Contents

• No settlement freeze
• Long-term plans come fruition

• Testing the redeployment model
• Taking the model to the West Bank
• Continuing settlement expansion
• A case study: al-Khader village
• A demonstration of good faith: The Mt. Abu Ghneim housing project
• East Jerusalem

• What are settlements?
• How is land taken for settlement?
• Who are the settlers?
• Why settle in the West Bank and Gaza?

• Settlement blocs
• Settlement roads
• Settler bypass roads
• Moving the Green line eastward

• Future prospects for peace

 - no settlement freeze

The peace negotiations which began so auspiciously in Madrid ended in Washington, deadlocked over the Israelis' refusal to agree to halt settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the interim phase. The negotiators from the Occupied Territories were united in their contention that settlements posed the greatest obstacle to achievement of peace and stability. The Palestinians at these first negotiations called for the Israelis to freeze settlement activity before further talks went ahead, or to agree that a settlement freeze would be included in any agreement to be signed.

The Oslo Accords were directly negotiated by the PLO. Under the terms of these agreements covering the interim phase to 1999, Israel and the Palestinians must not 'initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations." As the final status negotiations are to cover Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, and borders, among other issues, the Palestinians consider that this precludes the Israelis from continuing settlement activity until the issue is resolved. However, while former prime minister Rabin promised the US administration that there would be no new settlements, expansion of existing settlements (currently numbered at approximately 194)2 has been ongoing throughout the peace process. Moreover, the bulk of the land being taken from Palestinians in this interim phase has been for the settler bypass and security roads in the West Bank and Gaza Strip agreed to in the Oslo Accords.

 Therefore, as pictures of the Israeli army withdrawing from Palestinian cities went out over wire services, the impression grew internationally and even locally that the occupation was over, Palestinians were autonomous, and the settlers a radical but marginalised element who would be dealt with in the final phase of peace talks. Talk of a settlement freeze in this interim phase was common, with the Israeli right-wing protesting and the left applauding this supposed freeze. The reality bears little more than a superficial resemblance to this impression: in fact, during the Rabin-Peres administrations, the number of settlers increased by almost 50 percent. Not only are almost 300,000 settlers, their settlements, industrial zones and highways, and the military zones and installations necessary to defend them, still occupying some 70 percent of the West Bank and some 40 percent of the Gaza Strip, but the security of this 'marginalised' group remains the justification for the almost absurd limitations placed on Palestinian autonomy under the current peace accords. And, since the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo 11) - signed in September 1995 - 30,000 dunams (One dunam is approximately .25 acres of land) of land have been taken for settler bypass roads alone.'

Furthermore, the false sense of a peaceful resolution provided by the celebrated handshake on the White House lawn paved the way for an even further easing of the already muted US opposition to settlement. This, together with the approach of the 1996 US presidential elections (and the wish of candidates to show themselves friendly to Israel) allowed Israel to move ahead with unilateral changes which are slowly consolidating its territorial control, particularly over East Jerusalem and the greater West Bank.

Moves by the new Netanyahu government have not been encouraging. At a summit of European heads of state in Lisbon in early December 1996, prime minister Netanyahu spoke out firmly in support of continued settlement expansion, saying that he wanted to match the previous government's rate of settlement growth and regretting the possible constraint of economic considerations. (At the same time, he called for confidence-building measures from the Palestinians.) Settlement expansion will clearly continue at an even greater rate (the proposed construction of an additional 3,000 housing units in West Bank settlements was announced in late September 1996, and another 1200 were approved in November); Ariel Sharon, an aggressive proponent of settlement, is now in charge of a 'super ministry' which has at least partial jurisdiction over road construction, settlement, and water negotiations; and the Israeli redeployment in Hebron agreed to in the Oslo Accords has only now been carried out seven months past deadline.

Settlers and settlements have always played and continue to play a key role in the implementation of Israeli plans for control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Far from being determined by any negotiations that have taken place in the last few years, the current cantonisation of the West Bank and Gaza is detailed in maps and settlement plans dating back twenty years and has been pursued by Labour and Likud alike. Further, the continued presence of settlements and armed settlers - still illegally occupying and controlling the majority of land, still enjoying favourable access to natural resources at the expense of their Palestinian 'neighbours', justifying a large deployment of Israeli troops in and around Palestinian locales - can only be a source of extreme provocation to people free in name only from the term 'occupation'.

- long-term plans come to fruition

Israeli settlement policies have been fairly consistent over the years, with the most significant variations found only in the public rhetoric and declarations, shaded by the political leanings of the different governments. Meanwhile, Palestinians inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip have for years pointed out that the settlements will have a tremendous negative impact on any long-term solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. As one former negotiatior from the West Bank pointed out, 'How can you talk about an end to the occupation when you still have settlements - the very essence of occupation - at the same time?' Even as the start of final status talks remains on hold, the implications of Israel's policy over the past decades is only too clear:

1. The 1967 Green Line, the border existing at the time of the armistice, has effectively been 'erased'and at the very least Israel would be unable to $return' to it. Yet the peace process began with the understanding that any solution would be based on UN Resolution 242 and the return of lands taken in 1967.
2. The geographic placement of settlements and the construction of roads linking them to each other and to Israel, along with 'security' prohibitions on adjacent lands, have resulted in the disintegration of the West Bank into isolated cantons, and in the inability of the majority of Palestinian villages and towns to accommodate their natural expansion or exercise their right to develop.
3. The recognition by Israel of settlements and settlers as full Israeli citizens regulated by Israeli law only and the provision of infrastructure and services as to any community inside Israel has given them an assumption of permanence which encourages the adoption of an 'inter-ethnic' perspective. According to this approach (most clearly illustrated in Jerusalem), acceptance of which has been aided by the 'withdrawal' of troops, the problems are those of any two communities of different ethnicity living side by sidb. The question of where settlers came from, how and why - questions of rights and legality - are now practically irrelevant; it appears to be accepted by many non-Palestinians that the settlers are there to stay, with the only remaining question being how to regulate relations between them and their Palestinian 'neighbours'.

In effect - at this stage in the negotiations - Israel would appear to have achieved the de facto annexation Palestinian leaders have long believed they were aiming settlement for. While the most problematic issues in the conflict - refugees, Jerusalem, borders - are not to be addressed until the last stage of negotiations s'Israel has by its actions on the ground already begun implementing its vision of what a finalsettlement will look like.

 Our decisions on (delaying) the unification of Jerusalem, the return of those refugees who wish it, and Israel's refraining from establishing settlements and military settlements in the territories beyond Israel's borders since the eve of the war can only be interpreted in the rest of the world, in the Arab world, and among the population of the administered territory and the Israeli public, as if we are reconciling ourselves, or at least are prepared to reconcile ourselves, to giving up these territories. If such a recognition takes root among the interested parties on such an important issue, it is liable to make things very difficult for us in the future. If we wish to hold on to them in one way or another, it will be interpreted as a more inflexible and surprising step than it is in reality; and if …. a decision is made to return the West Bank or most of it… we will be in a weak bargaining position.

 We must also make decisions and determine facts in order to assure ourselves what we want to assure, and also in order to be in a position of strength in negotiations between us and any interested party, if and when they begin.

0'ne month before he was killed, then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin spoke to the Knesset about the Oslo 11 Accord which defines this current phase:

We view the permanent solution in the framework of the State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel [sic] as it was under the rule of the British Mandate ... The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six-Day War. We will not return to the June 4, 1967 lines.... The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.'

He further reassured Knesset members wary of the agreement by reminding them that:

Areas A and B [over which the Palestinian authorities have some limited jurisdiction] constitute less than 30 percent of the area of the West Bank. Area C, which is under our control, constitutes more than 70 percent of the area of the West Bank.

The day-to-day reality of living under what was supposed to be an interim arrangement is that Palestinians are suffering greater economic deprivation and more severe movement restrictions than at any time during the occupation. Most of the population are denied the right to enter Jerusalem; Palestinian institutions and residents are being forced out even as Jewish settlements expand. Despite the presence of a Palestinian Legislative Council, elected in January 1996, the Israeli authorities remain the ultimate authority, occupying the bulk of the land and controlling the majority of roadways, all under the framework of protecting Israeli security. The settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza are the most visible symbol of Israel's continued control. Meanwhile, for Palestinian communities, the irrevocable destruction of land being carried out to create and expand the vast network of bypass and settlement roads contradicts assurances that this is a transition phase only, with final resolution yet to be determined.

And all the while, economic conditions are worsening for the Palestinian population, due to the Israeli-imposed closure which has been effect in some form or another since 1993. Under this closure special permits are required for entry to Jerusalem, usually issued for very short terms and subject to cancellation without notice; West Bank and Jerusalem ID holders (and frequently even international aid workers) are generally not allowed into Gaza; and travel between the north and south West Bank is disrupted due to the inability to pass through Jerusalem.

Largely due to this closure policy and the resulting decrease in trade and employment, per capita GNP for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza has fallen by 38.8 per cent from 1992 levels." While support for the peace process in general has remained consistent (over 70 percent7), public confidence in the Oslo accords, the elected council and prospects of achieving real peace are all decreasing rapidly: the level of strong support for Oslo 11 went from a high of almost 40 percent in December 1995 to 23.6 percent in October 1996", while the level of pessimism rose from 27 percent in December 1995 to 56 percent in October 1996." Palestinian and Israeli analysts are warning of the danger of the growing sense of frustration and despair among Palestinians. With the close proximity of seftlers and a new Israeli government determined to roll back or confine the extent of Palestinian autonomy of movement, growth, development and subsistence, it is difficult to predict future events with any degree of optimism.