• Introduction
• Part One: Personal opinions regarding the Palestinian Intifada
• Part Two: Personal opinions regarding current political issues. 
• Methodology

This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 44, which was conducted by JMCC on 20th-23rd  March 2002 (the poll was conducted on 28th-29th March 2002 in the Bethlehem area due to closures) . 

This poll was conducted eighteen months after the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada, at a time that witnessed a severe escalation of the conditions in the Palestinian occupied territories.  US efforts to restore pre-Intifada conditions, including efforts of the Mitchell Committee, George Tenet, and Anthony Zinni, have so far failed in achieving stability to the region.  Palestinian president Yasser Arafat is still under siege in his headquarters “Al-Muqata’a” in Ramallah.  Since the beginning of March, the Israeli army  forces have repeatedly re-occupied several areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for varying periods of time.  Israeli incursions in Palestinian controlled areas have resulted in the killing and injuring of several Palestinians and in violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.  Additionally, several suicide attacks have taken place inside Israel.  It is worthwhile mentioning that the current poll was conducted before the latest Israeli reoccupation of the main Palestinian cities and towns which started on March 29th 2002, and has entered its forth week now.

The first part of this issue will focus on Palestinian public opinion regarding the current Palestinian Intifada.  The second part will discuss some of the findings concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, negotiations with Israelis, and internal Palestinian politics.  Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and characteristics of the selected sample.
 

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This section analyzes the current Palestinian public opinion concerning the 18-month old Palestinian Intifada, including support for its continuation, its preferred characteristics, and its goals.  We will also identify correlates of these opinions, and describe trends in these opinions over the past few months.
 

1.1Support for the continuation of Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada.  Eighty-four  percent of respondents stated that they supported the continuation of the Intifada. 

As figure 1 shows, there has been a gradual increase in the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada during its first year, which peaked in September 2001 (87%) and then levelled off.
 

Figure 1: Support for the continuation of the Intifada
 

Respondents’ personal characteristics were significantly associated with the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada.  Respondents with at least high school education were more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to respondents with less than high school education (88% versus 80%).  Residents of refugee camps were more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to residents of cities and villages (90% versus 86% and 84% respectively).  Residents of East Jerusalem were less supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (80% versus 87%). 
 

1.2 Preferred Characteristics of the Intifada.

Popular Versus Military Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether they preferred the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada (unarmed public resistance of the occupation), a strictly military Intifada, or a mixed popular and military Intifada. 

Sixty-six percent of respondents supported the continuation of a mixed popular and military Intifada as opposed to 13% who supported the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada, 15% who supported the continuation of a strictly military Intifada, and 6% who did not know/ did not provide an answer (see figure 2).  These has been an increase in Palestinians supporting both forms of the Intifada (55% to 66%) and a decrease in Palestinians supporting a strictly popular Intifada (21% to 13%) as compared to the latest JMCC poll conducted in December 2001.
 

Figure 2: Preferred Characteristics of Palestinian Intifada

Support for Military Operations Against Israeli Targets.

Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response during the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Military operations include shooting, car bombs, and mortar attacks, but do not include suicide attacks.  Seventy-four percent of respondents supported military operations, 20% rejected them, and 6% did not know/ did not provide an answer.  There has been an increase in the level of support for military operations since the latest JMCC poll conducted in December 2001 (68%).  Figure 3 shows the the vast increase in the level of support for military operations at the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000.
 

Figure 3: Trends in support for Military operations

Respondents living in refugee camps were more supportive of resuming military operations against Israeli targets as compared to respondents residing in cities and villages (79%, 75%, and 69% respectively).  Refugees were also more supportive of resuming military operations than non-refugees (81% versus 68%).  Additionally, Gaza Strip residents were more supportive of resuming military operations as compared to residents of East Jerusalem and the West Bank (78%, 73%, and 71% respectively).  Moreover, personal characteristics of respondents were associated with their level of support for resuming military operations (68% support among Palestinians with less than high school education versus 76% support among those with a high school education or higher;  and 67% support among Palestinians 40 years or older versus 76% support among those younger than 40 years old).

Respondents were also asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the occupied territories only, inside Israel and the occupied territories, or whether they did not support military operations.  Twenty percent of respondents supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 9% supported operations inside the occupied territories only, 49% supported operations inside Israel and the occupied territories, 16% did not support military operations against Israeli targets, and 5% did not provide an answer.
 

Support for suicide operations

Respondents were asked whether they supported suicide bombing operations as a suitable response in the current political conditions, or whether they opposed them and found them harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Seventy-two percent of Palestinians supported suicide operations.  This level represents an increase in the level of  support for suicide operations since the latest JMCC poll conducted in December 2001 (64%) 

As figure 4 shows, the level of support for suicide bombing operations has increased dramatically after the onset of the current Intifada to reach a high of 76% in April 2001.  It should be noted that only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide operations in May 1997. 
 

Figure 4: Support for suicide operations

Support for suicide operations varied by respondent charachteristics.  Respondents living in refugee camps are more supportive of suicide operations as compared to respondents residing in cities and villages (77%, 74%, and 66% respectively).  Refugees were also more supportive of suicide operations than non-refugees (78% versus 67%).  Moreover, personal characteristics of respondents were associated with their level of support for suicide operations (67% support among Palestinians 40 years or older versus 74% support among those less than 40 years old; and 74% support among respondents with at least a high school degree as compared to 67% among respondents with less than a high school degree). 

1.3 Goals of the Intifada:

The Best Way to Achieve Palestinian National Goals and End Occupation (Intifada versus Negotiations).

Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada alone, or negotiations and Intifada together would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end occupation.

Thirty-two percent of respondents believed that the Intifada alone would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals, 11% believed that negotiations alone would be the best method, 55% believed that Intifada and negotiations together would be the best method, and 2% did not provide an answer/ did not know (see figure 5). 
 

Figure 5: Best Method to AchievePalestinian National Goals

The Intifada alone was seen as the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals among 36% of respondent living in the West Bank, as opposed to 30% of those living in Gaza Strip, and 21% of those living in East Jerusalem.  Additionally, respondents younger than 40 years of age favored the Intifada alone as the way to achieve national goals more as compared to those 40 years or older (35% versus 25%). 

The Final Goal of the Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether the final goal of the Intifada should be the improvement of Palestinian negotiating conditions, ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, or the total liberation of Palestine (area under British mandate before 1948). 

Forty-eight percent of respondents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, 44% believed that it should be the total liberation of Palestine, 7% believed that it should be improving the Palestinian negotiation conditions, and 1% did not provide an answer/ did not know.  As figure 6 shows, the final goal of the intifada varied considerably by area of residence.
 

Figure 6: The final goal of the Intifada
 

The final goal of Intifada did not vary considerably by refugee status or type of locality of residence.
 

Optimism about the Intifada Achieving its Goals. 

Respondents were asked to evaluate their level of optimism towards the Intifada achieving the goal they specified.  Sixty-five percent of respondents were optimistic that the Intifada will achieve its goals, as compared to only 47% of respondents in JMCC’s latest poll conducted in December 2001. 

The level of optimism was lower among East Jerusalem residents as compared to West Bank and Gaza Strip residents (48% versus 66% and 68% respectively. 

Respondents were specifically asked whether they thought that the Palestinian Intifada had increased or decreased Israeli readiness to come closer to Palestinian demands for a peace treaty.  Sixty-eight percent of respondents believed that the Intifada has increased  Israeli readiness to come closer to Palestinian demands, while 18% believed that the Intifada has decreased it, 7% believed that the Intifada did not have an effect, and 8% did not know/ did not give an answer.

Respondents were also asked whether they believed that the Palestinian Intifada has increased or decreased chances for peace with Israel.  Forty-nine percent of respondents believed that the Intifada has increased chances of peace, while 33% believed that the Intifada has decreased chances of peace, 8% believed that it did not have an effect, and 2% did not kno/ did not provide an answer.
 

Most Harmful Israeli Violations to Palestinian Society. 

Respondents were asked to order Israeli violations (closures and siege, assassinations, incursions into PA areas, settlers’ attacks, killing, shelling) according to their degree of harm to Palestinian society.  The violation most harmful to Palestinian society is as follows: assassinations  (35%), closures and siege (28%),  incursions into PA areas, shelling (10%), killing (9%), settler’s attacks (2%). 

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2.1 Internal Palestinian Issues.

Evaluation of the Performance of the Palestinian Authority.

Respondents were asked about their views regarding the general performance of the Palestinian Authority.  Fifty-nine percent of respondents stated that the Palestinian Authority’s performance is very good/ good.  There has been an increase in the favorable evaluation of the Palestinian Authority’s performance since JMCC’s latest poll conducted in December 2001 (45%). 

East Jerusalem residents have a more favorable evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian Authority as compared to Gaza strip and West Bank residents (69% versus 59% and 57% respectively).    Residents of villages have a more favorable evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian Authority as compared to residents of refugee camps and cities (64% versus 58% and 56% respectively).  Additionally, respondents with at least a high school education have a less favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority as compared to those with less than high school education (56% versus 67%).  Moreover, respondents younger than 40 years of age have a less favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority as compared to those 40 years or older (56% versus 67%).
 

Trust in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions.

When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 32% indicated that they trusted Fateh most (including 2% who supported Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades- the military wing of Fateh), 24% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most  (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions), 8% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian Front, Arabic Front, Nidal Front, Al-Ba’th), 30% indicated that they did not trust any faction, and 6% did not give an answer (see figure 7).
 

Figure 7: Turst in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions

Support for Fateh was higher in Gaza Strip as opposed to the West Bank and East Jerusalem (35% versus 26%). 

It is worthwhile mentioning that support for Fateh has increased (26% in December 2001 to 32% in March 2002) and support for Islamic factions has decreased (29% in December 2001 to 24% in March 2002) since the latest JMCC poll.
 

Trust in Palestinian Figures.

When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 28% indicated that they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, 10% indicated that they trusted Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 25% indicated that they trusted other figures, 32% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure, and 5% did not give an answer (see figure 8).
 
 

Figure 8: Trust in Palestinian Figures

Level of trust in Palestinian President Yasser Arafat varied by area of residence (33% in Gaza Strip, 25% in West Bank, and 23% in Jerusalem) and by type of locality (33% support in villages, 32% support in refugee camps, and 24% in cities).  Level of trust in Ahmad Yassin also varied by area of residence (19% in Gaza Strip, 10% in West Bank, and 7% in Jerusalem).  Support for President Arafat was higher among respondents 40 years or older as compared to those less than 40 years old (39% versus 27%).
 

President Arafat‘s Level of Control of the Internal Palestinian Situation.

Respondents were asked whether they believed that president Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation.  Sixty-five percent of respondents believed that President Arafat was in control of the situation.  More refugee camp residents believe that President Arafat was in control of the situation as compared to village and city residents (71% versus 66% and 64% respectively).
 

2.2 Views Towards Negotiations and Relations with Israelis.

Support for Negotiations Between Palestinians and Israelis.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed negotiations with Israelis in principle.  Fifty percent of respondents indicated that they support negotiations with Israelis.  This figure is similar to that obtained from JMCC’s polls conducted in September and December 2001. 

Respondents with less than high school education were more supportive of negotiations with Israelis as compared to respondents with high school education or higher (56% versus 48%). 

Respondents were also asked whether they supported or opposed the ongoing negotiations with Israelis.  Forty-seven percent of respondents supported current negotiations. 
 

Evaluation of the Current Status of the Peace Process.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions.  Thirty-one percent of respondents thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, 50% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, 17% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations, and 2% did not provide an answer (see figure 9).
 

Figure 9: Current Status of the Peace Process

More respondents who are younger than 40 years of age thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations as compared to those 40 years or older (34% versus 25%).
 

Support for Oslo Agreements.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the Oslo agreements.  Thirty-two percent of respondents currently support Oslo agreements. 
The current level of support for Oslo agreements is similar to that obtained from JMCC’s polls conducted in September and December 2001.  It is worthwhile mentioning that there has been a dramatic decline in support for the Oslo agreements following the eruption of the current Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, which was followed by a gradual decline that levelled off with time (see figure 10). 
 
 

Figure 10: Support for Oslo Agreement

Support for Oslo agreements varies by locality of residence (36% in villages, 30% in cities, and 27% in refugee camps), refugees status (37% among non-refugees versus 26% among refugees), educational status (37% among respondents with less than high school education versus 30% among respondents with high school or higher education).
 

2.3 The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Optimism towards Reaching a Peaceful Settlement.

Respondents were asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Thirty-three percent responded that they were very optimistic / optimistic.  The level of optimism varied by area of residence (35% in the West Bank, 30% in Gaza Strip, and 23% in East Jerusalem), by locality of residence (37% among village residents, 32% among city residents, and 30% among refugee camp residents), and by refugee status (28% among refugees versus 37% among no-refugees).  Additionally, respondents with less than high school education were more optimistic as compared to those with high school education or more (39% versus 31%) and respondents younger than 40 years of age were less optimistic as compared to those 40 years or older (32% versus 40%).
 

Success of Zinni’s Mission.

Respondents were asked whether they believed that US envoy Zinni will succeed in his mission of a cease-fire and to return Palestinians and Israelis to the negotiating table.  Only 19% of respondents believed that he will succeed in his mission. 
 

Optimism Towards the Future.

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic towards the future.  Forty-eight percent of respondents stated that they were optimistic.  Respondents residing in villages were more optimistic about the future as compared to respondents living in cities and refugee camps (54%, 48%, and 40% respectively). 

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada.  In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).
 

Preferred Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Respondents were asked what they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was.  Forty-seven percent of Palestinians supported the two state solution, 32% supported a bi-national state in historic Palestine where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights, 13% supported a Palestinian state, 3% supported an Islamic state, and 5% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 11). 
 

Figure 11: Preferred solution for Palestinian Israeli Conflict 

Support for the two state solution is stronger in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (57%, 50% and 30% respectively). 

Twenty-two percent of respondents believe that signing a peace agreement with Israel based on “the 2-state solution” will mean an end to the historic Paleestinian-Israeli conflict.

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Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,160 Palestinian individuals 18 years or older, from 58 sampling points, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in their homes.

In the West Bank, 720  people were surveyed from the following areas:
Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp, Kufr Ra’i, ‘Arrabeh, Zababdeh, `Aqabeh, Siris, Al-Jdaydeh, A-Sileh Al-Harthiyyeh, T’innik.  Nablus: Nablus, Deir Sharaf, Beit Eiba, ‘Askar Refugee Camp, Rujib, Burin.  Tulkarem & Qalqilya: Tulkarem, Tulkarem Refugee Camp, ‘Allar, ‘Attil, Qalqilya, ‘Azzun.  Hebron: Hebron, Halhoul, Sa’ir, Dura, Al-‘Arroub Refugee Camp, Beit Ula, Yatta, and Tarquomia.  Bethlehem: Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Battir, Housan, Za’tara, Al-‘Azza Refugee Camp. Jericho: Jericho and ‘Ayn A-Sultan Refugee Camp.  Ramallah & al-Bireh: al-Bireh, Ramallah, Jifna, Al-Jalazon Refugee Camp, Al-Qbeibeh, Beit Rima, Biddu. Jerusalem: Al-‘Izariyyeh, Abu Dis, Shu’fat, Beit Hanina, Shu’fat Refugee Camp, Jabal Al-Mukabbir, Sur Bahir, Old City, Wadi Al-Joz, Al-‘Isawiyyeh, A-Sheikh Jarrah, Ras Al-‘Amoud, Silwan. 

In the Gaza Strip, 440 people were surveyed from the following areas:
Gaza North: Jabalya refugee camp, Jabalya, Beit Lahia, and Beit Hanoun. Gaza: Sheikh Radwan, a-Durj, al-Tuffah, Sabra, Tal Al-Hawa, al-Nasser, a-Zeitoun, a-Shuja’iyya, A-Shati refugee camp, al-Rimal south, and al-Rimal north. Deir al- Balah: al-Nusseirat refugee camp, Deir Al-Balah, Deir al- Balah refugee.  Khan Younis:  Khan Younis refugee camp, Khan Younis, Bani Suheila, ‘Abasan Al-Kabira, al-khuza’a and Qeezan Al-Najjar . Rafah: Rafah, Rafah refugee camp and Tal al-Sultan refugee camp.

The margin of error is 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.
 

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Age:
The average age of the respondents was 34  years.

Gender:
51% of respondents were males, and 49% were females.

Marital Status:
70% of respondents were married, 26% were single, 3% were widowed, and 1% were divorced.

Religion:
98% of respondents were Muslim and 2% were Christian.

Refugee Status:
45% of respondents were refugees and 55% were not refugees.

Residence:
52% of respondents were from the West Bank, 10% were from Jerusalem, and 38% were from Gaza Strip.
31% of respondents indicated that they lived in villages, 17% in refugee camps, 52% in towns/cities.

Education:
29% of respondents had less than secondary school education, 37% had secondary school education, and 34% had more than secondary school education.

Employment:
55% of respondents were not currently working (34% were housewives, 10% were students, 9% were unemployed, 2% were retired), 44% were currently working (18% were employees, 9% were laborers, 6% had a private business, 2% were professionals, 5% were farmers, 2% were technicians), and 1% did not give an answer.