Contents

• Preface
• Forward
• Executive Summary
• Introduction and Research Approach
• Part One: Palestinian Public Attitudes Over Time

Background
1. Public attitudes towards the peace process
1.1 In general
1.2. According to categories of refugee status and other indicators
2. Public attitudes towards political factions and personalities
2.1 Public attitudes towards political factions
2.2 Public attitudes towards Palestinain personalities
3. Public attitudes towards political institutions
3.1. Public attitudes towards the Palestinian Authority
3.2. Public attitudes towards the Palestinian Legislative Council


• Part Two: Palestinian Public Attitudes Towards the Refugee Issue

Background
1. Public attitudes on the most "difficult" and "important" issues under Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
1.1 Comparison between opinions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel
1.2. West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian public attitudes according to categories of refugee status and other indicators
2. Public attitudes concerning the origin of the refugee problem
2.1 West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinian public attitudes
2.2 According to categories of refugee status and other indicators
3. Public attitudes on a solution to the refugee problem
Background
3.1. The "most just" and "most feasible" solution to the refugee problem
3.2. Public attitudes concerning the right of return
3.3 Public attitudes concerning compensation of the refugees

The idea for this joint study originated in May 1999 when Oxfam GB was seeking to strengthen its advocacy initiatives in promotion of the social and civil rights of Palestinian refugees.  The positive reactions from and recognized impact of Oxfam GB’s policy document on the social implications of UNRWA’s budget deficit propelled Oxfam to investigate further useful research.  The analysis of existing opinion polls towards refugees over time was one idea that Oxfam GB took-up with JMCC, the leading pollster in Palestine.  Following numerous internal and external discussions and debates over the usefulness and impact of the study, its potential value was confirmed as an unparalleled attempt worth venturing into.

This study, that is also translated into Arabic, comes at a crucial time of final peace negotiations and heightened attention on the future of Palestinian refugees – a population who have suffered from prolonged dispossession, social and political exclusion and poverty.  We hope that the revealing results presented will enhance the various political deliberations by providing sound analysis on disparities in perceptions among refugees and non-refugees; camp-refugees and non-camp refugees; males and females; and the old and the young.  More importantly, it unveils the effects of dynamic political epochs and events on the attitudes and opinions of populations.

Through our wide distribution of the study, we also aspire that this analysis will serve as a basis for investigating further research opportunities and as Dr. Tamari suggests in the Forward, is followed by similar endeavors regionally.  We also hope it will be picked up and debated by the academicians, journalists, researchers and most importantly be the source of internal debate by refugees themselves.

Many individuals from within and outside our institutions, contributed to the successful conclusion of this study.  We would particularly like to thank the following:

Dr. Isabelle Daneels for her excellent work as the main author of the study
Jamil Rabah for his expert views and consultancy
Dr. Elia Zuriek for his expert review of the study
Dr. Salim Tamari for contributing a propelling Forward
Lee O’Brien for her contribution to the analysis and semantic presentation
Charmaine Seitz for her editing and writing of the executive summary

Ghassan El Khatib
JMCC
Joyce Ajlouny
Oxfam GB
September 2000

Events subsequent to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994 led to significant re-thinking among Palestinians, refugees and non-refugees alike, about the future status of the refugee question. It became clear, now that the deferred permanent status talks had begun, that the future of refugees, together with Jerusalem and settlements, were placed on top of the agenda of bilateral negotiations.  Refugee groups, both inside and outside Palestine, began to mobilize and agitate lest their long-awaited grievances were overlooked or traded off in the negotiations. What became increasingly obvious in these debates was that the opinion of refugees was not clearly solicited in the course of these processes, whether in the multi-lateral negotiations, or in the bilateral talks following the Camp David meetings in the summer of 2000.

This report is significant because it represents the first systematic attempt to examine, over a period of four years, positions and shifts in public attitudes among both refugees and non-refugees in Palestine, as well as corresponding positions among Israeli Jews and Arabs, concerning such critical issues as repatriation, restitution and compensation. This study builds on and supplements the significant work done in the survey of living standards among refugees and non-refugees (FAFO, 1993), the Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics Population and Housing Census (PCBS 1999) and the continued work of the CPRS and JMCC, among others, in polling samples of public opinion in the West Bank and Gaza over the last five years.  However none of these surveys have examined the meaning of these studies over a significant period of time, particularly the crucial years separating the first Oslo accord, and the permanent status negotiations in Camp David in 2000.

What are the critical findings of these periodized surveys:

The first conclusion is that the early negotiations, beginning with the terms of the Oslo Agreement, gave rise to high expectations among refugees, particularly those living in camps, which were soon followed by frustration and a sense of let down when moves on the ground did not correspond to the promises inherent in these accords. This frustration was translated in higher militancy, lower support for the peace process, and a decreased faith in the ability of the PNA and its leadership to deliver.  Nevertheless, and contrary to expectations, support among camp and non-camp refugees is still substantial in continued peace negotiations, and in the Palestinian leadership--though to a significantly reduced rate.

Secondly, the findings show a high degree of volatility among camp refugees in a manner not observed outside the camps. During the intifada camp refugees (particularly in Gaza, Bethlehem, and Nablus) initiated and led the civil insurrection against Israeli military rule.  In this survey we notice a higher initial support of the peace negotiations and less opposition to the terms of settlement among camp refugees, to be reversed in 1999 in favor of increased opposition to the peace process.. Why do we have this more extreme reversal of attitudes among camp refugees? It is partly the result of the lack of concrete expectations for a reasonably just solution from the current deliberations on refugees, in response to which camp refugees have increasingly adhered to a principled position towards issues of resettlement and compensation, insisting on categorical implementation of the right of return, which is reinforced by refugees’ physical proximity and access to their former homes and properties. This should indicate to policymakers that any future packaged solution must include a component of repatriation of refugees to Israel if it is to succeed. Furthermore, it is worth noting as well that these reversals reflect a tendency towards sudden shift in attitudes depending on anticipated results of political events that are not based on long term assessment of options.

Thirdly, having said that, we must note that the differences between refugees and non-refugees (as well as between camp and non-camp refugees) are not that crucial, particularly when we take into account degrees of error in statistical extrapolation.  While differences between camp and non-camp refugees are marked, we note that the even more crucial determinants of difference are regional (Gaza vs. West Bank), generational (old vs. young), gender-based (males vs. female), and only finally, refugees vs. non-refugees.   The study notes in this regard that women tend to be more supportive of the peace process than men, older people more than young people.  As for the regional factor, the study notes that initial support for the peace process was higher in Gaza than in the West Bank, only to be reversed three years later. The survey authors correctly attribute this to the higher frustration with the results among camp refugees in Gaza whose weight is much higher among the population as a whole compared to the West Bank.

Furthermore, it is significant to note that regional differences and the generation gap are more significant in terms of variance than the gap between refugees and non-refugees. I would also venture to say, on the bases of previous studies, that the attitudes of camps residents vs. refugees outside the camps tends to be, to some extent, a variance among members of different class categories, where the refugee status is enhanced and complicated by additional attributes of poverty and displacement.

FOURTHLY, the trends described here show substantial political atomization among all sectors of the population.  Although Yaser Arafat and Fateh continue to garner substantial support from refugees and non-refugees in both regions, this support is dropping.  What is more interesting is that the drop in support for the PNA and the peace process is not being translated into higher militancy (with the marginal exception of refugee camps in Gaza where an 8% increase of support for Hamas was recorded), or into support for oppositional figures like Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, or Haidar Abul Shafie. Parties in opposition have either kept their low level of support, or have experienced a historical decline.  It seems that people are losing faith in politics and political parties. In electoral terms this may mean that independent candidates and political figures with no party affiliation have a better chance in attracting support than old partisans. On the negative side, it means that it has become more difficult to mobilize support either for or against political issues.

Another value of this survey is that it has established comparative indices of measurement for changing attitudes in Israel, both among Arabs and Jews. What is interesting in this regards is that Israeli Jewish attitudes about the refugee issue, though deeply divided, reflect a significantly more conciliatory approach towards such controversial issues as repatriation, restitution, and the right of return, than any Israeli government, whether Labour or Likud. In other words, these surveys show that the Israeli public is more likely to accept a settlement that breaks the historical taboos against refugee return (for example, in a plebiscite) than is being presumed either by the public media, or the utterances of Israeli leaders, both right and left.  Having said that, one must realistically note that a majority of Israeli Jews continue to reject an agreement based on General Assembly Resolution 194, or assigning blame on their own state for the fate of the refugees themselves.  Nevertheless it seems that fully one third of the Israeli Jewish public (31%) accept the thesis of revisionist historians who assert that the cause of the flight of refugees in the 1948 war lies in the acts of expulsion by Israeli military forces.  Such attitudes would have been unthinkable only ten years ago.

Although there are noticeable differences in attitudes by region, there is nevertheless significant convergence among Gazans, West Bankers, and Palestinians in Israel on the crucial questions concerning the right of return, the practicality of its application, and in assigning Israeli responsibility for the flight of refugees in the 1948 war. The study underscores the increasing articulation of the voice of Palestinians in Israel ('Israeli Arabs') in participating in final status deliberations. Many of these voices demand to be heard as Israeli citizens who should be heard on equal par with their Jewish compatriots.  This is especially significant for the policy maker since any potential repatriation of refugees to the Galilee (particularly refugees from Lebanon) will most likely involve Arab villages in the northern part of Israel in matters of absorption and relocation.  The survey shows considerable divergence of attitudes between the three Arab communities and those of Israeli Jews, with a majority among the latter being opposed to repatriation, restitution of property, as well as in assigning blame or responsibility on the part of the Israeli state and its armed forces during the war. Nevertheless, as noted above, this rejection shows considerable amelioration--and one important value of this study points to shifting trends in Israel in favor of reconciliation and the breaching of what used to be taboo subject. One should look here for trends, and possibilities, not for absolute figures.

Finally a word should be mentioned as to where this study can be fruitfully expanded and replicated. The study deals with attitudes in Palestine and Israel alone. The bulk of the Palestinian refugees still live in Arab and foreign host countries, and their opinions are crucial to a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the peace process on the global fate of Palestinian refugees. The methodology and contents of this study could be usefully replicated, with proper methodological adjustments, to refugee groupings in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.  Here it is quite likely that we would witness significant divergences from the results cited here.  That, however, should be the more reason for extending the scope of this survey in the near future.

Salim Tamari
September 6th, 2000

The findings of this joint Oxfam - GB/JMCC report on the attitudes of refugees may be summarized as follows:

PART ONE of this report details how the peace process has enjoyed widespread support among Palestinians from 1996 to 1999, according to survey data. Still, analysis of support for key Palestinian political players and official institutions underscores that the peace process enjoys much less support than it did when it commenced.

While the majority of the Palestinian public continues to support the peace process with Israel, that support has declined by 13% from 1996 to 1999, the years within the scope of this report. Those opposing the peace process have increased by 21% over the same period.

 • Among refugees versus non-refugees, these trends are repeated. A small shift is noted from April 1997 to March 1999, where refugees, previously more supportive of the peace process than non-refugees, become slowly less supportive of the peace process than non-refugees.

 • A break with these trends appears, however, in examination of the attitudes of Palestinians living in refugee camps, versus those living in villages and cities. Those living in the camps are clearly less supportive of the peace process than those living in other areas.

 • Further, while refugees living in refugee camps were in 1997 less in opposition of the peace process than refugees living outside refugee camps, their opposition to the peace process increased by 19.1% over three years. By March of 1999, they were less supportive of and more in opposition to the peace process than refugees living outside the camps.
 • While attitudes in the West Bank and Gaza towards the peace process are now quite similar, that is largely because Gaza Strip residents have changed their opinions significantly. The roots of this change seem to be found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps. It is a major hypothesis of this report that the 13% drop in support for and 26% increase in opposition to the peace process seen in the Gaza Strip is due largely to this change in opinion among refugee camp residents.

 • Palestinian women are more supportive of the peace process than are Palestinian men. On average over three years, 73.4% of female respondents said that they support the peace process, as compared with only 65.4% of male respondents. Recently, however, this gap appears to be closing. Similar trends are repeated among male and female refugees.

 • JMCC opinion polls show that support for the peace process gradually increases with age, while opposition to the peace process decreases with age. Over the years, all age groups remain fairly consistent in showing a gradual increase of 22% in opposition to the peace process.

The political faction which the majority of Palestinians place the most trust in is Fateh, the political faction of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat. Hamas is the second most trusted faction, with other factions garnering incremental amounts of trust. However, a high and increasing number of respondents over the years say that they trust no political faction. In January 1996, 17.1% of interviewees said that they did not trust any faction, but by October 1999, this number had doubled. The increase appears to come at the expense of trust in Hamas and Fateh.

 • Among refugee camp residents in 1996, trust in Fateh was significantly higher than among villagers or city residents. Over time, however, trust in Fateh among camp residents decreased by 13%, while trust in Fateh among other groups changed only slightly.

 • Further, while trust in Fateh in the West Bank has stayed nearly the same, the Gaza Strip has seen an 11.5% drop in trust in Fateh over the years. When these results are broken down according to refugee camp residency, it appears that this decline is directly related to the opinions of Gaza Strip refugee camp residents, who show a 16% plunge in trust in Fateh since 1996. While city residents show a wavering decline in trust in Fateh, villagers in the Gaza Strip actually increased their trust in Fateh over the same period.

 • Trust in Hamas is almost always higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. It is notable that trust in Hamas has stayed fairly stable in both areas over the years. The important exception is in Gaza Strip refugee camps, where a steady 8% increase is seen in trust in Hamas. This rise has not been reflected in the Gaza Strip as a whole.

By far, the Palestinian personality who garners the most trust among survey respondents is Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin comes in a distant second. Notable, while in April 1997, 18% of respondents said that they did not trust anyone, this number had increased to 29.9% by October 1999. The increase in those trusting no one comes at the expense of trust in Arafat and Yassin.

 • Both Arafat and Yassin enjoy slightly higher trust among refugees than among non-refugees. Trust in Yassin among refugees seems to be increasing, however incrementally. Refugees are consistently less likely than non-refugees to say they trust no one, although both groups show a 30% rise in trusting no Palestinian personality.

 • A breakdown of the opinions of Gaza Strip residents by place of residency shows that, in the Gaza Strip, the gradual decline in trust in Arafat appears to be attributed to an erosion of trust among refugee camp residents. Gaza Strip refugee camp residents lost trust in Arafat by 17% over the years, dropping only 5% in villages and 11% in cities.

While the Palestinian public evaluates Palestinian Authority performance largely positively, that evaluation has worsened over time, with 32% of respondents in October 1999 evaluating Palestinian Authority performance negatively. In 1997 and 1998, Gaza Strip residents evaluated the Palestinian Authority more positively than did West Bankers, but in 1999, West Bankers became more pleased with the Palestinian Authority's performance, with 68% saying it was good, compared with 58% of Gaza Strip respondents saying it was good. In a breakdown of the Gaza Strip by city camp and village, the largest drop over time (33%) in those evaluating the Palestinian Authority's performance as good, and parallel increase (30%) in those evaluating the Palestinian Authority's performance as bad is seen among Gaza Strip city residents.

In concluding Part One's findings, while dissatisfaction with the peace process is widespread, it is slightly more evident among Palestinian refugees and markedly so among residents of refugee camps. One explanation for this could be the marginalization of the refugee issue in continuing Palestinian-Israeli talks and the inability of the Palestinian leadership to rally behind a clear agenda on the refugee issue. Frustration with the peace process is now higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, a trend that appears to be informed by the attitudes and opinions of refugees and refugee camp residents.

PART TWO of this report explores Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip attitudes on the rights of refugees and solutions to the refugee problem, glancing for comparative purposes at the opinions of Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Israel. This overview demonstrates that the opinions of Palestinians in Israel on the refugee problem are strikingly similar to those of Palestinians in the  West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Further, while the Palestinian public in general attaches high importance and difficulty to the refugee issue and generally agrees how it might be resolved, refugees tend to be more adamant in their views towards a resolution of the refugee problem.

The views of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, combined with those of Palestinians in Israel, are often antithetical to those of Israeli Jews when discussing the refugee issue. When asked the most "difficult" issue on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations table, however, all parties overwhelmingly agreed that it is the issue of Jerusalem and its status. Both Palestinians in the territories and inside Israel say that the refugee issue is the second most difficult issue to be settled, while Israeli Jews consider the issue of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza next in difficulty.

 • In examining the views of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by refugee status, while both refugees and non-refugees agree on the most "difficult" issues, it is clear that refugees attach higher difficulty to the issue of refugees. This trend is even more pronounced among refugee camp residents in comparison with residents of cities and villages.

 • When asked the most "important" issue, both refugees and non-refugees see the issue of Jerusalem as slightly more "difficult" than "important." Among refugee camp residents, however, a solution to the refugee problem is more "important" than all other issues.

 • Further, both refugees (versus non-refugees) and residents of refugee camps (versus those living outside camps) attach less difficulty and importance to the issue of borders.

One half of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip say that Israel was either solely or mostly responsible for the creation of the 1948 refugee problem. Another 42% of Palestinians give Israel joint responsibility with Arab parties.

In fact, 59% of Palestinian respondents in the territories said that the "immediate cause" of the 1948 refugee problem was the expulsion of the refugees by Jewish forces. Another 21% said that refugees left in part due to being expelled by Jewish forces, as well as other causes.

 • By comparison, 30% of Israeli Jewish respondents said that the refugees left voluntarily, although a significant 31% said that the immediate cause of the 1948 refugee problem was the refugees' expulsion by Jewish forces.

 • Among West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians, refugees are slightly more of the opinion than non-refugees that the immediate cause of the refugee problem was their expulsion by Jewish forces. Refugee camp residents, however, are much more of this opinion (with 67.2% of respondents choosing this answer) than Palestinians who live in cities (54.3%) and villages (60.6%).

 • Respondents in the Gaza Strip were much more likely than those in the West Bank to say that the cause of the refugee problem was the refugees' expulsion by Jewish forces. It appears that the roots of this opinion are found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, where 70% of refugee camp residents say that the cause of the refugee problem was mainly their expulsion by Jewish forces and only 6% say that the refugee problem was caused by a combination of expulsion by Jewish forces and being told to leave by Arab leaders. By comparison, approximately 60% of villagers and city residents said that mainly, the refugees were expelled by Jewish forces and 13 and 12% respectively said that the refugees were expelled by Jewish forces and told to leave by Arab leaders.

Eighty-two percent of Palestinian respondents in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip said that the most just solution to the refugee problem is one based on United Nations Resolution 194, which calls for the right of return for all Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not return. Only 11% of Palestinians say that the most just solution would be that which appears to be on the negotiations table now, i.e., return for a limited number of refugees and suitable compensation for those who do not return, to be negotiated between Israel and Palestinians.

 • By comparison, only 4.5% of Israeli Jewish respondents said that the most just solution to the refugee issue is one based on United Nations Resolution 194. Fifty-seven percent said that only those refugees approved by Israel should be allowed to return and compensation given to those who do not.

 • Palestinian refugees are even more adamant than non-refugees that a solution based on UN Resolution 194 is the "most just" and "most feasible" solution to the refugee problem. Male refugees answered more often than female refugees that the most just solution is one based in international law.

 • Interestingly, five percent more refugees living outside refugee camps said that the "most just" solution to the refugee problem is one based on international law than did refugees living in the camps. Still, the 83% of refugees living in camps said that the "most just" solution was one based on UN Resolution 194.

When asked the "most feasible" solution to the refugee problem, fully one fourth (the most of all surveyed subgroups) of refugees living in camps said that the most feasible solution was one based on a limited return and compensation to be negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians. Still, 58% of refugees in camps said that the "most feasible" solution is one based on UN Resolution 194. In comparison, 69% of refugees outside camps said that the "most feasible" solution is one based on international law.

 • Here it appears that the opinions of refugees in refugee camps influence the trends visible in the Gaza Strip as a whole. West Bank residents are nearly 10% percent more likely than Gaza Strip residents to say that the "most feasible" solution to the refugee problem is one based in international law.

On the issue right of return, over 55% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip agree without qualification with the principle that "according to international law, people who have left their homes voluntarily or by force as a result of war conditions are entitled to return home once hostilities end."

 • As to whether that principle applies to Palestinian refugees, Palestinians in the territories agreed or strongly agreed at a combined rate of 81%. Only 40% of the Israeli Jewish public said that they agreed at all that the principle of return applies to Palestinian refugees.

 • Both Palestinians in Israel (by 82%) and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (by 80%) agree that any Palestinian refugees who want to return should be allowed to. In contrast, only 12% of Israeli Jews gave this answer, with a full 43% saying that no refugees at all should be allowed to return.

 • When looking at breakdowns of Palestinian opinion in the territories, several trends become visible. Refugees are even more unequivocal than the general public over the principle of the right of return, with 59% agreeing without qualifications. Villagers are much more likely than city dwellers or camps residents to agree with qualifications to the statement that international law supports the right of return.

 • Refugees are more adamant (7% more) than non-refugees that the principle of the right of return applies to them. Ten percent of refugee camp residents, the most of all groups, actually disagree that the right of return applies to them. It is unclear if this is based on camp residents' understanding of the right of return or on how they have seen it applied.

 • Nearly 10% more refugees than non-refugees agreed that anyone who wants to return should be able to, although the vast majority of both groups gave this answer. Villagers (15%) said more than any other group that a few thousand refugees should be allowed to return.

When Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were asked who should bear the financial burden of compensating the refugees, only 21% of respondents said that Israel alone should bear the financial burden. Most said that the responsibility of compensation should fall on both Israel and international institutions like the United Nations.

 • In a breakdown according to refugee and non-refugee status, refugees said more often that Israel and the United Nations should be the source of compensation. Camp refugees preferred over refugees not living in camps that the source of compensation be Israel, international bodies and Arab governments combined or Israel and the United Nations.

IN CONCLUSION, this report demonstrates that it is important not to regard the refugees as one homogeneous group. While refugee attitudes tend to be more adamant than those of the general population, refugee opinion varies significantly according to residency in refugee camps and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Finally, the general Palestinian public and its leadership must take note of these views as negotiations continue over a final settlement with Israel.

This report aims to identify the attitudes of Palestinian refugees with respect to the political situation and the extent that these attitudes conform with those of the remainder of the Palestinian public living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including Jerusalem.

The study is divided into two main parts. The first part explores the attitudes of the Palestinian public, including refugees in general and residents of refugee camps specifically, on their level of support for the peace process, various political or religious factions and leaders and Palestinian institutions such as the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council.

The second part of this report, based solely on a survey conducted in November 1999, addresses issues pertaining to the refugee problem. It deals with the attitudes of the Palestinian public, with a special focus on refugee opinion in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, on issues such as the origin of the refugee problem, the right of return and compensation for the refugees.

While the first section of this report looks at popular opinion over a period of four years, the second section deals with attitudes on the refugee issue at the time of the November 1999 poll. Thus, the first section is an overview of changing public attitudes on the issues over a period of time, while the second does not reflect such shifts as it is not longitudinal or comparable with other similar surveys.

This report is based on data collected by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC). Only a number of the JMCC’s many surveys were used in this report. Due to the large number of surveys and the large volume of data, the researcher opted to select a sample of these polls in this report.

Surveys and questions from those surveys were selected for use in this report in three ways - by the use of similar wording in survey questions; according to the consistency of the question values  (answers) and according to the time period of the surveys. It is important to note that the researcher examined other surveys in order to be certain that their responses do not deviate from the trends reported in this study. The researcher is confident that the addition of other surveys would not call into question the conclusions of this report.

The comparative section of this report uses 1996 as a starting date because it was the year of the first Palestinian general elections. The following surveys were used in this report: April 1996, April 1997, May 1997, July 1997, August 1997, November 1997, May 1998, August 1998, March 1999, August 1999, October 1999, and November 1999.

The surveys of the JMCC are based on a random sample of approximately 1,200 people over the age of 18, who are interviewed face-to-face throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The respondents are selected randomly according to Kish Tables that take into consideration both the gender and age of household members.

The selection of households is preceded by a selection of population concentrations, defined as cities, villages, or camps. This selection is based on population estimates published by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Health Development Information Project (HDIP). The population concentrations are then subdivided into sampling points proportionate to the associated population concentration. Thus, if a particular village has a population of 10,000, it is assigned 10 sampling points.

Using the computer database Excel, an average of 60 sampling points for each poll were randomly selected from the combined West Bank and Gaza Strip sampling points. Each of the selected sampling points was assigned 20 questionnaires and one interviewer.

The November 1999 survey discussed in the second half of this report used a similar methodology. However, this survey was unique as part of a project that put the same questions to both the Israeli Jewish public and Palestinians living in Israel. The Steinmetz Center at Tel Aviv University conducted the survey among Israelis. The survey of Palestinians in Israel was directed by Professor Elia Zureik of Queen's University in Ontario, Canada and was supervised by Dr. As'ad Ghanem of Haifa University in Israel. The second section of this report concentrates largely on the opinions of the Palestinian public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, using the opinions of Israelis and Palestinians in Israel in a comparative manner.

Because of controversy surrounding the definition of a refugee, it is important to state that this report uses the term "refugee" for those Palestinians who identify themselves as such. The respondents were asked "Are you a refugee or not?" and then classified as "refugee" or "non-refugee" by their response. The classification of "camp resident," "villager" or "city resident," however, was made on the basis of the number of sampling points given to where the interviews took place. Once self-identified refugee status and place of residence were cross-tabulated, it was possible to distinguish further categories within the refugee sample according to age and gender.

 It is also worth noting that millions of Palestinian refugees do not reside in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Accordingly, the attitudes in this report reflect, and only reflect, the attitudes and views of those refugees residing in those two areas and not elsewhere. In addition, as the refugees interviewed are part of a larger Palestinian population sample, their numbers are relatively small for drawing statistical inferences, particularly when the refugee subgroup is further subdivided into various categories, such as gender and age.