Table of contents:
JMCC Public Opinion Polls are supported by a fund from
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Germany
INTRODUCTION
This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated
to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll
no. 39, which was carried out by the JMCC on 21, 22, 23, and 24 December
2000 .
The current opinion poll was conducted about 55 days after
the eruption of the Palestinian Intifada which started on September 28th,
2000. The Intifada started 2 months following a deadlock in the Camp
David negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis on final status issues,
including refugees, Jerusalem, and settlements. A visit by Likud
opposition leader Ariel Sharon to Al-Aqsa mosque which left dozens of Palestinians
injured instigated the eruption of the Intifada, the Palestinian
uprising against occupation and towards Independence. The situation
during the past 2 months have been extraordinarily difficult for Palestinians.
More than 300 Palestinians have been killed, thousands injured and disabled,
mostly during demonstrations against Israeli occupation or as a result
of shelling of residential areas. . Hundreds of Israeli Military
checkpoints were erected on entrances to Palestinian cities, villages and
refugee camps, isolating communities from each other. Additionally,
the West Bank and Gaza Strip were cut off from each other and from
the rest of the world. As expected, the prevailing conditions significantly
affect respondent’s views towards issues of concern.
The first part of this issue will discuss some of the
results about personal opinions regarding the current Palestinian Intifada.
The second part of this issue will focus on personal opinions about the
peace process. Later we will present a description of methodology
used by the JMCC Polling Unit and sample distribution.
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PART ONE: PERSONAL OPINIONS
REGARDING THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA
This section aims to highlight Palestinian’s personal
opinions regarding the current Palestinian Intifada and identify correlates
of these opinions.
1.1 Support for the continuation of the current Palestinian
Intifada
When respondents were asked whether they supported or
opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada, 70.1% stated that
they supported it, 17.8% stated that they opposed it, 8.9% did not know,
and 3.2% did not give an answer.
There were no significant differences in the level of
support for the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada between respondent
in the West Bank/East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. However, respondent’s
level of support for the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada was correlated
with the political faction that s/he trusts most. As figure 1 shows,
66.5% of respondents who indicated that they trust Fateh most supported
the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada, as opposed to 83.2% of those
who indicated that they trust Islamic factions (including Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, Hizbollah, and other Islamic factions) most, 77.4% of those who
supported other factions (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, PLO) most, 66.5%
of those who did not support any faction, and 59.4% of those who did not
give an answer about which faction they support most. Additionally,
73.2% of respondents who had a secondary degree or higher were supportive
of the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada as compared to 64.2% of
those who did not have a secondary degree. Also, 73.6% of males were
supportive of the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada as compared
to 66.6% of females.
Figure 1:
1.2 Preferred characteristics of the Palestinian Intifada
Respondents were asked whether they prefer the continuation
of a popular resistance Intifada alone, a military resistance Intifada
alone, or a popular and military resistance Intifada together. A
popular Intifada involves unarmed public resistance of the occupation (processions,
demonstrations, stone throwing, molotov cocktails, with the most extreme
case being individual stabbing incidents). A military Intifada entails
armed military involvement.
54.4% of respondents support the continuation of a popular
and military resistance Intifada together as opposed to 15.5% who support
the continuation of a popular resistance Intifada alone, 18.5% who support
the continuation of a military resistance Intifada alone, 8.0% who did
not know, and 3.5% who did not provide an answer.
Figure 2:
Preferred characteristics of the Palestinian Intifada
differed by area of residence. 63.0% of respondents from Gaza Strip
were supportive of a popular and military resistance Intifada as opposed
to 49.5% of respondent from the West Bank/East Jerusalem. Also, 7.7%
of respondents from Gaza Strip were supportive of a popular resistance
Intifada as opposed to 20.0% of respondent from the West Bank/East Jerusalem.
Additionally, the political faction that the respondent trusts most was
correlated to the characteristics of the Intifada that s/he prefers.
50.9% of respondents who indicated that they trust Fateh most were with
a popular and military resistance Intifada, as opposed to 63.3% of those
who indicated that they trust Islamic factions most, 56.6% of those who
supported other factions most, 54.3% of those who did not support any factions,
and 45.7% of those who did not give an answer about which faction they
supported most.
1.3 Best path to achieve Palestinian national goals:
Intifada, negotiations, or both.
When asked about the best way to achieve Palestinian national
goals, 52.0% of Palestinians believed that Intifada and negotiations together
were the best way, while 28.4% believed that Intifada alone was the best,
and 12.1% believed that negotiations alone were the best.
Figure 3:
A higher percentage of respondents from Gaza Strip believed
that Intifada alone was the best way to achieve Palestinian national goals
as compared to respondents from West Bank/East Jerusalem (35.7% versus
24.2% respectively). Additionally, 31.0% of respondents who had a
secondary degree or higher believed that Intifada alone was the best way
to achieve Palestinian national goals as compared to 23.4% of those who
did not have a secondary degree.
1.4 Support for military and suicide operations against
Israeli targets
As figure 4 shows, a dramatic increase is detected in
the level of public support for military and suicide operations against
Israeli targets within the current political conditions. At the present
time, 72.1% of respondents surveyed support the conception of military
operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response within the current
political conditions, as compared to a 34.2% support rate in May 1997 and
39.8% support rate in April 1997. The current level of support for
suicide operations against Israeli targets (66.2%) is more than double
the level of support during the past 5 years (26.1% in March 1999, 28.2%
in August 1997, 23.6% in May 1997, 32.7% in April 1997, and 32.8% in June
95).
Figure 4:
Respondents living in Gaza Strip are more supportive of
military and suicide operations against Israeli targets (80.9% and 74.3%)
when compared to respondents living in the West Bank/East Jerusalem (66.9%
and 61.5%).
Figure 5 illustrates the level of support for military
and suicide operations against Israeli targets by the political faction
that the respondent trusts most.
Figure 5:
Level of education of respondent was positively associated
with support for military and suicide operations against Israeli targets.
Level of support for military operations was 74.2% among respondents who
had a secondary degree or higher and 67.5% among those who did not have
a secondary degree. Similarly, level of support for suicide operations
was 68.3% among respondents who had a secondary degree or higher and 62.0%
among those who did not have a secondary degree.
Age of respondent was negatively associated with support
for military and suicide operations against Israeli targets.
Level of support for military operations was 76.7% among respondents 30
years old or younger and 68.9% among respondents older than 30 years of
age. In the same way, level of support for suicide operations was
71.3% among respondents 30 years old or younger and 62.7% among respondents
older than 30 years of age.
1.5 Satisfaction with Arab solidarity with the Intifada
When asked whether they were satisfied with Arab solidarity
with the Intifada, 38.9% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied,
while 60.5% were dissatisfied. There were no major differences in
the level of satisfaction of respondents with Arab solidarity with the
Intifada by other characteristics of the respondent.
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PART TWO: PERSONAL OPINIONS REGARDING
THE PEACE PROCESS
2.1 Support for Oslo agreement
Support for Oslo agreement is at its lowest level since
the signing of the agreement. 38.9% of respondents currently support
Oslo agreement in comparison with a high of 74.9% in December 1996.
There were no major differences in support for Oslo agreement by area of
residence. However, as figure 6 shows, support for Oslo agreement
is highly correlated with the political faction that the respondent trusts
most. 63% of respondents who indicated that they trust Fateh most
supported the Oslo agreement, as opposed to only 18% of those who indicated
that they trust Islamic factions most.
Figure 6:
Additionally, socioeconomic conditions were associated
with support for Oslo agreement. Respondents whose income was much
less than average Palestinian income were more likely than others to support
Oslo agreement (59.7% versus 50.6%). Also, respondents who had a
secondary degree or higher were more likely than respondents who did not
have a secondary degree to support Oslo agreement (47.9% versus 57.8%).
2.2 Opinion about future of Jerusalem
Respondents were asked if they would approve making Jerusalem
the unified capital of Israel if Jerusalem formed the last obstacle in
signing a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The
vast majority of respondents (94.3%) stated that they would disagree with
the specified option (99.3% in Gaza Strip versus 91.4% in the West Bank/East
Jerusalem). Other characteristics of respondents were not correlated
with their opinion regarding the Jerusalem issue.
2.3 Trust in Palestinian political or religious factions
When respondents were asked about the Palestinian political
or religious faction that they trust most, 32.1% indicated that they trust
Fateh, 23.9% indicated that they trust Islamic factions, 4.4% indicated
that they trust other factions, and 28.1% indicated that they did not trust
any factions.
Figure 7:
Support for Fateh has not changed much since the last
JMCC poll in June 2000. Level of support for Fateh was 34.5% at that
time (as compared to 32.1% in December 2000). However, level of support
for Islamic factions (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizbollah, and other
Islamic factions) has increased from 12.0% in June 2000 to 23.9% in December
2000. Apparently, the increase in support for Islamic factions draws
from the decrease in percentage of respondents who do not trust any faction
from 37.3% in June 2000 to 28.1% in December 2000. Support for other
factions (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, PLO) has not changed much since
the last JMCC poll in June 2000 (6.2% in June 2000 versus 4.4% in December
2000).
Figure 8:
2.4 Trust in Palestinian figures
When respondents were asked about the Palestinian figure
that they trusted most, 25.7% indicated that they trust Palestinian President
Yasser Arafat, 12.2% indicated that they trust Ahmad Yaseen, founder and
spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 21.5% indicated
that they trust other figures, and 31.9% indicated that they did not trust
anybody.
Figure 9:
According to JMCC’s previous poll in June 2000, when respondents
were asked the same question, 31.8% indicated that they trust Yasser Arafat,
6.1% indicated that they trust Ahmad Yaseen, 21.3% indicated that they
trust other figures, and 32.6% indicated that they did not trust anybody.
Figure 10:
The decline in support for Yasser Arafat might be related
to the increased support for Ahmad Yassin, or alternatively, to the increased
support for some of the other figures within Fateh (such as Marwan Barghouthi).
Since overall support for Fateh did not change much, the second alternative
might be more probable.
2.5 Evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian
Authority
When asked about the performance of the Palestinian Authority
in general, 55.5% of respondents said that the Palestinian Authority’s
performance is good. On previous JMCC polls, we could detect a gradual
decline in the percentage of respondents who say that the performance of
the Palestinian authority is good. 79.6% of respondents said that
the Palestinian Authority’s performance was good in April 1997, and the
percentage has been declining gradually since then to its lowest value
of 55.5% at the current poll.
Evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian authority
was highly correlated with the faction that the respondent trusts most.
80.5% of respondents who stated that they trusted Fateh most said that
the Palestinian Authority’s performance in general is good, as opposed
to only 33.6% of respondents who indicated that they trusted Islamic factions
most, 47.2% of respondents who indicated that they trusted other factions
most, and 44.2% of respondents who indicated that they did not trust any
faction most.
Figure 11:
Respondent’s evaluation of the performance of Palestinian
Authority as being good was also correlated with place of residence (59.0%
in the West Bank/East Jerusalem and 49.3% in Gaza Strip), type of community
(50.9% in a city, 54.0% in a refugee camp, and 64.2% in a village) , and
level of education (61.2% who had less than secondary education and
52.6% who had secondary or higher education).
2.6 Palestinian viewpoint about results of Israeli
elections
When asked about whether an Israeli government headed
by the Labor party (Barak) or a government headed by Likud Party (Sharon
or Netanyahu) would be better from a Palestinian viewpoint, a high percentage
of respondents (86.0%) indicated that both governments would be bad.
90.0% of respondents from Gaza Strip and 83.7% of respondents from the
West Bank/East Jerusalem indicated that both would be bad. Additionally,
79.5% of respondents who stated that they trusted Fateh most indicated
that both would be bad, as opposed to 92.7% of respondents who indicated
that they trusted Islamic factions most, 81.1% of respondents who indicated
that they trusted other factions most, and 88.4% of respondents who indicated
that they did not trust any faction most.
This percentage is much higher than the 50.2% of Palestinians
who did not see any difference between Likud and Labor parties in JMCC’s
March 1999 poll.
2.7 The role of the United States as a mediator in
the negotiations
The vast majority of respondents (95.1%) believe that
the United States is conducting its mediation in a biased manner towards
the Israelis. This belief does not differ by area of residence or
other characteristics of the respondent.
2.8 Optimism about the future
When respondents were asked about their level of optimism
or pessimism about the future in general, 48.8% stated that they were optimistic,
and 50.2% were pessimistic. Respondents living in the West Bank/East
Jerusalem were more optimistic when compared to those living in Gaza Strip
(51.3% versus 44.5%). Additionally, 60.5% of respondents who indicated
that they trusted Fateh most were optimistic, as opposed to 34.6% of respondents
who indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most, 50.9% of respondents
who indicated that they trusted other factions most, and 43.9% of respondents
who indicated that they did not trust any faction most.
Figure 12:
Based on information obtained from previous JMCC opinion
polls, optimism about the future is at its lowest level since January 1994.
Level of optimism dropped from 68.0% at the June 2000 poll to 48.8% at
this poll.
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METHODOLOGY
Following is a description of the methodology used by
the JMCC Polling Unit.
A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,199
Palestinian individuals 18 years or older, from 60 sampling points, was
selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in their homes.
In the West Bank, 759 people were surveyed
from the following areas: Jenin: Jenin, Jenin refugee camp, Kufr
Ra’ee, Arrabeh, Yabad, a-Zababdeh, Maythaloun, Aqaba, Sanour. Nablus:
Nablus,
Burqa, Beit Fureek, Haris, Sabastia, Balata refugee camp, Bidia, Boureen.
Tulkarem:
Tulkarem,
Rameen, Qalqilia, Tulkarem refugee camp, Beit Leed, Jayyous.
Hebron:
Hebron,
Doura, Al-Fawwar refugee camp, Beit Ummar, a-Tafuh, Yatta, Halhoul, al-Daharia.
Bethlehem:
Bethlehem,
Za’atara, Artas, Beit Ta’mar, Deihesheh refugee camp. Jericho:
Jericho,
Aqbet Jaber.
Ramallah & al-Bireh:
al-Bireh, Ramallah, Beir Zeit,
al-Mazra al-Sharqia, Kharbatha Bani Harith, al-Amari refugee camp. Jerusalem:
a-Ram,
Fufr ‘Aqab, Old City, Beith Hanina, Shufat, al-Iissawia, Jabal al-Mukaber,
Silwan, Sheikh Jarrah, Sawahreh.
In the Gaza Strip, 440 people were surveyed
from the following areas: Gaza North: Jabalia refugee camp, Jabalia,
Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun. Gaza: Sheikh Radwan, a-Darji,
a-Tufah, Sabra, a-Zeitoon, a-Nasser, a-Shujaeih, a-Rimal north and south
and Shati refugee camp, Saftawi, a-Sha’af, Sheikh Ajleen. Deir al- Balah:
al-bureij
refugee camp, Deir al Balah, refugee camp, al-Maghazi refugee camp. Khan
Younis: Khan younis, Khan Younis refugee camp, Bani Suheila, Absan
al-Saghira, Absan al-Kabira, al-Qarara. Rafah: Rafah, Rafah refugee
camp and Tal al-Sultan refugee camp.
The margin of error is +/- 3 percent, with a confidence
level of 95%.
Sample distribution
51.6% of the respondents were from West Bank, 11.7% from
Jerusalem, 36.7% from the Gaza Strip.
30.5% said they live in villages, 16.7% in refugee camps,
52.8% in towns/cities.
51.1% were male, 48.9% were female.
34.9% were housewives, 19.2% were employees, 10.6% of the
respondents were students, 13.3% were laborers, 7.7% were businessmen/
private business, 7.6% were unemployed/ retired, 2.6% were farmers/fishermen,
1.8% were craftsmen, 1.5% were professionals, 0.8% did not give an answer.
The average age of the respondents was 34.7 years.
Analaysis by Dr. Lama Jamjoum
