• Introduction
• Part One: Personal opinions regarding the Palestinian Intifada
• Part Two: Personal opinions regarding current political issues. 
• Part Three: Trends in Palestinian Public Opinion
• Methodology
• Footnotes

This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 43, which was conducted by JMCC on 6th-9th December 2001. This poll was conducted shortly after the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, declared a state of emergency in all Palestinian territories, commissioned the general security services to implement emergency laws, and considered any movement, organization, or group that does not respond to the decisions of the Palestinian Leadership, as outlaws. This declaration, which took place on December 2nd, followed several suicide attacks in Jerusalem and Haifa, which killed 28 Israelis. 

Fourteen months have elapsed since the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada. The situation since the beginning of the Intifada has been extraordinarily difficult for Palestinians. More than 800 Palestinians have been killed and tens of thousands injured and disabled. Additionally, three million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been living under a state of siege. Hundreds of Israeli Military checkpoints have been erected on entrances to Palestinian cities, villages and refugee camps, isolating communities from each other, and denying Palestinians their basic rights to health, education, and work. Moreover, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were cut off from each other and from the rest of the world on several occasions. 

The escalating instability in the region has led to the intensification of US efforts to restore pre-Intifada conditions, including efforts of the Mitchell Committee, George Tenet, and Anthony Zinni. So far, none of these efforts have succeeded in restoring stability to the area.

The first part of this issue will focus on Palestinian public opinion regarding the current Palestinian Intifada. The second part will discuss some of the findings concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, negotiations with Israelis, and internal Palestinian politics. The third part will include a brief analysis of trends in selected topics, from the first and second parts. Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and characteristics of the selected sample.

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This section analyzes the current Palestinian public opinion concerning the 14-month old Palestinian Intifada, including support for its continuation, its preferred characteristics, and its goals.  We will also identify correlates of these opinions, and describe trends in these opinions over the past few months.

1.1 Support for the continuation of Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada.  Eighty percent of respondents stated that they supported the continuation of the Intifada. 

As figure 1 shows, there has been a gradual increase in the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada during its first year.  The level of support peaked in September (87%) and then slightly decreased in December (80%).

Figure 1: Support for the continuation of the Intifada
 

Respondents' personal characteristics were significantly associated with the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada.  Respondents with at least high school education were more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to respondents with less than high school education (84% versus 78%); refugees were more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to non-refugees (88% versus 77%); residents of refugee camps were more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to residents of cities and villages (91% versus 83% and 75% respectively); residents of Gaza Strip were more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to residents of the West Bank/ East Jerusalem (87% versus 80%), and males were more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to females (87% versus 78%). 

Respondents were further asked whether they thought that the Intifada should continue in ints current form, whether it should continue in other forms, or whether it should stop.  Sixty-three percent of respondents thought that the intifada should continue in its current form, 16% thought that it should stop,  15% thought that there should be a change in the form of the Intifada (reactivating popular characteristics of the Intifada, reactivating armed resistance, reinforcing national unity, or getting more support from the Arab World) and 4% did not provide an answer.

1.2 Preferred Characteristics of the Intifada.

Popular Versus Military Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether they preferred the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada (unarmed public resistance of the occupation), a strictly military Intifada, or a mixed popular and military Intifada. 

Fifty-five percent of respondents supported the continuation of a mixed popular and military Intifada as opposed to 21% who supported the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada, 16% who supported the continuation of a strictly military Intifada, and 9% who did not know/ did not provide an answer (see figure 2).  These figures are similar to those obtained from JMCC's previous polls conducted in June and September 2001(1).

Figure 2: Preferred Characteristics of Palestinian Intifada

Palestinians residing in Gaza Strip were less supportive of a strictly popular Intifada as compared to Palestinians residing in the West Bank/East Jerusalem (12% versus 26%).
 

Support for Military Operations Against Israeli Targets.

Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response during the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Military operations include shooting, car bombs, and mortar attacks, but do not include suicide attacks.  Sixty-eight percent of respondents supported military operations, 26% rejected them, and 6% did not know/ did not provide an answer. 

Figure 3 shows that the level of support for military operations reached a high of 85% in September 2001, then dropped to 68% in December 2001.  The current level of support for military operations is similar to the level of support observed since the beginning of the Intifada, which is double the level before the Intifada. 
 

Figure 3: Trends in support for Military operations

Respondents living in refugee camps were more supportive of resuming military operations against Israeli targets as compared to respondents residing in cities and villages (82%, 70%, and 54% respectively).  Refugees were also more supportive of resuming military operations than non-refugees (80% versus 58%).  Additionally, Gaza Strip residents were more supportive of resuming military operations as compared to residents of West Bank/ East Jerusalem (78% versus 62%).  Moreover, personal characteristics of respondents were associated with their level of support for resuming military operations (62% support among Palestinians with less than high school education versus 70% support among those with a high school education or higher;  61% support among Palestinians 40 years or older versus 70% support among those less than 40 years old; and 62% support among Palestinian females versus 74% support among Palestinian males).

Respondents were also asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the occupied territories only, inside Israel and the occupied territories, or whether they did not support military operations.  Thirty-one percent of respondents supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 7% supported operations inside the occupied territories only, 37% supported operations inside Israel and the occupied territories, 21% did not support military operations against Israeli targets, and 5% did not provide an answer.
 

Support for suicide operations

Respondents were also asked whether they supported suicide bombing operations as a suitable response in the current political conditions, or whether they opposed them and found them harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Sixty-four percent of Palestinians supported suicide operations. 

As figure 4 shows, the level of support for suicide bombing operations has increased dramatically during the current Intifada to reach a high of 76% in April 2001.  However, the level of support for suicude bombing operations has slightly decreased  since then. 

It should be noted that a few years earlier, only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide operations (JMCC poll # 20, May 1997). 
 

Figure 4: Support for suicide operations

Support for suicide operations follows similar patterns to support of military operations against Israeli targets.  Respondents living in refugee camps were more supportive of suicide operations as compared to respondents residing in cities and villages (80%, 68%, and 52% respectively).  Refugees were also more supportive of suicide operations than non-refugees (76% versus 57%).  Additionally, Gaza Strip residents were more supportive of suicide operations as compared to residents of West Bank/ East Jerusalem (75% versus 60%).  Moreover, personal characteristics of respondents were associated with their level of support for resuming military operations (57% support among Palestinians 40 years or older versus 68% support among those less than 40 years old; and 62% support among Palestinian females versus 69% support among Palestinian males). 
 

1.3 Goals of the Intifada:

The Best Way to Achieve Palestinian National Goals and End Occupation (Intifada versus Negotiations).

Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada alone, or negotiations and Intifada together would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end occupation.

Thirty-five percent of respondents believed that the Intifada alone would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals, 14% believed that negotiations alone would be the best method, 47% believed that Intifada and negotiations together would be the best method, and 4% did not provide an answer/ did not know (see figure 5).  These figures are similar to those obtained in JMCC's previous poll (#42) conducted in September 2001.
 

Figure 5: Best Method to AchievePalestinian National Goals

Younger Palestinians (less than 40 years old) favored the Intifada alone as the way to achieve national goals more than those 40 years or older (38% versus 29%). 
 

The Final Goal of the Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether the final goal of the Intifada should be the improvement of Palestinian negotiating conditions, ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, or the total liberation of Palestine (area under British mandate before 1948). 

Forty-nine percent of respondents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, 40% believed that it should be the total liberation of Palestine, and 9% believed that it should be to improve the Palestinian negotiation conditions, and 3% did not provide an answer/ did not know (see figure 6).
 

Figure 6: The final goal of the Intifada

Optimism about the Intifada Achieving its Goals. 

Respondents were asked to evaluate their level of optimism towards the Intifada achieving the goal they specified.  Forty-seven percent of respondents were optimistic that the Intifada will achieve its goals.  There has been a slight decrease in the level of optimism towards the Intifada achieving its goals since September 2001 (55%).

The level of optimism was lower among West Bank/ East Jerusalem residents as compared to Gaza Strip residents (41% versus 58%), and among village residents as compared to city and refugee camp residents (40% versus 51% and 53% respectively).

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2.1 Internal Palestinian Issues.

Evaluation of the Performance of the Palestinian Authority.

Respondents were asked about their views regarding the general performance of the Palestinian Authority.  Forty-five percent of respondents stated that the Palestinian Authority's performance is very good/ good.  There has been a decline in the favorable evaluation of the Palestinian Authority's performance since September 2001 (65%).  

Refugees have a less favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority as compared to non-refugees (40% versus 52%).  Additionally, males have a less favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority as compared to females (41% versus 53%).  Moreover, respondents with at least a high school education have a less favorable evaluation of the performance of Palestinian Authority as compared to those with less than high school education (44% versus 53%).  
 

The Palestinian Authority's Detention of Palestinian Activists

Respondents were asked whether they thought that the Palestinian Authority's detention of Palestinian activists was justified or not in the current conditions.  

Only 20% of Palestinians thought that the detention was justified.  Residents of East Jerusalem were less supportive of the detention as compared to residents of the the West Bank and Gaza Strip (10% versus 21% and 21% respectively).  Additionally, residents of refugee camps and cities were less supportive of the detention as compared to residents of villages (16% and 18% versus 27% respectively).  
 

Trust in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions.

When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 26% indicated that they trusted Fateh most, 29% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most  (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, Hizb Al-Khalas, and other Islamic factions), 6% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian Front, Arabic Front, Nidal Front, Al-Ba'th), 30% indicated that they did not trust any faction, and 9% did not give an answer (see figure 7).
 

Figure 7: Turst in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions

There has been an increase in the percentage of respondents who do not support any faction (from 23% in September to 30% now) and a decrease in the level of trust in Fateh (from 29% in September to 26% now) since the previous JMCC poll conducted in September 2001.

Trust in Factions Supporting the Peace Process.

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on their support/opposition to the peace process.  Factions supporting the peace process included Fateh, FIDA, PPP, PLO, and factions opposing the peace process included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, Hizb Al-Khalas, other Islamic factions, PFLP, DFLP, Palestinian Front, Arabic Front, Nidal Front, Al-Ba'th.  Twenty-seven percent of respondents trust factions that support the peace process, while 34% of respondents trust factions that oppose the peace process.  

Level of trust in factions supporting the peace process is higher among non-refugees than refugees (30% versus 24%), among males than females (30% versus 24%), and among Gaza Strip residents than West Bank/ East Jerusalem residents (31% versus 24%).  
Trust in Islamic versus Secular Factions.

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on whether they are Islamic or secular.  Islamic factions included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, Hizb Al-Khalas, and other Islamic factions, and secular factions included Fateh, FIDA, PPP, PLO, PFLP, DFLP, Palestinian Front, Arabic Front, Nidal Front, Al-Ba'th.  Twenty-nine percent of respondents trust Islamic factions, while 32% of respondents trust secular factions.  

Level of trust in Islamic factions is higher among Gaza Strip residents than West Bank/ East Jerusalem residents (38% versus 24%) and among refugee camp residents as compared to city and village residents (35% versus 29% and 26% respectively).  

Trust in Palestinian Figures.

When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 25% indicated that they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, 13% indicated that they trusted Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 22% indicated that they trusted other figures, 33% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure, and 7% did not give an answer (see figure 8). 
 

Figure 8: Trust in Palestinian Figures

There has been an increase in the percentage of respondents who do not trust any figure (from 26% in September to 33% now) since the previous JMCC poll conducted in September 2001.

Level of trust in Palestinian President Yasser Arafat varied by area of residence (28% in Gaza Strip, 25% in West Bank, and 13% in Jerusalem).  Level of trust in Ahmad Yassin also varied by area of residence (19% in Gaza Strip, 10% in West Bank, and 7% in Jerusalem).
 

President Arafat's Level of Control of the Internal Palestinian Situation.

Respondents were asked whether they believed that president Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation.  Fifty-seven percent of respondents believed that President Arafat was in control of the situation.  There has been a decrease in the percentage of respondents who believe that President 'Arafat was in control of the situation since the previous JMCC poll conducted in September 2001 (70% versus 57%).
 

President Arafat's Call for a Cease-fire. 

Respondents were asked whether they thought that President 'Arafat's call for a cease-fire is justified or not in the current circumstances.  Thirty-five percent of respondents thought that the call for a cease-fire was justified.  The percentage of respondents who thought that the call for a cease-fire was justified varied by area (40% in West Bank, 36% in Gaza Strip, and 29% in East Jerusalem), and locality of residence (41% in villages, 38% in cities, and 30% in refugee camps).
 

2.2 Views Towards Negotiations and Relations with Israelis.

Support for Negotiations Between Palestinians and Israelis.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed negotiations with Israelis in principle.  Fory-nine percent of respondents indicated that they support negotiations with Israelis.  This figure is similar to that obtained from JMCC's poll conducted in September.  

Refugees were less supportive of negotiations with Israelis when compared to non-refugees (43% versus 56%).  
 

Negotiations as a mean to achieve National Goals.

Respondents were asked whether negotiations or armed struggle were the ideal mean to achieve Palestinian national goals.  Twenty-three percent indicated that negotiations alone is the ideal way to achieve Palestinian national goals, while 38% indicated that armed struggle is the ideal way, 37% indicated that negotiations and armed struggle together are the ideal way, and 3% did not provide an answer.

The percentage of respondents who believed that negotiations alone is the ideal way to achieve Palestinian national goals is higher among West Bank/ East Jerusalem residents than Gaza Strip residents (27% versus 17%) and higher among village residents than city and refugee camp residents (32% versus 23% and 12% respectively).
  

Evaluation of the Current Status of the Peace Process.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions.  Thirty-six percent of respondents thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, 47% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, 15% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations, and 3% did not provide an answer (see figure 9).

Figure 9: Current Status of the Peace Process

Support for Oslo Agreements.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the Oslo agreements.  Thirty-one percent of respondents currently support Oslo agreements.  

The current level of support for Oslo agreements is similar to that obtained in JMCC's poll #42 conducted in September.  It is worthwhile to mention that there has been a dramatic decline in support for the Oslo agreements following the eruption of the current Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, which was followed by a gradual decline with time (see figure 10).
 

Figure 10: Support for Oslo Agreement

Support for Oslo agreements varies by locality of residence (41% in villages, 31% in cities, and 30% in refugee camps).  Additionally, refugees are less supportive of the Oslo agreements as compared to non-refugees (24% versus 41%).
 

2.3 The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.
 

Optimism towards Reaching a Peaceful Settlement.

Respondents were asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Thirty-one percent responded that they were very optimistic / optimistic.  The level of optimism varied by area of residence (35% in the West Bank, 30% in Gaza Strip, and 23% in East Jerusalem).  

Success of Zinni's Mission.

Respondents were asked whether they believed that US envoy Zinni will succeed in his mission of a cease-fire and to return Palestinians and Israelis to the negotiating table.  Only 17% of respondents believed that he will succeed in his mission.   

Optimism Towards the Future.

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic towards the future.  Forty-five percent of respondents stated that they were optimistic.  Respondents living in the West Bank/ East Jerusalem were less optimistic than those living in Gaza Strip (42% versus 49%).  

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada.  In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).

Preferred Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Respondents were asked what they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was.  Forty-nine percent of Palestinians supported the two state solution, 28% supported a bi-national state in historic Palestine where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights, 14% supported a Palestinian state, 3% supported an Islamic state, and 5% did not provide an answer (see figure 11).  

Figure 11: Preferred solution for Palestinian Israeli Conflict 

Support for the two state solution is stronger in villages than in cities and refugee camps (60% versus 49% and 31% respectively).  Support is also stronger in the West Bank/ East Jerusalem than in Gaza Strip (53% versus 43%).   
 

The Road to Salvation for Palestinians from the Difficult Conditions they Live in.

Respondents were asked what they thought the road to salvation for Palestinians from the difficult conditions they lived in was.  
Thirty-seven percent thought that the road to salvation was continued struggle and resistance, 19% thought that it was negotiations, political and diplomatic work, 4% thought that it was both resistance and negotiations, 6% thought that it was internal reform and national unity, 4% thought that it was returning to Islam and seeking help from God, 4% thought that it was seeking Arab support and solidarity, 2% identified international support and legitimacy, 18% gave several other miscellaneous answers, and 7% did not know/ did not give an answer.

Part three includes a brief analysis of trends in selected topics from the first and second parts. It has been noted that there was a radicalization of Palestinian public opinion regarding several issues in the September 2001 JMCC poll. Results of this poll indicate that there has been a slight reversal of this radicalization in opinions. The following examples illustrate this finding:

• Since the latest JMCC poll conducted in September 2001, there has been an increase in the belief that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, and supporting a two state solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
• Public opinions regarding some issues remained the same since the latest JMCC poll conducted in September 2001. These issues include optimism towards the future, and support for Oslo areements, trust in Islamic factions.

Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,201 Palestinian individuals 18 years or older, from 60 sampling points, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in their homes.

In the West Bank , 761 people were surveyed from the following areas: Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp, Faqou'a, `Aqabeh, Tubas and 'Arrabeh. Nablus: Nablus, Deir Al-hatab, Balata Refugee Camp, Rujib, Beit Eiba, and Salfit. Tulkarem & Qalqilya: Tulkarem, Tulkarem refugee camp, Qalqilia, 'Anabta, 'Allar, and Jayous. Hebron: Hebron, Halhoul, Dura, Bani N'iem, Ithna, Tafouh, Beit-Kahel, and Tarquomia. Bethlehem: Bethlehem, al-Doha, Za'tara, Al-'Azza Refugee Camp. Jericho: Jericho and 'Aqabet Jaber Refugee Camp . Ramallah & al-Bireh: al-Bireh, Ramallah, Beitounia, Qibia, and Shuqba. Jerusalem: a-Dahia, A-ram, Shu'fat, Beit Hanina, Old City, Ras al-'Amoud, Qalandia refugee camp, al-'Isawiyya , Silwan, Kufr 'Aqab, 'Anata, 'Ein Yabroud and a-Sheikh Jarah.

In the Gaza Strip, 440 people were surveyed from the following areas: Gaza North: Jabalya refugee camp, Jabalya, Beit Lahia, and Beit Hanoun. Gaza: Sheikh Radwan, al-Nasser, a-Durj, al-Tuffah, Sabra, a-Zeitoun, a-Shuja'iyya, A-Shati refugee camp, al-Rimal south, and al-Rimal north. Deir al- Balah: al-Nusseirat refugee camp, al-Maghazi refugee camp, Deir al- Balah and al-Bureij refugee camp. Khan Younis: Khan Younis refugee camp, Khan Younis, Bani Suheila, al-khuza'a and al-Qararah . Rafah: Rafah, Rafah refugee camp and Tal al-Sultan refugee camp.

The margin of error is 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Age:
The average age of the respondents was 34 years.

Gender: 
51% of respondents were males, and 49% were females.

Marital Status:
69% of respondents were married, 24% were single, 3% were widowed, 2% were divorced and 2% gave no answer.

Religion:
99% of respondents were Muslim and 1% were Christian.

Refugee Status:
46% of respondents were refugees and 54% were not refugees.

Residence:
53% of respondents were from the West Bank, 10% were from Jerusalem, and 37% were from Gaza Strip.

25% of respondents indicated that they lived in villages, 16% in refugee camps, 60% in towns/cities.

Education: 31% of respondents had less than secondary school education, 38% had secondary school education, and 32% had more than secondary school education.

Employment:
55% of respondents were not currently working (32% were housewives, 12% were students, 11% were unemployed, 1% were retired), 44% were currently working (20% were employees, 9% were laborers, 7% had a private business, 2% were professionals, 4% were farmers, 2% were technicians), and 1% did not give an answer. 

(1) JMCC Polls: 

#39, December 2000,
#40 April 2001, 
#42 September, 2001.