

There is no PNA in the Interim Agreement. PNA only exists in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. When we came to the Interim Agreement, which Abu 'Ala¹⁸ negotiated, they had already carved, in a way, a role for the Council that is really a mix-up, because the word 'Council' mentioned in the agreement is really a synonym for the Palestine National Authority. If you go to the agreement, there is no PNA. It is always the Council, the authority of the Council, the work of the Council, association between Israel and the Council. That gave me a lot of trouble with donors when this interim agreement was signed. Some donors wanted to change all the agreements and turn them from the Palestinian Authority to the Council. I said, not the Council, it is a misnomer now. The Council now is not a unique Council, it is now a parliamentary Council, separated from the Executive Authority.

In reality a state-like structure has emerged in the autonomous areas — something Israel had wanted to avoid — complete with ministries and separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of authority. The Israelis wanted a small Council to lead the Palestinians through the interim period, with as little separation of powers as possible in order to prevent the emergence of a Palestinian Authority structure as it is today. Due to the combination of growing pains on the part of the Authority — typical for any new nation in the making — and political events over which it sometimes has no control, however, the shell of a state-structure might be present, but the system and organization to make this structure efficient remain largely insufficient. Hanna Amireh¹⁹, a prominent member of the PPP and a member of the PNC, made the following comparison:

It is like somebody who wants to build an apartment. He begins to build one room, and then another, and another, without looking for the whole picture of the building. First of all we need to have a system.

Only a few weeks after the first Legislative Council elections, in which the general public had invested so much hope, events began to counter the celebratory mood. On 25 February 1996, in response to a Jerusalem suicide bomb attack, Israel imposed a complete closure on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. One week later, following an attack in Ashkelon, the closure was extended to an internal closure, i.e., a virtual Israeli siege of the major Palestinian towns and cities. This made it impossible for Palestinians to move and paralyzed all social and economic life. The internal closure, which was to be repeated several times, forced Palestinians to face the hard fact that the peace agreements had provided the basis for a relationship of complete dependency on Israel, and had only reinforced Israel's stranglehold on the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The mirage of equal partnership was shattered. Increasingly people began complaining that before the Oslo agreements, when there was a closure, they could at least move between the different towns and villages within the West Bank and Gaza, whereas now they were besieged in their tiny islands of "liberated land", whenever Israel deemed it necessary for "security". People looked to the Legislative Council to take action against the closure and

¹⁸ Abu 'Ala is Ahmed Qrei', the Speaker of the Legislative Council.

¹⁹ The interview with Hanna Amireh (PPP) was conducted in Jerusalem on 18 August 1997.


the resulting economic and personal hardships, but the Legislative Council was powerless. Furthermore, the Israeli government even harassed Council members as they tried to move from place to place to meet their constituents or attend Council meetings. On several occasions, Council members from the Gaza Strip were unable to attend legislative sessions in the West Bank because they were refused permits by the Israeli authorities.

The Palestinian general public became even more desperate when the Labor Party with Shimon Peres as its candidate lost the Israeli general elections on 5 May 1996 against the Likud Party and Binyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu won the elections with his slogan of "security first", and has continued to use this term to exert pressure on the Palestinian Authority to ensure that they deal with the Hamas threat. He himself has continuously endangered the peace process with the provocative decisions of his government, such as the opening of a tunnel bordering the al-Aqsa mosque compound; beginning construction of a new settlement on Mt. Abu Ghneim; approving the construction of a 132-unit housing project for settlers in the center of the Palestinian neighborhood of Ras al-Amoud in East Jerusalem; delaying the additional redeployments in the West Bank which Israel had agreed to; and numerous others less publicized.

In response, the Palestinian Authority played into Israeli hands by cracking down on Hamas supporters, imprisoning many without trial or due process of law on the mere suspicion of having Islamic movement sympathies. The Palestinian public grew increasingly frustrated with their own Authority, particularly when they saw that the Legislative Council was completely ignored by the Executive Authority, issuing resolution after resolution urging the Executive branch to comply with internationally recognized human rights standards when dealing with its people.

Given the influence of Israeli policies upon the Legislative Council's image, it is not surprising that an overwhelming majority, 88.4%, of the Council members who completed the questionnaire, think that Israeli policies and practices have a negative effect on the Council's functioning. Figure 51 further shows that only one Council member thought that Israeli policies and practices have a positive effect on the functioning of the Legislative Council, and only 4.7% said that Israeli policies and practices do not affect the functioning of the Legislative Council at all.

Figure 51



This combination of Israeli policies and the way the Oslo agreements are written has also strained the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, bringing to the surface additional flaws and bad practices in the Palestinian Authority's structure and operations. The Legislative Council feels ignored by the Executive Authority, while members of the Executive Authority see the Legislative Council as interfering, often acting outside its jurisdiction. Complicating the situation further is the fact that some Council members are also members of the Executive Authority and have divided loyalties, leading to further paralysis in the Legislative Council. Last but not least, there is the problem of dual leadership — that of the Palestinian Authority and that of the PLO — which affects the Authority as a whole and has led to additional internal conflicts.

Dr. Haidar 'Abdel Shafi²⁰ expresses the frustration of many Council members with the Executive Authority as follows:

I think, initially, the elected members expressed an attitude of seriousness towards their task as representatives of the community, and, indeed, responded very well to whatever they were faced with. They adopted resolutions, but, regrettably, the Executive Authority took a very negative attitude towards the PLC, and that, of course, was very frustrating for Council members... I didn't at all expect that being a Council member would be as bad as this. I thought that the challenges we are facing required strong coordination and cooperation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority. I was hoping that a good Executive Authority performance would substitute for the negative aspects of Oslo, but the opposite happened.

²⁰ The interview with Dr. Haidar 'Abdel Shafi was conducted in Ramallah on 29 July 1997.

Dr. Nabil Sha'ath²¹, who is both a Council member and a member of the Executive Authority, is highly critical of the Legislative Council and represents the views of many in the political leadership who think that the Legislative Council has on many occasions acted outside its jurisdiction:

I think this PLC or this Council is trying to test the limits of its authority. So, it has acted sometimes as a court and made judgments and verdicts, even before asking anybody questions about the verdict. In the last months, it has acted like a kangaroo court. No due process, no rights of the accused, it just acted by typical medieval edict. It acted sometimes as it was the Executive Authority and made edicts to ministers about what to do with this and what not to do with that. Not that the ministers listen all the time, but they [the Council], in many cases acted as the Executive Authority, as the judiciary, as well as a parliamentary authority. In fact, if you want to be more specific, in their first year they did absolutely no legislating. They were doing nothing but [issuing] political edicts, executive edicts and court judgments about corruption.

Nabil Sha'ath²² is one of the Council members who are also members of the Executive Authority, and he clearly identifies more with the Executive Authority than with the Legislative Council:

I am a member of the Council, but I am also part of the Executive Authority. Therefore, in any conflict of inner identification, I do not identify with the Council. I mean, if I were to choose, I cannot identify with the Council. I did not find in the Council a real expression either of the democracy I thought was necessary to build our society, nor of the parliamentary authority that was supposed to be a real control of the democracy, due process of law, and the rights of people... My idea was that this was the conference that was going to set the rule of law and the rights of man in Palestine. And that it was going to [formulate] modern legislation that would create in Palestine institutions that are different and much better than all those in the countries around us. And I was greatly disappointed. Maybe it was a stupid expectation.

Hanan Ashrawi²³, also both a Council member and a member of the Executive Authority, represents the other end of the spectrum:

Having these two positions in a sense is rather strange, because I feel and identify with the people and I feel that the Cabinet members and the Executive Authority should be entirely accountable before the Council. I would like to empower the Council, so that it can do its job, in terms of monitoring, accountability as well as legislation. I take the Council seriously... I have certain jobs in the Cabinet, certain tasks and responsibilities which I try to fulfill professionally and honestly, and I try to be part of formulating the political discourse. But, at the same time, I feel that if we lose touch with the people, if we lose touch with the system of representation, then, there are no

²¹ The interview with Dr. Nabil Sha'ath was conducted in Al-Ram on 21 August 1997. It should be mentioned that the interview was conducted at the time the corruption report was being debated in the Legislative Council. Among the ministries singled out for criticism was the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.


²² The interview with Dr. Nabil Sha'ath was conducted in Al-Ram on 21 August 1997.

²³ The interview with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi was conducted in Ramallah on 16 September 1997.

political decisions that are worth anything, because politics and political decisions are not made in a vacuum. And we cannot have a rift between what people feel, want and believe and the decision-making process. I sometimes certainly feel that there is this rift and it is not conducive to confidence or to the decision-making process.


When Council members were asked, in the questionnaires distributed, about the relation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, the tension between the two branches of the Authority was apparent. As illustrated in Figure 52, Council members have very negative views about this; 27.9% think that the Legislative Council is very restricted by the Executive Authority and 58.1% say that the Executive Authority exerts some restrictive pressure on the Council. Only 14.0% of Council members think that the Legislative Council is not restricted at all by the Executive Authority.

Figure 52



In general, general Palestinian public opinion was even harsher about the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority. As illustrated in Figure 53 below, 35.7% of the public felt that the Council was very restricted by the Executive Authority, 8 percent higher than Council members. However, Council members responded more frequently than members of the public that there were some restrictions by the Executive Authority upon the Legislative Council.

Figure 53




As shown in Table 47, younger and more educated Palestinians were generally much harsher in their assessment of the relationship between the Executive Authority and the Legislative Council. Some 44.3% of the people who went to college and above replied that the Executive Authority was imposing some restrictions on the Legislative Council, compared to only 25.3% of those with primary school education. Similarly, 38.5% of the people between the ages of 18 and 25 said that the Legislative Council was very restricted by the Executive Authority, compared to 27.6% of those aged 46 to 55 years old, and 33.3% of people aged 55 and older. Also, whereas 46.7% of the people surveyed who were between 18 and 25 years old felt that the Legislative Council was subject to some restrictions by the Executive Authority, only 30.3% of those aged 55 years old and older thought so.

Table 47: Would you say that the PLC is very restricted by the Executive Authority, that there are only some restrictions on the Council by the EA, or that there are no restrictions by the EA?

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very restricted by EA	32.8%	29.4%	35.8%	40.4%	35.7%	33.8%	38.5%	36.0%	27.6%	33.3%
Some restrictions	35.3%	41.2%	44.6%	44.9%	44.3%	46.7%	38.8%	43.3%	44.8%	30.3%
No restrictions by EA	13.4%	13.1%	10.8%	9.2%	13.0%	11.1%	11.7%	11.3%	12.4%	10.6%
No answer	18.5%	16.3%	8.8%	5.4%	7.0%	8.4%	10.9%	9.4%	15.2%	25.8%


To further illustrate the relationship between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, Council members were asked to describe their level of communication with the Executive Authority. Only 14.0% said that communications were good; about 46.5% of the Council members described their level of communication as average; and 37.2% considered the communication poor.

Figure 54




Moreover, as shown in Figure 55, only 4.7% of Council members said that the Executive Authority has a positive affect on the functioning of the Council. In addition, the majority of Council members, 79.1%, said that the Executive Authority had a negative impact on the Council's performance. Only 9.3% of Council members thought that the Executive Authority had no effect at all on the functioning of the Legislative Council.

Figure 55



One of the main reasons for Council members' generally negative feelings about relations with the Executive Authority is the fact that the Council's resolutions are frequently ignored by the Executive branch, leaving many Council members feeling frustrated and powerless. When asked why the Executive Authority often ignores the resolutions taken by the Council, 37.2% of Council members felt it was the attitude of the Executive Authority and 20.9% felt it was inefficiency. About 32.6%, however, felt it was a combination of both attitude and inefficiency.


Figure 56



When examining the relation between the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority, the relationship between the Council and the head of the Executive Authority, Yasser Arafat, should not be overlooked. Arafat is also a non-voting member of the Legislative Council. When Council members were to evaluate the level of communication with the PA president, their views were similar to their earlier evaluation of the Executive Authority in general. Only 14.0% of Council members rated the level of communication with the president as good. The majority of Council members, 44.2%, rated communications as average, and 37.2% of Council members thought that the level of communication with the president is poor.

Figure 57


Council members' evaluation of level of communication with the president



Also, as shown in Figure 58 below, 69.8% of Council members felt that the PA president negatively affects the Council's functioning; only 11.6% replied that the president either affects the functioning of the Legislative Council positively or does not affect it at all.

Figure 58

Council members's evaluation of the president's impact on Council's functioning



The negative evaluation by Council members of their relation with President Arafat is due in part to their view that Arafat attempts to restrict the Council's powers. The most obvious explanation would be that Arafat is simply an authoritarian leader similar to others in the region, who does not want to share power and wants a puppet parliament. As Dr. Haidar 'Abdel Shafi²⁴ said in an interview at the time of the corruption debate in the Legislative Council:

I am sure there will be a serious debate and that the members will express their opinions strongly, but what will be the outcome of this? You see, in the absence of the Basic Law or the Interim Constitution, or even if there would be a Basic Law, I don't see that Arafat is going to comply. You have here the example of a real dictatorship, because Arafat has the authority, he has the military, and so on. So he is not going to listen. He will say that the decision-making is mine, to hell with everyone, the decision is mine.

Council member Marwan Bargouthi²⁵ explains, somewhat more diplomatically:

We have a special case for a President. We don't have a traditional president who was elected for four years and will leave after four years. We have a leader who started as a leader more than 30 years ago. Mr. Arafat has been the chairman of the PLO for 30 years, and a leader of Fateh. He is a historical symbol for the Palestinian people. So he is more than a normal president. These things give him some privileges and distinguished powers, and he was also elected by the people. In my opinion, Mr. Arafat took a very important decision with the general elections in order to strengthen democracy, but it is not real democracy or full democracy, as one would think. He has his own opinion about democracy as well. I think all the presidents in the world and all the governments in the world like to keep and strengthen their powers. It is not easy for anyone who has power to give it away. Also, for 30 years, Mr. Arafat was used to working with the institutions of the PLO and he was the decision-maker. This is the fact. The arrival of new chambers in the political field, who decided to take part and participate in the political decision-making, is not easy for him.


There could be another, deeper, reason for Arafat unwillingness to allow the Legislative Council too much power. Arafat might be trying to prevent the Council from becoming too influential because its mandate is restricted by the Oslo agreements and by the Interim Agreement and, at this stage in the peace process, Arafat might find it safer to maintain the strength of the PLO. Indeed, all the Palestinian Authority institutions derive their existence, jurisdiction and legitimacy from the peace process and the peace agreements signed by Israel and the PLO. These same peace agreements, however, give the PLO more independence, and its powers are not limited by the interim period. This may also explain why Arafat did not include the required number of Council members into his Cabinet. Article V.4.b of the Interim Agreement reads as follows:

²⁴ The interview with Dr. Haidar 'Abdel Shafi was conducted in Ramallah on 29 July 1997.

²⁵ The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on 19 September 1997.

The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive Authority, who are not members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote in meetings of the Council.


Consequently, according to the Interim Agreement, 80% of the Cabinet should consist of Council members. However, this is not the case. Only two thirds of the Cabinet are members of the Legislative Council. Moreover, since the establishment of regularly-scheduled Cabinet meetings, not one Cabinet meeting has taken place with only Cabinet members present. Instead, regular meetings are being held by members of the Cabinet and various people of Arafat's choice. These are usually members of the PLO Executive Committee, negotiators, heads of the security services, and high-ranking Fateh officials. This body, rather than only the members of the Cabinet, which takes the decisions. The Legislative Council is unhappy with this arrangement, seeing this body as violating the Interim agreement and illustrating the overlap of a dual power structure, in addition to lacking respect for the principle of separation of powers.



Council members are also not very positive in their evaluation of the media's impact on the Council's work. While 37.2% of Council members answered that the media have a positive influence on the Council's functioning, 55.8% thought that the media negatively affect the functioning of the Legislative Council.

Figure 60

Council members' evaluation of the impact of the media on Council's functioning



Many Council members charge that the media, particularly the local media, does not provide adequate press coverage and that it only shows interest in the Legislative Council if President Arafat attends a meeting. They accuse the media of self-censorship and only covering big stories, overlooking the smaller, but important steps taken by the Legislative Council. As Council member Rafat al-Najjar said in an interview with Human Rights Watch Middle East:


There was a decision at the [Council's] meeting in Rafah city in Gaza on May 8 and 9 [1996] that the Council meetings are free and open for all media and journalists, and we asked that all votes and decisions be covered live and all decisions printed in all media, especially radio and TV. This never happened. When they [the official broadcasting stations] cover the Council, they cover small things, and only when the president is talking. Several journalists have interviewed members of the Council who are critical, but they were afraid to publish the interviews.²⁶

Another important factor in the relationship with the media is related to an incident which occurred in May 1997. Daoud Kuttab, who runs the al-Quds TV station and had been broadcasting the Council sessions live on a local channel for several months, was jailed by the Palestinian Authority for a few days, after his transmission was jammed just when the Legislative Council was about to begin a debate on corruption in the Authority. Council members had been pleased with this independent live broadcasting of the full parliamentary sessions, realizing the importance of such coverage in increasing the Council's recognition among the Palestinian general public. After the al-Quds station was forced to stop airing the Council sessions, information about the Council was scarcer, and Council members became increasingly frustrated by the Executive Authority's attempts to further isolate Council members through this blocking of objective media coverage of the


²⁶ "Palestinian Self-rule areas: Human rights under the Palestinian Authority", *Human Rights Watch/Middle East Report*, Vol. 9, No. 10, September 1997, p. 37.

Council's work. This frustration with the Executive Authority's actions indirectly affected Council members' rather negative evaluation of the media.

Despite all the impediments to the effective functioning of the Council, Council members remain optimistic about their relationship with their constituents. About 60.5% of Council members feel that the level of communication with the people is good, and another 34.9% think that the level of communication is average.



Moreover, as shown in Figure 62 below, an overwhelming majority of Council members, 86.0%, feel that the people affect the Council positively. When examining the replies of Council members in Figures 58 and Table 59, it is clear that even when Council members have a very positive evaluation of the influence of the public on the Council's function, they are more cautious in their assessment of their level of communication with the people. This could be taken to mean that Council members not only acknowledge the many obstacles they face in trying to reach their constituents, but also realize there is room for improvement in this area of their work.



IV. PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL'S LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY

The previous chapters provided a general evaluation of the Legislative Council by both the general public and Council members, and examined the constraints on the performance of the Legislative Council. This chapter will attempt to determine whether or not the Legislative Council can be judged a democratic body, by assessing whether Council members are familiar with and agree with some generally-accepted democratic tenets.

1. Ranking of Countries by Level of Democracy

Council members were asked to rank selected countries by their level of democracy in order to get an idea of how they understand the basic concept of democracy. The countries included Egypt, France, Jordan; Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, Yemen and Sweden. As illustrated in Figure 63 below, in general, Council members felt that Sweden was the most democratic, followed by France, and then the United States. None of the Council members who filled in questionnaires considered either Sweden or France undemocratic, while 7.0% considered the United States undemocratic (undemocratic or very undemocratic).

Figure 63 Council members' perceptions of the level of democracy in selected countries





Figure 63 was divided into two charts, one ranking the Arab countries, and the second ranking the Western countries. Council members clearly consider the selected Western countries, with the exception of Turkey, as being far more democratic than the Arab

countries. Only 2.3% of the interviewed Council members view Turkey as being very democratic; 25.6% consider Turkey democratic

None of the Arab countries were given positive evaluations in terms of their level of democracy. None of the Council members considered any of the Arab countries included in the selection very democratic; 37.2% rated Tunisia as democratic. Egypt was ranked second, with 25.6% rating it as democratic, and Yemen was third, rated by 18.6% of the Council members as democratic. Jordan was ranked fourth, with only 11.6% rating the kingdom democratic; none of the Council members found Saudi Arabia democratic.

Figure 64




2. Level of Democratic Responsibility Among Council Members

In order to make an assessment of Council members' sense of democratic responsibility, five questions were formulated relating to voting behavior, constitutional amendments, accountability, and sources of interpretation.

2.1. Voting behavior

Council members were asked how they would vote on a bill that was popular, but which did not meet certain generally accepted democratic criteria. The majority, 58.1%, answered that they would vote against the bill; 20.9% said they would abstain from voting. Less than one fifth, 16.3%, replied that they would vote for the bill regardless. Thus, the majority were willing to sacrifice popular sentiments in favor of their democratic principles.

Figure 65




2.2. Constitutional amendments

When Council members were asked by what procedure the Constitution should be amended, 67.4% responded that it should be amended by a two thirds majority vote in the Legislative Council. Only 4.7% of the interviewed Council members answered that constitutional amendments could be carried by a simple parliamentary majority, and in fact the majority of Council members preferred a public referendum over a simple parliamentary majority. None of the Council members responded that the president should be able to amend the Constitution.

These findings, and the large number of members who favored constitutional amendment by referendum, indicate how seriously Council members take the issue of creating, upholding and protecting the Constitution

Figure 66




As yet, of course, the Palestinian Authority and its constituents do not have a Constitution to set out the rules in the autonomous areas. The Basic Law, which is to be the transitional Constitution for the duration of the interim period, has undergone three readings in the Legislative Council. Since September 1997, the version of the Basic Law which was approved by the Legislative Council has been with President Arafat, who is supposed to ratify the law before it can be enacted. However, proposed legislation usually becomes law automatically if it has not been ratified by the president one month after it has been handed over to him. By now, this month has long passed, but the Basic Law is still not in force, because before it becomes legal, it must be published in the Official Gazette, permission for which can only be given by President Arafat.

2.3. *Accountability*

The Council members were asked to whom, in their opinion, the president should be accountable. As illustrated in Figure 64 below, an overwhelming majority of the Council members, 90.5%, answered that the president should be accountable to the Legislative Council. When responding to this question, Council members were allowed to choose more than one option.²⁷ Their second choice was that the president should be accountable to the people, with 32.6% of Council members citing this opinion. The fact that Council members' first option was the Legislative Council and then the people, rather than the Cabinet or the judiciary, is logical, and is an indication that Council members take their responsibility as representatives of the people seriously.

Figure 67




²⁷ More detailed results can be consulted in Annex 4 of this report.

A similar question was asked in a public opinion poll conducted by JMCC in May 1995. As Figure 68 indicates, people at that time agreed with Council members that the parliament should hold the president accountable, albeit to a far lesser degree. Indeed, only 36.9% of those surveyed thought that the parliament should hold the president accountable, while 32.9% thought it should be the judiciary. Only 5.1% of interviewees responded that the people should hold the president accountable, slightly less than the number of people who replied that the president is above accountability.

A comparison between Council members' answers and those of the general public gives the impression that Council members have a much more clear and democratically-based idea of the president's accountability, further supporting the argument that Council members are democratically responsible.

Figure 68




Source: JMCC, May 1995

Council members were also asked to whom they thought the Cabinet should be accountable. As indicated in Figure 69 below, a surprisingly small number of Council members responded that the Cabinet should be accountable to the Legislative Council. Almost half the surveyed Council members, 47.6%, said that the Cabinet should be accountable to the president. However, Council members were, here also, allowed to

choose more than one option,²⁸ and the majority of Council members, 65.1%, said as their second choice that the Cabinet should be accountable to the Legislative Council.

Both the Council members who said that the Cabinet is accountable to the president and those who said that the Cabinet is accountable to the Legislative Council, are consistent with standard governmental norms. In the United States, the Cabinet is accountable to the president, whereas in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, the Cabinet is accountable to the parliament.

Figure 69




2.4. Highest legal authority

When asked what should be the highest level of authority in interpretation of the law, 46.5% of Council members who filled in questionnaires responded that the High Court should be the highest source of interpretation. Significantly, as shown in Figure 70 below, none of the Council members thought that the president or religious institutions should be the highest source of interpretation.

²⁸ More detailed results can be consulted in Annex 4 of this report.

Figure 70



Council members' indicate, yet again, that they respect the principle of separation of powers and are familiar with the mandates of each institution according to this principle.

In general, one can conclude from the results of these questions that Council members do have a well-developed sense of democratic responsibility, while at the same time acknowledging the limitations placed on the responsibility of their Council.

3. Council Members' Agreement With Basic Democratic Tenets

Council members were presented with a variety of statements, and were asked to express their level of agreement or disagreement with these statements from 1 to 5, with number 1 signifying strong agreement, and number 5 strong disagreement. For the purpose of this study, numbers 1 and 2 were interpreted as "agree", numbers 4 and 5 as "disagree". If Council members ticked number 3 on a certain question, it was understood as "neither" or "middle", i.e., the Council member in question is divided on the topic, and does not agree or disagree with the statement.

As becomes clear from Figure 71, Council members responded quite differently to the question of whether the ideal Council member should adhere to the Constitution than on the question of whether the ideal Council member should rely on religious interpretation.


About 93.0% of the Council members who filled up the questionnaires agreed that the ideal Council member should adhere to the Constitution but, in fact, 100% of the Council members who actually answered this question agreed that the ideal Council member should

adhere to the Constitution. This result indicates an extremely high level of democratic responsibility on the part of Council members.

On the question of reliance on religious interpretation, opinions were far more divided. Whereas the majority of the Council members who answered this question do not believe that the ideal Council member should rely on religious interpretation, 9.3% do. About 11.6% of Council members were divided on the topic, neither agreeing or disagreeing. The most significant point, however, is the fact that 51.2% of the Council members interviewed refused to answer this question. So, while there is strong agreement about the authority of the Constitution, there was much less clarity about the role of religion. This is not surprising as, reflecting the general population, the Legislative Council includes religiously observant people, and in general, religion remains an important factor in Palestinian society. Nevertheless, the majority of Council members backed the more pragmatic approach of reliance on the written Constitution.

Figure 71

The ideal Council member should:



Before analyzing Figures 72 and 74, it should be noted that the percentages presented in these figures are “valid percentages”. This means that the Council members who filled in a questionnaire but did not give their opinion on a certain statement, are not included in the results below, i.e., the value of “missing” or “no answer” has been excluded.

The first statement in Figure 72 is that there are some situations in which the PA is justified in breaking laws in order to protect national security. A majority of 58.5% of the Council

members who responded to this statement disagreed, while 29.2% agreed. About 12.2% was unsure whether to agree or not. In any case, the value of the majority who did not agree assumes even greater significance when considered in its current context. Indeed, even given the present situation of uncertainty in political developments, the majority of Council members do not believe that there are certain situations in which the PA would be justified in breaking the law.

In a public opinion poll conducted by JMCC in May 1995, 1069 people from the West Bank (including Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip were asked the same question. About 75.5% of the people said that in some situations it was permissible for the PA to break the law. Only 19.3% of the interviewees responded that they did not think that there are no situations in which the PA is justified in breaking the law; 5.0% of those surveyed did not express an opinion.

The second statement presented in Figure 72 is concerned with the principle of a presidential impeachment should the president violate the Constitution. Almost half, 47.6%, of the Council members agreed that the president should be impeached if violated the Constitution; 19.0% disagreed. Many Council members remained divided on this issue, with 33.3% saying that they neither agree or. 'Abdul Jawad Saleh, Minister of Agriculture and a member of the Legislative Council, is one of the Council members clearly in favor of the principle of impeachment and expressed this in an interview as follows:

I promoted the idea of impeachment of the president and I don't think that anybody else in the Council suggested it...I think that no person, whatever his status, should be exempted from questioning and investigation, or should be exempt from such a democratic procedure.²⁹

Contrary to the findings with regard to the first statement, the public were more outspoken about the issue of presidential impeachment than the Council. In the same public opinion poll conducted by JMCC in May 1995, 68.8% of the people said that they favored the principle of presidential impeachment by the parliament. About 22.9% of the people surveyed disagreed, and 8.3% did not answer the question.

The third statement in Figure 72 evolves around the quota system. A small majority of 39.3% of Council members said that they were in favor of a quota system to ensure fair representation for minorities. About 31.7% of Council members replied that a quota system was unimportant, while 29.3% were neither for or against it. Thus, Council members are clearly divided about the issue of quotas. It should be noted that in the 1996 elections, there was a quota system for Christians in some districts, but not for women. Marwan Bargouthi, a Council member and Secretary-General of the Fateh Higher Council in the West Bank is a firm defender of the quota system, for both women and Christians. He explains:

²⁹ The interview with 'Abdul Jawad Saleh was conducted in Ramallah on 23 August 1997.

I was born in this region [Ramallah district] and it is a mixed area with Christians and Muslims. We learned together, we studied together in school, in the university, and in society. So, for me it is not important if there are quotas or not. Believe me. Because I think that a Christian will not necessarily choose a Christian candidate, and Muslims will not necessarily choose a Muslim candidate. But for the first five or 10 years, I prefer to see that representation of the Christians in the parliament is guaranteed. I think to guarantee that, the quota system is very important.... We cannot take the experience of the elections in Egypt as an example. You know what the results were. Not one Christian was elected and they have 10 million Christians. Not one was elected! And Mubarak took the decision to appoint 10 or 12 Christian representatives. So, I think that it was a wise decision of the Election Committee to decide on a quota system for Christians. ... I am a supporter of quotas, all kind of quotas, also for women. I tried to convince the [Election] Committee.³⁰

The fourth statement in Figure 72 is concerned with the importance of having women in the Legislative Council. An overwhelming majority of 87.8% of the Council members agree that it is important to have women in the Legislative Council. Only 7.3% of the Council members think that it is not important, while 4.9% sat on the fence, unsure about the importance of women in the Council. The women's issue has been debated in the Legislative Council, but without success. Given the results of this question, however, legislation or resolutions by the Legislative Council on women's issues might be more successful in the future. Marwan Bargouthi explains:


You know that during the discussions four months ago, I suggested in the Legislative Council to establish a Women's Affairs Committee. There were heated discussions in the Council, but unfortunately my suggestion was voted down, 20 votes for and 18 against. So, we have the majority. But to change, we need 51 persons present in the Council, so it failed. But we will repeat it and I do not think that the majority of the Council doesn't support women. Part of the Council is very conservative and very religious, but we have a group who absolutely supports women's rights.³¹

As illustrated in Figure 73, the general public feels less strongly than Council members about the importance of having women in the Legislative Council. In an opinion poll conducted by JMCC in February 1996, 68.4% out of 1255 interviewees responded that it was important to have women in the Legislative Council, compared to 16.8% who said that it is not important. In addition, there was a gap in opinions between men and women on this issue. Far more women than men responded that it was important to have women in the Council, while more men than women replied that it was not important.

³⁰ The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on 19 September 1997.


³¹ The interview with Marwan Bargouthi was conducted in Ramallah on 19 September 1997.

Figure 73



The last statement in Figure 72 below looks at Council members' opinions on alcohol. A surprising 56.4% of the Council members said that alcohol drinking was a personal choice and should not be treated as a crime; 30.8% did not agree, while 12.8% were undecided on the topic. These results indicate that the Council members, even in an entity where the majority of the people are Muslim and are forbidden, by the Koran, to drink alcohol, retain liberal and tolerant attitudes.

Figure 72



The results in Figure 74 below illustrate a very strong belief among Council members about some basic democratic rights and principles. When Council members were asked about separation between state and religion, 59.5% said that they believed in this principle and 30.9% said they did not. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the Council members, 93.0% said they believe in individual rights, and none said they did not. Again, 93.0% support the principle of majority rule, while at the same time 88.4% believe in respecting the rights of minorities. About 97.6% of the Council members believe in judicial review, compared to only 2.4% who do not. Nearly all Council members, namely 97.6%, support the principle of freedom of assembly, and 90.7% acknowledge the right of opposition. Lastly, 95.4% of the interviewed Council members believe in freedom of the press, while only 2.3% do not, and 2.3% remain undecided on the issue.

Similar questions on some of the democratic rights discussed above were put before the general public in a survey conducted by JMCC in May 1995. From the results presented in Table 48 below, Council members appear to be far more democratically aware than the public. When asked about the government's right to interfere with some democratic freedoms and rights, only 39.7% of the surveyed people replied that the government cannot interfere with people's freedom of expression, and only 26.2% said that the government cannot interfere with freedom of assembly. Only 29.2% of the interviewees said that the government has no right to interfere with the opposition, but 53.8% answered that the government cannot intervene in their individual rights. Similarly, on average, between 10% to 15% of the surveyed people said that the government always has the right to intervene in the rights and freedoms listed in Table 50.


Table 48: Does the government have the right to intervene in:

	All the time	Sometimes	No intervention	No opinion/NA
Freedom of expression	11.7%	44.8%	39.7%	3.8%
Freedom of assembly	17.5%	50.5%	26.2%	5.8%
Individual rights	10.0%	28.0%	53.8%	8.2%
Opposition	15.0%	38.4%	29.2%	17.4%

N=1069

The Council members answers to these types of questions, by contrast, speak for themselves. Most Council members are not only familiar with basic democratic principles, but they believe in them firmly. This leads to the conclusion that whatever criticisms are expressed about the Legislative Council and whatever the reasons for the Council's less than perfect performance, there is no lack of knowledge or lack of support for democracy or democratic values on the part of Council members.

Figure 74



Conclusion

This comparative analysis — of public opinion and views of members of the Palestinian Legislative Council — has helped to gain a better understanding of the position of the Council in Palestinian society and the Council's contribution to the process of democratization in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has also illuminated some of the constraints under which the Council is operating and which also impede the state-building process. The international community, as well as Palestinians themselves, are clearly interested in the establishment of a democratic regime in the Palestinian autonomous areas, and an obvious question at the current time is whether that is possible or even realistic. Pressure for the rapid emergence of a fully-fledged democracy should, perhaps, instead be translated into finding solutions to the problem of how Palestinian society, and the Council as its representative, can develop democratically given the current constraints. The Palestinian Authority does not govern an independent state, but is rather a limited transitional government, held back both by its involvement in a bankrupt peace process and the difficulties of making the transformation from a revolutionary movement to a governing body.

The Palestinian national and presidential elections of 20 January 1996 were a historic first step toward democratic state-building. The Council which was ushered in by these elections is highly educated, fairly young, and shares a long history of political activism. It also includes five women among its 88 members. The composition of the Legislative Council, and the results of the public opinion poll, clearly indicate that candidates' history of involvement in the political struggle was of paramount importance to voters, while factors such as age, gender, and family relations were less influential. In short, the electorate, in general, voted according to political rather than traditional considerations. The educational level of voters influenced to a certain extent how they cast their vote and how they intend to vote in the future. Using selected criteria by the democratic nature of their elected Council and the democratically responsible nature of the electorate could be measured, the Palestinian voting public has a relatively high level of civic and democratic awareness. This is partly the, somewhat ironic, result of 30 years of the Israeli military occupation, which culminated in a popular uprising, the intifada. Palestinians became more aware and more political active in general, and the close proximity and exposure, albeit forced, to the negative and positive influences of Israel's Western society and politics, juxtaposed with the natural influence of neighboring Arab countries, has made Palestinians more discriminating about what they want and don't want in their own government.

To sum up the findings in brief, the Legislative Council was found to be generally democratic by both the people and members themselves. The Council does appear to represent the views of the public and to be aware of the needs of the people. There was agreement in a number of areas between the Council and the people. The Council has been responsible for opening and promoting debate on key issues within the Palestinian political

and social discourse. Furthermore, the 50 percent of the Council that participated in the survey expressed strong support for and belief in some central tenets of democratic governance.

Yet, despite these positive evaluations, which were shared by the public and Council members in general, the Council is widely seen as ineffective and there is popular dissatisfaction with its performance. The question then becomes: what went wrong? The Council's low public rating cannot be attributed to its lack of democracy or civic responsibility, or to its lack of courage in placing sensitive issues into a public forum.

The reasons for the gap between expectations and reality emerge clearly in this study: the political constraints obstructing the Council, constraints which are both externally and internally generated. The nature of the agreements by which the Council was set up, and the numerous Israeli political and other restraints on the Council's activities, together present a formidable obstacle to the Council's functioning as an effective and independent legislative body.

Equally as formidable are the internal political constraints, which are two-fold. There been ongoing interference from the Executive branch of the government, which appears to see the Council's attempts to monitor and legislate government activity as stepping outside the bounds of its mandate, and therefore employs delaying tactics or outright ignores the Council's resolutions or other directives. The second problem is the Council's unwillingness to back up its firmly-worded resolutions with actions, i.e., a vote of no confidence. In September 1997, for example, the Legislative Council recommended that PA president Arafat accept the resignation of his Cabinet, and assign ministerial posts by professional qualifications rather than other considerations. When no changes were made, the Council threatened to hold a no confidence vote. Arafat then responded by 1) promising to accept the two-month-old resignation of his ministers; 2) to reshuffle the Cabinet within six weeks; and 3) to ratify certain laws, provided certain amendments were made. The issue was finally resolved, not in Council, where it had been raised, but in internal Fateh meetings. This leads to one of the fundamental problems affecting the Council: the lack of any real opposition bloc due to boycott of the elections by parties opposing the Oslo accords.

Yet, despite the presence of a large Fateh block in the Council, in the two years that the Council has been functioning, only two of the myriad resolutions passed by the Council have been signed into law by the Fateh-ruled Executive Authority. This failure to achieve results has created frustration among members of the public and within the Council itself, as witnessed by the resignation of Dr. Haidar 'Abdel Shafi. Nevertheless, the Council has great potential as an institution and there is a process of democratization, slow but unfolding nonetheless, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The higher visibility of women on the Council and in the government, relative to Israel and other neighboring countries, is one positive sign. The active monitoring of governmental activity and the open debate on

corruption, mismanagement and human rights issues is another, as is the Council's fundamental respect for the principles and practices of democracy.

Therefore, it is important to note that, according to the results of this study, the Legislative Council is inherently democratic and the electorate that voted them in is aware of its democratic and civic responsibilities and rights. However, the Palestinian electorate may have to temper their expectations of an independent and democratic state lying just around the corner. The Council, for its part, must concentrate on working to the fullest extent of its powers, together with the Executive branch of the Palestinian Authority, to develop a democratically responsible government. Only time will tell if Palestine's interim agreement with democracy will develop into a permanent arrangement.

ANNEXES:

ANNEX 1: Public Opinion Poll on the Legislative Council Elections

ANNEX 2: Survey of Legislative Council Members

ANNEX 1

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS

Q1. Did you vote in the elections of January 1996? (c9)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes	64.6%	64.3%	64.8%	59.9%	72.7%	61.8%	68.9%
No	34.4%	34.9%	34.0%	38.9%	26.7%	37.2%	30.1%
No answer	1.0%	0.8%	1.2%	1.2%	0.7%	0.9%	1.0%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	58.8%	64.3%	65.7%	65.3%	67.8%	63.6%	64.2%	71.4%	69.5%	45.5%
No	38.7%	34.8%	34.0%	33.1%	31.3%	35.6%	35.5%	28.1%	28.6%	50.0%
No answer	2.5%	0.9%	0.3%	1.6%	0.9%	0.8%	0.3%	0.5%	1.9%	4.5%

Q2. For which political faction did vote? (c10)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Fateh	63.1%	61.9%	64.1%	65.1%	60.2%	65.2%	62.0%
Hamas	2.6%	2.6%	2.7%	1.5%	4.1%	3.0%	2.0%
PFLP	0.9%	1.5%	0.3%	1.1%	0.6%	1.0%	0.8%
DFLP	0.1%	—	0.3%	—	0.3%	0.3%	—
Islamic Jihad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PPP	1.7%	2.0%	1.3%	2.6%	0.3%	2.5%	0.8%
FIDA	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	1.3%	—	1.3%	0.3%
Democratic Coalition	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other Islamic Org.	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	1.1%	0.3%	1.0%	0.6%
Secular pro-peace	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.4%	1.3%	1.0%	0.6%
Secular against peace	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PLO	0.3%	0.5%	—	0.2%	0.3%	—	0.3%
Persons and not factions	19.8%	20.7%	18.9%	21.2%	17.9%	19.1%	19.7%
Others	0.5%	0.8%	0.3%	0.9%	—	1.0%	—
No answer	8.7%	7.7%	9.8%	4.4%	14.7%	4.5%	13.0%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Fateh	58.6%	68.3%	65.1%	61.5%	56.4%	69.7%	60.9%	64.1%	58.9%	66.7%
Hamas	2.9%	2.8%	2.7%	2.0%	3.8%	3.3%	2.6%	2.1%	2.7%	—
PFLP	—	0.7%	0.4%	2.0%	1.3%	0.8%	1.7%	0.7%	—	—
DFLP	—	—	—	0.5%	—	0.4%	—	—	—	—
Islamic Jihad	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PPP	—	—	2.0%	2.9%	2.6%	1.2%	2.6%	2.8%	—	—
FIDA	—	0.7%	1.2%	1.0%	—	0.4%	0.9%	0.7%	2.7%	—
Democratic Coalition	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other Islamic Org.	—	0.7%	0.8%	0.5%	1.3%	0.4%	0.4%	1.4%	—	3.3%
Secular pro-peace	1.4%	—	0.8%	1.0%	—	1.2%	0.4%	0.7%	—	—
Secular against peace	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
PLO	—	—	0.4%	—	1.3%	0.4%	—	0.7%	—	—
Persons and not factions	27.1%	18.3%	17.3%	19.5%	23.1%	14.1%	20.9%	17.2%	28.8%	23.3%
Others	1.4%	0.7%	0.4%	0.5%	—	—	1.3%	—	1.4%	—
No answer	8.6%	7.7%	9.0%	8.8%	10.3%	7.9%	8.5%	9.7%	5.5%	6.7%

Q3. Why didn't you vote? (c11)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=411	N=212	N=197	N=294	N=117	N=239	N=155
I didn't register on time	17.0%	17.5%	16.8%	16.7%	17.9%	14.6%	21.9%
I didn't believe that it would make a difference	13.4%	13.2%	13.7%	13.3%	13.7%	12.1%	13.5%
I didn't find candidates for whom I would cast my vote	22.6%	20.3%	24.9%	21.8%	24.8%	21.8%	23.2%
Others	8.5%	8.0%	9.1%	8.55%	8.5%	10.0%	6.5%
I am opposition/against Oslo	3.4%	4.7%	2.0%	3.1%	4.3%	3.3%	3.9%
Not convinced	4.9%	4.2%	5.6%	5.8%	2.6%	5.9%	3.2%
I was out of the country	7.1%	7.1%	6.6%	6.8%	7.7%	7.5%	5.2%
Personal reasons	2.9%	3.8%	2.0%	2.7%	3.4%	3.3%	2.6%
Too young	5.1%	7.1%	3.0%	5.4%	4.3%	4.2%	7.1%
Old	1.5%	1.4%	1.5%	1.7%	0.9%	2.1%	0.6%
Sick	1.9%	0.9%	3.0%	2.4%	0.9%	2.5%	1.3%
Didn't have an idea	2.7%	3.8%	1.5%	1.4%	6.0%	2.5%	3.2%
No answer	9.0%	8.0%	10.1%	10.5%	5.1%	10.0%	7.8%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=46	N=77	N=132	N=104	N=36	N=135	N=130	N=57	N=30	N=33
I didn't register on time	23.9%	14.3%	16.7%	20.2%	8.3%	20.0%	14.6%	10.5%	23.3%	24.2%
I didn't believe that it would make a difference	15.2%	13.0%	13.6%	14.4%	8.3%	11.1%	14.6%	14.0%	13.3%	15.2%
I didn't find candidates for whom I would cast my vote	10.9%	28.6%	22.7%	21.2%	27.8%	24.4%	24.6%	21.1%	13.3%	15.2%
Others	17.4%	10.4%	7.6%	4.8%	8.3%	5.9%	8.5%	19.3%	10.0%	6.1%
I am opposition/against Oslo	—	—	2.3%	8.7%	5.6%	3.0%	4.6%	5.3%	—	—
Not convinced	—	6.5%	4.5%	7.7%	—	5.2%	7.7%	5.3%	—	—
I was out of the country	2.2%	1.3%	7.6%	9.6%	19.4%	6.7%	6.9%	7.0%	6.7%	—
Personal reasons	2.2%	3.9%	2.3%	1.0%	5.6%	1.5%	4.6%	—	6.7%	6.1%
Too young	—	1.3%	9.8%	5.8%	—	12.6%	—	—	—	—
Old	8.7%	—	0.8%	—	—	0.7%	—	—	3.3%	12.1%
Sick	10.9%	1.3%	0.8%	—	—	0.7%	1.5%	—	10.0%	6.1%
Didn't have an idea	2.2%	5.2%	3.0%	—	5.6%	3.0%	2.3%	1.8%	3.3%	3.0%
No answer	6.5%	14.3%	8.3%	6.7%	11.2%	5.2%	10.0%	15.8%	10.0%	12.2%

Q4. When voting, did you know what was the agenda/campaign slogans of the candidates? (c12)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Yes	73.7%	81.3%	66.0%	75.3%	71.5%	74.3%	73.5%
No	21.1%	14.8%	27.7%	19.9%	22.9%	22.2%	20.3%
No answer	5.2%	3.8%	6.4%	4.9%	5.6%	3.5%	6.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Yes	54.3%	61.3%	74.5%	84.9%	87.2%	78.8%	72.8%	78.6%	64.4%	53.3%
No	42.9%	29.6%	20.4%	11.7%	10.3%	16.2%	23.0%	20.7%	30.1%	30.0%
No answer	2.9%	9.2%	5.1%	3.4%	2.6%	5.0%	4.3%	0.7%	5.5%	16.7%

I will list some categories of people. Please tell me whether, in general, you voted for them or not.

Q5. Returnees (c13)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Voted	61.4%	64.7%	58.5%	66.9%	53.6%	63.5%	57.7%
Did not vote	33.8%	31.5%	35.6%	28.0%	42.0%	32.5%	36.6%
No answer	4.8%	3.8%	5.9%	5.1%	4.4%	4.0%	5.6%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	70.0%	54.9%	61.2%	59.5%	67.9%	60.2%	61.7%	64.1%	64.4%	50.0%
Did not vote	25.7%	37.3%	36.1%	34.6%	28.2%	34.4%	33.2%	34.5%	35.6%	26.7%
No answer	4.3%	7.7%	2.7%	5.9%	3.8%	5.4%	5.1%	1.4%	—	23.3%

Q6. Relatives (c14)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Voted	28.4%	25.3%	31.6%	30.2%	25.7%	30.5%	25.4%
Did not vote	59.3%	61.9%	56.4%	54.3%	66.5%	55.7%	64.8%
No answer	12.3%	12.8%	12.0%	15.5%	7.8%	13.9%	9.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	35.7%	20.4%	36.5%	26.3%	15.4%	24.1%	30.2%	33.8%	26.0%	20.0%
Did not vote	47.1%	68.3%	54.9%	61.5%	66.7%	64.7%	57.0%	57.2%	57.5%	56.7%
No answer	17.1%	11.3%	8.6%	12.2%	17.9%	11.2%	12.8%	9.0%	16.4%	23.3%

Q7. Females (c15)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Voted	40.2%	36.8%	43.9%	39.3%	41.4%	41.3%	38.9%
Did not vote	53.2%	55.0%	51.3%	53.2%	53.3%	51.9%	55.8%
No answer	6.6%	8.2%	4.8%	7.5%	5.3%	6.8%	5.4%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	40.0%	33.8%	40.4%	45.4%	37.2%	40.2%	42.6%	44.8%	35.6%	30.0%
Did not vote	54.3%	59.2%	54.1%	47.3%	53.8%	53.5%	50.2%	52.4%	58.9%	63.3%
No answer	5.7%	7.0%	5.5%	7.3%	9.0%	6.2%	7.2%	2.8%	5.5%	6.7%

Q8. Christians (c16)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Voted	21.2%	24.0%	18.6%	23.8%	17.6%	20.2%	21.4%
Did not vote	70.7%	68.0%	73.4%	68.7%	73.7%	72.8%	70.1%
No answer	8.0%	7.9%	8.0%	7.5%	8.8%	7.1%	8.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	15.7%	15.5%	22.7%	23.4%	23.1%	18.3%	21.7%	20.7%	27.4%	26.7%
Did not vote	78.6%	76.1%	72.2%	66.3%	64.1%	71.8%	71.9%	72.4%	68.5%	56.7%
No answer	5.7%	8.5%	5.1%	10.2%	12.8%	10.0%	6.4%	6.9%	4.1%	16.7%

Q9. People with struggle history (c17)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Voted	90.0%	91.8%	88.0%	92.7%	86.2%	91.9%	87.6%
Did not vote	7.3%	5.4%	9.3%	4.6%	11.0%	5.8%	9.3%
No answer	2.7%	2.8%	2.7%	2.6%	2.8%	2.3%	3.1%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Voted	85.7%	85.9%	89.8%	96.1%	87.2%	88.4%	91.5%	92.4%	87.7%	90.0%
Did not vote	10.0%	10.6%	8.2%	1.5%	9.0%	7.1%	6.8%	5.5%	11.0%	6.7%
No answer	4.3%	3.5%	2.0%	2.4%	3.8%	4.6%	1.7%	2.1%	1.4%	3.3%

How important were the following factors when you cast your vote?

Q10. Democratic values (c18)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	59.8%	63.2%	56.1%	56.5%	64.6%	60.7%	59.4%
Important	28.5%	28.4%	28.7%	34.7%	19.7%	29.0%	27.0%
Somewhat important	6.7%	5.1%	8.5%	4.6%	9.7%	5.3%	8.7%
Not important	2.2%	2.5%	2.4%	2.2%	2.2%	2.8%	1.7%
Absolutely not important	0.8%	0.3%	1.3%	0.7%	0.9%	1.0%	0.6%
No answer	1.9%	1.0%	2.9%	1.3%	2.8%	1.3%	2.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Very important	41.4%	51.4%	60.8%	66.8%	74.4%	57.7%	60.4%	66.2%	60.3%	46.7%
Important	32.9%	39.4%	27.1%	24.9%	15.5%	29.0%	30.6%	23.4%	27.4%	33.3%
Somewhat important	10.0%	4.9%	8.2%	4.4%	7.7%	7.5%	5.1%	5.5%	6.8%	10.0%
Not important	7.1%	1.4%	2.0%	2.4%	—	2.9%	0.9%	2.1%	4.1%	3.3%
Absolutely not important	—	1.4%	0.8%	1.0%	—	1.2%	0.9%	—	1.4%	—
No answer	8.6%	1.4%	1.2%	0.5%	2.6%	1.7%	2.1%	2.8%	—	6.7%

Q11. Political affiliation (c19)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	41.8%	43.2%	39.9%	44.6%	37.9%	45.3%	38.3%
Important	28.6%	27.1%	30.6%	28.9%	28.2%	27.5%	30.4%
Somewhat important	9.8%	10.2%	9.6%	9.5%	10.3%	9.8%	9.6%
Not important	16.2%	16.6%	15.7%	14.6%	18.5%	14.4%	17.7%
Absolutely not important	1.7%	1.5%	1.9%	1.3%	2.2%	1.3%	2.0%
No answer	1.8%	1.3%	2.4%	1.1%	2.8%	1.8%	2.0%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Very important	40.0%	38.7%	43.1%	42.9%	42.3%	39.8%	45.1%	45.5%	42.5%	36.7%
Important	20.0%	33.1%	30.2%	26.8%	32.1%	36.1%	27.7%	20.0%	30.1%	23.3%
Somewhat important	5.7%	11.3%	7.5%	14.1%	7.7%	10.4%	9.4%	11.0%	5.5%	3.3%
Not important	22.9%	14.8%	17.3%	13.2%	12.8%	11.2%	15.3%	18.6%	17.8%	26.7%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	0.7%	1.2%	2.0%	3.8%	1.2%	0.4%	2.1%	4.1%	3.3%
No answer	8.6%	1.4%	0.8%	1.0%	1.3%	1.2%	2.1%	2.8%	—	6.7%

Q12. Religion (c20)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	39.4%	32.0%	46.8%	29.4%	53.6%	33.2%	47.3%
Important	25.3%	27.4%	23.4%	23.8%	27.3%	26.2%	24.2%
Somewhat important	11.9%	14.3%	9.3%	14.6%	8.2%	13.9%	9.0%
Not important	19.3%	22.0%	16.5%	26.3%	9.4%	22.2%	16.1%
Absolutely not important	2.5%	2.8%	2.1%	4.0%	0.3%	2.8%	1.7%
No answer	1.7%	1.5%	1.9%	2.0%	1.3%	1.8%	1.7%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Very important	48.6%	38.0%	42.4%	36.1%	32.1%	39.4%	40.4%	42.1%	38.4%	36.7%
Important	18.6%	28.2%	28.2%	23.9%	23.1%	27.0%	25.1%	21.4%	28.8%	20.0%
Somewhat important	4.3%	12.7%	9.8%	15.1%	12.8%	14.1%	11.9%	6.9%	11.0%	10.0%
Not important	17.1%	20.4%	18.0%	18.5%	24.4%	16.2%	17.9%	24.8%	19.2%	20.0%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	—	1.2%	4.9%	5.1%	2.5%	3.0%	1.4%	2.7%	6.7%
No answer	8.6%	0.7%	0.4%	1.5%	2.6%	0.8%	1.7%	3.4%	—	6.7%

Q13. Religious values (c21)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee Status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=772	N=391	N=376	N=453	N=319	N=397	N=355
Very important	34.2%	29.9%	38.6%	25.2%	47.0%	28.7%	41.1%
Important	26.6%	24.3%	29.0%	23.6%	30.7%	27.7%	26.2%
Somewhat important	16.3%	17.1%	15.4%	20.3%	10.7%	17.6%	14.4%
Not important	18.1%	22.8%	13.3%	24.1%	9.7%	19.9%	15.5%
Absolutely not important	2.3%	3.3%	1.3%	4.0%	—	2.8%	1.4%
No answer	2.5%	2.6%	2.4%	2.9%	1.9%	3.3%	1.4%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=70	N=142	N=255	N=205	N=78	N=241	N=235	N=145	N=73	N=30
Very important	44.3%	34.5%	36.5%	31.7%	23.1%	36.5%	34.0%	35.9%	27.4%	36.7%
Important	21.4%	33.1%	27.8%	23.4%	24.4%	24.1%	29.8%	25.5%	32.9%	20.0%
Somewhat important	8.6%	17.6%	17.3%	16.6%	16.7%	16.6%	15.7%	14.5%	17.8%	20.0%
Not important	12.9%	14.8%	16.5%	21.5%	25.6%	17.4%	16.6%	19.3%	17.8%	13.3%
Absolutely not important	2.9%	—	0.8%	4.9%	5.1%	2.5%	2.1%	2.8%	2.7%	3.3%
No answer	10.0%	—	1.2%	2.0%	5.1%	2.9%	1.7%	2.1%	1.4%	6.7%

Q34. Why wouldn't you vote again? (c42)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=308	N=158	N=149	N=211	N=97	N=164	N=135
It wouldn't make any difference	26.0%	24.7%	27.5%	24.2%	29.9%	23.2%	29.6%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	44.5%	44.9%	43.6%	40.3%	53.6%	39.6%	48.9%
Other reasons	15.9%	17.7%	14.1%	18.5%	10.3%	20.1%	11.1%
Don't believe in the PLC/ they're not going to fulfil their promises	1.0%	1.3%	0.7%	1.4%	—	1.2%	0.7%
No answer	12.7%	11.4%	14.1%	15.6%	6.2%	15.9%	9.6

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=36	N=70	N=98	N=72	N=24	N=88	N=108	N=51	N=19	N=22
It wouldn't make any difference	25.0%	31.4%	24.5%	23.6%	20.8%	23.9%	26.9%	23.5%	15.8%	27.3%
I don't believe the PLC represents the interests of the people	19.4%	42.9%	49.0%	51.4%	54.2%	56.8%	42.6%	45.1%	42.1%	9.1%
Other reasons	27.8%	11.4%	12.2%	19.4%	16.7%	12.5%	14.8%	17.6%	31.6%	22.7%
Don't believe in the PLC / they are not going to fulfil their promises	—	1.4%	2.0%	—	—	1.1%	1.9%	—	—	—
No answer	27.8%	12.9%	12.2%	5.6%	8.3%	5.7%	13.9%	13.7%	10.5%	40.9%

How important will the following factors be when you vote in future elections?

Q35. Democratic values (c43)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	65.1%	66.6%	62.9%	59.9%	73.0%	65.2%	65.8%
Important	27.3%	25.7%	29.4%	33.3%	17.9%	28.8%	24.7%
Somewhat important	3.7%	4.1%	3.4%	3.9%	3.5%	2.8%	4.6%
Not important	1.2%	0.7%	1.8%	0.6%	2.2%	1.2%	1.4%
Absolutely not important	0.1%	—	0.3%	—	0.3%	—	0.3%
No answer	2.6%	2.9%	2.3%	2.2%	3.1%	2.1%	3.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	53.5%	51.8%	68.9%	72.5%	70.2%	66.3%	64.8%	69.6%	64.1%	52.8%
Important	31.0%	41.6%	26.0%	20.2%	21.4%	26.6%	28.8%	24.6%	26.9%	33.3%
Somewhat important	5.6%	5.8%	3.3%	3.2%	2.4%	3.7%	2.6%	4.3%	5.1%	2.8%
Not important	2.8%	—	1.1%	0.5%	1.2%	1.1%	1.3%	0.7%	2.6%	—
Absolutely not important	—	—	—	0.5%	—	0.4%	—	—	—	—
No answer	7.0%	0.7%	0.7%	3.2%	4.8%	1.9%	2.6%	0.7%	1.3%	11.1%

Q36. Political affiliation (c44)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	37.1%	38.3%	35.6%	39.1%	34.0%	41.1%	33.0%
Important	30.4%	27.4%	34.0%	30.1%	30.8%	29.5%	32.8%
Somewhat important	12.0%	13.1%	10.8%	12.9%	10.7%	11.8%	11.5%
Not important	15.6%	15.5%	15.7%	14.7%	17.0%	13.7%	17.0%
Absolutely not important	3.2%	4.4%	1.8%	2.0%	5.0%	2.8%	3.4%
No answer	1.7%	1.5%	2.1%	1.2%	2.5%	1.2%	2.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	32.4%	32.1%	38.8%	41.7%	31.0%	36.7%	36.9%	44.9%	30.8%	33.3%
Important	26.8%	32.8%	33.3%	28.4%	28.6%	35.2%	31.3%	25.4%	32.1%	22.2%
Somewhat important	7.0%	19.0%	8.4%	13.8%	11.9%	11.2%	12.0%	10.9%	16.7%	8.3%
Not important	25.4%	13.9%	16.1%	10.6%	20.2%	12.0%	16.3%	15.2%	14.1%	22.2%
Absolutely not important	4.2%	1.5%	2.6%	3.7%	6.0%	3.4%	1.7%	3.6%	5.1%	2.8%
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.7%	1.8%	2.4%	1.5%	1.7%	—	1.3%	11.1%

Q37. Religion (c45)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	36.4%	30.0%	42.8%	29.7%	46.9%	32.0%	44.0%
Important	24.4%	24.7%	24.5%	23.3%	26.1%	24.4%	23.9%
Somewhat important	16.0%	17.7%	14.2%	18.2%	12.6%	18.1%	12.6%
Not important	18.2%	21.5%	14.7%	23.5%	10.1%	21.1%	14.4%
Absolutely not important	2.7%	3.9%	1.5%	3.5%	1.6%	2.6%	2.6%
No answer	2.2%	2.2%	2.3%	1.8%	2.8%	1.9%	2.6%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	49.3%	34.3%	39.9%	34.9%	21.4%	37.1%	37.3%	35.5%	37.2%	36.1%
Important	19.7%	28.5%	27.1%	19.7%	28.6%	24.7%	24.0%	26.8%	25.6%	13.9%
Somewhat important	11.3%	17.5%	13.2%	17.9%	19.0%	16.5%	16.7%	13.0%	17.9%	13.9%
Not important	11.3%	19.0%	16.5%	20.2%	23.8%	16.1%	18.9%	21.7%	12.8%	22.2%
Absolutely not important	4.2%	—	2.6%	4.1%	3.6%	3.0%	1.7%	2.2%	5.1%	2.8%
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.7%	3.2%	3.6%	2.6%	1.3%	0.7%	1.3%	11.1%

Q38. Religious values (c46)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	34.3%	30.0%	38.7%	24.5%	49.4%	28.1%	44.0%
Important	26.8%	26.6%	27.3%	24.7%	29.9%	28.5%	24.7%
Somewhat important	14.7%	15.5%	13.9%	17.6%	10.4%	16.5%	12.1%
Not important	19.0%	23.0%	14.4%	26.8%	6.9%	21.8%	14.4%
Absolutely not important	2.6%	2.7%	2.6%	4.1%	0.3%	3.0%	1.7%
No answer	2.6%	2.2%	3.1%	2.2%	3.1%	2.1%	3.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	47.9%	32.8%	35.2%	33.9%	22.6%	33.3%	36.5%	37.0%	25.6%	41.7%
Important	22.5%	28.5%	30.4%	21.6%	27.4%	27.0%	25.3%	30.4%	35.9%	13.9%
Somewhat important	8.5%	16.1%	12.8%	16.5%	20.2%	15.0%	14.2%	12.3%	20.5%	11.1%
Not important	14.1%	19.7%	16.8%	22.9%	21.4%	19.1%	19.3%	16.7%	14.1%	19.4%
Absolutely not important	2.8%	—	2.9%	3.2%	4.8%	3.0%	1.7%	2.9%	2.6%	2.8%
No answer	4.2%	2.9%	1.8%	1.8%	3.6%	2.6%	3.0%	0.7%	1.3%	11.1%

Q39. History of political struggle (c47)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	55.6%	57.6%	53.1%	55.0%	56.6%	55.5%	56.0%
Important	32.8%	29.3%	36.9%	32.9%	32.7%	32.5%	33.3%
Somewhat important	5.2%	6.3%	4.1%	5.7%	4.4%	5.6%	4.9%
Not important	3.7%	3.9%	3.6%	4.1%	3.1%	4.2%	3.2%
Absolutely not important	0.4%	0.5%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	0.7%	—
No answer	2.2%	2.4%	2.1%	1.8%	2.8%	1.6%	2.6%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	54.9%	46.0%	61.2%	61.0%	41.7%	59.2%	53.2%	55.8%	56.4%	58.3%
Important	29.6%	40.9%	31.1%	28.4%	38.1%	33.0%	32.6%	33.3%	33.3%	25.0%
Somewhat important	5.6%	6.6%	4.0%	5.0%	7.1%	4.1%	6.0%	5.8%	5.1%	2.8%
Not important	5.6%	4.4%	1.8%	2.8%	10.7%	1.9%	6.0%	5.1%	1.3%	2.8%
Absolutely not important	—	—	0.4%	0.9%	—	0.4%	—	—	—	—
No answer	4.2%	2.2%	1.5%	1.8%	2.4%	1.5%	2.1%	—	3.8%	11.1%

Q40. Education (c48)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	58.6%	57.9%	58.8%	54.6%	64.8%	56.6%	61.2%
Important	34.0%	34.1%	34.3%	37.6%	28.3%	35.5%	31.9%
Somewhat important	4.5%	5.3%	3.6%	5.3%	3.1%	5.1%	3.7%
Not important	1.1%	1.0%	1.3%	1.2%	0.9%	1.4%	0.9%
Absolutely not important	0.1%	—	0.3%	—	0.3%	0.2%	—
No answer	1.7%	1.7%	1.8%	1.2%	2.5%	1.2%	2.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	57.7%	52.6%	59.0%	57.8%	69.0%	59.2%	60.5%	62.3%	51.3%	58.3%
Important	25.4%	40.1%	34.1%	36.7%	26.2%	33.7%	33.5%	31.9%	37.2%	25.0%
Somewhat important	7.0%	5.8%	5.5%	2.8%	2.4%	4.5%	3.9%	4.3%	7.7%	2.8%
Not important	5.6%	0.7%	1.1%	0.5%	—	1.1%	0.4%	1.4%	2.6%	2.8%
Absolutely not important	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%	2.4%	1.5%	1.7%	—	1.3%	11.1%

Q41. Residence (c49)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	16.9%	15.5%	18.6%	14.5%	20.4%	14.6%	20.4%
Important	26.8%	24.9%	29.1%	25.6%	28.6%	28.8%	24.7%
Somewhat important	18.8%	19.6%	17.8%	19.4%	17.9%	22.3%	15.2%
Not important	32.3%	34.4%	29.9%	36.6%	25.8%	31.1%	32.5%
Absolutely not important	2.4%	2.7%	1.8%	1.2%	4.1%	1.2%	3.4%
No answer	2.9%	2.9%	2.8%	2.7%	3.1%	2.1%	3.7%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	19.7%	17.5%	19.4%	15.6%	7.1%	16.5%	16.3%	15.9%	16.7%	11.1%
Important	19.7%	27.0%	29.7%	27.5%	25.0%	30.0%	27.0%	30.4%	17.9%	22.2%
Somewhat important	14.1%	19.0%	18.7%	19.3%	20.2%	16.9%	17.6%	18.8%	30.8%	22.2%
Not important	39.4%	35.0%	28.2%	30.7%	39.3%	32.2%	34.8%	29.7%	28.2%	33.3%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	0.7%	2.6%	3.2%	3.6%	2.2%	1.7%	3.6%	2.6%	—
No answer	5.6%	0.7%	1.5%	3.7%	4.8%	2.2%	2.6%	1.4%	3.8%	11.1%

Q42. Socio-econo. status (c50)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	15.9%	12.6%	19.3%	13.1%	20.1%	12.8%	19.5%
Important	32.7%	31.2%	34.5%	33.3%	31.8%	34.8%	30.7%
Somewhat important	18.6%	19.4%	17.5%	19.8%	16.7%	18.1%	19.3%
Not important	27.8%	30.8%	24.7%	29.0%	25.8%	29.9%	25.0%
Absolutely not important	2.7%	3.4%	1.8%	2.7%	2.8%	2.6%	2.6%
No answer	2.4%	2.7%	2.1%	2.0%	2.8%	1.9%	2.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	16.9%	16.1%	15.4%	17.0%	9.5%	12.7%	17.6%	17.4%	17.9%	11.1%
Important	35.2%	30.7%	35.2%	31.2%	28.6%	34.8%	32.6%	31.2%	26.9%	41.7%
Somewhat important	14.1%	24.1%	16.1%	19.3%	21.4%	16.9%	21.9%	14.5%	21.8%	11.1%
Not important	23.9%	26.3%	30.4%	25.7%	35.7%	30.7%	23.2%	34.8%	28.2%	16.7%
Absolutely not important	5.6%	1.5%	1.8%	4.1%	1.2%	2.2%	2.1%	2.2%	3.8%	8.3%
No answer	4.2%	1.5%	1.1%	2.8%	3.6%	2.6%	2.6%	—	1.3%	11.1%

Q43. Reputation (c51)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	61.5%	58.1%	64.9%	57.1%	68.2%	59.9%	63.5%
Important	28.9%	31.7%	26.0%	32.1%	23.9%	29.0%	28.7%
Somewhat important	4.6%	4.6%	4.6%	5.5%	3.1%	5.6%	3.4%
Not important	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	2.0%	0.6%	2.1%	0.6%
Absolutely not important	0.6%	1.0%	0.3%	0.8%	0.3%	1.2%	—
No answer	3.0%	3.1%	2.6%	2.5%	3.8%	2.3%	3.7%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	70.4%	59.9%	61.9%	54.1%	72.6%	58.8%	60.9%	63.8%	65.4%	63.9%
Important	22.5%	32.8%	30.0%	32.1%	19.0%	33.0%	28.3%	26.8%	25.6%	19.4%
Somewhat important	1.4%	4.4%	4.4%	7.3%	2.4%	3.7%	7.3%	3.6%	3.8%	2.8%
Not important	—	0.7%	1.5%	1.8%	2.4%	1.9%	1.7%	1.4%	1.3%	—
Absolutely not important	—	—	—	1.4%	1.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.7%	—	—
No answer	5.6%	2.2%	2.2%	3.2%	2.4%	2.2%	1.3%	3.6%	3.8%	13.9%

Q44. Family relations (c52)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	12.8%	11.9%	13.7%	10.6%	16.0%	11.4%	14.9%
Important	28.3%	26.2%	30.2%	26.8%	30.5%	27.1%	29.6%
Somewhat important	23.4%	23.7%	23.2%	25.4%	20.4%	24.8%	21.6%
Not important	30.0%	31.7%	28.4%	32.9%	25.5%	31.1%	27.9%
Absolutely not important	3.2%	4.1%	2.3%	2.5%	4.4%	3.5%	3.2%
No answer	2.4%	2.4%	2.3%	1.8%	3.1%	1.9%	2.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	14.1%	11.7%	14.3%	11.0%	11.9%	8.6%	16.7%	9.4%	19.2%	8.3%
Important	25.4%	25.5%	31.5%	26.1%	28.6%	28.8%	28.3%	29.0%	28.2%	30.6%
Somewhat important	21.1%	24.8%	22.7%	26.1%	20.2%	25.5%	22.3%	22.5%	15.4%	27.8%
Not important	31.0%	35.8%	27.1%	29.4%	32.1%	31.5%	27.9%	33.3%	32.1%	22.2%
Absolutely not important	2.8%	1.5%	3.7%	4.6%	2.4%	3.4%	3.0%	4.3%	2.6%	—
No answer	5.6%	0.7%	0.7%	2.8%	4.8%	2.2%	1.7%	1.4%	2.6%	11.1%

Q45. Gender (c53)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	12.6%	11.9%	13.7%	10.4%	16.0%	12.3%	14.1%
Important	21.3%	18.4%	24.5%	19.6%	23.9%	22.0%	20.7%
Somewhat important	14.9%	16.0%	13.7%	14.3%	15.7%	16.0%	13.2%
Not important	44.0%	45.5%	42.5%	49.1%	36.2%	43.6%	43.4%
Absolutely not important	4.8%	6.1%	3.1%	4.5%	5.3%	3.9%	6.0%
No answer	2.4%	2.2%	2.6%	2.0%	2.8%	2.1%	2.6%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	12.7%	10.2%	17.2%	11.0%	7.1%	10.5%	15.0%	10.9%	15.4%	—
Important	21.1%	24.1%	20.1%	23.9%	14.3%	22.8%	21.0%	19.6%	20.5%	33.3%
Somewhat important	8.5%	11.7%	14.7%	17.0%	17.9%	13.9%	13.3%	20.3%	17.9%	2.8%
Not important	47.9%	48.9%	42.9%	39.4%	51.2%	45.7%	44.6%	44.2%	37.2%	41.7%
Absolutely not important	5.6%	3.6%	3.3%	6.9%	6.0%	4.1%	4.7%	4.3%	6.4%	11.1%
No answer	4.2%	1.5%	1.8%	1.8%	3.6%	3.0%	1.3%	0.7%	2.6%	11.1%

Q46. Age (c54)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	12.9%	12.1%	13.4%	11.9%	14.5%	11.8%	14.7%
Important	22.8%	21.1%	24.7%	23.7%	21.4%	26.0%	18.7%
Somewhat important	19.5%	20.6%	18.6%	20.7%	17.6%	18.3%	20.7%
Not important	39.0%	39.5%	38.7%	39.1%	39.0%	38.3%	39.9%
Absolutely not important	4.0%	4.8%	2.8%	3.3%	5.0%	4.2%	3.7%
No answer	1.9%	1.9%	1.8%	1.4%	2.5%	1.4%	2.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	11.3%	9.5%	16.1%	15.1%	4.8%	11.6%	15.5%	8.7%	17.9%	5.6%
Important	16.9%	21.9%	25.3%	21.6%	22.6%	22.5%	23.6%	23.2%	21.8%	25.0%
Somewhat important	15.5%	24.8%	15.8%	22.9%	19.0%	20.2%	18.9%	18.1%	17.9%	8.3%
Not important	43.7%	40.1%	40.3%	33.5%	44.0%	40.1%	37.8%	46.4%	34.6%	38.9%
Absolutely not important	8.5%	2.9%	1.8%	5.0%	6.0%	3.4%	3.0%	3.6%	6.4%	11.1%
No answer	4.2%	0.7%	0.7%	1.8%	3.6%	2.2%	1.3%	---	1.3%	11.1%

Q47. Campaign (c55)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=807	N=413	N=388	N=489	N=318	N=431	N=348
Very important	37.8%	42.6%	32.5%	39.3%	35.5%	40.4%	34.8%
Important	37.2%	33.7%	41.5%	37.8%	36.2%	38.3%	36.2%
Somewhat important	13.3%	12.3%	13.9%	13.7%	12.6%	10.0%	16.1%
Not important	9.2%	8.7%	9.8%	7.2%	12.3%	9.0%	10.1%
Absolutely not important	0.6%	0.7%	0.3%	0.6%	0.6%	0.9%	0.3%
No answer	2.0%	1.9%	2.1%	1.4%	2.8%	1.4%	2.6%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=71	N=137	N=273	N=218	N=84	N=267	N=233	N=138	N=78	N=36
Very important	29.6%	34.3%	38.1%	42.2%	40.5%	34.1%	40.8%	42.8%	42.3%	22.2%
Important	40.8%	43.1%	37.0%	34.9%	33.3%	41.2%	36.1%	34.1%	29.5%	41.7%
Somewhat important	8.5%	10.9%	13.9%	15.1%	13.1%	14.6%	11.6%	10.1%	15.4%	5.6%
Not important	14.1%	10.9%	10.6%	4.1%	8.3%	7.5%	9.0%	12.3%	11.5%	16.7%
Absolutely not important	1.4%	---	---	1.4%	1.2%	0.7%	0.9%	---	---	2.8%
No answer	5.6%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%	3.6%	1.9%	1.7%	0.7%	1.3%	11.1%

Q48. Do you think that, in general, people know how to vote for the right candidate? (c56)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes	23.5%	22.7%	24.3%	22.5%	25.3%	23.7%	23.1%
Some	51.8%	54.4%	49.1%	53.6%	48.7%	53.3%	49.9%
No	20.0%	19.9%	20.0%	20.6%	18.9%	18.1%	22.3%
No answer	4.7%	3.0%	6.6%	3.3%	7.1%	5.0%	4.7%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	35.3%	27.6%	22.4%	18.8%	17.4%	20.8%	23.0%	25.6%	26.7%	33.3%
Some	44.5%	48.4%	54.1%	54.5%	54.8%	57.8%	48.9%	47.8%	47.6%	40.9%
No	13.4%	20.4%	20.1%	21.0%	24.3%	16.1%	23.2%	22.7%	22.9%	18.2%
No answer	6.7%	3.6%	3.4%	5.7%	3.5%	5.3%	4.9%	3.9%	2.9%	7.6%

Do you think people voted rationally or irrationally? Do you think you yourself voted rationally or irrationally?

Q49. People (c57)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Rationally	44.6%	43.9%	45.3%	42.3%	48.5%	45.2%	43.3%
Irrationally	43.8%	46.1%	41.2%	45.1%	41.5%	43.1%	45.0%
No answer	11.6%	10.0%	13.4%	12.6%	10.0%	11.7%	11.7%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Rationally	53.8%	45.7%	46.1%	40.4%	39.1%	46.4%	42.1%	46.8%	47.6%	40.9%
Irrationally	34.5%	38.5%	44.3%	49.0%	48.7%	43.0%	47.0%	41.4%	42.9%	36.4%
No answer	11.8%	15.8%	9.5%	10.5%	12.2%	10.6%	10.9%	11.8%	9.5%	22.7%

Q50. You (c58)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Rationally	50.1%	52.0%	48.1%	48.9%	52.2%	49.8%	51.1%
Irrationally	10.5%	9.2%	11.9%	8.3%	14.4%	8.3%	13.6%
I did not vote	28.7%	28.8%	28.8%	31.3%	24.1%	31.6%	24.5%
No answer	10.6%	10.0%	11.2%	11.4%	9.3%	10.3%	10.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Rationally	43.7%	49.8%	52.8%	49.4%	53.9%	49.6%	48.9%	58.1%	56.2%	37.9%
Irrationally	9.2%	10.0%	12.6%	10.2%	7.0%	11.1%	12.3%	8.9%	9.5%	1.5%
I did not vote	32.8%	28.5%	26.3%	28.3%	28.7%	29.8%	28.7%	23.2%	27.6%	37.9%
No answer	14.3%	11.8%	8.2%	12.1%	10.4%	9.5%	10.1%	9.9%	6.7%	22.7%

Do you think people voted responsibly or irresponsibly? Did you yourself vote responsibly or irresponsibly?

Q51. people (c59)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Responsibly	55.6%	54.4%	56.9%	52.9%	60.1%	53.6%	58.4%
Irresponsibly	33.2%	34.7%	31.6%	35.2%	29.8%	34.6%	31.1%
No answer	11.2%	10.9%	11.6%	11.9%	10.0%	11.8%	10.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Responsibly	57.1%	63.3%	59.0%	47.5%	47.5%	56.5%	54.4%	59.6%	52.4%	53.0%
Irresponsibly	30.3%	25.8%	31.7%	37.6%	45.2%	32.5%	35.0%	29.6%	37.1%	33.3%
No answer	12.6%	10.9%	9.3%	15.0%	7.0%	11.1%	10.7%	10.8%	10.5%	13.6%

Q52. You (c60)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Responsibly	51.8%	53.1%	50.3%	50.0%	54.9%	50.3%	54.0%
Irresponsibly	8.5%	6.4%	10.5%	7.3%	10.5%	7.9%	9.5%
I did not vote	28.9%	28.5%	29.5%	31.9%	23.7%	31.6%	24.9%
No answer	10.9%	12.0%	9.7%	10.8%	10.9%	10.1%	11.7%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Responsible	45.4%	52.0%	54.4%	50.3%	57.4%	51.2%	51.9%	59.6%	56.2%	36.4%
Irresponsibly	7.6%	10.4%	8.8%	8.3%	4.3%	7.9%	9.3%	9.9%	8.6%	1.5%
I did not vote	33.6%	28.5%	27.1%	28.3%	27.8%	30.9%	27.9%	23.6%	27.6%	36.4%
No answer	13.4%	9.0%	9.8%	13.1%	10.4%	10.0%	10.9%	6.9%	7.6%	25.8%

Q53. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people? (c61)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes	13.2%	13.3%	13.3%	11.6%	15.9%	13.9%	12.6%
To a certain extent	54.3%	54.4%	54.5%	57.4%	49.0%	53.9%	54.0%
No	27.2%	28.3%	25.5%	25.8%	29.6%	26.5%	28.3%
No answer	5.3%	3.9%	6.7%	5.2%	5.5%	5.8%	5.0%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	23.5%	12.2%	13.4%	10.2%	11.3%	13.5%	12.3%	14.8%	15.2%	13.6%
To a certain extent	50.4%	52.0%	53.9%	57.0%	57.4%	56.2%	49.5%	55.2%	57.1%	57.6%
No	19.3%	26.2%	30.9%	27.7%	27.0%	25.6%	33.3%	24.6%	22.9%	16.7%
No answer	6.7%	9.5%	1.8%	5.1%	4.3%	4.7%	4.9%	5.4%	4.8%	12.1%

Q54. To what extent would you say the Council members know what the people want/need? (c62)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
A lot	29.3%	29.4%	28.8%	29.9%	28.2%	30.4%	27.6%
Not a lot	50.5%	49.5%	51.6%	49.9%	51.5%	49.1%	51.7%
Not at all	16.2%	16.3%	16.2%	15.5%	17.3%	15.7%	17.5%
No answer	4.1%	4.8%	3.4%	4.8%	3.0%	4.8%	3.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
A lot	28.6%	29.9%	28.6%	29.3%	30.4%	29.8%	27.6%	31.0%	33.3%	31.8%
Not a lot	42.0%	43.9%	55.2%	51.9%	53.0%	50.4%	53.3%	46.8%	52.4%	39.4%
Not at all	19.3%	19.9%	13.9%	15.6%	15.7%	15.3%	16.4%	18.2%	12.4%	15.2%
No answer	10.1%	6.3%	2.3%	3.2%	0.9%	4.5%	2.7%	3.9%	1.9%	13.6%

Q55. Some people say that the PLC is very restricted by the Executive Authority, others say there are only some restrictions by the EA, and others say there are no restrictions by the EA. What do you think? (c63)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very restricted by the EA	35.2%	37.5%	32.8%	33.5%	38.3%	34.4%	37.5%
Some restrictions by the EA	43.2%	43.8%	42.6%	45.6%	39.0%	44.9%	39.8%
No restrictions by the EA	11.0%	11.2%	10.7%	10.6%	11.6%	10.9%	10.7%
No answer	10.6%	7.6%	14.0%	10.3%	11.2%	9.8%	12.0%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very restricted by the EA	32.8%	29.4%	35.8%	40.4%	35.7%	33.8%	38.5%	36.0%	27.6%	33.3%
Some restrictions by the EA	35.3%	41.2%	44.6%	44.9%	44.3%	46.7%	38.8%	43.3%	44.8%	30.3%
No restrictions by the EA	13.4%	13.1%	10.8%	9.2%	13.0%	11.1%	11.7%	11.3%	12.4%	10.6%
No answer	18.5%	16.3%	8.8%	5.4%	7.0%	8.4%	10.9%	9.4%	15.2%	25.8%

In general, how would you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in the following areas?

Q56. Democracy (c64)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very democratic	6.8%	5.4%	8.1%	5.6%	8.9%	7.9%	5.0%
Democratic	56.1%	56.3%	55.9%	56.0%	56.3%	55.8%	56.1%
Not democratic	27.4%	28.5%	26.4%	29.2%	24.1%	27.3%	28.0%
Very undemocratic	7.2%	8.7%	5.5%	7.5%	6.6%	7.0%	7.4%
No answer	2.6%	1.2%	4.1%	1.7%	4.1%	2.0%	3.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very democratic	6.7%	6.3%	6.4%	6.4%	7.8%	6.1%	7.1%	8.4%	7.6%	3.0%
Democratic	58.8%	57.0%	55.9%	57.6%	49.6%	60.7%	51.4%	52.7%	64.8%	59.1%
Not democratic	21.8%	25.3%	29.4%	28.0%	32.2%	25.6%	30.9%	27.6%	18.1%	24.2%
Very undemocratic	5.9%	9.5%	6.2%	6.7%	9.6%	5.8%	7.9%	9.4%	5.7%	6.1%
No answer	6.7%	1.8%	2.1%	1.3%	0.9%	1.8%	2.7%	2.0%	3.8%	7.6%

Q57. Effectiveness (c65)	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very effective	3.5%	2.3%	4.8%	2.8%	4.8%	3.7%	2.9%
Effective	35.5%	32.1%	38.6%	34.5%	37.1%	35.8%	34.6%
Not effective	49.2%	53.3%	45.3%	51.9%	44.6%	47.7%	51.7%
Very ineffective	9.7%	11.0%	8.3%	9.0%	10.9%	10.4%	8.9%
No answer	2.1%	1.3%	2.9%	1.9%	2.5%	2.3%	1.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very effective	7.6%	4.1%	2.1%	2.9%	1.7%	3.2%	3.0%	4.4%	5.7%	4.5%
Effective	39.5%	32.1%	37.1%	34.4%	35.7%	35.9%	32.2%	37.9%	45.7%	33.3%
Not effective	39.5%	49.3%	50.3%	54.1%	50.4%	52.8%	52.7%	42.4%	39.0%	43.9%
Very ineffective	7.6%	12.7%	9.0%	8.3%	10.4%	6.6%	9.8%	13.8%	6.7%	12.1%
No answer	5.9%	1.8%	1.5%	0.3%	1.7%	1.6%	2.2%	1.5%	2.9%	6.1%

Q58. Responsiveness (c66)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very responsive	4.6%	3.3%	6.0%	3.2%	7.1%	4.8%	4.3%
Responsive	37.4%	35.2%	40.2%	40.5%	32.1%	39.3%	34.4%
Not responsive	45.4%	48.7%	42.4%	45.9%	45.3%	44.1%	48.2%
Very unresponsive	9.8%	10.7%	8.4%	8.2%	12.5%	9.7%	10.1%
No answer	2.5%	2.1%	2.9%	2.2%	3.0%	2.2%	3.1%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very responsive	7.6%	3.6%	4.6%	2.9%	6.1%	3.7%	3.8%	6.4%	6.7%	6.1%
Responsive	38.7%	34.8%	35.6%	40.8%	40.0%	41.7%	34.4%	36.9%	37.1%	31.8%
Not responsive	40.3%	47.5%	46.9%	48.4%	42.6%	45.6%	49.5%	41.4%	44.8%	40.9%
Very unresponsive	7.6%	12.7%	10.1%	7.6%	9.6%	7.1%	9.3%	12.8%	9.5%	15.2%
No answer	5.9%	1.4%	2.8%	0.3%	1.7%	1.8%	3.0%	2.5%	1.9%	6.1%

Q59. Independence from the EA (c67)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very independent	3.3%	3.3%	3.4%	2.0%	5.7%	2.5%	4.3%
Independent	24.2%	21.2%	27.6%	22.5%	27.1%	24.0%	24.5%
Dependent	54.7%	58.9%	50.3%	58.3%	48.5%	55.9%	53.6%
Very dependent	13.6%	14.6%	12.1%	14.4%	12.1%	13.7%	13.0%
No answer	4.2%	2.0%	6.6%	2.8%	6.6%	3.9%	4.7%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very independent	5.9%	3.6%	3.9%	1.9%	2.6%	4.2%	2.5%	3.0%	5.7%	3.0%
Independent	28.6%	28.5%	23.5%	22.3%	22.6%	25.1%	25.4%	22.2%	26.7%	19.7%
Dependent	47.9%	48.0%	57.2%	59.2%	54.8%	55.1%	53.3%	56.2%	53.3%	57.6%
Very dependent	10.9%	15.4%	11.6%	15.0%	16.5%	10.6%	14.5%	15.3%	12.4%	12.1%
No answer	6.7%	4.5%	3.9%	1.6%	3.5%	5.0%	4.4%	3.4%	1.9%	7.6%

Q60. Independence from the Judiciary (c68)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very independent	3.8%	3.3%	4.3%	2.5%	6.2%	3.0%	4.7%
Independent	34.0%	31.6%	36.4%	32.7%	36.2%	33.0%	35.0%
Dependent	48.9%	51.5%	46.4%	52.6%	42.4%	50.6%	47.8%
Very dependent	8.7%	10.2%	7.1%	8.5%	9.1%	8.6%	8.2%
No answer	4.6%	3.5%	5.9%	3.7%	6.2%	4.8%	4.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very independent	5.0%	2.7%	4.4%	3.8%	1.7%	3.7%	3.6%	4.4%	5.7%	1.5%
Independent	40.3%	37.1%	33.5%	31.5%	34.8%	35.6%	33.9%	34.5%	33.3%	31.8%
Dependent	42.9%	46.6%	49.5%	52.9%	49.6%	49.1%	47.5%	47.8%	52.4%	51.5%
Very dependent	5.0%	9.5%	8.2%	9.2%	9.6%	7.4%	10.4%	8.4%	4.8%	7.6%
No answer	6.7%	4.1%	4.4%	2.5%	4.3%	4.2%	4.6%	4.9%	3.8%	7.6%

Q61. Pluralism (c69)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very pluralistic	5.9%	4.8%	7.2%	4.6%	8.2%	5.9%	5.8%
Pluralistic	31.1%	30.8%	31.6%	29.5%	33.9%	31.6%	30.7%
Not pluralistic	45.0%	47.5%	42.4%	47.5%	40.8%	42.8%	47.6%
Very unpluralistic	13.1%	13.8%	12.1%	15.1%	9.6%	15.0%	10.7%
No answer	4.9%	3.1%	6.7%	3.3%	7.5%	4.7%	5.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very pluralistic	6.7%	5.0%	7.0%	4.8%	2.6%	6.1%	5.2%	6.9%	7.6%	6.1%
Pluralistic	31.9%	34.8%	32.5%	31.2%	23.5%	34.8%	32.5%	27.6%	39.0%	18.2%
Not pluralistic	42.9%	39.8%	45.9%	45.5%	55.7%	44.6%	45.9%	42.4%	40.0%	48.5%
Very unpluralistic	10.9%	15.8%	10.8%	15.0%	14.8%	10.6%	12.3%	17.2%	8.6%	15.2%
No answer	7.6%	4.5%	3.9%	3.5%	3.5%	4.0%	4.1%	5.9%	4.8%	12.1%

Q62. Do you believe in the importance of having women in the Legislative Council? (c70)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Yes	71.4%	67.8%	75.3%	70.2%	73.3%	71.2%	72.6%
No	22.4%	25.5%	19.1%	22.9%	21.6%	22.3%	22.1%
No answer	6.2%	6.7%	5.5%	6.9%	5.0%	6.5%	5.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Yes	64.7%	67.0%	71.4%	75.5%	78.3%	72.3%	72.1%	75.9%	64.8%	66.7%
No	26.1%	26.2%	22.9%	19.4%	18.3%	22.4%	21.3%	19.2%	27.6%	24.2%
No answer	9.2%	6.8%	5.7%	5.1%	3.5%	5.3%	6.6%	4.9%	7.6%	9.1%

Q63. Why do you think there is a need for women in the Legislative Council? (c71)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=853	N=412	N=437	N=531	N=322	N=457	N=374
Women need to demand their rights	63.4%	57.0%	68.9%	63.8%	61.8%	64.1%	61.8%
Better for democracy	29.7%	34.0%	25.2%	27.3%	33.5%	28.2%	31.8%
Women are 1/2 of society	0.9%	1.2%	0.7%	1.3%	0.3%	0.9%	1.0%
Other reasons	5.7%	6.8%	4.6%	6.4%	4.0%	6.3%	5.3%
No answer	0.2%	1.0%	0.7%	1.1%	0.3%	0.4%	—

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=77	N=148	N=277	N=237	N=90	N=274	N=264	N=154	N=68	N=44
Women need to demand their rights	66.2%	70.3%	60.3%	59.5%	62.2%	59.9%	63.3%	70.1%	57.4%	65.9%
Better for democracy	22.0%	25.0%	34.7%	31.6%	28.9%	34.3%	28.8%	24.7%	33.8%	20.5%
Women are 1/2 of society	—	—	1.1%	2.1%	—	1.5%	0.8%	1.3%	—	—
Other reasons	9.1%	4.1%	4.0%	6.3%	7.8%	4.4%	6.8%	3.2%	8.8%	9.1%
No answer	2.6%	0.7%	—	0.4%	1.1%	—	0.4%	0.6%	—	4.6%

Q64. Why don't you believe in having women in the Legislative Council? (c72)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=268	N=155	N=111	N=173	N=95	N=143	N=114
Men can represent women's needs	29.5%	32.3%	25.2%	29.5%	29.5%	26.6%	33.3%
No difference between the needs of men and women	19.4%	19.4%	19.8%	22.0%	12.6%	22.4%	15.8%
Not qualified for this position	39.6%	35.5%	45.0%	32.9%	47.4%	37.0%	43.9%
Other reasons	8.6%	9.7%	7.2%	9.8%	6.3%	9.8%	6.1%
No answer	3.0%	3.2%	2.7%	5.8%	4.2%	4.2%	0.9%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=31	N=58	N=89	N=61	N=21	N=85	N=78	N=39	N=29	N=16
Men can represent women's needs	25.8%	25.9%	30.3%	29.5%	23.8%	27.1%	29.5%	20.5%	41.4%	43.7%
No difference between the needs of men and women	32.3%	24.1%	16.9%	16.4%	9.5%	22.4%	16.7%	17.9%	17.2%	25.0%
Not qualified for this position	32.3%	43.1%	40.4%	37.7%	52.4%	40.0%	46.2%	48.7%	24.1%	18.7%
Other reasons	9.7%	5.2%	10.1%	9.8%	9.5%	8.2%	7.7%	7.7%	13.8%	6.2%
No answer	—	1.7%	2.2%	6.6%	4.8%	2.4%	—	5.1%	3.4%	6.2%

Q65. Looking back at the last year and a half since the Council has been elected, What is your opinion about its performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? (c73)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very satisfied	5.2%	5.6%	4.8%	4.0%	7.3%	4.5%	5.8%
Satisfied	33.1%	30.3%	36.2%	33.9%	31.9%	35.0%	30.5%
Dissatisfied	38.7%	41.9%	35.7%	39.4%	37.6%	37.7%	40.6%
Very dissatisfied	17.1%	18.4%	15.3%	16.7%	17.8%	16.7%	17.9%
No answer	5.9%	3.8%	7.9%	6.1%	5.5%	6.1%	5.2%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very satisfied	10.1%	4.1%	4.6%	3.5%	6.1%	2.9%	6.6%	5.4%	4.8%	12.1%
Satisfied	31.9%	33.9%	33.5%	33.8%	29.6%	35.1%	29.2%	33.5%	42.9%	31.8%
Dissatisfied	30.3%	37.1%	38.1%	41.4%	49.6%	40.1%	41.5%	38.4%	29.5%	28.8%
Very dissatisfied	15.1%	15.4%	20.6%	16.9%	13.0%	16.4%	18.0%	16.7%	17.1%	16.7%
No answer	12.6%	9.5%	3.1%	4.5%	1.7%	5.5%	4.6%	5.9%	5.7%	10.6%

Q66. Which of the following are the most important reasons for your satisfaction? (c74)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=458	N=218	N=238	N=286	N=172	N=254	N=187
Responsiveness	11.8%	9.2%	13.9%	8.4%	17.4%	9.8%	15.0%
Democracy	41.7%	43.1%	40.3%	43.0%	39.5%	41.3%	42.2%
Effectiveness	7.4%	7.8%	7.1%	6.4%	8.7%	8.3%	5.9%
Independence	7.6%	5.5%	9.7%	8.7%	5.8%	8.7%	7.0%
Courage	13.3%	12.4%	14.3%	12.6%	14.5%	12.6%	14.4%
Accessibility	6.1%	8.7%	3.8%	6.4%	5.2%	4.7%	7.0%
New experience	0.9%	0.9%	0.8%	1.4%	—	0.8%	1.1%
Other reasons	6.1%	8.7%	3.8%	7.0%	4.7%	6.3%	5.3%
No answer	5.0%	3.7%	6.3%	5.6%	4.0%	7.5%	2.1%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=50	N=84	N=148	N=117	N=41	N=144	N=131	N=79	N=50	N=29
Responsiveness	20.0%	8.3%	12.8%	10.3%	9.8%	11.1%	13.7%	12.7%	6.0%	13.8%
Democracy	18.0%	42.9%	43.9%	47.0%	41.5%	49.3%	38.9%	41.8%	38.0%	34.5%
Effectiveness	6.0%	9.5%	6.8%	6.8%	9.8%	5.6%	9.2%	6.3%	8.0%	6.9%
Independence	4.0%	9.5%	8.1%	8.5%	4.9%	11.1%	6.9%	6.3%	8.0%	—
Courage	22.0%	9.5%	14.2%	12.8%	12.2%	8.3%	14.5%	15.2%	20.0%	13.8%
Accessibility	12.0%	8.3%	3.4%	6.0%	7.3%	4.9%	6.1%	6.3%	4.0%	13.8%
New experience	—	1.2%	0.7%	0.9%	2.4%	1.4%	0.8%	1.3%	—	—
Other reasons	10.0%	3.6%	4.7%	6.8%	7.3%	4.9%	5.3%	3.8%	8.0%	6.9%
No answer	8.0%	7.1%	5.4%	0.9%	4.9%	3.5%	4.6%	6.3%	8.0%	10.3%

Q. 67 Which of the following are the most important reasons for your dissatisfaction? (c75)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=653	N=367	N=296	N=424	N=243	N=349	N=301
Lack of responsiveness	8.7%	7.1%	10.5%	9.0%	8.2%	9.2%	8.0%
Lack of democracy	7.2%	6.8%	7.4%	7.8%	6.2%	7.4%	7.3%
Lack of effectiveness	42.1%	42.8%	41.2%	43.9%	39.0%	43.6%	39.9%
Lack of independence	21.0%	21.8%	19.9%	20.3%	22.2%	20.3%	21.3%
Lack of courage	5.8%	7.4%	4.1%	5.0%	7.4%	6.0%	6.0%
Lack of accessibility	4.5%	3.5%	5.7%	4.2%	4.9%	4.0%	5.0%
Other reasons	8.5%	9.0%	8.1%	8.7%	8.2%	7.7%	9.3%
No answer	2.1%	1.6%	2.7%	1.2%	3.7%	1.7%	3.3%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=54	N=116	N=228	N=183	N=72	N=214	N=218	N=112	N=49	N=30
Lack of responsiveness	16.7%	7.8%	7.9%	7.7%	11.1%	8.4%	7.3%	8.9%	4.1%	23.3%
Lack of democracy	5.6%	8.6%	8.8%	6.0%	4.2%	5.6%	11.9%	4.5%	4.1%	6.7%
Lack of effectiveness	50.0%	38.8%	39.5%	40.4%	48.6%	41.1%	44.0%	40.2%	46.9%	43.3%
Lack of independence	9.3%	19.0%	21.5%	26.2%	19.4%	22.0%	19.7%	23.2%	20.4%	10.0%
Lack of courage	5.6%	3.4%	6.1%	7.1%	4.2%	7.0%	3.7%	6.2%	6.1%	10.0%
Lack of accessibility	3.7%	3.4%	7.0%	3.3%	2.8%	5.1%	6.0%	2.7%	—	3.3%
Other reasons	7.4%	12.1%	6.6%	9.3%	9.7%	8.9%	7.3%	9.8%	12.2%	—
No answer	1.9%	6.9%	2.6%	—	—	1.9%	—	4.5%	6.1%	3.3%

Q68. In general, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the performance of the elected Legislative Council in the future? (c76)

	Total	Gender		Area		Refugee status	
		Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Non-refugee	Refugee
	N=1195	N=608	N=580	N=756	N=439	N=642	N=515
Very optimistic	11.4%	10.2%	12.8%	9.4%	14.8%	11.1%	11.5%
Optimistic	47.7%	44.2%	51.0%	44.2%	53.8%	46.1%	49.7%
Very pessimistic	11.8%	13.8%	9.5%	12.8%	10.0%	11.7%	11.7%
Pessimistic	24.9%	28.0%	21.9%	29.4%	17.1%	26.9%	22.7%
No answer	4.3%	3.8%	4.8%	4.2%	4.3%	4.2%	4.5%

	Education					Age				
	Up to primary	Up to prep.	Up to sec.	Some college	College & above	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	55+
	N=119	N=221	N=388	N=314	N=115	N=379	N=366	N=203	N=105	N=66
Very optimistic	21.0%	12.2%	8.8%	8.6%	11.3%	10.0%	7.9%	13.8%	19.0%	16.7%
Optimistic	35.3%	43.9%	51.8%	48.7%	51.3%	53.3%	48.4%	45.3%	41.9%	34.8%
Very pessimistic	11.8%	13.1%	11.1%	12.7%	8.7%	8.2%	14.2%	16.7%	6.7%	10.6%
Pessimistic	25.2%	26.2%	24.7%	26.4%	25.2%	24.0%	25.7%	20.2%	29.5%	27.3%
No answer	6.7%	4.5%	3.6%	3.5%	3.5%	4.5%	3.8%	3.9%	2.9%	10.6%

ANNEX 2**SURVEY OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL MEMBERS**

1. In your opinion, how important were the following factors when people cast their votes?

Please note: (1) It is important to stress how people did vote, not how they will vote. (2)

Important to state what, in your opinion, the people think, not what you think.

A. Democratic values

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	13	30.2%
Important	11	25.6%
Somewhat important	14	32.6%
Not important	3	7.0%
Absolutely not important	—	—
Missing	2	4.7%

B. Political affiliation

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	11	25.6%
Important	15	34.9%
Somewhat important	14	32.6%
Not important	2	4.7%
Absolutely not important	—	—
Missing	1	2.3%

C. Religion

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	6	14.0%
Important	10	23.3%
Somewhat important	11	25.6%
Not important	9	20.9%
Absolutely not important	5	11.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

D. Religious values

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	2	16.3%
Important	21	48.8%
Somewhat important	10	23.3%
Not important	3	7.0%
Absolutely not important	—	—
Missing	2	4.7%

E. History of political struggle

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	24	55.8%
Important	14	32.6%
Somewhat important	4	9.3%
Not important	1	2.3%
Absolutely not important	—	—
Missing	—	—

F. Education

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	10	23.3%
Important	22	51.2%
Somewhat important	6	14.0%
Not important	2	4.7%
Absolutely not important	—	—
Missing	3	7.0%

G. Residence

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	1	2.3%
Important	14	32.6%
Somewhat important	5	11.6%
Not important	18	41.9%
Absolutely not important	3	7.0%
Missing	2	4.7%

H. Socio-economic status

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	4	9.3%
Important	14	32.6%
Somewhat important	18	41.9%
Not important	4	9.3%
Absolutely not important	1	2.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

I. Reputation

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	27	62.8%
Important	9	20.9%
Somewhat important	5	11.6%
Not important	1	2.3%
Absolutely not important	—	—
Missing	1	2.3%

J. Family relations

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	8	18.6%
Important	14	32.6%
Somewhat important	16	37.2%
Not important	3	7.0%
Absolutely not important	—	—
Missing	2	4.7%

K. Gender

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	6	14.0%
Important	15	34.9%
Somewhat important	10	23.3%
Not important	5	11.6%
Absolutely not important	4	9.3%
Missing	3	7.0%

L. Age

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	1	2.3%
Important	10	23.3%
Somewhat important	14	32.6%
Not important	13	30.2%
Absolutely not important	3	7.0%
Missing	2	4.7%

M. Campaign

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very important	7	16.3%
Important	15	34.9%
Somewhat important	19	44.2%
Not important	1	2.3%
Absolutely not important	—	—
Missing	1	2.3%

2. On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very rational, 10 being very irrational, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	5	11.6%
3	14	32.6%
4	5	11.6%
5	12	27.9%
6	—	—
7	3	7.0%
8	—	—
9	—	—
10	—	—

3. On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being very responsible, 10 being very irresponsible, how would you rate the Palestinian voter in the elections?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	7	16.3%
3	10	23.3%
4	9	20.9%
5	4	9.3%
6	2	4.7%
7	6	14.0%
8	1	2.3%
9	—	—
10	—	—

4. Do you think that in the next elections, people will vote according to the same criteria, not quite, or will they vote in a totally different way?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
According to the same criteria	3	7.0%
Not quite in the same way	30	69.8%
Vote in a totally different way	9	20.9%
Missing	1	2.3%

5. In general, do you think people know how to vote for the right candidate?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	14	32.6%
No	1	2.3%
Only to a certain extent	28	65.1%
Missing	—	—

6. In general, would you say, when people voted, they knew the agenda/campaign slogans of the candidates?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	8	18.6%
No	9	20.9%
Only to a certain extent	24	55.8%
Missing	2	4.7%

7. In your opinion what are the two most important problems currently facing Palestinian society?

A. Problem 1:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Tribalism	5	11.6%
Factionalism	—	—
Loss of hope	1	2.3%
Absence rule of law	3	7.0%
Economic situation	9	20.9%
Social problems	—	—
Occupation	13	30.2%
Lack of comprehensive plan	1	2.3%
Political situation	7	16.3%
Closure	1	2.3%
Separation of powers	—	—
Election fraud	2	4.7%
Corruption	1	2.3%
Settlements	—	—

B. Problem 2:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Tribalism	1	2.3%
Factionalism	2	4.7%
Loss of hope	—	—
Absence rule of law	9	20.9%
Economic situation	13	30.2%
Social problems	3	7.0%
Occupation	—	—
Lack of comprehensive plan	1	2.3%

Political situation	8	18.6%
Closure	1	2.3%
Separation of powers	1	2.3%
Election fraud	—	—
Corruption	3	7.0%
Settlements	1	2.3%

8. In general, would you say people are satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or dissatisfied with those candidates who made it to the Council?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Satisfied	5	11.6%
Somewhat satisfied	31	72.1%
Dissatisfied	5	11.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

9. Given the election results, do you think the elected members represent the views/concerns of the people?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	18	41.9%
To a certain extent	22	51.2%
No	1	2.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

10. To what extent would you say the Council members know what the people want/need?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
A lot	24	55.8%
Not a lot	15	34.9%
Not at all	—	—
Missing	4	9.3%

11. To what extent would you say that you know what the people want/need?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
A lot	29	67.4%
Not a lot	12	27.9%
Not at all	—	—
Missing	2	4.7%

12. What are the tools you as a Council member use to know the needs of the people you represent?

A. First tool:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Meetings	36	83.7%
Follow-ups	—	—
newspapers	1	2.3%
Lectures/Workshops	1	2.3%
Complaints/letters	—	—
Field visits	2	4.7%
Polls	1	2.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

B. Second tool:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Meetings	2	4.7%
Follow-ups	8	18.6%
newspapers	2	4.7%
Lectures/Workshops	6	14.0%
Complaints/letters	13	30.2%
Field visits	7	16.3%
Polls	—	—
Missing	5	11.7%

C. Third tool:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Meetings	3	7.0%
Follow-ups	—	—
newspapers	7	16.3%
Lectures/Workshops	4	9.3%
Complaints/letters	11	25.6%
Field visits	2	4.7%
Polls	1	2.3%
Missing	15	35.0%

13. What are in your opinion the three most important needs of the people?

A. First need:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Infrastructure	6	14.0%
Democracy/law/justice	4	9.3%
Equal opportunities	1	2.3%
Public liberties	1	2.3%
Security	2	4.7%

Political situation/future	10	23.3%
Economy	13	30.2%
Cure for corruption	—	—
Unemployment	5	11.6%
Housing	-	-
Land and water	-	-
Accountability	-	-
Missing	1	2.3%

B. Second need:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Infrastructure	3	7.0%
Democracy/law/justice	12	27.9%
Equal opportunities	1	2.3%
Public liberties	2	4.7%
Security	6	14.0%
Political situation/future	1	2.3%
Economy	8	18.6%
Cure for corruption	2	4.7%
Unemployment	7	16.3%
Housing	1	2.3%
Land and water	—	—
Accountability	—	—
Missing	—	—

C. Third need:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Infrastructure	6	14.0%
Democracy/law/justice	12	27.9%
Equal opportunities	1	2.3%
Public liberties	1	2.3%
Security	2	4.7%
Political situation/future	4	9.3%
Economy	6	14.0%
Cure for corruption	1	2.3%
Unemployment	7	16.3%
Housing	1	2.3%
Land and water	—	—
Accountability	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

14. How do you make sure that they are the needs?

A. First way to verify:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Listen/communicate	25	58.1%
Field visits/meetings	2	4.7%
Closure	—	—
Incoming complaints	5	11.6%
Research/studies	1	2.3%
Newspapers	—	—
Personal sense	5	11.6%
Shortages	—	—
We are part of the people	4	9.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

B. Second way to verify:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Listen/communicate	5	11.6%
Field visits/meetings	8	18.6%
Closure	1	2.3%
Incoming complaints	9	20.9%
Research/studies	5	11.6%
Newspapers	3	7.0%
Personal sense	—	—
Shortages	1	2.3%
We are part of the people	2	4.7%
Combination of the above	2	4.7%
Missing	7	16.3%

C. Third way:

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Listen/communicate	—	—
Field visits/meetings	2	4.7%
Closure	—	—
Incoming complaints	6	14.0%
Research/studies	8	18.6%
Newspapers	3	7.0%
Personal sense	3	7.0%
Shortages	—	—
We are part of the people	8	18.6%
Combination of the above	2	4.7%
Missing	11	25.6%

15. In your opinion, have Council members in general lived up to their promises/campaign slogans?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	6	14.0%
No	10	23.3%
To some extent	25	58.1%
Missing	2	4.7%

16. As a Council member, would you say you yourself are living up to your promises/campaign slogans?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes	18	41.9%
No	3	7.0%
To some extent	20	46.5%
Missing	2	4.7%

17. Looking back at the last year and a half since the Council has been elected, what is your opinion about its performance in general? Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?

Value label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very satisfied	1	2.3%
Satisfied	28	65.1%
Dissatisfied	12	27.9%
Very dissatisfied	2	4.7%
Missing	—	—

18. Which of the following are the most important reasons for your satisfaction?

A. First reason:

Value label	Frequency = 29	Percent
Responsiveness	12	41.4%
Democracy	14	48.3%
Effectiveness	2	6.9%
Independence	1	3.4%
Courage	—	—
Accessibility	—	—
Other reasons	—	—
Missing	—	—

B. Second reason:

Value label	Frequency = 29	Percent
Responsiveness	—	—
Democracy	4	13.8%
Effectiveness	1	3.5%
Independence	13	44.8%
Courage	9	31.0%
Accessibility	—	—
Other reasons	1	3.5%
Missing	1	3.5%

19. Which of the following are the most important reasons for your dissatisfaction?

A. First reason:

Value label	Frequency = 14	Percent
Lack of responsiveness	—	—
Lack of democracy	1	7.1%
Ineffectiveness	8	57.1%
Lack of independence	3	21.4%
Lack of courage	—	—
Inaccessibility	—	—
Busy with personal issues	1	7.1%
Other reasons	—	—
Missing	1	7.1%

B. Second reason:

Value label	Frequency = 14	Percent
Lack of responsiveness	1	7.1%
Lack of democracy	—	—
Ineffectiveness	2	14.3%
Lack of independence	4	28.6%
Lack of courage	1	7.1%
Inaccessibility	—	—
Busy with personal issues	1	7.1%
Other reasons	2	14.3%
Missing	3	21.4%

20. Some people say that the PLC is very restricted by the Executive Authority, others say there are only some restrictions by the EA, and others say there are no restrictions by the Executive Authority. What do you think?

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very restricted by the EA	12	27.9%
Some restrictions by the EA	25	58.1%
No restrictions by the EA	6	14.0%
Missing	—	—

21. Most of the resolutions of the PLC have not been implemented by the Executive Authority. In your opinion, why is that?

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Attitude of the EA	16	37.2%
Inefficiency of the EA	9	20.9%
Resolutions are outside the scope of the PNA	2	4.7%
Combination of attitude and inefficiency of the EA	14	32.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

22. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the performance of the elected Legislative Council in the future?

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Optimistic	37	86.0%
Pessimistic	5	11.6%
Missing	1	2.3%

23. Are you optimistic or very optimistic, pessimistic or very pessimistic?

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very optimistic	8	18.6%
Cautiously optimistic	30	69.8%
Very pessimistic	1	2.3%
Cautiously pessimistic	4	9.3%
Missing	—	—

24. How do you evaluate the Palestinian Legislative Council in the following areas?

A. Democracy

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	6	14.0%
Democratic	32	74.4%
Not democratic	3	7.0%
Very undemocratic	—	—
Missing	2	4.7%

B. Effectiveness

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very effective	1	2.3%
Effective	30	69.8%
Not effective	10	23.3%
Very ineffective	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

C. Responsiveness

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very responsive	4	9.3%
Responsive	31	72.1%
Not responsive	4	9.3%
Very unresponsive	1	2.3%
Missing	3	7.0%

D. Independence from the Executive Authority

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very independent	7	16.3%
Independent	25	58.1%
Dependent	9	20.9%
Very dependent	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

E. Independence from the judiciary

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very independent	12	27.9%
Independent	25	58.1%
Dependent	2	4.7%
Very dependent	—	—
Missing	4	9.3%

F. Pluralism

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very pluralistic	4	9.3%
Pluralistic	6	14.0%
Not pluralistic	26	60.5%
Very unpluralistic	5	11.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

25. Of the following, could you please state how much each affects the functioning of the Council. Would you say it affects the functioning positively, negatively, or it doesn't affect it at all?

A. Israeli policies and practices

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	1	2.3%
Affects negatively	38	88.4%
Doesn't affect	2	4.7%
Missing	2	4.7%

B. Executive Authority

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	2	4.7%
Affects negatively	34	79.1%
Doesn't affect	4	9.3%
Missing	3	7.0%

C. Judiciary

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	6	14.0%
Affects negatively	14	32.6%
Doesn't affect	18	41.9%
Missing	5	11.6%

D. President

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	5	11.6%
Affects negatively	30	69.8%
Doesn't affect	5	11.6%
Missing	3	7.0%

E. People

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	37	86.0%
Affects negatively	2	4.7%
Doesn't affect	2	4.7%
Missing	2	4.7%

F. Media

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Affects positively	16	37.2%
Affects negatively	24	55.8%
Doesn't affect	2	4.7%
Missing	1	2.3%

26. How would you evaluate the level of communication with the following?

A. Executive Authority

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Good	6	14.0%
Average	20	46.5%
Bad	16	37.2%
Missing	1	2.3%

B. Judiciary

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Good	9	20.9%
Average	17	39.6%
Bad	14	32.6%
Missing	3	7.0%

C. President

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Good	6	14.0%
Average	19	44.2%
Bad	16	37.2%
Missing	2	4.7%

D. People

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Good	26	60.5%
Average	15	34.9%
Bad	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

27. In your opinion, which country in the world is the most democratic? Please rate the following countries:

A. Egypt

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	—	—
Democratic	11	25.6%
Undemocratic	21	48.8%
Very undemocratic	3	7.0%
Missing	8	18.6%

B. France

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	26	60.5%
Democratic	11	25.6%
Undemocratic	—	—
Very undemocratic	—	—
Missing	6	14.0%

C. Jordan

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	—	—
Democratic	5	11.6%
Undemocratic	22	51.2%
Very undemocratic	8	18.6%
Missing	8	18.6%

D. Saudi Arabia

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	—	—
Democratic	—	—
Undemocratic	6	14.0%
Very undemocratic	28	65.1%
Missing	9	20.9%

E. Tunisia

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	—	—
Democratic	16	37.2%
Undemocratic	15	34.9%
Very undemocratic	3	7.0%
Missing	9	20.9%

F. Turkey

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	1	2.3%
Democratic	11	25.6%
Undemocratic	18	41.9%
Very undemocratic	4	9.3%
Missing	9	20.9%

G. United States

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	13	30.2%
Democratic	21	48.8%
Undemocratic	1	2.3%
Very undemocratic	2	4.7%
Missing	6	14.0%

H. Yemen

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	—	—
Democratic	8	18.6%
Undemocratic	21	48.8%
Very undemocratic	5	11.6%
Missing	9	20.9%

I. Sweden

Value Label	Frequency = 43	Percent
Very democratic	36	83.7%
Democratic	4	9.3%
Undemocratic	—	—
Very undemocratic	—	—
Missing	3	7.0%

28. Being a representative of the people, how would you vote on a bill that is popular, yet regarded as being undemocratic according to accepted democratic tenets?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
I would vote for the bill	7	16.3%
I would vote against the bill	25	58.1%
I would abstain from voting	9	20.9%
Missing	2	4.7%

29. In principle, do you think that the constitution should be amended by:

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
A simple parliamentary majority	2	4.7%
A 2/3 parliamentary majority	29	67.4%
A referendum amongst the people	11	25.6%
The president	—	—
Missing	1	2.3%

30. To which of the following should the president be accountable? (You may choose more than one option.)

a.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
PLC	38	88.4%
Cabinet	—	—
Courts of law	1	2.3%
President above accountability	1	2.3%
People	2	4.7%
God/Islam	—	—
Missing	1	2.3%

b.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
PLC	—	—
Cabinet	3	7.0%
Courts of law	9	20.9%
President above accountability	—	—
People	14	32.6%
God/Islam	3	7.0%
Missing	14	32.6%

31. To which of the following should the Cabinet be accountable? (You may choose more than one option.)

a.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
President	20	46.5%
Law & Courts	11	25.6%
PLC	11	25.6%
People	—	—
Missing	1	2.3%

b.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
President	—	—
Law & Courts	—	—
PLC	28	65.1%
People	3	7.0%
Missing	12	27.9%

32. Which in your opinion should be the highest source of interpretation?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
President	—	—
Parliament	10	23.3%
High Court	20	46.5%
Religious institutions	—	—
Constitutional court	7	16.3%
Parliament & High Court	5	11.6%
Missing	1	2.3%

33. In principle, do you agree or disagree with the following statements. The ideal Council member should: (1: strongly agree, and 5: strongly disagree)

A. Adhere to the Constitution

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	37	86.0%
2	3	7.0%
3	—	—
4	—	—
5	—	—
Missing	3	7.0%

B. Be flexible

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	8	18.6%
2	6	14.0%
3	5	11.6%
4	3	7.0%
5	—	—
Missing	21	48.8%

C. Rely on religious interpretation

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	4	9.3%
2	—	—
3	5	11.6%
4	3	7.0%
5	9	20.9%
Missing	22	51.2%

34. In principle, do you agree or disagree with the following statements: (1: strongly agree, and 5: strongly disagree)

A. There are some situations in which the Authority is justified in breaking laws in order to protect national security.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	6	14.0%
2	6	14.0%
3	5	11.6%
4	5	11.6%
5	19	44.2%
Missing	2	4.7%

B. If the President violates the Constitution, he should be impeached.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	15	34.9%
2	5	11.6%
3	14	32.6%
4	5	11.6%
5	3	7.0%
Missing	1	2.3%

C. The quota system is important to have representation for minorities.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	8	18.6%
2	8	18.6%
3	12	27.9%
4	2	4.7%
5	11	25.6%
Missing	2	4.7%

D. It is important to have women in the Council.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	32	74.4%
2	4	9.3%
3	2	4.7%
4	1	2.3%
5	2	4.7%
Missing	2	4.7%

E. Using the threat of violence as a political weapon is never justified.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	29	67.4%
2	-	-
3	1	2.3%
4	1	2.3%
5	10	23.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

F. There is too much concern for law and order, and not enough for rights.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	9	20.9%
2	8	18.6%
3	12	27.9%
4	1	2.3%
5	6	14.0%
Missing	7	16.3%

G. Drinking alcohol is a personal choice and should not be treated as a crime.

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	19	44.2%
2	3	7.0%
3	5	11.6%
4	3	7.0%
5	9	20.9%
Missing	4	9.3%

35. Which, in your opinion, should be the terms of reference for the negotiations during the interim phase: the PLO or the PNA?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
PLO	24	55.8%
PNA	5	11.6%
PLC	8	18.6%
PLO & PNA	5	11.6%
Missing	1	2.3%

36. How strongly do you believe in the following: (1: strongly believe, and 5: strongly do not believe)

A. Separation between religion and state

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	20	46.5%
2	5	11.6%
3	4	9.3%
4	3	7.0%
5	10	23.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

B. Individual rights

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	35	81.4%
2	5	11.6%
3	3	7.0%
4	—	—
5	—	—
Missing	—	—

C. Rule of majority

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	33	76.7%
2	7	16.3%
3	2	4.7%
4	—	—
5	1	2.3%
Missing	—	—

D. Rights of minorities

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	34	79.1%
2	4	9.3%
3	3	7.0%
4	—	—
5	2	4.7%
Missing	—	—

E. Judicial review

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	39	90.7%
2	2	4.7%
3	—	—
4	—	—
5	1	2.3%
Missing	1	2.3%

F. Freedom of assembly

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	41	95.3%
2	1	2.3%
3	—	—
4	—	—
5	1	2.3%
Missing	—	—

G. Rights of opposition

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	37	86.0%
2	2	4.7%
3	3	7.0%
4	—	—
5	1	2.3%
Missing	—	—

H. Freedom of press

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
1	38	88.4%
2	3	7.0%
3	1	2.3%
4	—	—
5	1	2.3%
Missing	—	—

37. The PLC has discussed many issues related to Israeli policy such as settlements and closures, etc. To what extent would you say that discussing such issues falls within the jurisdiction of the PLC, or do you think that the PLC should not be involved?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
Yes, PLC should be involved	43	100.0%
No, PLC should not be involved	—	—

38. Why is it within the PLC's jurisdiction?

Value Labels	Frequency = 43	Percent
People's representative	22	51.2%
PLC = part of PLO	1	2.3%
National responsibility	3	7.0%
Effect people represent	14	32.6%
Israeli practices (are on land in which PLC is responsible)	1	2.3%
Missing	2	4.7%

"This is the most thorough study of public attitudes toward a parliamentary body in any Arab country. The rigor and integrity of the work is impressive. The work is clearly of the highest importance in evaluating the democratic credentials of the Palestinian Legislative Council."

Prof. T. Niblock
Director, Center for Middle Eastern
and Islamic Studies
University of Durham, UK