This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 41, which was carried out by the JMCC between 14th and 17th June, 2001 .

The first part of this issue will discuss some of the results about personal opinions regarding the current Palestinian Intifada.  The second part will focus on personal opinions about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the peace process.  Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and sample distribution.

The current opinion poll was conducted about 8.5 months after the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada, which started on September 28th, 2000.  The Intifada started 2 months following a deadlock in the Camp David negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis on final status issues, including refugees, Jerusalem, and settlements.  So far, about 540 Palestinians have been killed, thousands injured and disabled, mostly during civilian demonstrations against Israeli occupation or as a result of shelling of residential areas.  Additionally, three million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been living under siege since the beginning of the Intifada.  On May 18th, Israelis used F-16 warplanes, for the first time since the 1967 war, to strike Palestinian areas killing 12 Palestinians.  On June 1st, a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 21 Israelis in Tel-Aviv.  These escalations led to the intensification of international efforts to restore pre-Intifada conditions.

The Mitchell Committee, a fact-finding committee led by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, was established after an October 2000 summit at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, and released its report on May 21st, 2001.  The commission called for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, and recommended confidence-building measures to bring the two sides back to negotiations, including resumption of talks between Israeli and Palestinian security officials, a freeze on construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and a call for Israel to lift economic restraints on Palestinian areas.  An American plan to stabilize the ceasefire and create measures to restore confidence between Palestinians and Israelis, and eventually lead to a resumption of formal peace negotiations, was brokered by CIA Director George Tenet on June 13th.

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This section aims to highlight Palestinians’ personal opinions regarding the current Palestinian Intifada and identify correlates of these opinions.
 

1.1 Support for the continuation of the current Palestinian Intifada

When respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada, 79% stated that they supported it, 15% stated that they opposed it, 5% were not sure, and 1% did not give an answer.  These figures are similar to those obtained in JMCC Poll # 40 conducted in April 2001.  However, they represent a 10-point increase in favor of continuation of the Intifada as compared to 6 months earlier when 70% of Palestinians supported the continuation of the Intifada (JMCC Poll #39, December 2000).  As figure 1 illustrates, Palestinians living in Gaza Strip are more supportive of the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada compared to Palestinians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (90%, 74% and 68% respectively).
 

Figure 1: Support for Continuation of Current Palestinian Intifada by Region

Also, Palestinians who live in refugee camps are more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada when compared to Palestinians living in cities and villages (88%, 81% and 71% respectively).  In general, refugees are more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada than non-refugees (85% versus 76% respectively).

Additionally, respondents who trust a specific party are more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada than those who do not trust any party at all (82% versus 73% respectively).  Among the former group, Fateh supporters have the lowest level of support for the continuation of the Intifada (79%), followed by supporters of Islamic parties, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions (85%), and supporters of other parties, including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, PLO, Democratic Coalition, and Seculars (90%) (see figure 2).
 

Figure 2: Supprot for continuation of current Palestinian Intifada by Political Party

1.2 Preferred characteristics of the Palestinian Intifada

Respondents were asked whether they prefer the continuation of a popular resistance Intifada alone (unarmed public resistance of the occupation), a military resistance Intifada alone, or a popular and military resistance Intifada together.

Fifty-four percent of respondents support the continuation of a popular and military resistance Intifada together as opposed to 20% who support the continuation of a popular resistance Intifada alone, 15% who support the continuation of a military resistance Intifada alone, 9% who were not sure, and 2% who did not provide an answer (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Preferred Characteristics of Palestinian Intifada

Support for military operations
Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response in the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Military operations do not  involve a Palestinian killing himself in the attack.  Examples of such operations include car bombs, mortar attacks, and shooting.   Seventy-one percent supported military operations, 20% opposed them, 8% were not sure, and 2% did not answer.  The level of support for military operations did not change much since December 2000 (JMCC Poll # 39).  However, current levels represent a doubling of levels of support found a few years ago (34%, JMCC’s Poll # 20, May 1997).

When asked whether they would support the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the occupied territories or inside israel and the occupied territories, 32% of respondents answered that they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 4% supported them inside the occupied territories, 41% supported them inside Israel and the occupied territories, 17% did not support them at all and 7% did not give an answer.

Support for suicide operations
Respondents were also asked whether they supported suicide bombing operations as a suitable response in the current political conditions, or whether they opposed them and found them harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Sixty-nine percent supported suicide operations, 23% opposed them, 6% were not sure, and 2% did not answer.  The level of support for suicude bombing operations decreased slightly since JMCC’s poll # 39 conducted in April 2001 (76%).    It is worthwhile mentioning that the level of support for suicide bombing operations had increased dramatically during the current Intifada as compared to a few years earlier (JMCC poll # 20, May 1997) when only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide operations (see figure 4).

Figure 4: Support for Suicide Operations against Israeli targets

The final goal of the Intifada
Respondents were asked whether the final goal of the Intiafada should be the improvement of the Palestinian negotiation situation, ending the occupation based on UN  resolution 242 and formation of a Palestinian state, or freedom of all Palestine. Forty-six percent of Palestinians believed that the final goal for the Intifada should be to end the occupation based on UN resolution 242 and form a Palestinian state, 41% believed that the goal should be to liberate Palestine (the area that was under British mandate before 1948), 9% believed that the goal should be to improve the  Palestinian negotiation situation, 1% had other goals in mind, 2% were not sure, and 1% did not give an answer (see figure 5).

Figure 5: The Final Goal of the Intifada

Respondents’ views about the final goal for the Intifada were highly correlated to their area of residence and the political party they trust most (see table 1).

Table 1: The final goal for the Intifada*
 

	Improve negotiations	End occupation,  Palestinian state (242)	Free all Palestine
	9%	46%	41%
Area of residence
West Bank	11%	50%	35%
E Jerusalem	16%	21%	53%
Gaza Strip	6%	46%	47%
Type of locality
Village	11%	49%	34%
Refugee Camp	6%	47%	45%
City	9%	43%	44%
Political party support
Fateh	12%	59%	26%
Islamic	6%	31%	62%
Others	5%	44%	51%
None	9%	43%	42%

* Less than 5% gave other answers, were not sure or did not give an answer
 

The best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end occupation
Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada alone, or both of them would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end occupation.

Twenty-nine percent believed that the Intifada alone is the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals, 12% believed that negotiations alone are the best method, 56% believed that Intifada and negotiations together are the best method, 3% were not sure and 1% did not give an answer (see figure 6).

Figure 6: Best Method to achieve Palestinian National Goals

Respondents’ views regarding the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals were highly correlated to their area of residence and the political party they trust most (see table 2).
 

Table 2: The best method to achieve Palestinian national goals*
 

	Intifada	Negotiations	Both
	29%	12%	56%
Area of residence
WB/EJ	24%	14%	57%
Gaza Strip	38%	7%	53%
Type of locality
Village	18%	14%	54%
Refugee Camp	37%	8%	51%
City	32%	11%	61%
Political party support
Fateh	12%	16%	70%
Islamic	52%	7%	39%
Others	34%	5%	59%
None	32%	12%	50%

* Less than 5% were not sure or did not give an answer.
 

1.4 Satisfaction with Arab solidarity with the Intifada

When asked whether they were satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada, 15% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied, while 85% were dissatisfied.  This represents a considerable decrease in the percentage of Palestinians satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada since April 2001 (41%, JMCC Poll # 40).

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2.1 Future optimism and potential solutions

Optimism about the future
Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic about the future.  Fifty-one percent stated that they were optimistic, and the rest were pessimistic.  Respondents living in East Jerusalem are more optimistic than those living in Gaza Strip and the West Bank (64%, 50%, and 49% respectively).  Additionally, respondents living in villages are more optimistic than those living in cities and refugee camps (56%, 52%, and 36% respectively).  Moreover, 60% of respondents who indicated that they trusted Fateh most were optimistic, as opposed to 46% of respondents who indicated that they did not trust any faction, 44% of respondents who indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most, and   39% of respondents who indicated that they trusted other factions.

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada.  In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).
 

Preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
Respondents were asked what they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was.  Forty-seven percent of Palestinians supported the two state solution, 22% supported a bi-national state in historic Palestine where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights, 12% thought that there was no solution to the conflict, 12% supported a Palestinian state, 1% supported an Islamic state, 4% were not sure, and 1% did not give an answer (see figure 7).  These figures are not significantly different from those reported 2 months ago (JMCC Poll # 40, April 2001).

Figure 7: Preferred solution of the Palestinian - Israeli conflict

Supporting two states was correlated with the area the respondent lives in, being a refugee, and the political party s/he trusts most.  Fifty percent of West Bank residents supported two states as compared to 46% of Gaza Strip residents, and 34% of East Jerusalem residents.  Additionally, 41% of refugees supported the 2-state solution a two states as opposed to 51% of respondents who were not refugees.  Moreover, respondents who trusted Fateh most had the highest level of support for two states (64%), followed by respondents who trusted other parties (49%), those who do not trust any party (40%), and respondents who trusted Islamic parties most (31%).
 

2.2 Peace process, Oslo agreements, and negotiations with Israelis

Evaluation of the status of the peace process
Respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions.  Twenty-seven percent of respondents thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, 50% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, 18% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations, 3% were not sure, 1% gave other answers, and 1% did not give an answer (see figure 8).

Figure 8: Status of the Peace Process

Support for the Peace process
Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the current peace process between Palestinians and Israelis.   Forty-seven percent of Palestinians supported the peace process, 48% opposed it, and 5% did not give an answer.  There has been a 10-point drop in the level of support for the peace process since the eruption of the Palestinian Intifada in September 2000 (see figure 9).

Figure 9: Support for the Peace Process

Supporting the peace process is associated with the gender of the respondent, the area where the respondent lives, and the political party s/he trusts most.  Fifty-two percent of females supported the peace process as opposed to 43% of males.  Additionally, 50% of West Bank and East Jerusalem residents supported the peace process as compared to 43% of Gaza Strip residents.  Village residents were more supportive of the peace process (56%) than those who lived in cities (45%), and refugee camps (39%).  Moreover, Fateh supporters had the highest level of support for the peace process (70%), followed by those who do not support any political party (43%), supporters of other parties (31%), and supporters of Islamic parties (22%).
 

Support for Oslo agreements
Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the Oslo agreements.  Thirty-eight percent of respondents  supported Oslo agreements, 54% opposed them, and 8% did not give an answer.  There has been a dramatic decline in support for the Oslo agreements following the eruption of the current Palestinian Intifada in September 2000 (see figure 10).

Figure 10: Support for Oslo agreements

The level of support for the Oslo agreements is associated the area where the respondent lives, being a refugee, and the political party s/he trusts most.  Forty-two percent of West Bank residents supported the Oslo agreements as compared to 36% of Gaza Strip residents, and 24% of East Jerusalem residents.  Also, 45% of village residents supported the Oslo agreements as compared to 38% of city residents, and 27% of refugee camp residents.  Additionally, 32% of refugees supported the Oslo agreements as opposed to 43% of respondents who were not refugees.  As figure 11 shows, Fateh supporters had the highest level of support for the Oslo agreements (57%), followed by those who do not support any political party (36%), supporters of other parties (21%), and supporters of Islamic parties (17%).

Figure 11: Support for Oslo Agreement by Political Faction

Mitchell Report
Respondents were asked whether they have had a look at the context of the report recently published by the Mitchell committee.  Fifty-two percent of respondents answered that they have seen the report.  Among the subgroup that has seen the report, 44% supported the Palestinian Authority’s acceptance of the report.

Respondents were also asked if they agreed to the cessation of the Palestinian Intifada in return for cessation of Israeli settlements on the occupied territories.  Sixty-seven percent of respondents disagreed with the proposal, 25% agreed, 5% were not sure, 2% did not give an answer, and 1% gave other responses.

Palestinians who reside in cities and refugee camps disagreed with the proposal much more than Palestinians who reside in villages (75%, 74% and 49% respectively).  Also, Palestinians who trust Islamic or other parties disagreed with the propposal much more than Palestinians who trust Fateh or do not trust any party (79%, 75%, 65% and 62% respectively).

President Arafat‘s decision of a cease-fire
Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed President Arafat’s decision of a cease-fire.  Fifty-two percent of respondents supported it, 44% opposed it, and 3% did not answer.  Non-refugees were more supportive of the decision than refugees (58% and 44% respectively).  West Bank residents were more supportive of the decision than East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip (58%, 50% and 44% respectively).  Village residents were also more supportive of the decision than city and refugee camp residents (58%, 54% and 37% respectively).  Additionally, Fateh supporters were more supportive of the decision than those who did not support any factions, supporters of Islamic factions, and supporters of other factions (74%, 55%. 26%  and 25% respectively).
 

2.3 Evaluation of Palestinian bodies, factions, and figures

Performance of the Palestinian Authority
When asked about their views regarding the general performance of the Palestinian Authority, 63% of respondents stated that the Palestinian Authority’s performance is good.  Based on previous JMCC polls, there is a gradual decline in the percentage of respondents who say that the performance of the Palestinian authority is good.  However, there has been no change in the evaluation of Palestinian Authority’s performance since the beginning of the current Intifada.

Respondents’ favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority is correlated with place of residence (67% in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and 55% in Gaza Strip), type of community (60% in cities, 52% in refugee camps, and 72% in villages), age category (70% for respondents 50 years or older, 61% for respondents younger than 50 years), gender (68% in females and 58% in males), and refugee status (56% for refugees and 67% for non-refugees).

Evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian authority is also highly correlated with the faction that the respondent trusts most.  Ninety percent of respondents who trust Fateh most indicated that the Palestinian Authority’s performance is good, as opposed to only 36% of respondents who trust Islamic factions most, 39% of respondents who trust other factions most, and 53% of respondents do not trust any faction (see figure 12).

Figure 12: Evaluation of the Performance of the Palestinian Authority by Political Party

Gaza Strip residents were more supportive of the formation of a national unity government than West Bank/East Jerusalem residents (75% versus 66% respectively).  Also residents of cities and refugee camps were more supportive of the formation of a national unity government than residents of villages (73%, 72% and 60% respectively).  Supporters of Islamic parties had the highest level of support for the formation of a national unity government (75%), followed by Fateh supporters (70%), those who do not support any political party (64%), and      supporters of other parties (61%).
 

Trust in Palestinian political or religious factions
When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 35% indicated that they trusted Fateh most, 26% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most  (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions), 5% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, PLO), 25% indicated that they did not trust any faction, and 9% did not give an answer (see figure 13).

Figure 13: Turst in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions

A comparison with figures obtained a year ago (JMCC Poll # 37, June 2000), shows that support for Fateh and other factions remained unchanged, while support for Islamic factions increased and support for no factions decreased (35%, 4%, 12%, and 37% respectively)

There is more trust for Fateh among residents of Gaza Strip and the West Bank than among residents of East Jerusalem (38%, 34%, and 25% respectively).  On the other hand, there is more trust for Islamic parties among residents of Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem than among residents of the West Bank (33%, 31% and 21% respectively).
 

Trust in Palestinian figures
When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 28% indicated that they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, 10% indicated that they trusted Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 28% indicated that they trusted other figures, 27% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure, and 8% did not give an answer (see figure 14).

Figure 14: Turst in Palestinian Figures

These figures are not significantly different from those obtained a year ago (JMCC Poll # 37, June 2000).
 

Satisfaction with the way President Arafat is handling his work
Respondents were asked about their satisfaction with the way President Arafat is handling his work as the head of the Palestinian Authority.  Fifty-six percent of Palestinians are generally satisfied with the way President Arafat is handling his work.  The level of satisfaction varies widely by the political faction the respondent trusts more; 86% of Fateh supporters are satisfied with the performance of President Arafat, as opposed to 26% of Palestinians who support other factions, 48% of Palestinians who do not support any faction, and 32% of Palestinians who support Islamic parties (see figure 15).

Figure 15: Satisfaction with President Arafat's Handling his work as head of  PA

President Arafat‘s control of the internal Palestinian situation
Respondents were asked whether they believed that president Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation.  Seventy-two percent believed that President Arafat was in control of the situation.

Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,201 Palestinian individuals 18 years or older, from 60 sampling points, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in their homes.

In the West Bank, 761 people were surveyed from the following areas: Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp (RC), Ya’bad, Zababdeh, Kufr Rai’, Fahmeh, Silat al-Harthia, T’nik. Nablus: Nablus, Madama, Kifl Haris, Marda, Beit Fureek, Balata RC, Sabastia, Zawata. Tulkarem & Qalqilya: Tulkarem, Tulkarem RC, Bala’, Beit Leed, Qalqilia, Jayyous . Hebron: Hebron, Yatta, Halhoul, Dhahiria, Fawar RC, Sureef, Tarqoumia. Bethlehem: Bethlehem,  BeitSahou, Duha, al-Khader, Artas, Deiheishe RC Jericho: Jericho, Aqbat Jaber RC . Ramallah & al-Bireh: al-Bireh, Ramallah, Beit Reema, Jalazon RC, Kufr Malik, Nilin . Jerusalem:  a-Dahia, A-ram, Shufat, Beit Hanaia, Old City, Wadi al-Joz, Ras al-Amoud, Beir Nabal, Qalandia RC, Beit Hanaian a-tahta, al-‘Isawia, Silwan.

In the Gaza Strip, 440 people were surveyed from the following areas: Gaza North: Jabalia refugee camp, Jabalia, Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun. Gaza:  Sheikh Radwan, a-Nasser, a-Daraj, a-Tufah, Sabra, a-Zeitoun, a-Shajai’a, Shati RC, a-Rimal Deir al- Balah: al-Nusseirat RC, al-Maghazi RC, Deir al- Balah and al-Bureij RC . Khan Younis: ‘Abassan al-Kabira, Khan Younis RC, Khan Younis, Bani Suheila and Abassan al-Saghira . Rafah: Rafah, Rafah RC and Tal al-Sultan RC .

The margin of error is +/- 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95%.

Sample distribution

• 53.2% of the respondents were from West Bank, 10.2% from Jerusalem, 36.6% from the Gaza Strip.
• 30.2% said they live in villages, 16.3% in refugee camps, 53.5% in towns/cities.
• 50.5% were male, 49.5% were female.
• The average age of the respondents was 34.0 years.
• 66.1% were married, 25.9%, were single, 4.2% were widowed, 1.7% were divorced, 2.1% gave no answer.
• 34.9% were housewives, 18.7% were employees (secretaries, municipal employees, teachers, nurses), 11.7% of the respondents were students, 10.8% were laborers, 8.2% were businessmen/ private business, 8.2% were unemployed, 1.6% were retired, 1.9% were farmers/fishermen, 1.7% were craftsmen, 1.5% were professionals (doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, engineers), 0.8% did not give an answer.