This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 40, which was carried out by the JMCC in April 2001 .

The current opinion poll was conducted about 6 months after the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada, which started on September 28th, 2000. The situation during the past 6 months has been extraordinarily difficult for Palestinians. About 450 Palestinians have been killed, thousands injured and disabled, mostly during demonstrations against Israeli occupation or as a result of shelling of residential areas. Hundreds of Israeli Military checkpoints were erected on entrances to Palestinian cities, villages, and refugee camps, isolating communities from each other and dividing the West Bank in 64 clusters and Gaza Strip into 3 clusters. Additionally, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were cut off from each other and from the rest of the world.  As expected, the prevailing conditions significantly affect respondent’s views towards issues of concern.

The first part of this issue will discuss some of the results about personal opinions regarding the current Palestinian Intifada.  The second part of this issue will focus on personal opinions about the peace process. Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and sample distribution.

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This section aims to highlight Palestinians’ personal opinions regarding the current Palestinian Intifada and identify correlates of these opinions.

1.1 Support for the continuation of the current Palestinian Intifada

When respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada, 80% stated that they supported its continuity, 13% stated that they opposed it, 5% did not know, and 2% did not give an answer. These figures indicate that there is a 10-point increase in favor of continuation of the Intifada, despite the increase in number of deaths, injuries, and damage, as compared to 4 months earlier when 70% of Palestinians supported the continuation of the Intifada (JMCC Poll #39, December 2000). As figure 1 shows, Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip are more supportive of the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada as compared to Palestinians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (87%, 79% and 76% respectively).

Figure 1:

The relation between the respondent’s level of support for the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada and the political faction s/he trusts most has changed since the JMCC December poll # 39. Currently, Palestinians who trust Fateh, Islamic parties, or other parties have almost similar levels of support for the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada (82%, 85%, and 82% respectively). Palestinians who do not trust any faction have a lower level of support for the continuation of the Intifada (72%). As figure 2 shows, these figures represent an increase from 67% for Fateh supporters, no change for Islamic factions (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizbollah, and other Islamic factions), an increase from 77% for supporters of other factions (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, PLO), and an increase from 67% for those who do not trust any faction.

Figure 2:

Additionally, 84% of respondents who have a secondary education or higher are supportive of the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada as compared to 72% of those who do not have a secondary education. In addition, 86% of males are supportive of the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada as compared to 74% of females. Support for the continuation of the Intifada does not significantly differ by type of community the respondent lives in (city, village, refugee camp).

1.2 Preferred characteristics of the Palestinian Intifada

Respondents were asked whether they prefer the continuation of a popular resistance Intifada alone, a military resistance Intifada alone, or a popular and military resistance Intifada together. A popular Intifada involves unarmed public resistance of the occupation (processions, demonstrations, stone throwing, Molotov cocktails, with the most extreme case being individual stabbing incidents). A military Intifada entails armed military involvement. ???

Sixty-two percent of respondents support the continuation of a popular and military resistance Intifada together as opposed to 14% who support the continuation of a popular resistance Intifada alone, 16% who support the continuation of a military resistance Intifada alone, 7% who did not know, and 2% who did not provide an answer (see figure 3).

Figure 3:

Preferred characteristics of the Palestinian Intifada differ by area of residence.  Seventy-six percent of respondents from Gaza Strip are supportive of a popular and military resistance Intifada as opposed to 58% of respondent from the West Bank and 43% of respondents from East Jerusalem.  Also, 8% of respondents from Gaza Strip are supportive of a popular resistance Intifada as opposed to 15% of respondent from the West Bank and 31% of respondents from East Jerusalem.

The political faction that the respondent trusts most is not significantly related to the characteristics of the Intifada that s/he prefers.

1.3 Support for suicide operations against Israeli targets

As figure 4 shows, an increase is detected in the level of public support for suicide operations against Israeli targets within the current political conditions.  At the present time, 76% of respondents surveyed support the conception of suicide operations against Israeli targets. This represents yet another increase from the 66% support level recorded in the December 2000 Poll (#39), which itself was more than double the level of support during the past 5 years (26.1% in March 1999, 28.2% in August 1997, 23.6% in May 1997, 32.7% in April 1997, and 32.8% in June 95).

Figure 4:

Palestinians living in Gaza Strip are more supportive of suicide operations against Israeli targets (86%) when compared to Palestinians living in the West Bank (72%) and those living in East Jerusalem (62%).

Level of support of suicide operations among respondents who trust Islamic factions most (90%) is higher than that of respondents who trust Fateh most (69%), respondents who trust other factions most (66%), and respondents who do not trust any faction (72%) (see figure 5).

Figure 5:

Male respondents support suicide operations against Israeli targets more than female respondents (78% versus 72%).  Additionally, refugees support suicide operations against Israeli targets more than non-refugees (81% versus 72%).

Age of respondent is negatively associated with support for suicide operations against Israeli targets. Level of support for suicide operations is 81% among respondents younger than 30 years and 73% among respondents 30 years or older.
 

1.4 Satisfaction with Arab solidarity with the Intifada

When asked whether they were satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada, 41% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied, while the rest were dissatisfied.  Residents of East Jerusalem are more likely to be satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada (60%) as compared to residents of Gaza Strip (44%) and the West Bank (34%). Additionally, females are more likely to be satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada (46%) as compared to males (36%). Moreover, refugees are more likely to be satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada (44%) when compared to non-refugees (37%). Furthermore, respondents with less than secondary education are more likely to be satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada (46%) as compared to non-refugees (38%).

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2.1 Evaluation of the status of the peace process

Respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions.  Thirty percent of respondents think that the peace process is dead and that there is no way to resume negotiations, 44% think that the peace process is passing through difficult times and its future is unknown, 19% think that the peace process is still alive and it is possible to resume negotiations, and 6% do not know (see figure 6)

Figure 6:

Respondents’ evaluations of the status of the peace process are associated with the political party the respondents trust most.  Forty-seven percent of supporters of Islamic parties think that the peace process is dead, as opposed to 35% of Palestinians who do not support any faction, 28% of Palestinians who support other factions, and 17% of Fateh supporters.
(The 17% ratio is important if related with Hamas figure)

2.2 Support for Oslo agreements

Forty-three percent of Palestinians support Oslo agreements. The level of support for the Oslo agreements declined noticeably after the eruption of the current Palestinian Intifada. Residents of West Bank/East Jerusalem are more likely to support Oslo agreements than Gaza Strip residents (50% versus 33%). As figure 7 shows, support for Oslo agreement is highly correlated with the political faction that the respondent trusts most. Sixty-seven percent of respondents who indicated that they trust Fateh most support the Oslo agreements, as opposed to 40% of Palestinians who trust other factions most, 34% of Palestinians who do not trust any factions, and only 19% of Palestinians who trust Islamic factions most.

Figure 7:

Support for Oslo agreements is also associated with several demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of respondents; females are more supportive of Oslo agreements than males (48% versus 39%), non-refugees are more supportive of Oslo agreements than refugees (48% versus 38%), residents of villages are more supportive of Oslo agreements than residents of cities and refugee camps (55%, 39%, and 36% respectively), and respondents with less than secondary education are more supportive of Oslo agreements than those with secondary education or higher (55% versus 39%).
 

2.3 Trust in Palestinian political or religious factions

When respondents were asked about the Palestinian political or religious faction that they trust most, 35% indicated that they trusted Fateh most, 26% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most  (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizbollah, and other Islamic factions), 5% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, PLO), and 23% indicated that they did not trust any faction (see figure 8).

Figure 8:

There is more trust for Fateh among residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip than among residents of East Jerusalem (42%, 39%, and 32% respectively).  On the other hand, there is more trust for Islamic parties among residents of Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem than among residents of the West Bank (35%, 33% and 25% respectively).

Figure 9 depicts levels of trust for political and religious parties among Palestinians over the past 10 months.

Figure 9:

2.4 Trust in Palestinian figures

When respondents were asked about the Palestinian figure that they trusted most, 35% indicated that they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, 9% indicated that they trusted Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 25% indicated that they trusted other figures, and 31% indicated that they did not trust anybody (see figure 10).

Figure 10:

Residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are more likely to support President Arafat than residents of East Jerusalem (37%, 35%, and 28% respectively).  Residents of East Jerusalem are more likely not to support any faction when compared to residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (41%, 33%, and 26% respectively).  Additionally, Palestinians with less than secondary education are more likely to support President Arafat than Palestinians with secondary education or higher (44% versus 32%).   Moreover, Palestinians who are 30 years or older are more likely to support President Arafat than Palestinians younger than 30 years of age (40% versus 30%).

Figure 11 depicts support for Palestinian figures among Palestinians over the past 10 months.

Figure 11:

2.5 Satisfaction with the way President Arafat is handling his work

Respondents were asked about their satisfaction with the way President Arafat is handling his work as the head of the Palestinian Authority.  Sixty percent of Palestinians are generally satisfied with the way President Arafat is handling his work.  There is no significant difference in the level of satisfaction by region of residence.  However, the level of satisfaction varies widely by the political faction the respondent trusts more; 86% of Fateh supporters are satisfied with the performance of President Arafat, as opposed to 59% of Palestinians who support other factions, 46% of Palestinians who do not support any faction, and 33% of Palestinians who support Islamic parties (see figure 12).

Figure 12:

2.6 Evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian Authority

When asked about their views on the performance of the Palestinian Authority in general, 64% of respondents stated that the Palestinian Authority’s performance is good.  Based on previous JMCC polls, there is a gradual decline in the percentage of respondents who say that the performance of the Palestinian authority is good.  However, there has been no change in the evaluation of Palestinian Authority’s performance since the beginning of the current Intifada.

Evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian authority is highly correlated with the faction that the respondent trusts most.  Eighty-seven percent of respondents who trust Fateh most said that the Palestinian Authority’s performance in general is good, as opposed to only 38% of respondents who trust Islamic factions most, 56% of respondents who trust other factions most, and 54% of respondents do  not trust any faction.

Figure 13:

Additionally, respondents’ evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority as being good was correlated with place of residence (67% in the West Bank, 62% in East Jerusalem, and 60% in Gaza Strip), gender (69% in females and 9% in males), type of community (61% in cities, 61% in refugee camps, and 69% in villages), and level of education (69% who had less than secondary education and 61% who had secondary or higher education).
 

2.7 The role of the United States as a mediator in the negotiations

The vast majority of respondents (96%) believe that the United States is conducting its mediation in a biased manner towards the Israelis.  This belief does not differ by area of residence or other characteristics of the respondent.
 

2.8 Preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

Respondents were asked what they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was.  Forty-four percent of Palestinians support the two state solution, 25% support a bi-national state in historic Palestine, 15% think there is no solution to the conflict, 8% support a Palestinian state, and 3% support an Islamic state (see figure 13). (No comparison) ??

Figure 14:

2.9 Optimism about the future

When respondents were asked about their level of optimism or pessimism about the future in general, 46% stated that they were optimistic, and the rest were pessimistic.  Respondents living in the West Bank/East Jerusalem are more optimistic when compared to those living in Gaza Strip (50% versus 40%).  Additionally, 55% of respondents who indicated that they trusted Fateh or other factions most were optimistic, as opposed to 38% of respondents who indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most, and 40% of respondents who indicated that they did not trust any faction.  It is noted that the percent of Fateh supporters who are optimistic about the future dropped from 61% in December 2000 to 55% in April 2001.

 Figure 15:

Based on information obtained from previous JMCC opinion polls, optimism about the future is at its lowest level since January 1994.  Level of optimism dropped from 68% at the June 2000 poll to 46% at this poll.

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Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,200 Palestinian individuals 18 years or older, from 60 sampling points, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in their homes.

In the West Bank, 760 people were surveyed from the following areas: Jenin: Jenin, Kufr Ra’ee, al-Zababdeh, Yabad, Aqaba , Silat al-harithia , Jenin Refugee Camp (RC) , Fahmeh, T’nak . Nablus: Nablus,  ‘Askar RC, Haris, Bidia, Hiwara, Burqa, Deir al-Hatab, a-Naqoura, Ain Abous and Bidia . . Tulkarem & Qalqilya : Tulkarem, Bala’, Qalqilia , Nur Shams RC , Zeita , Azzoun . Hebron: Hebron, Dura, Idna, Sureef, Halhoul, Yatta, S’eer, and Aroub RC. Bethlehem: Beit ta’mar, Beit Jala , Za’tra, al-khader, Beit Sahor and ‘ayda RC. Jericho: Jericho and Ain al – Sultan . Ramallah & al-Bireh: al-Bireh, Ramallah, Birzeit,  Ni’leen, al-Mizra , al-‘Amari , Kharbatha Bani Harith and  Sinjil . Jerusalem :  al-‘Izarria ,  Old  City, Shu’fat, Beit Hanina, Wadi al-Joz, Beit Hanina a-Thata , Anata , Hizma , Ras al-Amoud , Beir Nabala , Abu Dees , Qalandia RC .

In the Gaza Strip, 440 people were surveyed from the following areas: Gaza North: Jabalia refugee camp, Jabalia, Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun. Gaza:  Sheikh Radwan, a-Darji, a-Tufah, Sabra, , a-Zeitoon, a-Nasser, a-Shujaeih, a-Rimal north and south and Shati refugee camp. Deir al- Balah: al-Nusseirat refugee camp, al-Maghazi refugee camp, Deir al- Balah, and al-Bureij RC . Khan Younis: ‘Abassan al-Kabira, Khan Younis refugee camp, Khan Younis, Bani Suheila and al-Khuza’ . Rafah: Rafah, Rafah refugee camp and Tal al-Sultan RC .

The margin of error is +/- 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95%.

Sample distribution

• 53.4% of the respondents were from West Bank, 10.0% from Jerusalem, 36.6% from the Gaza Strip.
• 31.7% said they live in villages, 17.5% in refugee camps, 50.8% in towns/cities.
• 51.9% were male, 48.1% were female.
• The average age of the respondents was 35.0 years.
• 33.1% were housewives, 20.4% were employees, 12.3% of the respondents were students, 10.1% were laborers, 6.9% were businessmen/ private business, 7.5% were unemployed/ retired, 2.5% were farmers/fishermen, 2.9% were craftsmen, 1.6% were professionals, 1.4% did not give an answer.