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Palestinian Opinion Pulse

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The Jerusalem Media and Communication Center is the first institution in the Arab world to conduct public opinion surveys methodologically and continuously. The main aim of the JMCC with those regular opinion polls was to enhance public participation in the decision-making process by making the public's views available to decision-makers, and, also, to enable academics, researchers, and others to use scientifically collected data in their studies and policy projects.

The first public opinion poll in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was conducted by the JMCC in February 1993. Since then, over seventy extensive surveys were conducted on issues, including those pertaining to the peace process, democratization, international relations, economics, political socialization, gender, political partisanship, the media, and social issues.

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INTRODUCTION

This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated to analysis of some of the most interesting findings of poll no. 50, which was conducted¹ by JMCC between June 6th and 9th, 2004. The poll was conducted in the midst of the Israeli construction of the separation wall in the West Bank and about 3 months following the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Dr. Abdel Aziz Al-Rantissi, the political leaders of Hamas.

The second Palestinian Intifada against Israeli occupation, which started on September 2000, has witnessed severe violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by Israeli army forces against Palestinians, including placing the population of entire communities under prolonged curfews and movement restrictions, in addition to using excessive, disproportionate, and indiscriminate force to combat the Palestinian Intifada, which resulted in killing ? and injuring ? Palestinians (Palestine Red Crescent Society, 2004).

The first part of this issue will focus on Palestinian public opinion regarding the Palestinian Intifada. The second part will look at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the political process with the Israelis, including views towards the peace process, and potential solutions to the conflict. The second part will discuss some of the findings concerning internal Palestinian politics including views towards President Arafat, Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and Palestinian political parties and figures. Later we will present a description of the methodology used by JMCC Polling Unit and characteristics of the selected sample.

¹ JMCC Public Opinion Polls are supported by a fund from Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Germany.

PART One: PERSONAL OPINIONS REGARDING THE PALESTINIAN INTIFADA


This section analyzes the current Palestinian public opinion concerning the almost 4-year old Palestinian Intifada, including support for its continuation, and its desired results and nature. We will also identify correlates of these opinions, and describe trends in these opinions over time.

1.1 Support for the Continuation of the Intifada

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada. The majority of Palestinians (70%) remain strongly or somewhat supportive of the continuation of the Intifada. This represents a slight decrease from the 77% support rate recorded in JMCC's October 2003 poll.

As figure 1 shows, there has been a gradual increase in the level of support for the continuation of the Intifada during its first year, which peaked in September 2001 (87%) and then decreased slightly and leveled off.

Figure 1:



Support for the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada varied by location of residence (80% in Gaza Strip, versus 75%

in East Jerusalem, and 62% in the West Bank), type of residence (78% in refugee camps, versus 71% in cities, and 63% in villages), refugee status (74% among refugees versus 66% among non-refugees), and level of education (72% among Palestinians with at least a high school education versus 63% among those with less than a high school education).

Support for the continuation of the Intifada also varied by political ideology (69% among Fateh supporters, 85% among supporters of Islamic parties, 64% among supporters of other parties, and 61% among those who did not support any political party).


1.2 End Result of the Intifada

Respondents were asked what they thought the end result of the current Intifada should be; whether it should be improving negotiation conditions for Palestinians, ending the occupation based on UN Resolution 242 and the establishment of the Palestinian state, or liberating all of historic Palestine.

As figure 2 shows, respondents were split on what the end result of the current Intifada should be. Forty-two percent thought it should be ending the occupation based on UN Resolution 242 and the establishment of the Palestinian state; 46% of respondents thought it should be liberating all of historic Palestine; 7% thought it should be improving negotiation conditions for Palestinians, and 5% did not know or did not provide an answer.

It is interesting to note that in the current poll, the percent of respondents thinking that the end result of the Intifada should be liberating all of historic Palestine has surpassed those thinking that it should be ending the occupation based on UN resolution 242 and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Figure 2:



The desired end result of the Intifada varied by political party supported. Forty-one percent of Fateh supporters thought the end result of the Intifada should be liberating all of Palestine, as opposed to 60% of Islamic parties, 52% of supporters of other parties, and 37% of those who did not support any political party. Additionally, 40% of city residents thought that the end result of the Intifada should be liberating all of Palestine, as opposed to 51% of village residents and 55% of refugee camp residents.

Respondents were also asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards achieving the result they aspired for from the Intifada. Forty-seven percent of respondents were optimistic that the Intifada will achieve the result they aspired for, 50% were pessimistic, and 3% did not provide an answer.

Level of optimism that the Intifada will achieve it's goals varied by age group (51% among respondents younger than 30 years of age versus 43% among older respondents), level of education (49% among respondents who had a high school or higher education versus 40% among respondents with less than high school education), income (51% among respondents who identified themselves as having an income much less than the average versus 43% among others), area of residence (58% among Gaza residents, 42% among Jerusalem residents, and 40%

among West Bank residents), type of locality (55% among city residents, 49% among refugee camp residents and 33% among village residents). Additionally, 44% of respondents who believed that the goal of the Intifada should be liberating historic Palestine were optimistic about the Intifada achieving its goal as compared to 53% of those who believed that its goal should be establishment to a Palestinian state according to UN resolution 242.


1.3 Support for Operations against Israel.

Support for Military Operations Against Israeli Targets

Respondents were asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets as a suitable response during the current political conditions, or whether they rejected it and found it harmful to Palestinian national interests. Military operations include shootings, car bombs, and mortar rocket attacks, but do not include suicide attacks.


Sixty-five percent of respondents supported military operations, 27% rejected them, and 8% did not know/ did not provide an answer (see figure 3).

Figure 3:



As figure 4 depicts, a huge increase in the level of support for military operations occurred at the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000, which peaked in September 2001 (85%) and has been slowly decreasing since.


Figure 4:



Support for the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets varied by several personal characteristics (72% among Gaza Strip residents versus 64% among West Bank residents, and 60% among East Jerusalem residents; 72% among refugee camp residents versus 66% among city residents and 65% among village residents; 71% among refugees versus 62% among non-refugees; 69% among respondents with at least a high school education versus 59% of those with less than a high school education; and 64% among Fateh supporters versus 87% among supporters of Islamic parties, 64% among supporters of other parties, and 52% among respondents who do not support any party.


Support for military operations against Israeli targets was highest among the younger age group and decreased with increasing age (see figure 5).

Figure 5:



Respondents were also asked whether they supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, inside the Occupied Territories only, inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, or whether they did not support military operations. As figure 6 shows, 21% of respondents supported the resumption of military operations inside Israel only, 13% supported operations inside the Occupied Territories only, 40% supported operations inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, 20% did not support military operations against Israeli targets, and 6% did not give an answer.

Figure 6:



Stopping all Kinds of Operations inside Israel

Respondents were asked whether they supported stopping all kinds of operations inside Israel. Thirty percent of respondents supported stopping all operations inside Israel, as opposed to 40% support rate in JMCC’s Oct 2003 poll. Support for stopping all operations inside


Israel varied by refugee status (25% among refugees versus 35% among non-refugees). Additionally, stopping operations inside Israel was supported by 33% of Fateh supporters, 19% of supporters of Islamic parties, 34% of supporters of other parties, and 37% of respondents who did not support any Palestinian party.

Support for Suicide Operations

Respondents were asked whether they supported or opposed suicide-bombing operations against Israeli civilians. Sixty-two percent of Palestinians supported suicide operations. This figure is similar to the figure obtained in the latest JMCC poll conducted in October 2003.

As figure 7 shows, the level of support for suicide bombing operations has increased dramatically after the onset of the current Intifada to reach a high of 76% in April 2001. It should be noted that only 24% of Palestinians supported suicide operations in May 1997.

Figure 7:




Support for suicide operations varied by several personal characteristics, including area of residence (71% among Gaza Strip residents versus 57% among both West Bank and East Jerusalem residents), type of locality (70% among refugee camp residents versus 61% among both city and

village residents), refugee status (69% among refugees versus 56% among non-refugees), political party supported (62% among Fateh supporters, 83% among supporters of Islamic parties, 55% among supporters of other parties, and 46% among respondents who did not support any Palestinian party), and level of education (66% among respondents with high school or higher education versus 52% of those with less than high school education).

Additionally, support for suicide bombing was highest among the younger age group and decreased with increasing age (see figure 8).

Figure 8:



Wall and operations

Respondents were asked what they thought the effect of Israeli completion of the construction of the separation wall in the West Bank would be on the military operations inside Israel. Forty percent of respondents indicated that it would not effect military operations inside Israel, 36% thought it will decrease military operations, 16% thought it will increase military operations, and 8% did not provide an answer.

PART Two: PERSONAL OPINIONS REGARDING THE PEACE PROCESS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICT

2.1 Optimism Towards Reaching a Peaceful settlement

Respondents were asked whether they were optimistic or pessimistic towards reaching a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Twenty-nine percent responded that they were very or somewhat optimistic. The level of optimism did not change significantly in all JMCC polls conducted since June 2002.

Forty-one percent of Fateh supporters were optimistic as compared to 20% of supporters of Islamic parties, 18% of supporters of other parties, and 27% of respondents who do not support any party.

2.2 Optimism Towards the Future

Respondents were asked whether they were generally optimistic or pessimistic towards the future. Forty-five percent of respondents stated that they were optimistic, representing a slight decrease since the latest JMCC poll conducted in October 2003 (41%).

Optimism towards the future noticeably declined at the onset of the Intifada. In June 2000 (3 months before the beginning of the Intifada), 68% of respondents were optimistic about the future, as compared to only 49% in December 2000 (3 months after the beginning of the Intifada).

Gaza strip residents were more optimistic about the future as compared to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents (54%, versus 41% and 36% respectively). Also, city residents were more optimistic about the future as compared to refugee camp and village residents (48% versus 44% and

42% respectively). Level of optimism about the future varied by political party supported (53% among Fateh supporters, 47% among supporters of Islamic parties, 39% among supporters of other parties, and 41% among respondents who do not support any party).


2.3 Solutions for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

Preferred Solution for the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict.

Respondents were asked whether they thought the preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the two-state formula or a bi-national state in all of Palestine, where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights.

Forty-five percent of Palestinians supported the two-state solution (52% in April 2003, 47% in December 2002, and 46% in October 2003), 27% supported a bi-national state (25% in April 2003, 26% in December 2002, and 25% in October 2003), 11% supported a Palestinian state (16% in April 2003, 11% in December 2002, and 13% in October 2003), 2% supported an Islamic state (3% in April 2003, 5% in December 2002, and 3% in October 2003), 14% did not think there was a solution (none in April 2003 and 9% in October 2003), and 2% did not know or did not provide an answer (see figure 9).

Figure 9:



Support for the two-state solution did not vary significantly by personal characteristics.

Withdrawal from Gaza

Respondents were asked whether they thought that Sharon was serious in his plan to withdraw from parts of Gaza Strip and some settlements. Twenty-eight percent thought that Sharon was serious in his plan, 70% of respondents thought that Sharon was not serious, and 2% did not provide an answer. More Gaza Strip residents thought that Sharon was serious as compared to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents (32% versus 27% and 19% respectively). Additionally, more city residents thought that Sharon was serious as compared to refugee camp and village residents (33% versus 22% respectively).

Respondents were also asked whether the Palestinian Authority must accept Sharon's plan and negotiate it or refuse it and not deal with it. Fifty-five percent of respondents indicated that the Palestinian Authority must refuse the plan and not deal with it as opposed to 37% who thought the Palestinian Authority must accept the plan and negotiate it (8% did not provide an answer). More Gaza Strip residents indicated that the Palestinian Authority must accept and negotiate the plan as opposed to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents (47% versus 31% and 29% respectively). Additionally, more refugee camp residents indicated that the Palestinian Authority must accept and negotiate the plan as opposed to city and village residents (49% versus 42% and 24% respectively).

Political Situation Deterioration

Respondents were asked to identify the main cause of the recent state of chaos and lack of implementation of law and security order; whether it was the shortcoming of the Palestinian Authority and its security agencies in preserving law and order, the Israeli re-occupation of PA-controlled areas, or whether some groups exploited the political situation to bypass law and order. Forty-seven percent indicated that it was the Israeli re-occupation of PA-controlled areas, 27% indicated that it was groups exploiting the political situation, and 23% indicated that it was the shortcoming of PA and security agencies in preserving law and order.

Respondents were also asked whom they thought holds responsibility for the deterioration of the political situation, destroying of the peace process, and the absence of hope of a solution; whether it was the occupation, Israel and Sharon's policy, the PA and the Palestinian leadership, the USA, or the West. Sixty-six percent indicated that it is the occupation, Israel and Sharon's policy, 21% thought it is the USA, 8% though that it is the PA and Palestinian leadership, 4% thought it is the West, and 1% did not provide an answer.

Difficulties Facing Palestinian People

Respondents were asked whether the most important difficulties facing the Palestinian people these days were economic, security, or political. Fifty-two percent of respondents indicated that they were economic difficulties (62% in Gaza Strip, 48% in the West Bank, and 39% in East Jerusalem); 25% indicated that they were security difficulties (34% in East Jerusalem, 27% in the West Bank, and 21% in Gaza Strip); 21% indicated that they were political difficulties (25% in the

West Bank, 21% in East Jerusalem, and 17% in Gaza Strip); and 1% did not provide an answer.

Role of a Third Party in the Conflict

Respondents were asked whether they believed it is worth it and would make a difference to have a third party in the Palestinian lands to assist in solving the problem with Israel or not. Forty-three percent of respondents believed it is worth it to have a third party, while 36% believed that it won't make a difference, 17% believed it is not useful to have a third party, and 3% did not provide an answer.

Respondents were then asked whether they believed the international presence should be to observe only or whether it should have authority and power. Forty-five percent believed that the international presence should have authority and power, while 35% believed it should be to observe only, and 20% did not provide an answer. Fifty percent of West Bank and East Jerusalem residents believed that the international presence should have authority and power, as compared to 37% of Gaza Strip residents. Additionally, 50% of village residents and 43% of refugee camp and city residents believed that the international presence should have authority and power.

Respondents were then asked whether they believed it was appropriate to have the international presence limited to US presence, UN presence, or should be a joint US-European presence. Forty-three percent of respondents supported having UN presence as opposed to 32% who supported a joint US-European presence, 3% who supported a US presence, and 22% did not provide an answer. West Bank residents were less supportive of a UN-only presence as compared to East

Jerusalem and Gaza Strip residents (38%, versus 49% and 47%).

US Versus European Policies

Respondents were asked whether they saw a difference between the US and European policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Fifty-five percent of respondents did not see a difference in their policies as opposed to 40% who saw a difference (5% did not provide an answer).

PART Three: PERSONAL OPINIONS REGARDING INTERNAL PALESTINIAN ISSUES

3.1 Palestinian National Authority (PNA)

Evaluation of the PNA performance

Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of the PNA. Fifty-three percent of respondents evaluated the performance of the PNA as being bad/very bad, as opposed to 61% in the October 2003 JMCC poll. More East Jerusalem residents gave a bad evaluation of the PNA performance as opposed to Gaza Strip and West Bank residents (64% versus 56% and 47% respectively). Also, more refugee camp residents (61%) gave a bad evaluation for the PNA as compared to city residents (55%) and village residents (49%). Moreover, the evaluation of the performance of the PNA was highly affected by the political party that the respondent trusts most. The performance of the PNA was evaluated as being good by 64% of Fateh supporters, as opposed to 29% of supporters of Islamic parties, 32% of supporters of other parties, and 40% of respondents who did not support any party.

Feeling the Presence of the PNA

Respondents were asked whether they felt the existence of the PNA more three years after the violent struggle with Israel and after Israel re-occupied the majority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Forty-seven percent of respondents indicated that they did not feel the existence of the PNA (39% in Gaza Strip, versus 53% in the West Bank and 50% in East Jerusalem).

Maintaining the PNA

Respondents were asked whether they believed that the national benefit of the Palestinian people stipulates the continuation of the PNA presence or ending it, in light of the Israeli military control on all the Palestinian Authority territories. Sixty-five percent of respondents believed that the national interest of the Palestinian people stipulates maintaining the PNA as opposed to 58% in the October 2003 JMCC poll. Gaza Strip residents were more in favor of maintaining the PNA as compared to West Bank and East Jerusalem residents (75%, 71% and 64% respectively). Also, village residents were more in favor of maintaining the PNA as compared to refugee camp and city residents (76%, 72% and 69% respectively).

Seventy-seven percent of Fateh supporters favored maintaining the PNA as opposed to 44% of supporters of Islamic parties, 53% of supporters of other parties, and 56% of respondents who do not support any party.

PNA Corruption

Respondents were asked if they thought corruption existed in the PNA. Ninety percent indicated that they thought that corruption existed in the PNA, 4% did not think corruption existed, and 6% did not know.

Respondents were then asked to indicate the degree of corruption they thought existed in the PNA. Sixty-five percent indicated it existed to a large degree, 34% indicated it somewhat existed, 9% indicated it existed to a small degree, and 1% did not provide an answer.

Reforms by PNA

Respondents were asked to evaluate the reform implemented by PNA in recent months. Forty percent of respondents believed that the current political situation, including re-occupation and checkpoints, obstructed the success of these reforms (42% in the West Bank, 44% in Gaza Strip, and 34% in East Jerusalem), while 39% of respondents did not find the reforms serious (37% in the West Bank, 42% in Gaza Strip, and 55% in East Jerusalem), 17% found the reforms serious (21% in the West Bank, 15% in Gaza Strip, and 10% in East Jerusalem), and 4% did not provide an answer.

3.2 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)


Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of the PLC. Only 10% of respondents gave a good evaluation to the performance of the PLC; 50% of respondents believed that the performance of the PLC was bad or very bad, and 35% believed that it was average.

Fifteen percent of Fateh supporters believed that the performance of the PLC is good, as compared to 8% of supporters of Islamic parties, 15% of supporters of other parties, and 8% of respondents who do not support any party.

3.3 Palestinian Political and Religious Parties

When respondents were asked which Palestinian political or religious faction they trusted most, 27% indicated that they trusted Fateh most (23% in April 2003, 34% in December 2002, and 30% in October 2003), 27% indicated that they trusted Islamic factions most, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic factions (30% in April 2003, 25% in December 2002, 29% in October 2003), 5% indicated that they trusted other factions most (including PFLP, FIDA, PPP, Democratic Gathering, National Palestinian Initiative, Arabic Front, and Palestinian Front.), 28% indicated that they did not trust any faction (34% in April 2003, 26% in December 2002, and 28% in October 2003), and 13% did not give an answer / did not know (see figure 10).

Figure 10:




Support for Islamic factions was higher in Gaza Strip (36%) as compared to the West Bank (29%) and East Jerusalem (25%). Also, support for Islamic factions was highest in refugee camps (46%) followed by cities (31%) and villages (25%).

3.4 Palestinian Figures

When respondents were asked which Palestinian figure they trusted most, 24% indicated that they trusted Palestinian President Yasser Arafat (21% in April 2003, 28% in December 2002, 26% in October 2003), 35% indicated that they trusted other figures (similar to April 2003 and December 2002, and 26% in October 2003), 29% indicated that they did not trust any Palestinian figure (36% in April 2003, and 27% in December 2002 and October 2003), and 12% did not give an answer or said they did not know (see figure 11).

Figure 11:



Level of trust in Palestinian President Yasser Arafat varied by type of locality (30% in refugee camps, 23% in cities, and 22% in villages).

3.5 Palestinian President Arafat

Satisfaction with the manner President Arafat manages his position.

Respondents were asked whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the manner President Arafat carries out his duty as the Palestinian Authority President. Respondents were split on their satisfaction with the manner President Arafat manages his position as the

Palestinian Authority President (46% satisfied versus 47% dissatisfied). East Jerusalem residents were more dissatisfied with the manner Arafat manages his position as compared to Gaza Strip and West Bank residents (59% versus 49% and 43% respectively). There was no significant difference in this regard between city, village and refugee camp residents. Additionally, 71% of Fateh supporters were satisfied with the manner Arafat manages his position, as compared to 31% of supporters of Islamic parties, 27% of supporters of other parties, and 41% of respondents who do not support any party.

Re-election of President Arafat

Respondents were asked if they expected the Palestinian people to re-elect Arafat if free democratic elections were held under these conditions. Sixty-one percent of respondents thought that Arafat will be re-elected (54% in East Jerusalem, versus 62% in Gaza Strip and 76% in the West Bank). Additionally, 87% of Fateh supporters expected Arafat to be re-elected as compared to 54% of supporters of Islamic parties, 45% of supporters of other parties, and 67% of respondents who do not support any party.

President Arafat in control of the internal Palestinian Situation

Respondents were asked whether they thought that President Arafat is in control of the internal Palestinian situation. Forty-nine percent of respondents believed that Arafat was in control of the internal Palestinian situation, as opposed to 59% in October 2003. Sixty-eight percent of Fateh supporters believed that Arafat is in control, as compared to 36% of supporters of Islamic parties, and 41% of supporters of other parties, and 45% of respondents who do not support any party.

3.6 Evaluation of the performance of Abu Ala's government

Respondents were asked to evaluate the performance of Abu Ala's government eight months after it ceased to operate. Twenty percent indicated that it was either good or very good; 33% indicated that it was average; 41% indicated that it was either bad or very bad, and 7% did not provide an answer. West Bank residents gave a better evaluation to Abu Ala's government as compared to East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip residents (27% versus 17% and 12% respectively). Village residents gave a better evaluation to Abu Ala's government as compared to city and refugee camp residents (26% versus 20% and 7% respectively).

3.7 Exposure to Media

Respondents were asked about their exposure to different forms of media. Ninety-seven percent of respondents indicated that they have a television at home, 83% of which had a satellite. Sixty-nine percent of respondents indicated that they read a newspaper at least once a week. Twenty-nine percent of respondents indicated that they used the internet at least 1 hour per week.

METHODOLOGY

Following is a description of the methodology used by the JMCC Polling Unit.

A stratified multi-stage cluster random sample of 1,200 Palestinian individuals, 18 years or older, was selected from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. Face-to-face home interviews were conducted with respondents in 60 sampling points between June 6th and 9th 2004.

In the **West Bank**: 760 people were surveyed from the following areas:

Jenin: Jenin, Jenin Refugee Camp (RC), Tubas, Rummana, Aqqaba and al-Jalaboun. **Nablus**: Nablus, Kufr al-Deik, Beit-Wazan, al-Juneid, Deir al-Hatab, Balatah refugee camp and Jama'iin. **Tulkarem and Qalqilya**: Tulkarem, Nur-Shams refugee camp, Anabta, Ateel, Qalqilya and al-Jayyous. **Hebron**: Hebron, al-Fawwar refugee camp, Kharas, Sa'eer, Yatta, Dura, Halhul and Bani N'eim. **Bethlehem**: Bethlehem, al-Ubeidiya, Nahalin, Husan and al-Azzeh refugee camp. **Jericho**: Jericho, Aqabet Jaber RC. **Ramallah & al-Bireh**: al-Bireh, Ramallah, Kufr Neimeh, al-Am'ari refugee camp, 'Aboud and Kufr Malik. **Jerusalem**: Old City, al-Ram, al-Dahieh, Beir Nabala, Qalandia refuge camp, Shufat, Beit-Hanina, al-Isawiyeh, al-Sheikh Jarrah, Silwan and Jabal al-Mukabber.

In the **Gaza Strip**: 440 people were surveyed from the following areas:

In the **Gaza Strip**: 440 people were surveyed from: **North Gaza**: Jabalia RC, Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun. **Gaza City**: Sheikh Radwan, a-Naser, al-Durj, Attufah, Sabra, al-Zaytoun, al-Shaja'ieh, al-Rimal South, al-Rimal North and Shati RC. **Deir al-Balah**: Deir al-Balah, Bureij RC, Maghazi RC and Nuseirat RC. **Khan Younis**: Khan Younis, Khan Younis RC, Bani Sahila, Khuza'a and al-Qararah. **Rafah**: Rafah, Rafah RC, Tal al-Sultan RC.

The margin of error is 3 percent, with a confidence level of 95.

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Age:

The average age of the respondents was 34 years.

Gender:

50% of respondents were males, and 50% were females.

Marital Status:

68% of respondents were married, 26% were single, 3% were widowed, 2% were divorced, and 1% did not give an answer.

Refugee Status:

48% of respondents were refugees and 52% were not refugees.

Residence:

52% of respondents were from the West Bank, 11% were from Jerusalem, and 37% were from Gaza Strip.

33% of respondents indicated that they lived in villages, 15% in refugee camps, and 53% in towns/cities.

Education:

27% of respondents had less than secondary school education, 38% had secondary school education, and 35% had more than secondary school education.

Employment:

56% of respondents were not currently working (34% were housewives, 13% were students, 8% were unemployed, 1% were retired), 43% were currently working (18% were employees, 9% were laborers, 7% had a private business, 2% were professionals, 4% were farmers/fishermen, 2% were craftsmen), and 1% did not give an answer.