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News
Israel moves to launch university in West Bank settlement Jan. 21, 2010 ‘Fly-in‘ planned for Eastern Easter Sunday April 10, 2012 ‘Two state solution favoured by British Jews July 16, 2010

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Multimedia
Freedom for Palestine music video
Alizzz*zs Story
al-Jazeera Int: Dining with Terrorists, Fighting Occupation Pt. 1
al-Jazeera Int: Dining with Terrorists, Fighting Occupation Pt. 2.

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Documents Palestine Liberation Organization, the future State of Palestine, and the question of popular representation British White Paper of 1939 Churchill White Paper

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Publications Foreign Aid and Development in Palestine - Phase I Report Foreign Aid and Development in Palestine - Phase III Report Mortgaging Self-Reliance: Foreign Aid and Development in Palestine - Phase II Report

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Background Camp David II Civil society (Palestinian) Gaza

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Resources Israeli tourism website on Kiryat Shmona "Reflections on Archeology and Israeli-Settler Nationhood," by Nadia El-Haj "US Munitions Delivered to Israel," Amnesty International, April 2, 2009

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Document Text | EXCERPT
1. We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict
harmony with our instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of
one or more powers) is brought into Syria, should come in, not at all as a
colonizing Power in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatory under the
League of Nations, with the clear consciousness that "the well-being and
development" of the Syrian people form for it a "sacred trust."
(1) To this end the mandate should have a limited term, the
time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of
all the facts as brought out from year to year, in the annual reports of the
Mandatory to the League or in other ways.
(2) The Mandatory Administration should have, however, a period
and power sufficient to ensure the success of the new State; and especially to
make possible carrying through important educational and economic undertakings,
essential to secure founding of the State.
(3) The Mandatory Administration should be characterized from
the beginning by a strong and vital educational emphasis, in clear recognition
of the imperative necessity of education for the citizens of a democratic state,
and the development of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation of
national spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which has only
recently come to self-consciousness.
(4) The Mandatory should definitely seek, from the beginning of
its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to independent self-government as
rapidly as conditions allow, by setting up all the institutions of a democratic
state, and by sharing with them increasingly the work of administration, and so
forming gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly in the
progress of the country, and forming at the same time a large group of
disciplined civil servants.
(5) The period of "tutelage" should not be unduly prolonged,
but independent self-government should be granted as soon as it can safely be
done; remembering that the primary business of government is not the
accomplishment of certain things, but the development of citizens.
(6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatory in a country
like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete religious liberty is
ensured, both in the constitution and in the practice of the state, and that a
jealous care is exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is more
vital than this for the enduring success of the new Arab State.
(7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount of
indebtedness on the part of the new State should be avoided, as well as any
entanglements financially with the affairs of the Mandatory Power. On the other
hand the legitimate established privileges of foreigners such as rights to
maintain schools, commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject
to review and modification under the authority of the League of Nations in the
interest of Syria. The Mandatory Power should not take advantage of its position
to force a monopolistic control at any point to the detriment either of Syria or
of other nations; but it should seek to bring the new State as rapidly as
possible to economic independence as well as to political independence.
Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of the
Commission, the fulfillment of at least the conditions now named should be
assured, if the Peace Conference and the League of Nations are true to the
policy of mandatories already embodied in "The Covenant of the League of
Nations." This should effectively guard the most essential interests of Syria,
however the machinery of administration is finally organized. The Damascus
Congress betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country would
become, though under some other name, simply a colonial possession of some other
Power. That fear must be completely allayed.
2. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Syria be
preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the
people of Syria.
(1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too
small, and the economic, geographic, racial and language unity too manifest, to
make the setting up of independent states within its boundaries desirable, if
such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in
language, culture, traditions, and customs.
(2) This recommendation is in line with important "general
considerations" already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations,
as well as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.
(3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a
special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general
allotted.
The Commissioners believe, however, that the claim of the
Damascus Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either
historically or by commercial or language relations. The line between the
Arabic-speaking and the Turkish speaking populations would quite certainly class
Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has no such need of
further sea coast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.
(4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of Syria,
the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon, which have already had a
measure of independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity,
undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy, and especially in the
case of strongly unified groups. Even the "Damascus Program" which presses so
earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government "on broad
decentralization principles."
Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and
autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate
aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary, it
may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations with
the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the State,
rather than entirely independent of it.
As a predominantly Christian country, too, Lebanon naturally
fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she
would have a four-fold safeguard: her own large autonomy; the presence of a
strong Mandatory for the considerable period in which the constitution and
practice of the new State would be forming; the oversight of the League of
Nations, with its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of
minorities; and the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity
of such a state, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations.
Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if
Christians were present in the state in considerable numbers, rather than
largely segregated outside the state, as experience of the relations of
different religious faiths in India suggests.
As a predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted
that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful
influence if she were within the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs,
and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own
narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of
Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the
more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar statement might be
made for Palestine; though, as "the holy Land" for Jews and Christians and
Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique
treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed
more particularly in connection with the recommendation concerning Zionism.
3. We recommend, in the third place, that Syria be. placed
under on[e] Mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient
unity.
(1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria
among several mandatories, even if existing national unity were recognized; or
to attempt a joint mandatory of the whole on the commission plan:—neither of
these courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote
the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people. It is
conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to some such
form of divided mandate; but it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from
the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as considerations
already urged indicate.
(2) It is not to be forgotten, either, that, however they are
handled politically, the people of Syria are there, forced to get on together in
some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another-the Arabs of the East
and the people of the Coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped
or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations, by a
single mandatory? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of
difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent fragments.
And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the
relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable.
But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates the differences
and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern social
consciousness points to the necessity of understanding "the other half," as it
can be understood only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local
autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatory ought to form a
constant and increasingly effective help to unity of feeling throughout the
state, and ought to steadily improve group relations.
The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often
insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among
various groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the
Turkish Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes
plain that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike,
not their exploitation, decent human relations are pretty certain to prevail,
and a permanent foundation for such relations to be secured--a foundation which
could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic
groups.
The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good
of all groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole of Syria under a
single mandate.
4. We recommend, in the fourth place, that Emir Feisal be made
the head of the new united Syrian State.
(1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the
representative Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there
seems to be no reason to doubt that the great majority of the population of
Syria sincerely desire to have Emir Feisal as ruler.
(2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems
naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their long training under tribal
conditions, and with their traditional respect for their chiefs. They seem to
need, more than most people, King as the personal symbol of the power of the
State.
(3) Emir Feisal has come, too, naturally into his present place
of power, and there is no one else who could well replace him, He had the great
advantage of being the son of the Sherif of Mecca, and as such honored
throughout the Moslem world. He was one of the prominent Arab leaders who
assumed responsibility for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in
the complete deliverance of the Arab-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. He
was consequently hailed by the "Damascus Congress" as having "merited their full
confidence and entire reliance." He was taken up and supported by the British as
the most promising candidate for the headship of the new Arab State-an Arab of
the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through his Sherifian connection,
and through his broad sympathies with the best in the Occident. His relations
with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly, and his kingdom would not be
threatened from that side. He undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to
the Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the East; but no man can be
named who would have a stronger general appeal. He is tolerant and wise,
skillful in dealing with men, winning in manner, a man of sincerity, insight,
and power. Whether he has the full strength needed for his difficult task it is
too early to say; but certainly no other Arab leader combines so many elements
of power as he, and he will have invaluable help throughout the mandatory
period.
The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the fact
that an Arab of such qualities is available for the headship of this new state
in the Near East.
5. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of
the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews,
looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.
(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds
predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the
force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the
Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.
(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on
the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences
much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw
something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the
aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the
devotion of many of the colonists, and for their success, by modem methods, in
overcoming great natural obstacles.
(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement
had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted
statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however,
the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to-favoring "the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine"—it can hardly
be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified. For a
"national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine into
a Jewish State; nor ran the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished
without the gravest trespass upon the "civil and religious rights of existing
non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The fact came out repeatedly in the
Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked
forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish
inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.
In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the
following principle as one of the four great "ends for which the associated
peoples of the world were fighting": "The settlement of every question, whether
of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political
relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the
people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or
advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement
for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery." If that principle is to
rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what
is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish
population of Palestine-nearly nine-tenths of the whole-are emphatically against
the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon
which the population of Palestine was more agreed than upon this. To subject a
people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and
social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the
principle just quoted, and of the peoples' rights, though it kept within the
forms of law.
It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist
program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people
throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent--1350
in all--of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the
Zionist program. Only two requests-those for a united Syria and for
independence-had a larger support. This general feeling was only voiced by the
"General Syrian Congress," in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of their
statement [paras. 7, 8, 10, Doc. 251....
The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that
the Anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine
and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer,
consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be
carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought a force of
not less than fifty thousand soldiers would be required even to initiate the
program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the
Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and
Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but
they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious
injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives,
that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand
years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.
There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored,
if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish state,
however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact
that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike.
Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much
concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those
conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these
matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible
intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either
Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the
Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: the places which are most sacred to
Christians-those having to do with Jesus-and which are also sacred to Moslems,
are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible,
under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have
these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still
other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this
point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three
religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory
custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that
the precise meaning, in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of
Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist
program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish
feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to
Palestine as "the Holy Land."
In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of
sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that
only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and
even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish
immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making
Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.
There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be
included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the
holy places being cared for by an International and Inter-religious Commission,
somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and of
the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this
Commission.
6. The Recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity
of recommending what Power shall undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.
(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the
qualifications, ideally to be desired in this Mandatory Power: First of all it
should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing to enter heartily
into the spirit of the mandatory system, and its possible gift to the world, and
so be willing to withdraw after a reasonable period, and not seek selfishly to
exploit the country. It should have a passion for democracy, for the education
of the common people and for the development of national spirit. It needs
unlimited sympathy and patience in what is practically certain to be a rather
thankless task; for no Power can go in, honestly to face actual conditions (like
landownership, for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without making
many enemies. It should have experience in dealing with less developed peoples,
and abundant resources in men and money.
(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications,
certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these qualifications
that has not been more or less definitely indicated in our conferences with the
Syrian people and they certainly suggest a new stage in the development of the
self-sacrificing spirit in the relations of peoples to one another. The Power
that undertakes the single mandate for all Syria, in the spirit of these
qualifications, will have the possibility of greatly serving not only Syria but
the world, and of exalting at the same time its own national life. For it would
be working in direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the war, and give
proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And that would mean very much
just now, in enabling the nations to keep their faith in one another and in
their own highest ideals.
(3) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30,
1919, quoted in our Instructions, expressly state for regions to be "completely
severed from the Turkish Empire," that "the wishes of these communities must be
a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory Power." Our survey
left no room for doubt of the choice of the majority of the Syrian people.
Although it was not known whether America would take a mandate at all; and
although the Commission could not only give no assurances upon that point, but
had rather to discourage expectation; nevertheless, upon the face of the
returns, America was the first choice of 1152 of the petitions presented-more
than 60 per cent-while no other Power had as much as 15 per cent for first
choice.
And the conferences showed that the people knew the grounds
upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared that their
choice was due to knowledge of America's record: the unselfish aims with which
she had come into the war; the faith in her felt by multitudes of Syrians who
had been in America; the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in
Syria, especially the College in Beirut, with its well known and constant
encouragement of Syrian national sentiment; their belief that America had no
territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian
state was well established as her treatment both of Cuba and the *Philippines
seemed to them to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit; and her ample
resources.
From the point of view of the desires of the "people
concerned," the Mandate should clearly go to America.
(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already
stated as needed in the Mandatory for Syria, America, as first choice of the
people, probably need not fear careful testing, point by point, by the standard
involved in our discussion of qualifications; though she has much less
experience in such work than Great Britain, and is likely to show less patience;
and though her definite connections with Syria have been less numerous and close
than those of France. She would have at least the great qualification of fervent
belief in the new mandatory system Of the League of Nations, as indicating the
proper relations which a strong nation should take toward a weaker one. And,
though she would undertake the mandate with reluctance, she could probably be
brought to see how logically the taking of such responsibility follows from the
purposes with which she entered the war, and from her advocacy of the League of
Nations.
(5) There is the further consideration, that America could
probably come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at least, with less
friction than any other Power. The great majority of Syrian people, as has been
seen, favor her coming, rather than that of any other power. Both the British
and the French would find it easier to yield their respective claims to America
than to each other. She would have no rival imperial interests to press. She
would have abundant resources for the development of the sound prosperity of
Syria; and this would inevitably benefit in a secondary way the nations which
have had closest connection with Syria, and so help to keep relations among the
Allies cordial. No other Power probably would be more welcome, as a neighbor, to
the British, with their large interests in Egypt, Arabia, and Mesopotamia; or to
the Arabs and Syrians in these regions; or to the French with their
long-established and many-sided interests in Beirut and the Lebanon.
(6) The objections to simply recommending at once a single
American Mandate for all Syria are: first of all, that it is not certain that
the American people would be willing to take the Mandate; that it is not certain
that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially
welcome America's coming--a situation which might prove steadily harassing to an
American administration; that the vague but large encouragement given to the
Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her
large and influential Jewish population; and that, if America were to take any
mandate at all, and were to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia
Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. For there is a task there of
such peculiar and worldwide significance as to appeal to the best in America,
and demand the utmost from her, and as certainly to justify her in breaking with
her established policy concerning mixing in the affairs of the Eastern
Hemisphere. The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could come
into Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice to all the peoples
concerned.
To these objections as a whole, it is to be said, that they are
all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and that they only form the
sort of obstacles that must be expected, in so large and significant an
undertaking. In any case they do not relieve the Commissioners from the duty of
recommending the course which, in their honest judgment, is the best course, and
the one for which the whole situation calls.
The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the
logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked to undertake the
single Mandate for all Syria.
If for any reason the mandate for Syria is not given to
America, then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express request
of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate be given to Great
Britain. The tables show that there were 1073 petitions in all Syria for Great
Britain as Mandatory, if America did not take the mandate. This is very greatly
in excess of any similar expression for the French. On the contrary-for whatever
reason-more than 60 percent of all the petitions, presented to the Commission,
directly and strongly protested against any French Mandate. Without going into a
discussion of the reasons for this situation, the Commissioners are reluctantly
compelled to believe that this situation itself makes it impossible to recommend
a single French mandate for all Syria. The feeling of the Arabs of the East is
particularly strong against the French. And there is grave reason to believe
that the attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war between the
Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain a dangerous alternative. The
Commissioners may perhaps be allowed to say that this conclusion is contrary to
their own earlier hope, that because of France's long and intimate relations
with Syria, because of her unprecedented sacrifices in the war, and because the
British Empire seemed certain to receive far greater accessions of territory
from the war-it might seem possible to recommend that France be given the entire
mandate for Syria. But the longer the Commission remained in Syria, the more
clear it became that that course could not be taken.
The Commissioners recommend, therefore, that if America cannot
take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain; because of
the choice of the people concerned; because she is already on the ground and
with much of the necessary work in hand; because of her trained administrators;
because of her long and generally successful experience in dealing with less
developed peoples; and because she has so many of the qualifications needed in a
Mandatory Power, as we have already considered them.
We should hardly be doing justice, however, to our sense of
responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add at least some of
the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed and implied in our conferences,
which led to the preference for an American mandate over a British mandate. The
people repeatedly showed honest fear that in British hands the mandatory power
would become simply a colonizing power of the old kind; that Great Britain would
find it difficult to give up the colonial theory, especially in case of a people
thought inferior; that she would favor a civil service and pension budget too
expensive for a poor people; that the interests of Syria would be subordinated
to the supposed needs of the Empire; that there would be, after all, too much
exploitation of the country for Britain's benefit; that she would never be ready
to withdraw and give the country real independence; that she did not really
believe in universal education, and would not provide adequately for it; and
that she already had more territory in her possession-in spite of her fine
colonial record-than was good either for herself or for the world. These
misgivings of the Syrian people unquestionably largely explain their demand for
"absolute independence," for a period of "assistance" of only twenty years,
their protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, etc.
They all mean that whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send into Syria,
should go in as a true mandatory under the League of Nations, and for a limited
term. Anything else would be a betrayal of the Syrian people. It needs to be
emphasized, too, that under a true mandatory for Syria, all the legitimate
interests of all the nations in Syria would be safeguarded. In particular, there
is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be
severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory power, or in an
independent Syria.
There remains only to be added, that if France feels so
intensely concerning her present claims in Syria, as to threaten all cordial
relations among the Allies, it is of course possible to give her a mandate over
the Lebanon (not enlarged), separated from the rest of Syria, as is desired by
considerable groups in that region. For reasons already given, the Commissioners
cannot recommend this course, but it is a possible arrangement. | Document Text | EXCERPT
1. We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict
harmony with our instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of
one or more powers) is brought into Syria, should come in, not at all as a
colonizing Power in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatory under the
League of Nations, with the clear consciousness that "the well-being and
development" of the Syrian people form for it a "sacred trust."
(1) To this end the mandate should have a limited term, the
time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of
all the facts as brought out from year to year, in the annual reports of the
Mandatory to the League or in other ways.
(2) The Mandatory Administration should have, however, a period
and power sufficient to ensure the success of the new State; and especially to
make possible carrying through important educational and economic undertakings,
essential to secure founding of the State.
(3) The Mandatory Administration should be characterized from
the beginning by a strong and vital educational emphasis, in clear recognition
of the imperative necessity of education for the citizens of a democratic state,
and the development of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation of
national spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which has only
recently come to self-consciousness.
(4) The Mandatory should definitely seek, from the beginning of
its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to independent self-government as
rapidly as conditions allow, by setting up all the institutions of a democratic
state, and by sharing with them increasingly the work of administration, and so
forming gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly in the
progress of the country, and forming at the same time a large group of
disciplined civil servants.
(5) The period of "tutelage" should not be unduly prolonged,
but independent self-government should be granted as soon as it can safely be
done; remembering that the primary business of government is not the
accomplishment of certain things, but the development of citizens.
(6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatory in a country
like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete religious liberty is
ensured, both in the constitution and in the practice of the state, and that a
jealous care is exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is more
vital than this for the enduring success of the new Arab State.
(7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount of
indebtedness on the part of the new State should be avoided, as well as any
entanglements financially with the affairs of the Mandatory Power. On the other
hand the legitimate established privileges of foreigners such as rights to
maintain schools, commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject
to review and modification under the authority of the League of Nations in the
interest of Syria. The Mandatory Power should not take advantage of its position
to force a monopolistic control at any point to the detriment either of Syria or
of other nations; but it should seek to bring the new State as rapidly as
possible to economic independence as well as to political independence.
Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of the
Commission, the fulfillment of at least the conditions now named should be
assured, if the Peace Conference and the League of Nations are true to the
policy of mandatories already embodied in "The Covenant of the League of
Nations." This should effectively guard the most essential interests of Syria,
however the machinery of administration is finally organized. The Damascus
Congress betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country would
become, though under some other name, simply a colonial possession of some other
Power. That fear must be completely allayed.
2. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Syria be
preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the
people of Syria.
(1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too
small, and the economic, geographic, racial and language unity too manifest, to
make the setting up of independent states within its boundaries desirable, if
such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in
language, culture, traditions, and customs.
(2) This recommendation is in line with important "general
considerations" already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations,
as well as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.
(3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a
special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general
allotted.
The Commissioners believe, however, that the claim of the
Damascus Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either
historically or by commercial or language relations. The line between the
Arabic-speaking and the Turkish speaking populations would quite certainly class
Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has no such need of
further sea coast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.
(4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of Syria,
the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon, which have already had a
measure of independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity,
undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy, and especially in the
case of strongly unified groups. Even the "Damascus Program" which presses so
earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government "on broad
decentralization principles."
Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and
autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate
aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary, it
may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations with
the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the State,
rather than entirely independent of it.
As a predominantly Christian country, too, Lebanon naturally
fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she
would have a four-fold safeguard: her own large autonomy; the presence of a
strong Mandatory for the considerable period in which the constitution and
practice of the new State would be forming; the oversight of the League of
Nations, with its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of
minorities; and the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity
of such a state, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations.
Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if
Christians were present in the state in considerable numbers, rather than
largely segregated outside the state, as experience of the relations of
different religious faiths in India suggests.
As a predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted
that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful
influence if she were within the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs,
and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own
narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of
Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the
more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar statement might be
made for Palestine; though, as "the holy Land" for Jews and Christians and
Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique
treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed
more particularly in connection with the recommendation concerning Zionism.
3. We recommend, in the third place, that Syria be. placed
under on[e] Mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient
unity.
(1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria
among several mandatories, even if existing national unity were recognized; or
to attempt a joint mandatory of the whole on the commission plan:—neither of
these courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote
the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people. It is
conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to some such
form of divided mandate; but it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from
the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as considerations
already urged indicate.
(2) It is not to be forgotten, either, that, however they are
handled politically, the people of Syria are there, forced to get on together in
some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another-the Arabs of the East
and the people of the Coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped
or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations, by a
single mandatory? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of
difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent fragments.
And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the
relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable.
But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates the differences
and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern social
consciousness points to the necessity of understanding "the other half," as it
can be understood only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local
autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatory ought to form a
constant and increasingly effective help to unity of feeling throughout the
state, and ought to steadily improve group relations.
The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often
insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among
various groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the
Turkish Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes
plain that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike,
not their exploitation, decent human relations are pretty certain to prevail,
and a permanent foundation for such relations to be secured--a foundation which
could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic
groups.
The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good
of all groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole of Syria under a
single mandate.
4. We recommend, in the fourth place, that Emir Feisal be made
the head of the new united Syrian State.
(1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the
representative Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there
seems to be no reason to doubt that the great majority of the population of
Syria sincerely desire to have Emir Feisal as ruler.
(2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems
naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their long training under tribal
conditions, and with their traditional respect for their chiefs. They seem to
need, more than most people, King as the personal symbol of the power of the
State.
(3) Emir Feisal has come, too, naturally into his present place
of power, and there is no one else who could well replace him, He had the great
advantage of being the son of the Sherif of Mecca, and as such honored
throughout the Moslem world. He was one of the prominent Arab leaders who
assumed responsibility for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in
the complete deliverance of the Arab-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. He
was consequently hailed by the "Damascus Congress" as having "merited their full
confidence and entire reliance." He was taken up and supported by the British as
the most promising candidate for the headship of the new Arab State-an Arab of
the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through his Sherifian connection,
and through his broad sympathies with the best in the Occident. His relations
with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly, and his kingdom would not be
threatened from that side. He undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to
the Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the East; but no man can be
named who would have a stronger general appeal. He is tolerant and wise,
skillful in dealing with men, winning in manner, a man of sincerity, insight,
and power. Whether he has the full strength needed for his difficult task it is
too early to say; but certainly no other Arab leader combines so many elements
of power as he, and he will have invaluable help throughout the mandatory
period.
The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the fact
that an Arab of such qualities is available for the headship of this new state
in the Near East.
5. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of
the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews,
looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.
(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds
predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the
force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the
Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.
(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on
the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences
much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw
something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the
aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the
devotion of many of the colonists, and for their success, by modem methods, in
overcoming great natural obstacles.
(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement
had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted
statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however,
the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to-favoring "the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine"—it can hardly
be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified. For a
"national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine into
a Jewish State; nor ran the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished
without the gravest trespass upon the "civil and religious rights of existing
non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The fact came out repeatedly in the
Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked
forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish
inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.
In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the
following principle as one of the four great "ends for which the associated
peoples of the world were fighting": "The settlement of every question, whether
of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political
relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the
people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or
advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement
for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery." If that principle is to
rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what
is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish
population of Palestine-nearly nine-tenths of the whole-are emphatically against
the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon
which the population of Palestine was more agreed than upon this. To subject a
people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and
social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the
principle just quoted, and of the peoples' rights, though it kept within the
forms of law.
It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist
program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people
throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent--1350
in all--of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the
Zionist program. Only two requests-those for a united Syria and for
independence-had a larger support. This general feeling was only voiced by the
"General Syrian Congress," in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of their
statement [paras. 7, 8, 10, Doc. 251....
The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that
the Anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine
and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer,
consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be
carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought a force of
not less than fifty thousand soldiers would be required even to initiate the
program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the
Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and
Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary, but
they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious
injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives,
that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand
years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.
There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored,
if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish state,
however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact
that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike.
Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much
concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those
conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these
matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible
intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either
Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the
Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: the places which are most sacred to
Christians-those having to do with Jesus-and which are also sacred to Moslems,
are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible,
under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have
these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still
other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this
point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three
religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory
custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that
the precise meaning, in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of
Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist
program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish
feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to
Palestine as "the Holy Land."
In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of
sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that
only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and
even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish
immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making
Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.
There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be
included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the
holy places being cared for by an International and Inter-religious Commission,
somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and of
the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this
Commission.
6. The Recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity
of recommending what Power shall undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.
(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the
qualifications, ideally to be desired in this Mandatory Power: First of all it
should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing to enter heartily
into the spirit of the mandatory system, and its possible gift to the world, and
so be willing to withdraw after a reasonable period, and not seek selfishly to
exploit the country. It should have a passion for democracy, for the education
of the common people and for the development of national spirit. It needs
unlimited sympathy and patience in what is practically certain to be a rather
thankless task; for no Power can go in, honestly to face actual conditions (like
landownership, for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without making
many enemies. It should have experience in dealing with less developed peoples,
and abundant resources in men and money.
(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications,
certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these qualifications
that has not been more or less definitely indicated in our conferences with the
Syrian people and they certainly suggest a new stage in the development of the
self-sacrificing spirit in the relations of peoples to one another. The Power
that undertakes the single mandate for all Syria, in the spirit of these
qualifications, will have the possibility of greatly serving not only Syria but
the world, and of exalting at the same time its own national life. For it would
be working in direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the war, and give
proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And that would mean very much
just now, in enabling the nations to keep their faith in one another and in
their own highest ideals.
(3) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30,
1919, quoted in our Instructions, expressly state for regions to be "completely
severed from the Turkish Empire," that "the wishes of these communities must be
a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory Power." Our survey
left no room for doubt of the choice of the majority of the Syrian people.
Although it was not known whether America would take a mandate at all; and
although the Commission could not only give no assurances upon that point, but
had rather to discourage expectation; nevertheless, upon the face of the
returns, America was the first choice of 1152 of the petitions presented-more
than 60 per cent-while no other Power had as much as 15 per cent for first
choice.
And the conferences showed that the people knew the grounds
upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared that their
choice was due to knowledge of America's record: the unselfish aims with which
she had come into the war; the faith in her felt by multitudes of Syrians who
had been in America; the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in
Syria, especially the College in Beirut, with its well known and constant
encouragement of Syrian national sentiment; their belief that America had no
territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian
state was well established as her treatment both of Cuba and the *Philippines
seemed to them to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit; and her ample
resources.
From the point of view of the desires of the "people
concerned," the Mandate should clearly go to America.
(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already
stated as needed in the Mandatory for Syria, America, as first choice of the
people, probably need not fear careful testing, point by point, by the standard
involved in our discussion of qualifications; though she has much less
experience in such work than Great Britain, and is likely to show less patience;
and though her definite connections with Syria have been less numerous and close
than those of France. She would have at least the great qualification of fervent
belief in the new mandatory system Of the League of Nations, as indicating the
proper relations which a strong nation should take toward a weaker one. And,
though she would undertake the mandate with reluctance, she could probably be
brought to see how logically the taking of such responsibility follows from the
purposes with which she entered the war, and from her advocacy of the League of
Nations.
(5) There is the further consideration, that America could
probably come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at least, with less
friction than any other Power. The great majority of Syrian people, as has been
seen, favor her coming, rather than that of any other power. Both the British
and the French would find it easier to yield their respective claims to America
than to each other. She would have no rival imperial interests to press. She
would have abundant resources for the development of the sound prosperity of
Syria; and this would inevitably benefit in a secondary way the nations which
have had closest connection with Syria, and so help to keep relations among the
Allies cordial. No other Power probably would be more welcome, as a neighbor, to
the British, with their large interests in Egypt, Arabia, and Mesopotamia; or to
the Arabs and Syrians in these regions; or to the French with their
long-established and many-sided interests in Beirut and the Lebanon.
(6) The objections to simply recommending at once a single
American Mandate for all Syria are: first of all, that it is not certain that
the American people would be willing to take the Mandate; that it is not certain
that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially
welcome America's coming--a situation which might prove steadily harassing to an
American administration; that the vague but large encouragement given to the
Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her
large and influential Jewish population; and that, if America were to take any
mandate at all, and were to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia
Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. For there is a task there of
such peculiar and worldwide significance as to appeal to the best in America,
and demand the utmost from her, and as certainly to justify her in breaking with
her established policy concerning mixing in the affairs of the Eastern
Hemisphere. The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could come
into Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice to all the peoples
concerned.
To these objections as a whole, it is to be said, that they are
all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and that they only form the
sort of obstacles that must be expected, in so large and significant an
undertaking. In any case they do not relieve the Commissioners from the duty of
recommending the course which, in their honest judgment, is the best course, and
the one for which the whole situation calls.
The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the
logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked to undertake the
single Mandate for all Syria.
If for any reason the mandate for Syria is not given to
America, then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express request
of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate be given to Great
Britain. The tables show that there were 1073 petitions in all Syria for Great
Britain as Mandatory, if America did not take the mandate. This is very greatly
in excess of any similar expression for the French. On the contrary-for whatever
reason-more than 60 percent of all the petitions, presented to the Commission,
directly and strongly protested against any French Mandate. Without going into a
discussion of the reasons for this situation, the Commissioners are reluctantly
compelled to believe that this situation itself makes it impossible to recommend
a single French mandate for all Syria. The feeling of the Arabs of the East is
particularly strong against the French. And there is grave reason to believe
that the attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war between the
Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain a dangerous alternative. The
Commissioners may perhaps be allowed to say that this conclusion is contrary to
their own earlier hope, that because of France's long and intimate relations
with Syria, because of her unprecedented sacrifices in the war, and because the
British Empire seemed certain to receive far greater accessions of territory
from the war-it might seem possible to recommend that France be given the entire
mandate for Syria. But the longer the Commission remained in Syria, the more
clear it became that that course could not be taken.
The Commissioners recommend, therefore, that if America cannot
take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain; because of
the choice of the people concerned; because she is already on the ground and
with much of the necessary work in hand; because of her trained administrators;
because of her long and generally successful experience in dealing with less
developed peoples; and because she has so many of the qualifications needed in a
Mandatory Power, as we have already considered them.
We should hardly be doing justice, however, to our sense of
responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add at least some of
the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed and implied in our conferences,
which led to the preference for an American mandate over a British mandate. The
people repeatedly showed honest fear that in British hands the mandatory power
would become simply a colonizing power of the old kind; that Great Britain would
find it difficult to give up the colonial theory, especially in case of a people
thought inferior; that she would favor a civil service and pension budget too
expensive for a poor people; that the interests of Syria would be subordinated
to the supposed needs of the Empire; that there would be, after all, too much
exploitation of the country for Britain's benefit; that she would never be ready
to withdraw and give the country real independence; that she did not really
believe in universal education, and would not provide adequately for it; and
that she already had more territory in her possession-in spite of her fine
colonial record-than was good either for herself or for the world. These
misgivings of the Syrian people unquestionably largely explain their demand for
"absolute independence," for a period of "assistance" of only twenty years,
their protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, etc.
They all mean that whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send into Syria,
should go in as a true mandatory under the League of Nations, and for a limited
term. Anything else would be a betrayal of the Syrian people. It needs to be
emphasized, too, that under a true mandatory for Syria, all the legitimate
interests of all the nations in Syria would be safeguarded. In particular, there
is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be
severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory power, or in an
independent Syria.
There remains only to be added, that if France feels so
intensely concerning her present claims in Syria, as to threaten all cordial
relations among the Allies, it is of course possible to give her a mandate over
the Lebanon (not enlarged), separated from the rest of Syria, as is desired by
considerable groups in that region. For reasons already given, the Commissioners
cannot recommend this course, but it is a possible arrangement. |
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