Table of Contents

Methodology

Preface

I. Introduction: History of Palestinian Public Opinion Assessment

II. Palestinian Support for the Peace Process

III. Support for the Peace Process

• III.A. Geographical Distribution
• III.B. Residential Distribution
• III.C. Gender Distribution
• III.D. Distribution by Age
• III.E. Socio/Economic Profile
• III.E.1. Breakdown by Profession
• III.E.2. By Refugee Status
• III.E.3. By Marital Status
• III.E.4. Perceptions of Economic Situation

IV. Political Affiliation

• IV.A. Support for Arafat
• IV.B. Support for Fateh
• IV.C. Support for Other Politicians
• IV.D. Support for Other Parties

V. Poll Results and Political Events

VI. Conclusion 

• JMCC follows the following method for its household surveys:
• JMCC’s sample size is 1200, and since no single interviewer is expected to interview more than 20 respondents, the number of primary sampling units is normally 60.
• Sample is stratified in the West Bank and Gaza according to population.
• Stratification for districts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is also carried out according to population.
• Cities in each district are stratified according to population.
• Villages and refugee camps in each district were randomly selected (simple random sampling).
• All population concentrations within each district in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip are considered for selection. Concentrations include towns, villages and refugee camps.
• Each of these concentrations enters into it’s district data base for randomization purposes on the basis of size. Each concentration is divided by one thousand, which is designated as a single unit. If a certain village, for example, has a population of 10,000, then it is assigned ten units; accordingly it has ten chances of being randomly selected.
• After the population concentrations are randomly selected, interviewers are instructed to go to assigned primary sampling units to conduct the interviews.
• The household selection method is based on a pre-defined route. Interviewers are instructed to follow a specific route when selecting a household. Since most population concentration are not well planned, nor is there a well defined block system, interviewers, particularly in villages and refugee camps, are asked to go to a specific place (mosque, elementary school, etc.) to begin the route. They are instructed to start from that place and then take, for example, the fourth street on the left. When the street is determined they are instructed to take the third or second house on their right, then following the third house on the left etc.
• In cities the same method is used. The city is divided into neighborhoods. Neighborhoods are also randomly selected. Interviewers have a starting point in each neighborhood then each neighborhood is treated in the same way as above for the selection of households.

This study is the third in a series of public opinion polling projects produced by JMCC. Previous studies include Palestinian Public Opinion since the Peace Process (July 1998) and Palestine’s Interim Agreement with Democracy (May 1998). Each study uses the proper methodology to poll Palestinian sentiment regarding political leadership, democratic institutions, and the peace process with Israel. In conducting these polls, JMCC hopes to offer a thoughtful compilation of data and analysis in order to uncover the social, political and economic reasons behind Palestinian opinion.

This study is an overview of the majority of Palestinians, those who support the peace process, and how their support is linked to certain key variables. Using SPSS and the data obtained over the last five years, we have examined the impact of socio/economic, religious and political backgrounds on support of the peace process. The first section of the study gauges support by area, (Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem), residence (villages, refugee camps, cities), age, gender, occupation and marital status.

The final section of the study contrasts support for Palestinian political between the general population and peace process supporters, paying particular attention to Yasser Arafat’s popularity, as well as Palestinian’s support for Fatah in relation to other political parties. In presenting a look at political affiliation within Palestinian society, the study illustrates how political loyalties effect support for the peace process.

This study is not intended to be exhaustive but to highlight the way in which some key factors influence support for the peace process. JMCC believes that the polling process is an important indicator of Palestinian society, and we intend to continue the project, publishing additional studies in the future.

History of Palestinian Public Opinion Assessment

From 1967 to the initiation of the Israeli-Arab peace process in 1991, Palestinian popular opinion was in general unified by one simple fact — the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A formal assessment of popular opinion would have been virtually impossible during this period, however, since the occupation prevented the free expression of opinions on political, social or economic matters. Public elections were barred, there was no freedom of the press and the rule of law was arbitrarily applied. The measurement of public opinion during this period of over two decades was limited to the one-time-only local elections of 1976 (later annulled by Israel), and the elections within trade unions, NGOs, student unions and chambers of commerce. These events and the expression of Palestinian opinion in general were also significantly influenced by the agenda of the Palestinian leadership outside, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).

Beginning in 1987, a series of significant political events altered the Palestinian political reality: the intifada or popular uprising in the West Bank and Gaza the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War. The intifada made the Israelis aware that their occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was unsustainable; the end of the Cold War meant a decrease in Israel's regional influence; and the Gulf War placed the Palestinians in a position where they were forced to lower their expectations and make a deal. The intifada raised the profile of the Palestinian issue worldwide, brought about an increase in international support for the Palestinians, and sharpened criticism of Israel's occupation and human rights record. At the same time, the end of the Cold War meant the decline in influence and support from the Eastern Bloc for the Palestinians, as well as a reduction in Israel's value as a pro-Western ally in the Middle East. Finally, the Gulf War and the Palestinian leadership's support for defeated Iraq left the PLO facing the agenda of the world's one remaining superpower — the United States — with the traditional support of the Arab states seriously damaged.

The confluence of all these events provided the impetus for the initiation of an Arab-Israeli peace process, of which the October 1991 Madrid conference and the two-track (parallel bilateral/multilateral talks) formula were to serve as the basis. From the beginning, however, there was a lack of international consensus on Palestinian representation at the talks. At the 1979 Camp David negotiations, Palestinians had been discussed and Palestinian issues decided without Palestinians at the table. This was not the case at Madrid. However, Israel objected to the PLO's participation in the negotiations and insisted that only non-PLO affiliated Palestinians could participate and then only as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Therefore, the PLO, while directing the talks behind the scenes, did not officially take part in the negotiations, and the Palestinian delegation directly involved in the talks was composed of prominent figures from inside the Occupied Territories.

It was in the course of these initial rounds of negotiations that the opinions of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip began to play a more significant role in Palestinian politics, as was the case to some extent during the first year ofthe intifada. While the Palestinians at the talks had been selected by the PLO and were answerable to the outside leadership, they all — residing in the West Bank or Gaza Strip — had close contact with their constituency and had experienced firsthand the hardships of living under the Israeli occupation. Thus it happened that at times the positions of the negotiators diverged from that of the absent leadership, due to the negotiators' greater awareness of the needs and opinions of the general population of the Occupied Territories. One example of this was the Palestinian delegation's insistence on an Israeli halt to settlement expansion during any interim phase, something the PLO did not call for in the agreements it was to negotiate later on, in Oslo.

There was clearly a gap between the leadership outside and the general public that needed to be bridged. Assessment of public opinion in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was necessary in order to link Palestinian representatives outside with the population inside and for the outcome of any negotiations with Israel to be perceived as legitimate.

To serve these ends, and building upon the strong tradition of grassroots activism and volunteerism in the Palestinian territories, in 1993 the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre began conducting comprehensive public opinion surveys and has continued to do so ever since. This study represents the culmination of surveys taken between March 1993 and July 1998; the majority of analysis, writing and drafting was done in the autumn of 1998, while the currently manifestation of the Oslo accords, the Wye Memorandum was being drafted.

JMCC's targeted samples are Palestinians over 18 years of age, living in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Respondents are selected via a sampling frame adopted by JMCC in consultation with sampling experts, and interviews are carried out in randomly selected households. Respondents in the households are selected by specific charts and Kish tables. After the completion of each poll, results are analyzed by a team of trained pollsters and policy analysts, and are publicized and distributed to the Palestinian and foreign media, Palestinian government officials, international and local NGOs, consulates and embassies, and other interested parties.

Although public opinion polling in Palestine is a relatively new phenomenon, its impact over the last five years has grown. This may be due partly to the constantly changing political environment, in which the future becomes increasingly difficult to predict and indicators from "the street" become even more important. In this way, public opinion polling enhances the democratic process and assists Palestinian policy-makers in their negotiations with Israel. Finally, public opinion polls play a vital role in the provision of primary data to policy analysts, academics, researchers and journalists, helping to illuminate the intricacies of the Palestine issue.

The importance of polling to political analysts — and particularly journalists — is clear. With every new public opinion survey that comes out, results are eagerly cited: Palestinians support suicide bombings, Palestinians support Hamas, etc. Often, particularly in the international and Israeli media, certain findings are seized upon with fervor and cited extensively. Other, more serious researchers are interested in more in-depth analysis of the trends. With the majority of poll-watchers, their objective is to try and predict what is going to happen on the popular level. While the ability to make more accurate political forecasts is one factor enhancing the value of public opinion polls, there are many other reasons that, in the long-term, should take precedence. The link between the ongoing peace negotiations and any peaceful resolution to the Middle East conflict is the true legitimacy that comes from the participation of the constituency on whose behalf negotiations are being conducted. It is perhaps this link that can best be served by polling activities, since allowing the public to voice their opinions, and to have those opinions assembled together into hard data is one very clear way in which the public as a whole can "participate" in the process. Rather than superficial projections about what may or may not happen, Palestinian interests would be better served in examining why certain scenarios come to pass, what the feelings are that would underpin this or that scenario. The continuing and increasing decline in support for the peace process is the perfect case in point: energy is better spent examining and addressing the underlying reasons for the decline rather than, in any analysis of the future, divorcing that decline from the underlying causes.