2.1 Internal Palestinian Issues
a: Satisfaction with and Support for Palestinian Parties and Personalities:

Trust in Palestinian Political or Religious Factions

When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 22.6% indicated that they trusted Fateh most (34% in December 2002), 29.5% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions (25% in December 2002), 3.9% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, DFLP, FIDA, PPP, Nidal Front, Arabic Front), 34.3% indicated that they did not trust any faction (26% in December 2002), and 9.7% did not give an answer / did not know (see figure 6).
 
 

Figure 6:

Support for Fateh was higher in Gaza Strip as opposed to the West Bank and East Jerusalem (32% and 19% versus 12% respectively).  Support for Fateh was also higher among refugee camp residents as compared to city and village residents (29% versus 24% and 19% respectively). 
 

Factions Supporting/Opposing the Peace Process

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on their support/opposition to the peace process.  Factions supporting the peace process included Fateh, FIDA, PPP, and PLO, while factions opposing the peace process included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, other Islamic factions, PFLP, DFLP, Nidal Front, and Arabic Front.  Among the 674 respondents who did support a specific Palestinian party, 43% supported a party that supports the peace process as opposed to 57% who supported a party that opposes the peace process. 

Islamic versus Secular Factions

Palestinian factions were categorized into 2 groups based on whether they are Islamic or secular.  Islamic factions included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizb Al-Tahrir, and other Islamic factions, while secular factions included Fateh, FIDA, PPP, PLO, PFLP, DFLP, Nidal Front, and Arabic Front.  Among the 674 respondents who did support a specific Palestinian party, 47% supported a secular party as opposed to 53% who supported an Islamic party. 
 

Trust in Palestinian Figures

When respondents were asked which Palestinian personality they trusted most, 21.1% said they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat (28% in December 2002), 9.7% gave their trust to Ahmad Yaseen, founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas (same as December 2002), 25.4% indicated that they trusted other personalities (same as December 2002), 36.1% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian personality (27% in December 2002), and 7.7% did not give an answer or said they did not know (see figure 7). 

Figure 7:

The level of trust in Palestinian President Yasser Arafat varied by area of residence (26% in Gaza Strip, 20% in East Jerusalem, and 18% in the West Bank) and by type of locality (26% in refugee camps, 21% in cities, and 19% in villages). 

It is interesting to note that only 62% of Fateh supporters trusted Yasser Arafat most, as opposed to 11% of respondents who did not trust any Palestinian faction, 7% of supporters of Islamic parties, and 2% of supporters of other parties.

Personalities Supporting/Opposing the Peace Process

Among the 675 respondents who did support a specific Palestinian personality, 66% of them supported a Palestinian personality that supports Oslo compared to 34% who supported a personality that opposes Oslo. 
 

Islamic versus Secular Palestinian Personalities

Among the same pool of respondents, 69% supported a Palestinian figure that is secular as opposed to 31% who supported a Palestinian figure that is Islamic. 
 

b. Appointing Palestinian Prime Minister

Effects of Creating Prime Minister Position on Palestinians

Respondents were asked whether creating the position of Palestinian prime minister serves the Palestinian people and cause, hurts the Palestinian people and cause, or does not serve nor harm the Palestinian people and cause.

Thirty percent of respondents believe that the position will serve Palestinians, 22% believe that the position harms Palestinians, 39% believe that the position neither serves nor harms the Palestinians, and 9% did not know (Figure 8). 
 

Figure 8:

Thirty-five percent of village residents believed that the position would serve Palestinians, as compared to 31% of city residents and 17% of refugee camp residents.  Also, 50% of Fateh supporters believed that the position would serve Palestinians, as compared to 37% of supporters of other parties, 31% of those who do not support any party, and 15% of supporters of Islamic parties.
 

Effects of Appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister on Peace Process

Respondents were asked whether appointing Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) as prime minister in Palestine helps to push the peace process with Israel forward, backward, or will not influence the peace process.

Thirty percent of respondents believe that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister will assist in pushing the peace process forward, 17% believe that it will assist in pushing the peace process backward, 45% believe that it will not influence the peace process, and 9% did not know/did not give an answer (Figure 9). 
 
 

Figure 9:

Thirty-three percent of West Bank residents believed that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister would push the peace process forward as opposed to 28% of Gaza Strip residents, and 23% of East Jerusalem residents.  Also, 35% of village residents believed that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister would push the peace process forward, as compared to 32% of city residents and 16% of refugee camp residents.  Additionally, 52% of Fateh supporters believed that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister would push the peace process forward, as compared to 38% of supporters of other parties, 32% of those who do not support any party, and 15% of supporters of Islamic parties.

Effects of Appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister on PA Reform

Respondents were asked whether the appointment of Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) as prime minister in Palestine would assist in pushing the current Palestinian Authority reform process forward, backward, or would not have an influence on the current reform process.

Twenty-nine percent of respondents believe that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister will assist in pushing the PA reform process forward, 17.4% believe that it will assist in pushing the PA reform process backward, 43.2% believe that it will not influence the PA reform process, and 10.7% did not know/did not give an answer (Figure 10). 
 

Figure 10:

Thirty-three percent of village residents believed that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister would push the PA reform process forward, as compared to 30% of city residents and 16% of refugee camp residents.  Additionally, 50% of Fateh supporters believed that appointing Abu Mazen as Prime Minister would push the PA reform process forward, as compared to 36% of supporters of other parties, 27% of those who do not support any party, and 17% of supporters of Islamic parties.
 

Origins of Creating a Prime Minister Position

Respondents were also asked whether they believed that the decision to create a prime minister’s position came from external pressures and influences, as a result of a Palestinian conviction that this is in the interest of the Palestinian people, or both.
Sixty-eight percent of respondents believe that the decision to create a Prime Minister position came due to external pressures and influences, 6% believe that it came as a result of Palestinian conviction that this is in the interest of the Palestinian people, 19% believe that it came as a result of both, and 7% did not know/did not give an answer (Figure 11). 
 

Figure 11:

There were no significant differences in respondent’s opinions based on area of residence or type of locality.  However, 80% of supporters of Islamic parties believed that the decision was due to external pressures as compared to 71% of supporters of other parties, 65% of those who do not support any party, and 59% of Fateh supporters.
 
 

2.2 Views Towards Negotiations and Relations with Israel

Support for Negotiations Between Palestinians and Israelis

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed negotiations with Israel in principle.  Fifty-one percent of respondents indicated that they supported negotiations with Israel (54% in December 2002, 47% in September 2002). 

Support for negotiations varied by type of residence locality (55% among city residents, 50% among village residents, and 43% among refugee camp residents), support of political parties (71% among Fateh supporters, 55% among respondents who do not support any Palestinian party, 50% among supporters of other political parties, and 37% among supporters of Islamic parties), refugee status (48% among refugees versus 54% among non-refugees), and level of education (55% among respondents with high school education or less versus 45% among respondents with more than a high school education).
 

Evaluation of the Current Status of the Peace Process

When respondents were asked to evaluate the status of the peace process during the current difficult conditions, 38% thought that the peace process was dead and that there was no way to resume negotiations, 45% thought that the peace process was passing through difficult times and that its future was unclear, 13% thought that the peace process was still alive and that it was possible to resume negotiations, and 4% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 12).  Results are similar to those obtained from JMCC polls conducted in September and December 2002.

Figure 12:

2.3 The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Optimism towards Reaching a Peaceful Settlement

Respondents were asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Twenty-nine percent responded that they were very optimistic or somewhat optimistic.  The level of optimism did not change significantly since the latest JMCC polls conducted in June, September, and December 2002. 

Gaza Strip and West Bank residents were more optimistic about reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict as compared to East Jerusalem residents (31%, 30% versus 13% respectively).  Also, 43% of Fateh supporters were optimistic as compared to 41% of supporters of other parties, 25% of respondents who do not support any party, and 23% of supporters of Islamic parties.
 

Optimism Towards the Future

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic towards the future.  Forty-four percent of respondents stated that they were optimistic. 

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada.  In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).

Gaza Strip and West Bank residents were more optimistic about the future as compared to East Jerusalem residents (48%, 45% versus 19% respectively).  The level of optimism about the future was higher among supporters of other parties (57%) as compared to Fateh supporters (54%), supporters of Islamic parties (41%), and those who did not support any party (40%).

Preferred Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Respondents were asked whether they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the two-state formula or a bi-national state in all of Palestine, where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights. 

Fifty-two percent of Palestinians supported the two-state solution (47% in December 2002), 25% supported a bi-national state (26% in December 2002), 16% supported a Palestinian state on all of historic Palestine (11% in December 2002), 3% supported an Islamic state (5% in December 2002), and 4% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 13). 

Figure 13

Support for the two-state solution is stronger in East Jerusalem and the West Bank than in Gaza Strip (67%, 60% and 39% respectively).  Also, support for the two-state solution is stronger among village and city residents than among refugee camp residents (61%, 54% and 32% respectively). 

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3.1 War in Iraq 

Respondents were asked whether they thought that the influence of the current war in Iraq on Palestinians is negative, positive, or did not have an influence.  Fifty-six percent of respondents believe that the war has a negative influence on Palestinians, 17% believe that it has a positive influence, 15% believe that it does not have an influence, and 12% did not know/did not provide an answer.

3.2 Media 

Television Stations
Respondents were asked to identify the television station that they have recently watched the most.  Fifty-two percent of respondents watch the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, 14.2% watch Abu Dhabi Satellite Channel, 7.8% watch Al-Manar (Hizballah Satellite Channel), 5.3% watch Al-Arabia, 0.2% watch Israel television, 0.2% watch CNN, 1.1% do not watch television, and 19.5% watch a variety of other local and Arabic television channels.
 

Radio Stations
Respondents were asked to identify the radio station that they have recently listened to the most.  Of those interviewed, 13.5% listen to Voice of Palestine Radio, 12.1% listen to the Gaza-based Sawt Al-Hurriya, 6.1% listen to Israel Radio (Arabic service), 3.4% listen to London Radio, 3% listen to Monte Carlo, 31.6% do not listen to radio stations, and 28.8% listen to a variety of other local and Arabic radio stations.  Only 0.3% said they listen the most to Radio Sawa (the FM Arabic service radio by the US government-funded U.S. International Broadcasting). There was 1.0% who did not provide an answer.
 

Newspapers
Respondents were asked to identify the newspaper that they have recently read the most.  Of those interviewed, 37.1% read the Palestinian Jerusalem-based daily newspaper Al-Quds, 14% read the Ramallah-based Al-Ayyam newspaper, 11.2% read the Ramallah-based Al-Haya Al-Jadida, 36.2% do not read newspapers, and 1.2% read other local newspapers. There was 0.3% who did not provide an answer.

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Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,201 Palestinian individuals, 18 years or older, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip.  Face-to-face home interviews were conducted with respondents in 60 sampling points between April 5th and 9th 2003. 

In the West Bank: 761 people were surveyed from the following areas:
Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp (RC), ‘Arrabeh, A-Zababdeh, 'Aqabeh, Sarees, Al-Jdaydeh and Al-yamoun. Nablus: Nablus, Rujeeb, Balata Refugee Camp (RC), Madama, ‘Asira Al-Qibliya, Sabastia, Zawata, Kifl Haris, and Marda. Tulkarem and Qalqilya: Tulkarem, Tulkarem Refugee Camp (RC), Qalqilya, Jayyous, Bal’a, Beit Lid.  Hebron: Hebron, Dura, Beit Ummar, Fawwar R.C., A-Dahiria, Bani Naim and Tarqoumia. Bethlehem: Bethlehem, Bateer, al-Khader, Beit Sahour, a-Duha and Deheishe R.C. Jericho: Jericho, ‘Aqbat Jabr Refugee Camp (RC). Ramallah & al-Bireh: al-Bireh, Ramallah, Beit Rima, Kufr Malik, Jalazon RC and Nilin. Jerusalem:  ad-Dahia, A-ram, Shufat, Beit Hanina, Beit Hanina a-tahta, Old City, Wadi Al-Joz, Jabal Al-Mukaber, al-‘Issawia, a-Thori, Beir Nabala and Qalandia RC. 

In the Gaza Strip: 440 people were surveyed from the following areas:
North Gaza: Jabalia RC, Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun. Gaza City: Sheikh Radwan, a-Naser, al-Durj, Attufah, Sabra, al-Zaytoun,  al-Shaja’ieh, al-Rimal South, al-Rimal North and Shati RC. Deir al-Balah: Deir al-Balah, Bureij RC, Maghazi RC and Nuseirat RC. Khan Younis: Khan Younis, Khan Younis RC, Bani Sahila, Abssan al-Kabeera and Abassan al-Saghira. Rafah: Rafah, Rafah RC, Tal al-Sultan RC.

The margin of error is 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.
 

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Age:
The average age of the respondents was 34 years.

Gender:
48% of respondents were males, and 52% were females.

Marital Status:
68% of respondents were married, 26% were single, 4% were widowed, 1% were divorced, and 1% did not give an answer.

Refugee Status:
43% of respondents were refugees and 57% were not refugees.

Residence:
52.5% of respondents were from the West Bank, 10.8% were from Jerusalem, and 36.7% were from Gaza Strip.

32% of respondents indicated that they lived in villages, 16% in refugee camps, 52% in towns/cities.

Education:
25% of respondents had less than secondary school education, 39% had secondary school education, and 36% had more than secondary school education.

Employment:
57% of respondents were not currently working (37% were housewives, 13% were students, 6% were unemployed, 1% were retired), 43% were currently working (18% were employees, 9% were laborers, 8% had a private business, 2% were professionals, 4% were farmers/fishermen, 2% were craftsmen), and 1% did not give an answer. 
 
 

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