• Introduction
• Part One: Personal opinions regarding the Palestinian Intifada
• Part Two: Personal opinions regarding current political issues
• Methodology

This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analysis of some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 46, which was conducted by JMCC on the eve of the second anniversary of the Intifada (September 21st to 25th 2002) . 

The period since March 2002 has witnessed a severe escalation of the conflict since the beginning of the peace process. Israeli army forces have repeatedly re-occupied several Palestinian-controlled areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for varying periods of time, placing the population of entire communities to prolonged curfews and movement restrictions and committing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. 

The first part of this issue will focus on Palestinian public opinion regarding the Palestinian Intifada. The second part will discuss some of the findings concerning internal Palestinian politics, negotiations with Israel, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and characteristics of the selected sample.

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This section analyzes the current Palestinian public opinion concerning the two-year old Palestinian Intifada, including support for its continuation, its preferred characteristics, its goals, and opinions on the efficacy of the Intifada to achieve its aims. We will also identify correlates of these opinions, and describe trends in these opinions over time.

1.1 Support for the Continuation of the Intifada

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed maintaining the Palestinian Intifada. The majority of Palestinians remain supportive of this Intifada, wherein 81 percent of respondents stated that they supported its continuation, a slight increase from the latest JMCC poll conducted in June 2002 (79%). 

As figure 1 shows, there has been a gradual increase in the level of support for the Intifada to continue during its first year, which peaked in September 2001 (87%) and then decreased slightly and leveled off.

Figure 1:

Residents of the West Bank were less supportive of the continuation of the Intifada as compared to residents of the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (75% versus 88% and 87% respectively).  Additionally, Palestinians who did not trust any Palestinian faction were less supportive of the persistence of the Intifada as compared to supporters of Fateh, Islamic parties and other parties (74% versus 83%, 88% and 92% respectively).  Moreover, women were less supportive of the continuation of the Intifada than were men (77% versus 84%). 

1.2 Preferred Characteristics of the Intifada.

Popular Versus Military Intifada

Respondents were asked whether they preferred the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada (unarmed public resistance of the occupation), a strictly military Intifada, or a mixed popular and military Intifada.  Sixty percent of respondents supported the continuation of a mixed popular and military Intifada as opposed to 19% who supported the continuation of a strictly popular Intifada, 12% who supported the continuation of a strictly military Intifada, and 9% who did not know/ did not provide an answer (see figure 2).  There has been a slight decrease in Palestinians supporting a strictly military Intifada (17% to 12%) since the last JMCC poll conducted in June 2002.
 

Figure 2:

West Bank residents were more supportive of a strictly military Intifada as compared to residents of the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (17% versus 7% and 2% respectively).  Additionally, city residents were less supportive of a strictly popular Intifada as compared to village and refugee camp residents (16% versus 24% and 25% respectively).  

Support for Military Operations Against Israeli Targets

Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response during the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests.  Military operations include shootings, car bombs, and mortar rocket attacks, but do not include suicide attacks.  Seventy percent of respondents supported military operations, 23% rejected them, and 7% did not know/ did not provide an answer.  

The level of support for military operations has not changed significantly since JMCC’s last poll of June 2002.  However, as figure 3 depicts, there was a massive increase in the level of support for military operations at the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000.
 

Figure 3:

Support for the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets varied by several personal characteristics (73% among refugee camp and city residents versus 66% among village residents; 75% among refugees versus 67% among non-refugees; 80% among Gaza Strip residents and 77% among East Jerusalem residents versus 63% among West Bank residents, 73% among respondents with at least a high school education versus 65% of those with less than a high school education, and 90% among supporters of Islamic factions, 85% among supporters of other factions versus 66% among Fateh supporters and 61% among those who did not trust any faction.

Respondents were also asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the Occupied Territories only, inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, or whether they did not support military operations.  Twenty-one percent of respondents supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 12% supported operations inside the Occupied Territories only, 46% supported operations inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, 16% did not support military operations against Israeli targets, and 5% did not give an answer.
 

Support for Suicide Operations

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed suicide-bombing operations against Israeli civilians.  Sixty-four percent of Palestinians supported suicide operations.  The current level of support for suicide operations has decreased since the last JMCC poll conducted in June 2002 (72%). 

As figure 4 shows, the level of support for suicide bombing operations has increased dramatically after the onset of the current Intifada to reach a high of 76% in April 2001.  It should be noted that only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide operations in May 1997.  
 

Figure 4:

Support for suicide operations varied by respondents’ characteristics.  Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem residents were more supportive of suicide operations as compared to West Bank residents (77%, 74% versus 61% respectively).  Additionally, respondents living in refugee camps and cities were more supportive of suicide operations as compared to respondents residing in villages (72%, 71%, and 62% respectively).  Moreover, refugees were also more supportive of suicide operations as compared to non-refugees (75% versus 63%).  As figure 5 depicts, support for suicide operations was negatively correlated with age.    

Figure 5:

When asked whether they supported stopping all kinds of operations inside Israel, 31% of respondents were supportive (41% in the West Bank, 26% in Gaza Strip, and 14% in Jerusalem).

1.3 Goals of the Intifada:

The Best Way to Achieve Palestinian National Goals and End Occupation (Intifada versus Negotiations)

Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada alone, or negotiations and Intifada together would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end the occupation.  Thirty-two percent of respondents believed that the Intifada alone would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals, 11% believed that negotiations alone would be the best method, 52% believed that Intifada and negotiations together would be the best method, and 5% did not provide an answer/ did not know (see figure 6).  The results were similar to those obtained from the last JMCC poll conducted in June 2002.
 

Figure 6:

The Intifada alone was seen as the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals among 37% of respondents living in refugee camps, as opposed to 31% of those living in cities and villages.  Additionally, 36% of Gaza Strip residents favored the Intifada alone as the way to achieve national goals as compared to 31% of West Bank residents and 18% of Jerusalem residents.  Moreover, 57% of supporters of Islamic parties favored the Intifada alone as the way to achieve national goals as compared to 40% of supporters of other factions, 27% of respondents who did not support any faction, and 18% of Fateh supporters.
 

The Final Goal of the Intifada

Respondents were asked whether the final goal of the Intifada should be the improvement of Palestinian negotiating conditions, ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, or the total liberation of Palestine (area under British mandate before 1948).  

Forty-eight percent of respondents believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242, 43% believed that it should be the total liberation of Palestine, 6% believed that it should be improving the Palestinian negotiation conditions, and 3% did not provide an answer/ did not know.

It is worthwhile to note that respondents’ opinions regarding the final goal of the Intifada fluctuated over the past few months.  The percentage of Palestinians who believe that the final goal of the Intifada should be ending the occupation and forming a Palestinian state based on UN resolution 242 was 48% in March 2002, 43% in June 2002, and 48% in September 2002.  Similarly, the percentage of Palestinians who believe that that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine was 44% in March 2002, 51% in June 2002, and 43% in September 2002.  

Less Palestinians who are residents of East Jerusalem believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine as compared to Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (35% versus 43% and 45% respectively).  On the contrary, more refugees believed that the final goal of the Intifada should be the total liberation of Palestine as compared to non-refugees (47% versus 39%).  As figure 7 shows, the final goal of the Intifada varied by the party the respondent trusted most.
 

Figure 7:

Optimism about the Intifada Achieving its Goals 

Respondents were asked to evaluate their level of optimism towards the Intifada achieving the goal they specified.  Fifty-three percent of respondents were optimistic that the Intifada will achieve its goals, as compared to 65% in June 2002, and 47% in December 2001.  

The level of optimism among West Bank residents was lower than East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip residents (46% versus 57% and 62% respectively).    

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2.1 Internal Palestinian Issues

a: Satisfaction with and Support for Palestinian Bodies, Parties, and Figures:

Evaluation of the Performance of the Palestinian Authority

Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).  Forty-three percent of respondents rated the performance of the PNA as being very good or good, while 52% believed that the PNA performance was very bad or bad, and 5% did not provide an answer or said they do not know.  

There has been a decline in the favorable evaluation of the performance of PNA over the past few months (59% in March 2002).

East Jerusalem residents have a more favorable evaluation of the performance of the PNA as compared to Gaza strip and West Bank residents (57% versus 43% and 41% respectively).  Respondents younger than 40 years of age have a less favorable evaluation of the performance of PNA as compared to those 40 years or older (42% versus 48%).
 

Evaluation of the Performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)

Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of the PLC.  Ten percent of respondents rated the performance of the PLC as being good, 38% rated it as being average, 48% rated it as being bad, and 5% did not give an answer.  East Jerusalem residents have a worse evaluation of the performance of the PLC as compared to Gaza strip and West Bank residents (58% versus 51% and 45% respectively).  Additionally, Fateh supporters were less critical of the performance of the PLC as compared to supporters of Islamic parties, respondents who didn’t support any party, and supporters of other parties (31% versus 62%, 63%, and 78% respectively).  

Trust in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions

When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 34% indicated that they trusted Fateh most, 25% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most  (including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions), 4% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian Front), 26% indicated that they did not trust any faction, and 11% did not give an answer / did not know (see figure 8).
 

Figure 8:

It is worthwhile to note that support for Fateh fluctuated with time over the past few months (32% in March 2002, 29% in June 2002, and 34% in September 2002).  Similarly, support for Islamic factions has fluctuated with time (24% in March 2002, 28% in June 2002, and 25% in September 2002).

Support for Fateh was higher in East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip as opposed to the West Bank (42% and 39% versus 28% respectively).  Support for Fateh was also higher among refugee camp residents as compared to village and city residents (39% versus 32% and 32% respectively).  

Trust in Factions Supporting the Peace Process

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on their support/opposition to the peace process.  Factions supporting the peace process included Fateh, FIDA, PPP, and PLO, while factions opposing the peace process included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, other Islamic factions, PFLP, DFLP, and the Palestinian Front.  Thirty-four percent of respondents trust factions that support the peace process (27% in December 2001), while 29% of respondents trust factions that oppose the peace process (34% in December 2001).  
 

Trust in Islamic versus Secular Factions

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on whether they are Islamic or secular.  Islamic factions included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, and other Islamic factions, while  secular factions included Fateh, FIDA, PPP, PLO, PFLP, DFLP, Palestinian Front.  Twenty-five percent of respondents trusted Islamic factions (29% in December 2001), while 39% of respondents trust ed secular factions (32% in December 2001).  
 

Trust in Palestinian Figures

When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 28% said they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat (25% in June 2002), 10% gave their trust to Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement- Hamas (9% in June 2002), 26% indicated that they trusted other figures (34% in June 2002), 27% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure (25% in June 2002), and 9% did not give an answer or said they did not know (see figure 9). 
 

Figure 9:

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Level of trust in Palestinian President Yasser Arafat varied by area of residence (24% in the West Bank, 37% in the Gaza Strip, and 45% in Jerusalem) and by gender (34% among females and 26% among males).  

 
Satisfaction with President Arafat

Respondents were asked about their satisfaction with the manner that President Arafat manages his position as the president of the Palestinian Authority.  Fifty-one of respondents were very satisfied or somewhat satisfied, 42% were very dissatisfied or somewhat dissatisfied, and 7% did not give an answer or said they did not know.
 

President Arafat‘s Level of Control of the Internal Palestinian Situation

Respondents were asked whether they believed that President Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation.  Fifty-two percent of respondents believed that President Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation.  This represents a decline since March 2002, when 65% of respondents believed that President Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation.  

President Arafat‘s Re-election
Respondents were also asked whether they expected Palestinians to re-elect President Arafat if free democratic elections were held.  Sixty-one percent of respondents expected President Arafat to be re-elected, as compared to 48% of respondents surveyed in June 2002.
 

b. Palestinian Reform

Palestinian Authority Reform

Respondents were asked whether they believed that the Palestinian Authority was interested in conducting effective and serious reform.  Forty-six percent believed that the Palestinian Authority was interested in conducting reform, 41% believed that it was not interested, 12% said they did not know, and 1% did not provide an answer.  

Respondents were also asked whether the Palestinian leadership would be able to conduct reform and internal changes in light of the current political situation.  Twenty-four percent of respondents indicated that the Palestinian leadership would be able to conduct reform and internal change, 64% indicated that the Palestinian leadership would not be able to do so, 11% said they did not know, and 1% did not give an answer.

Support for Conducting Elections in January 2003

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed conducting presidential elections in January 2003.  Those who supported conducting presidential elections were 65.2%, 25.5% opposed them, while 7.3% did not know and 2% did not answer. 

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed conducting Legislative Council elections in January 2003.  There was a 73.2% who supported conducting Legislative Council elections, 18.4% opposed them, while 6.8% did not know and 1.6% refused to answer.  

When respondents were asked whether there is a need for a Prime Minister position in the PNA, 43% indicated that there is a need, 42% indicated that there is no need, 13% did not know, and 3% did not provide an answer.  
 

2.2 Views Towards Negotiations and Relations with Israel

Support for Negotiations Between Palestinians and Israelis

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed negotiations with Israel in principle.  Forty-seven percent of respondents indicated that they supported negotiations with Israel.  There has been no significant change in support for negotiations in the 4 polls conducted since September 2001.  

Support for negotiations varied by gender (50% among females versus 43% among males), and area of residence (49% in the West Bank, 46% in the Gaza Strip, and 34% in East Jerusalem).
 

Evaluation of the Current Status of the Peace Process

When respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions, 38.9% thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations (31% in June 2002), 44.5% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear (50% in June 2002), 12.7% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations (17% in June 2002), and 3.7% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 10).
 

Figure 10:

More respondents who are Jerusalem residents thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations as compared to those who are residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (47% versus 40% and 35% respectively).
 

Support for Oslo Agreements

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the Oslo agreements.  Twenty-nine percent of respondents currently support Oslo agreements.  The current level of support for Oslo agreements is not significantly different from that obtained by JMCC’s polls conducted over the past year.  

It is worthwhile mentioning that there was  a dramatic decline in support for the Oslo agreements following the eruption of the current Intifada in September 2000, which was followed by a gradual decline that leveled off with time (see figure 11).  
 

Figure 11:

2.3 The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Optimism towards Reaching a Peaceful Settlement

Respondents were asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Twenty-five percent responded that they were very optimistic or somewhat optimistic.  The level of optimism did not change since the latest JMCC poll conducted in June 2002.

Respondents were also asked whether they believed that at a certain point peace will be achieved between Palestinians and Israelis.  Forty percent believed that peace will be achieve at a certain point (42% in the West Bank, 41% in the Gaza Strip, and 21% in East Jerusalem).  

Optimism Towards the Future.

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic towards the future.  Forty-three percent of respondents stated that they were optimistic.  The level of optimism towards the future remained the same since June 2002, following a drop in March 2002 (from 48%). 

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada.  In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).
 

Preferred Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Respondents were asked what they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the two-state formula or a bi-national state in all of Palestine, where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights.  

Forty-four percent of Palestinians supported the two-state solution, 29% supported a bi-national state, 8% supported a Palestinian state, 2% supported an Islamic state, 13% thought that there will be no solution, and 4% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 12).  
 

Figure 12:

Support for the two-state solution is stronger in East Jerusalem than in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (62%, 45% and 39% respectively).   
 

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Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,199 Palestinian individuals, 18 years or older, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.  Face-to-face home interviews were conducted with respondents in 60 sampling points between September 21st and 25th 2002.  

In the West Bank: 759 people were surveyed from the following areas:
Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp (RC), ‘Arrabeh, Zababdeh, Silit Al-Harthiyya, and Sanour. Nablus: Nablus, Zawata, Huwwara, Kufr Qallil, Salfit, and Balata R.C.  Tulkarem and Qalqilya: Tulkarem, Tulkarem Refugee Camp (RC), Qalqilya, ‘Azzoun, Rameen, and Beit Leid. Hebron: Hebron, Yatta, Beit Ummar, Sa’ir, Dura, Beit Kahel, Beit Ula and Al-‘Aroub R.C. Bethlehem: Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Za’tara, Husan and Al-‘Azza R.C.  Jericho: Jericho, ‘Ain Al-Sultan R.C. Ramallah & Al-Bireh: Al-Bireh, Ramallah, Beit Rima, Al-Am’ari R.C., Kobar and Al-Mizra’a Al-Sharqiyya Jerusalem:  Ad-Dahia, Ar-ram, Beir Nabala, Shu’fat, Beit Hanina, Beit Hanina Al-tahta, Old City, Ras Al-‘Amoud, Qalandia R.C., Al-‘Isawia , Silwan, Wadi Al-Joz, and Jabal al-Mukaber.  

In the Gaza Strip: 440 people were surveyed from the following areas:
North Gaza: Jabalia R.C., Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun. Gaza City: Sheikh Radwan, Al-Darj, al-Tufah, Sabra, Al-Naser, Al-Zaytoun, Al-Shaja’ieh, Al-Rimal north and south, A-Shati R.C. Deir al-Balah: Deir Al-Balah, A-Nuseirat R.C., Al-Breij,  and Al-Maghazi R.C. Khan Younis: Khan Younis, Khan Younis R.C., Bani Sahila, ‘Abssan Al-Kabeera, ‘Abssan Al-Saghera. Rafah: Rafah, Rafah Refugee Camp (RC), Tal Al-Sultan Refugee Camp (RC). 

The margin of error is 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.
 

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Age:
The average age of the respondents was 34 years.

Gender:
49% of respondents were males, and 51% were females.

Marital Status:
68.5% of respondents were married, 24.9% were single, 4% were widowed, 1.6% were divorced, and 1.1% did not give an answer.

Refugee Status:
44% of respondents were refugees and 56% were not refugees.

Residence:
55% of respondents were from the West Bank, 8% were from Jerusalem, and 37% were from Gaza Strip.

32% of respondents indicated that they lived in villages, 16% in refugee camps, 52% in towns/cities.

Education:
31% of respondents had less than secondary school education, 38% had secondary school education, and 31% had more than secondary school education.

Employment:
56.5% of respondents were not currently working (34.3% were housewives, 10.6% were students, 10.3% were unemployed, 1.3% were retired), 42.2% were currently working (17.2% were employees, 9.1% were laborers, 7.8% had a private business, 1.9% were professionals, 4.3% were farmers, 1.9% were craftsmen), and 1.3% did not give an answer.