This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 42, which was carried out by the JMCC between 11th and 17th September, 2001. This poll was conducted shortly before the first anniversary of the second Palestinian Intifada.

Several interim agreements have been signed between Palestinians and Israelis since the launching of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in Madrid in October 1991. However, the Camp David talks between Palestinians and Israelis on final status issues, including refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, and borders, reached a deadlock in July 2000, and was followed by the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada on September 28th 2000. A visit by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (Likud opposition leader at that time), to Al-Aqsa mosque on the same day left dozens of Palestinians injured and instigated the eruption of the Intifada, the Palestinian uprising against occupation and towards Independence.

The situation during the past year has been extraordinarily difficult for Palestinians. About 700 Palestinians have been killed, thousands injured and disabled, mostly during peaceful demonstrations against Israeli occupation or as a result of shelling of Palestinian residential areas. Since the beginning of the Intifada, three million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been living under a state of siege. Hundreds of Israeli Military checkpoints have been erected on entrances to Palestinian cities, villages and refugee camps, isolating communities from each other, and denying Palestinians their basic rights to health, education, and work. Moreover, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were cut off from each other and from the rest of the world on several occasions.

The escalating instability in the region led to the intensification of international efforts to restore pre-Intifada conditions. The Mitchell Committee, a fact-finding committee led by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, which was established after an October 2000 summit at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, released its report on May 21st 2001, calling for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire, and recommending confidence-building measures to bring the two sides back to negotiations, including resumption of talks between Israeli and Palestinian security officials, a freeze on construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and a call for Israel to lift economic restraints on Palestinian areas. An American plan to stabilize the ceasefire and create measures to restore confidence between Palestinians and Israelis, and eventually lead to the resumption of formal peace negotiations, was brokered by CIA Director George Tenet on June 13th. So far, none of these efforts have succeeded in restoring stability to the area.

The first part of this issue will focus on Palestinian public opinion regarding the current Palestinian Intifada. The second part will discuss some of the findings concerning internal Palestinian politics, negotiations and relations with Israelis, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The third part will include a brief analysis of selected topics, from the first and second parts, suggesting radicalization in Palestinian public opinion since the beginning of the Intifada. Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and characteristics of the selected sample.

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This section aims to draw a picture of the current Palestinian public opinion concerning the year-old Palestinian Intifada, including underlying causes, preferred characteristics, goals, effects, support for its continuation, and solidarity with the Intifada. We will also identify correlates of these opinions, and describe trends in these opinions over the past few months.
 

1.1 Causes of the Intifada:

1.1a Underlying Causes of the Intifada.

Respondents were asked to identify the main cause leading to the eruption of the Intifada (multiple responses were allowed for this question). Fifty percent of respondents mentioned Sharon's visit to Al-Aqsa, while 29% mentioned the continuation of occupation, 16% mentioned the failure of negotiations, and 12% mentioned the continuation of Israeli settlement activity (see figure 1).
 

Figure 1: Underlying causes of the Intifada

1.1.b Responsibility for the Failure of Camp David Talks.

Respondents were asked to identify the side that bears more responsibility for the failure of the Camp David talks in July 2000. Eighty-five percent of respondents believed that the Israeli side is the one responsible for the failure of talks, while 2% of respondents believed that the Palestinian side is the one responsible, and 14% believed that both sides were equally responsible for the failure of talks. Based on these figures, 98% of respondents put partial or full responsibility on the Israeli side and 15% put partial or full responsibility on the Palestinian side.

When asked about the main issue that caused the failure of talks, 61% of respondents thought that the issue of Jerusalem was the main issue, 21% thought that the issue of settlements was the main issue, 16% thought that the issue of refugees was the main issue, and 2% thought that the issue of borders was the main issue.

1.2 Preferred Characteristics of the Intifada.

1.2. Popular Versus Military Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether they preferred the continuation of a strictly popular resistance Intifada (unarmed public resistance of the occupation), a strictly military resistance Intifada, or a mixed popular and military resistance Intifada.

Fifty-seven percent of respondents supported the continuation of a mixed popular and military resistance Intifada as opposed to 19% who supported the continuation of a strictly popular resistance Intifada, 19% who supported the continuation of a strictly military resistance Intifada, and 5% who did not provide an answer (see figure 2). These figures are similar to those obtained at JMCC's previous poll in June 2001 (1).

Figure 2: Preferred Characteristics of Palestinian Intifada

Palestinians residing in Gaza Strip were less supportive of a strictly popular Intifada as compared to Palestinians residing in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (11% versus 23% and 26%).

1.2.b Support for Military Operations Against Israeli Targets.

Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response during the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests. Military operations include shooting, car bombs, and mortar attacks, but do not include suicide attacks. Eighty-five percent of respondents supported military operations, 10% rejected them, and 5% did not know.

The current level of support for military operations (85%) is higher than the level documented in June 2001 (71%), which itself was more than double the level of support in May 1997 (34%) (2).

Respondents were also asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the occupied territories only, inside Israel and the occupied territories, or whether they did not support military operations. Thirty-three percent of respondents supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 8% supported operations inside the occupied territories only, 52% supported operations inside Israel and the occupied territories, and 7% did not support military operations against Israeli targets.

Respondents living in urban areas were more supportive of resuming military operations inside Israel only as compared to respondents residing in rural areas, and refugee camps (50%, 33%, and 18% respectively).

1.3 Means of Achieving Palestinian Objectives:

1.3a Best Way to Achieve Palestinian National Goals and End Occupation (Intifada versus Negotiations).:

Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada alone, or negotiations and Intifada together would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end occupation.

Thirty-six percent of respondents believed that the Intifada alone would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals, 10% believed that negotiations alone would be the best method, 52% believed that Intifada and negotiations together would be the best method, and 3% did not know (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Best method to achieve Palestinian National Goals

More respondents living in East Jerusalem favor the Intifada alone as the way to achieve national goals (49%) as compared to respondents in the West Bank (30%) or Gaza Strip (38%).

1.3.b The Final Goal of the Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether the final goal of the Intifada should be the improvement of Palestinian negotiating conditions, ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, or the total liberation of Palestine (area under British mandate before 1948).

Forty-nine percent of respondents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine, 42% believed that it should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, and 8% believed that it should be to improve the Palestinian negotiation conditions (see figure 4).

Figure 4: The Final Goal of the Intifada

It is interesting to note the change in public opinion since June 2001 (41% of respondents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine, and 46% believed that it should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242) (3).

1.3.c Optimism about the Intifada Achieving its Goals.

Respondents were asked to evaluate their level of optimism towards the Intifada achieving the goal they specified. Fifty-five percent of respondents were optimistic that the Intifada will achieve its goals. The level of optimism was lower among Jerusalem residents as compared to West Bank and Gaza Strip residents (40% versus 56% and 59% respectively).

1.4 Worst effects of Israeli policy during the Intifada on Palestinians.

Interviewers cited 6 Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights during the Intifada (siege and closures, assassinations, invasion of PA areas, settlers attacks, killing, shelling) for the respondents and asked them to list these violations according to the level of harm they have on the Palestinian society (starting with the violation causing the greatest harm and ending with the violation causing the least harm). Assassinations were considered the Israeli violation causing greatest harm by 35% of respondents, followed by siege and closures (27% of respondents), shelling (15% of respondents), killing and invading PA areas (9%of respondents for each), and settlers attacks (5% of respondents) (see figure 5).

Figure 5: Israeli violations causing greatest harm to Palestinian society

1.5 Support for the continuation of Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada. Eighty-seven percent of respondents stated that they supported the continuation of the Intifada. There was no significance difference in the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada by area of residency.

It is noted that there has been a gradual increase in the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada during the past year (see figure 6) (4).

Figure 6: Support for the continuation of Intifada

1.6 Solidarity with the Intifada.

1.6.a Satisfaction with the Arab Solidarity with the Intifada.

When asked whether they were satisfied with Arab solidarity with the Intifada, only 16% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied. As figure 7 shows, the level of satisfaction with Arab solidarity has dropped since the earlier months of the Intifada) (5).

Figure 7: Satisfaction with the Arab Solidarity with the Intifada

1.6.b Satisfaction with the Solidarity of Palestinians Inside Israel with the Intifada.

When asked whether they were satisfied with the solidarity of Palestinians inside Israel with the Intifada, 60% of respondents indicated that they were satisfied. Residents of Jerusalem were less satisfied as compared to residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (45% versus 58% and 66% respectively). Additionally, refugees were less satisfied as compared to non-refugees (55% versus 65%).

1.6.c Evaluation of the Israeli Peace Camp During the Intifada.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the way the Israeli Peace Camp has dealt with what's happening during the Intifada. The majority of respondents (84%) indicated that their position was bad and unacceptable.

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2.1 Internal Palestinian Issues.

2.1.a Evaluation of the Performance of the Palestinian Authority.

Respondents were asked about their views regarding the general performance of the Palestinian Authority. Sixty-five percent of respondents stated that the Palestinian Authority's performance is very good/ good. There has been no change in the evaluation of the Palestinian Authority's performance since the beginning of the current Intifada.

Residents of the West Bank have a more favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority as compared to residents of Gaza Strip and Jerusalem (73% versus 58% and 54% respectively). Additionally, residents of rural localities have a more favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority as compared to residents of urban localities and refugee camps (70% versus 64% and 59% respectively).

2.1.b Trust in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions.

When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 29% indicated that they trusted Fateh most, 29% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, and other Islamic factions), 7% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, PLO, Palestinian Front, Arabic Front, Nidal Front), 23% indicated that they did not trust any faction, and 12% did not give an answer (see figure 8).

Figure 8: Trust in Palestinian Political or Religious figures

There has been a decrease in the level of trust in Fateh (from 35% in June to 29% now) and an increase in the level of trust in Hamas (from 18.6% in June to 20.7% in September) since the last JMCC poll.
 

Trust in Factions Supporting the Peace Process.

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on their support/opposition to the peace process. Thirty-five percent of respondents trust factions that support the peace process, while 39% of respondents trust factions that oppose the peace process. Level of trust in factions supporting the peace process varies by area of residence (40% in Gaza Strip, 33% in the West Bank, and 28% in Jerusalem).

Trust in Islamic versus Secular Factions.

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on whether they are Islamic or secular. Thirty-three percent of respondents trust Islamic factions, while 42% of respondents trust secular factions. font>

2.1.c Trust in Palestinian Figures.

When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 24% indicated that they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, 11% indicated that they trusted Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 30% indicated that they trusted other figures, 26% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure, and 10% did not give an answer (see figure 9).

Figure 9: Trust in Palestinian figures

Trust in Palestinian President Yasser Arafat varied by area of residence (Gaza Strip 27%, West Bank 23%, Jerusalem 15%). Trust in Ahmad Yassin also varied by area of residence (Gaza Strip 16%, West Bank 8%, Jerusalem 6%).
 

2.1.d President Arafat's Control of the Internal Palestinian Situation.

Respondents were asked whether they believed that president Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation. Seventy percent believed that President Arafat was in control of the situation. This figure is similar to that obtained from the previous JMCC poll conducted in June 2001.

2.2 Views Towards Negotiations and Relations with Israelis.

2.2.a Willingness to Negotiate with Israeli People or Groups.

Respondents were asked about their willingness to negotiate with Israeli people or groups. Only 12% of respondents indicated that they are willing to do so, 63% indicated that are not willing to negotiate with Israelis, and 21% indicated that the current circumstances are not suitable for negotiations with Israelis.

2.2.b Support for Negotiations Between Palestinians and Israelis.

Respondents were asked whether they supported negotiations with Israelis. Forty-nine percent of respondents indicated that they support the negotiations. Residents of East Jerusalem were less supportive of negotiations with Israelis when compared to residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (38% versus 51% and 49% respectively.

2.2.c Evaluation of the Current Status of the Peace Process.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions. Forty-two percent of respondents thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, 41% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, 14% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations, and 3% did not give an answer (see figure 10).

Figure 10: Current Status of the Peace Process

More residents of Jerusalem thought that the peace process is dead and there is no chance to resume negotiations as compared to residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (60% versus 41% and 39%).

Evaluation of the current status of the peace process figures are significantly different from those obtained from JMCC's previous poll in June 2001. At that time, 27% of respondents thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, 50% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, and 18% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations.
 

2.2.d Support for Oslo Agreements.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the Oslo agreements. Thirty-three percent of respondents supported Oslo agreements. There has been a dramatic decline in support for the Oslo agreements following the eruption of the current Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, followed by a gradual decline with time (see figure 11).

Figure 11: Support for Oslo Agreement

Support for Oslo agreements varies by area of residence. Residents of East Jerusalem are less supportive of the Oslo agreements as compared to residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (14% versus 35% and 33% respectively).

2.2.e Support Normal Relations with Israelis if Agreement is Reached.

Respondents were asked if they supported having normal relations with Israelis if an agreement between Palestinians and Israelis is reached. Twenty-one percent of respondents supported the idea, 49% opposed it, it did not make a difference for 24% of respondents, and 6% did not know.

2.3 Obstacles and Potential Solutions for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

2.3.a Optimism About the Future.

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic about the future. Forty-five percent stated that they were optimistic, and the rest were pessimistic. Respondents living in East Jerusalem were less optimistic than those living in Gaza Strip and the West Bank (37%, 44%, and 48% respectively).

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada. In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).

2.3.b Preferred Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Respondents were asked what they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was. Forty-four percent of Palestinians supported the two state solution, 33% supported a bi-national state in historic Palestine where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights, 14% supported a Palestinian state, 3% supported an Islamic state, and 3% did not give an answer (see figure 12).

Figure 12: Preferred solution for Palestinian Israeli Conflict

Support for the 2-state solution has slightly decreased since the previous JMCC poll conducted in June 2001 (from 47% to 44%) and support for a bi-national state has increased since then (from 22% to 33%). Additionally, support for the two state solution is stronger in urban areas than in rural areas and refugee camps (50%, 38%, and 35% respectively).

On the other hand, support for the bi-national state is stronger in Jerusalem than Gaza Strip and the West Bank (50% versus, 34% and 28% respectively). Additionally, support for the bi-national state is stronger in rural areas and refugee camps than in urban areas (40% and 39% versus 27%).

2.3.c Establishing a Palestinian State Within 1967 Borders.

Respondents were asked whether they supported the establishment of a Palestinian State within the 1967 borders.
Thirty-seven percent of respondents supported the idea. Support was higher among Gaza Strip residents (40%) and West Bank residents (38%) when compared to Jerusalem residents (22%).

2.3.d Giving-up 1948 Lands in Return for a Final Solution.

Respondents were asked whether they agreed to giving up 1948 Palestinian land in return to a final solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Eighteen percent of the respondents agreed to the idea. Agreement was higher among Gaza Strip residents (25%) as compared to West Bank residents (16%) and Jerusalem residents (10%).

2.3. The issue of Jerusalem.

Importance of Jerusalem for Palestinians.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of Jerusalem for Palestinians. Ninety-seven percent of respondent thought that Jerusalem was very important for Palestinians.

The respondents where then asked to give reasons of why they think that Jerusalem is important for Palestinians (multiple responses were allowed for this question). Ninety percent of respondents thought that Jerusalem is important because of religious reasons, 16% gave political reasons, and 6% gave economic reasons.

Importance of Jerusalem for Israelis.

Respondents were also asked to evaluate the importance of Jerusalem for Israelis. Fifty-four percent of respondent thought that Jerusalem was very important for Israelis, 24% thought that Jerusalem was somewhat important for Israelis.

The respondents where then asked to give reasons of why they think that Jerusalem is important for Israelis (multiple responses were allowed for this question). Forty-one percent of respondents thought that Jerusalem is important because of religious reasons, 46% gave political reasons, 17% gave economic reasons, 0.1% gave historic reasons, and 0.3% gave tourism as the reason for importance.

Best solution for Jerusalem.

Respondents were asked what they thought the best and final solution for the issue of Jerusalem should be.

Forty-three percent of respondents thought that unified Jerusalem (east and west) should be the capital of Palestine, 29% thought that Jerusalem should be the capital of Muslims, 18% thought that East Jerusalem should be the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem should be the capital of Israel, 5% thought that Jerusalem should be an international city, 3% thought that Jerusalem should be an open city and the capital of two states, 2% thought that West Jerusalem should be the capital of Israel, the old city should have joint sovereignty, and East Jerusalem should have Palestinian sovereignty, and 0.2% thought that unified Jerusalem (East and West) should be the capital of Israel.

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PART THREE: RADICALIZATION OF PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION.

Part three includes a brief analysis of selected topics, from the first and second parts, suggesting radicalization in Palestinian public opinion since the beginning of the Intifada.

Examples of such trends in Palestinian public opinion include:

• 85% of respondents support resumption of military operations against Israeli targets, as compared to 71% in June 2001.
• 49% of respondents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine, as compared to 41% in June 2001.
• 87% of respondents supported the continuation of the Intifada, as compared to 79% in June 2001.
• 29% of respondents trusted Fateh (faction supporting peace process) as compared to 35% in June 2001.
• 29% of respondents trusted Islamic factions (factions opposing peace process) as compared to 26% in June 2001.
• 42% of respondents thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, as compared to 27% in June 2001.
• 33% of respondents supported Oslo agreements as compared to 38% in June 2001.
• 45% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to 49% in December 2000.
• 44% of respondents thought that the two state solution was the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as compared to 47% in June 2001.
• 33% of respondents thought that a bi-national state in historic Palestine, where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights, was the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as compared to 22% in June 2001.

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METHODOLOGY

Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,198 Palestinian individuals 18 years or older, from 60 sampling points, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in their homes.

In the West Bank, 758 people were surveyed from the following areas: Jenin: Jenin, Jenin rc, Kufr Ra'i, Silat al-Harthiyya, Tubas and 'Arrabeh. Nablus: Nablus, Bidia, Huwwara, Azmout, Zawata, Kufr al- Deik, 'Urief, 'Askar rc and Deir Sharaf. Tulkarem & Qalqilya: Tulkarem, Tulkarem rc, Beit Leed, Qalqilyia, 'lllar and 'Azzoun. Hebron: Hebron, Halhoul, al-Fawwar rc, Dura , Bani N'iem , Sa'eer, Beit-Ula and Tarqoumia. Bethlehem: Bethlehem, al-Khader, Bateer, Husan and Dheisheh RC. Jericho: Jericho, 'Ain al-Sultan rc. Ramallah & al-Bireh: al-Bireh, Ramallah, al- Jalazon, Birzeit, Sinjil, Ni'lin, Silwad, and Shuqba. Jerusalem: a-Dahia, A-ram, Shu'fat, Beit Hanina, Old City, Ras al-'Amoud, Qalandia rc, al-'Isawiyya, Silwan, Biddu, Kufr 'Aqab, Qatannah and a-Sheikh Jarah.

In theGaza Strip, 440 people were surveyed from: Gaza North: Jabalya rc, Jabalia, Beit Lahia, and Beit Hanoun. Gaza: Sheikh Radwan, al-Nasser, a-Durj, al-Tuffah, Sabra, a-Zeitoun, a-Shajai'a, a-Shati rc, al-Rimal south and al-Rimal north. Deir al- Balah: al-Nusseirat RC, al-Maghazi RC, Deir al- Balah and al-Bureij rc. Khan Younis: Khan Younis rc, Khan Younis, Bani Suheila, al-khuza' and al-Qararah. Rafah: Rafah, Rafah RC and Tal al-Sultan rc.

The margin of error is +/- 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95%.

Sample distribution

Age:

• The average age of the respondents was 34.0 years.

Gender:

• 51% of respondents were males, and 49% were females.

Marital Status:

• 66% of respondents were married, 24% were single, 5% were widowed, 2% were divorced and 3% gave no answer.

Religion:

• 98% of respondents were Muslim and 2% were Christian.

Refugee Status:

• 46.5% of respondents were refugees and 53.5% were not refugees.

Residence:

• 52% of respondents were from West Bank, 11% were from Jerusalem, and 376% were from Gaza Strip.


• 30% of respondents indicated that they lived in villages, 16% in refugee camps, 54% in towns/cities.

Education:

• 33% of respondents had less than secondary school education, 33% had secondary school education, and 34% had more than secondary school education.

Employment:

• 54.8% of respondents were not currently working (33.5% were housewives, 11.1% were students, 9.8% were unemployed, 0.4% were retired), 43.2% were currently working (18.1% were employees, 11% were laborers, 5.7% had a private business, 1.8% were professionals, 3.9% were farmers, 1.7% were technicians), and 1.9% did not give an answer.

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FOOTNOTES

(1) JMCC Poll #41, June 2001

(2) JMCC Poll #20, May 1997

(3) JMCC Poll #41, June 2001

(4) JMCC Polls: #39, Dec. 2000,   #40, Apr. 2001,  #41, Jun 2001.

(5) JMCC Polls: #39, Dec. 2000,   #40, Apr. 2001,  #41, Jun 2001.

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Analaysis by Dr. Lama Jamjoum