Table of contents:
JMCC Public Opinion Polls are supported by a fund from
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Germany
INTRODUCTION
This issue of the Palestinian Opinion Pulse is dedicated
to analyzing some of the most interesting findings of poll
no. 33, which was carried out by the JMCC on 21 and 22 October 1999.
The first part of this issue will discuss some of the
results of the more general questions in the survey, including regarding
Palestinians’ optimism towards the future, the performance of the Palestinian
Authority, the level of trust in political figures and factions, and Palestinian
popular attitudes towards the peace process.
The second part of this issue will focus on issues pertaining
to the media.
First, however, a short outline of the methodology used
by the JMCC Polling Unit is provided.
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PART ONE: RESULTS OF THE GENERAL
SURVEY QUESTIONS
This section intends to both highlight the main results
of the general questions of poll no. 33, and to provide background information
and analysis where deemed important.
1.1. Optimism about the future
When the interviewees were asked about their level of
optimism or pessimism about the future, 70.7% of the respondents replied
positively, whilst 27.9% saw the future negatively. There were no major
differences in the level of optimism about the future between the surveyed
people in the West Bank and those in the Gaza Strip.
Figure 1
The results in figure 1, above, however, do indicate that
the level of optimism or pessimism amongst Palestinians about the future
over the last ten months was not much influenced by political events such
as the change in the Israeli government and the election of Labor prime
minister Ehud Barak. Also, given the slow and hazardous road to peace,
it is interesting to see how such a large number of Palestinians managed
to
remain optimistic about their future. It might be suggested
that this optimism, even under difficult circumstances, is part of Arab
culture and even religion, whereby people tend to think that in the end
the situation has to improve.
A breakdown of the surveyed people according to their
trust or distrust of political factions reveals an engaging explanation
for the high level of optimism. As becomes clear from figure 2, Fateh supporters
are far more optimistic about the future than supporters of other political
factions and respondents who stated that they do not trust any faction.
A possible explanation for the higher optimism amongst Fateh supporters
might be that they stand much more to gain from the main political faction,
as it is heavily entangled in all layers of Palestinian society and as
Yasser Arafat heads it. Indeed, 83.9% of the surveyed Fateh supporters
said they were optimistic about the future compared to only 64.2% of supporters
of other factions, and 63.7% of those respondents who said that they do
not trust any faction. Similarly, whereas only 16.1% of the Fateh
supporters stated that they were pessimistic about the future, 35.9% of
the respondents who said that they support other factions than Fateh said
that they were pessimistic, and 36.3% of those who distrust all factions
said so. It is therefore, possible to deduct that the positive picture
described in figure 1, above, is heavily influenced by the Fateh contingent
within Palestinian society.
Figure 2
1.2. Popular evaluation about internal factors
1.2.1. The performance of the Palestinian Authority
In general, one can say that public perceptions of the
performance of the Palestinian Authority have remained stable since the
beginning of 1999. As shown in figure 3 below, 63% of the respondents
evaluated the performance of the Palestinian Authority positively, whilst
32% responded negatively. When the same question was asked in public opinion
polls conducted respectively in August and February 1999, it is clear that
opinions on the performance of the Palestinian Authority did not fluctuate
much.
Figure 3
Again, a breakdown of the surveyed people according
to their trust or distrust of political factions explains why, given a
less than optimal domestic situation, such a high percentage of Palestinians
nonetheless seem to evaluate the Palestinian Authority positively.
The answer lies again with the Fateh supporters within Palestinian society.
As shown in figure 4, 85% of the Fateh supporters said that, in their opinion,
the performance of the Palestinian Authority is good. Amongst supporters
of other factions, only 47.4% evaluated the performance of the Palestinian
Authority positively. In fact, more of those who support other factions
than Fateh (52.6%) said that the performance of the Palestinian Authority
is bad. Therefore, whereas at first glance it might seem that Palestinians
are contented with the performance of their Authority, a further look indicates
that merely a section of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip are. Again, it might be suggested that the Fateh supporters
evaluating the Palestinian Authority more positively can be in part explained
by the personal benefits and job opportunities this segment of society
enjoys as a result of their political affiliation.
Figure 4
A closer look at Palestinian opinion on the performance
of the Palestinian Authority since the beginning of 1999, also denotes
an increasing gap between popular opinion on this issue in the Gaza Strip
and that in the West Bank. Indeed, as shown in figure 5, below, 66.3%
of the West Bankers evaluated the performance of the Palestinian Authority
positively, compared to only 57.6% of the Gazans. Similarly, whereas
28.2% of the West Bank respondents classified the performance of the Palestinian
Authority as bad, 38.3% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip did so.
Figure 5
One explanation for the more negative evaluation by the
respondents in the Gaza Strip could be the higher dependence on the Palestinian
Authority by Gaza residents than their compatriots in the West Bank.
The West Bank is a more open area with better access to Israel, a better
economy, a larger private sector, and a well-established NGO community.
Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip remains under siege and its economy continues
to decline. The average daily wage for a household head in the Gaza Strip
is approximately 20% lower than that of a household head in the West Bank.
Moreover, the long-awaited safe passage linking the Gaza Strip to the West
Bank has proved another major disappointment. Disappointment, especially
for the Gaza residents, as there are heavy restrictions regarding those
permitted to use the safe passage, and free movement of goods and persons
between Gaza and the West Bank continues to be difficult. In short, Westbankers
are provided with alternatives to the Palestinian Authority, whereas Gazans
remain highly dependent on the Palestinian Authority, and are, therefore,
likely to be more critical of its performance.
Another explanation for the more negative evaluation of
the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip could be the larger support
for Hamas in that area. In the JMCC poll Number 33, 13.9% of Gazan
respondents said that they trusted Hamas most compared to 9.4% of the Westbankers.
Hamas is in opposition to the Palestinian Authority and its supporters,
therefore, are more critical of the performance of the Palestinian Authority.
1.2.2. Trust in Palestinian figures
When asked which Palestinian figure they trust most, as
usual, most respondents answered Arafat. As shown in figure 6, below, Palestinian
figures residing in the Gaza Strip (such as Ahmed Yaseen and Haidar Abdel-Shafi)
are more popular amongst Gazans, and Palestinian figures residing in the
West Bank (such as Hanan Ashrawi and Sa'eb Erekat) or Jerusalem (such as
Faisal al-Husseini) are more trusted by Palestinians living in the West
Bank.
Figure 6
Two aspects included in figure 6, above, are worth
a further discussion: One is the popularity of Yasser Arafat; the second
aspect concerns the number of respondents answering that they do not trust
anybody. As shown in figure 7, below, both aspects are fluctuating considerably
over time. Whenever Arafat’s popularity increases, the number of respondents
replying that they do not trust anyone decreases. The opposite is also
the apparent. Whenever Arafat’s popularity decreases, the number of respondents
saying that they do not trust anyone increases. The correlation between
these two variables and its fluctuation can be easily explained when placed
in the context of the political events since the beginning of 1999.
Figure 7
As is to be expected, Yasser Arafat, being the head
of Fateh, is most trusted by Fateh supporters. What is surprising,
however, is the extent to which he is basically forced to rely on this
segment of Palestinian society. As shown in figure 8, 68.9% of the
Fateh supporters said that they trust Arafat most. Only 16.8% of those
who support other factions than Fateh said that Arafat was their most trusted
political leader, and a mere 12.7% of those who do not trust any faction
made Arafat their choice. Moreover, amongst non-Fateh supporters, trust
in Sheikh Ahmed Yassin is higher than trust in Arafat. Also, as shown
in figure 8, Dr. Haidar Abdul-Shafi remains a popular figure amongst those
sections of Palestinian society. In short, although from the general data
it appeared that Arafat is by far the most trusted political figure in
Palestine, in actuality, his support base is more precarious than would
be imagined at first sight.
Figure 8
1.2.3. Trust in political factions
When interviewees were asked which political factions
they trust most, similar trends appeared as in the question about trust
in political figures. As becomes clear from figure 9, below, whenever
support for the most trusted factions (i.e. Fateh and Hamas) declines,
the number of people responding that they do not trust anybody increases.
Figure 9
1.3. Popular evaluation of issues related to the peace
process
1.3.1. Personal opinions about the peace process
Since the last opinion poll conducted by the JMCC in August
1999, the feelings of the interviewees about the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process have remained stable. As shown in figure 10, below, 58% of the
respondents stated their support to the peace process, 21.8% neither support
nor oppose the peace process, whilst 18.1% oppose it. It is noteworthy
that the Gazan respondents are clearly far more opposed to the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process than the West Bank respondents are. Again, a possible explanation
for the more negative attitude amongst Gazans towards the peace process
could be that the Gaza Strip continues to suffer economically under the
siege by the Israelis. Also, as 70-80% of the Gaza residents are
refugees and as the refugee problem is an issue to be dealt with in the
final status talks between Israel and the PLO, the majority of Gazans have
not seen many tangible results of the peace process. The Palestinian Authority,
for example, refuses to improve the living conditions in the refugee camps
until an appropriate agreement on the refugee issue is reached in the final
status talks.
Figure 10
Again a breakdown of the surveyed Palestinians according
to their trust or distrust in political factions shows, that the relatively
high number of respondents stating that they support the peace process
is merely a result of the high support for the peace process amongst Fateh
supporters. As becomes clear from the results illustrated in figure 11,
81.6% of the Fateh supporters also support the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, whilst only 4.7% of them oppose it. Of those respondents
who distrust all political factions, only 51.1% said that they support
the peace process, compared to 21% who oppose it. Even more negative
were those interviewees who support factions other than Fateh. Only,
41.4% of these respondents seem to support the peace process, whilst 34.6%
of this segment of society opposes the peace process.
Figure 11
1.3.2. The respondents' evaluation of people's feelings
or opinions towards the peace process
When the respondents were asked how they evaluated people’s
attitude towards the peace process, it became clear that they thought other
people support the peace process less than they do themselves. As shown
in figure 12, only 33.8% of the respondents thought that other people supported
the peace process, whilst 42.9% said that other people are hesitant in
their attitudes towards the peace process. These findings might support
the argument made in section 1.3.1. and might be an indication that support
for the peace process is not as solid as would be expected from the overall
survey results on respondents’ personal opinions about this issue.
Figure 12
1.3.3. Sense of personal security since the beginning
of the peace process
When asked if their feeling of self-security is better
than before the peace process, the small majority of the respondents (53.5%)
seemed to think so. About 28.2% said that their sense of self-security
did not change since the beginning of the peace process, whilst 16.3% of
the respondents replied that it became worse than before the peace process.
Figure 13
As shown in figure 13 above, respondents in the Gaza Strip
were more positive in their evaluation than those in the West Bank. Whereas
62.1% of the surveyed Gazans stated that their feeling of self-security
improved compared to before the peace process, only 48.6% of the surveyed
Westbankers agreed with this statement.
The evident positive feeling amongst Gazans with regard
to their personal security could be explained by the low Israeli presence
within the Gaza Strip as the Gaza territory is predominantly under the
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. As a result, Israeli attacks
or harassment, whether by settlers or by soldiers, are relatively negligible
in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, provocation by settlers and
Israeli soldiers is more evident, because their presence in the West Bank
continues to be very prevalent. This reality might have a negative effect
on the sense of personal security of the West Bank residents.
CONCLUSION
The main conclusion to be extracted from Part One is the
crucial importance of the Fateh supporters in Palestinian society.
Without them, the performance of the Palestinian Authority would be evaluated
negatively and Arafat’s popularity would pludge under that of political
figures such as Ahmed Yassin and Haidar Abdul-Shafi. Also, without
the massive support of Fatah supporters, the majority of the Palestinians
are not very much in favor of the peace process. In short, the Palestinian
leadership is heavily dependent upon this segment of society for approval
of both its internal affairs and its strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process.
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PART TWO: RESULTS OF THE MEDIA
QUESTIONS
2.1. The Palestinian Media environment
The media landscape in the Palestinian territories is
unique in the Arab world. This is due to a number of reasons.
Most importantly, ever since the establishment of the
autonomous Palestinian Authority (PA), private ownership of newspapers
and TV- and radio stations became possible in Palestine. Palestinians have
eagerly made use of the right to establish private media. Presently, there
are 5 private newspapers, 26 private TV channels, and 9 private radio stations
catering to the needs of Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. In
addition, a nationwide public broadcasting system has been established.
Secondly, censorship is not an officially condoned behavior.
However problematic this provision might be in practice, it provides the
local media with a legal framework unknown to other Arab countries.
Thirdly, the Palestinian audience is divided into two
major factions, one in the Gaza Strip, the other in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
While foreign media (including the non-Palestinian Arab media) feature
prominently in Palestine in general, the two areas are affected differently
by this phenomenon, as the results of this poll clearly present.
2.2. Media usage habits
For Palestinians, electronic media are the prime sources
of information.
As indicated in figure 14, over two third of those interviewed
(68.8%) retrieve their information from either radio or TV, while only
14% rely on newspapers as their primary source.
Among the electronic media, local radio stations feature
most prominently, garnering 36.9%. Arabic satellite broadcast news ranks
second, with 31.9%. The informal sector, i.e. workplace discussions, rumors
and chats with friends, serves as a prime source of information for 17.1%.
Figure 14
As to the preferences of information resources,
residents of Gaza and of the West Bank reveal different habits. The informal
sector is about twice as important for Gazans as a source for news as it
is for people from the West Bank (23.5 vs. 13.3%). The latter rely on local
radio much more than their fellow Palestinians in Gaza (43.1 vs. 26.5%).
The above findings indicate that the media has not yet
established an information monopoly as strong in Gaza as it was capable
of doing in the West Bank. This could be due to the fact that in the relatively
poorer Gaza Strip media access is not as affordable on average than it
is in the West Bank. Also, the much higher population density in Gaza might
further the development and enhance the importance of the informal sector
as a source of information.
2.2.1. Television
TV watching habits are a prime example for the importance
of the foreign media in Palestine.
Al-Jazeerah, an Arabic TV channel based in Qatar, was
named the most independent TV station by roughly one third of the Palestinians
surveyed in both Gaza and the West Bank (37.1% combined, see figure 15).
This corresponds strongly with the trust Palestinians put in non-Palestinian
TV stations, as presented in figure 17. Al-Jazeerah is also by far the
most trusted channel in Palestine (35.7%).
Figure 15
When it comes to viewing habits, however, Gazans
and West bank residents reveal different habits: While Al-Jazeerah ranks
high among both groups, Gazans rely on Palestine TV almost twice as much
as West Bank residents do (30.8% vs.16.2%). This makes Palestinian TV Gaza’s
first program of choice, and third in the West Bank. As a result, Palestine
TV is the most widely-watched TV station in all of Palestine (see figure
16). In the West Bank, the top slot is taken by Al-Jazeerah. Jordanian
TV, which is the West Bank’s second most watched TV channel is not among
the Gaza top three programs. In turn, Egyptian television, which Gazans
name as their third most-watched program, does not
feature prominently with West Bank resident. This is,
of course, partly due to respective areas’ proximity to the proximity of
the respective areas to the home countries of these TV channels.
Figure 16
Palestine TV is trusted most by a total of 18.1% of the
interviewed respndents, which makes it the second most trusted channel
in the region. Israel TV is considered about as trustworthy as Jordanian
TV (7.2% vs. 7.7%), despite it being watched considerably less often.
Figure 17
The perceived independence of the foreign media could
be attributed to the fact that they are less inhibited to criticize the
PNA and its performance. For foreign stations, the PNA is an easy target
and no retributions need to be feared from it. Vis-à-vis their
respective home governments, these stations might
not show the same critical stand.
Figure 18 indicates the duration of daily TV usage in
Palestine. The relative majority of TV consumers (39.7%) in Palestine spend
at least 1-2 hours watching TV. One out of four Palestinians (25.9%) uses
the TV more than four hours a day. Long-time watching habits (i.e. spending
more than four hours watching TV) can be observed in Gaza (32.7%) more
often than in the West Bank (22.1%). Accordingly, short-time watching habits
(i.e. using the TV for 1-2 hours daily) are more frequent in the West Bank
(43.7%) than in Gaza (32 %).
Only a small minority of the respondents (4.3%) stated
that they watch no television at all.
Figure 18
2.2.2. Radio
Radio is a predominantly local medium, and only few stations
distribute their programs nation-wide. Surprisingly, Israeli radio stations
are the most listened-to programs among surveyed Palestinians (see figure
19). 24% of them named them as their programs of choice, followed by Palestine
radio (21.6%) and BBC World Service (9.8 %).
Figure 19
Furthermore, while Gazans and West Bank residents show
a similar appreciation for Israeli radio, they differ significantly with
respect to consumption of Palestinian radio. Only 11.5% of Gaza residents,
but 26.7% of West Bank residents rank Palestine radio as their number one
station. This makes Palestine radio the first choice in the West Bank,
but only fourth in Gaza. Gazans also give Palestine radio weak ratings
when it comes to trust and independence. In both categories Israel radio
takes second best rating, as opposed to rank four in both for Palestine
radio. For Gazans, only the BBC is considered more trustworthy and independent
than the Israeli radio.
Figure 20
Among West Bank residents, a different picture emerges.
In line with their listening habits, trustworthiness and independence of
Palestinian radio are considered much higher than in the Gaza strip. Furthermore,
the BBC is much less frequented in the West Bank than in Gaza (6.9% vs.
15.7%).
Figure 21
Generally, Palestinians are very much inclined to listen
to radio programs produced outside their own territories. In both Gaza
and the West Bank, foreign stations take three of the top four positions,
with Israel radio taking No. 1 in Gaza.
Part of the Israeli radio’s appeal to Palestinian listeners
has to do with its closeness to the Israeli government which is the region’s
prime news maker. Israel radio can provide vital news faster than the Palestinian
media can. Also, Israel radio can provide a different perspective on current
affairs, an ability that is seemingly appreciated by many Palestinian listeners.
The poll also inquired about the listeners’ preferred
times of radio usage. More than at any other time during the day, the radio
is used in the early hours between 6 and 9 a.m. One third of the Palestinians
(32.5 %) claim to use the radio at this time of the day. The radio is then
used again in the evening by one out of five Palestinians (19.4%). In between,
radio usage is significantly lower, ranging from 11.9% at lunchtime to
9.5% in the afternoon. West Bank residents are more likely to use the radio
in the morning than Gazans (37.9% vs. 22.8%). In Gaza, radio usage is highest
in the evening (28%), and almost as popular during lunchtime (21.4%) as
it is in the morning.
Figure 22
2.2.3. Daily Newspapers
Different from TV and radio, the newspaper media segment
is primarily a Palestinian domain. The two most widely-read newspapers,
Al-Quds (57.3%) and Al-Ayyam (24.4 %) are produced within the Palestinian
territories or East-Jerusalem. Kul al-‘Arab, which takes the third place
(14.1 %), is the newspaper of Arabs with Israeli citizenship. Foreign
papers, such as Cairo-based Al-Ahram, do not play a major role in the reading
habits of Palestinians.
Figure 23
Since newspaper consumption involves the purchase of an
actual copy, and there is usually only one copy bought a day, the decision
to rely on a local product seems to be the most natural one. This could
account for the almost exclusive use of Palestinian papers.
Figure 24
Figure 25 presents Al-Quds as by far the most trusted
newspaper. It is also deemed the most independent one and, consequently,
it is the one most read (as indicated by figure 23). Al-Ayyam takes second
place in all three categories. Despite not being listed among the papers
most trusted, Kul al-‘Arab is the third-most read paper in Palestine.
Figure 25
2.2.4. Openness to social topics
As indicated in figure 26, below, two thirds (66.4%) of
the surveyed Palestinians think that the media should devote more space
to coverage of non-political and social issues. About one fifth (20.7 %)
is contented with the current amount of articles and programs on these
topics. The lack of coverage on these issues has been subject to complaint
for some time now among media. For the first time, these results show that
the problem is perceived similarly by the public. Developing a critical
attitude towards the contents presented in the media is crucial for the
critical usage of the media in general. Palestinians seem to be concerned
with the lack of coverage of events and topics on segments of society.
Such as women and children.
Figure 26
2.3. Independence of media and its political significance
A free media is generally considered to be a cornerstone
of a democratic society. Palestinians overwhelmingly share this point of
view. When asked how important a free media is for promoting democracy
in Palestine, about three quarters (74.7%) of the respondents said that
it is “very important” (as shown in figure 27).
Figure 27
Palestinians are very well capable of distinguishing the
desirable from reality, since, at the same time, only twenty percent of
them consider the media to be entirely free (see below, figure 29).
Answers to the question “Should the media play a role
in affecting the government?” were very much in line with the above findings.
Palestinians favor an independent media as a strong actor vis-à-vis
the government. As figure 28 illustrates, over 80 percent of the Palestinians
surveyed want the media to affect government. Hence, it can be said that
the concept of the media as the “fourth estate” monitoring the government,
an inherently Western idea, is widely accepted by Palestinians. As a consequence,
Palestinians are very concerned about the freedom of the press in their
country.
Figure 28
When asked whether they deemed the Palestinian press independent
or not, only one fifth (20.5%) believed in the independence of the local
media, as illustrated in figure 29. While 27% claimed that the press was
neither independent nor dependent but somewhere “in between,” a relative
majority clearly viewed the press as being not independent at all (39.2%).
This belief is more firmly held in Gaza (42.9%) than in the West Bank (37.1%).
The Palestinian press has not managed to present itself as an independent
player among the media present in the area.
Figure 29
Among those who expressed skepticism about the media’s
independence, a combined 56.5% believed that some kind of direct censorship
was the reason for this lack of freedom. As figure 30 reveals, all three
forms of direct censorship – exercised by either the PNA, Israel, or both
combined – scored roughly the same percentage (ranging at 14.2%, 15.7%,
and 16.6% respectively).
Figure 30
Self-censorship, as exercised by either the journalists
themselves (1.3%) or their superiors (3.1%), obviously, is not a major
concern of the Palestinian people. Also lack of professionalism and lack
of proper funding were not seen as major obstacles to a greater freedom
of the press. A large relative majority (40.6%), however, believed that
a combination of several of the named factors are responsible for the media’s
lack of independence.
2.4. Conclusion
In general, Palestinians have developed a mature attitude
towards the press, embracing modern ideas such as freedom of the press,
and the controlling of government by the media. One reason for this is
that Palestinian society is historically more open than that of other Arab
nations. A revolutionary heritage and principles such as pluralism and
transparency are stronger than anywhere else in the Arab world. The diverse
civil society with its variety of NGOs, parties and associations is proof
of this.
The above findings make a good point of departure for
the subsequent development of an open and democratic society in a future
Palestinian state. However, the critical views of the Palestinian people
also hint at the major obstacles that need to be overcome in order to reach
the goals envisioned. Despite censorship not being legally framed, a real
freedom of the press remains yet to be established. A major problem is
the traditional structure of Palestine society, which impedes the free
exchange of diverse viewpoints. While the institutions for a free exchange
of opinions exist, the market is yet a limited one. Touching social topics,
for example, remains difficult. Journalists exercise self-censorship in
order to prevent societal restrictions from coming into effect.
Palestinians show a strong ability to distinguish between
what is desirable and the current situation. This, more than anything else,
will enable them to gradually develop a media environment that can live
up to their expectations.
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METHODOLOGY
A random sample of 1200 people over the age of 18 was
interviewed face-to-face throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip on 21,
22 October 1999. The interviews were conducted in randomly selected homes,
and the subjects inside each home were also selected randomly according
to Kish tables. The interviews were conducted in 58 sampling points chosen
randomly according to population.
In the West Bank, 762 people were surveyed
from the following areas: Jenin: Jenin, Tubas, Jenin refugee camp,
Kufr Ra’ii, ‘Arrabeh, Silat al-Harthieh. Nablus: Nablus, Salfit,
Huwara, Beit-Dajan, Deir Sharaf, Kufr al-Deik, Burin, Askar refugee camp,
Zuwwata. Tulkarem: Tulkarem, Tulkarem refugee camp, ‘Anabta. Qalqilia:
Qalqilia,
‘Illar, al-Jayyous. Hebron: Hebron, Sa’eer, Beit-Ula, Bani
N’eim, Dura, Assamou’, Tarqoumia, al-Fawwar refugee camp.
Bethlehem:
Bethlehem,
Nahalin, al-Duhha, Husan, al-‘Azzeh refugee camp. Jericho: Jericho
and ‘Ein al-Sultan refugee camp Ramallah & Jerusalem: Ramallah,
al-Bireh, Jalazon refugee camp, Sinjil, Ni’ilin, Silwad, Shuqba, Old City,
al-Dahieh, al-Ram, al-‘Izarieh, Abu deis, Beit-Hanina, Shu’fat, Beir Nabala,
Qalandia refugee camp, Kufr Aqab, ‘Anata.
In the Gaza Strip, 438 people were surveyed
from the following areas: Gaza North: Jabalia refugee camp, Jabalia,
Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun. Gaza: Sheikh Radwan, a-Darji,
a-Tufah, Sabra, al-Meghraqa, a-Zeitoon, a-Nasser, a-Shujaeih, a-Rimal north
and south and Shati refugee camp. Deir al- Balah: Nusseirat refugee
camp, Deir al-Balah refugee camp, Deir al- Balah. Khan Younis: Khan
Younis, Khan Younis refugee camp, Khuza’ah, al-Qararah and Bani Suheila.
Rafah:
Rafah,
Rafah refugee camp and Tal al-Sultan refugee camp.
The margin of error is +/ - 3 percent, with a confidence
level of 95.
Sample distribution
¨ 57.2% of the respondents were from West Bank, 6.3%
from Jerusalem, 36.5% from the Gaza Strip.
¨ 41.9% said they live in villages, 16.0% in refugee
camps, 42.1% in towns/cities.
¨ 47.2% were male, 52.5% were female.
¨ 66.3% were married, 26.7%, single, 3.7% widowed,
1.4% divorced, 1.9% no answer.
¨ The average age of the respondents was 34 years.
Analaysis by Dr. Isabelle Daneels
