• Introduction
• Part One: Personal opinions regarding the Palestinian Intifada
• Part Two: Personal opinions regarding current political issues
• Part Three: Effects of Israeli incursions on personal opinions
• Methodology

This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 45, which was conducted by JMCC on May 29th to June 2nd 2002 .  

This poll was conducted twenty months after the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada.  The period since March 2002, during which the Israeli army forces have repeatedly re-occupied several Palestinian-controlled areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for varying periods of time, have witnessed a severe escalation of Israeli violations to human rights and international humanitarian law. 

The first part of this issue will focus on Palestinian public opinion regarding the current Palestinian Intifada.  The second part will discuss some of the findings concerning the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, negotiations with Israelis, and internal Palestinian politics.  The third part will examine how the Israeli incursions into PA areas affected people’s perspectives regarding several issues.  Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and characteristics of the selected sample.

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1.1 Support for the continuation of Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada.  Seventy-nine percent of respondents stated that they supported the continuation of the Intifada. 

As figure 1 shows, there has been a gradual increase in the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada during its first year, which peaked in September 2001 (87%) and then decreased slightly.

Figure 1:

Residents of refugee camps were more supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to residents of cities and villages (88% versus 79% and 74% respectively).  Additionally, residents of East Jerusalem and the West Bank were less supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to residents of Gaza Strip (77% versus 83%). 
 

1.2 Preferred Characteristics of the Intifada.

Popular Versus Military Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether they preferred the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada (unarmed public resistance of the occupation), a strictly military Intifada, or a mixed popular and military Intifada. 

Fifty-eight percent of respondents supported the continuation of a mixed popular and military Intifada as opposed to 19% who supported the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada, 17% who supported the continuation of a strictly military Intifada, and 6% who did not know/ did not provide an answer (see figure 2).  These has been an increase in Palestinians supporting both forms of the Intifada (66% to 58%) and an increase in Palestinians supporting a strictly popular Intifada (13% to 19%) as compared to the latest JMCC poll conducted in March 2002.

Figure 2:

Support for Military Operations Against Israeli Targets.

Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response during the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Military operations include shooting, car bombs, and mortar attacks, but do not include suicide attacks.  Seventy-one percent of respondents supported military operations, 23% rejected them, and 6% did not know/ did not provide an answer.  The level of support for military operations has not changed significantly since the latest JMCC poll conducted in March 2002.  Figure 3 shows the vast increase in the level of support for military operations at the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000.

Figure 3:

Respondents living in refugee camps were more supportive of resuming military operations against Israeli targets as compared to respondents residing in cities and villages (79%, 73%, and 66% respectively).  Refugees were also more supportive of resuming military operations than non-refugees (76% versus 67%).  Additionally, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem residents were more supportive of resuming military operations as compared to residents of the West Bank (75% and 68% respectively).  Moreover, 67% of females supported the resumption of military operations as compared to 76% of males).

Respondents were also asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the occupied territories only, inside Israel and the occupied territories, or whether they did not support military operations.  Nineteen percent of respondents supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 11% supported operations inside the occupied territories only, 51% supported operations inside Israel and the occupied territories, and 19% did not support military operations against Israeli targets.
 

Support for suicide operations

Respondents were asked whether they supported suicide-bombing operations as a suitable response in the current political conditions, or whether they opposed them and found them harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Seventy-two percent of Palestinians supported suicide operations.  The current level of support for suicide operations is exactly the same as the level of support in the latest JMCC poll conducted in March 2002. 

As figure 4 shows, the level of support for suicide bombing operations has increased dramatically after the onset of the current Intifada to reach a high of 76% in April 2001.  It should be noted that only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide operations in May 1997. 

Figure 4:

Support for suicide operations varied by respondent characteristics.  Respondents living in refugee camps were more supportive of suicide operations as compared to respondents residing in cities and villages (81%, 71%, and 70% respectively).  Refugees were also more supportive of suicide operations than non-refugees (77% versus 68%).  There were no significant differences in support for suicide operations by area of residence or level of education.  However, as figure 5 depicts, support for suicide operations was positively correlated with age. 

Figure 5:

1.3 Goals of the Intifada:

The Best Way to Achieve Palestinian National Goals and End Occupation (Intifada versus Negotiations).

Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada alone, or negotiations and Intifada together would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end occupation.  Thirty-three percent of respondents believed that the Intifada alone would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals, 10% believed that negotiations alone would be the best method, 51% believed that Intifada and negotiations together would be the best method, and 6% did not provide an answer/ did not know (see figure 6). 

Figure 6:

The Intifada alone was seen as the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals among 40% of respondent living in the refugee camps, as opposed to 34% of those living in cities, and 26% of those living in villages.  Additionally, refugees favored the Intifada alone as the way to achieve national goals more as compared to non-refugees (38% versus 28%). 
 

The Final Goal of the Intifada.

Respondents were asked whether the final goal of the Intifada should be the improvement of Palestinian negotiating conditions, ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, or the total liberation of Palestine (area under British mandate before 1948). 

Forty-three percent of respondents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, 51% believed that it should be the total liberation of Palestine, 43% believed that it should be improving the Palestinian negotiation conditions, and 2% did not provide an answer/ did not know.  It is worthwhile to note that the percent of Palestinians who believe that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242 has decreased since the latest JMCC poll conducted in March 2002 from 48% to 43%, and the percentage of Palestinians who believe that that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine has increased from 44% to 51%. 

More Palestinians who are residents of East Jerusalem believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine as compared to Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (73% versus 50% and 46% respectively); and less Palestinians who are residents of East Jerusalem believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242 as compared to Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (19% versus 46% and 46% respectively).  Additionally, More refugees believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine as compared to non-refugees (57% versus 47%); and less refugees believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242 as compared to non-refugees (39% versus 46%). 

As figure 7 depicts, respondents believes about what the final goal of the Intifada should be varied considerably by age group.

Figure 7:

The final goal of Intifada did not vary considerably by type of locality of residence.

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2.1 Internal Palestinian Issues.

Palestinian Authority Performance

Respondents were asked whether they thought that the performance of Palestinian National Authority (PNA) apparatuses during the latest Israeli invasion of PNA areas performed in the best possible manner, was disappointing, or whether they couldn’t have done more within their limited capabilities.  Forty-five percent of respondents believed that PNA apparatuses couldn’t have done better within their limited capabilities, 43% believed that their performance was disappointing, 6% believed that they performed in the best possible manner, and 6% did not know or did not provide an answer.

Being disappointed with the performance of PNA apparatuses was associated with area of residence and personal characteristics.  West Bank residents were more disappointed with the performance of PNA apparatuses as compared to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents (49% versus 38%).  Males were more disappointed than females with the performance of PNA apparatuses (51% versus 35%).  Refugees were more disappointed with the performance of PNA apparatuses (48% versus 40%).  Respondents with high school or higher education were more disappointed with the performance of PNA apparatuses (47% versus 37%). 
 

Palestinian Authority Reform

Respondents were asked their opinion regarding the debate that recently emerged in the Palestinian society regarding the need to have reforms in the Palestinian Authority.  Respondents were asked whether they believed it is time to hold internal reforms, whether the time is not appropriate to engage in internal reforms, or whether there is no need for any kind of reform.  Fifty-eight percent of respondents believed that it is time to hold internal reforms, 27% believed that the time is not appropriate to engage in internal reforms, 11% believed that there is no need for any reforms, and 5% did not have an opinion / did not provide an answer (See figure 8). 

Figure 8:

Belief that it is time to hold internal reforms varied by area of residence (80% among East Jerusalem residents, 60% among Gaza Strip residents, and 51% among West Bank residents) and refugee status (64% among refugees versus 53% among non-refugees).

Respondents who believed that the time is not appropriate to engage in internal reforms were asked for the reason they believed so.  Forty-seven percent stated that it is not appropriate to engage in internal reforms during the struggle with Israel, 25% stated that Palestinians are not ready internally to hold real and serious reforms, 24% stated that they fear the reforms will be superficial, 3% did not believe there is a need for reform, and 1% did not have an opinion.

Respondents who believed that it is time to hold internal reforms and respondents who believed that the time is not appropriate to engage in internal reforms were asked what they thought the best way to achieve real reforms were.  Forty-two percent thought that holding free democratic elections would be the best way, while 29% thought that improve the accountability laws and regulations and implement them on others would be the best, 23% thought that changing the structure of the official people would be the best, and 6% provided other answers or did not provide an answer.

Trust in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions.

When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 29% indicated that they trusted Fateh most (including 1% who supported Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades- the military wing of Fateh), 28% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most  (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions), 6% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian Front, Arabic Front, Nidal Front, Al-Ba’th), 27% indicated that they did not trust any faction, and 10% did not give an answer / did not know(see figure 9).

Figure 9:

Support for Fateh was higher in Gaza Strip as opposed to the West Bank and East Jerusalem (40% versus 27% and 26% respectively).  Support for Islamic factions was higher among refugees as compared to non-refugees (36% versus 24%). 

It is worthwhile mentioning that support for Fateh has slightly decreased (32% in March 2002 to 29% in May 2002) and support for Islamic factions has slightly increased (24% in March 2002 to 28% in May 2002) since the latest JMCC poll.

Trust in Palestinian Figures.

When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 25% indicated that they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, 9% indicated that they trusted Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), 34% indicated that they trusted other figures, 25% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure, and 8% did not give an answer (see figure 10). 

Figure 10:

Level of trust in Palestinian President Yasser Arafat varied by area of residence (31% in Gaza Strip, 26% in West Bank, and 22% in Jerusalem) and by level of education (35% among respondents with less than high school education and 24% among respondents with high school or higher education). 
 

President Arafat’s Support

Respondents were specifically asked what they thought about Chairman Arafat as a leader for Palestinians during the latest Israeli incursions into PA areas.  Forty-one of Palestinians thought he was very good / good, 26% thought that he was in between good and bad, and 29% thought that he was very bad/ bad, and 4% did not give an answer.

Respondents were also asked whether they expected Palestinian people to re-elect President Yasser Arafat if free democratic elections were held.  Forty-eight percent of respondents expected Arafat to be re-elected, 38% did not expect him to be elected, and 15% did not have an answer.
 

2.2 Views Towards Negotiations and Relations with Israelis.

Support for Negotiations Between Palestinians and Israelis.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed negotiations with Israelis in principle.  Forty-seven percent of respondents indicated that they supported negotiations with Israelis.  There has been no significant change in support for negotiations as compared to JMCC’s polls conducted in September and December 2001 and March 2002. 

Support for negotiations varied by personal characteristics of respondents.  Females were more supportive of negotiations as compared to males (55% versus 38%); refugees were less supportive of negotiations than non-refugees (43% versus 50%); respondents with less than high school education were more supportive of negotiations as compared to respondents with high school education or higher (51% versus 44%); and respondents younger than 50 years of age were less supportive of negotiations as compared to those 50 years or older (45% versus 57%). 

Support for Oslo Agreements.

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the Oslo agreements.  Thirty percent of respondents currently support Oslo agreements. 

The current level of support for Oslo agreements is not significantly different from that obtained by JMCC’s polls conducted in September and December 2001 and March 2002.  It is worthwhile mentioning that there has been a dramatic decline in support for the Oslo agreements following the eruption of the current Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, which was followed by a gradual decline that leveled off with time (see figure 11). 

Figure 11:

Support for Oslo agreements varies by locality of residence (35% in villages, 29% in cities, and 24% in refugee camps), refugee status (35% among non-refugees versus 25% among refugees), educational status (35% among respondents with less than high school education versus 28% among respondents with high school or higher education), and sex (35% support among females versus 26% support among males).

Support for Saudi Peace Initiative

Respondents were asked about their opinion regarding the Saudi initiative which was adopted at the last Arab Summit in Beirut.  The initiative stipulates the withdrawal of Israel to 1967 borders including East Jerusalem, solving the refugee problem based on UN resolution 194, and the establishment of a Palestinian state in return to Arab states’ recognition of Israel and establishing normal peace relations with it.  Only 14% of respondents believed that the initiative was good because it is congruent with Palestinian goals, 37% of respondents believed that the initiative was somewhat reasonable initiative but it should be amended, 38% believed that it was a bad initiative because it contradicts with Palestinian goals, and 12% did not have an opinion, or did not give an answer (See figure 12). 

Figure 12:

More West Bank residents believed that the initiative was bad as compared to Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem residents (47% versus 30% and 27% respectively).  Also, more males believed that the initiative was bad as compared to females (44% versus 33%).  Additionally, more refugees believed that the initiative was bad as compared to non-refugees (42% versus 35%). 
 

2.3 The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Optimism towards Reaching a Peaceful Settlement.

Respondents were asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Twenty-six percent responded that they were very optimistic / optimistic.  The level of optimism dropped since the latest JMCC poll conducted in March 2002 (from 33% to 26%). 

Level of optimism towards reaching a peaceful agreement varied by area of residence (32% in the West Bank, 24% in Gaza Strip, and 18% in East Jerusalem), by locality of residence (32% among refugee camp residents, 27% among village residents, and 24% among city residents).  Additionally, respondents with less than high school education were more optimistic as compared to those with high school education or more (31% versus 24%) and respondents younger than 40 years of age were less optimistic as compared to those 40 years or older (24% versus 32%).

Optimism Towards the Future.

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic towards the future.  Forty-three percent of respondents stated that they were optimistic.  The level of optimism towards the future dropped since the latest JMCC poll conducted in March 2002 (from 48% to 43%).  Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada.  In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).

Respondents younger than 40 years of age were less optimistic towards the future as compared to respondents 40 years or older (40% versus 49%). 
 

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Respondents were asked whether the Israeli incursion affected their perspective towards several current political issues including Chairman Arafat, Fateh movement, Hamas movement, Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian security services, negotiations with Israel, and suicide bombings.  As figure 13 shows, Chairman Arafat, Fateh and Hamas movements had increased support following the Israeli incursions, while  Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian security services had decreased support.   People also became more supportive of suicide operations and less supportive of negotiations with Israel following the Israeli incursions.
 

Figure 13: 

 
        

 
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Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,179 Palestinian individuals 18 years or older was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.  Face-to-face home interviews were conducted with respondents in 60 sampling points between May 29th and June 2nd 2002.  

In the West Bank: 739 people were surveyed from the following areas:
Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp (RC), Kufr Ra’i, ‘Arrabeh, Zababdeh, ‘Aqabeh, Sarees, Maythaloun and Al-yamoun. Nablus: Nablus, ‘Asira Al-qibliyeh, Kufr Hares and Marda. Tulkarem and Qalqilya: Tulkarem, Tulkarem Refugee Camp (RC), Qalqilya, Jayous, Bal’a and Beit Leid. Hebron: Hebron, Halhoul, Doura, Beit Kahel, Al-fawwar Refugee Camp (RC), Ithna, Bani Na’eem and Tarqoumia. Bethlehem: Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Al-khader, Al-doha, Artas and Duhesheih Refugee Camp (RC). Jericho: Jericho, ‘Aqbet Jaber Refugee Camp (RC). Ramallah & al-Bireh: al-Bireh, Ramallah, Beit Rima, Jalazon Refugee Camp (RC), kufr Malek and Na’leen. Jerusalem:  a-Dahia, A-ram, Shu’fat, Beit Hanina, Beit Hanina Al-tahta, Old City, Ras al-Amoud, Qalandia Refugee Camp (RC), al-‘Isawia, Silwan, Kufr ‘Aqab, Wadi Al-joz.
  
In the Gaza Strip: 440 people were surveyed from the following areas:
North Gaza: Jabalia Refugee Camp (RC), Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun. Gaza City: Sheikh Radwan, al-Darj, al-Tufah, Sabra, al-Naser, al-Zaytoun, al-Shaja’ieh, al-Rimal north and south, A-Shati Refugee Camp (RC). Deir al-Balah: Deir al-Balah, A-Nuseirat Refugee Camp (RC), Al-Breig and Al-Maghazi Refugee Camp (RC). Khan Younis: Khan Younis, Khan Younis Refugee Camp (RC), Bani Sahila, Abssan al-Kabeera, Abssan AL-Saghera. Rafah: Rafah, Rafah Refugee Camp (RC), Tal al-Sultan Refugee Camp (RC). 

The margin of error is 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.
 

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Age:
The average age of the respondents was 34  years.

Gender:
50% of respondents were males, and 50% were females.

Marital Status:
70% of respondents were married, 22% were single, 2% were widowed, 2% were divorced, and 3% did not give an answer.

Religion:
99% of respondents were Muslim and 1% were Christian.

Refugee Status:
46% of respondents were refugees and 54% were not refugees.

Residence:
51% of respondents were from the West Bank, 12% were from Jerusalem, and 37% were from Gaza Strip.

31% of respondents indicated that they lived in villages, 15% in refugee camps, 54% in towns/cities.

Education:
29% of respondents had less than secondary school education, 37% had secondary school education, and 34% had more than secondary school education.

Employment:
57% of respondents were not currently working (35% were housewives, 9% were students, 11% were unemployed, 1% were retired), 42% were currently working (16% were employees, 8% were laborers, 10% had a private business, 3% were professionals, 5% were farmers, 2% were craftsmen), and 1% did not give an answer.