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Palestinian Opinion Pulse

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The Jerusalem Media and Communication Center is the first institution in the Arab world to conduct public opinion surveys methodologically and continuously. The main aim of the JMCC with those regular opinion polls was to enhance public participation in the decision-making process by making the public's views available to decision-makers, and, also, to enable academics, researchers, and others to use scientifically collected data in their studies and policy projects.

The first public opinion poll in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was conducted by the JMCC in February 1993. Since then, over seventy extensive surveys were conducted on issues, including those pertaining to the peace process, democratization, international relations, economics, political socialization, gender, political partisanship, the media, and social issues.

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INTRODUCTION

This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to the analysis of some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 49, which was conducted¹ by JMCC between October 18th and 21st, 2003. The poll was conducted during the month following the third anniversary of the second Palestinian Intifada, and about 6 months following the US-led war on Iraq.

The second Palestinian Intifada against Israeli occupation, which started on September 2000, has witnessed severe violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by Israeli army forces against Palestinians, including placing the population of entire communities under prolonged curfews and movement restrictions, in addition to using excessive, disproportionate, and indiscriminate force to combat the Palestinian Intifada, which resulted in killing 2,570 and injuring 24,004 Palestinians (Palestine Red Crescent Society, 2003). Recently, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has been involved in an internal reform process.

The first part of this issue will focus on Palestinian public opinion regarding the Palestinian Intifada. The second part will discuss some of the findings concerning internal Palestinian politics including views towards President Arafat, the Palestinian National Authority, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and Palestinian political parties and figures. The third part will look at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the political process with the Israelis, including views towards the peace process, and potential solutions to the conflict. Later we will present a description of the methodology used by

¹ JMCC Public Opinion Polls are supported by a fund from Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Germany.

JMCC Polling Unit and characteristics of the selected sample.

PART ONE: PERSONAL OPINIONS REGARDING THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA


This section analyzes the current Palestinian public opinion concerning the 3-year old Palestinian Intifada, including support for its continuation, its desired results and nature, and its role in achieving Palestinian national goals. We will also identify correlates of these opinions, and describe trends in these opinions over time.

1.1 Support for the Continuation of the Intifada

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada. The majority of Palestinians (77%) remain strongly or somewhat supportive of the continuation of the Intifada.

As figure 1 shows, there has been a gradual increase in the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada during its first year, which peaked in September 2001 (87%) and then decreased slightly and leveled off.

Figure 1:



Support for the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada varied by location of residence (83% in Gaza Strip, versus 80% in East Jerusalem, and 73% in the West Bank), type of residence (81% in refugee camps, versus 79% in cities, and 71% in villages), refugee status (79% among refugees versus 74% among non-refugees), and level of education (78% among Palestinians with at least a high school education versus 72% among those with less than a high school education).


Support for the continuation of the Intifada also varies by political ideology (73% among Fateh supporters, 89% among supporters of Islamic parties, 84% among supporters of other parties, and 70% among those who did not support any political party).

1.2 End Result of the Intifada

Respondents were asked what they thought the end result of the current Intifada should be, whether it should be improving negotiation conditions for Palestinians, ending the occupation based on UN Resolution 242 and the establishment of the Palestinian state, or liberating all of historic Palestine.

As figure 2 shows, respondents were split on what the end result of the current Intifada should be. Forty-five percent thought it should be ending the occupation based on UN Resolution 242 and the establishment of the Palestinian state; on the other hand, 43% of respondents thought it should be liberating all of historic Palestine; only 10% thought that the end result should be improving negotiations conditions for Palestinians, and 2% did not know or did not provide an answer.

Figure 2:



The desired end result of the Intifada varied by political party supported. Thirty two percent of Fateh supporters thought the end result of the Intifada should be liberating all of Palestine, as opposed to 61% of Islamic parties, 47% of supporters of Other parties, and 38% of those who did not support any political party.

Respondents were also asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards achieving the result they aspired for. Fifty-one percent of respondents were optimistic that the Intifada will achieve the result they aspired for, 47% were pessimistic, and 2% did not provide an answer.

It is interesting to note that 60% of respondents who wanted to liberate all of Historic Palestine were optimistic about achieving their goal, while 45% of respondents who wanted to end the occupation and implement UN Resolution 242 were optimistic about achieving their goal. This might be due to the fact that supporters of Islamic parties were more optimistic (65%) about the Intifada achieving it's goals as compared to 52% of Fateh supporters, 39% of supporters of other parties, and 41% of respondents who did not support any party.

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liberating all of Palestine, as opposed to 61% of Islamic parties, 47% of supporters of other parties, and 38% of respondents who do not support any political party.


1.3 Support for Operations against Israel.

Support for Military Operations Against Israeli Targets

Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response during the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests. Military operations include shootings, car bombs, and mortar rocket attacks, but do not include suicide attacks.


Sixty-eight percent of respondents supported military operations, 28% rejected them, and 4% did not know/ did not provide an answer (see figure 3).

Figure 3:



The level of support for military operations has slightly increased since the latest JMCC poll conducted in April 2003. As figure 4 depicts, a huge increase in the level of support for military operations occurred at the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000.


Figure 4:



Support for the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets varied by several personal characteristics (79% among Gaza Strip residents versus 62% among West Bank residents, and 60% among East Jerusalem residents; 72% among refugee camp residents, 70% among city residents versus 62% among village residents; 72% among respondents with at least a high school education versus 57% of those with less than a high school education; and 60% among Fateh supporters versus 87% among supporters of Islamic parties, 73% among supporters of other parties, and 59% among respondents who do not support any party.

Respondents were also asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the Occupied Territories only, inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, or whether they did not support military operations. As figure 5 shows, 18% of respondents supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 14% supported operations inside the Occupied Territories only, 42% supported operations inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, 24% did not support military operations against Israeli targets, and 2% did not give an answer.

Figure 5:




Support for Suicide Operations

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed suicide-bombing operations against Israeli civilians. Sixty-two percent of Palestinians supported suicide operations, a slight increase from figures obtained in the latest JMCC poll conducted in April 2003 (60%).

As figure 6 shows, the level of support for suicide bombing operations has increased dramatically after the onset of the current Intifada to reach a high of 76% in April 2001. It should be noted that only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide operations in May 1997.

Figure 6:



Support for suicide operations varied by several personal characteristics, including area of residence (69% among Gaza Strip residents versus 59% among West Bank residents and 50% among East Jerusalem residents), type of locality (64% among

city residents and 63% among refugee camp residents versus 57% among village residents), political party supported (53% among Fateh supporters, 88% among supporters of Islamic parties, 53% among supporters of other parties, and 50% among respondents who did not support any Palestinian party), and level of education (67% among respondents with more than a high school education versus 59% of those with high school education or less).

Stopping all Kinds of Operations inside Israel

Respondents were asked whether they supported stopping all kinds of operations inside Israel. Forty percent of respondents support stopping all operations inside Israel (53% in Jerusalem and 47% in the West Bank, versus 26% in Gaza Strip). Village residents were highly supportive of stopping all kinds of operations inside Israel (51%) as compared to city residents (38%) and refugee camp residents (25%). Additionally, stopping operations inside Israel was supported by 43% of Fateh supporters, 30% of supporters of Islamic parties, 41% of supporters of other parties, and 43% of respondents who did not support any Palestinian party.

1.4 Role of Intifada versus Negotiations:


The Best Way to Achieve Palestinian National Goals and End Occupation (Intifada versus Negotiations)

Respondents were asked whether negotiations alone, Intifada alone, or negotiations and Intifada together would be the best method to achieve Palestinian national goals and end the occupation.

Thirty-three percent of respondents believed that the Intifada alone would be the best method to achieve Palestinian

national goals, 13% believed that negotiations alone would be the best method, 51% believed that Intifada and negotiations together would be the best method, and 3% did not provide an answer/ did not know (see figure 7).

Figure 7:



Favoring the Intifada alone as the best way to achieve national goals varied by several personal characteristics, including area of residence (40% among Gaza Strip residents versus 30% among Jerusalem residents and 28% among West Bank residents), type of locality (41% among refugee camp residents versus 34% among city residents and 26% among village residents), refugee status (36% among refugees versus 30% among non-refugees), and level of education (36% among respondents with more than a high school education versus 30% of those with high school education or less).

PART TWO: PERSONAL OPINIONS REGARDING CURRENT POLITICAL ISSUES

2.1 Internal Palestinian Issues

2.1.a Palestinian National Authority

Evaluation of the PNA performance

Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of the PNA. A majority of

respondents (61%) evaluated the performance of the PNA as being bad/very bad. The evaluation did not vary significantly by area of residence. However, more city residents (64%) gave a bad evaluation for the PNA as compared to refugee camp (58%) and village residents (57%). Additionally, more respondents with secondary education or higher (71%) gave a bad evaluation for the PNA as compared to respondents with up to secondary school education (56%). Moreover, the evaluation of the performance of the PNA was highly affected by the political party that the respondent trusts most. The performance of the PNA was evaluated as being good by 59% of Fateh supporters, as opposed to 20% of supporters of Islamic parties, 26% of supporters of other parties, and 30% of respondents who did not support any party.

Feeling the Presence of the PNA

Respondents were asked whether they felt the existence of the PNA three years after the violent struggle with Israel and after Israel re-occupied the majority of the West Bank and Gaza. Forty-three percent of respondents indicated that they did not feel the existence of the PNA (56% in Gaza Strip, versus 35% in the West Bank and 31% in East Jerusalem). Refugee camp residents did not feel the existence of the PNA most as compared to residents of cities and villages (55% versus, 43% and 36% respectively).

Maintaining the Palestinian Authority

Respondents were asked whether they believed that the national interest of the Palestinian people stipulates maintaining the PNA or ending it, in light of the Israeli military control over the majority of the Palestinian territories. Fifty-eight percent of respondents believe that the national interest of the Palestinian people stipulates

maintaining the PNA (63% in Jerusalem, versus 60% in Gaza Strip, and 55% in the West Bank). Refugees are less in favor of maintaining the PNA as compared to non-refugees (51% versus 64%).

Seventy-seven percent of Fateh supporters favored maintaining the PNA as opposed to 44% of supporters of Islamic parties, 53% of supporters of other parties, and 56% of respondents who do not support any party.

Reforms by PNA

Respondents were asked whether they thought the PNA is interested in conducting serious and effective reforms. Again, respondents were split on this issue (47% believed that the PNA is interested in conducting serious and effective reforms, while 44% did not believe so, and 8% did not know). Refugee camp residents had the least trust in the PNA's interest in implementing reforms as opposed to village and city residents (39% versus 46% and 50% respectively). Additionally, 74% of Fateh supporters believed that the PNA is interested in conducting serious and effective reforms, as opposed to only 29% of supporters of Islamic parties, 39% of supporters of other parties, and 40% of respondents who do not support any party.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the reform implemented by PNA in recent months. Forty-nine percent of respondents believe that the current political situation, including re-occupation and checkpoints, obstruct the success of these reforms, while 36% of respondents do not find the reforms serious, and 13% find the reforms serious.

Respondents were also asked to explain why during the process of reform, some

parts were reformed and others did not succeed in being reformed. The majority of respondents (59%) believed that some parts did not succeed in being reformed due to restrictions imposed on PNA, 9% believed that it is due to financial restrictions, and 29% believed it is because the PNA was not serious about implementing reforms.

2.1.b Evaluation of the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)

Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of the PLC. Only 10% of respondents gave a good evaluation to the performance of the PLC; 49% of respondents believed that the performance of the PLC is bad, and 36% believed that it was in-between.


Twenty-two percent of Fateh supporters believed that the performance of the PLC is good, as compared to only 4% of supporters of Islamic parties, 6% of supporters of other parties, and 6% of respondents who do not support any party.

2.1.c Palestinian Political and Religious Parties

When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 30% indicated that they trusted Fateh most (23% in April 2003, and 34% in December 2002), 29% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions (30% in April 2003 and 25% in December 2002), 6% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, FIDA, PPP, Democratic Gathering, National Palestinian Initiative, Arabic Front, and Palestinian Front, 28% indicated that they did not trust any faction (34% in April 2003 and 26% in December

2002), and 7% did not give an answer / did not know (see figure 8).

Figure 8:



There was no significant difference in support for Fateh by area of residence, as opposed to support for Fateh in April 2003, which was higher in Gaza Strip as opposed to the West Bank and East Jerusalem (32% and 19% versus 12% respectively). Also there was no significant difference in support for Fateh by type of locality, as opposed to support for Fateh in April 2003, which was higher among refugee camp residents as compared to city and village residents (29% versus 24% and 19% respectively).

Factions Supporting/Opposing the Peace Process

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on their support/opposition to the peace process. Factions supporting the peace process included Fateh, FIDA, PPP, and PLO, while factions opposing the peace process included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, other Islamic factions, PFLP, Democratic Gathering, National Palestinian Initiative, Arabic Front, and Palestinian Front. Among the 779 respondents who trusted a specific Palestinian party, 49% trusted a party that supports the peace process as opposed to 51% who supported a party that opposes

the peace process. This is in comparison to 43% who trusted a party that supports peace and 57% who trusted a party that opposes peace in the latest JMCC poll conducted in April 2003.


Islamic versus Secular Factions

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on whether they are Islamic or secular. Islamic factions included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, and other Islamic factions, while secular factions included Fateh, FIDA, PPP, PLO, PFLP, DFLP, Nidal Front, and Arabic Front. Among the 779 respondents who did support a specific Palestinian party, 55% supported a secular party as opposed to 45% who supported an Islamic party. This is in comparison to 47% supporting a secular party and 53% supporting an Islamic party in the latest JMCC poll in April 2003.

2.1.d Palestinian Figures

When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 26% said they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat (21% in April 2003 and 28% in December 2002), 11% trusted Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement- Hamas (similar to April 2003 and December 2002), 26% indicated that they trusted other figures (similar to April 2003 and December 2002), 27% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure (36% in April 2003 and 27% in December 2002), and 5% did not give an answer or said they did not know (see figure 9).

Figure 9:



Level of trust in Palestinian President Yasser Arafat varied by area of residence (30% in Gaza Strip, 25% in the West Bank, and 19% in East Jerusalem) and by type of locality (32% in refugee camps, and 25% in cities and villages).

2.1.e Palestinian President Arafat

Satisfaction with the manner President Arafat manages his position.

Respondents were asked whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the manner President Arafat manages his position as the Palestinian Authority President. Respondents were split on their satisfaction with the manner President Arafat manages his position as the Palestinian Authority President (47% satisfied versus 49% dissatisfied). East Jerusalem residents were more dissatisfied with the manner Arafat manages his position as compared to Gaza Strip and West Bank residents (57% versus 49% and 47% respectively). There was no significant difference in this regard between city, village and refugee camp residents. Additionally, 78% of Fateh supporters were satisfied with the manner Arafat manages his position, as compared to 29% of supporters of Islamic parties, 30% of supporters of other parties, and 39% of respondents who do not support any party.

Re-election of President Arafat

Respondents were asked if they expected the Palestinian people to re-elect Arafat if free democratic elections were held under these conditions. Sixty percent of respondents thought that Arafat will be re-elected (71% in East Jerusalem, versus 61% in the West Bank, and 56% in Gaza Strip). Additionally, 86% of Fateh supporters expected Arafat to be re-elected as compared to 37% of supporters of Islamic parties, 53% of supporters of other parties, and 56% of respondents who do not support any party.

President Arafat in control of the internal Palestinian Situation

Respondents were asked whether they thought that President Arafat is in control of the internal Palestinian situation. Fifty-nine percent of respondents believed that Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation (69% in East Jerusalem versus 59% in Gaza Strip and 57% in the West Bank). Additionally, 79% of Fateh supporters believed that Arafat is in control, as compared to 37% of supporters of Islamic parties, and 51% of supporters of other parties, and 60% of respondents who do not support any party.

2.1.f Forming a Palestinian Government

Respondents were asked whom they thought was responsible for the quick downfall of Abu Mazen's government, 4 months after it was formed.

The majority of respondents (62%) believed that the Israeli escalation was responsible for the downfall of Abu Mazen's government, as opposed to 17% who believed that Arafat was responsible for that, 16% believed that Abu Mazen

was responsible for that, and 5% did not give an answer.

Only 50% of East Jerusalem residents believed that the Israeli escalation was responsible for the downfall of Abu Mazen’s government as opposed to 63% of West Bank and Gaza Strip residents.

In regard to forming an emergency Palestinian government consisting of seven ministries, 63% of respondents did not believe that the decision was justified. The percentages did not vary significantly by area of residence or type of locality. However it varied significantly by political party supported (56% among Fateh supporters, 26% among Islamic party supporters, 24% among supporters of other parties, and 29% among respondents who do not support any party).


2.1.f The Effects of Appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister

Effects of Appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister on PA Reform

Respondents were asked whether the appointment of Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) as prime minister in Palestine assisted in pushing the current Palestinian Authority reform process forward, backward, or did not have an influence on the current reform process.

Fifteen percent of respondents believe that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister assisted in pushing the PA reform process forward (29% believed that in the latest JMCC poll conducted in April 2004), 16% believe that it assisted in pushing the PA reform process backward, 63% believe that it did not influence the PA reform process, and 6% did not know/did not give an answer (Figure 10).

Figure 10:




Seventeen percent of Gaza Strip residents believed that appointing Abu Mazen pushed PNA reform forward, as compared to 15% of West Bank residents, and 5% of Jerusalem residents. Additionally, 20% of village residents believed that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister pushed PNA reform process forward, as compared to 12% of city residents and 14% of refugee camp residents.

Effects of Appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister on Peace Process

Respondents were asked whether appointing Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) as prime minister in Palestine has helped to push the peace process with Israel forward, backward, or has not influenced the peace process.

Eleven percent of respondents believe that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister has assisted in pushing the peace process forward (30% believed that in the last JMCC poll conducted in April 2003), 19% believe that it has assisted in pushing the peace process backward, 65% believe that it has not influenced the peace process, and 5% did not know/did not give an answer (Figure 11).

Figure 11:



Thirteen percent of Gaza Strip residents believed that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister has pushed the peace process forward as compared to 10% of West Bank residents, and 3% of East Jerusalem residents.


PART THREE: PERSONAL OPINIONS REGARDING THE PEACE PROCESS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT

3.1 Views Towards the Peace Process

Evaluation of the Current Status of the Peace Process

When respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions, 39% thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, 45% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, 14% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations, and 2% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 12). Results are similar to those obtained from JMCC polls conducted in September and December 2002, and April 2003.

Figure 12:



Forty-seven percent of Gaza Strip residents believed that the peace process is dead as compared to 36% of West Bank residents and 26% of Jerusalem residents. Additionally, 48% of refugee camp residents believed that the peace process is dead as compared to 41% of city residents and 30% of village residents. Moreover, 26% of Fateh supporters believed that the peace process is dead, as compared to 53% of supporters of Islamic parties, 40% of supporters of other parties, and 40% of respondents who do not support any party.

3.2 Optimism Towards Reaching a Peaceful Settlement and the Future

Optimism towards Reaching a Peaceful Settlement

Respondents were asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Twenty-seven percent responded that they were very optimistic or somewhat optimistic. The level of optimism did not change significantly since the latest JMCC polls conducted in June, September, and December 2002, and April 2003.

West Bank and East Jerusalem residents were more optimistic about reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict as compared to Gaza Strip

residents (32%, 26% versus 20% respectively). Also city and village residents were much more optimistic about achieving a peaceful settlement with Israel as compared to refugee camp residents (30%, 29% and 16% respectively). Additionally, 34% of Fateh supporters were optimistic as compared to 19% of supporters of Islamic parties, 26% of supporters of other parties, and 26% of respondents who do not support any party.

Optimism Towards the Future.

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic towards the future. Forty-one percent of respondents stated that they were optimistic, representing a slight decrease since the latest JMCC poll conducted in April 2003 (44%).

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada. In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).

West Bank residents were more optimistic about the future as compared to East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip residents (44%, versus 40% and 36% respectively). Level of optimism about the future varied by political party supported (41% among Fateh supporters, 42% among supporters of Islamic parties, 30% among supporters of other parties, and 38% among respondents who do not support any party).

3.3 Solutions for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Preferred Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Respondents were asked whether they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the two-state formula or a bi-national state in all of Palestine, where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights.

Forty-six percent of Palestinians supported the two-state solution (52% in April 2003 and 47% in December 2002), 25% supported a bi-national state (25% in April 2003 and 26% in December 2002), 13% supported a Palestinian state (16% in April 2003 and 11% in December 2002), 3% supported an Islamic state (3% in April 2003 and 5% in December 2002), 9% did not think there was a solution (none in April 2003), and 4% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 13).

Figure 13:



Support for the two-state solution is stronger in the West Bank than in Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (50%, 41% and 39% respectively). Also, support for the two-state solution is stronger among village and city residents than among refugee camp residents (50%, 46% and 38% respectively).

Renewing the Ceasefire

Respondents were asked whether the Palestinian interest entails renewing the cease fire or not. Fifty-two percent of

respondents indicated that Palestinian interest entails renewing the ceasefire (63% in East Jerusalem, 52% in the West Bank, and 48% in Gaza Strip). Sixty percent of village residents supported renewing the ceasefire opposed to 55% among refugee camps residents and 47% among city residents.

Role of a Third Party in the Conflict

Respondents were asked whether they believed it is useful to have a third party role in the Palestinian lands to contribute to solving the problem with Israel or not. Forty-nine percent of respondents believed it is useful to have a third party, while 29% believed that it won't make a difference, 18% believed it is not useful to have a third party, and 4% did not provide an answer. More Gaza Strip residents supported the involvement of a third party as compared to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents (54%, 47%, and 42% respectively). Additionally, more refugee camp residents supported the involvement of a third party as compared to city and village residents (57%, 49%, and 45% respectively).

Respondents were then asked whether they believed the international presence should be for the sake of monitoring only or it should have authority and power. Forty-six percent believed that the international presence should have authority and power, while 28% believed it should be for monitoring purposes only, and 26% did not provide an answer. Fifty-two percent of West Bank residents and 49% percent of East Jerusalem residents believe that the international presence should have authority and power, as compared to 37% of Gaza Strip residents. Additionally, 57% of village residents and 49% of refugee camp residents believe that the international presence should have

authority and power, as compared to 40% of city residents.

Respondents were then asked whether they believed it was appropriate to have the international presence limited to US presence, UN presence, or should be a joint US-European presence. Thirty-nine percent of respondents supported having UN presence as opposed to 31% who supported a joint US- European presence, 3% who supported a US presence, and 27% did not provide an answer. East Jerusalem residents were less supportive of a UN presence as compared to West Bank and Gaza Strip residents (31%, 38%, and 43%).

METHODOLOGY

Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,198 Palestinian individuals, 18 years or older, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. Face-to-face home interviews were conducted with respondents in 60 sampling points between October 18^h and 21st 2003.

In the **West Bank**: 758 people were surveyed from the following areas:

Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp (RC), A-Zababdeh, Faqou'a, Kufr Dan and Tubas. **Nablus:** Nablus, Deir Ballut, Talfeet, 'Ain Beit el-ma RC, Zawata, and Salfit. **Tulkarem and Qalqilya:** Tulkarem, Tulkarem RC, Qalqilya, 'Azzoun, 'Anabta and 'Ateel. **Hebron:** Hebron, Beit Ummar, 'Aroub RC, A-Dhahriyya, Halhoul, Nuba, Beit Kahel and Tarqoumia. **Bethlehem:** Bethlehem, Beit

Sahour, Beit Jala, a-Duha and 'Aida RC. **Jericho:** Jericho, 'Ain Sultan RC. **Ramallah & al-Bireh:** al-Bireh, Ramallah, Beit Liqya, Turmus 'Ayya, Jalazon RC and Deir Qadees . **Jerusalem:** ad-Dahia, A-ram, Shufat, Old City, al-'Issawia, a-sheikh Jarrah, Beir Nabala, Hizma, Silwan and Shu'fat RC.

In the **Gaza Strip:** 440 people were surveyed from the following areas:

In the **Gaza Strip:** 440 people were surveyed from: **North Gaza:** Jabalia RC, Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun. **Gaza City:** Sheikh Radwan, a-Naser, al-Durj, Attufah, Sabra, al-Zaytoun, al-Shaja'ieh, al-Rimal South, al-Rimal North, al-Meghraga, and A-Shati RC. **Deir al-Balah:** Deir al-Balah, Deir al-Balah RC and Nuseirat RC. **Khan Younis:** Khan Younis, Khan Younis RC, Bani Sahila, Khuza'ah and al- Qararah. **Rafah:** Rafah RC, Tal al-Sultan RC.

The margin of error is 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Age:

The average age of the respondents was 34 years.

Gender:

50% of respondents were males, and 50% were females.

Marital Status:

67% of respondents were married, 26% were single, 4% were widowed, 2% were divorced, and 1% did not give an answer.

Refugee Status:

46% of respondents were refugees and 54% were not refugees.

Residence:

55% of respondents were from the West Bank, 8% were from Jerusalem, and 37% were from Gaza Strip.

28% of respondents indicated that they lived in villages, 15% in refugee camps, 57% in towns/cities.

Education:

25% of respondents had less than secondary school education, 38% had secondary school education, and 37% had more than secondary school education.

Employment:

56% of respondents were not currently working (34% were housewives, 12% were students, 9% were unemployed, 1% were retired), 43% were currently working (18% were employees, 8% were laborers, 8% had a private business, 2% were professionals, 5% were farmers/fishermen, 2% were craftsmen), and 1% did not give an answer.