This issue of Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to examining trends in Palestinian public opinion regarding the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, which started in October 1991 in Madrid.

Several Palestinian-Israeli interim agreements were signed since the launching of the peace process, including the Declaration of Principles on Palestinian Interim Self-Government Arrangements- Oslo 1 (Washington DC, September 13th 1993), the Economic Agreement (Paris, April 28th 1994), the Gaza-Jericho Self Rule Accord (Cairo, May 4th 1994), the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip- Oslo 2 (Washington DC, September 28th 1995), the Protocol on Israeli Redeployment in Hebron (January 15th 1997), the Wye River Memorandum (Washington DC,  October 23rd 1998), and the revised Wye River accord- Sharm A-Sheikh Understandings (Sharm A-Sheikh, September 4th 1999).

Talks between Palestinians and Israel on final status issues including refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, and borders, started officially on May 4th 1996 in Taba.  September 13th 2000 was set as the deadline for reaching a permanent peace deal with Israel.  The Camp David negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis on final status issues reached a deadlock in July 2000 leading to the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada on September 28th 2000.

Since February 1993, JMCC have conducted 40 public opinion polls examining Palestinians’ views regarding political issues including the peace process with Israel.  Random samples of Palestinians 18 years or older living in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip were selected for participation using random sampling methods.

The first part of this issue includes an analysis of the prevailing political and socioeconomic conditions following the onset of the peace process and their effects on trajectories in Palestinian public opinion regarding the peace process.  The second part of this issue will focus on personal characteristics of the respondents and their relationship to their political views and opinions.

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This section aims to examine trends in Palestinian public opinion regarding the peace process and how they are affected by the prevailing political and socioeconomic conditions.

1.1 Support for Peace Process

Support for the peace process started at 73% in December 1995 and then reached its highest level in December 1996 (78%).  Although, the level of support for the peace process had its ups and downs since then, a declining trend in support for the peace process is observed, reaching its lowest level (47% support) in December 2000, 3 months after the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Trend in Palestinian support for Israeli-Palestinian peace process

1.2 Support for Oslo Agreements

Support for Oslo agreements started at 45% in January 1994, and then gradually increased to reach its highest level (75%) in December 1996.  A declining trend in support for Oslo agreements is also observed, reaching its lowest level (39%) in December 2000 (see figure 2).
 

Figure 2: Trend in Palestinian support for Oslo agreements

1.3 Prevailing Political and Socioeconomic Conditions

Moderate support for the peace process and Oslo agreements was recorded at the beginning of the peace process, because Palestinians believed that it would help them achieve their national aspiration of ending the occupation and building an independent Palestinian state.  Positive developments associated initially with the peace process led to an increased support for the peace process and Oslo agreements, which reached highest levels in December 1996.  These positive developments included return of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and more than twenty thousand exiled Palestinians, Israeli redeployment from the major towns and villages of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and initial steps towards building an independent Palestinian state such as conducting first Palestinian presidential and legislative elections, the Palestinian authority taking control of civil aspects of Palestinian life.

However, after some time, Palestinians started to feel the limitations of the peace process and the Oslo agreements.  This led to a gradual decline in support for both the peace process and the Oslo agreements.  This was due to the deteriorating political and economic conditions of Palestinians as a result of Israeli violations of Interim agreements, continued Israeli settlement activity and Palestinian land confiscation, closures and restriction of movement of Palestinians, and the fact that most aspects of Palestinian life remained under Israeli control.

Results from JMCC Poll # 37, conducted in June 2000, indicate that only 49% of Palestinians were confident that the Palestinian leadership will continue to insist on its negotiation position represented in ending the occupation over the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, return of refugees and establishing an independent state.  In a recent JMCC Poll (#39, December 2000) respondents were asked to identify the best path to achieve the national goals of Palestinians and end the occupation.  Results indicate that only 12% of respondents believed that negotiations alone are the best path, 28% believed that the Intifada alone is the best path, 52% believed that the continuation of the Intifada and negotiations together are the best path, and 5% were undecided.

Additionally, Palestinian disappointment with the performance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) had a negative effect on support for the peace process.  Results from JMCC Poll # 19 conducted in April 1997 indicate that 79% of Palestinians think that there is a great deal/ fair amount of corruption in the PA.  This percentage rose to 91% in 4 months (August 1997).

The deteriorating economic conditions of Palestinians as a result of the peace process had an additional negative impact on support for the peace process.  According to JMCC Poll # 19, conducted in April 1997, 70% of respondents indicated that the Arab-Israeli peace process had a negative effect on Palestinian economy and only 20% indicated that it had a positive effect on Palestinian economy.

It should also be noted that support for the peace process and Oslo agreements declined dramatically following the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000.
 

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The following two sections are based on a detailed analysis of respondents’ views of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process obtained in poll no. 39 (carried out on 21, 22, 23, and 24 December 2000).
 

2.1 Personal beliefs and support the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process

Opinions about the peace process and Oslo agreements are highly correlated.  A majority of Palestinians (81%) have similar opinions on both issues (either support or oppose both).

Palestinian support for the peace process and Oslo agreements depends on the political faction that they trust most.  Seventy-four percent of Palestinians who trust Fateh most support the peace process, as compared to 20% of Palestinians who trust Islamic factions most, 33% of Palestinians who trust other factions most, and 40% of Palestinians who do not trust any faction (see figure 3).
 
 

Figure 3:  Support for peace process by the political faction trusted most

A similar pattern applies for support for Oslo agreements.  Sixty-six percent of Palestinians who trust Fateh most support the Oslo agreements, as compared to 19% of Palestinians who trust Islamic factions most, 31% of Palestinians who trust other factions most, and 34% of Palestinians who do not trust any faction.
 

Figure 4:  Support for Oslo agreements by the political faction trusted most

Moreover, Palestinian support for the peace process and Oslo agreements is highly correlated with whether they believe that the peace process and Oslo agreements will actually lead to peace and to the achievement of their national aspirations.

Support for the peace process highly depends on whether the person is optimistic about reaching a peaceful Arab-Israeli settlement to the conflict or not.  Eighty-four percent of Palestinians who are optimistic about reaching a peaceful Arab-Israeli settlement to the conflict do support the peace process, as opposed to 27% of Palestinians who are not optimistic about reaching a peaceful Arab-Israeli settlement (see figure 5).
 

Figure 5:  Support for peace process by level of optimism regarding reaching a peaceful Arab-Israeli settlement

Support for Oslo agreements highly depends on whether the person believes that the Oslo process will lead to peace.  Eighty-four percent of Palestinians who believe that the Oslo process will lead to peace do support the Oslo Agreements, as compared to 60% of Palestinians who neither believe nor disbelieve, and only 15% of Palestinians who do not believe that the Oslo process will lead to peace (see figure 6).

Figure 6:  Support for Oslo agreements by belief that it will lead to peace

Additionally, support for Oslo agreements highly depends on whether the person believes that the Oslo process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State.  Seventy-three percent of Palestinians who believe that the Oslo process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinians state do support the Oslo Agreements, as opposed to 19% of Palestinians who do not believe that the Oslo process will lead to the establishment of a Palestinians state (see figure 7).
 

Figure 7:  Support for Oslo agreements by belief that it will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State

2.1 Personal Characteristics and support for the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process

The level of support for the peace process and Oslo agreements is also associated with several personal characteristics including age, gender, socioeconomic conditions, level of education, and area of residence.

2.1.1 Support for Peace Process

Forty-seven percent of Palestinians support the peace process.  Residents of the West Bank and East Jerusalem are more likely to support the peace process than Gaza Strip residents (51% versus 41%).  Additionally, older Palestinians (30 years or older) are more likely to support the peace process than younger Palestinians (51% versus 42%).  On the other hand, males are less likely to support the peace process than females (43% versus 51%).

Additionally, socioeconomic indicators are associated with support for the peace process.  Palestinians with less than secondary school education are more likely to support the peace process when compared to Palestinians who have a secondary education or higher (54% versus 44%).  Low-income Palestinians (have an income much less than average) are less likely to support the peace process than other (39% versus 53%).  There is no significant difference in the support for peace process by refugee status.
 

2.1.2 Support for Oslo Agreements

Forty-two percent of Palestinians support the Oslo agreements.  The same set of personal characteristics is associated with support for Oslo agreements.  Residents of the West Bank and East Jerusalem are more likely to support Oslo agreements than Gaza Strip residents (46% versus 35%).

On the other hand, males are less likely to support the peace process than females (37% versus 47%).

Socioeconomic indicators are also associated with support for Oslo agreements.  Palestinians with less than secondary school education are more likely to support Oslo agreements when compared to Palestinians who have a secondary education or higher (48% versus 39%).  Low-income Palestinians (have an income much less than average) are also less likely to support the Oslo agreements  than other (37% versus 46%).  There is no significant difference in the support for Oslo agreements by age category or refugee status.