• Introduction
• Part One: Personal opinions regarding the Palestinian Intifada
• Part Two: Personal opinions regarding current political issues
• Part Three: Israeli elections and the latest American proposal to solve the conflict
• Methodology

This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analysis of some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 47, which was conducted by JMCC between December 8th and 12th, 2002 .

The second Palestinian Intifada against Israeli occupation started on September 2000. The situation has witnessed a severe escalation since March 2002. Israeli army forces have repeatedly re-occupied several Palestinian-controlled areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for varying periods of time, placing the population of entire communities under prolonged curfews and movement restrictions and committing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.

The first part of this issue will focus on Palestinian public opinion regarding the Palestinian Intifada. The second part will discuss some of the findings concerning internal Palestinian politics, negotiations with Israel, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The third part will discuss Israeli elections and the latest American proposal to solve the conflict. Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and characteristics of the selected sample.

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This section analyzes the current Palestinian public opinion concerning the 27-month old Palestinian Intifada, including support for its continuation, its preferred characteristics, its goals, and optimism about the Intifada achieving its goals. We will also identify correlates of these opinions, and describe trends in these opinions over time.

1.1 Support for the Continuation of the Intifada

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada. The majority of Palestinians (81%) remain supportive of the continuation of the Intifada.

As figure 1 shows, there has been a gradual increase in the level of support for the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada during its first year, which peaked in September 2001 (87%) and then decreased slightly and leveled off.

Figure 1:

Support for the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada varied by location of residence (86% in Gaza Strip, 82% in East Jerusalem, and 77% in the West Bank), type of residence (93% in refugee camps, 80% in cities, and 76% in villages), refugee status (87% among refugees versus 76% among non-refugees), and level of education (83% among Palestinians with at least a high school education versus 75% among those with less than a high school education).

Respondents were also asked whether they thought the Intifada should continue in its current form, should continue in other forms, or should stop.
Fifty-nine percent of respondents indicated that the Intifada should continue in its current form, 19% indicated that the Intifada should continue in other forms, 17% indicated that the Intifada should stop, and 5% did not provide an answer.

1.2 Preferred Characteristics of the Intifada.

Popular Versus Military Intifada

Respondents were asked whether they preferred the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada (unarmed public resistance of the occupation), a strictly military Intifada, or a mixed popular and military Intifada. Fifty-eight percent of respondents supported the continuation of a mixed popular and military Intifada as opposed to 21% who supported the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada, 14% who supported the continuation of a strictly military Intifada, and 7% who did not know/ did not provide an answer (see figure 2). These results are similar to those obtained from the last JMCC poll conducted in September 2002.
 

Figure 2:

West Bank residents were more supportive of a strictly military Intifada as compared to residents of the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (17% versus 13% and 10% respectively).

Support for Military Operations Against Israeli Targets

Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response during the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests. Military operations include shootings, car bombs, and mortar rocket attacks, but do not include suicide attacks. Seventy-one percent of respondents supported military operations, 24% rejected them, and 5% did not know/ did not provide an answer.

The level of support for military operations has not changed significantly since JMCC’s polls of June and September 2002. However, as figure 3 depicts, there was a massive increase in the level of support for military operations at the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000.
 

Figure 3:

Support for the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets varied by several personal characteristics (75% among refugee camp residents, 70% among city residents, and 65% among village residents; 74% among refugees versus 66% among non-refugees; 76% among Gaza Strip residents, 66% among West Bank residents, and 62% among East Jerusalem residents; and 73% among respondents with at least a high school education versus 60% among those with less than a high school education).

Respondents were also asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the Occupied Territories only, inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, or whether they did not support military operations. Nineteen percent of respondents supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 12% supported operations inside the Occupied Territories only, 45% supported operations inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, 20% did not support military operations against Israeli targets, and 4% did not give an answer.

Support for Suicide Operations

Respondents were also asked whether they supported or opposed suicide-bombing operations against Israeli civilians. Sixty-three percent of Palestinians supported suicide operations. As figure 4 shows, the level of support for suicide bombing operations has increased dramatically after the onset of the current Intifada to reach a high of 76% in April 2001. It should be noted that only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide operations in May 1997.
 

Figure 4:

Support for suicide operations varied by place of residence; Gaza Strip residents were more supportive of suicide operations as compared to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents (71%, 61%, and 46% respectively), and refugee camp residents were more supportive of suicide operations as compared to residents of cities and villages (71%, 65%, and 56% respectively). Support for suicide operations also varied by personal characteristics; Refugees were more supportive of suicide operations as compared to non-refugees (69% versus 58%). Also, 65% of respondents with at least a high school education supported suicide operations versus 56% of those with less than a high school education. Additionally, 69% of respondents younger than 30 years supported suicide operations versus 60% of respondents 30 years or older

1.3 Goals of the Intifada:

The Best Way to Achieve Palestinian National Goals and End Occupation (Intifada versus Negotiations)

Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada alone, or negotiations and Intifada together would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end the occupation.

Thirty percent of respondents believed that the Intifada alone would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals, 16% believed that negotiations alone would be the best method, 50% believed that Intifada and negotiations together would be the best method, and 4% did not provide an answer/ did not know (see figure 5).

Figure 5:

Thirty-two percent of West Bank residents favored the Intifada alone as the best way to achieve national goals as compared to 29% Gaza Strip residents of and 25% of Jerusalem residents.

Respondents were also asked whether they viewed negotiations or armed struggle as the ideal way to achieve Palestinian national goals.

Thirty-six percent of respondents believed that armed struggle is the ideal way to achieve Palestinian national goals, 21% believed that negotiations is the ideal way to achieve Palestinian national goals, 40% believed that armed struggle and negotiations together are the ideal way to achieve Palestinian national goals, and 3% did not provide an answer/ did not know (see figure 6).
 

Figure 6:

Twenty-seven percent of respondents with less than a high school education viewed negotiations alone as the ideal way achieve Palestinian national goals versus 19% of respondents with at least a high school education.

The Final Goal of the Intifada

Respondents were asked whether the final goal of the Intifada should be the improvement of Palestinian negotiating conditions, ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, or the total liberation of Palestine (area under British mandate before 1948).

Forty-six percent of respondents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, 47% believed that it should be the total liberation of Palestine, 4% believed that it should be improving the Palestinian negotiation conditions, and 3% did not provide an answer/ did not know.

As figure 7 shows, respondents’ opinions regarding the final goal of the Intifada fluctuated over the past few months.
 

Figure 7:

Less Palestinians who are residents of East Jerusalem believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine as compared to Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (39%, 46% and 52% respectively). Additionally, more refugees believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine as compared to non-refugees (51% versus 44%). Moreover, 49% of city and refugee camp residents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine as opposed to 42% of village residents.

Optimism about the Intifada Achieving its Goals

Respondents were asked to evaluate their level of optimism towards the Intifada achieving the goal they specified. Fifty-three percent of respondents were optimistic that the Intifada will achieve its goals, as compared to 53% in September 2002, 65% in June 2002, and 47% in December 2001.

The level of optimism among respondents younger than 30 years of age was higher than respondents 30 years or older (57% versus 50%). Also, the level of optimism among Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem residents was higher than that of West Bank residents (61%, 60%, and 56% respectively). Additionally, the level of optimism among city residents was higher than that among refugee camp and village residents (61%, 49% and 42% respectively).

The level of optimism among West Bank residents was lower than East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip residents (46% versus 57% and 62% respectively).    

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When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 28% indicated that they trusted Fateh most, 28% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions), 4% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian Front), 31% indicated that they did not trust any faction, and 9% did not give an answer / did not know (see figure 8).
 

Figure 8:

It is worthwhile to note that support for Fateh fluctuated with time over the past few months (32% in March 2002, 29% in June 2002, and 34% in September 2002). Similarly, support for Islamic factions has fluctuated with time (24% in March 2002, 28% in June 2002, and 25% in September 2002).

Trust in Palestinian Figures

When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 25% said they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, 12% gave their trust to Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement- Hamas, 26% indicated that they trusted other figures, 30% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure, and 7% did not give an answer or said they did not know (see figure 9).
 

Figure 9:

Re-election of President ‘Arafat

Respondents were asked if they expected Palestinian people to re-elect ‘Arafat given free democratic elections were held under these conditions. Fifty-six percent of respondents expected ‘Arafat to be re-elected, as opposed to 33% who did not expect him to be re-elected, and 11% who did not provide an answer.

Sixty-four percent of Gaza Strip residents expected ‘Arafat to be re-elected versus sixty percent of Jerusalem residents and 50% of West Bank residents. Additionally, 64% of refugee camp residents expected ‘Arafat to be re-elected as opposed to 58% of city residents and 51% of village residents.

Respondents were also asked whether they would personally elect ‘Arafat given free democratic elections were held under these conditions. Forty-seven percent indicated that they would elect ‘Arafat versus 43% percent who indicated that they would not elect ‘Arafat, and 10% who did not provide an answer.

More Gaza Strip residents indicated that they would re-elect ‘Arafat as opposed to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents (53% versus 44% and 44% respectively). Additionally, 50% of refugee camp residents and 48% of city residents indicated that they would elect ‘Arafat as opposed to 43% of village residents.

b. Palestinian Reform

Palestinian Authority Reform

Respondents were asked whether they found the reform that the Palestinian Authority has been working on in recent months serious, not serious, or whether the political situation (re-occupation and checkpoints) obstructed the success of these reforms. Thirteen percent of respondents found the reform serious, 47% found it not serious, 33% believed that the political situation obstructed the success of these reforms, and 7% did not provide an answer.

It is worthwhile mentioning that 46% of respondents surveyed in JMCC’s last poll conducted in September 2002 believed that the Palestinian Authority was interested in conducting reform versus 41% who believed that it was not interested in conducting reforms.

Respondents were then asked about the reason why during the process of reform conducted by the Palestinian Authority, there were parts that were reformed and others where reform did not succeed. Respondents were given the following options to choose from: lack of seriousness by the authority in reform, restrictions imposed by the occupation on the Authority (re-occupation and siege), and financial difficulties. Forty-three percent of respondents indicated that the reason is lack of seriousness by the authority in reform, 40% indicated that the reason is the restrictions imposed by the occupation on the Authority (re-occupation and siege), 10% indicated that the reason is financial difficulties, 2% gave other reasons, and 5% did not provide an answer.

2.2 Views Towards Negotiations and Relations with Israel

Support for Negotiations Between Palestinians and Israelis

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed negotiations with Israel in principle. Fifty-four percent of respondents indicated that they supported negotiations with Israel. There has been an increase in support for negotiations since the last poll conducted in September 2002 (47%).

Support for negotiations varied by type of residence locality (59% among refugee camp residents, 55% among city residents, and 51% among village residents), and area of residence (59% in the Gaza Strip, 54% in East Jerusalem, and 50% in the West Bank).

Evaluation of the Current Status of the Peace Process

When respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions, 37% thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, 44% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, 15% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations, and 4% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 10). Results are similar to those obtained from the last JMCC poll conducted in September 2002.
 

Figure 10:

Support for Oslo Agreements

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the Oslo agreements. Thirty-two percent of respondents currently support Oslo agreements. The current level of support for Oslo agreements is not significantly different from that obtained by JMCC’s polls conducted over the past year.

It is worthwhile mentioning that there was a dramatic decline in support for the Oslo agreements following the eruption of the current Intifada in September 2000, which was followed by a gradual decline that leveled off with time (see figure 11).
 

Figure 11:

Support for Oslo agreements varies by area of residence (36% in the West Bank, 32% in the Gaza Strip, and 19% in Jerusalem); type of locality of residence (36% among village residents, 32% among city residents, and 25% among refugee camp residents); and refugee status (32% among non-refugees versus 25% among refugees).

2.3 The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Optimism towards Reaching a Peaceful Settlement

Respondents were asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Twenty-six percent responded that they were very optimistic or somewhat optimistic. The level of optimism did not change since the latest JMCC polls conducted in June and September 2002.

Gaza Strip residents were more optimistic about reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict (30%) as compared to West Bank residents (27%) and East Jerusalem residents (12%).

Optimism Towards the Future.

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic towards the future. Forty-one percent of respondents stated that they were optimistic. The level of optimism towards the future remained the same since the JMCC polls conducted in June and September 2002, following a drop in March 2002 (from 48%).

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada. In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).

Gaza Strip and West Bank residents were more optimistic about the future as compared to East Jerusalem residents (44%, 43%, and 28% respectively).

Preferred Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Respondents were asked whether they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the two-state formula or a bi-national state in all of Palestine, where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights.

Forty-seven percent of Palestinians supported the two-state solution, 26% supported a bi-national state, 11% supported a Palestinian state, 5% supported an Islamic state, 5% supported an Islamic independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, and 6% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 12).
 

Figure 12:

Support for the two-state solution is stronger in East Jerusalem than in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (56%, 46% and 43% respectively).
 

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Of those 32%, 7% believed that the Palestinian leadership should approve the plan, 46% believed that the Palestinian leadership should reject the plan, 38% believed that the Palestinian leadership should work on improving the plan, and 9% did not provide an answer.
 

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Employment:
57% of respondents were not currently working (38% were housewives, 10% were students, 8% were unemployed, 1% were retired), 42% were currently working (18% were employees, 9% were laborers, 7% had a private business, 2% were professionals, 4% were farmers/fishermen, 2% were craftsmen), and 1% did not give an answer.

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