


No Exit

Israel's Curfew Policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territories



The
Jerusalem
Media and
Communication
Centre

NO EXIT:
Israel's Curfew Policy in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories

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PREFACE

From 9 December 1987, when the Palestinian uprising broke out, until 31 December 1990, every Palestinian living in the occupied territories had spent an average of approximately ten weeks under in-house curfew. The Israeli military authorities imposed round-the-clock curfew on Palestinian communities more than 7,800 times in this three-year period. Many communities were subject to curfews of a week or more in length; some curfews lasted more than a month. The purpose of this report is to explore the reality of curfew as it is experienced by the 134,431 people who are imprisoned in their homes by curfew on any given day in the occupied territories. This exploration is pursued at two levels: The report offers an inside look at the immediate and personal experience of a curfewed community, while also examining the wider ramifications of Israel's curfew policy.

The report is divided into three major sections. A short introductory section, Chapter 1, examines the Israeli policy of curfew in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the first three years of the uprising. In this chapter, the frequent use of curfews is discussed and general curfew patterns are summarised. Israeli curfew policy is then briefly analysed in light of international law and Israel's political objectives. Information in this section is drawn primarily from the Palestinian press and supplemented by reports from local and international human rights and development organisations as well as JMCC's own field research.

Chapter 2 is based on an in-depth survey of the curfew experience in two refugee camps during the first three years of the uprising. The survey offers a unique insight into the personal experience of camp residents under curfew --what it means to be forcefully confined to your home 24 hours a day for days on end, isolated from the outside world and without access to essential supplies and services, while armed forces patrol the neighbourhood streets and periodically break into your home. It shows the complete paralysis which strikes all aspects of camp life, from work to study to worship to play, as a result of the collective imprisonment of an entire community. It further documents the campaign of terror which incarcerated populations are regularly subjected to during curfew, including systematic army brutality and the frequent, arbitrary implementation of numerous punitive and isolatory measures. In addition to describing the experiences of individuals under curfew, the survey documents the comprehensive damage sustained by the community as a result of curfew.

In the midst of completing the analysis of the survey data and preparing the original report for publication, Israeli military authorities announced an open-ended blanket curfew over the entire occupied territories.* This curfew, officially imposed for "security reasons" at the outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf, lasted in various forms for nearly two months

*The only exception to the blanket curfew was East Jerusalem. Israel annexed East Jerusalem following the 1967 war and therefore does not recognise it as part of the occupied territories, despite international consensus to the contrary. Nonetheless, throughout the blanket curfew a number of East Jerusalem communities were subject to curfew for varying lengths of time.

--longer than the war itself. The curfew was the longest of its kind since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 and has had catastrophic consequences for the occupied territories. The "war curfew",** itself a dramatic extension of Israel's curfew policy over the previous three years, indicates that Israel is prepared to escalate its use of curfew --even during current international peace efforts in the region. Due to the serious implications of this curfew, a separate section has been added to the original report as Chapter 3. This section provides a preliminary account and analysis of the blanket "war curfew". Information presented in this section is gathered from the local press and from reports by local and international organisations.

In addition, the report includes a number of appendices which provide detailed graphs of curfew patterns throughout the uprising (Appendix B) and detailed documentation of military measures which accompanied the "war curfew" in particular (Appendix C).

**The term *war curfew*, which has commonly been used to refer to the blanket curfew imposed on 17 January, is actually misleading; not only did the curfew outlast the war, the nature of the curfew and the additional measures implemented by Israel during the curfew belie Israeli claims that it was imposed for reasons necessitated by the outbreak of the war.

CHAPTER 1 - THREE YEARS OF ISRAELI CURFEW POLICY AT A GLANCE

1. Patterns


1.1 Totals

From 9 December 1987, when the Palestinian uprising began, to the end of 1990, JMCC recorded 7,852 curfew incidents in the Israeli-occupied territories.¹ Virtually every refugee camp, village, and town in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip² was subject to curfew on at least one occasion; on average, the 311 communities subject to location-specific curfew orders during this period spent over eight days a year under curfew. Based on available population figures,³ this amounts to the cumulative loss of 150,293,600 person-days, where one person-day is the equivalent of one person under curfew for one day; on average, every person in the occupied

territories spent 69 days in three years (over three weeks a year) under curfew.⁴ Every day between 9 December 1987 and 31 December 1990, an average of more than 134,431 Palestinians in the occupied territories were confined to their homes by curfew.

In many communities, residents spent several months a year under curfew. Residents of Tulkarem Refugee Camp in the West Bank were under curfew over an entire year (371 days) between the start of the uprising and the end of 1990. In the Gaza Strip, the Jabalia and Shati refugee camps were both under curfew for over nine months during the same time period (296 and 291 days respectively).⁵ (See Appendix B1.)

CURFEW IN WEST BANK & GAZA STRIP (Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)



* Person-Day = one person under curfew for one day

1.2 Trends

Comparison of annual trends

The high frequency of curfew incidents and the large number of locations and people affected by curfews, which characterised the first year of the uprising, continued through 1989 and 1990; annual patterns indicate no significant changes in Israeli curfew policy during the three-year period. The total number of curfew incidents recorded was highest in 1988 when 2,842 incidents were recorded. The annual number of incidents recorded dropped to 2,467 in 1989, and rose again in 1990 to 2,514. However, the number of person-days recorded was highest in 1989 (51,606,465), due largely to the high frequency of curfews in major population centres, particularly in the Gaza Strip, while the highest number of locations under curfew was recorded in 1990 (202). (For additional graphs depicting curfew trends, see Appendix B2-B9.)

Comparison by community type

Refugee camp residents, representing approximately 16% of the population of the occupied territories, were the target of 53% of the curfew incidents and likewise accounted for over 52% of the person-days under curfew between 9 December 1987 and 31 December 1990. 1990 was the only year in which the number of curfew incidents and person-days for the non-refugee camp population exceeded that of the refugee camps. The Gaza Strip refugee camps, which represent approximately 12% of the total population of the occupied territories, accounted for over 41% of the recorded person-days. West Bank refugee camps, representing approximately 5% of the total population, accounted for over 11% of the total person-days.

Examining the Gaza Strip separately, the refugee camp population (approximately 36% of the total Strip population) was subject to 75% of the curfew incidents and 65% of the person-days recorded. In the West Bank, the refugee camp population (approximately 8% of

the total West Bank population) was subject to 43% of the curfew incidents and 30% of the person-days recorded. Within the West Bank non-camp population, towns accounted for 10% of the curfew incidents and 50% of the person-days recorded, and villages accounted for 47% of the curfew incidents and 20% of the person-days.

Comparison by geographic region

The Gaza Strip, which constitutes approximately 32% of the total population of the occupied territories, accounted for 31% of the total curfew incidents and over 64% of the total person-days in the time period recorded.


Within the West Bank, the Nablus area was subject to the highest number of curfew incidents (30%) and person-days (42%). Second highest figures were recorded in the Tulkarem area, which accounted for 20% of the total number of curfew incidents and 18% of the total person-days. Jenin and Hebron areas accounted for 11% and 10% of the total number of person-days respectively, but only 10% and 6% of the total curfew incidents. Ramallah, Qalqilia, and Bethlehem areas each recorded 5-7% of the person-day total, although Ramallah and Bethlehem accounted for 16% and 11% of the total number of curfew incidents respectively. Jerusalem and Jericho recorded only 1% each of the total number of curfew incidents and person-days.

2. Legality and Rationale

Israel has repeatedly defended its use of curfews on alleged security grounds, claiming the need to control protests or restore order. Israeli authorities have also constructed an image of curfew as a humane alternative to other more overtly violent means of quelling activities thought to threaten Israeli security. This image, however, ignores the international legal standards to which Israel is accountable and belies the far-reaching consequences of

GAZA STRIP CURFEWS


(Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)



* Person-Day = one person under curfew for one day

WEST BANK CURFEWS

(Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)



* Person-Day = one person under curfew for one day

Israel's curfew policy. Curfews, as used by the Israeli authorities are punitive and debilitating.

2.1 Curfew and International Law

While international law regarding belligerent occupation makes no specific reference to the imposition of curfew, consensus within the international community is that a particular practice which is neither sanctioned nor prohibited by international law, should only be implemented by the occupying power,

if sufficiently compelling security reasons exist and then **only if its application of the measure does not violate fundamental humanitarian safeguards or unjustifiably disrupt orderly civil life.** If the occupant fails to meet either of the above conditions, its actions cannot be considered lawful. [emphasis added]⁶

Thus in legal terms, Israel's implementation of curfew in the occupied territories is strictly circumscribed and only permissible under very specific conditions.⁷ An occupying power is first obliged to preserve the welfare of the occupied civilian population; this obligation cannot be compromised for the security interests of the occupier, which must be balanced with the rights of the civilian population.⁸ The enforcement of curfew is prohibited if it in any way denies the civilian population access to basic humanitarian services or unnecessarily disrupts civil life.⁹ Within the context of international law then, curfew, because it involves the suspension of civil life by definition, is conceived of as an extraordinary and temporary measure.¹⁰ Moreover, the implementation of curfew as a form of punishment or reprisal is absolutely forbidden under all circumstances by the Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Conventions.¹¹ Also of significance, given Israel's usual manner of enforcing curfew, humiliation, brutality, or degrading treatment of any kind are expressly forbidden according to customary international law.¹² The use of curfew in a manner which in any

way exceeds these limitations or interferes with the obligations of the occupying power as established by international law cannot be justified on any grounds; this includes justifications based on the claim that alternative means of control would constitute more extreme human rights violations.

Furthermore, the administration of curfew does not relieve the occupying power of its obligations to the occupied population as specified in international law. According to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupier is specifically obliged to ensure an adequate supply of food, medical supplies, and other essentials, and, in case of inadequate supplies, to facilitate relief consignments. The occupier is likewise obliged to ensure and maintain the normal operation of all health institutions and services, and to facilitate the care and education of children. Also applicable are articles in the Fourth Geneva Convention relating to obligations mandating the orderly functioning of the national Red Cross/Crescent and other non-military relief societies; the right of religious leaders to provide spiritual assistance; and prohibitions against the destruction of property.¹³

2.2 Israeli Strategy

Clearly, Israel's use of curfew has grossly exceeded limitations prescribed by international law.¹⁴ Israel has regularly used curfew as a form of collective punishment, and has admitted as much on a number of occasions. In September 1989, for example, Justice Minister Dan Meridor declared that measures of collective punishment such as curfew were necessary in Israel's struggle to defeat the *intifada*:

It is not desirable but sometimes there is no choice. In normal society, criminal punishment is only inflicted on people at the margins. During a period of war, however, you need greater deterrence.

There is no escaping this, even if it involves

sealing homes, demolitions, and curfews.¹⁵

Rather than an extraordinary and temporary measure, curfew has, particularly since the uprising, been standard Israeli policy in the occupied territories. Indeed, the very regularity with which it has been used reflects the importance of curfew as an integral part of the occupying power's programme to quash resistance to the occupation and permanently subjugate the Palestinian population. Little over a month into the uprising, Israeli military's then Chief of General Staff, Dan Shomron, declared that curfew was "the most effective weapon to suppress the uprising".¹⁶

The aims behind the use of curfew correlate with the overall objectives of the occupying force. First, at the immediate level, curfews are imposed by the army to stop activities (eg. demonstrations) which might fuel the uprising. Curfews also diminish the possibility of direct confrontations and prevent press coverage which might damage Israel's image abroad.

Second and more generally, curfew is perhaps the most comprehensive means available to the Israeli authorities for re-asserting their control over and subjugating the rebelling Palestinian population. Curfew is intentionally used to inflict hardship on communities in the hopes of collectively coercing them to abandon their resistance, renounce the national leadership, and recognise the authority of the occupier. Curfews in Qabatia in August and September 1988 provide a classic example of this strategy. Reserve soldier Jonathan Kestenbaum, who served in Qabatia, recorded in his journal: "The battalion commander tells us that they remain under curfew until they are 'broken', whatever that means."¹⁷ Central to this "breaking" process is the economic pressure exerted on a community by curfew. Thus, Tat-Aluf Zvi Poleg, the commander of Israeli military forces in the Gaza Strip in the autumn of

1988, explained his intended use of curfew:

So over a period of time, if they [Palestinians] don't work because of either a curfew or a strike, they're hurt, they have no other source of income. Since it is in my power to cut off the residents' access to their means of support, I'm hoping that this is one of the means I can use effectively to lower the level of violence.¹⁸

Likewise, a high-ranking military source explained the imposition of a blanket curfew in the Gaza Strip in May 1989, during which all Gazan workers inside Israel were indefinitely prohibited from entering Israel, as a message to residents in the Gaza Strip:

"[t]he Gaza population should know that we --and not some leaflet [from the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising]-- decide **when and how life is to be disrupted**" [emphasis added].¹⁹

Curfew directly interferes with communication and organisational processes within the Palestinian community. Israeli curfew policy is thus directed at destroying the independent Palestinian infrastructures that have been developed by popular and national institutions. These institutions are both tools of resistance and a vital part of the nation-building process embodied in the goals of the uprising. The policy of frequent and protracted curfews creates constant disruption in developmental efforts, including health and education programmes. It also furthers the occupier's efforts to thwart Palestinian economic development recognised by both the occupied and occupier as a foundational element of national independence. Curfew policy, by regularly interrupting economic activity, at once heightens financial hardships at the family level, and undermines the nascent Palestinian economic infrastructure, the development of which has been one of the uprising's major concerns.

Chapter 1 - Endnotes

1. *One curfew incident* is the equivalent of one full location under curfew for one day. Curfews imposed and lifted the same day, night curfews, and partial curfews affecting only particular neighbourhoods of a village, town, or refugee camp are not included in the figures cited.
2. The only locations not affected by curfew on at least one occasion were a handful of villages/suburbs of East Jerusalem. All other West Bank and Gaza Strip locations were subject to blanket curfew on at least one occasion.
3. Accurate population figures for the West Bank and Gaza Strip are difficult to obtain as there has been no census since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967.

Population figures for individual locations in this report are based primarily on figures provided in Meron Benvenisti and Shlomo Khayat (West Bank and Gaza Atlas, Jerusalem: West Bank Data Project, 1988). Populations for locations not listed in Benvenisti and Khayat are based on 1987 figures from the Arab Studies Society and, in several cases, JMCC field investigation. Population figures for refugee camps are taken from UNRWA figures for 1987, which is used as a base year. Population figures for 1988-1991, are calculated based on a conservative standard estimate of a 2.5% average annual increase in the population. Because this percentage increase is an average of varying population expansion trends in different types of populations (ie. camp, town, village), all population figures are based on 1987 figures and calculated accordingly. This formulation is used even in the case of refugee camps where UNRWA figures as recent as 1990 are available in order to maintain as close an estimate as possible to the overall aggregate population for the occupied territories. UNRWA population figures for refugee camps post-1987 are slightly higher than calculated figures, as the average population increase in camps is generally higher than the 2.5% nation-wide average used in this report. People-day figures for camps in particular, should thus be viewed as conservative estimates.

The total population for the entire West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip used for this report is 2,176,000. This figure, an average of the three years under study (December 1987 - December 1990), is calculated on the basis of a compilation of population estimates for this period and the standard estimate of a 2.5% annual increase in the population:

	Population Totals			
	1987	1988	1989	1990
1) WB camp residents	94,824	97,195	99,625	102,116
2) WB non-camp residents	1,169,186	1,198,415	1,228,375	1,259,084
3) WB totals (excl. EJ)	1,264,010	1,295,610	1,328,000	1,361,200
4) East Jerusalem	136,000	139,400	142,885	146,457
5) GS camp residents	244,416	250,526	256,789	263,209
6) GS non-camp residents	426,800	437,470	448,407	459,617
7) GS total	671,216	687,996	705,196	722,826
TOTALS	2,071,226	2,123,006	2,176,081	2,230,483

Average over three year period: 2,176,000

NOTES (see corresponding line number above):

- 1) WB camp resident figures are calculated using UNRWA population records for 1987 as a base figure (94,824), and adding a 2.5% increase for each year following.
- 2) WB non-camp resident figures are derived by subtracting WB camp resident population figures (Line #1) from WB totals (Line #3).
- 3) WB totals (excluding East Jerusalem) are calculated using the 2.5% annual increase and a 1989 base figure (1,328,000) from an internal Israeli Civil Administration report published in *Al-Katib* (no.132, May 1991, p.27).
- 4) East Jerusalem figures are calculated using Benvenisti and Khayat's (*op. cit.*, p.28) figure for 1987 (136,000), and adding a 2.5% increase for each following year.
- 5) GS camp resident figures are calculated using UNRWA population records for 1987 as a base figure (244,416), and adding a 2.5% increase for each following year.
- 6) GS non-camp resident figures are derived by subtracting GS camp resident population figures (Line #5) from GS totals (Line #7).
- 7) GS totals are calculated using the 2.5% annual increase and a 1987 base figure (671,216) from an in-house report of the Israeli Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and a Save the Children Federation Survey, as cited in Nixon et al. (The Status of Palestinian Children During the Uprising in the Occupied Territories: Part 1(2), 1990, p.314).

4. This figure is calculated using the average total West Bank and Gaza Strip population (including East Jerusalem) of 2,176,000 divided into the total number of person-days recorded (150,293,600). See preceding endnote regarding total population figures for occupied territories used in the report.

5. Tulkarem Refugee Camp was under curfew for 5 days in 1987, 124 days in 1988, 158 days in 1989, and 84 days in 1990. Jabalia Refugee Camp was under curfew for 11 days in December 1987, 134 days in 1988, 85 in 1989, and 66 in 1990. Shati Refugee Camp was under curfew 149 days in 1988, 86 days in 1989, and 56 days in 1990.

6. Al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege, Ramallah: al-Haq, 1989, p.400.
7. An in-depth analysis of the legal arguments can be found in al-Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising (December 1987 - December 1988), Ramallah: al-Haq, 1988, pp.177-193; al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege, op. cit., pp.365-366, 400-402.
8. Al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege, op. cit., pp.400-401.
9. The occupier is forbidden to interfere in the provision and distribution of food-stuffs, medical supplies, and other essential items. Cf. Fourth Geneva Convention, of 12 August 1948, Article 55.
10. Al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege, op. cit., p.365.
11. Cf. Ibid.
12. Cf. al-Haq, Punishing a Nation, op. cit., pp.179-180; al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege, op. cit., p.402.
13. Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Articles 50, 55-63.
14. The extent of these excesses is unique to Israel. As noted by al-Haq (Punishing a Nation, op. cit., p.181):

...in a decade characterised by violent political upheaval, armed conflict and popular rebellion, there is no parallel to its use by the Israeli military authorities in the Occupied Territories. This becomes all the more revealing when one considers that the uprising has not been an armed conflict and that the military government has an almost complete monopoly on the use of armed force.

According to al-Haq (Punishing a Nation, op. cit., p.180), other governments have, "virtually without exception", used curfew only as an extraordinary and temporary measure in instances of severe violence and generally precede the imposition of curfew by the declaration of a state of emergency. Most often curfew is imposed for specified hours only, such as dusk to dawn. Round-the-clock curfews have been used in extreme cases, but usually last for a limited number of days, with a daily reprieve of several hours. Furthermore, efforts to ensure proper distribution of food, medicine, and basic supplies and to facilitate medical services are, under such circumstances, generally undertaken by even "the most repressive of governments", and cutting water and electricity supplies "is rarely if ever even contemplated" (ibid., p.181).

15. Quoted in Jerusalem Post (26 September 1989). In another example, in August 1990 a senior army spokesman told the Jerusalem Post (31 August 1990) that the decision to impose an extended curfew on Rafah town following the killing of a collaborator, which had been taken by Major-General Matan Vilna'i, "did not deny that there was a 'collective' element to the protracted nature of the curfew".

16. Cf. Attali'a, 14 January 1988.

17. Kestenbaum describes a policy of brutality and humiliation, accompanied by a campaign to intentionally starve the residents of Qabatia into submission. The Jerusalem Post Magazine reports that in the end, leaders of the community were forced to go to the army and promise "to keep the peace" in exchange for the lifting of curfew in order to save the village from total destruction (Joel Greenberg, "A Soldier's Diary," Jerusalem Post Magazine, 16 September 1988, p.4).

18. Jerusalem Post, 8 September 1988.

19. Jerusalem Post, 16 September 1989.

This particular curfew was lifted the morning of 21 May in anticipation of a general strike called by the UNLU. Commenting on the lifting, the Israeli military said "the security forces hope that the meaning [of the curfew's end] is understood by the Gaza residents", referring to the army's attempt to dissuade Gazans from following UNLU calls by strategically imposing and lifting curfews (Jerusalem Post, 21 May 1989).

CHAPTER 2 - CURFEW: THE EXPERIENCE OF TWO REFUGEE CAMPS

The harsh realities of curfew have been veiled with a false benignity. The sheer frequency with which Israeli authorities have implemented curfew has been largely responsible for this distortion. Additionally, the very nature of curfew as an isolatory measure allows Israel to cover up the ramifications of its imposition. Indeed, Israel has exploited the covert nature of curfew to portray its curfew policy as a humane alternative to more overtly violent means of defending its "security". The JMCC curfew survey was designed to dispel this myth of "benign curfew" by documenting first-hand accounts of life under curfew and presenting detailed information regarding both the individual and communal effects of curfew.

In order to obtain an in-depth view of curfew experiences, the survey was limited to two refugee camp communities -- Jalazon Refugee Camp in the West Bank and Shati [Beach] Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip. The survey consisted of extensive interviews with 98 and 101 households in Jalazon and Shati respectively, carried out by a team of field researchers between August and November 1990. Families included in the survey were selected from a random sample of the entire camp.¹ Additional information was gathered from interviews with United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)² officials and experts in the legal, economic, education, health, and psychological fields. Local press sources and several publications exploring Israel's curfew policy were also used in the research process and are cited within the report.

The decision to focus on refugee camps was based largely on the fact that refugee camps have, in many respects, borne the brunt of Israel's curfew policy. The actual experience of curfew varies considerably between town, village, and refugee camp, and between

families of different economic circumstances; the experience of one family may vary from curfew to curfew depending on whether the curfew was expected, how long it lasted, the stringency with which it was enforced, and the sanctions which accompanied it. Curfew experiences also change over time as effects from curfew to curfew accumulate. In general, however, curfews have been deployed against refugee camps more strictly and frequently than against towns and villages. (See Chapter 1, section 1.2.) Moreover, the consequences of curfew tend to be particularly severe for refugee camp populations, which are generally propertyless and more heavily dependent on wage labour than other sectors of Palestinian society.

Shati and Jalazon refugee camps were chosen for the survey in order to illustrate the multiple dimensions of curfew experience. Both communities have been subjected to many of the most extreme manifestations of curfew policy. From the start of the uprising through December 1990, Shati residents were subject to more curfew days than any other camp, town, or village with the exception of Tulkarem Refugee Camp in the West Bank and Jabalia Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip.³ Jalazon residents spent over three months of the first year of the uprising under curfew and have been subject to several markedly prolonged curfews, including a 40-day curfew in the spring of 1988, which was the longest curfew over any single location in the first three years of the uprising. At the same time, despite these extremities of frequency and duration, the curfew patterns in these two camps demonstrate experiences widely shared with other refugee camps as well as other non-camp communities.

Jalazon Refugee Camp, renowned for its nationalist activities throughout the occupation, has been "an active site of

demonstrations and confrontations since the intifada began".⁴ Located on the main road between Ramallah and Nablus, and in close proximity to the Israeli settlement of Beit El, it has always been particularly vulnerable to harassment by both Israeli soldiers and settlers. During the uprising military forces have entered the camp at least twice daily, patrolling the streets every morning and afternoon and harassing camp residents on an almost continuous basis.⁵ Countless army raids involving attacks on both people and property have been directed against the camp, home to over 6,000 residents. Between 9 December 1987 and 31 December 1990, the camp's residents spent 129 days under military in-house curfew, a total of 673,308 person-days.⁶

Like Jalazon, Shati Refugee Camp, which lies on the Gaza Strip coast just north of Gaza City, has been severely affected by Israeli military measures during the uprising. Numerous protest demonstrations and widespread confrontations with Israeli military forces, many involving thousands of people, have occurred since the outbreak of the uprising. Between 9 December 1987 and 31 December 1990, 31 people from the camp of over 46,000 have been killed by Israeli gunfire or in other army-related incidents.⁷ As part of the Gaza Strip, Shati Camp has been subject to 21 blanket curfews for a total of 67 days and an additional 224 days under camp curfew during the same time period. The resulting total, nine and a half months, translates into 12,523,732 person-days of curfew.

1. Summary of Major Survey Findings

1. The Israeli military continuously terrorises and humiliates curfewed populations as part of a systematic policy to forcibly break Palestinian resistance to the occupation. Standard practices during curfew include:

- * House raids - 197 out of the 199 surveyed households were subjected to army raids under curfew. 93% of the households were raided three or more times during curfew; over 54% of the households were raided more than five times.
- * Beating - 25% and 48% of Jalazon and Shati families reported one or more persons beaten during curfew raids.
- * Property damage - 40% of the Jalazon households and 19% of the Shati households sustained property damage during army raids.
- * Use of tear gas - 10% and 5% of the households in Jalazon and Shati respectively were attacked with tear gas on one or more occasions.
- * Use of sound bombs, rubber bullets, and live ammunition - soldiers typically fire at random to intimidate the population and, on occasion, fire directly into homes or at alleged curfew breakers.
- * Arrest operations - 11% of the total number of households surveyed reported that one or more members had been arrested under curfew.

2. Curfew isolates and immobilises entire communities, cuts off their access to basic supplies and services, and paralyzes normal civil life.

- * Soldiers intentionally bar access to food and fuel supplies, block relief efforts, and destroy existing food supplies.
- * Electricity, water, and telephone lines are periodically cut during curfews.
- * Outside observers are prevented from entering the camp and access roads are typically sealed.

3. The health of the camp community is severely compromised by curfew conditions and curfew-related sanctions.

- * Access to medical care is routinely obstructed by the military; one third of the surveyed residents who sought medical treatment were either delayed or denied access to medical services.
- * Army brutality, including shooting, beating, and firing tear gas, causes serious injuries; the survey population included two women who miscarried following tear gas exposure and four wounded children under 13, including two girls who were shot.
- * Curfew creates serious problems for persons requiring regular medical attention and/or special diets. Communicable diseases become more widespread and the frequency of home accidents increases.
- * Regular health care and nutritional services are disrupted, including immunisations, supplementary feedings, and regular pre-natal and new-born check-ups. Programmes for the physically and mentally disabled and the chronically ill are also halted.
- * Under curfew, the general health situation deteriorates as a result of dietary deficiencies, improper sanitation, overcrowding, and excessive stress.

4. Curfew cuts off the income of entire households and undermines the viability of the Palestinian economy.

- * Curfew restrictions result in significant income losses; in Jalazon 73% of the surveyed households reported that curfews had resulted in the loss of daily wages. 88% and 91% of the surveyed households in Shati and Jalazon respectively reported an overall income loss of 20% or more during the past three years. Of these, 42-43% suffered income losses between 40-60%, and 19% sustained income losses of over 60%.
- * Curfew-imposed job absenteeism is used as grounds for firing Palestinian employees; in Jalazon 5% of the households reported job losses as a direct result of curfew. In Shati over 50% of the households attributed the loss of jobs in the family to curfew and other uprising-related conditions, and only 10% of the households reported no wage or job loss.
- * Commercial activity is stymied; Gaza City suffers a 23% reduction in the number of consumers to which it caters every time Shati is under curfew --an average of three months a year.

* Economic repercussions of curfew reverberate through all levels of the Palestinian economy, which is particularly vulnerable given the current recession and its general state of underdevelopment.

5. Israeli authorities impose curfews as part of their campaign against Palestinian education.

* Curfew forces schools to close; in one three-month period alone 37 UNRWA schools serving Shati students were shut down by curfew 635 times. Between 9 December 1987 and 31 December 1990, UNRWA schools in Shati lost over 31 school weeks as a direct result of curfew.

* Curfew restricts home study; students are unable to get together with classmates to study, become frustrated and discouraged by repeated interruptions in their schooling, and are further distracted by the siege-like atmosphere of curfew.

* During curfew raids soldiers confiscate or destroy study materials.

* Disruptions in schooling and economic difficulties caused by curfew contribute to the current increase in student drop-out rates.

6. Curfew exacts a heavy toll on the psychological health of the camp community.

* Psychological duress results from the combination of confinement, paralysis, lack of security, humiliation, fear of violence, and the overriding sense of deprivation.

* Significant changes occur in children's behaviour; parents report increased aggressiveness and/or passivity and general disorientation amongst their children.

* Adults struggle to cope with continuous anxieties regarding the safety and welfare of their families, especially as economic uncertainties and difficulties in feeding their children mount.

* Household tensions heighten the possibility of angry outbursts; parents feel less able to deal appropriately and effectively with each other and their children.

7. Curfew brings normal camp life to a standstill; imprisoned in crowded quarters, children and adults are left with little possibility for creative or productive activity.

* Children are denied their primary play space.


* Sleeping and viewing television are the most common activities under curfew for people of all ages.

2. Curfew Patterns

Jalazon residents were under curfew for over one quarter of the first year of the uprising (94 days), making it the camp with the fourth highest number of curfew days in the West Bank in 1988 and the fifth highest location in the entire West Bank. From 16 March to 25 April 1988, Jalazon residents were subjected to 40 consecutive days of curfew --the longest curfew imposed on any single location during the first three years of the uprising. In the

second and third years of the uprising, the frequency of curfew in Jalazon declined considerably; residents were confined to their homes by curfew for 16 and 19 days in 1989 and 1990 respectively. Over the three-year period, Jalazon was subject to 129 days of curfew, the equivalent of 673,308 person-days. On average then, Jalazon was under curfew for one and a half months each of the past three years or 224,436 person-days of curfew each year.

JALAZON REFUGEE CAMP (Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)




Shati residents were under curfew for nearly five months of 1988 (149 days), nearly three months of 1989 (86 days), and just under two months of 1990 (56 days), or a combined total of over nine months (291 days). Shati was under curfew for 27% of this three-year period --12,523,732 person-days. During 1988, Shati residents were under curfew ten or more

days every month, with the exception of June when they were under curfew six days. On average, Shati residents spent over three months of each of the three years or eight days every month under curfew. In person-day units this amounts to an average of 4,174,577 per year or 347,881 per month.

SHATI REFUGEE CAMP (Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)

Month



Total Curfew Days: 291

Source: UNRWA records

UPRISING FIGURES FOR JALAZON REFUGEE CAMP
(9 December 1987 - 31 December 1990)

DEATHS: 2 children killed by Israeli army gunfire
 1 resident died as a result of severe beatings

INJURIES: At least **470** people were shot with live or rubber bullets by Israeli forces. Four of those injured were paralysed as a result of their injuries and a 2-year-old girl lost an eye.

GROUP ROUND-UPS: On **33** separate occasions soldiers rounded up residents of the camp between the ages of 14 and 60 and held them in the camp's market where they were subject to insults, beatings, and other forms of humiliation throughout the night.


ARRESTS: Some **980** youths from the camp have been arrested (some as many as three times). As of 1.1.91, **160** camp youths were under detention. **57** children between 5-12 years were detained by the military until their families paid a bail of NIS1,000 for each child; a total of NIS57,000 was thus collected from camp residents.

DEMOLITIONS & SEALINGS: **25** homes were demolished on 'security' grounds
10 homes were sealed on 'security' grounds

6 homes were unintentionally destroyed during the punitive demolitions of neighbouring houses

SCHOOLS: The military issued **25** closure orders against the camp's schools for up to one month periods and launched army raids on the schools **37** times.

SOURCE: UNRWA records



UPRISING FIGURES FOR SHATI REFUGEE CAMP
(9 December 1987 - 31 December 1990)


DEATHS: 19 residents have been killed by Israeli gunfire
4 camp residents were beaten to death
7 camp residents died of tear gas asphyxiation
1 camp resident died in detention of unknown causes

INJURIES: 875 live ammunition injuries
3,198 beating injuries
362 plastic-coated metal bullet injuries
168 rubber bullet injuries
1,836 tear gas-related injuries

DEPORTATIONS: 4 residents were deported
Khaleel Ibraheem 'Abd al-Qouqa,
deported 11.4.88
Jamal 'Awad al-Jawad Zaqout,
deported 1.8.88
'Abd al-Min'em Hassan Abu 'Atiyeh,
deported 1.1.89
'Atta Hussein Abu Kirsh,
deported 29.6.89

**DEMOLITONS
& SEALINGS:** 5 homes were demolished on
on 'security' grounds
4 homes were sealed on
'security' grounds

SCHOOLS: The military issued 4 closure
orders against schools in the
camp and at least 81 closure
orders against Gaza City schools
where the majority of camp
students attend classes.



SOURCES: JMCC records; injury figures from UNRWA records

SURVEY POPULATION STATISTICS

	Jalazon	Shati
Number of households	98	101
Number of people	753	948
Percentage of camp population	12.3%	2.1%
Average number of people/household	7.7	9.4
Average number of rooms/household	2.9	3.6
Average covered area of household (m ² /person)	70	50
Average crowding rate (m ² /person)	9.2	5.3

UPRISING FIGURES FOR SURVEY POPULATIONS (December 1987 - November 1990)

	Jalazon	Shati
% of households where one or more members were beaten	77%	70%
% of households where one or more members were injured	38%	45%
% of households where one or more members were arrested	60%	43%
% of households where one or more members were detained	49%	51%

SOURCE: JMCC survey findings

3. Life under Curfew

When curfews are imposed, people are involuntarily thrust into isolation; camp residents are separated from each other and the camp itself is cut off from the outside world.⁸ At the same time, curfew paralyses all aspects of normal camp life. Everyone --from labourers to merchants to professionals-- is prevented from working. All economic activity in the camp comes to an abrupt halt. All students --from kindergarten to university-- are prevented from attending school. Social life, including visits to friends and relatives inside and outside the camp, is brought to a standstill. Religious activity, customarily centred around the mosque, is completely curtailed. Furthermore, access to all basic supplies and services is severed by military actions designed to further isolate the

curfewed community.

Curfew renders the entire camp a prison, each home a cell, every resident a prisoner detained without trial. Leaving home is a punishable offence. Any "extra-cellular" movement requires prior permission. The most significant difference between detention in a prison and internment under curfew, however, is that in the case of prison, authorities acknowledge their responsibilities for the welfare of the prisoners. Families under curfew, on the other hand, must rely on whatever resources they can find within their homes; the military authorities take no responsibility for ensuring that their "prisoners" are fed or have sufficient fuel supplies. When and if given the "privilege" to replenish supplies, families must do so at their own expense. Under curfew, authorities do not

provide a "prison doctor" or clinic, nor do they guarantee the right of their "prisoners" to seek medical care. Under curfew "prisoners" are denied the right to practise their religion collectively or to seek spiritual guidance; nor are they given the right to seek legal counsel or to make legal appeal. Absolutely no provisions are made for "prisoners" educational needs. Rights considered basic by the world community and those extended even to convicted criminals in prison are denied to civilian populations under curfew.

3.1 The Enforcement of Curfew

Curfew is most often imposed during the early hours of the morning when people are at home, thus making it easier to enforce the order. When curfew is imposed during the day, as occasionally happens following large-scale demonstrations, for example, residents are usually given a limited amount of time to return home following the announcement. People re-entering the camp are generally permitted entrance until nightfall. Curfew enforcement is typically stricter after the first 24 hours, by which time all residents are expected to have returned.

The imposition of curfew is announced over loudspeakers from military jeeps driven throughout the camp. Residents report that curfew announcements are usually accompanied by threats against those caught breaking curfew. Typical announcements include statements like: "Residents of Shati, you are forbidden to move from your homes, anyone breaking curfew will be shot," or "Residents of Jalazon, curfew has been imposed, anyone caught outside their home will be killed."

Camp residents have learned to anticipate the imposition of curfews on days marking Palestinian national occasions or the commemoration of nationalist events. However, because curfewed populations are not told how long a curfew will last, residents live in a state of constant uncertainty. They have no means of knowing how to ration food supplies or if existing stocks will be sufficient for the duration of curfew. Nor can they predict when normal life will resume.

Punishments for breaking curfew are numerous. In Jalazon, residents reported that

Curfew Imposed Over Jalazon

"At 5:00am on Saturday 5 March 1988, a large number of soldiers laid siege to Jalazon camp. They were ferried in by helicopters and dropped around the camp to ensure that it was completely surrounded and sealed off. Then, using loudspeakers, the army imposed a curfew on Jalazon. The rest of the force, which consisted of approximately 2,000 soldiers, entered the camp and began breaking into houses in the most violent way, ransacking homes, smashing wooden doors and windows, and strewing around clothes and mattresses....Many youths were taken and summarily beaten, denied even the time to put on their shoes or get dressed. Many were almost naked and barefoot. They were taken to the schoolyard, blindfolded and with their hands tied behind their backs, were kept there for the entire day. Some clashes erupted between soldiers and the parents of the youths during the raids on the houses. The soldiers attacked and beat the fathers, mothers, and sisters of those who were arrested."

- excerpt of report compiled by Jalazon Refugee Camp residents, published by al-Haq, Punishing a Nation, Ramallah: al-Haq, 1988, p.220.

persons caught defying curfew are commonly beaten before given a chance to explain the reasons for leaving their homes. Curfew breakers are also frequently detained at the military post above the camp for periods ranging from several hours to several days. During this time they are subject to further beatings and other forms of abuse, such as being forced to remain in physically difficult positions for hours in the hot sun/cold and rain, or chanting slogans demeaning to themselves and Palestinian leaders. A number of residents in the survey received heavy fines, some exceeding NIS1,000, as a penalty for breaking curfew. Those unable to pay fines were detained for longer periods. In the Gaza Strip camp, where soldiers more regularly resort to gunfire, interviewees reported that shooting curfew breakers as a punishment is second only to that of beating. Fewer incidents of curfew breakers being shot were reported in Jalazon, although at least one child in the camp was fatally shot outside his home when soldiers attempted to impose curfew.⁹ In both camps, the unpredictable and arbitrary nature of punishment means that the curfewed population is, in effect, under a constant threat of death.

Despite the severity of curfew enforcement, curfew orders are frequently resisted. In both camps, there have been numerous instances when the military resorted to tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to force protesting residents into their homes. Defiance in the form of mass demonstrations was particularly common during the first year of the uprising, and has continued, on a lesser scale, throughout the three-year period studied. On 20 November 1990, for instance, hundreds of Shati residents demonstrated in defiance of curfew; soldiers opened live fire on the protesters, injuring seven.¹⁰

3.2 Cut-off of Basic Supplies and Services

Curfew severs access to supplies and services essential to the community's livelihood.

Families are forced to rely on whatever food they have in store. Additionally, soldiers deliberately destroy food supplies and prevent the acquisition and distribution of basic supplies during breaks in curfew. The curtailment of utility services as well as basic sanitation and health services further intensifies the hardships experienced under curfew.

Blocking access to food and basic supplies

Accounts of soldiers deliberately destroying food stocks were given by a number of interviewees. Fifty-kilogramme sacks of flour, rice, sugar, and other food basics are spilled onto the floor and trampled on, rendering them unusable. In some instances, soldiers even go so far as to mix foods --sugar is mixed with rice, for example, or oil or milk is dumped into flour stocks. At least 6% of those households interviewed had food supplies spoiled one or more times while under curfew. In Jalazon Refugee Camp, residents also described cases in which soldiers had deliberately killed livestock used by families to supplement their diet. Rabbits, pigeons, chickens, and goats were asphyxiated when soldiers fired tear gas into livestock shelters. The destruction of food supplies exacerbates the already difficult situation most families face when people depend for days or even weeks at a time solely on food stocks they have stored within the house. Even when curfew regulations are temporarily relaxed and if supplies are available within the camp, many families are short of monetary resources and are therefore unable to replenish their stocks. Supplies in stores have also been destroyed by marauding soldiers. During the 40-day curfew in Jalazon in March 1988, for example, the army destroyed a number of stores and their stocks, as well as a petrol station in the camp.¹¹ If a curfew lasts more than three or four days, the army usually announces the lifting of curfew for several hours to allow camp residents to replenish food and fuel stocks. These brief respites are

Jalazon Residents Describe 40-Day Curfew

26 March, 1988 - *"After the curfew was imposed the army raided homes throughout the night, ordered residents outdoors, beat them, and forced them to clean the streets. During the curfew the army took the following measures:*

- The electricity supply to the camp was disconnected.*
- No food was allowed into the camp.*
- Any food being carried by residents was destroyed by soldiers.*
- Soldiers spoiled dough by stepping on it and prevented women from going to neighbourhood ovens to bake their bread.*
- There was a shortage of flour, vegetables, and milk for infants.*
- There was a shortage of fuel, gas, and kerosene, which caused the residents to spend cold and dark nights.*

After the curfew had been in effect for five days the residents were allowed to leave their homes for one hour. By this time, however, all refrigerated foodstuffs, such as meat, fish and dairy products had spoiled because of the electricity cut. A delegation from 'Peace Now' came to the camp and lodged a protest with the authorities about the ill-treatment of the residents of the camp. When the delegation arrived the army immediately changed its behaviour. They allowed the inhabitants of the camp to leave their homes and permitted an UNRWA truck to deliver bread to the residents. As soon as the delegation left, however, the soldiers quickly and violently forced the residents back into their homes, destroyed foodstuffs, chased women with their jeeps, and prevented the distribution of the bread which had been delivered by UNRWA."

3 April, 1988 - *"The curfew on the Jalazon camp is still in force, and it is now also a closed military area, which journalists cannot enter. Local and foreign journalists are prevented from getting near the camp. The people are subjected to the army's violence and brutality on a daily basis, which includes the firing of tear gas canisters into homes. This practice has caused medical complications for young children and the elderly. Furthermore, the army is prohibiting the transportation of the wounded to hospitals. Because the electricity supply continues to be disconnected by the military authorities, the women of the camp have been baking bread on an open flame instead of in an oven. Whenever soldiers see women baking bread, they fire tear gas at them. The starvation policy has reached a point where the army is destroying chickens, rabbits, pigeons, and goats by asphyxiating them with tear-gas. Since the beginning of the curfew, no food or other items necessary for subsistence have been allowed into the camp, and the stores are completely empty. Essential items such as flour, vegetables, meat, milk, and fuel have been completely depleted. The residents of the camp are only allowed out of their homes one hour every two days, but there is absolutely nothing to buy...."*

Excerpted from a report compiled by Jalazon Refugee Camp residents during the 16 March - 25 April 1988 curfew, as translated by al-Haq, Punishing a Nation, Ramallah: al-Haq, 1988, pp.222-223.

generally granted every two or three days, but may be granted as infrequently as once every week or ten days. The two-to-three hour period rarely allows residents a sufficient amount of time to acquire provisions, seek necessary medical treatment, and complete other essential household tasks. This is particularly true in the Gazan refugee camp where supplies must be procured for over 46,000 people during curfew reprieves lasting no more than a couple of hours.

During breaks in curfew residents may leave their homes but not the camp itself. As a result, particularly during extended curfews, the acquisition of supplies is further complicated by the depletion of food and fuel stocks within the camp. During the 40-day curfew in Jalazon, cooking gas, for example, could not be found either in the houses or in the stores. Residents described how they had to gather old torn rags and burn them underneath a piece of tin so as to bake their bread and warm themselves. Because electricity was also cut for the duration of this curfew, supplies of fresh food items and dairy products requiring refrigeration were lost to spoiling. Additionally, the army often uses curfew breaks to further harass and intimidate residents and may even directly interfere with food distribution. For example, residents described incidents in which soldiers fired tear gas and even live ammunition just prior to and/or during curfew reprieves. Incidents in which soldiers threatened, beat, or arrested residents, or destroyed food and other goods during reprieves were also recorded in the survey.

In both camps, curfew has also interfered with UNRWA's monthly distribution to refugee families classified as special hardship cases and with UNRWA's supplementary feeding programmes.¹² The army has also prevented UNRWA and other relief organisations from distributing emergency food provisions to curfewed camp residents on a number of

occasions. For instance, on 17 April 1988 the army turned back an UNRWA convoy carrying emergency food supplies to Jalazon residents under curfew for the 32nd consecutive day on grounds that the food "could trigger further unrest".¹³

"Left without electricity and cooking fuel, women in the camp are cooking on fires made with branches and scraps of cardboard. Residents say they have even resorted to burning old shoes and pieces of furniture."

"They say there have been no supplies of fresh meat, poultry, and dairy products. The power cut has made it impossible to refrigerate anything. Houses are lit at night by lamps fuelled with dwindling supplies of kerosene."

- description of Jalazon Refugee Camp on 19 April 1988, after over a month of continuous curfew, as reported in the Jerusalem Post, 20 April 1991.

Like food and fuel stocks, access to medical supplies is also severely restricted by curfew. Families are less likely, however, to stock ample medical supplies in the same manner that they have become accustomed to with other basic items. Medical supplies are expensive, and illness --unlike hunger-- is not generally planned for. Moreover, while foods supplies are sometimes clandestinely shared amongst neighbours or distributed by popular committees, medical supplies are less available to the population at large.

Curtailement of health and sanitation services
Basic services are also disrupted by curfew. Immediate access to health services, for instance, is nearly impossible. Those requiring medical help generally attempt to gain

permission to leave their homes by summoning passing military patrols or breaking curfew to reach a telephone or doctor in the camp. Those who reach soldiers lose vital time attempting to convince them that medical care is necessary. In each camp surveyed, over one third of the cases in which residents required medical treatment while under curfew involved the delay or denial of access to medical services. Curfew also interrupts regular health care and nutritional services, a particular problem for members of the community with special health needs such as pregnant women, new-borns, mentally and physically disabled persons, and the chronically ill. (See Section 4.1.)

Additionally, curfew restrictions completely stop, or under the best of circumstances, seriously curtail sanitation services, which are normally provided by UNRWA staff. Garbage collection, insect/rodent control, latrines and drainage canals, are among the sanitation services which are seriously obstructed during

curfews.

Cutting utilities

The military periodically takes deliberate measures to cut water, as well as electricity, and/or telephone services. During the 5 March curfew over Jalazon in 1988, soldiers intentionally cut off water supplies by polluting water tanks with tear gas or puncturing them with bullets. Electricity was cut off at night, sending the camp into darkness and preventing people from watching television or listening to radios.¹⁴ During the 40-day curfew, electricity to the camp was cut the first day and remained off the duration of the curfew. According to residents, the most devastating effect of this prolonged electricity cut was the spoiling of meat, milk, and other foodstuffs requiring refrigeration. Children complained that the cut denied them one of the few forms of entertainment available during curfew -- television. Adults complained that they were unable to listen to the radio, their primary

"My first brush with the nightmare. As we reach the end of a night-patrol (the patrols to ensure nobody tries to rescue their dying crops), we spy a family bringing in a bucket of tomatoes. Suddenly our jeep springs into action, chasing this family as if the very future of our country depends on it. We corner them. All are told to report to the commanding officer. They tell us they have no food, are simply starving to death and had no choice. At which point the old woman, 90 years old, falls to her knees, kisses my hand, and begs me not to send her away. 'We really needed tomatoes,' she tells me.

Another scenario from the other side of hell. Patrolling in the fields we spot a young boy coming out of the orchard. Two soldiers run after him, at which point he throws his hands up and says, 'Don't shoot me.' His identity card shows him to be nine years old. Same story: 'I'm hungry and came to collect apples.'

...Meanwhile, the doctor of the town, who practically runs from house to house, tells me there's dysentery in Qabatia. When I mention this to one of my officers, he tells me that if they stop throwing stones they won't have dysentery."

- from the diary of reserve soldier Jonathan Kestenbaum serving in Qabatia during a prolonged curfew, as published in the Jerusalem Post Magazine, 16 September 1988.

source of news. Their sense of isolation was further exacerbated when the single telephone line to the camp was also cut. The loss of this telephone line severed one of the last remaining links to the outside world and prevented residents from alerting the media or UN officials about military activities, health emergencies, or the general welfare of the camp community. Water supplies in several neighbourhoods of the camp were also severed during the same curfew leaving families without sufficient supplies for drinking, cooking, and washing.¹⁵

"I was in Jalazon. It had been under curfew for twenty days. At a certain stage the area commander, Avram Mitzna, decided that it was not right for us to be out in the rain while the Arabs were at home watching television. He wanted some symmetry. So he decided to cut off their electricity supply. It was considered legitimate because they have not learned their lesson."

- Ronit Matalon, "The Wild West," *Ha'aretz*, 11 March 1988 translated in Jerusalem Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, Report on the Violation of Human Rights in the Territories During the Uprising, 1988, p.13.

3.3 Campaign of Terror

According to survey findings, the imposition of curfew is regularly accompanied by a systematic campaign of terror whereby the army deploys a variety of humiliating and brutal measures against the refugee camp population.¹⁶ Because this campaign occurs inside the "walls" of an imprisoned camp, it remains largely invisible to the outside world. Nonetheless, military personnel confirm that it is practical, if not official military policy, to intimidate and harass curfewed populations:

In an interview conducted by al-Haq with Israeli reserve soldiers, one soldier involved in enforcing the 40-day curfew on Jalazon stated that he had shot a pregnant woman in the stomach with a round of rubber bullets because she refused to enter her home. He also stated that he belonged to an elite unit whose responsibility it was to intimidate and harass the population, for example, by jumping up and down on people's roofs and banging on windows with clubs so that residents would keep them closed. Asked if he felt he was violating army regulations, the soldier stated that it was his impression that units could do whatever they felt was necessary to enforce the curfew, and that furthermore no member of his unit had been charged with any offence.¹⁷

During curfews in the period covered by the survey, Jalazon and Shati residents were subjected to mass round-ups, collective and gratuitous humiliation, the spiteful firing of sound bombs, barrages of rubber and plastic bullets as well as live gunfire, systematic ransacking of houses, and physical attacks on family members of all ages. The measures most frequently cited by interviewees are described below.

House raids

Army raids on houses during curfew are so frequent that children from the survey population often included them in their standard definitions of curfew. All but two households out of the entire survey of 199 had been raided under curfew.¹⁸ Moreover, of these 197 households, all but fourteen,¹⁹ or 93% of the total survey, were raided not once, but three or more times, during curfew. Over 54% of the households recorded more than five instances of army raids. According to one interviewee living near a military watch tower at the edge of Jalazon Refugee Camp, his family rarely spends a day under curfew

without soldiers raiding their home "at least once". "There are instances," he added, "when the army has descended on our house two or three times in one day."

Raids vary considerably in scope and intensity. They may involve three to four soldiers or as many as several dozen. They may last a matter of minutes, or continue for several hours. Often raids involve "security" searches for people --ie. someone who has broken curfew or is wanted by the military authorities for political activity, or someone refusing to pay taxes; or for items --ie. illegal objects such as Palestinian flags or political communiques. Sixty houses in Jalazon and 28 in Shati were subject to house searches on one or more occasions while under curfew. Curfews are sometimes implemented primarily to facilitate arrests. During curfew on 5 March 1988, for instance, raiding Israeli troops arrested at least 46 people in Jalazon camp.²⁰ Within the survey, 11% of the households have been subject to arrest raids under curfew.²¹ Parents and children, particularly younger children, expressed considerable fear regarding the safety of their sons/elder brothers.

Raids are further characterised by violence; windows and doors are smashed, furniture broken, food supplies are intentionally spoiled, and family members of all ages are verbally abused, physically beaten, and/or tear-gassed.²²

Beating

According to the UNRWA camp director in Jalazon, "beating is a systematic policy during curfew."²³ Soldiers attack and beat family members either separate from or in coordination with search operations. 48% of Shati families and 25% of the Jalazon families reported that one or more members of the household were beaten during raids. Among those injured as a result of beatings was a 20-year-old youth from Shati who, having sustained a broken arm, was refused permission to seek medical treatment by the army.²⁴

Generally, when soldiers attack one family member, other family members, attempting to protect the victim(s), quickly find themselves subject to similar or more brutal treatment; soldiers become indignant when families dare

"...there were signs of genuine excitement by some soldiers at the prospect of 'teaching them not to raise their heads.' ...The humiliation goes on all the time....Today a new vulgarity. There seems to be a kind of obscene competition among the standing army units to see who is the most feared.

Nahal arrived for 3 hours of 'support' as they called it. For one afternoon they ran about the town looking to impose the curfew and beating anyone they could find....Among the soldiers [there is] a depressing routine of wild abandon. Everybody here makes up their own rules. The young officers see our job as some kind of game and their behaviour ranges from callousness to pure sadism....The reaction among the soldiers is frightening. They have almost become de-sensitised to the human misery around them...The Golani youngsters are particularly trigger happy and shoot at any provocation."

- from the diary of reserve soldier Jonathan Kestenbaum serving in Qabatia during a prolonged curfew as published in the *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 16 September 1988.

to resist rather than passively watch while children, siblings, parents, or even grandparents are beaten. In order to avoid interference, soldiers often drag one member of the family outside to be beaten in isolation. One 40-year-old man from Shati, a father of 11 children, for example, was taken from his house and severely beaten on three separate occasions when the camp was under curfew. Beatings are also used as a punitive measure against curfew violators. Additionally, collective beatings are a common feature of group round-ups.

Tear gas, sound bombs, rubber and metal bullets, and live ammunition

Survey findings indicate that soldiers routinely use weapons to enforce curfew and to harass and intimidate the curfewed camp population. Resulting injuries are particularly serious given the difficulties in gaining access to emergency medical treatment. Patrolling soldiers habitually fire tear gas into narrow camp streets, house courtyards, and, at times, directly into houses, particularly if residents are spotted in the courtyard or on the roof. Just over 10% of the households in Jalazon and 5% in Shati were attacked with tear gas while confined to their homes.²⁵

Sound bombs are also set off at random or thrown directly at residents spotted by passing patrols. These explosions are particularly terrifying when unexpected. Beyond the initial shock of the noise, sound bombs also cause injury; in a number of cases Palestinians have been seriously burned.²⁶ Women, in particular, are popular targets for both tear gas and sound bombs. Jalazon residents reported that women are commonly harassed while hanging laundry or baking bread, a daily activity which provides families with one of the most essential staples of the Palestinian diet. Women often bake bread on open fires in the courtyards or on the rooftops of their homes (obligatory when electricity supplies are cut). The smoke from the wood fires alerts soldiers

who fire tear gas and sound bombs to intimidate the women and force them inside their homes.

Survey results further show that it is standard practice for soldiers to terrorise the curfewed population by randomly firing live ammunition. Firing at alleged curfew breakers is more frequent in Shati Refugee Camp, reflecting a general trend regarding the use of live fire in the Gaza Strip. In Jalazon, soldiers stationed in the ring of watch towers surrounding the camp often shower random fire on the houses below and sometimes use their vantage point to fire directly at curfew breakers. Within the survey population, the two cases in which actual injury was sustained due to gunfire during curfew both occurred in Jalazon. One girl was shot with a rubber bullet while in the courtyard of her home. In the second incident, a girl was shot with a rubber bullet while near the camp market during a curfew reprieve. In several other cases soldiers fired rubber bullets and live ammunition directly into houses from the streets, from watch towers, or from neighbouring rooftops, or while launching house raids.

Vandalism and theft

Property damage is a regular occurrence under curfew. Forty per cent of the Jalazon households sustained property damage as a result of army raids under curfew, while in Shati 19% of the households were vandalised. In several cases, soldiers have also stolen household property. For example, during a house-to-house search following the imposition of curfew over Jalazon on 5 March, 1988, soldiers stormed houses terrifying residents, smashing through doors, breaking furniture and television sets, and stole gold jewelry or money in at least two separate incidents. Soldiers also broke into shops, smashing windows, and stealing merchandise.²⁷

In one typical raid on a house in Jalazon Refugee Camp, soldiers banged on the door of

a home, burst in, breaking the door and windows. Having forced their way in, the patrol wiped their muddy boots on the curtains and carpets. In the ensuing search, the entire house was turned upside down. Soldiers dumped clothes out of the closet, threw mattresses on the floor, slit open settees, and mixed food stocks. In this particular incident, soldiers also beat the mother of the family when she tried to protect her teenage son from soldiers who were beating him.

Group round-ups

Survey records show that the practice of forcing camp residents, generally males between the ages of 14 and 60, to gather in a specified location where they are subject to a variety of collective measures ranging from humiliation to brutal physical abuse is standard during curfew. Round-ups are implemented on a neighbourhood-wide or camp-wide basis, generally depending on the number of soldiers deployed in the area. After ordering residents to congregate in a specified place, soldiers launch house-to-house searches to ensure that all those included in the order respond; those who fail to obey orders risk arrest, the confiscation of their identity cards, and/or becoming the target of especially brutal treatment during the round-up.

In a typical round-up in Jalazon Refugee Camp, approximately 70 men were forced to assemble in the camp's school, which had been taken over by the army. The detainees were subject to brutal interrogation throughout the day. Nasser Sa'ad al-Qatami was among those singled out for "special" treatment. Soldiers took him from among the group gathered at the school, blindfolded and handcuffed him, and then tied him to the back of an army jeep. The jeep drove around, first accelerating and then stopping quickly; the suddenness of the stop jerked Nasser's head, causing it to bang repeatedly against the back of the jeep.²⁸ Round-up victims are often ordered to perform demeaning tasks --like cleaning the

streets of road barricades or painting over nationalist graffiti on camp walls; or humiliating acts --such as jumping like dogs and making animal sounds. A Jalazon resident described a typical round-up of this sort. In February 1989 while the camp was under curfew, soldiers came to his neighbourhood at 11:30 at night and ordered all men between 16 and 60 years to come out of their houses. About 30 men were gathered in the street. It was raining heavily. The men were ordered to sweep the muddy streets clean. Following this futile task, the men were ordered to sit in a crouched position under the rain for some five or six hours. Throughout the night they were subject to intermittent beatings and forced to perform humiliating acts for the amusement of the troops, including singing praises to particular patrols, singing the Israeli national anthem, and repeating curses against Palestinian leaders or against themselves. The men were not released until dawn the following morning.

Gratuitous harassment

Gratuitous harassment is a standard element of interviewees' curfew descriptions. In addition to the forms of harassment mentioned above in connection with group round-ups, soldiers frequently harass residents with identity card inspections and/or temporary card confiscations.²⁹ The confiscation of identity cards is often used to force people to clear roadblocks, remove Palestinian flags, or paint over political graffiti on street walls; soldiers refuse to return the cards until their orders have been obeyed. Identity card checks and orders to paint over political graffiti were most frequent in the West Bank camp where 18% of the households reported that they had been subjected to identity card checks during curfew raids, and 10% related incidents when they had been forced by raiding soldiers to paint over graffiti. The corresponding figures for Shati were 3% and 6% respectively.

According to interviewees, soldiers also make

"Collective punishment: The shabab [youths] have taken to spreading nails on the streets to puncture tyres. Today when two officers' jeeps were punctured, the entire population of that street was hauled out of homes and made to clear the streets. Under the steely eye of armed soldiers, elderly women and five-year-old children clear rotting garbage out of the gutter."

- from the diary of reserve soldier Jonathan Kestenbaum serving in Qabatia during a prolonged curfew, as published in the Jerusalem Post Magazine, 16 September 1988.

a habit of jumping on roof tops and banging on doors and windows to frighten residents imprisoned inside. In addition, the army continually uses its loudspeakers to threaten and abuse residents. Following mass arrests during a curfew over Jalazon, for example, soldiers broadcast a statement in the name of the Civil Administration claiming that the curfew and arrests had been carried out in order to protect the camp residents from an irresponsible minority. The residents were warned that cooperation with this "riotous minority" would only threaten their security and that of their children and that protest activities would only result in further arrests, beatings, and destruction.³⁰

Women in particular are targets of curses and insults broadcast over loudspeakers from patrolling military jeeps. Announcements often carry sexual innuendos and threats aimed to insult the Palestinian community's code of honour. Among the phrases women in Jalazon camp are frequently subject to are: "All you women in the camp and all your sisters are *sharameet* [=bitches or prostitutes]," and "You women need Arafat to come and fuck you."

House demolitions and sealings

Curfews are customarily imposed when houses are being either sealed or demolished on alleged "security" grounds.³¹ The imposition of curfew and the speed with which the operation is carried out preclude any possibility of appealing, protesting or publicising the demolition orders. A typical demolition begins when a large contingent of soldiers arrive at the camp and declare curfew. The targeted family is then handed the demolition order and given an hour or less to pack their belongings before the house is blown up. Similar procedures are followed in sealing operations. Curfew slows news of the impending operation from reaching the community or the wider public, prohibits the presence of the media or international personnel, and thwarts efforts on the part of the camp residents to protest the action.

From the start of the uprising in December 1987 through 31 December 1990, 25 houses in Jalazon Refugee Camp were demolished in this manner. Six other houses were unintentionally destroyed by the explosives used in an operation nearby.³² Ten houses in the camp were sealed. In Shati Refugee Camp, the military demolished five homes and sealed four others.

3.4 Passing Time under Curfew

By confining people to small and overcrowded quarters (averages exceed nine and seven people in a three-room house in surveyed households in Shati and Jalazon respectively) curfew forces the immobilised population into a state of inactivity similar to that suffered by imprisoned inmates. Curfew days are characterised by a grinding monotony. Family members of all ages are prevented from pursuing their normal daily activities, whether these be work, study, or play. Furthermore, there is no possibility of seeking alternative means of occupying their time. Under normal circumstances, most family members spend the majority of their waking hours outside the

home; space as well as productive and entertainment resources are generally limited within households. Hour after hour, and day after day are spent simply waiting for curfew to lift and the tedium to break. On top of this boredom, people are forced to grapple with the ever present fear of military attack.

Young children (through 12 years)

Streets are the primary play space for children in refugee camps since the cramped quarters in most houses do not have space for active games. Trapped inside, children's normal patterns of activity are abruptly curtailed. According to the survey results, in contrast to their high level of activity under normal circumstances, children under curfew spend most of their time in highly passive activities. Indeed, the most commonly cited activity for children is sleeping. When not sleeping, children are most apt to do no more than sit and watch, often engaging in only the most limited interaction with those around them. Children sit staring out windows or through the slats of closed shutters as soldiers move through their neighbourhood; or they sit for hours in front of television screens --if electricity has not been cut. Or, children simply sit. One mother in Shati Refugee Camp explained: "My children never leave me during curfew, wherever I am, they are there sitting beside me."

Attempts to read or do schoolwork are encouraged by parents and older siblings, many of whom try to help young children with their studies. However, parents reported that it is extremely difficult to engage their children in studies because of the anxiety-ridden atmosphere. (See also Section 4.2 below.) A number of parents also observed that in their idleness, children spend more time eating than they would under normal circumstances. Children's increased appetites are an added pressure on parents already coping with food shortages resulting from curfew.

Attempts at play in cramped and overcrowded rooms (largely void of the indoor toys typically found in Western households) often turn destructive. With no means of releasing their normal youthful energies, let alone the fears and nervous energy created by the curfew situation, children turn to rough-housing, jumping up and down on and damaging household furniture and items. Many interviewees remarked that "the only game the children have during curfew is to fight with each other all the time." Often parents end up demanding that their children resume passive activities in order to avoid more damage.

Household conflicts often erupt as a result of children's unwillingness to accept curfew restrictions. A number of parents expressed frustration at the difficulty of trying to control their normally active children. Many feared that their children would be shot, beaten, detained, or cause the physical punishment, imprisonment, or imposition of fines on other members of the family. Children, unaware of the dangerous situation outside their homes, frequently rebel against parental controls. Children within the survey spoke of their longing to escape their cramped quarters and some outlined their attempts to sneak outside. Many of the younger children simply do not understand the restrictions placed on them; parents describe repeated arguments ending in children's frustrated tears. Some parents reported that they had to physically prevent their children from going outside by blocking the doors. One father, surrounded by half a dozen children, told a Jalazon field researcher that after paying a NIS1,000 fine when one of his sons was caught breaking curfew, he had been forced to sit and guard the door throughout the duration of every curfew in order to prevent his children from escaping again; he could not afford a second fine.

The few active games children do play during curfew usually involve reenactments of the fear and violence which characterise the situations in which they find themselves. The "curfew game", for example, was described by a number of families. In this game children hide in the house, curfew is declared, and siblings assigned the role of soldiers carry out mock raids in search of them.

Teenagers (13-18 years)

Teenagers also spend the majority of their time either sleeping or watching television. They are more likely, however, to help with household work than their younger siblings. Teenage girls spend time helping their mothers cleaning and cooking. They also embroider or unravel old sweaters and use the yarn to knit new styles or sizes. Teenage boys tend to busy themselves in household repairs or improvements, or in playing cards. Both male and female teenagers are more likely to study than their younger siblings or spend time reading, particularly the *Qur'an*. Few are able to read for more than short periods, however, because of difficulties in concentrating under the strain of curfew conditions.

Teenagers are more successful at evading parental attempts to keep them at home. If the situation allows, young men, in particular, often escape to visit neighbours where they socialise or play cards. Males between 13 and 18 are also the most likely to defy curfews and confront the army in street demonstrations. Additionally, they are the most frequent targets of military violence and arrest. Probability of the latter heightens the restlessness of male youth during curfew; those who know they are sought by the military often hide in the homes of friends or relatives, rather than staying with their family. Families are particularly fearful for this age group (both parents and siblings are extremely protective towards young men during curfews); in the event of a house raid, family members instinctively form a

protective circle in order to block soldiers from reaching their young men.

Adults

Like their children, adults sleep much more frequently during curfew. Housework, undertaken almost exclusively by women, becomes more difficult and time-consuming because of curfew restrictions. These burdens are increased by the presence of children, who are constantly underfoot and require close supervision lest they attempt to leave the house. Moreover, men are not used to spending time at home; for both men and women this adjustment often aggravates household tensions. Generally, men spend their waking hours playing cards, or watching television. Some also do repair or improvement work in the house. Both men and women fill time by listening to news broadcasts on the radio -- one of the only remaining means of connecting with the world outside of curfew.

Many men, particularly those living on the edges of the camp, attempt to escape curfew in order to work. Driven by economic necessity, they must often remain outside of the camp for the duration of the curfew.

I used to leave the camp early in the morning during the curfew and work all day in Ramallah. I would return after nightfall [when curfew tends to be less stringent] if I could. Otherwise I had to sleep in the mosque in Ramallah....I had to leave the camp to work, it was an economic necessity. I had to feed my wife and children.

Men must thus constantly weigh economic necessity with the risk of breaking curfew; according to survey results soldiers occasionally fire at people caught outside their homes, or in the best case, fine them up to several thousand shekels (often more than their average monthly wage).

The activities or, perhaps more accurately, general inactivity of family members of all ages reflects the apathy which arises from the tedium and boredom of curfew routine, on the one hand, and the restlessness and anxiety which arise from the constant fear of army attack on the other. Every household contains a multitude of crossfiring emotions, resulting in serious psychological strains on both individuals and family units.

3.5 Psychological Trauma

The curfew survey shows the psychological impact of curfews to be varied and multi-dimensional. Both children and adults are subject to considerable psychological stress under curfew. Prolonged confinement in cramped quarters, often accompanied by food shortages, denial of electricity and water, the frequent sound of shooting and sound bombs, and the continual fear of attack by raiding soldiers, give rise to a range of anxiety-ridden emotions. Despite the anxiety and fear, however, both children and adults insisted that curfew and the accompanying measures of repression strengthen their resolve to withstand the Israeli occupation. In the survey, expressions of fear, weariness, and resignation were counter-balanced by statements like "Morales [under curfew] were high" and:

We know why they [the soldiers] impose curfew. It is in order to destroy our morale and we will not give them the pleasure of achieving this.

Sources of psychological stress under curfew

The sources of psychological stress under curfew are numerous. House confinement and the sense of deep isolation which stems from it are usually compounded by a number of additional measures including the sealing of camp entrances and/or cutting electricity and telephone lines. The resulting prison-like situation of enforced confinement, particularly when prolonged, generates serious psychological pressures which are known to

result in physiological symptoms.³³ The imprisonment is aggravated by the complete disruption of daily life.

Moreover, heavy army surveillance and the threat of violence which accompany curfew exacerbate the psychological pressures associated with confinement. The mere presence of the soldiers in the camps day and night, for example, was described in the survey as "humiliating" and a "constant source of provocation". Jalazon camp is surrounded by five army watch towers, as well as one large army encampment situated on the hillside overlooking the camp; soldiers maintain round-the-clock surveillance of camp residents from these vantage points. Further intensifying the psychological pressure on Jalazon residents, the army has installed huge search lights throughout the camp which are turned on nightly. In Shati, the army is permanently established at a centre inside the camp boundaries. Patrols set off day and night from this stronghold.

Palestinian psychiatrist and head of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, Dr. a-Sarraj reports that curfews, alongside other repressive measures by the Israelis during the uprising, have given rise to a variety of domestic problems including "violence at home, apathy, depression, phobias, bedwetting, and nightmares".

- Paper presented by Dr. 'Iyad a-Sarraj to "Children of War Conference," 24-28 June 1990, Freud Centre, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

The army's continuous and highly visible surveillance underscores the vulnerability of camp residents during curfew. Surveillance rapidly transforms into very real physical threats against the camp population. The

powerlessness of residents under this constant state of siege commonly translates into a strong sense of humiliation which soldiers regularly exploit with arbitrary and gratuitous harassment. This combination of threat and actual physical and psychological violence leads to serious emotional turmoil within the curfewed population.

Children

Unaccustomed to indoor restrictions, children quickly become frustrated, angry, and bored during curfews. They want to go outside and see their friends and are often confused about the reasons why they are imprisoned in their homes. Even very young children described feelings of entrapment. One Jalazon mother commented: "They [my children] are strangled by the limited space in which they have to play."

Many parents expressed deep concern about the negative psychological consequences their children suffer as a result of growing up in such circumstances. Many feel that the cumulative effect of frequent and prolonged curfews, compounded by the general conditions of occupation, deny their children --regularly prohibited from the most basic of children's activities, such as playing freely outdoors or even in the courtyard-- their childhood. In Jalazon, soldiers who caught a four-year-old child playing in her courtyard warned the family to keep her inside, and threatened to shoot her if she was caught again.

School closures are particularly disruptive for children. Under curfew, familiar school routines, known to be an important source of comfort and stability for children, are replaced by a monotonous pattern of inactivity. The closure of schools also cuts them off from regular interactions with children their own age.

Insecurity is further compounded by the siege-like atmosphere to which children are subjected. With schools closed, their playgrounds forbidden territory, and their homes full of tensions and under constant threat of attack, children are robbed of any haven of security. Children are quick to pick up their parents' anxieties and are also directly frightened by the army and the threat of house raids. Under curfew, home not only becomes a prison; its sanctity is also violated. Children are forced to watch as the army invades their homes and humiliates and brutalises parents and siblings. They too may fall prey to army violence. Survey results show house raids under curfew to be particularly traumatising. A mother in Shati offered a typical description of children's reactions to house raids:

I never saw my children scream and cry as they did when soldiers raided our house [while under curfew] and beat their father and older brother....Their eyes were filled with terror. Later, they would sit very quiet, usually not talking for an hour or two, still overcome with feelings of shock.

Parents cited numerous examples of behavioural abnormalities resulting from curfew. According to the survey, a number of children refused to leave their mother's side for the extent of the curfew. In other cases, children refused to sleep alone and/or suffered from repeated nightmares. A father in Jalazon, for example, reported that during curfew his five-year-old son repeatedly dreamt that the army demolished their home over the family's heads. Many parents noted that their children cry much more frequently during curfew than under normal circumstances. Increases in cases of bedwetting were also recorded in the survey. The survey further revealed that traumas associated with curfew leave many children

with a sense of partial or total disorientation. Children suffer from exhaustion, listlessness and passivity, accompanied by a general state of lethargy or sharp mood changes.

Children also adopt strange social patterns, including abnormally high unsociability, or even temporary spells of complete withdrawal. Aggressive behaviour is significantly higher during curfew as well. In family after family, parents reported an increase in the number and intensity of quarrels and fist fights among their children. A number of parents told field researchers that "wild and aggressive" behaviour under curfew makes it very difficult to deal with their children.

Survey results indicate that children old enough to link the deprivation and restrictions imposed on them to the military are likely to direct their anger and frustrations at soldiers. According to parents in the survey, children's hatred of soldiers intensifies as time spent under curfew increases.

Over time, the frequency of curfews has led many children to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the roots of curfew. Curfews, in this sense, are one of the most influential of the many experiences which serve to politicise Palestinian children from an early age. A large number of parents attribute increased political awareness of their children to curfew experiences. Older children frequently express a desire to share the burdens confronting their parents. One 15-year-old boy from Jalazon assured his parents in the presence of the interviewing field researcher: "When we grow up, we will fight against the soldiers and defeat them so that you won't have any more worries."

Survey responses show that some children have developed means of coping with the extraordinary conditions of curfew and, at least outwardly, have become more accustomed to curfews over time. Fear is

replaced by expressions of bravado, including play-acting defiance³⁴ and, in some cases, actual resistance (ie. breaking curfew, stone-throwing, demonstrating). At the same time, parents noted that for many children emotional stress and anxiety-ridden behaviour often increase with repeated and particularly prolonged curfews. Tensions inevitably mount the longer that people overcome with anxiety remain imprisoned inside their crowded homes with nothing to do. Familiarity with such conditions may allow for the development of coping mechanisms but does not necessarily lend itself to healthy adjustment. Indeed, the frequency of curfews has led some children to display abnormal curfew-related behaviours following the lifting of curfews due to continued disorientation or fears of recurring curfew.

Adults

According to fieldworkers, adults tend to focus their concerns on their children, often brushing aside or belittling the significance of the psychological toll they themselves sustain as a result of curfew. Interviewees generally maintained that curfew is easier for adults because they are more able to adjust to it and because they better understand the reasons behind it, particularly as they often view it as evidence that the occupation authorities are frightened by the uprising's success. Parents commonly expressed the sentiment: "For us [adults] it's a normal process, we worry about the kids."

Nonetheless, comments made by adults suggest that their sense of responsibility for the welfare of their children becomes a source of considerable anxiety and psychological pressure during curfews, when their ability to fulfill this responsibility is seriously undermined. Indeed, the overwhelming concern for the conditions which their children face, indicates a high level of psychological strain, associated with the uncertainty and fear of being unable to adequately provide for and

protect their children. "It is the worst feeling when you do not have food to feed your family," said a 36-year-old father of six children, voicing a feeling reiterated by parent after parent involved in the survey. A mother in Jalazon described the sense of utter deprivation and impotence which underscores most adult curfew experiences:

The worst part of curfew was when my child kept asking for a banana and I couldn't give it to him. All he wanted was a banana and I couldn't give it to him...and he couldn't understand why. It was horrible.

Survey responses indicate that psychological pressures escalate as economic uncertainties increase. This is particularly noticeable when economic consequences threaten to become long-term as a result of repeated and prolonged curfews. Economic pressures are particularly acute for the male head of the household whose social value and personal self-esteem are strongly linked to his ability to provide for his family.

Moreover, given the army violence regularly accompanying curfew, it is virtually impossible for parents to protect their children. During house raids in particular, parents can do little to prevent arrests, humiliation, or physical violence. Under such conditions, parents feel their worth is devalued in the eyes of their children. This feeling is also prevalent in instances when children witness soldiers humiliating or beating their parents. Parents are reduced to a position of helplessness where they are incapable of defending themselves or their home.³⁵ Consequently, amongst adults fear, anxiety, anger, and frustration are often accompanied by a sense of powerlessness, incompetence, humiliation, and worthlessness. A number of parents, for example, described losing their sense of self-esteem. "You feel you are forced to hate yourself and you are

less human than the soldiers," explained a father reflecting on his inability to provide for his family.

A number of adults also emphasised that the absence of control over their lives and the uncertainty regarding the future leave them feeling hopeless and unable to direct their energies usefully or find motivation to carry on. Feelings that life is "worthless", or "wasted", are accompanied by a sense of "dying slowly", being "slowly strangled", or the desperation of feeling "we cannot bear another day".

The comments made by adults in the survey reflect a keen sense of their own as well as their children's deprivation, particularly in terms of their inability to move about freely. The comparison of curfew to imprisonment was used by dozens of interviewees. "We are like animals put in a cage," explained one interviewee, capturing the degradation which accompanies this sense of deprivation. Even those adults who minimised the psychological impact of curfew, spoke largely in terms of "waiting out" the curfew --a state of immobility which is itself frequently characterised by a sense of anxiety and helplessness.

Adults' anxieties and frustrations influence their interactions with one another and with their children. Parents reported that, despite their best efforts, curfew situations usually leave them with less patience for each other and for their children; tempers flare quickly as half a dozen restless children and anxious adults try to accommodate each other in one or two small rooms. Close confinement makes the resolution of rising tensions especially difficult; there is nowhere to vent potentially explosive emotions except within the walls of their home-prison. Parents admitted that the situation often pushed them to the point of shouting, or even striking their children.

Overall, the survey responses of adults, and even older children, regarding the psychological implications of the compilation of frequent and prolonged curfew experiences reflected a tension between a stoic attempt to diminish the effects of curfew on the one hand, and a simultaneous desire to expose the intense psychological strain created by curfew on the other. The former arises from an understanding that curfew is a weapon designed to break their will to resist. Within this context, denying the psychological effects of curfew becomes an important act of resistance. This refusal to be defeated by curfew is a source of empowerment for the community. Other acts of resistance, such as defiance of curfew, particularly on an organised and collective basis, serve to further empower the besieged community. Respondents also claimed that the regularity of curfews has, in one sense, allowed them to adjust to the resulting conditions. Neither the indefinite nature of curfew (in terms of length, severity, accompanying measures, consequences), nor the insecurity which it creates, however, are lessened by familiarity. On the contrary, interviewees pointed out that the cumulative effect of frequent and prolonged curfew tends to increase resulting difficulties (eg. economic) which serve as major sources of psychological pressure under curfew. In this regard, preliminary survey findings indicate that the long-term psychological effects of such conditions, particularly if they continue unabated, may involve considerable damage to the mental health of the besieged community.

4. Attack on Community Infrastructure

Israeli curfew policy constitutes a direct assault on the regular functioning of society. Israel exploits the paralysis of civil life and general isolation created by curfew to undermine operations in the health, education, and economic sectors, and to destroy

autonomous Palestinian infrastructures which challenge its authority. Curfew thus severely compromises the general welfare of the community and damages its ability to develop independently.

4.1 Endangering Health

According to survey findings, the combination of food and medicine shortages, inadequate sanitation services, increased household tension, and army violence, severely compromise health of the people under curfew. Inaccessibility to both regular and emergency health services results in serious health complications, many of a long-term nature. Medical services are further disrupted by military harassment of health workers.

Disruption of emergency treatment

Survey results show that, in contravention of all international legal standards, curfew regularly disrupts access to emergency medical care. Amongst the two survey populations the military delayed the acquisition of medical treatment in at least 49 separate instances. A number of these delays resulted in serious medical complications, including at least one fatality.

In Jalazon Refugee Camp, 18 persons, or over 38% of the total number of those reporting health complications during curfew, sought and were denied immediate access to medical treatment. Of these, twelve persons were prevented from seeking medical treatment for several days or until curfew was lifted, including a nine-year-old boy who suffered a fractured arm when he jumped off a wall trying to escape from soldiers, and a woman who gave birth at home. In three cases, people were granted permission to seek medical assistance after delays of several hours and in one case, an ill child, originally prohibited from seeking treatment, reached hospital in an UNRWA vehicle. Two girls, aged nine and 12, suffering injuries as a result of live army gunfire, had to be smuggled out of the camp

Summary of Health Complications Reported in Curfew Survey

Health complaints documented in the survey included cases of illnesses arising during the curfew, chronic illnesses, home accidents, and army-inflicted injuries. Cases including women in labour and requiring medical aid were also included within the total number of health complication cases. In Shati Refugee Camp, 71% of the surveyed households reported at least one instance of health complications during curfew; the total number of such cases was 100 --an average of just under one case per household or over 10% of the survey population of Shati. Additionally, two members of the Shati survey population died during curfew as a result of health complications. In Jalazon, just under 48% of the households reported at least one instance in which a household member suffered health complications while under curfew; the total number of such cases reported was 48, or 6% of the surveyed population.

The elderly and children, particularly young children, suffer the highest frequency of health complications under curfew. The vast majority of the reported health problems in the two camps involved children under 16 years; of these, most cases concerned children five years or under. The remaining cases predominantly involved adults aged 50 and over.

Gastroenteritis (diarrhea), considered one of the main causes of infant mortality in refugee camps, was the most frequently reported illness among children in the curfew survey. Throat and skin infections were also recorded, as were injuries resulting from home accidents. Children and pregnant women sustained the highest number of injuries and health complications inflicted by army-related activities. Amongst the elderly, the chronically ill most frequently suffered complications.

through the surrounding hills in order to get medical treatment.

In Shati, there were 29 cases in which medical attention was sought and denied or delayed. Additionally, two cases were reported in which women about to deliver were delayed by the army. In all, nearly one third of those reporting health complications under curfew, sought and were denied immediate access to medical treatment. Twenty-four of these cases were prevented from seeking medical assistance for the duration of the curfew. The remaining seven cases, including a woman in labour, involved delays ranging from several to 24 hours. The former group included a pregnant woman who was forced to give birth at home and the 60-year-old male with

chronic heart problems who died when his condition irreversibly deteriorated after having been denied permission to go to hospital.

The chronically ill are particularly vulnerable during curfews. In both Jalazon and Shati, a number of chronically ill people suffered serious complications after being denied access to care. For example, a family doctor verified that delay in treatment was the primary cause of death for the 60-year-old man mentioned above. His death followed several serious relapses sustained while he was confined to his home and unable to seek medical attention. In another case, a 53-year-old man suffering from hypertension lost consciousness due to a sharp rise in his blood

pressure. At least four people suffering from chronic hypertension faced serious delays when they sought medical attention. The survey also included the case of a 23-year-old mentally disabled man from Shati who was prevented from seeking medical treatment. The man, suffering from a severe tooth infection, spent the entire curfew in acute pain.

In several cases, access to medical treatment was only gained following the intervention of UNRWA, ICRC, or foreign personnel. People unable to acquire outside care used home remedies, secretly visited local health workers, and/or simply waited for a lift in curfew. In addition to suffering severe discomfort during curfew, a number of people developed serious health complications at a later stage as a result of delays in medical treatment. Furthermore, in instances where permission was given to the sick to get medical treatment outside the camp, no help was offered by the army to facilitate their transport.

"To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory....Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties."

- The Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Article 56

Disruption of regular health care and nutritional services

The most serious long-term effects of curfew on health conditions result from the frequent

and prolonged disruption of regular health care and nutritional services essential to the health of every community. Immunisation programmes, supplementary feeding programmes, regular check-up programmes for pregnant women and new-borns, care and rehabilitation programmes for the disabled, and regular check-up and care for the chronically ill are among the essential health services disrupted when a camp is placed under curfew. Health workers report that the constant interruption of these programmes will result in a number of long-term health problems.

As is the case with disruptions in emergency care, the chronically ill suffer the most when regular health care is curtailed. During curfew, chronically ill persons are prevented from receiving regular medical supervision, essential if their conditions are to remain stable. Diabetics, for example, who rely on drug therapy treatment and/or controlled diets are unable to receive the care they need or to purchase special foods for their diet.³⁶ At least 27 cases of health complications reported in the two camps were related to chronic illnesses.³⁷ In addition, two chronically ill people in Shati, including the 60-year-old man with a heart condition mentioned above, died following interference in receiving health care. The second case involved a woman suffering from both high blood pressure and a heart condition who died during curfew, her fragile health severely taxed by curfew conditions.

Shortages of medication for treatment of chronic illnesses such as hypertension and diabetes were reported in both camps. In Jalazon, for example, a wife and husband, both suffering from diabetes, were unable to acquire the medication they needed for several days due to curfew. The woman, aged 50, who suffered serious complications requiring hospitalisation, was delayed for two hours at an army checkpoint before she was

allowed to seek medical assistance. In another case, a 65-year-old Shati woman with a chronic heart condition suffered a heart attack while being evacuated to hospital. In Jalazon, a 60-year-old male with ulcers was prevented from seeking medical attention for three days. By the time curfew was lifted, his condition had deteriorated and he required 20 days of hospitalisation.

With the exception of chronically ill people, few persons in the survey even attempted to keep regular health care appointments. All of those who did were prevented from doing so. Among these was an eight-year-old boy who required follow-up treatment for a recent leg operation and an elderly man who was scheduled for a check-up and tests; both

missed their appointments.

Injuries resulting from army violence

Army brutality, a standard component of the general campaign of terror accompanying curfew, further jeopardises the health of curfewed community. Tear gas, clubs, rubber bullets, and live ammunition are all part of the standard arsenal employed by the Israeli army against Palestinians under curfew; all were used during curfew in both of the camps surveyed and were the cause of a number of serious injuries and health complications.

Incidents involving tear gas were the most frequently reported. Unlike other forms of ammunition, a single tear gas canister affects a large number of people simultaneously. As

Long-Term Effects of Curfew Disruption to Regular Health Care Services

- * "[M]edical personnel report that, clinically, they have observed an overall rise in the rate of infant mortality in the West Bank during 1988 and 1989. According to medical practitioners, this may be due to restrictions on movement, which have hampered pre-natal and post-natal care programmes" (al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege Ramallah: al-Haq, 1989, p.109).
- * Findings from a joint UNRWA-UNICEF study in the Gaza Strip on the treatment of persons with uprising-related disabilities at the Physiotherapy Emergency Programme reveal that between May 1988 and April 1990 over 27% of the patients were not able to receive regular treatment as a direct result of curfew and other restrictive Israeli measures and 14% discontinued treatment altogether (Ulrike Krammer, "Medical Study on the Physiotherapy Emergency Programme, Gaza Strip," June 1990, UNRWA/UNICEF, p.8).
- * UNRWA predicts that continued disruptions in immunisation programmes will "depress the high level of immunisation coverage sustained by the Agency over several years", leaving children increasingly vulnerable to diseases which were being progressively eradicated. According to Agency officials, frequent curfews and school closures have prevented mothers from reaching clinics with their infants for scheduled immunisations and kept school children from continuing with boosters and immunisations on time (UNRWA, "Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA 1 July 1988-30 June 1989," June 1989, p.24).

noted above, 10% and 5% of the households in Jalazon and Shati respectively were tear-gassed at least once while under curfew.³⁸

Tear gas exposure, particularly from close distances or within closed spaces, frequently requires medical treatment. UNRWA, for example, treated 316 tear gas-related casualties in a one-year period, including respiratory complications, miscarriages, and still births, in Shati Refugee Camp alone.³⁹

Within the survey population, three cases of significant health complications arising from tear gas were reported, all involving pregnant women.⁴⁰ In Jalazon, two pregnant women reported health complications after being exposed to tear gas; one, aged 26, miscarried and the other, aged 20, fell ill. A second miscarriage following tear gas exposure was reported in Shati.

Other army-induced injuries included three cases of shooting, two of which involved children, a nine-year-old girl shot in the leg and a 12-year-old girl shot in the spine; two cases of broken arms, one resulting from beatings and the second sustained by a nine-year-old boy who fell as he fled from soldiers; and a 20-year-old man from Shati who cut himself when soldiers forced him to clean the street of a roadblock built from old car parts. The latter bled for five hours when he was prevented from seeking medical treatment. Access to medical treatment was also delayed or denied in the other five cases cited above. The survey also included the case of a 17-year-old male from Jalazon who suffered kidney complications as a result of torture inflicted during previous interrogation. In addition, a 12-year-old girl who was outside her home when the army raided the camp and declared curfew severely burnt herself, when, in her rush to flee the area, she hit a nearby *falafel* [a cake made from deep-fried chickpeas] stand, spilling hot cooking oil over herself.

"Israeli military personnel...regularly discharge tear gas not only to quell demonstrations, but also as a means of punishment and harassment...When used improperly, tear gas is a lethal form of ammunition; hence practices such as throwing it into enclosed spaces or aiming it directly at individuals clearly violate the international principles of necessity and proportionality concerning law enforcement conduct" (al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege Ramallah: al-Haq, 1989, p.40).

"Al-Haq's documentation shows that the second highest percentage of deaths among women after live ammunition was due to tear gas asphyxiation. (Twenty-four percent of documented cases of killings among women)" (al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege, Ramallah: al-Haq, 1989, p.509).

"Researchers for this report [Save the Children, Sweden] collected a sample of 3,299 tear gas injury records and estimate that 10,600 to 13,200 children required medical treatment for tear gas-related injury during the two years under study...[including] 37 recorded tear gas-related deaths...of infants" (Anne Nixon et al., The Status of Palestinian Children during the Uprising in the Occupied Territories: Part 1(1), Sweden: Save the Children, 1990, p.xv).

General deterioration of health conditions

In addition to the serious consequences resulting from the frequent disruption of emergency, preventive, and rehabilitative health care, curfew, particularly when prolonged, produces *ipso facto*, a number of conditions detrimental to the general health of the community. Most prevalent among these are dietary deficiencies, decline in

Ala' Abu al-Foul, a 13-year-old boy from Shati Refugee Camp died shortly after his home was tear-gassed for the third time in two weeks. On 19 August 1988, the army fired tear gas at demonstrators near Ala's home. Ala', who was both mentally and physically disabled, developed serious respiratory distress and began frothing at the mouth. His family took him to the nearby clinic from where he was transferred to hospital as his situation continued to deteriorate. He died on 23 August (Anne Nixon et al., The Status of Palestinian Children during the Uprising in the Occupied Territories: Part 1(1), Sweden: Save the Children, 1990, p.181). According to family members, 65 tear gas canisters were later collected from the area around Ala's house.

sanitation, overcrowding, and stress. These conditions are especially damaging given the general deterioration in health standards since the uprising, particularly in the refugee camps where existing conditions were already responsible for serious health difficulties.⁴¹

Survey results suggest that difficulty in obtaining food supplies leads to dietary deficiencies, both in terms of quality and quantity of food intake. The diet described by interviewees in both camps was virtually uniform, reflecting the limited availability of staple foods customarily stored in Palestinian homes. The predictability of the diet under curfew was summed up by a resident in the West Bank camp: "Under curfew, we eat the regular curfew menu." Daily menus in both camps lacked fresh vegetables and fruits, as well as fresh meat. Most, if not all, of the households interviewed reported that they had experienced varying degrees of food shortages during curfew periods. The interruption of sanitation services in the camps, often already substandard due to poor sewage and water infrastructure, further aggravates the health situation under curfew.⁴²

Food shortages, poor sanitation, and confinement within crowded areas are all known to increase the spread and severity of contagious diseases. Gastroenteritis, for example, is the most frequent illness reported among children in the survey.⁴³ Essential to the treatment of diarrhea is a specially

controlled diet consisting primarily of liquids, vegetable soups, certain fruits (particularly bananas), and yogurt; all foods which are among those most likely to be in short supply during curfew. Likewise, proper sanitation, significantly compromised during curfew by reduced sanitation services and occasional contamination or interference in water supplies, is not only fundamental to preventing the spread of communicable diseases such as gastroenteritis, but is also an important component of any treatment programme. Failure to treat gastroenteritis results in serious, even fatal consequences.⁴⁴ At least one case reported in the survey required hospitalisation. Moreover, communicable diseases such as gastroenteritis are rapidly transmitted under the crowded conditions resulting from curfew.

"Medical practitioners reported an increase in malnutrition and infectious diseases among children in the occupied West Bank during 1989. Doctors explain that extended curfews and sieges have made it difficult for families to maintain proper nutrition or access to preventive health care."

- al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege
Ramallah: al-Haq, 1989, p.109.

The Typical "Curfew Diet"

Breakfast: fowl (a dip made from dried beans)
hoummus (a dip made from dried chick peas)
za'tar (dried thyme eaten with bread dipped in oil)
olives
olive oil
tea
(Cheese and jam were also less frequently included.)

Lunch: dried beans
rice
canned vegetables
(Some families also reported that they ate sardines when available.)

Supper: The final meal of the day invariably consisted of left-overs from the day's earlier meals.

The curfew diet in Shati Refugee Camp generally matched that of Jalazon, with minor variations. Za'tar (commonly grown in the West Bank), was not part of the diet. Additionally, a number of Shati households included eggs and canned beef in their daily menu; the latter was part of regular UNRWA rations.

Survey results record notable increases in the number of home accidents which occur during curfews.⁴⁵ According to parent interviewees, overcrowded conditions, children's restlessness, and high levels of tension all increase the risk of home accidents. Nine cases of home accidents under curfew were recorded in the survey; at least six of these were serious enough to require immediate medical attention, which was seriously delayed or denied by the military in all but one instance. Accident-related injuries sustained by children included burns, poisoning, and wounds from sharp objects. In the above-mentioned case of the Jalazon girl who suffered hot oil burns, soldiers permitted her to go to hospital only after a long delay, even though she had highly visible burns on her legs. Another case in the same camp involved a two-year-old child who had to be hospitalised after she poisoned herself by drinking

kerosene while her mother was busy filling a heater.

4.2 Blocking Educational Development

Curfew impositions exacerbate the mounting crisis in Palestinian education, itself a direct result of Israeli military policy. During the past four academic years, the military has repeatedly issued individual and area-wide closure orders against West Bank and Gaza Strip schools. All six Palestinian universities in the occupied territories were closed for the first three years of the uprising; the three largest universities remain closed to date.

Loss of school days

During the first three years of the uprising frequent imposition of curfews circumvented the need to issue specific closure orders against schools in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, schools were more frequently closed by

direct order.⁴⁶ The 37 UNRWA schools in Shati Refugee Camp and nearby Gaza City were closed by curfew a total of 635 times between 1 September and 28 December 1988 alone.⁴⁷ In the first six months of the uprising approximately 14,000 school students in Shati missed some 64 days of school (or 61% of the semester) due to curfews.⁴⁸ By the end of December 1990 curfew had barred Shati students from their classrooms for over 31 school weeks, approximately 205 school days. Jalazon students lost over a month of school to curfew during the same period, in addition to up to 16 months of school lost to area-wide closures.

Disruption of learning process

In addition to closing schools, curfew restricts possibilities for home study. Parents in the survey pointed out that curfew prevents students from studying together and helping one another as they frequently do when schools are shut by closure orders. If caught by an unexpected curfew, students find themselves without needed texts and study materials. Furthermore, soldiers sometimes confiscate study materials. A Birzeit University student in Jalazon, for example, reported that an army patrol stormed his

family's house during a curfew and confiscated his books. In another incident in the home of a Jalazon teacher, raiding soldiers grabbed books off the shelves and tore them up, saying "these kinds of books destroy your mind, only our instructions will make you happy." When the 35-year-old teacher protested, the soldiers threatened, "if you don't shut up we will cut your tongue off."

Parents in both camps cited the lack of continuity in their children's schooling as the single most detrimental effect of curfews. In Jalazon every household with school-age children cited school interruptions as a major obstacle to educational progress. "Studying is no longer a systematic process," explained one parent interviewee. Added another: "Under present conditions, particularly when there is curfew, studying is no longer normal."

Studying while under curfew is made extremely difficult by the siege-like atmosphere students are forced to work in. "The situation is so tense," explained one father, "that no real studying takes place."⁴⁹ Other parents pointed out that because children fear for their own well-being, as well as that of their family and friends, it is not

UNRWA Schools in Jalazon and Shati Refugee Camps

	Jalazon	Shati
No. of Schools:	1 elementary boys 1 elementary girls 1 preparatory boys 1 preparatory girls	4 elementary boys 7 elementary girls 2 preparatory girls *
No. of In-Camp Students:	1,292	8,610

*Boys from Shati at the preparatory level attend schools in Gaza City, as do all secondary students. Jalazon secondary students attend schools in Ramallah town or nearby villages.

SOURCE: UNRWA

only difficult for them to concentrate on studies, it is nearly impossible for them to see studying as a priority. General feelings of restlessness, boredom, listlessness, anger, deprivation, fear, and hunger distract children from their studies. Furthermore, the motivation to learn is eroded by the threat of army raids and arrests, and the sporadic sounds of shooting and sound bombs. This is especially the case since children have now been denied the right to a normal school routine for well over three years. The benefits

of trying to pursue an education against such obstacles are more and more elusive. For many students loss of interest and motivation prevails well beyond the lifting of curfew.

Decline in academic standards

A serious decline in academic standards has inevitably resulted from the continuous military-imposed interruptions at both the school and college/university levels. As far back as November 1988 educators predicted that the impact of the military-imposed

Approximate Number of School Weeks Lost as a Result of Israeli Military Interference (December 1987 - December 1990)

	Jalazon Refugee Camp		Shati Refugee Camp	
	Area-wide closure orders	Curfew closures	Area-wide closure orders	Curfew closures
1987/88	11-13+	2.3	-	9.6
1988/89	24-27	-	0-6	15.3
1989/90	7-8	0.4	7	3.4
1990/91	1-4	0.3	3-10	2.9
Total	43-52	3	10-23	31.2

25 individual military closure orders were issued against UNRWA schools in Jalazon for periods ranging from one day to one month.

4 military closure orders were issued against schools in Shati and 83 orders were issued against schools in Gaza City, where the majority of Shati students go to school. Closures ranged from one day to over three months.

*Semester 1 only (through 31 December 1990)

+Variance is a result of staggered re-openings by grade level

NOTE:

Curfew figures do not include days in which schools were already closed by area-wide or individual military order.

The normal school year includes 210 school days or 35 school weeks, where one school week = 6 school days.

disruptions on education would affect academic standards for at least 10 to 12 years. Two years later teachers estimated that students in general were one and a half to two years behind in knowledge and skills relative to former standards. Repeated educational disruptions have made it virtually impossible for teachers and students to salvage academic standards for the current generation of students; educators now predict that generations to come will suffer the effects of measures imposed against today's students.⁵⁰

Long-term consequences

The systematic disruption of Palestinian education by the Israeli military has had serious detrimental effects on the social, cultural, and economic life of the Palestinian community.⁵¹ The wider dimensions of the educational crisis are indicated by survey results; several students in the survey have dropped out of school as a direct result of continued military interference in their education. A father of eight children, for instance, said that economic difficulties, largely a result of curfews, had forced him to take his daughter out of school. Several other parents reported that interruptions were the main reason for their children's decisions to leave school. Still others reported that their children were so frustrated by repeated setbacks in their educational efforts, they were threatening to give up their schooling altogether.⁵² The prospect of an increasingly uneducated future society is particularly disturbing given the extremely high level of Palestinian educational achievement today; Palestinians currently hold one of the highest post-secondary education rates in the world.⁵³

4.3 Shutting Down the Economy

Economic concerns are one of the primary preoccupations of adults under curfew. Because all economic activity is paralysed, curfews eliminate family incomes, shut down the economic activities of entire communities, and jeopardise the viability of the Palestinian

economy as a whole.

Economic hardships at the household level

The economic hardships caused by curfew are particularly severe for populations living in refugee camps, where dependence on wage labour is highest and access to resources is limited.⁵⁴ In Jalazon Refugee Camp, over 73% of the households surveyed reported that curfews had resulted in the loss of daily wages normally earned by one or more wage earners in the family.⁵⁵

"A high percentage of the Gaza Strip's labour force is composed of individuals who live in the Gaza Strip but travel daily to work inside Israel. The vast majority of these workers earn their wages on a daily rather than a monthly basis. This means that if they cannot get to work because of a curfew they forfeit their wages and receive no compensation. A significant number of workers have lost their jobs as a result of repeated and prolonged absences, and the level of unemployment has increased as a result. This pattern has had a particularly serious impact on residents of the refugee camps, who are disproportionately represented in the above-mentioned migrant labour force, have a greater need for their wages, and yet have suffered the largest decrease in their income levels because of continuous curfews."

- Al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege, Ramallah: al-Haq, 1989, p.369.

As curfews increase, the uncertainty surrounding regular income and the possibility of long-term unemployment increase. Labourers working inside Israel who lose their jobs for failing to report to work during curfew are increasingly less likely to find


employment elsewhere, especially since employers are reluctant to hire them precisely because of this absenteeism. Expectations among Israeli employers of high absenteeism rates have resulted in an unwillingness to hire Gaza and West Bank Palestinians; Israeli employees estimate that a combination of curfews, roadblocks, other movement restrictions, and strike days will keep Palestinian workers away from their jobs one third of the work year. At the same time, massive Soviet immigration, high Israeli unemployment, and the promotion of "non-Arab" labour in the name of defending "national security" have led to a significant drop in work opportunities for Palestinians inside Israel.⁵⁶ Camp residents are generally considered a particularly high risk, both in

terms of absenteeism and "security". In Jalazon, 5% of the households surveyed reported job losses as a direct result of curfew. In Shati, over 50% of the households attributed the loss of one or more jobs in the family to curfew and other uprising-related conditions.

Additionally, the accumulation of curfew days drain the limited disposable income available to families dependent on wage labour. Household savings are quickly depleted and families find themselves without the resources necessary to buy food and other essential supplies during curfew reprieves. As these losses accumulate, a household's ability to prepare for future curfews also diminishes. Families no longer have the savings needed to

INCOME LOSS IN SURVEY POPULATIONS

During the First 3 Years of the Uprising



Source: Survey conducted Aug - Nov 1990

stock up on food, fuel, and other basic supplies in preparation for the possibility of curfew. A family's capacity to cope with curfew is thus destroyed and its very subsistence placed in question.

In both surveyed camps, residents suffered a dramatic decline in overall income losses during the uprising, reflecting the impact of curfew on the one hand, and their ability to cope with curfew on the other. When asked to estimate the overall amount of income lost during the first three years of the uprising, 88% and 91% of the surveyed households in Shati and Jalazon respectively reported an average income loss of 20% or more. Of these households, 43% in Shati and 42% in Jalazon reported income losses of 40-60%, and 28% in Shati and 9% in Jalazon reported losses of over 60%.⁵⁷

Paralysis of Palestinian economic activity

Curfews effectively paralyse all commercial activity within the targeted refugee camp. Even when restrictions are temporarily lifted in order to permit people to replenish supplies, shopowners and merchants remain cut off from their suppliers and are unable restock produce and fuels. When existing stocks are exhausted, camp residents are forced to rely on relief agencies for essentials. Relief distribution, however, is frequently disrupted by military personnel.

The impact of curfews on Palestinian commercial activity extends beyond the community upon which they are imposed. For example, most commercial activity for Shati and Jalazon camp residents is centred not in the refugee camps, but in Gaza City and Ramallah, respectively. A curfew over Shati Refugee Camp reduces the number of persons serviced by Gaza City's commercial sector by over 46,000. This means that consumers of commercial services in the city are reduced by over 20% for an average of eight days every month due to curfews on Shati camp

alone.⁵⁸ According to the human rights organisation al-Haq, simultaneous curfews over the camp, housing projects, and the most populous quarters of the city, mean that the number of consumers serviced by the city's commercial sector frequently falls from over 200,000 to less than 70,000, a 65% reduction.⁵⁹

The reverse is also true. When centres of commercial activity are subject to curfew, both buyers and sellers from outside the area sustain significant losses. For instance, Palestine Square, in the heart of Gaza City, was under almost continuous curfew throughout the entire summer of 1990, resulting in the closure of approximately 100 shops. Curfew over the Square drastically reduced both pedestrian and vehicle traffic passing through the area. As a result, shops located outside of the curfew but in the vicinity of the Square suffered losses as high as 75%. The dozens of street vendors catering to passersby were similarly affected. Taxi drivers, hundreds of whom use the Square as a collection point for passengers, also suffered severe losses.⁶⁰

The cumulative effect of curfews also reduces the purchasing power of individuals. Resulting losses in demand in turn exacerbate the already existing economic recession in the occupied territories. The multiplier effect is all the more severe due to the small size of the Palestinian economy; detrimental effects of curfew, even if indirect, quickly reverberate throughout all levels of the economy and jeopardise the viability of future economic development.⁶¹ The effect of frequent and prolonged curfews is particularly serious given the fragile nature of the nascent Palestinian economy; Israel's long-time policy of severely restricting economic development in the occupied territories in order to ensure Palestinian dependence on Israel is now compounded by an increasingly militant campaign inside Israel to replace Palestinian workers with recent Soviet immigrants. The

recent loss of workers' remittances and other support funds from the Persian Gulf has further destabilised the economy.

Survey results demonstrate that workers bear the immediate brunt of the overall decline in the Palestinian economy resulting from the continued use of curfew. Because of limited savings, workers feel losses in income and purchasing power most rapidly and most acutely. Resulting drops in sales and production losses only heighten the possibilities of workers' unemployment.

5. Conclusion

Three years of curfew experience in Jalazon and Shati refugee camps clearly demonstrate that Israeli curfew policy involves a two-pronged assault on the individuals and national infrastructure of the targeted community designed to crush the will and capacity of Palestinians to resist. Under the prison-like conditions of curfew, individuals are besieged by a systematic campaign of arbitrary humiliation and brutality. The military regularly launches house-to-house raids, beats and arrests residents, destroys property, fires tear gas and live ammunition, and engages in numerous acts of gratuitous harassment. The combination of this campaign and the grinding monotony and sense of entrapment which characterise the experience of in-house detention creates serious psychological strain. This psychological onslaught is combined with measures designed to exacerbate the material hardships of curfew. Isolated and terrorised, people are deliberately denied adequate access to food and other essential supplies and services.

At the same time, in completely and abruptly halting normal civil life, curfews strike a heavy blow at the viability of national infrastructures, thus threatening the welfare

of curfewed individuals and the community as a whole. The deliberate disruption of emergency health care, regular health care programmes, and sanitation services, as well as army brutality, combined with intentionally-induced food and water shortages, overcrowding, and high levels of tension lead to unnecessary and sometimes fatal health complications for individuals and threaten to imperil the long-term health of the community. The repeated interruptions to schooling caused by curfew are catastrophic given the Israeli campaign against Palestinian education over the past three years. Students are frustrated into abandoning educational efforts and the Palestinian community's high educational achievements are being eroded by a policy of enforced ignorance. The shut-down of all economic activity eliminates the income of entire households, drains family savings, and creates unemployment. The repeated breakdown of economic operations also destroys the vitality of the developing Palestinian economy.

Contrary to all international legal standards, Israel imposes curfew as a form of collective punishment on a frequent and widespread basis. Israeli military personnel publicly acknowledge that in exacting high costs, curfews are directed at subjugating Palestinians. The assault on local infrastructure also damages Palestinian achievements in the health, education, and economic spheres, the foundations upon which their national movement is based. Results of the survey indicate that the continuous battering of community infrastructures threatens to have serious long-term consequences for the Palestinians' struggle for political and economic self-reliance and national independence. Curfew, because of its comprehensiveness, is one of Israel's most effective weapons in its war of attrition against Palestinian resistance.

Chapter 2 - Endnotes

1. In Jalazon Refugee Camp researchers visited every twelfth family registered in UNRWA's list of the camp population in 1990. If during field visits the selected family was not found, the field researchers moved to the house next door to carry out the survey. Because UNRWA has no updated list of families living in Shati Refugee Camp, field researchers in the Gaza camp randomly selected one house from blocks of 25 houses located in all areas of the camp.

Several difficulties were encountered during the survey process and should be noted. First, curfews imposed during the period of research proved to be a serious obstacle for data collection, particularly in the Gaza Strip; Shati Refugee Camp was under curfew over three weeks during the period of data collection. Moreover, the fact that Shati Refugee Camp was under night curfew throughout the entire survey period meant that the field researcher responsible for surveys in the camp could only visit the camp during the day. This not only slowed down the research process, but created specific problems due to the fact that in many households women are at home alone during the day; women were often unwilling to receive a male researcher without the presence of male family members. The general military-imposed isolation of the Gaza Strip also meant that access to and confirmation of information regarding the camp was much more difficult to gain than in the case of Jalazon. During the final writing of the report, lack of access to Jalazon also became a serious obstacle due to the imposition of the 17 January 1991, blanket curfew. Another drawback was that both field researchers and interviewees were predominantly male; this may have resulted in the neglect of certain aspects of curfew experience in the data gathered, especially in terms of women's experiences.

2. UNRWA is mandated by the UN General Assembly to assist Palestinian refugees through providing education, relief, and health services. The Agency operates over 200 elementary and preparatory schools as well as operating a wide range of health, nutritional, and relief and social services in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

3. This comparison looks only at full curfews. If partial curfews, effecting specific areas or neighbourhoods of a camp or other locations, are included, the number of curfew days in some locations rises considerably. Sections of Jabalia and Rafah refugee camps in particular have been subject to numerous partial curfews. In the first year of the uprising 32 partial curfews were recorded in Jabalia Refugee Camp affecting a median of 6,810 people, and in Rafah Refugee Camp a median population of 15,500 were affected by 78 partial curfews. Many of the latter were in the Shaboura and/or Yibna sections of the camp (Anne Nixon et al., The Status of Palestinian Children During the Uprising in the Occupied Territories: Part 2, Sweden: Save the Children, 1990, pp.303,312).

4. UNRWA, "Facts," March 1989, p.11.

5. According to the camp director, the only exception to the twice-daily visits from patrolling troops was during June-July 1990 following Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Arens' policy of reducing the presence of Israeli troops in the occupied territories. The policy was abandoned at the onset of the Gulf crisis. Since that time, troops have again entered the camp at least twice daily (JMCC interview with UNRWA camp director of Jalazon, 1 September 1990).

6. These figures are based on population estimates for aggregate calculations. The population estimates are actually lower than UNRWA figures for refugee camps. Thus person-day figures for individual camps are conservative relative to UNRWA population figures for 1988-1990. See Chapter 1, endnote 3 for detailed explanation of population figures used for the report.

The military's use of curfew is not restricted to the uprising. According to the UNRWA director of Jalazon Refugee Camp, between 13 June 1979 and 1 September 1990 Jalazon was placed under curfew 40 times. In 1983, seven camp residents died during a 42-day curfew in which electricity and water supplies were cut and UNRWA was prevented from opening its clinic and nutrition centre (JMCC interview with UNRWA camp director of Jalazon, 1 September 1990).

7. JMCC records based on a compilation of local press reports and field research.

8. The physical set-up of refugee camps --confined to a demarcated area, often set apart from neighbouring communities-- makes camps particularly vulnerable to isolatory measures. Jalazon camp, which is relatively small and situated in a narrow valley with only one main road, is effectively monitored day and night by soldiers posted in five watch towers, surrounding the camp and equipped with high-power surveillance lights which light up the camp throughout the night. The sheer size of Shati makes comprehensive quarantine there more difficult.

A common means of further controlling traffic in and out of the camp is the sealing of access roads. Both camps in the survey have been almost completely sealed off in this fashion for most of the past three years. Soldiers blocked the northern entrance to Jalazon Refugee Camp with a bulldozed earth mound during a curfew there in March 1988 (FACTS, Towards a State of Independence, Jerusalem: FACTS Information Committee, 1988, p.204) and the entrance has subsequently remained blocked or partially blocked ever since. The only other entrance has been similarly blocked for much of the past three years. In Shati, seven access roads have been sealed off with mounds of dirt or cemented barrels, affecting the movement of 90% of the population.

These roadblocks create added obstacles for camp residents trying to re-supply depleted food and fuel stocks during curfew respites. They also help to keep unwanted outsiders from entering the camp and residents from escaping. Interviewees cited the denial of entry to outside observers --including members of the press, relief workers, international solidarity groups, and even Israeli solidarity groups and politicians-- as a further means of ensuring that military activities during curfew are kept hidden; outsiders are often kept out of the camp even during temporary lifts in curfew.

9. Thirteen-year-old Ameen Abu Ridaha was shot by soldiers on 25 May as he was running home following the announcement of a curfew, part of military efforts to disperse a demonstration. The child was evacuated to hospital by military helicopter. Two days later the military returned the child's body to his family and demanded US\$6,000 in hospital costs. According to extensive field work carried out by Save the Children, Ameen "appears to have been shot in a punitive action, possibly for breaking curfew" (Nixon et al., The Status of Palestinian Children During the Uprising in the Occupied Territories: Part 1(1), p.114; Part 1(2), op. cit., pp.24-25).

10. Al-Ittihad, 21 November 1990.

11. Cf. al-Haq, Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising (December 1987 - December 1988), Ramallah: al-Haq, 1988, p.224.

12. UNRWA is responsible for the regular distribution of food rations such as skim milk, rice, flour, canned corned beef, and sugar to families qualifying as special hardship cases (defined as those families without a single male over 18 who is not studying full-time and is mentally and physically capable of earning an income). There has been a significant rise in the number of such cases in both camps; services have been extended considerably during the uprising due to economic difficulties resulting from curfews and continuing unrest (UNRWA, "Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, 1 July 1988-30 June 1989," June 1989; UNRWA, "Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, 1 July 1989-30 June 1990," June 1990). By March 1988, UNRWA concluded that in Jalazon, for example, 18.5% of the total population had been so severely affected as to constitute special hardship cases (UNRWA, "Facts," 1989, op. cit., p.10).

Additionally, until January 1991, UNRWA operated supplementary feeding centres in both West Bank and Gaza Strip refugee camps, providing one daily meal to children under the age of ten and to elderly people referred by the clinic. One such centre was located in Jalazon Refugee Camp and five were located in Shati Refugee Camp. According to UNRWA officials, Israeli authorities have prevented the operation of these supplementary feeding centres during curfew --a time when such meals were particularly important and could have compensated for curfew-related food shortages (UNRWA Information Sheet, September 1989; UNRWA, March 1989, op. cit.).

13. Al-Haq, op. cit., p.192.

14. Cf. FACTS, op. cit., p.204.

15. Cf. al-Haq, op. cit., p.224.

16. Other studies confirm these findings. See for example, al-Haq, op. cit., pp.177,193; Nixon et al., Part 2, op. cit., pp.31-32.

17. Al-Haq, op. cit., p.223.

18. Both of these houses were in Shati Refugee Camp.
19. Of these 14 households, three were in Jalazon and 11 in Shati.
20. Al-Haq, op. cit., pp.220-221.
21. Seven per cent of the total households surveyed in Jalazon, and 15% of the total households surveyed in Shati, had one or more members arrested during curfew raids.
22. Taxation raids, a common feature of curfews in many locations, particularly in West Bank towns and villages, were not reported in the camp surveys. (See Chapter 3, Section 4.1 for examples of taxation raids during the "war curfew".)
23. JMCC interview with UNRWA camp director of Jalazon, 1 September 1990.
24. Although systematic beatings were most prevalent during the first year of the uprising under then Defence Minister Rabin's infamous "bone-breaking" policy, beating incidents have also occurred during recent curfews in both camps.
25. Improperly used tear gas can be fatal; the deployment of tear gas in enclosed spaces and/or from close range is particularly dangerous. See Nixon et al., Part 1(2), op. cit., pp.319-338; al-Haq, 1988, op. cit., pp.27-31; al-Haq, A Nation Under Siege, Ramallah: al-Haq, 1989, pp.40-42.
26. Soldiers have also injured themselves detonating sound bombs. In the Gaza Strip in April 1990, for example, an Israeli army officer lost two fingers after a sound grenade exploded in his hand as he attempted to throw it in the direction of a crowd (Jerusalem Post, 29 April 1990).
27. Cf. FACTS, op. cit., p.204.
28. Ibid.
29. All Palestinian residents of the occupied territories over the age of 15 are issued an identity card by the Israeli authorities, which they are required to carry with them at all times.
30. For further details, see FACTS, op. cit., p.204; Statement from camp residents published in al-Haq, Punishing a Nation, op. cit., p.221.
31. Demolition orders have been issued against houses in which a member is accused of throwing molotov cocktails or stones, charged with "incitement", or wanted by the military authorities. House demolitions and sealings are carried out without charges, trial, or effective appeal. For detailed discussion of Israel's house demolition policy, see CAABU, "Punishing the Innocent," London: CAABU, 1987; al-Haq, Punishing a Nation, op. cit., pp.152-158; al-Haq, Nation Under Siege, op. cit., pp.345-358.
32. UNRWA records, 3 January 1991.

33. Commenting on the psychological effect of the several-hour confinement of the Israeli population during the Gulf war, for example, Israeli psychiatrists predicted a great increase in psychosomatic problems including "worsening of asthma attacks, sleep problems, irritable bowel syndrome, (and) ulcers" (*Jerusalem Post*, 30 January 1991).

34. According to local psychologists, uprising- and curfew-related games have become very widespread among children who divide themselves into two groups: soldiers and residents. Psychologists maintain that such play reflects the very real fears experienced by children and may also serve to release much of the fear and tension that the children go through in reality. Cf. Nixon et al., *Part 2, op. cit.*, pp.14-17.

35. This act of humiliating an authority figure is replicated in the case of school teachers and others in social positions of authority. Nixon et al. (*Part 2, op. cit.*) argue that the Israeli soldiers' policy of humiliating authority figures is a deliberate attempt to break the morale of younger family members and thus to shake a strong social foundation at the level of the family and the community.

36. According to an UNRWA health official, the total number of recorded diabetic cases among the West Bank refugee population was over 2,600 persons, of whom approximately 90% were 40 years and above. The vast majority of diabetics rely on a combined diet and drug therapy programme and the remainder are treated with dietary programmes alone or controlled diets supplemented with insulin (JMCC interview with UNRWA health official, December 1990).

37. The number of reported cases of chronic diseases in the curfew study does not represent the total number of cases of chronic illnesses within the survey population but only those cases which experienced health problems and complications while under curfew. In Shati, 14 people with chronic hypertension reported complications and seven cases were reported in Jalazon. The frequency of health complications, reported by those suffering from hypertension may also be significant in light of the discussion above regarding psychological stress and the known vulnerability to psychological pressures experienced by those suffering from hypertension. Other chronic conditions which resulted in health complications during curfew included diabetes, heart and kidney diseases, ulcers, and rheumatism.

38. Tear gas is designed to disperse crowds by making both seeing and breathing difficult and painful for its targets. The immediate effects of tear gas include a sharp stinging sensation and irritation to the eyes, nose, mouth, and throat, frequently followed by shortness of breath and breathing difficulties, dizziness, and/or headaches. The long-term effects of tear gas are difficult to establish due primarily to problems in follow-up and Israel's use of several kinds of tear gas during the uprising. The extensive and indiscriminate use of tear gas throughout the uprising, however, particularly the use of large quantities within enclosed areas, has resulted in innumerable health complications, and is known to have been a contributing, if not primary factor in an increasing number of deaths. See, for example, Nixon et al., *Part 1(2), op. cit.*, pp.319-338; al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation, op. cit.*, pp.27-31; *Nation Under Siege, op. cit.*, pp.40-42.

39. UNRWA, "Report June 1990," *op. cit.*, p.44.

40. Al-Haq (Nation Under Siege, op. cit., p.510) documented five miscarriage cases in Shati Refugee Camp in one night --8 March 1988 when excessive amounts of tear gas were used during an army raid on the camp. According to the UNRWA camp director in Jalazon, the UNRWA clinic treated five cases of miscarriage following exposure to tear gas from the beginning of the uprising through the end of August 1990 (JMCC interview with UNRWA camp director of Jalazon, 1 September 1990).

41. For more details regarding the decline in the health situation during the uprising, see periodic reports from UPMRC and UNRWA, as well as al-Haq, Punishing a Nation, op. cit., p.69.

42. The low standards of sanitation in the camps, especially in the Gaza Strip, have always constituted health hazards to the refugee population; underground sewage is accessible to only 22% of the refugee population in the West Bank and a dramatically lower rate of 6% in Gaza Strip (UNRWA, "Report June 1990," op. cit., p.9). UNRWA has attributed the recent increase in health hazards in part to the impediment or prevention of garbage, refuse, and sewage disposal resulting from military-imposed curfews (UNRWA, "Report June 1989," op. cit., p.30).

43. Thirty-six children in the two surveyed camps suffered diarrhea and fever while under curfew, nine in Jalazon and 27 in Shati; the majority were under 15 years of age.

44. An UNRWA health official interviewed in August 1988 reported three separate cases of children from Gaza who died from gastroenteritis during curfew. In all three cases parents were prevented from attaining medical assistance. By the time they reached hospital, their children were already dead. The official added that deaths from gastrointestinal diseases had been eradicated several years before through rigorous efforts by UNRWA.

45. These findings agree with other observations. UNRWA health officials, for example, have noted an increase in the numbers of home accidents during curfews because parents were busy, absent from a certain area, or distracted and unable to supervise their children. Nixon et al. (Part 2, op. cit., p.38) also noted an increase in the numbers of home accidents, predominantly poisoning and burn accidents.

46. School closures resulting from curfews generally receive significantly less criticism from the press and international community than the more overt closure of schools by specific military order. Curfew closures, however, were less practical in the West Bank where the imposition of widespread curfews is more difficult; in contrast to the Gaza Strip where the vast majority of the population is concentrated in a small area, over half of the West Bank population live in hundreds of villages spread over a wider geographic area. Cf. JMCC, Palestinian Education: A Threat to Israel's Security?, 2nd ed., Jerusalem: JMCC, August 1990, pp.19-20.

47. One "time" is the equivalent of one school closed for one day due to curfew; these figures, based on UNRWA attendance records, were compiled by JMCC. Cf. JMCC, Palestinian Education: A Threat to Israel's Security?, Jerusalem: JMCC, January 1989, p.46.

48. Nixon et al., Part 2, op. cit., p.256.

49. Neither the classroom nor the home provide a secure place for children to study. One Jalazon parent described how her child hated going to school because soldiers were always parked just outside the school entrance. A father in Shati protested that his son could not even get to the bathroom while at school because soldiers are positioned in an observation point just above the school.

50. Cf. JMCC, Palestinian Education, 2nd ed., op. cit.

51. For details, see ibid.; Nixon et al., Part 2, op. cit.

52. The situation appears to be particularly difficult for young women. A young woman in secondary school commented:

The whole situation for young women is very difficult now....Many young women feel there is no future in school for them now. Even if the schools do open most of us won't be able to get jobs when we graduate. Because of the worsening economic situation it's going to be much harder than it already was for a woman to work in a good job.

At the same time, economic pressures are also encouraging an increasing number of young men to drop out of school in order to seek employment.

53. For further discussion regarding Palestinian educational achievements and the current crisis, see Sarah Graham-Brown, Education, Repression, Liberation: Palestinians, London: World University Service, 1984; Khaleel Mahshi and Kim Bush, "The Palestinian Uprising and Education for the Future," April 1989; JMCC, Palestinian Education, 2nd ed., op. cit.

54. According to a study conducted by the Birzeit Research Centre, in 1987 more than 77% of the work force in the Ramallah area refugee camps were wage labourers (Adil Yahya, "The Role of the Refugee Camps," in Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads, Birzeit University/Praeger Publishers, 1991, p.92). In the Gaza Strip, the percentage of wage labourers is generally estimated to be still higher.

55. Survey results did not permit the accurate calculation of a comparable figure in Shati Refugee Camp. However, 90% of the households surveyed in Shati reported the loss of daily wages and/or loss of jobs due to curfew and other intifada-related factors.

56. Yediot Aharonot, 11 January 1991 as translated in Al-Fajr English, 28 January 1991.

57. Income losses resulted from a variety of factors including the loss of labourers' daily wage, drops in merchants' sales, salary deductions etc., as well as a severe drop in the value of the Jordanian dinar (the monetary unit in which salaries of many employees in the West Bank are paid). The households which suffered no substantial drop in income during the uprising --12% of the Shati household and 5% of the Jalazon households-- were predominantly those in which family members were employed in UNRWA or municipality jobs.

58. The population of Gaza City and its environs (including Shati and housing projects) is over 200,000. Gaza City's commercial district, centred in Palestine Square and the surrounding quarters, is the heart of commercial activity for the entire Gaza Strip population of more than 700,000.

59. Al-Haq, Nation Under Siege, op. cit., p.369.

60. Al-Fajr English, 30 July 1990; Al-Fajr, 1 August 1990.

61. The direct macro-economic results of curfew over the two camps are, as discussed, related to drops in workers' income generation and productivity, and commercial activity. Unlike villages, curfews over refugee camps have little direct impact on the agricultural sector. Relatively few refugee camp residents are independent farmers. In Jalazon there are a small number of residents who rent land outside the camp and cultivate it on a share-cropping basis. A number of Jalazon households also have small family vegetable gardens within the camp itself. During curfew, families face the dilemma of losing crops upon which they depend for their livelihood or tending crops at the risk of being beaten, arrested, shot, or heavily fined. This dilemma is particularly acute when food stocks in the house are depleted and harvestable crops are in the field. In economic terms, however, this situation is much more significant in villages, where agriculture remains a primary source of income and contributes substantially to the productivity of the Palestinian economy. (See Chapter 3, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 for detailed description of agricultural losses sustained as a result of the "war curfew".)

CHAPTER 3 - THE "WAR CURFEW"

Immediately following the official outbreak of war in the Gulf, Israeli authorities imposed a strict 24-hour curfew over the entire Gaza Strip and West Bank, with the exception of some parts of East Jerusalem.¹ For approximately a month, more than two million Palestinians were collectively imprisoned in their homes. This curfew was the longest and most comprehensive one since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. Despite its unprecedented nature, both in terms of length and damage, the curfew reflected a dramatic extension of a long-standing Israeli policy, rather than an exceptional event. The intimidation, violence, and punitive measures accompanying this particular blanket curfew

are all commonplace phenomena as was shown in the preceding chapter on the curfew experience of two refugee camps. The damage inflicted on the Palestinian community by the most recent blanket curfew differs only in scale from other curfews. Because of its severity, however, this curfew provides a particularly poignant illustration of the devastating effects of one of Israel's most potent weapons in its campaign to crush the Palestinian uprising.

This chapter will focus on the ten-week period beginning on 17 January when the "war curfew" was first imposed until 31 March, 1991.

1. Summary of Major Findings

1. The "war curfew" advanced through three stages during which Israel progressively reasserted its control over the occupied territories by escalating its two-pronged assault on both the Palestinian people and their institutions.

- * The first phase, which lasted approximately three weeks, was characterised by strict 24-hour enforcement, leading to the complete shut-down of all civil and economic activities throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

- * The second phase, beginning in the fourth to fifth week of curfew and lasting until early March, was characterised by irregular curfew reprieves, increasing economic hardship, a massive arrest campaign, and an acceleration of punitive military operations.

- * The third phase, beginning in early March, was characterised by the institutionalisation of the pass system, the permanent fragmentation of the occupied territories, a dramatic increase in army brutality, and alarming levels of destitution.

2. Military obstruction of health care during the curfew resulted in numerous deaths and a variety of long-term medical complications, in addition to compromising the ability of the Palestinian health system to provide adequate care.

- * Medical experts confirmed that at least 13 people died as a result of delays in medical treatment due to curfew restrictions in the first month of the curfew.

- * Decisions regarding access to health care were made by Israeli military and administrative personnel, the majority of whom have no medical qualifications and based their decisions on arbitrary, non-medical criteria.

- * Interruptions in basic, preventive, and rehabilitative health programmes interrupted life-preserving treatment for pregnant women, new-borns, the chronically ill, and the disabled.

- * Restrictions on the movement of health workers prevented hospitals and clinics from working at full capacity.

- * Israeli military personnel and armed civilians intentionally harassed doctors and other medical personnel and directly interfered with medical aid.

- * Doctors warned that continued disruptions would result in the long-term degeneration of Palestinian health as thousands of diseases and complications went undiagnosed and untreated, malnutrition rose, and sanitation and preventive health practices declined.

- * Despite curfew liftings, movement restrictions based on the pass system continued to hinder the treatment of both regular and emergency patients, particularly those referred to central hospitals in East Jerusalem.

3. Curfew violators were harshly punished, particularly in the first phase.

- * In the first month of curfew, at least three Palestinians were shot and killed by Israeli military forces without provocation.

- * The maximum prison sentence for curfew violation was raised to five years and the maximum fine to NIS30,000.

- * In the West Bank alone, 1,714 Palestinians were arrested and fined or imprisoned for curfew violations by the fourth week of curfew.

4. Under cover of curfew, Israel launched a comprehensive campaign of repression against the Palestinian community designed to regain control of the occupied territories.

- * From 17 January, the entire Gaza Strip and West Bank, with the exclusion of East Jerusalem, were closed military areas, barring access to the press and restricting the movement of local and international human rights and relief workers.

- * Five Palestinian press offices were closed by military order and new censorship orders were issued.

- * Military raids involving house-to-house searches, during which soldiers harassed and beat residents, vandalised and confiscated property, and carried out large-scale arrest operations, were systematically launched throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

- * The military's use of punitive measures was extensive; 75 Palestinian homes were demolished or sealed, approximately 3,000 trees were uprooted, and deportation orders were issued against four Gaza residents.

- * Army brutality was widespread; in the Gaza Strip alone, 1,053 people were treated for beating injuries in the two-month period beginning 1 February and 428 were treated for other army-related injuries.

- * Israeli confiscation of Palestinian lands continued; in the ten week period Israeli authorities expropriated over 19,000 dunams, and the owners of 50,000 additional dunams were informed of impending Israeli take-over.

5. The effect of the curfew on the Palestinian economy was catastrophic --as a result, the occupied territories faced its worst recession since 1968.

* During the first month, daily losses were estimated at US\$5.2 million; the Palestinian economy, whose annual GDP is approximately US\$1.7 billion, had already suffered three years of serious economic setbacks.

* Drastic drops in income led to a depletion of savings for the large majority of Palestinians; purchasing power declined and sources of credit dried up, leaving Palestinian businesses without adequate means to regenerate economic activity.

* Wage labourers were denied a minimum of three weeks' income; after ten weeks, over 25% of those previously working in Israel were still prohibited from returning to their jobs.

* The curfew paralysed all agricultural activity; damage to crops and livestock and the breakdown of distribution and marketing activities reduced sectoral productivity to approximately 70% in the first month of curfew, the equivalent of a US\$12 million loss.

* Long-term losses in agricultural production were expected to result from disruptions in planting, loss of export credibility, and inadequate funds for investment.

* Palestinian industry was brought to the brink of bankruptcy; 93-95% of the total production in the industrial sector was lost during the first month of curfew.

* The predominantly small-scale and interdependent nature of Palestinian industry, combined with difficulties in distribution and marketing, rendered the partial re-opening of factories ineffective in re-generating the economy.

* Due to movement restrictions, a decline in market demands, and insufficient start-up funds, many factories in the occupied territories remained closed at the end of March and others were working at reduced capacities; 50,000 workers normally employed in the occupied territories were jobless at the end of March.

* Israeli measures compounded the economic crisis; the tax collection campaign was intensified, central commercial markets were closed, utilities were cut to entire towns, and Palestinian property was destroyed or confiscated.

* Economic hardship threatened the viability of the Palestinian health system; hospitals and clinics reported 80-100% increases in hardship cases and health workers estimated that 40% of their patients were unable to pay for health care.

6. Palestinian education was further undermined as schools and universities were once again shut down.

* All schools were closed from 15 January until mid-February; elementary schools were closed at least five weeks during this period.

* First and second secondary schools were closed until mid-March; classes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip met a maximum of two weeks between 1 January and 31 March.

* 44 schools were ordered closed by individual military orders for additional periods of up to several weeks in length.

* Higher education was brought to a standstill; community colleges and al-Quds and Bethlehem University were shut down for over a month. The four largest of the six Palestinian universities in the occupied territories remain closed for the fourth consecutive year.


2. Curfew Calendar

Israel seized upon the "war curfew" to advance its two-pronged assault on the Palestinian people and their national infrastructure, imprisoning the entire Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip and West Bank round-the-clock for approximately four weeks. Six weeks later curfew restrictions continued to regularly hinder movement throughout the occupied territories. For the purposes of analysis, the ten-week period examined below can be divided into three phases. Each phase is marked by a series of military measures and operations used by Israel to progressively reassert its control over the occupied territories. The proceeding section outlines the chronology of these three stages and highlights features within each

stage which show the nature of Israel's assault on Palestinian individuals and their families. An examination of each stage indicates that Israeli authorities were determined to destroy the will and capability of the Palestinian people to resist. A discussion of the assault on national infrastructure will then be treated in two separate sections; the first examines the situation of the Palestinian health and education systems, while the second documents the effect on the Palestinian economy.

2.1 The First Stage

The first stage began on 17 January with the outbreak of war in the Persian Gulf and lasted approximately three weeks. This phase was characterised by strict, round-the-clock curfew enforcement during which normal civil



life in the occupied territories was completely paralysed. Resulting disruptions in medical treatment left at least 13 Palestinians dead within the first month of curfew. By this time, many areas were suffering serious shortages in food, fuel, and medicine. Information regarding conditions faced by the curfewed population was severely restricted not only by the curfew, but also by rigorous military censorship of the press.

"Under the current curfew, every aspect of daily life, from buying food for the family to earning a living, is tightly controlled by the Israeli military. Authorities have instituted an elaborate system of passes and permits designed to monitor all activity in the occupied territories. The result is the total breakdown of the normal patterns of both social and economic interaction."

- CCINGO, Press Statement, 2 February 1991, p.1

Enforcement

During the first three weeks, the military strictly enforced curfew, confining residents to their homes 24 hours a day. Brief reprieves of two to three hours were granted an average of every three to four days in the West Bank. In many areas, however, the population passed a week or more under curfew before being permitted to leave their homes for a few hours to try and replenish exhausted supplies. Qabatia, for example, spent 20 days without a reprieve.² In Jalazon Refugee Camp near Ramallah, curfew was lifted an average of once every ten days throughout the first month.³ In the Gaza Strip, where comprehensive curfew was imposed a day before the war began, reprieves were granted once a week for two hours. Only women were allowed to leave their homes; men and children were permitted outside on only one

occasion between 16 January and 28 February.⁴ From the start, Israeli authorities threatened to severely punish curfew violators. Reports of patrolling soldiers threatening residents that those breaking curfew would be shot were widespread.⁵ Press and human rights organisations reported that Israeli soldiers threw sound bombs and fired tear gas and live ammunition at children playing outside their homes and at residents sitting on their roofs and verandas, or in their courtyards. Three days into the curfew, soldiers shot and killed a woman while she was holding her baby on the balcony of her home.

Israeli authorities raised the maximum prison sentence for breaking curfew to five years and the maximum fine to NIS30,000. Less than a week after the curfew was imposed, more than 60 West Bank Palestinians were tried and sentenced during a two-day period for breaking curfew; sentences ranged from fines to three months actual or suspended prison sentences.⁶ By the end of January, the number of arrests for alleged curfew violation had jumped to over 600 people in Gaza and 400 in

"I saw with my own eyes broken arms and other bodily injuries, and I took affidavits from those injured. They said the injuries had occurred on February 3, when the curfew in the Shaboura refugee camp in Rafah was lifted for three hours. The injured I interviewed were all elderly people or children. They said they were in their homes when the curfew was lifted. Border Policemen burst into their homes, looking for children."

- "ACRI Attorney Tamar Pelleg-Sryck's Testimony: Visit to Gaza Under Curfew 3-5 February 1991," in B'Tselem, Information Sheet, January-February 1991, p.15.

the West Bank.⁷ On 30 January, 400 cases, including 250 "quick" trials⁸ for alleged curfew violators were heard in the Gaza Strip.⁹ In a single village, 42 Palestinians were arrested, subjected to "quick" trials, and then sentenced up to three months and fined NIS500-800 during the first three weeks of curfew.¹⁰

News blackout

The strict enforcement of the curfew made it virtually impossible to collect information regarding the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The entire occupied territories was declared a closed military area, barring all access to the press, as well as international observers and relief workers. All news that did reach the media was rigorously censored by the military according to emergency regulations.¹¹ In several instances, reports of shooting deaths did not reach the press for several weeks. In at least one instance, the Palestinian press was prohibited from publishing news of a Palestinian death.¹²

Shortages in essential supplies

With all activity at a standstill, communities began to run out of essential supplies. Food, fuel, and medical supply shortages were reported by the end of the first week and increased throughout the first stage. Areas which had already been under curfew before 17 January were particularly hard hit.¹³ The over 7,000 residents of Deheishe Refugee Camp outside Bethlehem, for example, had been under almost continuous curfew since the

end of December. Likewise, 'Azzoun village and Nur Shams Refugee Camp had been under curfew more than a week when the blanket curfew was imposed.¹⁴

Fatalities and health complications

Curfew regulations prohibited Palestinians from both providing and seeking medical treatment without the prior acquisition of a permit from Israeli military and administrative officials. Access to medical help was rendered impossible for many, a life-threatening risk for others, and a long, difficult, and often humiliating process for all. Since less than 5% of the population has telephones, it was practically impossible to call for ambulances in the case of emergencies.¹⁵ Furthermore, no explicit instructions were issued to the population regarding procedures in case of medical emergencies. Consequently, seeking medical care was often treated as a breach of curfew. A 21-year-old man from Beit Ummar village in the Hebron area, for instance, was shot and wounded by soldiers who opened fire without warning as he was on his way to the local clinic for treatment of a severe skin allergy.¹⁶ The risks involved discouraged many Palestinians from even attempting to obtain permits. Those who did so were at the mercy of "hostile and medically unqualified combat soldiers and administrative personnel".¹⁷ Even if successful in obtaining permits, Palestinians were often left without any means of transportation. Furthermore, travel to hospitals was itself

"This situation is quite outrageous. The right of the sick to receive medical attention is perhaps one of the most basic principles of humanitarian law. Irrespective of the circumstances, the Fourth Geneva Convention allows --indeed obliges-- the Occupying Power to permit the sick to be 'collected and cared for' and accorded 'protection and respect' (Geneva Convention, 1949). Not even a state of war immunised the Israeli authorities from responsibility for such gross human rights violations in the medical field."

- MAP, "Summary Report No.2," 17 February 1991, p.2

"During my tour of duty in Huwara I was witness to tens of cases in which a local resident tried to pass through [a] checkpoint in order to apply for permission to go to hospital, and the soldiers at the checkpoint, who have no medical training, told the resident: 'You are not sick, you don't need any permits, go home.' In order to pass from one area to another, one needs to go through seven stages of Hell. There are those who simply hate Arabs and who try to harass (sic) them in any way. Even if a local has all the permits, he is liable to be stuck at a checkpoint for hours."

"...I don't think that [it] is my or any other soldier's job, if he doesn't have any medical training, to make medical decisions. How are we supposed to know? And why should we be placed in a situation in which we hold in our hands the health of human lives...?"

"Sometimes during the curfew a local arrived and requested a permit to go to hospital, but the soldier in charge sends him back since he doesn't seem sick to him. How have we reached such a situation, in which a soldier decides the medical diagnosis of the residents?"

- sworn testimony of Israeli reserve soldier Simon Ohana, 26 March 1991, as translated by The Society of St. Ives Legal Resource Centre for Human Rights

regulated by on-the-spot decisions of soldiers positioned at numerous check-points. All decisions regarding access to medical care were based on arbitrary, non-medical criteria.

Interference in emergency medical treatment resulted in at least 14 documented fatalities and numerous other cases of serious medical complications. According to a study by the AIPPHR, the number of deaths in Maqassed Hospital in East Jerusalem doubled between December and January. Of nineteen deaths investigated by the Association, at least six were a direct result of delays in medical treatment caused by curfew restrictions.¹⁸ The disruption of regular health care programmes also created difficulties, especially for pregnant women, infants, post-operative patients, the chronically ill, and the mentally and physically disabled.

At least two new-borns died after parents were unable to reach medical help in time.¹⁹ Regarding pregnant women, one international

health organisation reported that by the end of the first phase, "[g]iving birth has become hazardous."²⁰ Home births and pregnancy complications increased significantly as a result of the inability to get curfew passes.²¹ By the last week of January, all hospitals had reported a dramatic fall in deliveries.²² At least one woman died of pregnancy complications when she failed to reach hospital on time. In another case, a pregnant woman from the village of Deir Abu Mish'al, gave birth at military headquarters in Ramallah while waiting for a curfew pass.²³ The woman was stopped at a checkpoint en route to hospital and ordered to go to military headquarters for a pass. In another incident a woman from Turmus 'Aya village, who was forced to deliver without medical help, required urgent treatment after the placenta remained in the womb and caused rapid and excessive haemorrhaging. No doctor was able to reach her. In this case, a phone was available and a doctor talked the mother-in-law through the treatment procedure.²⁴

Fatalities Due to Movement Restrictions

- * Kamilla Kabha, a cerebral palsy patient from the Jenin area village of Barta'a suffering from dehydration was discharged from the local government hospital due to the emergency situation. Although her condition worsened several days afterwards, her family hesitated to embark on the required procedures for obtaining a permit. When they did, they experienced great difficulties. She died on arrival at hospital (UPMRC, Appeal No.7, 14.2.91, p.1).
- * 'Abdallah a-Sheikh Nimr, an older man from the village of Ya'abad near Jenin, died shortly after arriving at al-Ittihad Hospital in Nablus following an internal bleeding episode. His family attempted to obtain a permit to transfer him to hospital on several occasions, but their request was denied by the Israeli authorities on grounds that "his children were troublemakers". It was several days before he received a permit to reach hospital (UPMRC, Appeal No.7, 14.2.91, p.1).
- * In Jenin, a woman suffered from toxemia of pregnancy and died before reaching hospital, following a serious delay in obtaining the necessary transport permit (UPMRC, Appeal No.7, 14.2.91, p.2).
- * Ala' Muhammed, a child with hydrocephaly from Biddu village near Ramallah, died at home after contracting a respiratory infection for which he was unable to receive medical treatment (UPMRC, Appeal No.7, 14.2.91, p.2).
- * Ten-month-old 'Omar Ibraheem from Za'atara in the Bethlehem district died of severe respiratory distress; it took his family several hours to receive a curfew pass and the infant died before they could reach medical services (UPMRC, Appeal No.7, 14.2.91, p.2).
- * On 17 January, the government hospital refused to send an ambulance for an elderly man in Ramallah suffering a heart attack. After a two-and-half hour delay a local ambulance managed to reach him but he died en route to hospital (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 31.1.91, p.11).
- * Shehadeh 'Omar, 76, of Hebron, arrived at Maqassed Hospital 22 January where he died as a result of brain damage and a lung infection due to delay in receiving medical attention because of the curfew (AIPPHR, "Report on Death Cases at Maqassed," 7.4.91).

(cntd.)

- * On 28 January, in Bal'een, a 12-day old girl infant, Sharouq 'Abd al-Lateef Yaseen, died from complications associated with a breach birth where there had been no attending physician due to the curfew. There are no telephones and only six cars in the village (*Al-Fajr English*, 25.3.91; PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.9).
- * Mahmoud Bargouthi, 74, of Ramallah, who had been suffering from cancer of the large intestine, was unable to receive treatment for his condition during curfew. He arrived at Maqassed Hospital in critical condition on 25 January and died on 29 January (AIPPHR, "Report on Death Cases at Maqassed," 7.4.91).
- * A four-day-old infant boy from Taqu'a died on 24 February when his father was refused a permit to take him to hospital for a sudden illness. The father went to the Israeli settlement of Kufr Etzion five kilometres from the village to request a permit from the military officer there but was ordered home immediately under threat of arrest. The infant died on the way home (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.10).

The chronically ill faced similar difficulties in receiving vital treatment. Hundreds of cancer patients were unable to reach treatment centres, "leading to the failure of their entire treatment protocol".²⁵ A child who missed his dialysis treatment in a Jerusalem hospital for three days was on the verge of cardiac arrest when he was finally brought to hospital.²⁶ Other chronically ill patients, including those with heart diseases, hypertension, and diabetes, suffered from lack of follow-up and medication shortages.²⁷ Treatment programmes for the disabled were likewise disrupted. The Bethlehem Arab Society for the Physically Handicapped, for example, reported that although eight out of ten of their chronic patients requiring daily treatment were able to return on 29 January, two weeks of interruption in treatment had badly affected their muscles and worsened the condition of their bedsores.²⁸

Psychological toll

The prolonged curfew resulted in extremely high levels of psychological stress for Palestinians of all ages. Approximately 50% of the population live in two rooms or less while the average family size is seven to eight persons per household.²⁹ The sense of vulnerability, deprivation, and discrimination normally felt during curfew were compounded by the length of this curfew and, equally importantly, by the lack of adequate protection against conventional and chemical attack.³⁰ The UPMRC reported cases of serious psychological complications resulting from "being locked up at home 24 hours daily".³¹ Palestinian psychiatrists predicted that the major victims of the curfew would be children.³² Incidents of stress-related symptoms amongst children, such as bed-wetting, rose significantly during the curfew. The number of reported cases of domestic violence also increased.³³

Curfew conditions also led to an increase in stress-related diseases. Hospitals and clinics reported a rise in premature labour, chest pains, respiratory distress, a 37% rise in diabetic cases, and a 30% increase in the number of heart attacks.³⁴

2.2 The Second Stage

- The second stage began in the second to third week of February and lasted until early March. As the devastation of the month-long paralysis took hold and households faced acute economic hardship, military troops systematically raided community after community, terrorising residents and arresting hundreds of Palestinians. At the same time, punitive measures imposed against the Palestinian community rose sharply.

"As an international humanitarian organisation, UNRWA feels that these curfews --which are imposed not in response to any specific security-related incident-- are an unnecessary burden on Palestinians who are already suffering greatly from the effects of the Gulf war in the form of lost jobs and income from the Gulf states."

- then UNRWA Commissioner-General Giorgio Giacomelli in a statement issued at UNRWA headquarters in Vienna, as quoted in UNRWA News, No. 223, 6 February 1991.

Enforcement

During the fourth and fifth weeks, the curfew began to take on a different form; the military officially announced that on extended day-time reprieves of eight to twelve hours would be granted so that a restricted number of workers could return to their jobs in Israel and some schools could reopen. Authorities warned, however, that any area where violence erupted would be punished and that

workers from such areas would be denied permits.³⁵ Reprieves were implemented on a location by location basis. In many areas, curfew continued as usual. Residents of Jericho, for instance, were subject to a week of curfew without reprieve from 18 February.³⁶ In the same week, curfew in Beit Sahour was lifted for only two hours after five days without reprieve.³⁷ During the same week in the Gaza Strip, over half of the towns and refugee camps were under curfew without reprieve on any given day, and from 19 February Deir al-Balah and Nuseirat Refugee Camp were under seven and six days of curfew without reprieve respectively.³⁸ Despite claims by the Israeli authorities that life was returning to normal, the granting of reprieves continued to follow an irregular and geographically staggered pattern throughout the rest of February.

Even during breaks in the curfew, inter-regional movement within the occupied territories remained prohibited without the acquisition of special curfew passes. Areas were consequently isolated from each other, rendering the West Bank and Gaza Strip a series of "closed-open prisons".³⁹ The already numerous military checkpoints were increased and existing roadblocks took on a semi-permanent appearance. Entrance into East Jerusalem and Israel was also tightly restricted. International personnel, including those involved in relief, development, and media work, continued to be denied access to the occupied territories. The only persons not subject to movement restrictions, aside from military personnel, were Israeli settlers living in the occupied territories.

The stringency of curfew enforcement varied considerably from area to area during this period. In some villages, movement restrictions were more relaxed due to the lack of military presence. Curfew regulations, however, remained ambiguous and were arbitrarily enforced. The sudden appearance

CURFEWS IN THE GAZA STRIP

(February 1991)

Beit Hanoun							12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	
Jabalia				4			4				7					8						4				9	10	
Jabalia RC				4			4				7					8						4				9	10	
Deir al-Balah	3							2			8			2			5								9.5	5		
Deir al-Balah RC	3							2			8			2			5								9.5	5		
Khan Younis				2			3				7				7			7	8			9	9	9.5	9	14		
Khan Younis RC				2			3				7				7			7	8			9	9	9.5	9	14		
Bureij RC		2				2				6			2			7			7				9.5	7.5	8.5	14		
Nuseirat RC					2				2			2				4					7			8.5	7.5	14		
Gaza City				4			6				8			8.5			9	9	9	9		9	9	9	9	10		
Rafah			3				3						3.5			3			7			7				14		
Rafah RC			3				3						3.5			3			7			7				14		
Maghazi RC		2				2				12			7			7	9			2				8.5	9	14		
Shati RC						4				4		2					3					4				10		
February 1991	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28

Nos. shown are hours of curfew reprieve*



▪ total curfew

SOURCE: UNRWA records

*Reprieves granted for women only, excepting 6 February.

of the army in a village or the changing moods of patrolling soldiers remained a constant threat to residents venturing outside their homes. The inconsistency of enforcement was in and of itself an additional danger, since people accustomed to relatively relaxed curfew enforcement might suddenly find themselves under fire for breaking curfew.

On 10 February, a 12-year-old boy from Deheishe Refugee Camp grazing sheep near his home was shot dead by soldiers for breaking curfew. In another incident, a 17-year-old youth from Tulkarem Refugee Camp, was shot in the buttocks with live ammunition for breaking curfew and then beaten on the chest and head, damaging his ear. Soldiers frequently beat curfew breakers. On one day in Nablus, at least five cases were documented in which residents, ranging in age from 12 to 47, were beaten so severely they required medical treatment.⁴⁰

Arrest of curfew breakers continued in this phase. By 13 February, the army reported that 1,714 persons were arrested for breaking curfew in the West Bank alone. Most were fined between NIS500 and NIS1,500, the equivalent of about a month's pay, even as curfew continued to prevent the vast majority of the Palestinian work force from returning to work; those unable to pay were held in prison for several weeks.⁴¹

Economic hardships and shortages in essentials

By the second stage, movement restrictions coupled with economic hardship, had led to severe food and medicine shortages, which seriously threatened the health of young children, pregnant women, the elderly, the chronically ill, and the disabled.⁴² Even before the second phase, health workers were reporting increases in nutritional diseases due to lack of food, particularly baby formula and milk.⁴³ Changes in consumption patterns of destitute families led to as much as a 30% increase in malnutrition rates. In some

"A state of war, however, does not lessen the duty of the state to respect human rights, and the new situation does not imply the absence of binding legal norms, morality, and fairness. The real test of a society is exactly its commitment to the basic value of justice during a time of a crisis."

- B'Tselem, Information Sheet, January-February 1991, p.2.

villages, meat consumption dropped by 80% and reliance on rice increased by as much as 250%.⁴⁴ Hypothermia cases among infants due to the inability of families to purchase heating oil were also reported.⁴⁵ UNRWA responded to the critical situation by implementing an emergency food programme aimed at some 295,000 Palestinian families;⁴⁶ other international NGOs as well as Palestinian relief and welfare institutions also undertook emergency relief programmes. All agencies, however, faced serious difficulties in implementing their programmes due to the curfew and other military restrictions.⁴⁷ Confinement in close quarters, the interruption of sanitation services, and water shortages in some areas heightened the risk of infectious diseases. A number of these problems occurred as a direct result of military interference. Soldiers routinely prevented sanitary workers from emptying sewage tanks, leading to leakages in a number of refugee camps. As of 3 March, the UNRWA director of Deheishe Refugee Camp reported that sanitation vehicles had been unable to move in the camp for three months.⁴⁸

Army operations and punitive measures

The second phase was marked by a vigorous attempt on the part of Israeli military forces to re-establish control over the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. Soldiers, often accompanied by tax officials,

conducted systematic raids, moving from village to village and camp to camp. Military raids involved house-to-house searches, during which soldiers physically assaulted and verbally abused residents, in addition to

inflicting extensive damage to household property. Many of the raids were part of a massive arrest operation launched during the second phase. By 12 February, the Israeli military reported that it had arrested 1,291

**Punitive Measures Launched Against Palestinians
17 January - 31 March 1991**

Deportation orders

- * Deportation orders were issued against four Gaza residents for alleged "security" reasons.

Demolitions and sealings

- * 13 houses, 10 stores, and 1 clinic were fully demolished on "security" grounds.
- * 16 houses were fully sealed and 3 partially sealed on "security" grounds.
- * 40 houses were fully destroyed and 3 partially destroyed for lack of building permit.

Tree uprootings

- * Approximately 3,000 trees were uprooted.

Press

- * 5 Palestinian press offices were closed by military order.
- * 3 Palestinian journalists were detained.
- * 1 Palestinian editor was detained.

Closure of research centres

- * 2 East Jerusalem offices of the Arab Studies Society were closed by military order for five months each on "security" grounds. Orders closing other Arab Studies Society offices in July 1988 were extended through July 1991.

Utility services cut

- * Water supplies were cut to at least 11 locations, affecting a population of over 93,000, because some residents were unable to pay water bills.
- * Electricity was cut to a number of locations, including Hebron and Halhoul where over 95,000 people were without power for three days.
- * Telephone lines were cut to several locations.

Closure of central markets

- * In the Gaza Strip, Palestine Square was closed for 75 consecutive days as of 31 March.
- * In the West Bank, central markets in at least 3 major towns were closed for varying lengths of time even during curfew lifts.

SOURCE: JMCC records from the local press (For detailed lists see Appendix C.)

Palestinians in the West Bank alone. Hundreds more were arrested in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip for alleged "security" offences in the last two weeks of February.

The military also accelerated its use of punitive measures during this period. In the fifth week of curfew (17-23 February), 13 houses were destroyed and five sealed or partially sealed. The following week, seven stores, three houses, and one clinic were demolished. (See Appendix C2.) Uprooting of trees, a punitive measure most often carried out on grounds that the orchard is allegedly used as a cover for stonethrowers targeting Israeli vehicles, were also widespread. By the

end of February hundreds of trees were being uprooted weekly.⁴⁹ (See Appendix C3.)

2.3 The Third Stage

During the third stage, which began in early March, Israel established complete control over movement in the occupied territories through the institutionalisation of a new pass system. The fragmentation of the occupied territories into isolated geographic subdivisions was made permanent. Economic destitution reached alarming levels. Simultaneously, Palestinians were subjected to a dramatic increase in army brutality. This phase was also marked by Israel's accelerated confiscation of Palestinian land.

Examples of Arrest Raids

- * 11 February, Israeli authorities announced that military forces had detained approximately 350 members of the Islamic movement *Hamas* (*Al-Ittihad*, 12.2.91). The same day, military forces arrested 17 villagers from Qabatia wanted by Israeli security (*An-Nahar*, 12.2.91).
- * 12 February, 31 "wanted" youths from Deir al-Ghasoun, near Tulkarem were arrested (*Al-Fajr English*, 18.2.91).
- * 18 February, military forces arrested 30 villagers from 'Awarta village, 15 people in the Bethlehem area, 21 in the Hebron area, and 15 in the Ramallah area. All of the arrestees were allegedly sought by the military (*Al-Fajr English*, 25.2.91).
- * 19 February, 10 youths from Kufr 'Ain and three from Jalazon Refugee Camp were arrested during further raids in the Ramallah area (*Al-Fajr English*, 25.2.91).
- * 23 February, raiding military forces in the Tulkarem area arrested 12 villagers from Kufr Labad (*A-Sha'ab*, 24.2.91).
- * During a two-day sweep in Jerusalem, Israeli police arrested approximately 60 Palestinians allegedly suspected of participating in demonstrations, stone throwing, and arson attacks (*An-Nahar*, 23.2.91).
- * During a two-day sweep in the Gaza Strip, 76 Palestinians were arrested (*Al-Fajr English*, 4.3.91). During similar operations in the Jericho, Tulkarem, and Bethlehem areas, approximately 60 people were arrested in 48 hours (*Attali'a*, 28.2.91).
- * 25 February, in the Ramallah area, 20 persons were arrested from Birzeit and 39 from Qarawat Bani Zeid (*A-Sha'ab*, 26.2.91).
- * 27 February, 14 villagers were arrested from 'Awarta in the Nablus area (*Al-Ittihad*, 28.2.91).

Lifting of the blanket curfew

On 3 March, after 46 days, the blanket curfew in the Gaza Strip was lifted during day-time hours. (The "war curfew" brought the number of blanket curfews imposed on the Gaza Strip since the start of the uprising to 26, for a combined total of 123 days.⁵⁰) Night curfew, in effect almost continuously during the uprising, remained in force throughout the Gaza Strip.⁵¹

In the West Bank, day-time reprieves continued to be issued on a selective and haphazard basis. A number of locations, however, remained subject to prolonged curfews. The village of 'Awarta in the Nablus area, for example, was under continuous curfew from 25 February through 24 March, during which only four reprieves, each lasting just two hours, were granted. During reprieves, residents were prevented from leaving the village to replenish food stocks and other basic necessities. Water supplies were cut to the village and uncollected sewage overflowed. During the curfew, soldiers conducted house-to-house raids beating residents and causing extensive damage to property.⁵²

Night curfew was finally lifted from Qalqilia on 23 March and from the rest of the West Bank on 24 March (with the exception of areas subject to individual curfew orders). Nearly one month after the Gulf war had ended, most of the over two million Palestinians living in the occupied territories were finally allowed to leave their homes on a regular basis.

The institutionalisation of the pass system

Despite the lifting of the blanket curfew, movement restrictions continued to hamper life in the occupied territories. During the third stage, Israeli authorities institutionalised the pass system, geographically fragmenting the occupied territories into four regions -- the northern West Bank, East Jerusalem, the southern West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

Under the new pass system, Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip are prohibited from entering East Jerusalem or Israel without first acquiring a special pass from the Israeli Civil Administration authorities in their area of residence. Palestinians outside of East Jerusalem are cut off from the nucleus of their cultural and religious activity, as well as from a major site of business and commercial activity.⁵³ They are also prevented from reaching some of the most important medical facilities,⁵⁴ the majority of media and communication services,⁵⁵ and a number of educational institutions located in East Jerusalem. Residents are further barred from seeking services available in areas accessible to them only by passage through East Jerusalem, including major marketing centres and specialised medical facilities.⁵⁶

Anyone wishing to enter East Jerusalem or Israel to work, seek medical care, attend school, worship, visit family or friends, or simply to reach another region of the occupied territories must acquire a permit expressly for this purpose. Clear instructions regarding the procedure for acquiring a permit and the criteria upon which they are granted, however, were never issued. All applicants must specify their reasons for requesting a permit; different types of permits are issued from a variety of different Israeli authorities. All applicants must receive "security" clearance in addition to obtaining verification from the Israeli-run tax department that all their taxes and fines have been paid. In a number of cases, applicants were forced to make down payments on next year's income taxes. In Qalqilia, for example, people were denied work permits on grounds that taxes were owed from as far back as 1985.⁵⁷

The application process can take several hours, several days, or even several weeks. There is no guarantee that a pass will be issued. It is not unusual for the process to take longer than the period for which a permit

"Despite the claims of Israeli authorities, life in the occupied territories has not returned to normal. On the contrary, Palestinians are being subjected to an entirely new form of domination --the pass system. All movement between and within the West Bank and Gaza Strip is now tightly controlled. No Palestinians are allowed to pass through or enter into East Jerusalem without a special permit, cutting off the majority of the Palestinian population from the commercial and cultural centre of Palestinian life. This also restricts travel between the north and south of the West Bank, and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip...."

"The rhythm of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is now severely disrupted by this pass system. Rather than operating according to clearly specified regulations, the system is based on a completely arbitrary devolution of power. It is administered by individual soldiers staffing numerous checkpoints located throughout the occupied territories."

"Soldiers decide on a day-by-day and case-by-case basis which Palestinians will or will not be allowed to pass through the roadblocks. Junior-ranking soldiers have the authority to prevent even doctors and patients from reaching hospitals either to carry out their duties or to receive treatment."

- CCINGO, "Update: The Effects of the Curfew and the New Pass System on the Palestinians Living in the Occupied Territories," 26 March 1991, pp.1-2.

is valid. Passes are issued for a specific amount of time ranging from a single day to several months. At the end of the specified period, the recipient must repeat the same application process all over again in order to obtain a new pass. Each pass is issued with specific limitations regarding the location, time period (ie. between 6:00am - 4:00pm), and purpose (ie. work, medical, etc.) for which it is valid. In addition to travel passes and work permits, separate permits are required for vehicles with West Bank and Gaza Strip licence plates to enter Jerusalem and Israel.⁵⁸

In the case of a health emergency in the Gaza Strip at the end of March, for example, three separate passes were required to transfer a patient referred to one of the major hospitals in East Jerusalem --one pass for the car, one for the driver, and a third for the patient. In the case of one private school in East Jerusalem, 50% of its staff required passes to reach work. The school's headmaster reported

that since most teachers were unable to bring their cars into East Jerusalem, the school was forced to provide transportation for teachers living outside the city. Separate passes were required for the school's vehicles, drivers, teachers, and the majority of its students. In order to operate properly, the school needed five different types of passes separately issued by two different authorities.⁵⁹

Economic destitution

In both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, conditions continued to deteriorate in the third phase. Unemployment soared to 50% and over 150,000 workers and their families were without any visible means of income.⁶⁰ Many families are unable to pay rent, utility bills, or even to buy food and essential fuel and medical supplies. By mid-March, despite the easing of curfew restrictions, 12% of the households in several surveyed West Bank villages were living below subsistence levels⁶¹ and UNRWA Commissioner-General Ilter

Turkmen announced that the food situation was becoming "critical".⁶²

Army brutality

Given the impossibility of monitoring human rights violations in the first phase, injury statistics for the curfew period are sparse and incomplete, particularly for the West Bank. Preliminary evidence suggests that army brutality increased sharply by the third stage. Most injuries were a result of beatings. Palestinians of all ages were beaten in their homes during military raids, or in the streets for breaking curfew or during curfew reprieves. At least 686 army-related injuries were treated in Gaza Strip hospitals and clinics in February, including 548 beating injuries⁶³ and 60 live ammunition injuries. In March, UNRWA reported 505 cases of beating injuries and a quadrupling of live ammunition injuries to 226 cases.⁶⁴ Beatings were also widespread in the West Bank. On the morning of 28 March, for example, soldiers beat at least 100 men and several women on Haifa Street in Nablus city alone.⁶⁵

"...soldiers are in the habit of raiding the residents' homes, mostly in the middle of the night, beating them up and committing various provocations with the intent of terrorising the residents....The utterly uncontrolled and unrestrained behaviour of the soldiers is enabled by the indifference demonstrated by the military authorities apparently as part of a policy of intentional disregard.... Consequently, every soldier can do whatever he sees fit."

- from a joint statement by AIPPHR and Hotline for the Defence of Individuals, regarding military actions in Qalandia Refugee Camp as quoted in Al-Fajr English, 25 March 1991.

International organisations, many of which regularly monitor the human rights situation in the occupied territories, were also subject to military harassment and brutality. UNRWA reported 14 army incursions into its schools and health centres in the Gaza Strip as of 6 March. During the same time period, five UNRWA staff members in Gaza were mistreated by soldiers, including a warehouse guard in Rafah, who was severely beaten by raiding troops, and two international staff members, who were physically assaulted by Israeli soldiers while on duty in West Bank refugee camps.⁶⁶ In one of these incidents an international officer was attacked and severely beaten when he arrived in Qalandia Refugee Camp as soldiers were forcibly rounding up all male residents in the camp from ages 16 and 40.⁶⁷

Palestinians Killed by Israeli Army and Settlers (17 January - 30 March 1991)

army gunfire	16
settler gunfire	1
death in prison	1
<u>miscellaneous</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	21

Land confiscation

The third phase was also marked by an acceleration of land confiscation. Israeli authorities continued their long-standing policy of land confiscation throughout the curfew, during which the curtailment of newspaper circulation kept most residents uninformed of the confiscation orders. (Residents usually learn of land confiscation orders through announcements published in East Jerusalem newspapers.) Curfew restrictions further precluded the possibility of appealing such orders. Between 17 January and 28 February, Israeli authorities

confiscated 1,000 dunams of land. In the third phase, the amount of land confiscation rose to over 18,000 dunams and owners of an additional 50,000 dunams were informed that their land was to be expropriated.

"We are convinced that living on the Palestinian side of the 'green line' is like living in one big prison."

- Ettore Masina, delegation spokesperson for the Human Rights Commission of the Italian Parliament following a visit to the occupied territories, as quoted in *Al-Fajr English*, 1 April 1991).

3. The Paralysis of Civil Society Operations

The assault on Palestinian infrastructure was total and devastating. All normal civil life ground to an immediate halt during the first phase of curfew; despite a degree of relaxation in the latter phases, operation in all sectors of Palestinian society remained seriously restricted. Institutional damage in the health and education sectors was particularly severe. Medical institutions were forced to function at severely reduced capacities during the first two stages of the curfew; in the third stage essential health services continued to be disrupted, and many hospitals were operating in the red. Educational institutions, completely closed down for over a month, remained unable to function effectively for the third consecutive month due to continuing movement restrictions.

3.1 Health

The "war curfew" wreaked havoc on an already overtaxed health system in the occupied territories. Movement restrictions, harassment of health workers, interruptions in preventive and rehabilitative health care programmes, and economic hardship all

seriously compromised the ability of medical institutions and health workers to adequately provide for the health needs of the Palestinian community.

Restrictions on movement

As mentioned above, curfew restrictions prevented many Palestinians from gaining access to hospitals and clinics for vital health care. At the same time, the limited number of passes granted to health personnel forced hospitals to operate at greatly reduced capacities. A month into curfew, only 20-30% of the health care personnel (including physicians, nurses, ambulance drivers, and other support staff) had received curfew passes.⁶⁸ Israeli-run government hospitals were still under instructions to admit only emergency cases and hospitals and clinics in the non-governmental sector, which provide over 50% of the basic curative, preventive, and rehabilitation health services, were able to operate only marginally, if at all.⁶⁹ Several organisations opened their clinics without permits in response to the declining health situation; in these instances, however, both staff and patients were at considerable risk for violating curfew regulations.⁷⁰

Two weeks into the curfew, Maqassed Hospital in East Jerusalem, the major referral centre for the entire occupied territories, was operating with only 40% of its staff. The remaining 60% were either confined to their homes by curfew or unable to pass through checkpoints despite having passes.⁷¹ By the third week of curfew, only 150 passes had been granted for Maqassed employees;⁷² 460 of the hospital's 700 member staff live in the occupied territories outside of Jerusalem. Those able to reach hospital were forced to work double and triple shifts. By the end of February, only 260 staff members had received passes.⁷³

Hospitals and clinics also faced shortages in medical and first aid supplies. The majority of

Examples of Movement Restrictions on Health Workers

- * At St. John's Ophthalmic and St. Joseph's hospitals in Jerusalem, 50% of the nursing staff and 25% of the physicians were unable to reach work at the end of January (UPMRC, Appeal No.5, 26.1.91, p.1).
- * A staff member of Augusta Victoria Hospital in Jerusalem who lives in Abu Dees was fined NIS350 while standing on the road waiting to be picked up by a hospital car. Two weeks into curfew, only 30% of the hospital's medical staff were able to reach work (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 31.1.91, p.10).
- * In the Hebron area village of Samou'a, the only physician for the population of 8,000 had not been granted permission to leave his house by the start of the fifth week of curfew (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17.2.91, p.10).
- * Maqassed Hospital was unable to open its village clinic network throughout the first two weeks of curfew (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 31.1.91, p.10).
- * By the second week of curfew, al-Ittihad Hospital in Nablus was only able to operate on an emergency basis as most medical teams were unable to report to work despite the fact that valid curfew passes for staff predated the onset of the "war curfew" (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 31.1.91, p.10).
- * UHWC reported that as of 12 February, only 13 of its 42 clinics were able to function and home visits by health workers had been reduced by 50% (UHWC statement 12.2.91; PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17.2.91, p.10).
- * The Hebron Red Crescent applied for permits for its 120-member staff on 16 January, but only 10% were granted. On 31 January, a second application for 40 more essential staff was made. The organisation had yet to receive a reply by the third week of curfew (MAP, "Summary Report No.1," 17.1.-3.2.91, p.3).
- * A doctor working with the Patients Friends Society's primary health care clinics in the Ramallah area was given a pass but his car was not (MAP, "Summary Report No.2," 17.2.91, p.3).
- * Beit Liqia, a village of 800 residents, had no physician for 15 days (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17.2.91, p.10).
- * The Patients Friends Society in Nablus reported that one month into curfew only 40 of its 70 employees had been granted curfew passes; physicians were among those refused (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17.2.91, p.10).
- * Gaza Child Development Centre, caring for 60 disabled children suffering from cerebral palsy and PKU (a protein-deficiency syndrome), reported one month into the curfew that physical therapists were still unable to travel to the centre (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17.2.91, p.10).
- * On 24 February, only those in close proximity to Muhammed 'Ali Muhtaseb Hospital in Hebron were able to reach work. The local military authorities announced that all previously issued passes, including those of health workers, were invalid. Employees were forced to work double shifts since only 50% of the physicians and 45% of the nurses were on site at the time of the announcement. Although ambulances continued to operate, they faced serious military harassment and delay (MAP, "Situation Report," 24.2.91, pp.3-4).
- * On 24 February, the permits of all UNRWA workers, including medical personnel, in the 4 Nablus refugee camps, were revoked and camp clinics prevented from opening. Physicians were only able to move in ambulances (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.12).

drug companies in the occupied territories were closed during the first week to ten days of curfew. Even after being permitted to open, pharmaceutical companies were forced to operate at greatly reduced capacities. Furthermore, distribution of pharmaceuticals remained difficult due to continued movement restrictions.⁷⁴

Basic, preventive, and rehabilitative health programmes continued to be threatened due to the institutionalisation of the pass system. As a result of movement restrictions, many out-patients were still unable to make appointments in Jerusalem hospitals in late March. On Friday, 22 March, for example, only 9 of 40 regular day patients at Augusta Victoria were able to enter Jerusalem. Patients possessing all the necessary permits still faced the prospect of either delays or refusals to pass at the numerous checkpoints located throughout the occupied territories.⁷⁵

"...medical treatment for Palestinians in the tertiary hospitals of East Jerusalem remains effectively prohibited as all the occupied territories are closed military zones; and tens of thousands of Palestinians holding marked identity cards, equivalent to the now-discarded South African pass cards, are subject to severe restriction of movement and harassment, thus effectively depriving them of seeking and finding work and medical treatment."

- AIPPHR and The Society of St. Ives Legal Resource Centre for Human Rights, in an open letter to US Secretary of State James Baker 9 April 1991

Harassment of health workers

Health workers were frequently prevented from administering medical treatment, particularly in the first two stages of the

curfew. According to field investigations carried out by the PHRIC, during the first month of curfew "[v]irtually every medical institution or organisation reported interference from the military in carrying out their jobs."⁷⁶ In addition to routine harassment and delays, at least one physician was shot by Israeli soldiers while trying to administer treatment, ambulance drivers and health workers were shot or beaten in a number of separate incidents, clinics were raided, and physicians and health workers were arrested.

Disruption of health care programmes

The breakdown of non-emergency health care constituted a grave threat to public health. The disruption of immunisation programmes, for example, continued for two months; 60% of the population of school-age children did not receive necessary vaccinations due to curfew-imposed school closures.⁷⁷ In early February, an outbreak of measles was reported in the West Bank. The disease spread to the largely unvaccinated Palestinian Bedouin community and by 14 February, 200 cases including six deaths had been documented.⁷⁸ By March, measles were reported throughout the West Bank. Many of the children over six who should have been revaccinated were not. These children contracted measles and then infected children under 15 months who had not yet been vaccinated. In addition to increases in infectious diseases, physicians also reported a rise in a variety of other health problems usually treated in health programmes, including complications among pregnant women, new-borns, and the chronically ill.⁷⁹

Economic hardship

The decline in the economic welfare of the population further taxed the ability of health organisations to function. Economic hardships left many Palestinians unable to pay for medical care, resulting in a sharp increase in operational costs for non-governmental health institutions. One month into curfew, organisations reported 60% drops in

Military Harassment of Health Workers

- * Within the first two weeks of curfew, at least three incidents were reported in which Red Crescent ambulance drivers in the Hebron area were attacked by Israeli soldiers (MAP, "Summary Report No.1," 17.1.-3.2.91, p.2).
- * On 16 February, Khalaf Muhammed 'Abd a-Rahman Muhtaseb, an ambulance driver for the Hebron Red Crescent Society, was shot at by ten armed settlers as he was passing through the Old City of Hebron on an emergency call. Settlers blocked the road despite the fact that the ambulance lights and siren were operating. When Khalaf manoeuvred his way around the settlers, one settler opened fire at him from behind. A bullet entered the back door of the ambulance and passed through the driver's seat, grazing Khalaf's buttock (MAP, "Summary Report No.2," 17.2.91, p.4; PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.11).
- * Physician and peace activist Dr. Mamdouh al-Aker was arrested on 27 February and held for 39 days. During his incarceration, the 47-year-old urologist was deprived of sleep for 60-hour periods and held in isolation in a tiny cell with a sack over his head and his hands handcuffed behind his back. Al-Aker, a founding member of the Mandela Institute for Palestinian Prisoners, a member of the Israeli-Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights, and the Palestinian Centre for the Study of Non-Violence, and an advisor to the PHRIC, went on hunger strike for several days after Israeli authorities refused to allow him to pass on medical information regarding his critically ill patients. The physician ended his strike after three and a half days when authorities allowed him to turn over a list of patients and prescribed medical treatment to a colleague. Upon his release, Dr. al-Aker was placed under house arrest (*A-Sha'ab*, 28.3.91, 29.3.91; *Al-Fajr English*, 25.3.91; *Al-Fajr*, 8.4.91).
- * On 5 February, soldiers entered the UNRWA clinic in Jalazon Refugee Camp and ordered it closed. Patients, UNRWA employees (the clerk and assistant pharmacist) were beaten, cursed and forced to leave. UNRWA employees carrying curfew passes were also stopped from distributing milk to children (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17.2.91, p.11).
- * Dr. 'Adnan Quqa, a 33-year-old physician, was shot in the leg with live ammunition as he was administering treatment to tear gas victims in the Old City of Nablus on 7 February (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17.2.91, p.11).
- * Dr. Peter Qumri, 44, chief of surgery at al-Hussein Hospital in Beit Jala and president of Bethlehem's Patients Friends Society, was arrested 14 January and placed under six-month administrative detention in early February (*Al-Fajr English*, 11.2.91). Dr. Qumri was reportedly being held on suspicion of providing training on how to treat victims of chemical warfare (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.11).
- * At the start of the ground war in the Persian Gulf on 24 February, soldiers raided the UNRWA clinic in Jenin Refugee Camp and ordered doctors and nurses to leave. Soldiers stationed at the entrance to hospitals in Jenin turned back physicians (Aseel Press Services, as reported in PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.11).

patient fees and 50% increases in patient loads. At the same time, organisations were forced to extend lines of credit with local drug companies.⁸⁰ By the end of March, hospitals and clinics reported an 80-100% increase in the number of hardship cases and health workers estimated that approximately 40% of their patients were unable to pay for medical care.⁸¹

3.2 Education

On 15 January the Israeli military authorities ordered the closure of all educational institutions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The closures affected over 500,000 school students and over 22,800 college and university students. It was over a month before permission was granted to begin the gradual reopening of schools, a process which took yet another month. Elementary schools in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were closed a minimum of five to seven school weeks from 15 January.⁸² Preparatory and secondary classes were closed a minimum of six to nine weeks. Moreover, during the month-long reopening period (19 February - 18 March) curfews continued to regularly interrupt classes in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In Hebron, the West Bank's third largest city, for example, classes were interrupted by curfews approximately one third of the first month in which schools were formally reopened. Over half of the Gaza Strip was under curfew on any given day during the first ten days in which schools began to resume classes there.

At the time of writing (April 1991), four of the six Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip remained closed for the fourth consecutive year. Bethlehem University and the fourteen community colleges (including the four community colleges comprising Al-Quds University) were permitted to reopen between 18 and 20 March after more than two months of closure. However, movement restrictions continued to

prevent a considerable portion of students from reaching classes.

West Bank

Due to a mandatory military-imposed "vacation" from 31 December through 12 January, schools in the West Bank had only been open for two days when the 15 January blanket closure was issued.⁸³ A number of West Bank schools, subject to individual closure orders in addition to area-wide closures, had already lost up to 73% of the first semester of this year.⁸⁴ When elementary students finally returned to school they had already lost at least 30% of the second semester. Elder students lost approximately 50% of the semester due to the blanket closure; students in the first and second secondary classes have met only two school weeks since their classes resumed.⁸⁵ Despite this, at the end of March Israeli authorities were still refusing requests to extend the current school year.⁸⁶

Schools in East Jerusalem, although not directly affected by the general curfew, were also unable to operate normally. In early February, many teachers working in private schools had still not received travel passes.⁸⁷ Even with the lifting of curfew, the pass system continued to hinder the normal functioning of East Jerusalem private schools as it required a significant number of students and staff to acquire permits to reach school. (See Section 2.3 above.)

Gaza Strip

Due to a blanket closure order effective 27 December (the third blanket closure of Gaza Strip schools issued that month), schools in the Gaza Strip had already been shut down for over two weeks when the "war curfew" was imposed.⁸⁸ In a normal year, Gaza Strip students are two weeks away from finishing the school year's pre-set curriculum by the end of February and the remainder of the school year is used for revision and

Calendar of the Second Semester of the 1990/91 School Year

27.12.-15.1.	Blanket closure of all GS schools.
31.12.-12.1.	Mandatory "vacation" for all WB schools interrupting mid-term exams scheduled for 3.1.-10.1.
15.1.-18.2.	All WB and GS schools closed by military order.
19.2.-4.3.	WB and GS elementary classes resume on a gradual basis in locations where day-time curfew reprieves are granted. Schools in at least 13 West Bank villages and camps prohibited from reopening.
24.2.	Military authorities grant permission for WB third secondary classes to resume. Despite the announcement, all schools in the WB and GS are shut down by the re-imposition of a comprehensive curfew.
25.2.	WB third secondary schools resume in locations where day-time curfew reprieves are granted. Eight secondary schools in Nablus prohibited from reopening.
1.3.	All classes in GS again suspended by comprehensive curfew. Military authorities extend closure orders against Birzeit, a-Najah, and Hebron universities in the West Bank for three months. The indefinite closure of the Islamic University in the Gaza Strip remains in effect.
3.3.	GS third secondary schools permitted to resume.
4.3.	WB preparatory schools permitted to resume. Schools in the villages of Jayyous, Kufr Jamal, Kufr Zeebad, and Kufr 'Aboush in the Tulkarem area, and Kufr Qadoun in the Nablus area permitted to reopen for the first time since 15.1.
7.3.	GS preparatory schools permitted to resume, excluding two schools closed by military order prior to the Gulf war.
16.3.	All 5 schools in the Tulkarem Refugee Camp closed, effecting over 2,200 students.
17.3.	GS first and second secondary classes permitted to resume.
18.3.	WB first and second secondary classes permitted to resume. All community colleges in the occupied territories granted permission to resume with the exception of Abu Dees College and al-Bireh Nursing College.
20.3.	Abu Dees College, al-Bireh Nursing College and Bethlehem University granted permission to reopen. Three weeks later, one third of Bethlehem University's 1,500 students were still unable to reach classes due to continued movement restrictions.
29.3.-30.3.	All schools closed for two days, marking the 15th anniversary of Land Day.
3.4.	Study for 800 students in Shweike village's three schools permitted to resume for the first time since 15 January.

**Approximate Number of School Weeks Lost
(1 January - 31 March 1991)**

	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Elementary	5-7	5-7
Preparatory	7	7
Secondary I & II	9	9
Secondary III	6	7

Note: These figures show the approximate number of weeks lost due to the comprehensive closure order beginning 15 January and the gradual reopening by grade level beginning 19 February, as well as blanket curfews (4 days in GS, 3 days in WB) which closed all schools following school reopenings. They do not take into account closure orders affecting individual schools or location-specific curfews. Thus, the actual number of school days lost for the majority of students at each level is much higher than indicated in the above figures.

**Additional Military-Imposed Closures and Opening Delays
(1 January - 31 March 1991)**

Total number of individual closure orders:	44
Total number of location-wide closure orders:	1*
Total number of individual schools delayed in reopening:	17
Total number of location-wide delayed reopenings:	4

* the 5 UNRWA schools in Tulkarem Refugee Camp were closed by a location-wide order

SOURCE: JMCC records based on local press (For detailed list of school closures see Appendix C5.)

examinations. By the end of this February, however, secondary classes in government schools had met only 20 days and completed only one of the school year's eight curriculum sections. Preparatory classes in government schools had met only 42 days during the preceding five months and, at most, only 20% of the year's curriculum had been covered. Educators reported that due to continued military disruptions, the area's 113,000 elementary students had yet to master basic reading and writing skills.⁸⁹

4. Economic Collapse

As a direct result of the curfew, the Palestinian economy suffered its worst recession since 1968. The recession came hard on the heels of three years of serious economic decline in the occupied territories.⁹⁰ The assault on the Palestinian economy was the most devastating aspect of the curfew. For a period ranging from several weeks to over two months more than 304,000 workers were deprived of their sources of income. An

estimated 2.2 million dunams of cultivated land, much of it with produce ready for harvest, was forcibly left untended;⁹¹ in the West Bank alone, over 120,000 dunams of agricultural land was partially or fully damaged.⁹² 4,255 factories and workshops were shut down, and commercial activity was brought to a virtual standstill.⁹³ The consequences of this complete shut-down of all economic activity will extend well beyond the immediate curfew period and result in long-term repercussions of catastrophic proportions. The apparently permanent nature of the pass system in addition to military-imposed economic sanctions further damaged the ability of the Palestinian economy to recuperate.

4.1 Breakdown by Stage

The first stage of curfew was characterised by the shut-down of the economy and the total loss of income for tens of thousands of people dependent on daily wages. By the second stage, individual savings had been depleted, declines in purchasing power had led to a serious constriction of supply and demand, and businesses were experiencing a debilitating credit squeeze. These recessionary trends have spiraled in the third stage, which has been further marked by a sharp escalation of military-imposed economic sanctions.

Stage one: economic shut-down

Economic activity remained at a virtual standstill throughout the first phase of the curfew. After a week of complete economic shut-down, the Israeli authorities gradually began to issue a limited number of passes allowing factories to reopen, in addition to issuing a small number of work permits for employees in the industrial and agricultural sectors. However, the issuing of permits was partial and failed to remedy the crisis; factories permitted to reopen often remained without sufficient resources and workers to operate. Farmers acquiring permits found spoiled crops in their fields. Furthermore,

agricultural permits were often granted solely to male household heads, even though much of the farming in the region depends on family labour. By the start of the fourth week, the occupied territories was generating only US\$400,000 a day, 12% of pre-curfew production levels.⁹⁴

The most immediate and serious economic consequence of the prolonged curfew was the dramatic rise in unemployment. 304,000 Palestinian workers were cut off from their sources of income during the first stage of the curfew.⁹⁵ Hardest hit were those dependent on daily or weekly wages. Losses in wages during the first month are conservatively estimated at US\$56.4-65.4 million.⁹⁶

Estimates regarding daily losses during the first two to three weeks of curfew range between US\$5-6 million.⁹⁷ According to PEPCC, total losses incurred by the curfew during the first phase averaged a minimum of US\$5.2 million per day.

Stage two: constriction of supply and demand

After nearly a month of curfew, Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Arens announced that Palestinian workers from the occupied territories would gradually be allowed to return to work inside Israel. Only those workers granted newly issued work permits, however, were to be allowed entry. On 10 February, for the first time since the start of

"The denial of income to entire communities represents a new and extremely harsh form of collective punishment."

- CCINGO, "Update: The Effects of the Curfew and the New Pass System on the Palestinians Living in the Occupied Territories," 26 March 1991, p.2.

the Gulf war, 1,500 Palestinians --less than 2% of the pre-war workforce commuting to Israel-- returned to their jobs according to military figures.⁹⁸ The relaxation of restrictions came after mounting pressure from Israeli employees and several politicians (most notably Housing Minister Ariel Sharon), who claimed that the cut-off of Palestinian workers was having a devastating effect on

the Israeli economy; correspondingly, in issuing permits, the Israeli authorities gave priority to workers in the agricultural and building sectors, which were hardest hit by the absence of cheap Palestinian day labour.⁹⁹ The number of permits issued remained limited throughout the second phase.¹⁰⁰ By 25 February, the number of workers entering Israel was still under 10% of pre-war levels.

**Estimated Losses Due to Curfew by Job Sector
as Calculated by PEPCC
(17 January - 10 February 1991)**

Type of workers	Number of workers	Average monthly wage (US\$)	Direct losses (US\$ million)	Total losses (US\$ million)
1. WB and GS workers in Israel	100,000	500	41.500	41.500*
2. Workers in the WB and GS	47,500	300	11.875	23.750**
3. Employees in the WB and GS	56,500	600	2.825	2.825***
4. Independent workers & employers in WB and GS	100,000	750	62.500	62.500
TOTAL:	304,000	—	118.700	130.575

* Calculated to the average wage and the number of workers taking into consideration the partial and seasonal aspect of this work.

** The total losses here are double the amount of the direct losses in workers' wages on the basis that workers produce a surplus value of 100%.

*** The losses in this sector were calculated at 10% since a number of educational and health institutions, in addition to municipalities, were receiving an income from their services, which covered part of the wages of their employees.

The minimum average of daily losses during this curfew is estimated at US\$5.2 million, taking into consideration that the surplus value brought in by type 4 workers has not been included in this calculation.

SOURCE: PEPCC, "The Effect of the Prolonged Curfew on the Palestinian Community," 19 February 1991.

The gradual relaxation of curfew did not translate into the resumption of market activity at pre-war levels. By the third week of curfew loss of purchasing power led to a 20-30% decline in demand at the same time that institutional credit dried up, placing extensive stress on the supply side.¹⁰¹ On the demand side, families, especially those dependent on daily wages, were increasingly living below normal standards in order to stretch dwindling savings. In many towns, more than 50% of the residents were living on credit by early February.¹⁰²

By the fourth week of curfew, consumption levels of red meat had dropped as much as 80%, while white meat consumption dropped 40% and that of fresh vegetables dropped by 70%.¹⁰³ At the same time, uncertainty regarding the timing of curfew reprieves made it extremely difficult to plan for the packing and transport of fresh produce. Crops which could be harvested were sold in glutted markets at reduced prices, while many areas experienced severe shortages. The price of one 15 kilogramme box of tomatoes in Jericho in early February plunged from NIS15 to NIS5, given market saturation, and sales still dropped by 60%. By comparison in Doura al-Qara', a person able to smuggle tomatoes into the village in mid-February charged NIS19 per box.¹⁰⁴

By the end of February, economists reported that the majority of Palestinians had depleted their savings; merchants, likewise overextended, were unable to provide credit for their customers. Factories, forced to extend normal credit lines to their customers, were left without sufficient funds to cover start-up costs. Many enterprises were consequently unable to resume operations. Banks and investors, in the occupied territories and abroad, refused to finance local businesses in anticipation that production and marketing might be stopped at any moment.¹⁰⁵

"...the motive for renewal of permits [for working in Israel] is not to alleviate conditions for the residents of the territories who were unable to attend work in Israel because of the curfew. Rather, the main motive was to aid Israeli employers in need of labourers."

- B'Tselem, *Information Sheet*, January-February 1991, p.5.

Stage three: unemployment and escalation of punitive measures

In the third stage, Israeli authorities legislated tighter restrictions on Palestinian workers entering Israel. Furthermore, as the economic crisis reached catastrophic proportions, Israel intensified its long-time use of punitive economic measures. Taxation raids were launched, major commercial centres shut down, and utilities cut off to entire communities. In combination with continued unemployment, these measures threatened to permanently cripple the already devastated Palestinian economy.

a) Regulation of workers in Israel

The number of workers granted permits to enter Israel was gradually increased during the third stage.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, however, regulations for hiring workers from the occupied territories were tightened. The number of military and police checkpoints erected at West Bank and Gaza Strip exits, as well as entrances into major Israeli cities tripled.¹⁰⁷ In the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas, no workers were permitted to return to work until 17 March and even then, only groups of at least ten labourers were issued permits. At the end of March, workers were still forbidden to drive to work and had to depend on their Israeli employers for transport; the ban on overnight stays was strictly enforced. Palestinians caught illegally working or sleeping inside Israel were immediately

**Numbers of Palestinian Workers
From the Occupied Territories
Entering Israel**

Pre-war figures:

legally employed 40,000
illegally employed 60,000-80,000

=====

total 100,000-120,000

Figures for 17 January - 31 March 1991
(according to military sources)

Date	Workers reporting to work
17 Jan-9 Feb	0
10 Feb	1,500
17 Feb	11,000
20 Feb	15,800
25 Feb	10,000
2 Mar	16,000
3 Mar	20,000
7 Mar	25,000
10 Mar	35,000
11 Mar	21,200
17 Mar	17,400
18 Mar	47,200
29-30 Mar	0 (permits not accepted)

SOURCE: military sources as quoted in
local press

arrested and taken to their area of residence to stand trial before a military court.¹⁰⁸ In response to rising demands to de-Arabise the Israeli workforce, this new policy was explicitly designed to discourage Israeli employers from hiring Palestinians. Employers were made responsible for ensuring that their employees did not constitute a "security" risk. Furthermore, authorities threatened to enforce regulations which raise the cost of employing Palestinian workers (eg. paying social service compensation), diminishing their

chances of being hired.¹⁰⁹ Ironically, even as the regulations were being discussed in the Israeli Knesset, the General Federation of Palestinian Workers in the occupied territories reported that Israeli employers were using continued curfew and the latest influx of Soviet Jews seeking employment to fire Palestinians without paying pensions or other compensation.¹¹⁰ All 700 Palestinian employees in the Tel Aviv municipality, for instance, were dismissed in April and replaced by Soviet Jewish immigrants.¹¹¹ Employers illegally hiring Palestinians faced significantly increased fines.¹¹²

Work permits were allocated on a highly discriminatory basis; a number of villages and refugee camps were completely by-passed. For example, no workers from Qalqilia, a town of over 20,000 residents, were permitted to enter Israel to work for over a month; 300 workers travelled to Israel for the first time on 18 February.¹¹³ One month later, none of Nahaleen's more than 350 workers had been granted a work permit.¹¹⁴ Moreover, many workers with valid permits continued to experience difficulties in reaching their work places. In a number incidents soldiers and police refused to recognise valid permits, tore up permits, or caused workers costly delay. Cases in which workers with valid permits were arrested and fined also continued to be reported.¹¹⁵ In mid-March, hundreds of Palestinians were still lining up outside Israeli Civil Administration offices in order to apply for work permits. At the end of March, Israeli military sources reported that 75,000 work permits had been granted¹¹⁶ --under 75% of the pre-war workforce. The actual numbers of workers travelling to Israel was just over 22,000.¹¹⁷

b) Taxation

Despite the economic crisis, Israeli authorities stepped up taxation raids, demanding down payment on 1991-92 taxes, as well as levying

"...Palestinian workers from the territories were charged the same taxes and social security payments collected from Israeli citizens over the years. Social security payments of 16% of income have been directed into what is termed the 'territories fund'. This fund was created to enhance the welfare of the residents. In spite of this, to the best of our knowledge neither this fund, nor any other sources --government or Histadrut monies-- have been used to compensate and ease the suffering of the workers forced to remain idle [during the curfew]."

- B'Tselem, *Information Sheet*, January-February 1991, p.9.

exorbitant fines for allegedly unpaid taxes.¹¹⁸ The pass system provided a ready framework for demanding tax payment; curfew passes, passes to open factories, and passes to enter East Jerusalem and Israel for work or medical reasons were only issued by Israeli officials

after verification of full payment of taxes. Identity cards and property were confiscated from those who refused to pay; others were arrested. Furthermore, in a number of locations, hundreds of people were slapped with fines imposed for alleged petty traffic

A Day in Ramallah

On 26 February alone, 255 people in the Ramallah/al-Bireh area were issued traffic violation tickets with fines ranging from NIS50-350; the tickets had to be paid within 14 days or drivers would face court proceedings. The tickets were issued by soldiers and police stationed at locations throughout the two neighbouring cities. All cars were stopped; soldiers checked licences, insurance papers, road tax papers, car registration papers, and passengers' identity cards, and imposed fines "on nearly every car" (*Al-Fajr English*, 4.3.91). At least 20 cars were confiscated in Ramallah in the latter half of February (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, p.5). Police, "suddenly concerned with road safety in the occupied territories", levied fines for every possible petty traffic violation; even jay walkers were ticketed NIS60 "the moment they crossed the road in Ramallah", despite the fact that crosswalk markings are barely visible on the streets (*Jerusalem Post*, 8.3.91). Ramallah residents complained that Israeli police were writing out traffic tickets "for everything except breathing" (*Al-Fajr English*, 4.3.91).

The same day, soldiers, police, and tax officials confiscated 70 vegetable carts and stalls, 40 of which had been in the same location for as long as 15 years. Owners were obliged to pay NIS100 to retrieve their stands and their identity cards which had also been confiscated. Muhammed Sameer Dabour, 27, who runs a sandwich stand with two other men, had his identity card confiscated; soldiers took him to the Civil Administration where he was forced to dismantle his stand, after which soldiers put the pieces on a truck and drove away. Many of those subject to the confiscations had only recently become street vendors. After losing their regular jobs due to the curfews, these people were once again left with no source of income (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, p.5; *Jerusalem Post*, 8 March 1991).

violations and other misdemeanours.

c) Closure of commercial centres

Other punitive measures with an immediate economic impact were more transparently collective in nature. Even when general curfew was lifted, location-specific curfews continued to shut down central markets in a number of major towns. In Gaza City, Palestine Square, the heart of all commercial activity in the Gaza Strip and site of approximately 100 shops, remained closed for the 75th consecutive day at the end of March. Nablus central vegetable market, used by

producers from the whole northern West Bank and employing 200 workers, as well as Jenin and Hebron's central markets were also closed for shorter length of times.¹¹⁹

d) Cutting utilities

Utility services were cut to entire towns and villages because residents could not pay their bills. Civil Administration head Brig.-Gen. Shaikha Erez told Palestinians who met with him at Beit El headquarters on 20 February that temporary exemptions from taxation and utility bills would not be granted for reasons of economic hardship. According to a member

Taxation Raids: Examples

- * 1 February, Israeli authorities launched a nighttime tax raid on the city of Nablus. A number of housewives were among those subject to "income" tax levies (*Al-Fajr*, 2.2.91).
- * 31 January, several merchants in Jericho were ordered to pay down payments ranging from NIS5,000-105,000 on the 1991-92 fiscal year (*Al-Fajr*, 1.2.91).
- * 31 January, Tulkarem residents were taken from their homes to local military headquarters where officials demanded payment of their outstanding traffic fines (*Al-Fajr*, 1.2.91). Two weeks later, the army raided homes ordering merchants to report to the Civil Administration where they were interrogated by tax officials and ordered to pay down payments on 1991 taxes. Three brothers of the Abu Shamlah family were ordered to pay NIS12,000 as a down payment for 1991 taxes despite the fact that their carpentry business had been shut down by curfew since the start of the year. Bilal Qusma', a Tulkarem merchant, was ordered to pay NIS101,000 as a down payment on 1991 taxes (*Al-Fajr English*, 18.2.91).
- * In Bethlehem, Ahmed a-Ramlawi was arrested for not paying NIS85,000 in taxes on his store (*Al-Fajr*, 8.3.91).
- * In Nahaleen, near Bethlehem, Salah 'Abdallah Fanoun advertised to sell his kidney in order to pay a tax of NIS400,000. Salah, imprisoned in Dhaharia prison for 45 days for not paying his taxes, received threats from the Israeli authorities that his house would be seized if he did not pay the taxes (*Al-Quds*, 5.3.91).
- * On 27 March, 10 villagers from Qabatia were arrested for not paying taxes (*A-Sha'ab*, 28.3.91).
- * Farouq Abu 'Ikir, a garage owner in Beit Jala, was ordered to pay NIS240,000 in taxes (*Al-Ittihad*, 17.3.91).
- * On 21 February, in Jericho, tax officials raided the premises of farmers and merchants, confiscating equipment and supplies from those unable to pay cash for taxes, including Ibraheem al-Jasi. Soldiers raided his shoe shop and confiscated all his merchandise (Aseel Press Service as quoted in PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.5).

of the Palestinian group, "[w]e only asked him for a month or two of credit. If people have to pay everything now, they won't have money to start up again."¹²⁰

In Hebron, the third largest city in the West Bank (population 85,000) and the neighbouring town of Halhoul (population 10,500), the Israeli electricity company cut electric supply from 4-7 March because residents were unable to pay their electricity bills.¹²¹ The cut came during "the first week of normal life since mid-January" and did not discriminate between those who had paid their bills and those who had not.¹²² According to Hebron's Israeli-appointed mayor, the power cut resulted in an estimated NIS20 million loss to local laboratories and factories.¹²³

In March alone, the press reported that at least eleven locations, representing more than 93,000 people, were subject to water cuts of varying lengths as a result of unpaid water bills, including Yatta (population 22,300), which by mid-March had been without water for an entire month. The village allegedly owed the Israeli water company NIS115,000.¹²⁴ In Ya'abad village (population 9,100), water supplies had been cut for six consecutive months by the end of March, because villagers were unable to pay NIS160,000 owed in water bills.¹²⁵

4.2 Breakdown by Sector

Productivity losses after one month of curfew were 95% or higher in the industrial, tourist, transportation, and construction sectors of the Palestinian economy. Long-range losses threatened to bankrupt both Palestinian agriculture and industry, the two sectors employing the largest number of workers in the occupied territories.

Agriculture

The agricultural sector provides jobs for approximately 37,000 to 42,000 Palestinians involved in the farming, transporting, and

marketing of agricultural products and generates between 23-35% of the GDP in the occupied territories.¹²⁶ Additionally, several thousand Palestinians depend on agriculture as a secondary source of income.¹²⁷ Due to severe drought conditions prior to the curfew, Palestinian farmers faced the prospect of 60% losses in the grain harvest, as well as losses in the fruit and olive harvest and losses associated with increased military restrictions on livestock grazing.¹²⁸

"It should be evident by now that curfew strikes a heavy blow at all aspects of the agricultural production process whether partially or completely, directly or indirectly. The most relevant loss, however, is the one resulting from the decline in level of consumption for agricultural plant or animal products which lowered its prices. Now, with the curfew entering its fifth week the farmers will be forced to get rid of their herds. This poses a direct threat to the agricultural infrastructure and its achievements of the last four years."

- PEPCC, "The Effect of the Prolonged Curfew on the Palestinian Economy," 19 February 1991, p.5

Curfew-related losses in the agricultural sector resulted from a combination of complete and partial crop damage, reduced animal production and increases in the cost of maintaining livestock, complete and partial losses of seedlings and saplings, serious interruptions in distribution and marketing activities, and a sharp decline in market demands.¹²⁹

Preliminary figures estimated agricultural losses sustained during the first month at US\$5-20 million,¹³⁰ with the PEPCC citing a

Table of Major Sectoral Losses as Calculated by PEPCC

	No. of workers	Losses in 1st month of curfew (US\$ million)	Productivity in 1st month of curfew	Estimated losses at 3 months (US\$ million)	Productivity in 3rd month
Workers in Israel	100,000	55	0%	130	17%
Industry	30,000	16	5%	42	17%
Agriculture	42,000	12	70%	37.5	70%
Tourism	10,000	7.5	0%	22.5	0%
Transport	14,000	10	5%	21	50%
Construction	20,000	12	0%	36	0%

Notes:

1. The figures provided are estimates based on Israeli statistics for 1989.
2. Monthly losses in the agricultural sector are based on seasonal estimates and not on division of annual total by 12 months.
3. The three-month estimation was based on a gradual lifting of the blanket curfew after one month and continued intermittent curfews on a location by location basis in the second and third month.

SOURCE: PEPCC, "A Plan of Action for Relief and Development Aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip," 19 February 1991.

figure of US\$12 million.¹³¹ Loss in market credibility abroad, however, combined with the severe credit squeeze left many farmers unable to make investments for next season's crops. Debts incurred as a result of curfew losses jeopardised future profit margins and reduced the overall rate of investment. Because most farmers operate on a small-scale family basis and are dependent on annual profits for next season's start-up costs, long-term agricultural development was seriously threatened.¹³²

The most serious damage to the agricultural sector occurred during the first phase; virtually all agricultural activity was suspended for two to three weeks. By 31 January, only 150 permits had been granted

for the entire occupied territories.¹³³ The selective distribution of permits, moreover, precluded the possibility of normal agricultural operations. In the first week of curfew, for example, merchants in Ramallah and Bethlehem were given permits to collect produce from Jericho, but farmers there were not given permits to harvest their crops. In Jericho itself, only two out of 2,000 farmers were permitted to farm during the first five days of curfew. Several-hour reprieves did little to alleviate the situation since most Palestinians live 2-4 km from their fields.¹³⁴ In the Gaza Strip, only five permits had been granted to farmers by 22 January. By early February, only 35 permits had been issued.¹³⁵ Throughout February, the sporadic lifting of curfews, the separation and isolation of

geographic areas from each other, and the limited, discriminatory, and uncoordinated fashion in which passes continued to be issued kept agricultural activity in a state of partial paralysis. Approximately 30,000 agricultural workers were still unable to acquire curfew passes by the fourth week of curfew.¹³⁶ It was not until mid-March that the majority of West Bank and Gaza Strip farmers were again able to resume operations on a regular basis. By this time, however, irretrievable damage to crops and livestock had occurred. Moreover, distribution and marketing processes remained severely restricted.

**Summary of Estimated Agricultural Losses
in the Gaza Strip
According to UNRWA Field Report
(17 January - 31 March 1991)**

Sector	Estimated Losses
Citrus (price drops)	\$ 940,000
Citrus (low exports)	\$7,200,000
Vegetables	no estimate available
Poultry	\$ 425,000
Dairy	\$1,500,000
Fishing	\$ 85,000
Total	\$10,150,000

SOURCE: UNRWA, "Economic Conditions in Gaza following the Gulf War," no date.

a) Crops

Irrigated crops, located primarily in the Jordan valley, Qalqilia and Tulkarem areas, and the Gaza Strip, suffered the greatest damage under the curfew,¹³⁷ which was imposed during the primary seasons for vegetable and citrus production. Because farmers were unable to irrigate, spray, ventilate greenhouses, or harvest crops, a substantial decrease in plant productivity and

increased susceptibility to fungal infection occurred. Ripe crops were left rotting in fields because farmers were unable to harvest or market them. Farmers were likewise prohibited from tending grain, barley, and bean crops in the rain-fed highlands. Over 100,000 dunams of crops were damaged or lost by mid-February.¹³⁸

The curfew also interfered with preparation for next season. At least half a million vegetable and tree seedlings in nurseries were damaged as a result of inadequate watering and care. Farmers were also unable to transplant seedlings at the appropriate time, delaying the last agricultural cycle of the year.¹³⁹ 300,000 fruit tree seedlings are regularly planted at the time of year when curfew was imposed. 200,000 dunams of land normally prepared during the winter months for summer cultivation were left fallow during the curfew.¹⁴⁰

b) Livestock

The most severe agricultural losses in the first phase were sustained by livestock farmers.¹⁴¹ In the first month, approximately US\$6 million were lost, primarily as a result of increased dependence on fodder and animal weight loss. The inability to graze animals created an artificial dependence on feed imported from Israel. Farmers who normally pastured their animals were forced to purchase fodder. By mid-February, the cost of feed had risen by 8-10% per ton.¹⁴² Curfew also prevented farmers from restocking feed supplies. Inadequate feed for livestock resulted in both weight loss and drop in egg and milk production. Water shortages, particularly in villages where Israeli authorities cut drinking supplies, also caused major problems for livestock farmers.¹⁴³ The poultry industry was particularly hard hit -- in some instances breeding stock was sold for meat at 25% of cost to avoid complete losses as a result of starvation.¹⁴⁴ In the West Bank alone 3,400,000 chickens were sold at a loss of 0.5JD during the first month of curfew.¹⁴⁵

**Breakdown of Major Agricultural Losses in the West Bank by Area
as Calculated by Agriculturalists Ibraheem Deek and Shakar Judeh
(15 January - 15 February 1991)**

TULKAREM

400,000 chickens sold at a loss of JD0.5/chicken	= JD 200,000
5,292 dunams of unpicked citrus X JD100/dunam	= JD 529,200
60 dunams of greenhouse vegetables X JD1,500/dunam	= JD 90,000
100 dunams of high tunnel vegetables X JD800/dunam	= JD 80,000
1,400 dunams damaged greenhouse vegetables X JD1,000/dunam	= JD1,400,000
860 dunams of damaged high tunnel vegetables X JD500/dunam	= <u>JD 430,000</u>
	JD2,729,200

JENIN

750,000 chickens sold at loss of JD0.5/chicken	= JD 375,000
989 dunams of damaged citrus X JD100/dunam	= JD 98,900
150 dunams of greenhouse vegetables X JD1,000/dunam	= JD 150,000
6,000 dunams of irrigated crops X JD30/dunam	= <u>JD 180,000</u>
	JD 803,900

NABLUS

550,000 chickens sold at a loss of JD0.5 per chicken	= JD 275,000
1,669 dunams of damaged citrus X JD100/dunam	= JD 166,900
20 dunams of greenhouse vegetables X JD1,000/dunam	= JD 20,000
5,000 dunams of exposed vegetables X JD100/dunam	= <u>JD 500,000</u>
	JD 961,900

JERICHO

2,000 dunams of damaged citrus X JD100/dunam	= JD 200,000
200,000 chickens sold at a loss of X JD0.5/chicken	= JD 100,000
16,711 dunams of vegetables X JD200	= JD3,342,200
4,500 dunams of bananas X JD200/dunam	= <u>JD 900,000</u>
	JD4,542,200

RAMALLAH

800,000 chickens sold at a loss of X JD0.5/chicken	= JD 400,000
25 dunams of damaged greenhouse vegetables X JD1,000/dunam	= JD 25,000
1,500 dunams of exposed vegetables X JD200/dunam	= JD 300,000
23,000 dunams of grapes X JD20/dunam	= <u>JD 460,000</u>
	JD1,185,000

HEBRON

700,000 chickens sold at a loss of X JD0.5/chicken	= JD 350,000
51,000 dunams of grapes X JD20/dunam	= <u>JD1,020,000</u>
	JD1,370,000

TOTAL LOSSES = JD11,592,200 [= US\$15,417,626]

* JD = Jordanian dinar; the dollar equivalent at the time of calculations was approximately .75JD = US\$1.00

Examples of Agricultural Losses

- * 500 of 2,000 chickens in Beit Ummar died by the end of the second week of curfew, due to lack of feed. 8,000 chickens in 'Aqabat Jabr Refugee Camp had to be sold for NIS1 each after two weeks of curfew, due to lack of feed [normal market price for chickens is NIS3/kilo] (PARC, field investigation, 31.1.91).
- * In Jericho, curfew was lifted daily for 4-5 hours from the second week of curfew to allow people to work on farms. Fines of NIS7-10,000 were levied for trying to take produce from the area without permits (PARC, field investigation, 31.1.91).
- * In January, an Israeli military patrol at the entrance to Nablus city prohibited Abu Saleh a-Toubassi from entering the city to sell eggplants and tomatoes despite the fact that he had a permit and that a curfew reprieve was in effect (PARC, "Severe Damages in the Agricultural Sector in the Jordan Valley," 1.91).
- * The price of Gaza citrus plunged from US\$84/ton to US\$42; production costs consequently outstripped income by US\$15/dunam. Farmers were forced to sell approximately one third of the 1991 crop to Israeli juice factories at half of last year's price to be paid in installments starting three months after delivery (UNRWA, "Economic Conditions in Gaza Following the Gulf War," pp.8-9; *Al-Fair*, 14 March 1991).
- * 2,500 dunams of squash and fava beans in the Jordan Valley were lost by mid-February because farmers were unable to spray crops on time (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17.2.91, p.6).
- * Beit Fureek farmers were unable to cultivate 1,000 dunams of land next to Tel Haim settlement due to settler harassment. On 19 February, armed settlers forcibly took four shepherds and their sheep into the settlement, where they beat and questioned them regarding an alleged arson attack on settlers' hay the previous day. The settlers released the shepherds after an hour, but kept 150 sheep valued at US\$22,500. 'Ali Yaseen, 60, was forced off his land on 21 February by two armed settlers (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.6).
- * On 21 February, Jericho farmers with curfew passes were prevented from going to their fields. Soldiers raided farms near the Jordanian border, including the Arab Development Society farm in al-'Auja and forced farmers to stop working and return home. The military withdrew all 36 curfew passes issued to farmers and vegetable merchants in the village in addition to all permits allowing food shops and bakeries to open under curfew (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.5).
- * Jericho farmers were forced to spend cash reserves on food rather than on plastic sheeting and sprays for the coming season. Demand for plastic for sealing against chemical attack drove the cost of plastic up to ten times its normal price (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3.3.91, p.4).
- * By early February, the abattoir in Nablus was oversupplying the meat market despite the fact that it slaughtered only 20% of the livestock killed the previous month (*Jerusalem Post*, 8.2.91).
- * An estimated 2 million cubic metres of spring water was wasted in the first month of curfew because springs that farmers were unable to reach continued to pump out water (ACC, "The Effects of the Prolonged Curfew on the Agricultural Sector," 20.2.91, p.2).

c) Distribution and marketing

Drivers, wholesalers, and retailers faced considerable losses as a direct result of their inability to transport and market agricultural produce. Curfew restrictions made it virtually impossible for export companies to meet this year's contracts with EEC countries. Companies reported that failure to meet these contracts would result in both immediate losses, exacerbated by the absence of substitute outlets for products, and future losses, due to damaged export credibility.¹⁴⁶ Exports to Jordan were also sharply curtailed during the curfew.¹⁴⁷ By the end of January, trucks were permitted to enter Jordan on the condition that they return by 1:00pm the same day.¹⁴⁸ Three weeks into the curfew, however, only one truck was allowed to cross into Jordan daily, in contrast to the normal traffic of ten to 20 trucks. By mid-February, the situation had only marginally improved --three trucks were permitted to cross the bridge every day. Because of the continued stipulation that trucks return the same day, drivers went only 4 kilometres into Jordan. Produce then had to be reloaded onto Jordanian trucks, resulting in additional handling costs, as well as product damage.¹⁴⁹

Marketing inside the occupied territories was obstructed by movement restrictions. In the

second week of curfew only 5% of the workers involved in agricultural transport had been issued curfew passes.¹⁵⁰ By mid-February, approximately 70 trucks transporting agricultural produce were confiscated by Israeli authorities.¹⁵¹ Travelling restrictions between major towns and regions remained in force until the second week of March. Even then, passage from area to area remained subject to decisions by individual soldiers stationed at numerous checkpoints along all major regional roads. Israeli authorities have also tightened enforcement of the long-standing ban on the sale of all agricultural products from the occupied territories in Israel and Jerusalem.¹⁵²

Industry

According to PEPCC, 93-95% of the total production of the industrial sector was lost during the first month of the curfew, the equivalent of US\$16 million.¹⁵³ Throughout the first three weeks, all industrial establishments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip --4,255 enterprises employing approximately 30,000 workers¹⁵⁴-- remained closed with the exception of 32 food and pharmaceutical factories, which were permitted to operate from the second and third weeks.¹⁵⁵ In Hebron, one non-vital industry received permission to operate in January; shoe manufactures were

"The economic consequences of the current measures will not only surface within the next few days or weeks, but will leave their marks for coming months or even years. The worker who is absent from his job in Israel for two weeks does not only lose his two weeks' wage but most probably his job altogether, in addition to his insurance and compensation money. The farmer who fails to sow the seeds in the rain season, which coincided with the beginning of the war, loses a whole season of grain which is practically his livelihood and the life of his animals on which he depends. The clothing factory which fails to submit the merchandise on time, and even delays for weeks, not only loses the immediate deal, but its credibility which it has worked for years on establishing, all in one unexpected sweep."

- PEPCC, "The Economic Effect of the Prolonged Curfew on the Palestinian Economy," 19 February 1991, pp.1-2.

Examples of Losses in the Industrial Sector

- * The **Balsam Drug Company** was permitted to reopen on 26 January although only 38% of its work force received permits. Workers were required to travel to and from the factory in groups of four, despite the fact that their homes were distributed over a wide geographic area. Staff shortages forced production capacity down by 70%. The company faced serious distribution problems because it could not obtain permits for a sufficient number of drivers. Military searches at checkpoints further hindered distribution (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 31.1.91, p.10; MAP, "Summary Report No.1," 17.2.-3.2.91, p.3).
- * The **Siniora Factory**, which produces canned food and meat, had to operate without 35 of its 45 workers in January, since only ten of its employees could reach the factory in Jerusalem (PHRIC, *From the Field*, January 1991, p.7).
- * The **Juneidi Dairy** in Hebron received a permit to operate several days after the imposition of the curfew but remained unable to operate because all farms on which it depends for its milk supply were shut down and only ten of its 30 workers were able to acquire curfew passes as of 31 January (PHRIC, *From the Field*, January 1991, p.8). In early February, Juneidi was losing NIS8,000 daily because shopkeepers were returning unpurchased products which had passed their expiry date (*Jerusalem Post*, 8.2.91).
- * By mid-February, **Jerusalem Pharmaceuticals** had secured passes for only 30 of its 120 staff members, including only two of its eight technicians. Production dropped to 25% of total capacity, making it impossible to fill pre-curfew orders. The company also faced serious distribution problems because 70% of its market is composed of pharmacies which were still closed during curfew. In the Gaza Strip, for example, only one of approximately 50 pharmacies was permitted to open during curfew and only for four hours daily. Company drivers with valid permits continued to face difficulties in movement. One driver with a valid pass was turned back at the Gaza Strip checkpoint. While re-applying for another pass in Jerusalem, he was first ordered to pay NIS9,000 on his lorry as a down payment for 1991 income taxes (MAP, "Summary Report No.2," 17.2.91, p.6).
- * The **Shomali** powdered food plant in Beit Sahour was functioning at 10% by the start of the fourth week of curfew, partly because only three of 14 workers had curfew passes and partly because factory co-owner Shawkat Shomali had to renew his operating permit each week (*Jerusalem Post*, 8.2.91).
- * By the start of March, the **Club Soda** factory in Ramallah was "flat on its back" and facing the possibility of firing its 105 workers as a result of sale losses (*Jerusalem Post*, 8.3.91).

permitted to work at full capacity to avoid interrupting the supply of low-cost shoes to the Israeli market.¹⁵⁶ By the fourth week, only 46 industrial plants had received permits to operate;¹⁵⁷ not one of approximately 30 factories in 'Azzaria, an industrial centre on the outskirts of Jerusalem, had received permission to operate.¹⁵⁸ Because many Palestinian factories produce items such as food, beverages, and cigarettes, which respond to short-term inelastic demand, lost sales cannot be compensated for through speed-up in production at a later date.¹⁵⁹

Even those factories which were permitted to reopen faced serious difficulties as a result of staff shortages (both in production and distribution), due to the limited number of passes issued to workers. Furthermore, the predominantly small-scale companies which characterise the Palestinian economy are highly interdependent. Production problems in one company are quickly felt by other companies. The West Bank Vegetable Oil Company, for example, was given a permit to resume operations at the end of January. At that time, however, the tin container factory which produces containers for the vegetable oil was not permitted to operate. With no means of packaging its oil, the company was unable to resume production.¹⁶⁰ Several weeks into curfew, most opened factories were operating at only 10-25% of normal levels, resulting in income reductions of as much as 80%.¹⁶¹

At the end of March many businesses in the occupied territories were still closed due to continued movement restrictions. Others, faced with a sharp constriction in market demands and lack of credit, continued to work at reduced capacities, employing as little as 50% of their workforce. The decline in factory profits resulted in high internal unemployment --50,000 workers usually employed in the occupied territories were jobless by April.¹⁶² Importing raw materials from Israel remained

difficult because of movement restrictions. As in the case of the agricultural sector, the inability of factories to fulfill export contracts was expected to result in serious long-term losses.¹⁶³

Other sectors

Within the commercial sector, numerous family-owned shops and retail businesses also sustained considerable losses.¹⁶⁴ During the first three weeks, these enterprises, which supply most of the food, clothing, and basic consumer goods to the population, were only permitted to open during the several-hour breaks granted an average of every three to four days. Between 20-25% of all commercial establishments, owned by villagers living outside major towns, were unable to open at all. In addition to the loss of income and perishable goods, merchants and shopkeepers were adversely affected by the precipitous declines in purchasing power.¹⁶⁵

Construction and tourism were brought to a complete standstill during the first month of the curfew, leaving 20,000 and 10,000 workers respectively in each sector without work. Sectoral losses for the first month were estimated at US\$12 million in construction and US\$7.5 million in tourism. The transportation sector, which employs 14,000 workers, was likewise severely hit. PEPCC sets productivity losses for the first month in this sector at US\$10 million, 95% of pre-war levels.¹⁶⁶

5. Conclusion

The results of the survey conducted in Jalazon and Shati refugee camps, which are presented in Chapter 2, expose the comprehensive damage sustained by individuals and communities subjected to Israel's policy of frequent and prolonged curfews over the past three years. This policy has constituted a direct assault on Palestinians' will and capacity to resist Israel's 24-year-old

occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, an assault which was dramatically escalated with the imposition of the "war curfew" on 17 January 1991. The "war curfew" has resulted in a crisis of individual and communal hardship of unprecedented proportions.

The nature of the "war curfew" contradicts Israeli claims that it was necessitated by security concerns arising from the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Not only did curfew restrictions outlast the war by nearly a month; the curfew was accompanied by a series of punitive and debilitating measures, through which the Israeli occupation forces progressively reasserted their control over the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. Israel thus exploited the international community's preoccupation with the Gulf war to advance its own war of attrition against the Palestinian uprising. In clear violation of all international legal standards, more than two million Palestinians were imprisoned in their homes for approximately four weeks as a measure of collective punishment. This measure was designed to deal a decisive blow to Palestinian resistance against the occupation and to permanently destroy the viability of the nascent Palestinian state.

Economically, Palestinians are facing alarming levels of destitution, while the local economy is on the brink of collapse. Efforts towards

economic self-sufficiency, which lay at the core of the Palestinian programme for national development, have been seriously undermined. Simultaneously, the occupation authorities have used the "war curfew" to tighten their grip over all aspects of Palestinian life. Politically, as the international community has turned its attention to issues of regional peace, the devastation of Palestinian society caused by the "war curfew" has enhanced Israel's negotiating position. Furthermore, the fragmentation of the occupied territories through the institutionalisation of the pass system has effectively cut off Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the rest of the West Bank from their capital and strengthened Israel's *de facto* control over annexed Arab East Jerusalem, as well as the occupied territories as a whole.

For the first three years of the uprising, curfew has been one of Israel's most effective means of collectively punishing Palestinians for their continuing resistance to the Israeli occupation. While international public opinion was focussed on the occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent outbreak of war, Israel escalated its curfew policy as part of its ongoing campaign to destroy the economic and political achievements of the uprising and cement, in a more concrete form than ever before, its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Chapter 3 - Endnotes

1. Despite the fact that civil, and not military law, applies to East Jerusalem as a result of its annexation by Israel following the 1967 war, at least six of the city's neighbourhoods (Silwan, a-Tor, Thouri, a-Ram, Dhahiyat al-Bareed, and Jabal Mukaber) as well as Shu'fat Refugee Camp were subject to curfews of up to six days.
2. Cf. PHRIC, "Prolonged Blanket Curfew in Occupied Territories Jeopardises Palestinian Survival," *From the Field*, vol.1, no.5, January 1991, p.1.
3. Cf. *Attali'a*, 21 February 1991.
4. UNRWA records.
5. Cf. CCINGO, Press Statement, 24 January 1991; *Al-Fair English*, 28 January 1991.
6. Cf. *Al-Quds*, 24 January 1991.
7. PHRIC, "Prolonged Blanket Curfew in Occupied Territories During Gulf War Jeopardises Palestinian Subsistence," *Information Bulletin*, 31 January 1991, pp.3-4.
8. "Quick" trials are carried out at a speed which precludes the possibility of due legal process and customarily leaves defendants without legal representation.
9. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 31 January 1991, *op. cit.*, p.4.
10. PHRIC, "Palestinians Under Curfew: Israel's Prisoners of the Gulf War," *Information Bulletin*, 17 February 1991, p.17.
11. Newspapers were required to send all their material, including advertisements and weather reports, to the military censor twice --once before layout and again immediately prior to printing. Cf. *Al-Ittihad*, 13 February 1991 (article translated in JMCC, *Weekly Report*, 10-16 February 1991, pp.7-8).
12. The fatal shooting by Israeli soldiers of 'Imad Mustafa Mahmoud Salameh, 18, of 'Aqaba, which occurred on 16 January, did not reach the nearby town of Jenin until mid-February due to curfew restrictions. The press was barred from reporting the death of 14-year-old 'Ayed 'Abdallah Bani 'Odeh of Tamoun, who was killed by an explosion while apparently trying to cross the Jordan valley. Cf. JMCC, *JMCC Weekly Report*, 17-23 February 1991, p.5; *Al-Ittihad*, 20 February 1991.
13. For details regarding food and medical shortages and resulting emergency needs, see MAP, "Summary Report No.1," 17 January-3 February 1991; MAP, "Summary Report No.2," 17 February 1991.
14. Cf. *Al-Fair*, 1 February 1991, 2 February 1991, 4 March 1991; MAP, "Summary Report No.1," *op. cit.*, p.4.

15. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17 February 1991, op. cit., p.8.
16. *Ibid.*, p.14.
17. From an open letter to US Secretary of State James Baker by the AIPPHR and The Society of St. Ives Legal Resource Centre for Human Rights, 9 April, 1991.
18. AIPPHR, "Report on Death Cases at Maqassed," 7 April 1991 (in Hebrew).
19. Many serious health complications occurred in the infant population. In just one example, a three-month-old baby girl from Nablus suffering from an acute respiratory infection was brought to Maqassed near death after soldiers forced her father to wait for hours at a checkpoint and then ordered him to the police station in West Jerusalem for interrogation before he was permitted to take the infant to hospital (*Al-Fajr English*, 11 February 1991).
20. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., p.5.
21. Cf. Map, "Summary Report No.1," op. cit., p.3; CCINGO "Update: The Effects of the Curfew and the New Pass System on the Palestinians Living in the Occupied Territories," 26 March 1991, p.3.
22. Al-Maqassed Hospital, for example, registered only 150 births in one month of curfew compared to an average of 500 births in normal months (B'Tselem, "Human Rights in the Occupied Territories During the War in the Persian Gulf," *Information Sheet*, January-February 1991, p.12).
23. UPMRC, "Palestinians on the Occupied Territories Enter the Twentieth Day of Stringent Curfew Conditions," Appeal No.6, 4 February 1991, pp.1-2; MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., p.5.
24. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," p.5.
25. UPMRC, "Palestinians Enter the Twentieth Day," op. cit., p.2.
26. More fortunate than most, this child was among regular patients at the Shaare Zedek Hospital, which has the only paediatric dialysis unit in the country. The hospital called the Israeli military authorities to arrange for special permits allowing its patients to reach hospital for life-sustaining treatment (*Jerusalem Post*, 23 January 1991).
27. UPMRC, "The Immediate Lifting of Curfew is the Most Urgent Health Need of Palestinians Under Curfew," Appeal No.7, 14 February 1991, p.3.
28. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., p.5.
29. UPMRC, "The Immediate Lifting," op. cit., p.3.

30. With the exception of East Jerusalem residents, almost no Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including physicians and health workers, had been issued gas masks and other equipment essential for protection against the threat of chemical warfare. No alarm system was set up to warn Palestinians of missile attack, nor was sufficient training and preparation for casualties undertaken in hospitals as had been done inside Israel. Palestinian prisoners, including those held inside Israel and near military installations in contravention of international law, were also deprived of proper protection. Cf. CCINGO, "CCINGO Appeal," 8 February 1991, p.2; al-Haq, "Urgent Alert to the International Community," 13 January 1991, p.2.

In mid-January the UPMRC issued an urgent appeal warning that "[t]he health and medical facilities in Occupied Palestine are totally incapable of facing such dangers [the potential use of mass destruction weapons, including chemical and biological warfare, on the population]. The occupying authorities have intentionally neglected upkeeping basic medical and health services and have discriminated against the Palestinian population by failing to provide them with needed protection against chemical warfare" (UPMRC, "An Urgent Appeal from the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees," 13 January 1991).

Following an Israeli court ruling on 14 January the Israeli authorities were obliged to distribute gas masks to Palestinians in the occupied territories. However, Israeli authorities claimed that only a limited number of gas masks were available and that distribution would exclude all children under 16 years --over 50% of the Palestinian population. Over a month later and as war in the Gulf was drawing to a close, only 60% of the 173,000 masks in stock at the time of the court order had been distributed. (See B'Tselem, op. cit., pp.17-20, for details of court ruling and Israel's failure to provide adequate protection to Palestinians in the occupied territories.)

Furthermore, 75-year-old Fatmeh 'Ali Samara of Bateer near Bethlehem suffocated to death on 19 January after she and her 80-year-old husband entered a sealed room with a wood-burning stove during a missile alert. Her husband, Isma'eel Muhammed Oweineh, was unconscious in Augusta Victoria Hospital with severe brain damage as of 31 January. (PHRIC, Information Bulletin, 31 January 1991, op. cit., p.11).

31. UPMRC, "The Immediate Lifting," op. cit., p.3.

32. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., pp.5-6.

33. JMCC interviews with local counseling centres, March-May 1991.

34. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," op. cit., 26 March, 1991, p.3.

By comparison, in the second week of the war, Israeli experts reported that psychological stress resulting from the war had led to a significant rise in anxiety-related problems amongst Israelis. (The Israeli population, unlike Palestinians in the occupied territories, was fully equipped with protective gear and constantly informed of the war situation.) Anxiety amongst Israelis manifested itself in a variety of syndromes, some 10% of which

required professional treatment. One syndrome reported was the increase in early births due to anxiety-related hormones which induce premature labour. Israeli crisis hotlines also reported a marked increase in women calling with complaints of verbal and mental abuse in the home (*Jerusalem Post*, 23 January 1991, 30 January 1991; *In Jerusalem*, 22 February 1991).

35. Cf. *An-Nahar*, 12 February 1991. Correspondingly, Israel Radio announced on 13 February that curfew was not to be lifted over Nablus due to the outbreak of demonstrations (*A-Sha'ab*, 14.2.91).

36. Cf. *Al-Fajr*, 24 February 1991; *Jerusalem Post*, 26 February 1991.

37. Cf. *Al-Quds*, 24.2.91

38. UNRWA records.

39. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," *op. cit.*, p.1.

40. PHRIC, "State of Siege Continues," *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, p.15.

41. B'Tselem, *op. cit.*, p.6. Arrest of curfew breakers continued into March. As late as 16 March, Ahmed Husni Abu a-Rab of Misilliah village was fined NIS2,000 and imprisoned for four months on charges of violating curfew regulations (*Al-Ittihad*, 17 March 1991).

42. In the Gaza Strip, for example, mothers of children at the Child Development Centre reported that a month into curfew they no longer had money to buy milk powder for their children; 25 mothers with children at the Centre could no longer afford the protein substitute they needed for their ill children (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17 February 1991, *op. cit.*, p.10).

43. Cf. UHWC, Press Statement, 12 February 1991.

44. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," *op. cit.*, p.3; UPMRC, "The Immediate Lifting," *op. cit.*, p.3. Sanabel Press Service (Newsletter, 15 February 1991) described a situation typical of many villages by the fourth week of curfew. There are five shops in the agricultural village of Doura al-Qara', all of which were out of most things except coffee. Chicken consumption in the village had been cut to less than half; meat was non-existent as there are no butchers in the village and people were relying on eggs and *halaweh* for protein. Villagers also faced great difficulty in obtaining vegetables from outside the village.

45. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," *op. cit.*, p.3.

46. For details see: UNRWA, *UNRWA News*, No.222, 23 January 1991; *UNRWA News*, No.223, 6 February 1991; *UNRWA News*, No.225, 6 March 1991.

47. For detailed examples see: UNRWA, *UNRWA News*, No.225, *op. cit.*, p.2; CCINGO,

"The Pressures That NGOs Are Facing During the Current Curfew," 21 February 1991; PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, *op. cit.*, p.10.

48. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, *op. cit.*, p.10.

49. Incidents of property destruction in this phase also included the destruction of eleven wells in Wadi Bir Qos, west of Beit Ula in the Hebron area, on 17 February (Palestinian Hydrology Group, "Arab Water Resources and Israeli Violations: Confiscations and Demolitions," 20 February 1991). Several trees and rows of vegetable plants were damaged and nine generators were confiscated. The wells destroyed were used by 18 families, supplied two chicken farms as well as Beit Ula's 3,000 sheep and 30 cattle, and irrigated 73 dunams of lemon trees and vegetables; in summer, residents of four nearby villages also used the wells for watering. Additionally, the four villages often depended on the wells for drinking-water when regular supplies were cut (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, pp.7-8). Total damage was estimated at US\$500,000. (*Al-Fajr English*, 25 February 1991).

50. Cf. *A-Sha'ab*, 3 March 1991.

51. Night curfew, from 8:00pm to 3:00am, was imposed over the Gaza Strip on 31 March 1988. It has remained in force since that time with the exception of 8 April-6 June 1989 when curfew was lifted for the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. In the Ramadan season in 1988, 1990, and 1991 night curfew continued but was shortened by one to two hours to allow worshippers to attend evening prayers.

52. During the curfew, crops rotted in the fields of this primarily agricultural village. 400 villagers who regularly work in Israel were barred from returning, and all students were kept from their studies for the second consecutive month (*Al-Quds*, 3 April 1991).

53. Movement restrictions prevented Palestinians from exercising their right to worship in major mosques and churches at a time of the year when both Muslims and Christians observe major religious holidays. Access to holy sites in East Jerusalem was completely barred to all Palestinians from outside the city, including those with curfew permits, on the first Friday of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and from the night of 28 March through the morning of 30 March, which marked both the second Friday in Ramadan and the Easter holiday for churches following the Western calendar, dates when tens of thousands of Palestinians usually attend prayers in Jerusalem.

54. Al-Maqassed Hospital, the primary referral hospital for the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip and St. John's Ophthalmic Hospital, the only eye hospital in the occupied territories are both in East Jerusalem.

55. All of the major Arabic newspaper offices are located in East Jerusalem, as well as the central post office.

56. Cf. al-Haq, "Restriction of Access To and Through East Jerusalem," 4 April 1991.

57. Aseel Press Services as reported in PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, op. cit., p.7.
58. Cf. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," op. cit.; al-Haq, "Restriction of Access," op. cit.
59. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," op. cit. On 4 April, for example, Israeli authorities prevented nine of the 38 teachers from al-Mutran School from reaching their work because they hold West Bank identity cards (*A-Sha'ab*, 6 April 1991).
60. Cf. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," op. cit., p.2.
61. Studies at the end of February showed that 6% of the families in a small sample of villages surveyed in the hill regions of the West Bank were at near starvation level; 50% had sizeable debts which they were unable to repay, and were further unable to acquire credit for basic food purchases (*Jerusalem Post*, 28 February 1991). Three weeks later, the number of families below subsistence level had doubled to 12% (CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," op. cit., p.2).
62. Cf. *Al-Fajr English*, 18 March 1991.
63. The number of beatings reported between 12 and 25 February more than doubled that of the previous two weeks. Cf. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, op. cit., p.16.
64. UNRWA records.
65. Cf. *Jerusalem Post*, 29 March 1991.
66. UNRWA, *UNRWA News*, No. 225, op. cit., p.3.
67. Numerous reports of an ongoing campaign of harassment and intimidation launched by military forces against residents in Qalandia Refugee Camp near Ramallah emerged in late February. The AIPPHR and Hotline for the Defence of Individuals gathered numerous testimonies indicating that soldiers were intentionally "terrorising" residents. In addition to house-to-house raids, soldiers rounded up all male residents in the camp from ages 16 to 60 and held them outside in the cold throughout the night; raided the cooperative society's kindergarten, terrorising the children; severely beat a group of young workers stopped at the camp entrance as they returned from work; attacked and severely beat an international worker for UNRWA who arrived in the camp to observe army activity during a group round-up; and ordered the UNRWA camp director to keep quiet regarding army activity lest they come looking for him and his sons. The organisations complained that "misbehaviour of the soldiers has become a daily routine" and that their protest to the Israeli military regarding the harassment had met with no response (*Ibid.* p.4; *Al-Fajr English*, 25 March 1991).
68. Cf. UPMRC, "The Immediate Lifting," op. cit., p.2; PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17 February 1991, op. cit., p.8.

69. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., p.3.

70. By mid-February, UPMRC, operating the largest rural clinic network in the West Bank, reported that all but one of its 30 clinics were functioning in villages although no permits had been acquired for their operation (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17 February 1991, op. cit., p.10). Likewise, the UHWC reported that by 17 February, 70% of its clinics were operating and all its doctors were working despite the fact that only 25% had received passes; although no passes had been given to support staff, 55% of nurses and 75% of technicians were nonetheless reporting to work (MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., p.4).

71. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 31 January 1991, op. cit., p.10.

72. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., p.3.

73. B'Tselem, op. cit., p.12.

74. Nablus area doctors, for example, reported drug shortages in the local market by the second week of curfew (PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 31 January 1991, p.10). Shortages of medical supplies were also reported in all other West Bank districts as well as the Gaza Strip. Cf. MAP, "Summary Report No.1," op. cit.; MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit.

75. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," op. cit., p.3.

76. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17 February 1991, op. cit., p.11.

77. Cf. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., p.5.

78. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17 February 1991, op. cit., p.11.

79. UPMRC, "The Immediate Lifting," op. cit., "Palestinians Enter the Twentieth Day," op. cit.; JMCC interview with UPMRC doctor, April 1991.

80. MAP, "Summary Report No.2," op. cit., p.6.

81. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," op. cit., p.3.

82. All elementary schools were closed 35 days from 15 January. Classes resumed gradually over a 12-day period, during which all schools in the Gaza Strip were again closed for one day due to a comprehensive curfew. Other curfew interruptions vary according to location and are not included in these figures; thus the actual number of days lost in most areas was considerably higher.

83. Because of the mandatory "vacation", last semester's exams (originally scheduled for 3-10 January), had not yet been taken when schools reopened following the extended "war-time" closure.

84. In a regular school year the first semester begins in September and ends by early January. The second semester begins in late January and is completed by early June. The normal school year includes 210 teaching days.

During the first semester of this year a-Sawia Secondary School in the Nablus area was closed all but 28 school days. A-Sina'ia and Qadri Touqan secondary schools, in Nablus city, were open for only 44 and 49 days respectively (*Attali'a*, 21.2.91).

85. According to UNRWA statistics, its 98 schools in the West Bank lost 51.3% of the 178 teaching days between September 1990 and March 1991 due to military closure orders (73.4%), curfews (10.1%), strikes (13.3%), and other causes (3.2%); the equivalent of 8,405 days when calculated in units of one day per each school (*Al-Quds*, 19 April 1991).

86. Cf. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," *op. cit.*, p.4. By contrast, following the loss of several weeks of classes in Israeli schools due to the war, vacations were cut short to make up lost days and a massive effort was made to implement home study programmes. Cf. *Jerusalem Post*, 18 February 1991, 20 February 1991. It should be noted that similar efforts by Palestinian educators to implement home study programmes during the extended closures in 1988 and 1989 were forbidden by the Israeli authorities. Cf. JMCC, *Palestinian Education: A Threat to Israel's Security?*, 2nd ed., Jerusalem: JMCC, August 1990.

87. For example, the principal of St. George's School reported that private schools in East Jerusalem submitted a list of teachers' names to the municipality in order to obtain permits for them to leave their homes, but had received no response and the majority of teachers remained under curfew at the start of the third week of curfew (*Al-Fajr English*, 4 February 1991).

88. All Gaza Strip schools were closed by military order from 8-11 December and were again shut down on 15 December and reopened over a several day period beginning 19 December. Cf. *Al-Quds*, 12 December 1990; *A-Sha'ab*, 19 December 1990. According to UNRWA statistics, its 149 schools in the Gaza Strip lost 48.2% of 179 teaching days between September 1990 and March 1991 due to military closure orders (67.2%), curfews (14.4%), strikes (14.3%), and other causes (4.1%); the equivalent of 13,691 school days when measured in units of one day per each school (*Al-Quds*, 19 April 1991).

89. See *Attali'a*, 28 February 1991.

90. The economic effects of the prolonged comprehensive curfew and subsequent imposition of the pass system must be understood within the context of the marked deterioration of the Palestinian economy in the occupied territories over the past three years. Increased Israeli restrictions on the flow of money into the occupied territories imposed in March 1988 and the simultaneous step-up of economic restrictions in response to the uprising, the devaluation of the Jordanian dinar at the end of 1988, the loss of remittances as a result of the Gulf crisis, and finally, the marked increase in restrictions on Palestinian workers inside Israel following the al-Aqsa massacre in October 1990 and

coinciding with large numbers of Soviet immigrants seeking employment, had all created a serious economic crisis prior to the blanket curfew during the Gulf war.

Local economists estimate a 15% drop in the GNP of the occupied territories during this time (CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects of the Curfew to be Presented to European Community Policy-Makers," 28 February 1991, p.2). According to Palestinian economist Dr. 'Abd al-Fatah Abu a-Shukor, 75% of the West Bank population were considered to be either poor or living under the poverty line [=monthly income under JD200 or approximately US\$260] at the time when the curfew was imposed. The situation in the Gaza Strip is even worse, although given the difficulties of collecting statistics there, it is impossible to fully quantify the extent of destitution (*Attali'a*, 31 January 1991).

91. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," *op. cit.*, p.4.

92. Isma'eel Deek and Shakar Judeh, "The Damage to the Agricultural Sector in the West Bank During the Curfew, 15 January-15 February 1991," 19 February 1991 (in Arabic).

93. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," *op. cit.*, p.2.

94. *Jerusalem Post*, 8 February 1991.

95. According to Israeli statistics, prior to the war one third of the Palestinian work force from the occupied territories, 100,000 to 120,000 workers, were employed inside Israel. Approximately 47,500 Palestinians work as labourers in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to 56,500 employees and a further 80,000 to 100,000 who work as independent labourers or employers (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Judea, Samaria and Gaza Area Statistics*, vol.19, 1989-90).

96. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," *op. cit.*, p.5.

97. Exact figures, such as the total economic losses resulting from the curfew, are difficult to obtain because the occupation has not allowed for the development of centralised bureaus for collecting and documenting national statistics. Data collection during the curfew was complicated by movement restrictions. The most comprehensive figures to date regarding curfew-related economic losses have been provided by the PEPCC and economist Sameer Haleileh. PEPCC's figures have been widely quoted and are generally considered conservative, although one source claims that average wage levels for workers in Israel and employees in the occupied territories used by the PEPCC are exaggerated. Cf. UNRWA, "Economic Conditions in Gaza Following the Gulf War," no date, p.13.

CCINGO reported an estimated loss of US\$5-6 million per day during the first 10 days of the curfew, US\$150-200 million total loss in the first month of curfew, and a loss of US\$289 million by 26 March (CCINGO, "Update: The Effect of the Prolonged Curfew on the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories," 2 February 1991, p.1, "Paper on the Economic Effects," *op. cit.*, p.6, "Effects of the New Pass System," *op. cit.*, p.2). PHRIC estimated a loss of US\$5-5.5 million per day during the first two weeks of curfew and

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predicted that daily losses would continue at approximately US\$4 million. (PHRIC, Information Bulletin, 31 January 1991, op. cit., p.4). Palestinian economist Dr. Abu a-Shukor estimated US\$45 million dollar loss per week during the first two weeks of curfew (WB US\$30 million and GS US\$15 million) based on pre-war production figures (Attali'a, 31 January 1991).

98. Jerusalem Post, 11 February 1991; A-Sha'ab, 12 February 1991.

99. See for example, Jerusalem Post, 28 January 1991, 29 January 1991, 30 January 1991.

100. On 27 February, Israeli defence sources reported to the Israeli Knesset that quotas on the number of work permits being issued had been lifted. The sources added, however, that several factors continued to prevent workers from travelling to Israel, including the continued ban on entrance to the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas. Cf. Jerusalem Post, 28 February 1991.

101. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.3.

102. Jerusalem Post, 8 February 1991.

103. PEPCC, "The Effect of the Prolonged Curfew on the Palestinian Economy," 19 February 1991, p.5.

104. Jerusalem Post, 8 February 1991; Sanabel Press Services, op. cit.

105. Cf. Jerusalem Post, 28 February 1991, 8 March 1991.

106. From 17 January to 9 February no work permits were issued. According to military sources quoted in the local press, during the fourth week of curfew 6,000 passes were issued. By the start of March, Israeli authorities reported that 30,000 passes had been issued. A month later, 75,000 permits had reportedly been granted (JMCC records).

107. Jerusalem Post, 1 April 1991.

108. Jerusalem Post, 6 March 1991, 8 March 1991.

109. Cf. Jerusalem Post, 28 February 1991.

110. Cf. Al-Fajr English, 18 February 1991; Al-Quds, 16 March 1991.

111. Al-Ittihad, 19 March 1991.

112. Beginning in May the fine will be raised from NIS2,000 to NIS15,000. Cf. Jerusalem Post, 28 March 1991; Al-Fajr English, 1 April 1991.

113. PHRIC, Information Bulletin, 3 March 1991, op. cit., p.6.

114. CCINGO, "Effects of the New Pass System," op. cit., p.2.

115. On 18 February, Muhammed Shareef, of Nur Shams Refugee Camp, was prevented from leaving the camp despite having permit; his permit was torn up by soldiers who told him no one from his camp could go into Israel to work (Aseel Press Services as reported in PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, p.6). On 2 April, Israeli military authorities fined Fou'ad Khaleel Zahran of Deir Abu Mish'al village in the Ramallah area NIS350 on grounds that he was found "illegally" in Israel although he possessed a valid work permit (*An-Nahar*, 3 April 1991).

116. The number of permits actually exceeds the number of workers who have received passes partly because a number of workers have been issued more than one permit (UNRWA, "Economic Conditions," *op. cit.*, p.13).

117. *Jerusalem Post*, 2 April 1991.

118. Refusal to pay taxes has been an important aspect of the Palestinian uprising. The boycott is based on the grounds that taxes are neither levied by Palestinian representatives nor used to the benefit of the Palestinian population. The Israeli military authorities have responded to the boycott by trying to force individuals and businesses to pay. The campaign has included intimidation, confiscation of identity cards and/or private property, arrests, the imposition of excessive fines for failure of tax payment, pressure on third parties, refusals to issue a wide range of licences and permits (eg. car licences or travelling documents) without proof of full tax payment, punitive measures against family members, and store-by-store raids. Taxation raids against villages and towns are routinely launched, often during curfews. See Marc Stephens, *Taxation in the Occupied West Bank 1967-1989*, Ramallah: Al-Haq, 1990.

119. JMCC records; Cf. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 3 March 1991, *op. cit.*, p.4; *A-Sha'ab*, 17 March 1991; *Al-Fajr*, 1 April 1991.

120. *Jerusalem Post*, 8 March 1991.

121. *Al-Ittihad*, 5 March 1991, 7 March 1991.

122. *Jerusalem Post*, 8 March 1991.

123. *Al-Fajr English*, 11 February 1991.

124. *Al-Quds*, 23 March 1991.

125. Cf. *Attali'a*, 28 March 1991. Water supplies were also cut to Jenin and Jenin Refugee Camp (combined population of over 37,000) (*A-Sha'ab*, 17 March 1991), al-'Issawiah village (population of approximately 1,000) (*Al-Quds*, 18 March 1991), and the six Hebron area villages of Dhaharia, Deir Samit, Beit Ula, Nouba, Kharas, and Sureef (combined population of approximately 24,000) (*A-Sha'ab*, 8 March 1991).

126. The higher figures refer to every second year when a good olive harvest substantially increases both the employment and GDP figures. According to official Israeli statistics, the combined value of agricultural crop production in 1989 for the West Bank and Gaza

Strip was US\$255 million and that of livestock and livestock products was US\$238 million (Cf. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects" op. cit., p.4).

127. PEPCC, "Effect on Economy," op. cit., p.4.

128. By 20 January total rainfall was at 70mm compared to the usual annual average of 400mm. Due to the drought, the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture decreased irrigation water allowances by 60%. A loss of US\$500 million was expected as a result of the drought (PARC, "A Report on the Current Agricultural Problems," 21 January 1991, p.2; ACC, "The Effects of the Prolonged Curfew on the Agricultural Sector in the Occupied Territories," 20 February 1991, p.2).

129. Additional losses resulted from water waste and interference in extension and technical services.

5 130. Cf. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.5. Due to the scale and range of damage suffered by the agricultural sector, experts are still in the process of calculating precise figures regarding the total losses sustained during the curfew itself. This problem is even greater in assessing medium-range and long-range losses which will be sustained in seasons to come. The most comprehensive estimates to date are included in this report.

131. PEPCC, "A Plan of Action for Relief and Development Aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip," 19 February 1991, p.1.

132. Cf. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.5; ACC, "The Effects of Continuous Curfews on Direct Agricultural Export from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the EEC," no date; ACC, "The Effects of the Prolonged Curfew," op. cit., p.2.

133. PARC field investigations, 15-30 January 1991.

134. PHRIC, *From the Field*, January 1991, op. cit., p.7.

135. Israeli government sources as quoted in UNRWA, "Economic Conditions," op. cit., p.9.

136. ACC, "Socio-Agricultural Report (SAR)" No.6, 10 February 1991, p.2.

137. Approximately 104,000 of 2 million dunams of cultivated land in the West Bank are irrigated; close to 50% of 200,000 dunams in the Gaza Strip are irrigated (CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.4). About 10,000 dunams of greenhouse land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were in production at the time of the curfew (PARC, "Report on the Economic Costs to the Agricultural Sector of the Prolonged Curfew in the Occupied Territories," 30 January 1991, p.1).

138. ACC, "SAR No.6," op. cit., p.2. See also Deek and Judeh, op. cit.

139. PARC, "Report on Economic Costs," op. cit., p.2.

140. Olive, almond, and grape land should be cultivated in the winter months in preparation for the summer season (ACC, "Effects of the Prolonged Curfew," op. cit., p.1).

141. According to Israeli statistics for 1989, the combined value of output of livestock and livestock products for the West Bank and Gaza Strip was US\$238 million (CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.4.).

142. PHRIC, *Information Bulletin*, 17 February 1991, op. cit., p.6.

143. Cf. ACC, "The Effects of the Prolonged Curfew," op. cit., p.2. January and February are especially critical months for dairy farmers since, due to birthing, they are high milk-producing months for both sheep and cattle. Cf. Deek and Judeh, op. cit.

144. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.4.

145. Deek and Judeh, op. cit. Additionally, the curfew paralysed all agricultural extension and technical services, and all grassroots agricultural organisations working in development. Such services were particularly critical at the time of the curfew due to drought damage and the need for services to aid in birthing and vaccination. The interruption of crucial veterinary services is expected to lead to increased losses of new-borns. Cf. ACC, "The Effects of the Prolonged Curfew," op. cit., p.2; PARC, "Report on the Economic Costs," op. cit., p.2.

146. According to the ACC, between December 1990 and mid-January, Palestinians shipped a total of 5,000 tons of citrus, 200 tons of tomatoes, 70 tons of strawberry, 1,100 tons of olive oil, 500 tons of aubergines, and 60 tons of pepper. These quantities fulfilled less than 20% of this year's EEC contracts (ACC, "The Effects on Direct Agricultural Export," op. cit.). 'Abd a-Rahman Abu 'Aref, Chairperson of the West Bank Olive Oil Marketing Committee reported that the Committee had been unable to keep a contract with the Italian Government for the export of 6,000 tons of oil (B'Tselem, op. cit., p.8).

147. Exports to Jordan have been severely restricted since the onset of the Gulf crisis. Cf. Deek and Judeh, op. cit.

148. PARC field investigation, 31 January 1991.

149. Sanabel, op. cit.; *Al-Fajr English*, 18 February 1991, 25 February 1991.

150. ACC, "SAR No.1," 27 January 1991, p.1.

151. ACC, "The Effects of the Prolonged Curfew," op. cit., p.1.

152. Cf. ACC, "SAR No.1" op. cit., "SAR No.6," op. cit.; *Jerusalem Post*, 8 March 1991.

153. PEPCC, "Effect on the Economy," op. cit., p.4. CCINGO gives a more conservative estimate of US\$10-12 million (CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.3).

154. The industrial sector generates approximately 9% of the occupied territories' GDP. The majority of its establishments are small, individually or family-owned enterprises employing one to four people (CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.2).
155. PEPCC, "Effect on Economy," op. cit., p.4.
156. Israel receives 90% of its shoe supply from West Bank factories. PHRIC, *From the Field*, January 1991, op. cit., p.8.
157. *Jerusalem Post*, 8 February 1991.
158. Sanabel Press Services, op. cit.
159. CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.3.
160. *Attali'a*, 31 January 1991.
161. *Jerusalem Post*, 8 February 1991, 8 March 1991; CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.3.
162. Cf. *Jerusalem Post*, 8 March 1991, 2 April 1991.
163. Cf. PEPCC, "Effect on Economy," op. cit., p.4; CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., pp.2-3.
164. Approximately 37% of the GDP of the occupied territories is generated by transport and trade (CCINGO, "Paper on the Economic Effects," op. cit., p.5).
165. Ibid.
166. PEPCC, "A Plan of Action," op. cit., p.1.

Appendix A: List of Acronyms Used in Report

ACC	Agricultural Coordinating Committee
ACRI	Association for Civil Rights in Israel
AIPPHR	The Association of Israeli-Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights
CAABU	Committee for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding
CCINGO	Coordinating Committee of International Non-Governmental Organisations
EEC	European Economic Community
EJ	East Jerusalem
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GS	Gaza Strip
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
JD	Jordanian dinar [.75JD = US\$1.00]
LWE	Land and Water Establishment for Studies and Legal Services
MAP	Medical Aid for Palestine
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NIS	New Israeli shekel [1NIS = US\$2.00]
PARC	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee
PEPCC	Palestinian Economic Planning and Coordinating Committee
PHRIC	Palestine Human Rights Information Centre
UHCW	Union of Health Workers Committee
UNLU	Unified National Leadership of the Uprising
UNRWA	United Nations Relief & Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UPMRC	Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees
WB	West Bank


**Appendix B1: Locations with Highest Curfew Frequency Annually
1988, 1989, 1990**

	1988		1989		1990	
	Location	# of days	Location	# of days	Location	# of days
Camps	Tulkarem RC*	124	Tulkarem RC	158	Tulkarem RC	84
W	Balata RC*	123	Nur Shams RC	110	'Askar RC	69
E	al-'Amari RC*	114	Balata RC	99	Deheishe RC*	58
S	Jalazon RC	94	'Askar RC*	94	'Ain Beit Ilma RC	57
T	'Ain Beit Ilma RC*	68	Jenin RC	54	Balata RC	56
Non-camps	Qalqilia*	111	Dhannabeh	70	Qabatia	56
B	'Anabta	75	Nablus	60	Nablus	49
A	Dhannabeh	67	Beit Wazan	43	'Anabta	40
N	'Azzoun	63	Tulkarem	42	Hebron	39
K	Nablus	58	Jneid	40	Jenin	37
					Bidia	37
Camps	Shati RC	149	Rafah RC	109	Jabalia RC	66
G	Jabalia RC*	134	Shati RC	86	Rafah RC	64
A	Bureij RC	117	Jabalia RC	85	Shati RC	56
Z	Nuseirat RC	107	Nuseirat RC	84	Nuseirat RC	53
A	Khan Younis RC	85	Burieij RC	80	Khan Younis RC	47
S Non-camps	Jabalia	25	Beit Hanoun	43	Rafah	59
T	Deir al-Balah	23	Rafah	37	Khan Younis	32
R	Khan Younis	23	Jabalia	34	Gaza City	31
I	Beit Hanoun	22	Khan Younis	33	Beit Hanoun	28
P	Rafah	20	'Abasan	29	Deir al-Balah	19

* These locations were also under curfew for one or more days in December 1987

CURFEW INCIDENTS


Breakdown by Year



GAZA STRIP CURFEW INCIDENTS

Breakdown by Community Type

(Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)




*Incident = one location under curfew for one day

WEST BANK CURFEW INCIDENTS

Breakdown by Community Type


(Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)

Appendix B4:




*Incident = one location under curfew for one day

Appendix B5:




Appendix B6:



WEST BANK & GAZA STRIP


Curfew Incidents (Dec 1987 - Dec 1990)



*Incident = one location under curfew for one day

WEST BANK CURFEW INCIDENTS


Breakdown by Area



* Incident = one location under curfew for one day

WEST BANK PERSON-DAYS UNDER CURFEW

Breakdown by Area



*Person-Day = one person under curfew for one day

APPENDIX C1: Palestinians Killed by Israeli Army & Settlers
(17 January - 31 March 1991)

Date	Name	Age/Sex	Hometown	Details	Source
1 19.01.91	Lubna Nasser Abu Khader	24 f	Nablus	shot on her balcony during curfew	J.20.1.91
2 30.01.91	Ibraheem Abu Jalal	30 m	Maghazi RC	shot in chest	JMCC
3 03.02.91	Lutfi Mahmoud Hweita	27 m	Jenin RC	shot in eye while on roof of home during curfew	PHRIC
4 06.02.91	Hiba Maher Hassanat	4 f	Gaza City	run over by military vehicle	PHRIC
5 11.02.91	Bassem Issa al-Ghrouz	12 m	Deheishe RC	shot while grazing sheep during curfew	I.12.2.91
6 13.02.91	Adnan Jarad	30 m	'Askar RC	shot in stomach during clashes	I.14.2.91
7 16.02.91	Hussein 'Abd a-Rahman al-Adarba'i	20 m	Beit Ula	under detention, died in hospital in coma	S.17.2.91
8 18.02.91	Jabber 'Abdallah Batah	15 m	Hajeh	shot during clashes	I.19.2.91
9 18.02.91	Salameh Jalal Musteh	14 m	Beit Sahour	shot by settler while inside his home	I.19.2.91
10 22.02.91	'Izzat Hazazi	14 m	Yatta	shot in chest during stoning incident	I.24.2.91
11 ?	'Ayed 'Abdallah Bani 'Odeh	21 m	Tamoun	killed by explosion crossing Jordan Valley	I.20.2.91
12 25.02.91	Hussam Anees Obeidi	18 m	Jenin RC	shot in head during clashes	Q.26.2.91
13 01.03.91	Najeeb Mustafa Hamei	21 m	Burjeen	shot in head during clashes	S.2.3.91
14 06.03.91	'Adli 'Abd al-Lateef al-Barghouti	18 m	Deir Ghassaneh	shot in chest & head during army raid on school	I.7.3.91
15 18.03.91	Hasan 'Abd al-Lateef 'Issa	55 m	Salem	shot 18.12.90 for allegedly running checkpoint	I.19.3.91
16 19.03.91	Hussam Hasouneh 'Attallah	13 m	Gaza City	run over by military vehicle	I.20.3.91
17 23.03.91	Jihad Hussein Zaghad	18 m	Nur Shams RC	shot in chest, allegedly inciting demonstrators	I.25.3.91
18 24.03.91	'Attiyeh Khader Ja'fer	15 m	Gaza City	shot in head while shopping, clashes nearby	I.25.3.91
19 27.03.91	Zayed Sami 'Abd al-'Al	19 m	Rafah RC	shot in head on his way home from prayers	JMCC
20 28.03.91	Sa'eed 'Odeh Abu Mur	12 m	Rafah RC	shot in head, protesting killing of 'Abd al-'Al	I.29.3.91
21 31.03.91	Iyad Ibraheem 'Abd a-Ra'ouf	17 m	Tulkarem RC	shot in head during clashes	S.1.4.91

16 Palestinians shot dead by Israeli military
 1 Palestinian shot dead by Israeli settlers
 3 Palestinians killed in other military-related incidents

 21 Total number of Palestinians killed 17.1.91 - 31.3.91

Note: Unless otherwise noted, shooting deaths were executed by Israeli military personnel. Palestinian deaths as a result of military interference in medical treatment are not included in this table.

Source abbreviations used in Appendix C:
 E = Al-Fajr English; F = Al-Fajr; I = Al-Ittihad; J = Jerusalem Post; N = An-Nahar; Q = Al-Quds; S = A-Sha'ab; T = Attali'a

**APPENDIX C2: Houses Demolished or Sealed by Israeli Military
(17 January - 31 March 1991)**

Date	Location	Houseowner/ # of residents	Action	Reason	Source
1 25/01/91	Nablus	Ayman Kama1	S	SR	N.26.1.91
2 29/01/91	Rafat	Isma'eel Ahmed 'Amer	D	SR	Q.30.1.91
3 29/01/91	Rafah RC	Yousef 'Ali 'Issa	D	SR	Q.30.1.91
4 06/02/91	Hussan	'Abd al-Fattah Hamamrah / 4	D	BL	F.7.2.91
5 06/02/91	Ramallah	Harb 'Omar a-Sabbar	S	SR	E.7.2.91
6 07/02/91	Jab'a	Yousef Saleimeh	S	SR	Q.8.2.91
7 07/02/91	Bethlehem	Yousef a-Sheikh / 20	PD	BL	F.8.2.91
8 07/02/91	Tafouh	Fahed a-Tarwah	D	BL	F.8.2.91
9 07/02/91	Tafouh	Nimer a-Tarwah	D	BL	F.8.2.91
10 08/02/91	Nablus	Muhammed Tawfeeq / 13	D	SR	S.9.2.91
11 09/02/91	Beiteen	Muhammed Liftawi / 9	D	BL	F.10.2.91
12 09/02/91	Deir Abu Mish'al	Yousef Salem Shunar / 14	D	BL	N.10.2.91
13 09/02/91	Bruqeen	'Abd a-Rahman Salman / 14	D	BL	Q.10.2.91
14 10/02/91	Samou'a	Sa'eed a-Salameen	D	BL	N.11.2.91
15 11/02/91	Beit Fajjar	Yousef al-Haj	D	BL	Q.12.2.91
16 11/02/91	Beit Fajjar	'Ali Taqatqah	D	BL	Q.12.2.91
17 11/02/91	Barta'a a-Sharqia	Ibraheem Shalash	D	BL	Q.12.2.91
18 12/02/91	Barta'a a-Sharqia	Mustafa 'Abas / 10	D	BL	N.13.2.91
19 13/02/91	Jenin	Ameen Musa Abu Hamad / 14	S	SR	E.18.2.91
20 14/02/91	Jenin	Muhammed a-Sa'adi / 10	D	SR	F.15.2.91
21 14/02/91	al-Walajeh	Muhammed al-Hajajleh	D	BL	Q.15.2.91
22 14/02/91	Bal'a	Sameer Abu Sitah / 8	D	BL	S.15.2.91
23 14/02/91	Bal'a	Saleh Hamdan	D	BL	S.15.2.91
24 14/02/91	Beit Leed	'Abd al-Haleem Ziadi / 10	D	BL	S.15.2.91
25 14/02/91	Sinjel	'Ali 'Abd al-Jawad	D	BL	S.15.2.91
26 14/02/91	'Arroura	Yousef Saleh	D	BL	S.15.2.91
27 15/02/91	Gaza City	Hassan Ba'louji / 6	D	SR	F.16.2.91
28 18/02/91	Nablus	'Adel Qadouni	S	SR	S.19.2.91
29 18/02/91	Nablus	Khaled al-'Anani	S	SR	Q.19.2.91
30 19/02/91	Nablus	Yasser 'Obeid	PS	SR	Q.19.2.91
31 19/02/91	Jadeeda	Iyad Samarah / 13	D	BL	I.20.2.91
32 19/02/91	Gaza City	Ra'fat Hamdounah / 5	PS	SR	F.20.2.91
33 19/02/91	Deir a-Sudan	'Abd al-Wahab Sa'eed / 22	D	BL	N.20.2.91
34 19/02/91	Ramallah	'Awad Awasi / 7	D	BL	N.20.2.91
35 19/02/91	Deir Abu Da'eef	'Abd a-Raheem 'Awad / 4	D	BL	S.20.2.91
36 19/02/91	Jabalia	Khader Suleiman / 15	D	BL	S.20.2.91
37 19/02/91	Jabalia	Muhammed a-Najjar / 6	D	BL	S.20.2.91
38 19/02/91	Jabalia	Kameleh 'Abd Rabuh / 5	D	BL	S.20.2.91
39 19/02/91	Rafah	'Abd al-Mun'am 'Obeid / 20	D	SR	S.20.2.91
40 19/02/91	Rafah	Aymen Tayem / 11	D	SR	S.20.2.91
41 19/02/91	Rafah	Zaki Abu Qa'oud / 19	D	SR	S.20.2.91
42 21/02/91	'Azzaria	Mahmoud Abu Rumi / 6	D	BL	N.22.2.91
43 21/02/91	al-Walajeh	Jamal Saleh Jibreel	D	BL	I.22.2.91
44 22/02/91	'Aseera a-Shamalia	Muhammed Abu Haleemeh / 9	D	SR	F.23.2.91
45 22/02/91	'Aseera a-Shamalia	Hamed a-Shouli / 8	S	SR	F.23.2.91
46 25/02/91	Beit 'Awa	Subhi Shalash / 7	D	SR	N.26.2.91
47 25/02/91	Beit 'Awa	Subhi Muhammed al-Masalmah	D	SR	Q.26.3.91
48 25/02/91	Jerusalem	Ahmed Quntar / 7	D	BL	Q.26.2.91
49 03/03/91	Jabal al-Mukaber	Hussein 'Obeidat	D	BL	S.4.3.91
50 03/03/91	Jerusalem	Ra'ed Shweiki	D	BL	S.4.3.91
51 05/03/91	Sarrah	'Abd al-'Azeez Mahmoud Hasan	PD	BL	S.6.3.91
52 05/03/91	Kufr Jamal	Hilmi Subhi Fareed a-Sheikh / 10	D	BL	Q.6.3.91
53 06/03/91	Qatanna	Ibraheem al-Haj	D	BL	T.7.3.91
54 06/03/91	Qatanna	Isma'eel Muhsan	D	BL	T.7.3.91
55 06/03/91	Qatanna	Mahmoud al-Hayik	D	BL	T.7.3.91
56 06/03/91	Qatanna	Fatima Jabar	D	BL	T.7.3.91
57 06/03/91	Kufr Qaleel	'Abd al-Baset 'Abd a-Rahman	D	BL	S.7.3.91
58 06/03/91	Qasrah	'Abd al-'Azeez Saleh	PD	BL	Q.7.3.91
59 06/03/91	Mudawar	'Abdallah Othman Abu Deeb	D	BL	Q.7.3.91
60 14/03/91	Beit Laqia	Fayzah 'Assi / 7	S	SR	I.15.3.91
61 14/03/91	Shu'fat RC	Ribhi a-Dibwani	D	BL	F.15.3.91
62 14/03/91	al-'Issawiah	Ibraheem Hamdan / 6	D	BL	F.15.3.91
63 14/03/91	Rujeeb	'Adnan 'Adel al-'Amoudi	D	BL	Q.15.3.91
64 15/03/91	Jabalia RC	Muhammed Abu Jalaleh / 29	D	SR	S.16.3.91
65 15/03/91	al-Jeeb	Hamdi Abu Asmer / 13	D	BL	S.16.3.91
66 15/03/91	Jabalia RC	Othman Abu Ziadi / 10	D	SR	S.16.3.91
67 23/03/91	Til	'Amer 'Ali Abu 'Assideh / 7	S	SR	S.24.3.91
68 25/03/91	Gaza City	'Imad 'Ali Rayan / 10	S	SR	I.26.3.91
69 27/03/91	Jenin	Iyad a-Salfeeti / 7	S	SR	F.28.3.91

70	27/03/91	Dhaharia	Bilal Abu 'Alan / 14	S	SR	S.28.3.91
71	27/03/91	Dhaharia	Majed a-Shamleh / 13	S	SR	S.28.3.91
72	28/03/91	Jenin RC	Muhammed Mas'oud Abu a-Saba'/13	S	SR	Q.29.3.91
73	28/03/91	Jenin RC	Ibraheem Mas'oud Abu a-Saba'	S	SR	Q.29.3.91
74	28/03/91	Nablus	Nasser al-Athmi	S	SR	Q.29.3.91
75	31/03/91	'Ain Areek	'Anees Shukri Hassan	PS	SR	S.1.4.91

D = demolished
S = sealed

PD = partially demolished
PS = partially sealed

SR = action taken for alleged "security" reasons

BL = action taken on grounds that house was built without acquisition of building licence

Number of houses demolished for "security" reasons:	13
Number of houses sealed for "security" reasons:	16
Number of houses partially sealed for "security" reasons:	3
Number of houses demolished for lack of building permit:	40
Number of houses partially demolished for lack of building permit:	3

**APPENDIX C3: Trees Uprooted by Israeli Military
(17 January - 31 March 1991)**

Date	Location	Number of trees	Owners	Source
1 20.01.91	Deir Ibzi'a	35 olive trees	?	F.21.1.91
2 07.02.91	'Awarta	50 olive trees	'Izzat Nassar & others	F.8.2.91
3 17.02.91	Beit Sureek	200 olive, 400 other trees	Khader Jaber	S.18.2.91
4 19.02.91	'Awarta	10 olive trees	?	F.20.2.91
5 19.02.91	Beitunia	100 olive, 7 almond trees	Hassan 'Issa	N.20.2.91
6 21.02.91	Hebron	20 trees	'Abdeen & Hashleeman families	I.22.2.91
7 27.02.91	Barta'a a-Sharqia	1,200 olive trees	Kabha family	I.28.2.91
8 27.02.91	Beit Jala	10 olive trees	Jawdat A-Sha'er	I.28.2.91
9 28.02.91	al-'Azab	100 olive trees	Muhammed Darawsheh	Q.1.3.91
10 03.03.91	Rantees	40 olive trees	Salameh family	E.4.3.91
11 04.03.91	Tumus 'Aya	15 olive trees	?	S.5.3.91
12 05.03.91	Doura al-Qara'	17 olive trees	?	N.6.3.91
13 07.03.91	Deir Ibzi'a	40 olive trees	Diyab Nimer	F.8.3.91
14 13.03.91	Deir Istia	60 olive trees	Muhammed Abu Nasser & others	S.14.3.91
15 14.03.91	Sikah	60 olive trees	Musa Harbiyak & Ameen 'Ideh	I.15.3.91
16 14.03.91	Doura al-Qara'	6 olive trees	Khader Hamdan	I.15.3.91
17 14.03.91	Beit 'Awa	300 olive trees	Hassan 'Ali & Mahmoud a-Sweiti	I.15.3.91
18 19.03.91	'Azzoun	20 olive trees	'Abd al-Lateef Yousef	Q.20.3.91
19 21.03.91	al-Yamoun	20 olive trees	'Ieed Naser	I.22.3.91
20 21.03.91	Silat al-Harthia	60 olive trees	Yasser Abu Salah & Ahmed Jaradat	I.22.3.91
21 23.03.91	'Anabta	78 olive trees	Ahmed Mulhem & Khayri Hanoun	F.24.3.91
22 25.03.91	Beit Jala	apricot, almond, olive trees	?	Q.26.3.91
23 27.03.91	Deir Balout	16 olive trees	Muhammed Hussein	Q.28.3.91
24 28.03.91	Wadi Tufah	2 dunams of trees	'Azam 'Abdeen & others	PHRIC
25 29.03.91	Deir Istia	100 olive trees	Saqer 'Abd al-Hamed	F.30.3.91
26 31.03.91	'Anabta	20 almond, 2 olive trees	'Abd al-Lateef Hamdan	F.1.4.91

Total number of uprootings: 2,986 trees & 2 dunams of orchards

**APPENDIX C4: Palestinian Land Confiscated by Israeli Occupation Authorities
(17 January - 31 March 1991)**

Date	Location	Number of dunams	Landowners	Source
1 27/02/91	Ba'leen	1,000 dunams of fruit trees	Waqf [Islamic Trust Authorities]	I.28.2.91
2 28/02/91	Toubas	0.5 dunams	Hafith Isma'eel	F.1.3.91
3 08/03/91	Deir Abu Mish'al	2,500 dunams	?	Q.9.3.91
4 09/03/91	Lubban al-Gharbia	10,000 dunams	'Abd a-Raheem 'Odeh, etc.	LWE
5 10/03/91	Samou'a	1,000 dunams	11 villagers	S.11.3.91
6 10/03/91	a-Zawia	8 dunams of olive trees	Kamal Rajab	Q.11.3.91
7 11/03/91	Rafat	4,500 dunams	?	F.12.3.91
8 16/03/91	Birzeit	20 dunams	Hanna Musa Qasees	Q.17.3.91
9 17/03/91	Bethlehem	200 dunams	'Odeh Gazal	LWE
10 24/03/91	Toubas	.42 dunams	Hafith Daraghme	Q.25.3.91
*11 31/03/91	Ramon, Taibe, Deir Dibwan, Deir Jareer	50,000 dunams		I.1.4.91

Total dunams confiscated: 19,229 dunams
Additional dunams for which confiscation has been announced: 50,000 dunams

* verbal order only

**APPENDIX C5: Individual School Closures by Military Order
(19 February - 1 March 1991)**

Dates of Closure from	until	Location	Name of School	Sources
*15.01.91	26.02.91	Nablus	Shareef Sabouh Elem.	N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	26.02.91	Bathan	Elem.	N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	26.02.91	Beit Dajan	Elem.	N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	26.02.91	Lubban a-Sharqia	Elem.	N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	26.02.91	Balata RC	Elem.	N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	26.02.91	'Askar RC	Elem.	N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	26.02.91	'Ain Beit Ilma RC	Elem.	N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	27.02.91	a-Sawia	Sec. Boys	N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	27.02.91	Nablus	Kamal Junblat Sec. Girls (3rd sec.)	N.27.02.91; N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	27.02.91	Nablus	a-Sina'ia Sec. Boys (3rd sec.)	N.27.02.91; N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	27.02.91	Huwara	Sec. Boys (3rd sec.)	N.27.02.91; N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	27.02.91	Burqa	Sec. Boys (3rd sec.)	N.27.02.91; N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	02.03.91	Nablus	Ma'zouz al-Masri Sec. Boys (3rd sec.)	N.27.02.91; N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	02.03.91	Nablus	Qadri Touqan Sec. Boys (3rd sec.)	N.27.02.91; N.27.02.91
*15.01.91	?	Nablus	King Talal Sec. Boys (3rd sec. class)	N.24.02.91
*15.01.91	03.03.91	Jayyous	all schools	Q.01.03.91; N.04.03.91
*15.01.91	03.03.91	Kufr 'Aboush	all schools	Q.01.03.91; N.04.03.91
*15.01.91	03.03.91	Kufr Jamal	all schools	Q.01.03.91; N.04.03.91
*15.01.91	03.03.91	Kufr Qadoun	all schools	Q.01.03.91; N.04.03.91
*15.01.91	03.03.91	Kufr Zeebad	all schools	N.04.03.91
*15.01.91	03.04.91	Shweike	all 3 schools	F.04.04.91
*15.01.91	?	Gaza City	Imam Shafri Prep. Boys	Q.07.03.91
*15.01.91	28.03.91	Bani Suheila	UNRWA Prep. Girls	Q.07.03.91; Q.29.03.91
23.02.91	24.02.91	Jerusalem	a-Rashidia Sec. Girls	F.24.02.91; F.24.02.91
23.02.91	24.02.91	Jerusalem	'Abdallah Ibn al-Hussein Sec. Boys	F.24.02.91; F.24.02.91
27.02.91	?	Halhoul	Sec. Boys	S.28.02.91
27.02.91	?	Halhoul	Sec. Girls	S.28.02.91
06.03.91	20.03.91	Ya'abad	Sec. Boys	F.07.03.91; F.20.03.91
07.03.91	14.03.91	Beit Sahour	Roman Orthodox	F.08.03.91; Q.15.06.91
07.03.91	14.03.91	Ramallah	Roman Orthodox Prep. Boys	Q.08.03.91; Q.08.03.91
08.03.91	24.03.91	Jerusalem	al-Fatah al-Laji'a Sec. Girls	S.09.03.91; N.25.03.91
08.03.91	17.03.91	Bethlehem	Roman Catholic Sec. Boys	F.10.03.91; F.11.03.91
10.03.91	24.03.91	Hebron	Ameer Muhammed Prep. Boys	F.11.03.91; N.25.03.91
10.03.91	?	Hebron	Ibn al-Muqufa' Prep.	S.11.03.91; F.21.03.91
13.03.91	14.03.91	Qalandia RC	UNRWA Prep. Boys	F.14.03.91; F.14.03.91
13.03.91	16.03.91	'Aqabat Jabr RC	UNRWA Prep.	F.14.03.91; F.14.03.91
14.03.91	24.03.91	Beitunia	Sec. Boys	I.15.03.91; N.25.03.91
14.03.91	17.03.91	Toubas	Prep.	I.15.03.91; I.15.03.91
14.03.91	17.03.91	Toubas	Sec.	I.15.03.91; I.15.03.91
14.03.91	17.03.91	Silat al-Harthia	Sec. Boys	I.15.03.91; I.15.03.91
16.03.91	?	Tulkarem RC	all 5 UNRWA schools	I.17.03.91; S.01.04.91
16.03.91	20.03.91	Silat al-Harthia	Elem.	N.17.03.91
16.03.91	?	Beit Ummar	Sec. Boys	S.17.03.91
18.03.91	?	Taibe	Roman Prep.	S.19.03.91
18.03.91	?	Taibe	Latin Sec.	S.19.03.91
19.03.91	?	Dhaharia	Elem. Boys	N.20.03.91
19.03.91	?	Za'atara	Sec. Boys	N.20.03.91
20.03.91	24.03.91	Bidia	Sec. Boys	F.21.03.91; F.25.03.91
20.03.91	?	Ya'abad	Sec. Boys	F.21.03.91
20.03.91	?	Nablus	al-Kandi Elem. Boys	S.21.03.91; S.27.03.91
20.03.91	23.03.91	Jerusalem	a-Rashidia Sec. Boys	I.21.03.91; S.22.03.91
20.03.91	?	Jiftlik	Prep. Boys	I.21.03.91
21.03.91	?	Qalandia RC	UNRWA Girls Prep	S.22.03.91
21.03.91	28.03.91	'Aqabat Jabr RC	UNRWA Prep.	S.22.03.91; S.22.03.91
21.03.91	24.03.91	al-Bireh	al-Hashimia Sec. Boys	S.22.03.91; S.22.03.91
22.03.91	?	'Ain Yabroud	Sec. Boys	S.23.03.91
23.03.91	30.03.91	Jalazon RC	UNRWA Prep.	I.24.03.91; I.24.03.91
24.03.91	31.03.91	Jericho	Hisham Ibn 'Abd al-Malek Sec. Boys	N.25.03.91; N.25.03.91
24.03.91	25.03.91	Silat al-Harthia	Sec. Girls	F.25.03.91
24.03.91	25.03.91	Silat al-Harthia	Elem. Boys	F.25.03.91
24.03.91	?	Nablus	a-Sina'ia Sec. Boys	F.25.03.91; S.27.03.91
25.03.91	01.04.91	'Ain a-Sultan RC	UNRWA	N.26.03.91; N.26.03.91
25.03.91	?	Ramallah	Melek Ghazi Sec. Boys	I.26.03.91
25.03.91	25.04.91	Silat al-Harthia	Prep. Boys	I.26.03.91; I.26.03.91
26.03.91	?	Tulkarem	al-Umaria Prep. Boys	S.27.03.91
27.03.91	27.04.91	Hebron	Khaled Ibn 'Abd al-'Azeez Prep. Boys	F.28.03.91; Q.31.03.91
30.03.91	06.04.91	Hebron	Ameer Muhammed Prep. Boys	Q.31.03.91; Q.31.03.91
30.03.91	?	Gaza City	a-Zahra Sec. Girls	F.31.03.91

* reopening date following 15 January blanket closure delayed by military order

Total number of individual closure orders:	44	Total no. of individual delayed openings:	17
Total number of location-wide closure orders:	1+	Total no. of location-wide delayed openings:	6

The Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre

is a Jerusalem-based group which works to provide accurate and objective information concerning events in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

JMCC produces weekly summaries of events reported in the local press, organises tours for journalists and other interested parties, and produces briefing papers on current issues.

Briefing papers to date include:

- *Soviet Jewish Immigration and Israeli Settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Dec 1990)
- *Palestinian Education - A Threat to Israel's Security?* (2nd ed., updated, Aug 1990)
- *Lessons of Occupation - Palestinian Higher Education During the Uprising* (May 1990)
- *The Intifada: An Overview - The First Two Years* (Dec 1989)
- *Reporting Harassment - Israeli Restrictions of Press Freedom in the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Aug 1989)
- *Bitter Harvest - Israeli Sanctions Against Palestinian Agriculture During the Uprising* (May 1989)

For further information, contact:

JMCC
POB 25047
East Jerusalem
West Bank via Israel

Tel (02) 827478